THE SIEGE OF ATHENS.--THE DEFENDERS OF THE ACROPOLIS.--THE EFFORTS OF
GORDON AND KARAœSKAKES.--LORD COCHRANE'S PLAN FOR CUTTING OFF THE
TURKISH SUPPLIES.--THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH HE WAS INDUCED TO PROCEED
INSTEAD TO THE PHALERUM.--HIS ARRIVAL THERE.--HIS OTHER ARRANGEMENTS
FOR SERVING GREECE.--HIS FIRST MEETING WITH KARAœSKAKES.--THE
CONDITION OF THE GREEK CAMP.--LORD COCHRANE'S POSITION.--HIS EFFORTS
TO GIVE IMMEDIATE RELIEF TO THE ACROPOLIS, AND THE OBSTACLES RAISED BY
THE GREEKS.--KARAœSKAKES'S DELAYS, AND GENERAL CHURCH'S
DIFFICULTIES.--THE CONVENT OF SAINT SPIRIDION.--THE BATTLE OF
PHALERUM.--THE CAPTURE OF SAINT SPIRIDION.--THE MASSACRE OF THE
TURKS, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.--LORD COCHRANE'S RENEWED EFFORTS TO SAVE
THE ACROPOLIS.--THE DEATH OF KARAœSKAKES.--THE MARCH TO THE
ACROPOLIS.--ITS FAILURE THROUGH THE PERVERSITY OF THE GREEKS.--THE
BATTLE OF ATHENS.--THE FALL OF THE ACROPOLIS.
[1827.]
After the conquest of Missolonghi, by which all Western Greece was
brought under Turkish dominion, Reshid Pasha lost no time in
proceeding to drive the Greeks from Athens, their chief stronghold in
the east. The siege of the town had been begun by Omar Pasha of
Negropont, with a small Ottoman force, on the 21st of June, 1826.
Reshid arrived on the 11th of July, and, after much previous fighting,
stormed Athens so vigorously on the 14th of August, that the
inhabitants were forced to abandon it. Many of them, however, took
refuge in the Acropolis, where a strong garrison was established under
the tyrannical rule of Goura, and in this fortress the defence was
maintained for nearly two months. Goura died in October, and the
rivalries of the officers whom he had held in awe, now allowed to have
free exercise, threatened to make easy the further triumph of the
besiegers. The citadel must have surrendered, but for the timely
arrival of KaraÔskakes and Fabvier, each with a strong body of troops,
who diverted the enemy by formidable attacks in the rear. KaraÔskakes
and his force continued, with various success, to watch and harass the
enemy from without. On the 12th of December Fabvier, by a brilliant
exploit, forced his way into the Acropolis with about six hundred men.
He had intended only to give it temporary relief, but many of the
native chiefs, gladly taking advantage of the arrival of a body for
which, conjointly with the garrison already established, there was not
room in the fortress, hastily departed. Thus the leadership of the
garrison, comprising about a thousand soldiers, with whom were four or
five hundred women and children, and more than forty Philhellenes from
France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, devolved upon Colonel
Fabvier. The besiegers numbered about seven thousand picked soldiers,
including a regiment of cavalry veterans and a good train of
artillery. The Greek regulars and irregulars, including a corps of
Philhellenes, commanded by Captain Inglesi, who attempted to raise the
siege, varied, at different times, from two or three thousand to seven
or eight thousand.
That was the state of affairs when Lord Cochrane arrived in Greece.
That the expulsion of the Turks from Attica and the recovery of Athens
was the first great work to be attempted was clear to every one,
whether native or Philhellene, who had the welfare of Greece at heart;
but opinions varied as to the best mode of procedure. Nearly all
previous efforts had been aimed at the direct attack of the besiegers
in Athens and its neighbourhood. General Gordon had established a camp
of about three thousand men at Munychia, the hill from which, two and
twenty centuries before, Thrasybulus had gone down to deliver Athens
from the thirty tyrants; and KaraÔskakes, with some two thousand five
hundred followers, was stationed at Keratsina, on the other side of
the PirÊus. But the operations of both leaders were restrained by
Reshid Pasha's establishment of a garrison in the monastery of Saint
Spiridion, midway between the two camps; and, without wiser leaders
than the Greeks had hitherto possessed, there seemed small chance of
their chasing the enemy from his strong positions. Another plan,
feebly recommended and yet more feebly attempted before Lord
Cochrane's arrival, was to starve him out by intercepting the supplies
of provisions that were brought from Turkey by way of the northern
channel of the Negropont, to be sent overland from Oropos, a
well-fortified magazine on the northern shore of Attica.
