THE FIRST CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERFERENCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS AND THE
BATTLE OF NAVARINO.--LORD COCHRANE'S INTENDED SHARE IN FABVIER'S
EXPEDITION TO CHIOS.--ITS ABANDONMENT.--HIS CRUISE AMONG THE ISLANDS
AND ABOUT NAVARINO.--HIS EFFORTS TO REPRESS PIRACY.--HIS RETURN TO THE
ARCHIPELAGO.--THE MISCONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT.--LORD COCHRANE'S
COMPLAINTS.--HIS LETTERS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALLIED POWERS,
ACQUITTING HIMSELF OF COMPLICITY IN GREEK PIRACY.--HIS FURTHER
COMPLAINTS TO THE GOVERNMENT.--HIS RESOLUTION TO VISIT ENGLAND.--HIS
LETTER TO COUNT CAPODISTRIAS EXPLAINING AND JUSTIFYING THAT
RESOLUTION.--HIS DEPARTURE FROM GREECE, AND ARRIVAL AT PORTSMOUTH.--HIS
LETTER TO M. EYNARD.
[1827-1828.]
Heartily rejoicing at the benefit conferred on Greece by the battle
of Navarino, Lord Cochrane could not but be troubled to think that the
overthrow of the Turkish and Egyptian fleet, which he had laboured so
zealously to effect, and which, had he received any adequate support
from the Government or the people, would have been a work as easy for
him as the enterprises in which he had been so notably successful in
former times and other countries, had to be done by the officers and
ships of foreign nations instead of by him and the native fleet of
which, by name, he was commander-in-chief. The battle being won,
however, he tried, with no flagging of his energy, to complete the
triumph that had been thus begun, and, if anything was easy to a
people so wanting in patriotism, made easier.
He was at Poros at the time of the battle. On his way thither he had
fallen in with the _Enterprise_, the first of the steamers built in
England, and which, with others that never were completed at all,
ought to have been completed nearly two years before. The _Enterprise_
had been so badly constructed, that now that she arrived, she was of
very little use. Lord Cochrane was now trying to improve her sailing
powers, and at the same time attempting to collect a really manageable
crew for the _Hellas_, and to bring together other vessels fit for
naval work. In these labours there was no less difficulty than had
befallen him on former occasions. The _Hellas_ was in want of water;
but the inhabitants of Poros refused to supply it, on the plea that
they had no more than was needed for their lemon-gardens. Some
carpentering was urgently needed by the _Enterprise_; but, as it had
to be done on Sunday, the workmen declined to touch a hammer,
notwithstanding the exhortations of a priest who promised them
absolution, and even threatened to excommunicate them if they failed
in their duty to the country in this pressing time of its necessity.
Of those sorts were the obstacles that occurred each day, and rendered
futile all the efforts of Lord Cochrane and his officers.
On the 27th of October, Lord Cochrane again set sail from Poros in the
_Hellas_, accompanied by the _Sauveur_, and the corvette which he had
lately taken from the Turks, to which the name of _Hydra_ was now
given, and proceeded to Chios. That island, the scene of previous
disasters, had since 1822 been left in the hands of the Turks. Colonel
Fabvier was now attempting to recover it for Greece, and Lord Cochrane
entered heartily into the work. He arrived on the 30th, and spent two
days in vigorous co-operation with the land force that had reached the
island a day before. His share in this enterprise, however, was brief.
He was visited on the 2nd of November first by Captain Le Blanc,
bearing a message from Admiral de Rigny, and afterwards by Captain
Hamilton, who produced a copy of a letter addressed on the 24th of
October to the Legislative Assembly by the Admirals of the three
allied powers. "We will not suffer Greece," they there said, "to send
any expedition to cruise or blockade, except between Lepanto and Volo,
comprehending Salamis, Egina, Hydra, and Spetzas. We will not suffer
the Greeks to carry insurrection into either Chios or Albania, and, by
so doing, to expose the inhabitants to the cruel reprisals of the
Turks. We regard as null and void all letters of marque given to
cruisers found beyond the above limits; and the ships-of-war of the
allied powers will everywhere have orders to detain them. There
remains no longer any pretence for them. The maritime armistice is, in
fact, observed on the side of the Turks, since their fleet no longer
exists. Take care of yours, for we will destroy it also, if the case
requires it, to put an end to a system of maritime pillage which will
end by putting you out of the protection of the law of nations."
