LORD DUNDONALD'S SECRET WAR-PLANS.--HIS CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THEM
WITH LORD LANSDOWNE, LORD MINTO, LORD HADDINGTON, AND LORD
AUCKLAND.--HIS LETTER TO THE "TIMES."--THE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE
CONSISTING OF SIR THOMAS HASTINGS, SIR JOHN BURGOYNE, AND LIEUT.-COL.
COLQUHOUN UPON THE SECRET WAR-PLANS.--A FRENCH PROJECT FOR NAVAL
WARFARE WITH ENGLAND.--LORD DUNDONALD'S OPINION THEREUPON.--HIS VIEWS
ON THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND.
[1833-1848.]
Zealously as the Earl of Dundonald strove through nearly twenty years
to perfect and to make generally useful his inventions in connection
with steam shipping, he attached yet greater importance to another and
an older invention or discovery, which, though its efficacy has been
admitted by all to whom it has been explained, has never yet been
adopted. This was the device known as his "secret war-plans," for
capturing the fleets and forts of an enemy by an altogether novel
process, attended by little cost or risk to the assailant, but of
terrible effect upon the objects attacked.
These plans were conceived by him in 1811, and in the following year,
as he has told in his "Autobiography," he submitted them to the Prince
Regent, afterwards King George IV. By the Prince they were referred to
a Secret Committee, consisting of the Duke of York, as President, Lord
Keith, Lord Exmouth, and the two Congreves; who, on the details being
set before them, declared this method of attack to be infallible and
irresistible. Lord Dundonald was pledged to secrecy by the Prince
Regent, and it was proposed to employ the device in the war still
proceeding with France. That proposal, however, was abandoned, and
another, for a trial of the plan under Sir Alexander Cochrane in North
America, in 1814, was prevented by the Stock Exchange trial. After
that, the long peace enjoyed by England would have postponed the
experiment, even if Lord Dundonald had not been debarred from pursuit
of his calling as an English naval officer. He might have used his
secret in Chili, Brazil, and Greece; but his promise to the Prince
Regent, and patriotic feelings, that were even more cogent than that
promise, restrained him. Once used, it would cease to be a secret; and
he resolved that the great advantage that would accrue from the first
use should be reserved for his own country.
The project, however, was not forgotten by him. Soon after the
accession of King William IV., he explained it to his Majesty, who
acknowledged its value, and paid a tribute to Lord Dundonald's
honourable conduct in keeping his secret so long and under such strong
inducements to an opposite course. Soon afterwards, and during many
years, the prospect of another war induced him to engage in frequent
correspondence on the subject with various members of the successive
Governments.
"I long ago," wrote the Marquis of Lansdowne--then President of the
Council--in May, 1834, "communicated the substance of the paper you
left with me, on the important objects which might be accomplished by
the agency you describe, in an attack upon an hostile marine, to such
of my colleagues as I then had an opportunity of seeing, and more
particularly to Lord Minto, whom I found in some degree apprized of
your views upon this subject. As questions of such importance to the
naval interests of the country can only be satisfactorily inquired
into by the Admiralty Department of the Government, I should recommend
your entering into an unreserved communication with him on the
subject, which I know he will receive with all the attention due to
your high professional character and experience."
The Earl of Minto gave many proofs of his regard for Lord Dundonald;
but he was not disposed to think favourably of the secret war-plan,
and it was kept in abeyance for four years more. In the autumn of 1838
Lord Dundonald again pressed its consideration upon Lord Lansdowne,
alleging as a reason the warlike attitude of Russia. "I am obliged to
you for your letter," wrote Lord Lansdowne in reply, on the 5th of
November, "and will certainly make use of the communication it
contains in the proper quarter, if the occasion arises, which I
sincerely hope it will not. Ambitious and encroaching as Russia is
seen and felt to be in all directions, I am confident that her own
true policy is to avoid giving just cause for war, and that, busily as
she may use all indirect means towards her ends which she thinks she
can justify, she will yield to remonstrance when these limits are
transgressed by her agents. This is a course, however, which requires
to be, and I trust will be, most carefully watched."