Lord Cochrane saw at once that this latter course was the one most
likely to be of service, or, at any rate, the one rightly devolving
upon him, while General Church was pursuing his operations nearer to
Athens; and he was strengthened in this conviction by discussion on
the subject with General Gordon, who came for a short visit to Poros,
on the 21st of March, in his own yacht. To this end he laboured while
he was waiting for the reconciliation of parties and the official
recognition of his employment as First Admiral. "The fate of Athens,"
he wrote, both to Kolokotrones and to KaraÔskakes, on the 29th of
March, "depends upon our depriving the enemy of the provisions
obtained by him from the north. The general and the soldiers who first
devote themselves to this object will have the glory of raising the
siege. For myself, I offer the heartiest co-operation of the fleet,
accompanied by two thousand brave marines, and the use of all the
war-steamers and transports in any port of eastern Attica. There is
not a moment to be lost." This proposal was rejected by Kolokotrones.
On the 2nd of April, KaraÔskakes sent an ambiguous acceptance of it,
which he cancelled on the 13th. "We are so mixed up with the enemy,"
he wrote, "that if we abandon the smallest of our positions we must
resign ourselves to the loss of all. The Turks are so embarrassed by
us that they can offer only a feeble siege to the Acropolis. Of this I
am assured by several Greeks who have lately come from their camp.
Therefore, my lord, I am deterred from assailing the enemy from the
north; and I have the boldness to assure and promise you that, if you
will aid me here, Athens will be free in a few days. With the help of
two thousand good recruits, the enemy will not be able to resist our
enthusiasm. I implore you, in the name of Greece, to assist me as soon
as possible with the means of destroying him and of saving Athens."
That letter, and the advice of all in office, whether military or
civil, to the same effect, altered Lord Cochrane's plans. "As he,"
said Gordon, who afterwards blamed him on this account, "unacquainted
with the country and the language, could not form a correct judgment
on the innumerable reports transmitted to him, it is not surprising
that he was deceived by letters written from the Acropolis, and
entrusted to soldiers who, disguised as Turks or Albanians, slipped
from time to time through the enemy's lines. In these epistles,
Fabvier and the other chiefs painted their situation in the blackest
colours, carefully concealing the fact of their having provisions for
many months."[3] By them native Greeks and foreigners long resident in
the country were deceived. Lord Cochrane, still clinging to his
project for injuring the Turks by cutting off their supplies, was
constrained to defer it for the present, and in compliance with the
requests of the Government, of General Church, and of KaraÔskakes, to
co-operate in the direct attack upon the enemy in the PirÊus. "I now
agree with you," he wrote to the latter, on the 14th of April, "that
the time is past when a movement in the rear of the Turks, and the
cutting off of their provisions, could have the effect of saving the
Acropolis, and I see clearly the justice of your observation that a
decisive blow must be struck at once against the enemy. The eyes of
Europe are turned towards Greece, and on the success or failure of the
measures now to be adopted depends the support of your glorious cause,
or its abandonment in despair."
[3] Gordon, vol. ii., p. 386. As Gordon was with Lord Cochrane at the
time, and on intimate relations with him, it is strange, unless he
himself, with far less excuse, shared the error for which he blamed
him, that he did not advise him to pursue his former plan. Compare
Trikoupes, vol. iv., p. 137, who blames and involuntarily acquits Lord
Cochrane almost in the same breath.
Something was done by Lord Cochrane at once, however, towards the
fulfilment of his first design. He despatched Captain Abney Hastings,
with the _Karteria_ and five other vessels, to the Gulf of Volo and
the Channel of Negropont, with orders to seize as many Turkish
provision-ships as he could there find within the next fourteen days.
One expedition was very successful. Off Volo, on the 20th of April,
Hastings found eight transports protected by the guns of the fort. He
silenced the guns, captured five of the vessels, and destroyed the
other three. He then passed down the channel, and near Tricheri fell
in with a Turkish brig-of-war, which, after some skilful fighting, he
destroyed by shells that exploded her powder magazine. After that he
proceeded to Kumi, where he captured a store of grain, and reached
Poros within the time appointed.