By that letter, Lord Cochrane was constrained to abandon his intended
work at Chios. He could excuse the angry terms in which it was
couched, since the anger was only directed against the same
unpatriotic conduct which he had all along been denouncing. He was
painfully aware that, with the exception of his own flag-ship and the
few vessels commanded by English officers, his fleet was chiefly
composed of pirates, who only took temporary service under the
national flag in order to fill up their idle time, or to make their
public service an occasion for further clandestine pursuit of their
lawless avocations. From the first he had persistently and fiercely
denounced this piracy, and from the day on which he had heard of the
victory at Navarino he had resolved to make it a special business to
do all in his power to root out the evil. "The destruction of the
Ottoman fleet by that of the allied powers," he had said in a
proclamation dated the 29th of October, "having delivered the Greek
fleet from the cares which had necessarily occupied its attention, and
the commander of the maritime forces of Greece having the right to
take due measures for the extinction of piracy, to preserve the honour
of the State, and to protect the people and property of friendly
nations, it is now made known that ships of less than a hundred tons'
burden are not to have arms on board, unless they are first provided
with express commissions, so registered, and numbered in such a manner
that the number shall be conspicuously noted on the ship. All other
vessels of the size defined which shall be found at sea with arms will
be considered as pirates, and the crews shall be brought to trial,
and, if found guilty, be executed."
For the brief remainder of his service in Greece, indeed, Lord
Cochrane made it his principal duty to do all in his power towards the
suppression of piracy. The admirals of the allies having insisted that
the Greek vessels should do nothing but watch their own coasts within
a distance of twelve miles from the shore, he proceeded to the
southern part of the Morea, making only a short tour, in order to meet
the primates of Samos, Naxia, Paros, Candia, and other islands, and
ascertain from them the condition of the people and their power of
resistance to the Turks and to their piratical enemies of their own
race. The information gained by him was not satisfactory. He found
that here, as in the mainland and the nearer islands, patriotism was
weak and misrule oppressive. Everywhere the people were the victims of
their own want of patriotism and of the tyranny of foes, both Moslem
and Christian.
He was off Cerigo on the 15th of November. There, having heard that
the residue of the Turkish and Egyptian fleet was preparing to put to
sea with all the available force, apparently to carry on the war in
Candia, he at once sailed on to the south-eastern promontory of the
Morea, and, during a fortnight, maintained the blockade on both sides
of Navarino, between Coron and Prodana. There also he was able to
carry on his war against pirates. "The _Hellas_ being off the island
of Prodana, a few miles to the north of Navarino," he reported to the
Government, describing an important adventure of the 21st of November,
"I sent two boats for the purpose of procuring wood from the island.
The boats, being fired upon from persons near to some vessels in a
cove, returned with a report that there were Turks upon the island. In
consequence of this report, the corvette _Hydra_ was directed to enter
by the northern passage, whilst the _Hellas_ entered to the southward
of the island, and both vessels anchored opposite to the place where
the supposed Turkish vessels were at anchor. It was immediately
perceived, however, that the vessels were not Turkish, and, on
examination, one proved to be a schooner under the Greek flag. It was
soon discovered that a Dutch vessel at anchor in the same port had
been seized, without the slightest pretence, by the schooner and
plundered of almost everything that could be removed, and, moreover,
that the captain and crew had been most barbarously flogged, for the
purpose of ascertaining where the proceeds of the outward cargo were
deposited."
Lord Cochrane wrote to the same effect to the Governor of Zante. "I
have left the piratical vessel with a petty officer and sufficient
crew to blockade Prodana, until you can send and seize the pirates,
should you think proper, as they have been plundering and annoying the
trade of the Ionian Islands. I send two of the pirates in irons, in
order that, obtaining further information, you may deal with them and
with the others according to the law of nations."
That instance of the policy adopted by Lord Cochrane will help to show
how he set himself to put down piracy. The work was not easy, as the
lawless conduct was secretly authorised by the Government, and
practised with very little secresy by great numbers of the national
vessels. It was in vain that he issued the proclamation of the 27th of
October, that has been quoted; in vain, too, that he sent two gunboats
to visit all the principal ports, with fresh injunctions against
piracy and with authority to compel obedience to those injunctions, if
necessary, by force. Good work, however, was done by these gunboats,
in conjunction with two brigs detached for the purpose, in escorting
neutral trading vessels through the waters most infested by the
sea-robbers.