In that interesting letter, Lord Lansdowne showed, by his silence,
that he was not inclined to investigate the war-plan; and a like
indifference was experienced by Lord Dundonald in his repeated
efforts, during the ensuing years, to secure its acceptance by the
Government. It was submitted to a favoured few, and all to whom it was
explained acknowledged its efficacy; but no more than that was done.
Its most competent critic was the Duke of Wellington, who recognised
the terrible power of the device, although he objected to it on the
score that "two could play at that game." "If the people of France
shall force their Government to war with England," wrote Lord
Dundonald to Lord Minto on the 3rd of August, 1840, "I hope you will
do me the favour and justice to reflect on the nature of the opinion
you received from the Duke of Wellington in regard to my plans, which
is the same as that given to the Prince Regent by Lords Keith and
Exmouth and the two Congreves in the year 1811, and that your lordship
will perceive, that 'although two can play at the game,' the one who
first understands it can alone be successful. In the event of war, I
beg to offer my endeavours to place the navy of France under your
control, or at once effectually to annihilate it. Were my plans known
to the world, I should not be accused of over-rating their powers by
the above otherwise extraordinary assertion." Lord Minto's answer was
very brief: "I shall bear your offer in mind; but there is not the
slightest chance of war."
For the same reason the secret plans were set aside by the Earl of
Haddington, who was First Lord of the Admiralty after Lord Minto. He
rendered considerable aid to Lord Dundonald in testing his
steam-engine and boiler, but considered the fact that England was at
peace as a sufficient reason for not discussing the value of a new
instrument of war.
Lord Dundonald, however, who knew the value of his invention, thought
otherwise. While vast sums of money were being spent at Dover,
Portsmouth, and elsewhere upon fortifications and harbours of refuge
for trading-vessels, which, in war time, could have no chance of
safety against fighting steam ships in the open sea, he deemed it
especially important that attention should be paid to a project
calculated to effect an entire revolution in the principles and
methods of warfare. If his project was feasible, it furnished an
instrument by which fortifications and harbours of refuge would be
rendered useless, seeing that the most powerful enemy might by it be
effectually prevented from coming within reach of those defences, or,
if he was allowed to approach them, could use it with a terrible
effect, to which the most formidable defences could offer no
resistance. It was under this impression that, on the 29th of
November, 1845, finding Governments indifferent to his arguments, he
addressed a vigorous letter to "The Times."
"Had gunpowder and its adaptation to artillery," he there said, "been
discovered and perfected by an individual, and had its wonderful power
been privately tested, indisputably proved, and reported to a
Government, or to a council of military men, at the period when the
battering-ram and cross-bow were chief implements in war, it is
probable that the civilians would have treated the author as a wild
visionary, and that the professional council, true to the _esprit de
corps_, would have spurned the supposed insult to their superior
understanding. Science and the arts, both of peace and war,
nevertheless, in despite of all such retarding causes, have advanced,
and probably will advance, until effects and consequences accrue which
the imagination can scarcely contemplate.
"It is not, however, my intention to intrude observations of an
ordinary nature, but to endeavour to rectify an erroneous opinion
which appears to prevail, that consequences disastrous to this country
may be anticipated from the introduction of steam-ships into maritime
warfare. I am desirous of showing that the use of steam-ships of war,
though at present available by rival nations, need not necessarily
diminish the security of our commerce; that still less need it
necessarily endanger our national existence, which appears to be
apprehended by those who allege the necessity of devoting millions of
money to the defence of our coasts. I contend that there is nothing in
the expected new system of naval warfare, through the employment of
steam-vessels, that can justify such expensive and derogatory
precautions, because there are equally new, and yet secret, means of
conquest, which no devices hitherto used in maritime warfare could
resist or evade.