In the meanwhile Lord Cochrane had gone to the Bay of Athens as soon
as he could complete his arrangements for the present and future
employment of the Greek shipping. "Four of the largest brigs at Poros
are in process of equipment," he wrote to the Government on the 16th
of April, "and five of the fastest small sailing vessels of Spetzas,
and eight transports, with a thousand men, are ready at Hydra to
proceed on service. The frigate _Hellas_ is victualled for two months,
four gun-boats have been ordered to be built, and fireships are in
progress in addition to those which were already fitted out. The
expenses of these preparations have been, or will be, defrayed out of
the funds in my possession. In addition to these disbursements, a very
considerable sum, out of the money destined for the naval service, has
been advanced by me for military purposes. I consider that the fate of
Greece depends, in a great measure, on pecuniary aid from the rest of
Europe, and such aid on the probability of ultimate success; but
assuredly it will not be afforded if Greece proves unable or unwilling
to exert herself against the handful of sickly and enfeebled Turks who
continue to besiege the Acropolis of Athens."
On the 17th of April, Lord Cochrane passed from Poros to Salamis in
the _Hellas_, attended by twelve brigs and schooners from Hydra and
Spetzas. In his pay were a thousand Hydriots, two hundred Cretans, and
a corps of Roumeliots. On the same day, General Church embarked with
three thousand soldiers collected in the Morea, under Gennaios
Kolokotrones, Chrisanthos Sessini, and others. These new supplies,
with the troops already at Keratsina and Munychia, composed a force of
about ten thousand men.
Five days were spent in organising this force, over which Sir Richard
Church, though nominally generalissimo, had very little real command.
The delay and the want of discipline which caused it were alike
annoying to Lord Cochrane, whose little fleet was anchored in the
small Bay of Phalerum, his Hydriot recruits, under Major Gordon
Urquhart, being established on the adjoining shore. On the 18th he
received a four hours' visit on board the _Hellas_ from KaraÔskakes, a
tall, bony, athletic man, small-featured, and swarthy, with flashing
eyes, and a lively tongue, about forty years of age. On the 19th he
and General Church went to inspect the camp of the famous Greek leader
at Keratsina. It gave but slight evidence of military organization,
and both officers and men appeared to Lord Cochrane more willing to
talk than to fight. His presence among them, however, stirred up a new
and fitful enthusiasm. On this occasion he brought with him a large
blue and white flag, with an owl, the national emblem of Greece,
painted on the centre, which had been conveyed from Marseilles. The
flag was unfurled in the presence of seven thousand Greek soldiers,
within sight of the Turkish camp. Through his interpreter, Lord
Cochrane briefly addressed the soldiers, urging them, for love of
their country, and for their own honour and welfare, to unite in a
prompt and vigorous attack on the enemy. Then, firmly planting the
flag in the ground, he exclaimed, "Soldiers, whoever of you will lodge
this flag on the summit of the Acropolis, shall receive from me, as a
reward of his bravery, a thousand dollars, and ten times that sum
shall be my share of the recompense to the force that accompanies
him!" Great applause, of course, followed that announcement, but not
much more than applause.
Lord Cochrane's popularity with the troops and their leaders, for the
time at any rate, was unbounded. KaraÔskakes, Niketas, Zavella,
Notaras, Makriyannes, Gennaios Kolokotrones, and all the other
captains vied with one another in offering fulsome adulation to him,
and pledging themselves to yield implicit obedience to his
instructions. By word, indeed, they were more submissive than he
wished. He had to remind them that he was admiral of the fleet, not
generalissimo on land, and that the latter office was held by Sir
Richard Church. Unfortunately, KaraÔskakes and his followers were,
from the first, jealous of General Church; and General Church,
accustomed only to the management of a small disciplined band, was
unequal to the troublesome duties appertaining to him as controller of
a heterogeneous crowd of irregular soldiers, most of them trained as
brigands, and accustomed to the half-lawless rule of their own petty
officers. Hardly a day passed in which he did not complain bitterly to
Lord Cochrane of the obstructions thrown in his way; and Lord Cochrane
had to take upon himself the thankless functions of a mediator between
a good-hearted commander-in-chief and his disaffected subordinates.