Slowly and painfully the conviction was forced upon Lord Cochrane
that, after all his previous failures in attempting to turn the
lawless Greeks into honest patriots and to convert their ill-manned
ships into members of an efficient navy, his labours were now more
useless than ever. After a fortnight's cruising about Navarino, he
retraced his course and anchored, on the 3rd of December, off Egina,
where the so-called Government was then located. To it he wrote on
that day, asking for directions as to his mode of procedure. "The
squadron under my command," he said, "has been in the blockade of
Coron, Modon, and Navarino, and I have to inform your excellencies
that there yet exists in the port of Navarino a naval force, under the
Turkish flag, superior to the force under my command. I have,
therefore, felt it my duty to repair to this port, in order that I may
obtain instructions for my guidance, more especially as the Turkish
squadron is ready for sea, and said to be destined for Candia, with
ten thousand men, intending there to repeat the barbarities which the
want of provisions in the Morea renders it impossible they can longer
perpetrate in that quarter. There is also a great number of captive
women and children about to be transported as slaves, and the only
force of the allied powers off Navarino consists of a small brig, the
_Pelican_, which is totally inadequate to impede the naval operations
of the Turks. Under these circumstances, I beg to be explicitly
informed whether I am to consider that 'the armistice _de facto_'
continues, and if you have any doubt on the subject that you will be
pleased candidly to inform me, that I may not be led into error and so
increase the evils by doing anything in opposition to the intentions
of the allied powers."
That letter was answered by a personal visit from the members of the
Government, when Lord Cochrane was informed that the triumvirate was
so embarrassed by the demands of the allied powers for restitution on
account of piracies committed with its approval that it could neither
do nor sanction anything at all. He was told that even the scanty
means that he had had for supporting the fleet out of the revenues of
the islands could no longer be allowed to him, as every dollar that
could any how be collected would be required for other purposes.
Still, however, the Government expected him to continue his work, and
he was even asked to do work from which, both for his own honour and
in the interests of Greece, he felt bound to abstain. "I have received
your letter," he wrote to the Secretary, about ten days afterwards,
from Poros, "informing me that it is the desire of the Government that
a national vessel shall be despatched to Chios, in the event of my
being prevented from personally proceeding in the _Hellas_ to that
island. In reply to this intimation, I have to state to you that it is
impossible for me, consistently with the duties which I owe to Greece,
to place the national squadron, whilst it shall continue under my
command, or any part thereof, under circumstances to be treated by the
ships-of-war of the allied powers after the manner set forth in the
letter of the 24th of October, addressed by the three admirals to the
Legislative Assembly,--a determination which is even more painful to
me than the grief I feel at finding myself involved, notwithstanding
all my precautions, in the restrictions and penalties justly laid upon
privateers and pirates. I cannot trust myself to say more on this
subject, lest I should be led by my feelings to pass the bounds which
I prescribe to myself as an officer when treating of the conduct of
the Government which he serves. If Chios remains unprotected, if
Candia is deprived of the aid it might receive from the national
marine, and if the ships-of-war are incapacitated from extending the
bounds of Greece, I have the consolation of knowing that I have used
my utmost endeavours to prevent the evils I foresaw. One of these,
however, I was far from anticipating,--namely, that the revenues which
I was authorised to collect for the service of the marine would have
been withdrawn from my control and expended for other purposes; more
particularly that sums so diverted should be placed to the account of
the marine, without the objects for which they were employed having
received my sanction or even been known by me.
"I have struggled during eight months in the service of Greece against
difficulties far greater than all I ever encountered before; and I
would most willingly continue to contend with these, did I find the
slightest co-operation in any quarter. But, as the Government has
withdrawn _de facto_ the resources decreed, and the seamen decline to
embark without pay in advance, and the funds, arising from the
philanthropy of other European nations, which supplied the navy with
the means of subsistence, are wholly exhausted, I have no alternative
but to lay the ships up in port, until means to defray the expenses of
the navy shall be found. I have myself, during the last month, paid
the Greeks in the naval service; but whilst I see that even the share
of prizes claimed by Government is diverted from its proper use, I
shall not continue to be answerable for future expenses, nor for the
liquidation of the just claims of the foreign officers, which they
have had the patience to leave in arrears for many months."
It had come to this. Lord Cochrane had been devoting all his energies
to the service of Greece; and now he found himself deserted by his
employers, or only retained in the hope that he would be an unpaid
agent in piratical and lawless proceedings.