"That the like prejudice or incredulity which in all probability would
have scouted the invention of gunpowder, if offered to notice under
the circumstances above supposed, may exist to a considerable extent
in the present case, is extremely likely; yet I do not the less
advisedly affirm, that with this all-powerful auxiliary invasion may
be rendered impossible, and our commerce secure, by the speedy and
effectual destruction of all assemblages of steam-ships, and, if
necessary, of all the navies of the whole world, which, for ever
after, might be prevented from inconveniently increasing. Away then
with the sinister forebodings which have originated the recent devices
for protruding through the sterns of sluggish ships of war additional
guns for defence in fight! Away with the projected plans of
'protective forts and ports' of cowardly refuge! Let the manly
resolution be taken, when occasion shall require, vigorously to attack
the enemy, instead of preparing elaborate means of defence. Factitious
ports on the margin of the Channel cannot be better protected than
those which exist, respecting which I pledge any professional credit I
may possess, that whatever hostile force might therein be assembled
could be destroyed within the first twenty-four hours favourable for
effective operations, in defiance of forts and batteries, mounted with
the most powerful ordnance now in use.
"In the capacity of an officer all hope seemed to be precluded, that
in time of peace I could render service to my country. A new light,
however, has beamed through the cloud, for in the pursuit of my
vocation as an amateur engineer it has become apparent that a plan,
which I deemed available only in war, may contribute to prevent the
naval department from being paralysed by wasteful perversion of its
legitimate support. Protective harbours (save as screens from wind and
sea) may be likened to nets wherein fishes, seeking to escape, find
themselves inextricably entangled; or to the guardian care of a
shepherd, who should pen his flock in a fold to secure it from a
marching army. No effective protection could be afforded in such ports
against a superior naval force equipped for purposes of destruction;
whilst their utility as places of refuge from steam privateers is
quite disproportioned to their cost--privateers could neither tow off
merchant vessels from our shore, nor regain their own, if appropriate
measures shall be adopted to intercept them.
"Impressions in favour of so expensive, so despondent, and so
inadequate a scheme, can have no better origin than specious reports,
emanating from delusive opinions derived from a very limited knowledge
of facts. The hasty adoption of such measures, and the voting away the
vast sums required to carry them into execution, are evils seriously
to be deprecated. It is, therefore, greatly to be desired that those
in power should pause before proceeding further in such a course. It
behoves them to consider in all its bearings, and in all its
consequences, the contemplated system of stationary maritime defence,
subject, as that system may become, to the overwhelming influence of
the secret plan which I placed in their hands, similar to that which I
presented in 1812 to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, who
referred its consideration confidentially to Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth,
and the two Congreves, professional and scientific men, by whom it was
pronounced to be infallible, under the circumstances detailed in my
explanatory statement.
"Thirty-three years is a long time to retain an important secret,
especially as I could have used it with effect in defence of my
character when cruelly assailed (as I have shown at length in a
representation to the Government), and could have practically employed
it on various occasions to my private advantage. I have now, however,
determined to solicit its well-merited consideration, in the hope,
privately, if possible, to prove the comparative inexpedience of an
expenditure of some 12,000,000l. or 20,000,000l. sterling for the
construction of forts and harbours, instead of applying ample funds at
once to remodel and renovate the navy--professionally known to be
susceptible of immense improvement--including the removal from its
swollen bulk of much that is cumbrous and prejudicial.
"However injudicious it might be thought to divulge my plan, at least
until energetically put in execution for an adequate object; yet, if
its disclosure is indispensable to enable a just and general estimate
to be formed of the merits of the mongrel terraqueous scheme of
defence now in contemplation, as compared with the mighty power and
protective ubiquity of the floating bulwarks of Britain, I am
satisfied that the balance would be greatly in favour of publicity. It
would demonstrate that there could be no security in those defences
and those asylums, on the construction of which it is proposed to
expend so many millions of the public money; it might, therefore, have
the effect of preventing such useless expenditure, and of averting the
obviously impending danger of future parsimonious naval
administration, abandonment of essential measures of nautical
improvement, and the national disgrace of maritime degradation--all
inseparable from an unnatural hermaphrodite union between a
distinguished service, which might still further be immeasurably
exalted, and the most extravagant, derogatory, inefficient, and
preposterous project that could be devised for the security and
protection of an insular, widely-extended, colonial and commercial
State."