This state of things would at any time have been irksome to him. It
was especially so in the condition of affairs represented to him. Each
day fresh reports were brought of the desperate state of the
Acropolis. "The affairs of the fortress of Athens," we read in one
document, signed by seven leaders of the besieged, and dated the 22nd
of April, "have arrived at a very critical height, and no longer any
remedy is expected from within, and therefore the besieged are obliged
to address themselves to the Government of Greece and to the
commanders of her forces, and to urge them to adopt the best, the
speediest, and the most efficient measures to relieve the citadel. The
Government and the commanders have always replied with promises of the
most positive kind to raise the siege in a very few days. We can no
longer believe their word. To give you further intelligence, we send
now five men, who will tell you verbally what we cannot describe. If,
however, they do not persuade you, we tell you this is our last
letter. We will wait five days longer, and we can hold out no more. We
have been brothers, and remain so during dearth, sickness, and all
evils. Our nature is like that of all men: we can suffer no more than
others. We are neither angels nor workers of miracles, to raise the
dead, or do impossible things. If any evil should happen, we are not
to blame, nor has God to condemn us in anything." The bearers of this
letter, and others who brought a like report, were carefully examined
by Lord Cochrane, and by them he was solemnly assured that the
garrison of the Acropolis, destitute of provisions and every other
necessary, could not possibly hold out more than five days longer.
He and all others were deceived; but he alone thoroughly felt the
urgent need of instant action. "As I perceive the ruin of Greece," he
wrote to KaraÔskakes on the 23rd of April, "in the delay now taking
place, and as I have every reason to believe that intrigues are
carrying on by persons of desperate fortune and worthless character,
with a view to promote their private ends, they not being aware that
the subjection of Greece to a foreign power will ultimately destroy
the hopes which they entertain, I take the liberty of urging, as an
officer who has some character to lose in this affair, that your
excellency should caution the officers of your army against the vain
belief that intrigues at the present moment can produce any other
effect than the ruin of themselves and their country. The education
which my countrymen, in common with myself, have received, leads to an
attachment to the cause of Greece amounting to enthusiasm, and this
feeling cannot but be increased by viewing the monuments of her
ancient grandeur. I am ready to do my utmost to promote the interests
of your country, but I am by no means willing to allow myself to be
made the puppet of intriguers. I shall put an end to intrigue in the
navy or I shall quit it, and I trust your excellency will excuse me if
I adopt the same resolutions respecting the army, if you yourself
cannot put it down. I have been but a short time in Greece, but have
taken effectual measures to obtain that sort of information which is
necessary for my guidance. This has led me to the resolution to act by
myself and for Greece, so far as I can, whenever I find that others
are either disinclined or unable to co-operate. I have moved the
transports close to the Phalerum in order that they may be more
conveniently situated when I shall learn the determination of your
excellency and the officers in your camp. If that determination is to
relieve Athens the night of the 26th is passed, the marines whom I
have hired, paid, and victualled, shall co-operate; if not, I shall
try to render them serviceable in some other quarter, and I will
denounce to the world as traitors to their country those intriguers
who are the cause of the captivity and perhaps annihilation of the
garrison in the Acropolis. My advice to your excellency is, that
passing the tambourias by night, without firing a shot, you join our
troops in the olive-grove, where I will take care they shall meet your
excellency, if such is your pleasure. I have been anxious that the
glory of relieving Athens should accrue to a Greek, and especially to
your excellency. That object I am ready to promote by every means in
my power. The friendly manner in which we the other day met will cause
me to regret, if in my next letter I shall be obliged to bid your
excellency adieu for ever."
That letter to KaraÔskakes was followed by one, written on the 24th,
to General Church. "In forty-eight hours," wrote Lord Cochrane, "the
question of relieving Athens will be at a close. I have told
KaraÔskakes what I think of the state of affairs, and have made up my
mind to act accordingly; taking upon myself all the responsibility of
not looking longer on tambouria disputes whilst it seems resolved by
the Greeks themselves not to march to the relief of Athens. I have not
sent the transports to Attica to raise the miserable inhabitants at
this hour, when too late for them to be of the least use in relieving
the Acropolis. If I had done so, I should have the load on my
conscience of causing their heads to be struck off. I can assure you,
Sir Richard, that Colonel Gordon and myself laboured long ago to
prevail on KaraÔskakes to do this, but he resisted every application,
for reasons which it will be well if he can satisfactorily explain
hereafter. If your men will not come on, and KaraÔskakes's men will
not in the night pass those miserable tambourias, which in that case
are no impediment, what is the use of my detaining the squadron here?
I have viewed the bugbear of a convent this day from opposite sides,
and it is no more in KaraÔskakes's way than the church of Poros.