That last circumstance was to him the most painful of all. Having done
his utmost to restrain the piracy that was rife, he was still regarded
by the governing triumvirate as only the most powerful instrument for
achievements that were little better than piratical; and the same cruel
misrepresentation of his functions was common among his enemies in
England and other parts of Europe. Colour for this misrepresentation
appeared in the celebrated letter written by the three admirals on the
24th of October, which, describing the national fleet as a mere crowd
of "Greek corsairs," by implication included Lord Cochrane and his
English supporters in the same opprobrium. This had not at first been
perceived by him. On his detecting the insult, he wrote to the
representatives of the three powers three letters, which here need to
be quoted in his justification.
The first was addressed, on the 13th of December, to Captain Le Blanc,
commander of the _Junon_. "The silence respecting the regular forces
under my orders," he said, "observed in the letter of the admirals of
the mediating powers, dated October the 24th, 1827, appearing to make
no distinction between them and the mere pirates, hanging over both
the same accusations, and subjecting consequently the former to the
restrictions wisely adopted towards the latter, makes it my duty, both
towards the country which I serve, towards the officers under my
command, and towards myself, to protest publicly and in the face of
Europe, against the interpretations to which such a document seems to
give foundation. The detailed account of the conduct of those ships of
war which are under my immediate orders, and which compose the
national squadron of Greece, will prove that no neutral vessel
whatever has been seized, driven out of its course, or stopped by them
under any pretext whatever, with the exception of such as have broken
the blockade of Lepanto, the detention of which is legalized by the
act above mentioned. These facts are undeniable. The conduct of the
officers of the national squadron has been conformable, in all points,
to the laws of nations and to the instructions issued by the admirals,
in their character of representatives of the mediating Powers. No
hostility has been committed by the national vessels against the
territory or the forces of the Turco-Egyptian Government, placed
beyond the prescribed limits of Lepanto. But, if such be the state of
things, I have the right of sending on a mission, for the public
service, ships of war beyond these limits, and, availing myself of
that right, I have despatched two (the one to Corfu, and the other to
Syra), the destination of which relates to the finances of the navy.
Be pleased, sir, to communicate the contents of this letter to Admiral
de Rigny, with whom you have communicated verbally on the subject, and
explain to him the propriety of this step, to avoid explanations with
which it is not necessary that the public should intermix."
The second letter, dated the 5th of January, 1828, was to the
commander of the Russian frigate _Constantine_. "Although I am aware,"
wrote Lord Cochrane, "that his excellency, Count Heyden, when he
affixed his signature to the letter of the Admirals, addressed to the
Legislative Assembly of Greece, dated the 24th of October, could not
attest, of his own knowledge, the truth of the imputations contained
in the said document; yet, as the public may not recollect that the
recent arrival of the Count precluded the possibility of his being in
the slightest degree acquainted with facts regarding the regular naval
service under my command, I expect from the Count, that so soon as he
shall have informed himself on the subject, he will take the necessary
steps to remove an evil impression which he unconsciously has
contributed to produce, and thus save me, in as far as the Count is
concerned, the necessity, always disagreeable, even of a satisfactory
refutation of the imputations cast upon me as Commander-in-Chief of
the Greek fleet."
The third letter was to Commodore Hamilton, of the _Cambrian_, who had
been left by Sir Edward Codrington to represent the British squadron
in the Archipelago. "The Government of Greece having acquiesced in the
offer made by the three Powers to mediate in her behalf," wrote Lord
Cochrane, "it became my duty to obey the decision of the admirals
representing those Powers, when duly communicated. But whilst my
official situation demands acquiescence on points of a public nature,
it is far otherwise when the Admirals give reasons affecting the
character of the regular naval service of Greece, in justification of
restrictions imposed by them on the movements of the squadron I
command, accompanied by threats to destroy the Greek vessels of war,
in order to prevent asserted piracy. You, sir, who are accurately
acquainted with facts, and now possess ample means of ascertaining the
truth here upon the spot, must know, or may learn, that no neutral
vessel has been seized or disturbed in her course by the national
squadron on the high seas, nor any vessel detained, except those
acting in violation of the blockades acknowledged by these very
Admirals. Is it not then extraordinary that such limitations and
menaces on false grounds should originate with persons whose high
official situations would seem to sanction imputation under their
signatures? I have told the French and Russian commanders, and I hope
you will assure the British Admiral, that I shall be loth to trespass
on public attention with explanations, to refute their joint letter of
the 24th of October, in justification of those under my orders; but it
will become me so to do unless a satisfactory interpretation shall be
given to expressions which, at present, seem even more particularly
personal to myself."