A few months after that letter had been written, Lord Dundonald's
hopes that his secret plans would be accepted by the Government were
revived. In 1846, his friend Lord Auckland took office as First Lord
of the Admiralty; and by him, with very little delay, it was proposed
to submit the plans to the judgment of a competent committee of
officers. This was all that Lord Dundonald had asked for, and he
gladly accepted the proposal. The officers chosen were Sir Thomas
Hastings, then Surveyor General of the Ordnance, Sir J. F. Burgoyne,
and Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Colquhoun. By them the project was
carefully considered, and on the 16th of January, 1847, they tendered
their official report upon it. "These plans," it was there said, "may
be classed under three heads:--1st. One, on which an opinion may be
formed with experiment, for concealing or masking offensive warlike
operations; and we consider that, under many particular circumstances,
the method of his lordship may be made available as well by land as by
sea, and we therefore suggest that a record of this part of Lord
Dundonald's plans should be deposited with the Admiralty, to be made
use of when, in the judgment of their lordships, the opportunity for
employing it may occur. 2nd. One, on which experiments would be
required before a satisfactory conclusion could be arrived at. 3rd.
Nos. 1 and 2 combined for the purpose of hostile operations. After
mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable that
any experiment should be made. We assume it to be possible that the
plan No. 2 contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the
inventor ascribes to it; but it is clear this power could not be
retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment
would develop both its principle and application. We considered, in
the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed secret plans
would accord with the feelings and principles of civilized warfare. We
are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and 3 would not be so. We
therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 should
remain concealed. We feel that great credit is due to Lord Dundonald
for the right feeling which prompted him not to disclose his secret
plans, when serving in war as naval commander-in-chief of the forces
of other nations, and under many trying circumstances, in the
conviction that these plans might eventually be of the highest
importance to his own country."
That report was, in the main, highly gratifying to Lord Dundonald. It
recognized the efficacy of his plans, and recommended their partial
use, at any rate, in time of need. "Permit me to express, as far as I
am able," he wrote to Lord Auckland on the 27th of January, "my deep
sense of obligation to your lordship in causing my plans of war to be
thoroughly investigated by the most competent authorities, and for the
extremely kind terms in which you have informed me of the satisfactory
result. With regard to their disposal, I submit that it would be
advisable to retain them inviolate until a period shall arrive when
the use of them may be deemed beneficial to the interests of the
country, I have to observe, as to the opinions of the commission, that
plans Nos. 2 and 3 would not accord with the principles and feeling of
civilized warfare, that the new method resorted to by the French, of
firing horizontal shells and carcases, is stated by a commission of
scientific and practical men appointed by the French Government to
ascertain their effects, to be so formidable that 'it would render
impossible the success of any enterprise attempted against their
vessels in harbour,' and that, 'for the defence of roadsteads, or for
the attack of line-of-battle ships, becalmed or embayed, its effect
would be infallible,'--namely, by blowing up or burning our ships, to
the probable destruction of the lives of all their crews. I submit
that, against such batteries as these, the adoption of my plans Nos. 2
and 3 would be perfectly justifiable."
That the French, not yet forgetful of the injuries inflicted on them
in the last great war, and in the frequent wars of previous centuries,
were still hoping and planning for an opportunity of retaliation, and
that their plans needed to be carefully watched and counteracted, were
convictions strongly impressed upon Lord Dundonald in these years; and
in 1848 he had a singular verification of them. "I enclose a paper of
some consequence," wrote Lord Auckland to him on the 30th of June. "It
contains the plan which, in contemplation of war, has been submitted
to the French Provisional Government for naval operations. It is,
perhaps, little more than the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville,
carried out methodically and in detail, and the writer seems to me to
anticipate a far more exclusive playing of the game only on one side
than we should allow to be the case; but, nevertheless, such a mode of
warfare would be embarrassing and mischievous, and I should like to
have from you your views of a counter project to it, and your
criticisms upon it."