"Since writing the above," Lord Cochrane added, "I have received your
note requesting that six hundred men shall be transported hence to
KaraÔskakes's head-quarters in the rear. The naval funds have been
expended and our funds exhausted in bringing forces nearer to the
enemy. I am sure if you reflect on this demand of his, and that
KaraÔskakes's head-quarters are twice as far from Athens as the
Phalerum, you will be of the opinion that it would be better to bring
an equal number, or even the whole of KaraÔskakes's force here, and
endeavour immediately to do something effectual to save Fabvier and
the garrison from the inevitable destruction consequent on the present
mode of proceeding. If KaraÔskakes wants more men he wants them to
take tambourias, and not to march past them as he ought, for his
present position is of no use whatever. Do cause some rational mode of
proceeding to be adopted, or let us give it up; for we are now only in
the way by occasioning jealousy and promoting the vilest intrigues."
The "bugbear of a convent," which KaraÔskakes wished first to capture,
was the monastery of Saint Spiridion, occupied by a few scores of
Turks, who from it overlooked the Greek encampments on each side, the
one at PirÊus, the other at Munychia, with a distant view of Lord
Cochrane's station at Phalerum and of Sir Richard Church's on the
other side. Finding that KaraÔskakes would not join with Church and
press on to Athens, at a distance of about seven miles, Lord Cochrane
had urged the co-operation of all the forces at Cape Colias, whence
the way to Athens was only about five miles long. KaraÔskakes,
however, refused this plan also. He maintained that the only safe
course was to preserve his position and strengthen it by the formation
of innumerable small circular earthworks, known as tambourias, within
which the soldiers could crouch by day and lie securely on the bare
ground at night. In this way he hoped to starve out the garrison at
Saint Spiridion, the capture of which he deemed essential before any
formidable attempt was made upon the main body of the Turkish camp, in
Athens and around it, and especially under the walls of the Acropolis.
In vain Lord Cochrane urged that this mode of warfare, tardy and
expensive enough at the best of times, was cruelly reprehensible when
they considered the wretched state in which the garrison of the
Acropolis was supposed to be, and the prospect of its speedy
evacuation. KaraÔskakes refused to move, answering each appeal by
unreasonable demands upon Lord Cochrane for supplies of ammunition and
provisions, which it was no part of his duty to supply out of the
residue of the insignificant sum of 8,000l. supplied to him out of the
Greek loan for naval purposes.[4] It may be that KaraÔskakes--a bold
and shrewd man--was not personally responsible for his inactivity. His
army was little more than a commonwealth of small bands, of which each
leader claimed an authoritative share in all deliberations, and owed,
even to him, only a nominal subjection. But if we acquit him
individually of cowardice, we only throw the greater blame on the
Greek force as a whole. That it was blameworthy is clear. "Your
lordship," wrote Sir Richard Church in answer to the letter just
quoted, "is not aware of all the difficulties I had to encounter in
passing our troops who had all struck for pay. Not one would move.
However, that difficulty is now nearly over and the greater part are
passing to the camp at this moment."
[4] Trikoupes, Gordon, Finlay, and all the other authorities, say that
Lord Cochrane had 20,000l. He had only been supplied with 8,000l; and
nearly all this sum had been already disposed of in fitting out the
fleet at Poros, and paying the seamen's wages.
Unexpected boldness was forced upon them on the 25th of April. "I am
now in a position," wrote Lord Cochrane to General Church at eight
o'clock in the morning from the PirÊus, "to carry you all over to the
rear of the enemy, if KaraÔskakes's army have the courage to walk to
this point, which is in their own possession, in order to land on the
opposite shore at two hundred yards distance, and whereon is not a
living soul. I can make such a diversion by means of the seamen at
night as would enable KaraÔskakes's army to move on by land towards
the Phalerum, whilst those on the Phalerum, with the exception of a
few, might take up a position near Athens or in the town. I can embark
you and yours, and leave KaraÔskakes's men without food, taking all
the provisions to the advanced post, leaving him to starve or come
on."
That desperate expedient was averted. Two or three hours after
suggesting it, Lord Cochrane was superintending the debarkation of
some thirty soldiers, under cover of two gunboats. A party of
Ottomans, seeing the operation, hurried down with the intention of
harassing the new comers. Lord Cochrane's Hydriots, however, rushed to
the rescue. Other Turkish troops came up, to be met by other Greeks,
and the battle became general. Lord Cochrane, with nothing but his
telescope in his hand, gathered the Christian troops round him, and,
with encouraging words, led them on in an orderly attack upon the
entrenchments about the monastery of Saint Spiridion. Within an hour,
nine entrenchments were in the hands of the Greeks, who lost only
eight men. Sixty Turks were slain, and then their comrades fled, most
of them hurrying up to the camp of Athens, a few betaking themselves
to the convent.