That was almost the last letter written by Lord Cochrane in Greece for
many months. Finding his position as First Admiral of the Greek navy,
without work to do or crews to direct, unbearable, he had resolved
upon a fresh expedient for attempting to improve the state of affairs.
Before that, however, he made a last attempt to gain support from the
nominal Government, and uttered a last protest against its mode of
procedure. "I have strenuously endeavoured," he wrote on the 18th of
December, "to avoid laying before you any complaint, more particularly
concerning acts done by your excellencies; but there is a point at
which such forbearance on my part would become a dereliction of my
duty as an officer in the service of Greece, amounting even to treason
against the State. So long as the evils extended no further than the
depriving the ships-of-war of their crews, and preventing the
brulottes from being equipped for service; so long as the injury
occasioned by the granting of numerous licences to privateers only
prevented naval operations from being carried on against the enemy, I
remained silent. But now that the conduct of those privateers has
brought down upon the Greek nation a threat of being placed out of the
law of nations, and has involved the national squadron, unmeritedly,
in the disgrace attached to those who have been guilty of unlawful
acts, it is my duty to notify to your excellencies that I consider all
authorities given without my intervention to armed vessels, of any
description, for belligerent purposes, to be illegal, and that I have
given orders to the national vessels under my authority to seize them,
wherever they may be found, that they may be judged according to the
law of nations." "I have been waiting with anxiety," he wrote in
another letter, a few days later, "for the occurrence of events which
would have rendered it unnecessary for me to enter into any
correspondence with your excellencies on pecuniary matters; but,
unfortunately, my anticipations on this head having been disappointed,
and the squadron being without even the provisions necessary for the
maintenance of the few men required on board the ships when at anchor,
it has become an imperious duty no longer to delay calling upon your
excellencies to fulfil the engagement entered into relative to the
appropriation of two-thirds of the revenues of the islands, which you
have thought fit to apply to other purposes."
To neither letter was any satisfactory answer sent by the authorities,
and Lord Cochrane, after all his previous troubles, believed that none
would ever be obtained. He therefore suddenly resolved to leave Greece
for a time, to go himself to England and France, and there, by
personal communication with the leading Philhellenes, to describe the
actual condition of Greece, and to see if any better state of affairs
could be brought about. This resolution he announced on the 1st of
January, 1828, to Count Capodistrias, who, having been elected
President of Greece nearly nine months before, and having accepted
that office, had not yet thought fit to enter upon it or to do
anything towards repairing the shattered fortunes and retrieving the
violated honour of the State of which he was nominally the head.
"On my return home from Brazil," said Lord Cochrane, in this memorable
letter, "I was pressed by various friends of Greece to engage in the
service of a people struggling to free themselves from oppression and
slavery. My inclination was consonant to theirs. It was stipulated
that, for the objects in view, six steam-vessels should be rapidly
built, and that two old vessels of war, or Indiamen, should be
purchased and manned with foreign seamen. The engines for the
steam-vessels were to be high-pressure, these being the easiest
constructed and managed; and two American frigates, when finished,
were also to be placed under my authority. The failure of the
engineer, through disgraceful ignorance or base treachery, in the
proper construction of the engines--the want of funds to procure the
old vessels of war or Indiamen with foreign seamen--and the retention
of one of the frigates built in North America, deprived me of the
whole of the stipulated force, except the _Hellas_. It is needless to
remark that with one frigate I was unable to effect that which has
since required eleven European ships of the line, aided by many
frigates and smaller vessels, to accomplish. Under these
circumstances, it became my duty to confine myself to desultory
operations, secretly conducted against the enemy.