The report here forwarded to Lord Dundonald by Lord Auckland, entitled
"La Puissance Maritime de la France," and designed to show that "une
guerre maritime est plus ‡ redouter pour l'Angleterre que pour la
France," besides affording curious confirmation of Lord Dundonald's
opinions, is a document very memorable in itself. Its main idea was
that in naval warfare victory is to be obtained, not by mere numbers,
but by superiority in ships and guns. "In the present condition of our
marine," said its author, "we must give up fleet-fighting. The English
can arm more fleets than we can, and we cannot maintain a war of
fleets with England without exposing ourselves to losses as great as
those we experienced under the First Empire. Though during twenty
years, however, our warfare, as carried on by fleets, was disastrous,
that of our cruisers was nearly always successful. By again sending
these forth, with instructions not to compromise themselves with an
enemy superior to them in numbers, we shall inflict great loss on
English commerce. To attack that commerce is to attack the vital
principle of England--to strike her to the heart."
That was the view advanced under Louis Philippe's reign by the Prince
de Joinville; but it was much more elaborately worked out by the
advocate of naval energy in days immediately preceding Prince Louis
Napoleon's accession to power. "What I propose," he said, "is a war
founded on this principle of striking at English commerce. In a naval
war between two nations, one of which has a very large commerce, and
the other very little, military forces are of small consequence. In
the end, peace must become a necessity to the power which has much to
lose and little to gain. Let us see what took place in America during
the disputes on the Oregon question. Despite the immense superiority
of the English navy, the Americans maintained their pretensions.
England found out that their well-equipped frigates and countless
privateers were sufficient to carry on a war against her commerce in
all parts of the globe; whilst all the damage she could do to America
was the destruction of a few coast-towns, by which she could gain
neither honour nor profit; and so she decided to preserve peace by
yielding the question. It is this American system that we in France
must adopt. Renouncing the glory of fleet victories, we must make
active war on the commercial shipping of Great Britain. If America
with her small means could gain such an advantage over England, what
results may we not expect to obtain with a hundred and fifty ships of
war and three hundred corsairs armed with long-range guns?"
The report recommended that the naval force of France should be
organized in twenty "corsair-divisions." These were to have Cherbourg
for their head-quarters; one to look after the merchant-shipping in
the British Channel; another to watch the mouth of the Thames; and a
third to cruise along the Dutch and German coasts, so as to intercept
our Baltic trade; and all these were to be aided by a line of
telegraphs from Brest to Dunkirk, in correspondence with a line of
scouts ranged along the French coast, with orders to communicate to
the central station at Cherbourg every movement of British
merchantmen. Three similar divisions were to be formed at Brest,
charged respectively with the oversight of the East and West Indian
shipping as it passed Cape Clear, of the Azores, and of the Irish
Coast. A seventh division, stationed at Rochefort, was to watch for a
favourable opportunity of co-operating with the other six, if
desirable, in transporting an army to Ireland. An eighth division was
to watch the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and four others were to be
stationed in various parts of the Mediterranean. Three other divisions
were to cruise along the North American coast, to harass our commerce
with the United States, to intercept the trade of Canada and the
neighbouring colonies, and, in spring time, to capture the produce of
the Newfoundland fisheries. Three smaller divisions were to be charged
with the annoyance of our West Indian Islands and the destruction of
their commerce; and the remaining two were to scour the coasts of
South America. A separate and formidable establishment of
screw-frigates was to have for its head-quarters a port of refuge to
be constructed in Madagascar, whence operations were to be directed in
all quarters against our East Indian possessions and their extensive
trade.
"In addition to these means," it was further said in the report, "the
Departmental Councils should each arm one steam-frigate, commanded by
an officer of the navy born in the department. The prizes captured by
each should in this case be at the disposal of the Departmental
Councils, a portion being devoted to defraying the expenses of the
vessel, and the remainder applied to the execution of public works
within the department." "As regards the defence of French ports, this
may be best effected by flat-bottomed hulks, armed with long-range
guns adapted to horizontal firing. The chances against invasion are
greatly in favour of France, on account of the superiority of her land
force, and the facility of transporting troops by railway to the
locality attacked." "A great point will be the perfect training of the
French squadron by annual evolutions, and with double or treble the
requisite number of officers. If these suggestions are carried out,
France will establish at sea what Russia has done on land, to the
injury and restriction of British commerce, which must be seriously
damaged, without material harm being done to ourselves. This loss of
commerce will especially affect the working classes of England, and
thus bring about a democratic inundation which will compel her to a
speedy submission."