"The difficulties I have had to contend with, even in these
excursions," he continued, "can best be appreciated by the few foreign
European officers who accompanied me. The obstinate refusal of the
Greek seamen to embark or perform the smallest service without being
paid in advance--the contempt with which the elder portion of the
seamen treated every endeavour to promote regularity and maintain
silence in exercising the great guns and other evolutions, rendered
their improvement hopeless; and the enlistment of young seamen, whilst
the old were rejected, has been rendered extremely difficult by reason
of the influence of the latter, and by the prejudice excited against a
regular naval service by influential individuals, whose power and
importance are thereby diminished in the maritime islands. The frequent
mutinies or resistance to authority, and the numerous instances in
which I have been obliged to return to port or abstain from going to
sea are recorded, as to dates and circumstances, in the log-book of the
_Hellas_, together with the disgraceful conduct of the crew in the
stripping and robbing of prisoners, and their want of coolness in the
presence of an enemy--exemplified on our attacking a small frigate and
a corvette near Clarenza, and by the firing of upwards of four hundred
round shot, on a subsequent occasion, at the corvette now named
_Hydra_, without hitting the hull of that vessel four times, although
she was within a hundred yards of the _Hellas_. Such was the confusion
excited by the contiguity even of so inferior an enemy. It is not my
intention to trouble you at present with detail; yet I cannot suffer to
pass unnoticed that certain commanders, and the seamen of the majority
of the fireships--in the use of which vessels rested my last
hopes--failed in their duty on the only two important occasions when
their services were required; once at Alexandria in the presence of the
enemy, as the brave Kanaris can well testify; and again by the crews
abandoning their duty and embarking in privateers, many of them after
having received pay in advance for their services. Indeed--encouraged
by privateering licenses--insubordination, outrage, and piracy have
arrived at such a pitch that these very national fireships, stripped
not only of their rigging, but of their anchors and cables, are now
drifting about the harbour of Poros. A neutral boat, detained by the
_Hellas_ for violation of blockade, has been plundered by those sent in
charge of her; and scarcely a vessel can pass between the islands, or
along the shore, without the passengers and property being exposed to
brutal violence and plunder. A darker period is yet approaching if
decisive measures are not adopted for the suppression of outrages like
these.
"I am ready to serve Greece, and to aid in any way in the
accomplishment of the arduous task you have undertaken; but, on the
fullest consideration of circumstances, I feel that I should practise
a deception were I to contribute to the belief that the few foreign
officers in the naval service can put a stop to these disorders, which
must finally involve the character of that very service, already
prematurely brought in question by the conduct of vessels unlawfully
commissioned by the temporary Government. I have, in consequence of
this opinion, come to the resolution to exert myself to procure
adequate means to execute the duties of an office in which my efforts
hitherto have been all counteracted; and I the more readily adopt this
resolution as, during the winter months, it is impossible to navigate
the _Hellas_ in these narrow seas with a crew of young inexperienced
Greek seamen, and still more impracticable to manage her with old ones
of Turkish habits. I may, indeed, add that, until the communication
addressed on the 24th of October by the three admirals to the
Legislative Assembly shall be cancelled, it is hopeless to attempt any
naval enterprise in favour of Greece, even had Admiral de Rigny not
super-added his commands 'that all Greek vessels, armed for war, found
beyond twelve miles from the shores of continental Greece, between
Volo and Lepanto, shall be destroyed.' I repeat that I have taken my
determination, not from any private feeling of disgust at the above
disgraceful restrictions brought by the temporary Government; nor from
their misappropriation of the revenues allotted to maritime purposes,
and the consequent want of pay, stores, and even provisions for the
ships of war; nor from the painful feeling that the crippled ships of
the enemy are thereby enabled to depart in security, dragging with
them four thousand Grecian captives to slavery; nor from the
impossibility of reducing their maritime fortifications, while the
Greeks, unpunished, are the chief violators of the blockade; but I
have resolved to proceed to England without loss of time, that I may
render better service to Greece. If you aid me with means, my object
as to seamen will be ensured. Sober, steady men can be obtained from
the northern nations, who will do their duty, and, since precept is
useless, teach the Greeks by example. Then piracy may cease and
commerce may flourish. Be your intention in regard to the
steam-vessels still in England what it may, foreign seamen are
indispensable to the interests of Greece and to your own; and the
expense of bringing them here will be little increased if these
steamers, fitted under my inspection, shall become the means of their
conveyance. The hardship of a winter's voyage to the North, in a small
vessel, I shall deem amply repaid if I can accomplish these objects,
expose the injustice and impolicy of certain measures, and bring the
real wants of Greece to the knowledge of a liberal and enlightened
administration."