Those were the chief proposals of the secret memoir which, falling
into the hands of the British Government, so far alarmed it as to lead
it to call upon the Earl of Dundonald for his opinions as to the best
way of meeting the threatened danger. "This document," he wrote in his
reply to Lord Auckland, "describes a plan of maritime operations
undoubtedly more injurious to the interests of England than that
pursued by France in former wars. There is nothing new, however, in
the opinions promulgated. They have long been familiar to British
naval officers, whose wonder has been that the wide-spread colonial
commerce of England has never yet been effectually assailed. It is
true that the advice given in the memoir derives more importance now
from the fact that the application of steam-power to a system of
predatory warfare constitutes every harbour a port of naval equipment,
requiring to be watched, not in the passive manner of former
blockades, but effectively by steam-vessels having their fires kindled
at least during the obscurity of night. The cost and number of such
blockades need not be dwelt on, nor the indefinite period to which
prudence on the part of the enemy, and vigilance on that of the
blockading force, might prolong a war. One hundred millions sterling
added to our national debt would solve a doubt whether the most
successful depredation on British commerce could produce consequences
more extensive and permanently injurious. The memoir obviously
anticipates that 'l'usage des canons bombes, dont les atteintes ont un
si prodigieux effet,' will prevent our blockading ships from
approaching the shores of France, and that thus their steam-vessels
might escape unobserved during night, even with sailing-vessels in
tow. This is no vague conjecture, but a consequence which assuredly
will follow any hesitation on our part to counteract the system
extensively adopted, and now under the consideration of the National
Assembly, of arming all batteries with projectiles, whereby to burn or
blow up our ships of war--a fate which even the precaution of keeping
out of range could not avert, by reason of the incendiary and
explosive missiles whereby 'les petits bâtiments à vapeur pouront
attaquer les plus gros vaisseaux.' It is impossible to retaliate by
using similar weapons. Forts and batteries are incombustible. Recourse
must therefore be had to other means, whereby to overcome
fortifications protecting expeditionary forces and piratical
equipments."
The means recommended by Lord Dundonald, it need hardly be said, were
the secret war-plans which he had developed nearly forty years before,
and the efficacy of which had recently been again admitted by the
committee appointed to investigate them in 1846. It is not allowable,
of course, to quote the paragraphs in which Lord Dundonald once more
explained them and urged their adoption in case of need. The only
objection offered to them was that they were too terrible for use by a
civilized community. "These means," he replied, "all powerful, are
nevertheless humane when contrasted with the use of shells and
carcases by ships at sea, and most merciful, as competent to avert the
bloodshed that would attend the contemplated 'descente en Angleterre
ou en Ireland,' and other hostile schemes recommended in the memoir."
That letter was forwarded to Lord Auckland from Halifax, where Lord
Dundonald then was, in the beginning of August. "Assuredly the reasons
which you give for the use of the means suggested are such as it is
difficult to controvert," wrote Lord Auckland on the 18th; "but I
would at least defer my assent or dissent to the time when the
question may be more pressing than it is at present." "I would
postpone my own reflections on the 'secret plans,'" he wrote again on
the 1st of September, "and would fain hope that events will allow the
Government long to postpone all decision upon them. I agree with you,
however, in much that you say upon their principle, and am well
satisfied that to no hands better than yours could the execution of
any vigorous plans be entrusted."
When, however, as will be seen on a latter page, an opportunity did
arise for enforcing those plans against another power than France,
their execution was not permitted to Lord Dundonald.
Strongly as he himself was impressed with their importance, they
formed only a part of a complete system of opinions respecting the
defence of England at which he arrived by close study and long
experience. These have already been partially indicated. He did not
wish that his plans should be lightly made use of; but, believing that
they would ultimately become a recognised means of warfare, and that
even without them a great revolution would soon take place in ways of
fighting, he deprecated as useless and wasteful the elaborate
fortifications which were in his time beginning to be extensively set
up at Dover, Portsmouth, and other possible points of attack upon
England, and urged, with no less energy, that vast improvements ought
to be made in the construction and employment of ships of war.
Fortifications, he considered, were only desirable for the protection
of the special ports and depÙts around which they were set up; and
even for that purpose they ought to be so compact as to need no more
than a few troops and local garrisons for their occupation. To have
them so complicated and numerous as to require the exclusive attention
of all or nearly all the military force of England, appeared to him
only a source of national weakness. His own achievements at Valdivia
and elsewhere showed him that skilful seamanship on the part of an
invader would render them much less sufficient for the defence of the
country than was generally supposed. If all our soldiers were
scattered along various parts of the coast, it would not be difficult
for the enemy, by a bold and sudden onslaught, or still more by a
feint of the sort in which he himself was master, to take possession
of one, and then there would be no concentrated army available to
prevent the onward march of the assailant. Much wiser would it be to
leave the seaboard comparatively unprotected from the land, and to
have a powerful army so arranged as to be ready for prompt resistance
of the enemy, if, by any means, he had gained a footing on the shore.
To prevent that footing being gained, however, Lord Dundonald was
quite as eager as any champion of monster fortifications could be; but
this prevention, he urged, must be by means of moveable ships, and not
by immoveable land-works. A strong fleet of gunboats, stationed all
along the coast, and with carefully-devised arrangements for mutual
communication, so that at any time their force could be speedily
concentrated in one or more important positions, would be far more
efficacious and far more economical than the more popular expedients
for the military defence of England. He heartily believed, in fact, in
the old and often-proved maxim that the sea was England's wall, and he
desired to have that wall guarded by a force able to watch its whole
extent and pass at ease from one point to another as occasion
required.
Desiring that thus the coast should be immediately protected by
efficient gunboats, he desired no less to augment the naval strength
of the country by means of improved war-ships as much like gunboats as
possible. To large ships, if constructed in moderation and applied to
special purposes, he was not averse; but he set a far higher value
upon small and well-armed vessels, able to pass rapidly from place to
place and to navigate shallow seas. "Give me," he often said, "a fast
small steamer, with a heavy long-range gun in the bow, and another in
the hold to fall back upon, and I would not hesitate to attack the
largest ship afloat." His opinion on this point also was confirmed by
his own experience--most notably in the exploits of his little
_Speedy_ in the Mediterranean--and by the whole history of English
naval triumphs. Since the time when the so-called Invincible Armada of
Spain entered the British Channel, designed to conquer England by
means of its huge armaments, and when the bulky galleons and galeasses
of Philip's haughty sailors were chased and worried by the smaller
barks and pinnaces of Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and the other
sea-captains of Elizabeth, who sailed round and round their foe, and
darted in and out of his unwieldy mass of shipping, never failing to
inflict great injury, while his volleys of artillery passed harmlessly
over their decks to sink into the sea, there had been abundant proof
of the constant superiority of small warships over large. A "mosquito
fleet," as he called it, was what Lord Dundonald wished to see
developed; a swarm of active little vessels, just large enough to
carry one or two powerful guns, which could go anywhere and do
anything, to which the larger crafts of the enemy would afford
convenient targets, but which, small and nimble, would be much less
likely to be themselves attacked, and, even if attacked and sunk,
would entail far less loss than would ensue from the destruction of a
large war-ship. "As large a gun as possible, in a vessel as small and
swift as possible, and as many of them as you can put upon the sea,"
was Lord Dundonald's ideal. For this he argued during half a century;
for this he laboured hard and long in the exercise of his inventive
powers. In 1826, the plan of the war-steamers which he was to have
taken to Greece was explained to Lord Exmouth--no slight authority on
naval matters. "Why, it's not only the Turkish fleet," exclaimed the
veteran, "but all the navies in the world, that you will be able to
conquer with such craft as these."