On the same New Year's Day Lord Cochrane wrote, explaining his
resolution, to Dr. Gosse, who, of all the Philhellenes in Greece, had
rendered him most efficient service in his thankless task, and most
zealously encouraged him, throughout a long series of failures for
which he was in no way answerable, to persevere in struggling for
success. "My dear friend and fellow-sufferer," he said, "in conformity
with your wish and opinion, I have tolerated my mental load of
grievances until the new year; but as it is essential to commence it
well in order that measures may prosper to the end, I have resolved to
put my intention in execution, regardless of the officious tongues of
those of microscopic views who may deem that my time might be well
employed in balancing the rivalships of barbarous seamen or protecting
the movable stores of the immovable _Hellas_. In my present state of
official insignificance I could render no other service. I have stated
a few of my reasons in a letter to Capodistrias, for his private
information, when he shall assume the office of president. I hope
these will suffice, and that he will communicate his desire, which
shall be duly attended to."
In accordance with his new resolution, Lord Cochrane transferred the
command of the _Hellas_, and such control of the whole navy as was
possible, to Admiral Miaoulis. He left Poros in the little schooner
_Unicorn_, on the 10th of January, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 11th
of February. "The anxiety and disappointment," he said, writing to M.
Eynard from Portsmouth on the following day, "which I experienced in
regard to the steam-vessels and other means that were to have been
placed at my disposal are trifling, when compared to the distress I have
felt at finding my only remaining hope of rendering effectual service to
Greece destroyed by the impossibility of inducing the Greek seamen to
submit to the slightest restraint on their inclinations, or to render
the most trifling service without being paid in advance, or to perform
such service after being so paid, if it suited their interest or
convenience to evade the fulfilment of their engagement. More than six
crews have passed under my review on board the _Hellas_ in the course of
as many months, exclusive of those in other vessels, and,
notwithstanding all that has been written to praise the courage of the
Greek seamen, they are collectively the greatest cowards I have ever met
with. No service of any difficulty or danger can be undertaken with such
men without the greatest risk of being compromised by the confusion they
create, and the impossibility of causing orders to be obeyed. Indeed,
though styled Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Naval Forces, I have,
since the 12th of April last, when I hoisted my flag, been, in truth,
under the control of wild and frantic savages, whose acts are guided by
momentary impulses or heedless avidity to grasp some immediate pecuniary
or petty advantage, regardless of any prospect of future benefit,
however great, to their country or to themselves. To give you an idea of
the character of men suddenly emancipated from a state of the most
degrading and abject slavery, in which state cunning, deception, and
fraud, if not absolutely requisite, were convenient and profitable, of
their present arrogancy, ignorance, despotism, and cruelty, when safe
opportunity offers for revenge, would require that a diary should be
laid before you of events which have actually occurred. The confidence
you were pleased to repose in me, and the friendly offices for which I
am indebted to you would have imposed upon me the task of transmitting
to you such detail, had the state of my mind, harassed by constant
contrarieties, permitted.
"Leaving to a future period, then, minute recital of distressing
occurrences, permit me to make a few observations as to the course
that appears to be necessary to be pursued in order to save Greece
from impending ruin:--1st. The chief leaders of the different factions
should be removed from Greece,--those who have education, on missions
to different states, as envoys, consuls, etc., and the others, as
circumstances will permit. Else Greece will be a theatre of plunder
and discord whilst they hold authority or have means to interfere in
public affairs. 2ndly. Troops to the amount of four thousand, at
least, are required to enforce obedience to salutary laws and
regulations. 3rdly. Five hundred seamen from the northern nations of
Europe or North America are indispensable for the suppression of
piracy and to prevent the plunder of the islands. 4thly. Young Greek
seamen should be employed by the civilized nations in their vessels of
war and commerce. 5thly. The settlement of persons from all quarters
of Europe, in numbers affording mutual protection, should be
encouraged. Of course education at home, but more especially abroad,
will improve the rising generation. For all those people now at the
age of maturity in Greece there is no hope of amelioration. In regard
to myself, I am ready, according to my engagement, to render any
service in my power to Greece, and I shall feel great satisfaction if
I am enabled to do so; but it is no part of my contract to place
myself under the control of lawless savages. What might we not have
done had the steam-vessels and five hundred good seamen been employed
in Greece, when, with these barbarians, we have doubled the number of
Greek national vessels of war, and destroyed twice as many of the
enemy's squadron? I hope the President Capodistrias will not put his
foot on shore in Greece, unless accompanied by a military force. If he
does, he will afford corroborative proof of the impossibility of
establishing a new order of things by the instrumentality of men who
feel interested in the continuance of ancient habits and abuses."[12]
[12] See Appendix.