"The Greeks," wrote Lord Cochrane to the Government, "have this day
done as their forefathers were wont to do. Henceforth commences a new
era in the system of modern Grecian warfare. If every one behaves
to-morrow as all, without exception, have behaved to-day, the siege of
the Acropolis will be raised and the liberty of Greece secured."
By this success the Turks, with exception of the garrison in the
convent, were driven back to the neighbourhood of Athens, and
KaraÔskakes was encouraged to remove his camp from Keratsina to the
PirÊus. At a council of war held the same evening Lord Cochrane urged
a sudden and united attack upon the Turkish camp on the morrow.
KaraÔskakes, however, declined to move a step further until the
monastery was captured, and, as General Church agreed with this view,
Lord Cochrane assented to it.
Early next morning the bombardment of the monastery was begun. The
_Hellas_, commanded by Miaoulis, discharged her heavy guns upon it
during several hours, with such effect that it seemed to be only a
mass of ruins. It was feebly invested by KaraÔskakes on land. But its
garrison held out with excellent bravery. Thrice the Greeks tried to
storm it; but thrice they were driven back.
In the evening the Turks solicited an armistice, and offered to
capitulate on condition that they should be allowed to retire with all
their arms and properties: and this proposal KaraÔskakes was inclined
to accept. Lord Cochrane, however, contended that they should have
nothing but bare life. While this was being discussed, the Turks
perfidiously assassinated a Greek messenger sent to treat with them,
and fired upon a boat in which Lord Cochrane's secretary, Mr. Edward
Masson, was carrying the flag of truce. Thereupon, the Chief Admiral
refused to hear any more of a compromise. Returning to his ship, he
ordered the bombardment of the convent to be resumed, and besought
KaraÔskakes to continue storming it by land.
This was done throughout the 27th, but unsuccessfully, because
unwillingly. The Greeks asserted that the Turkish garrison was utterly
without provisions and water. Lord Cochrane urged that, if it was so,
a small detachment of the Greek army and the ships of war would
suffice for its investment, while the main force marched boldly on to
Athens before the terror inspired by its recent achievements had died
out. He reproached them with cowardice, and threatened to leave them
unless they took prompt measures for completing their triumph. "The
services of the navy," he wrote to KaraÔskakes, "are immediately
required for other purposes than those of attending upon an inactive
army. My duty I am determined to execute in all possible ways in which
my services can benefit Greece. I shall therefore be gratified if, in
reply to this letter, you will inform me if it is in your power to
make the army advance, and if that advance will take place before
to-morrow night. It will give me the greatest pleasure to co-operate
with you in all manner of ways, but my desire to that effect is
rendered null if those under your orders will not conform to your
wishes or obey your commands."
To the same effect Lord Cochrane wrote, on the following morning, to
General Church. "The convent and its walls," he said, "have been
levelled to the ground. The rubbish alone remains on the southern side
towards the shipping; and it appears that not more than one hundred of
those it contained, or who fled within its walls for safety, now
remain to oppose, or assault, or threaten, the rear of the Greek army,
should you be able to prevail on its leaders to advance. I should
remind those leaders that, independently of the army, I have full
fifteen hundred men under my command, a thousand of whom, being on
shore now at this port, are more than sufficient to blockade these
ruins or destroy all within; which last event might have taken place
yesterday had it not been that the seamen were removed from the
positions which they had stormed and taken, in the neighbourhood of
the convent, and soldiers placed in their stead--a circumstance which
seems to have given them offence, so that they leave the storming of
the ruins of the convent to those thus placed, as they say, in the
post of honour. These feelings, in such minds--however proper the
proceedings may have been in a military point of view--I cannot
prevent or remove. Time, provisions, and money, are wasting in
inaction. The enemy is concentrating troops and fortifying positions
around Athens, each of which positions will be a pretext for delay;
even were I not aware that abundant excuses of other kinds will not be
wanting--such as the arrival of a few hundred cavalry from Negropont
or the like; so that I really begin to despair of one step being made
in advance for the relief of the Acropolis. I know the difficulties of
your situation, and I fear that they are more than even your energy
can surmount. When you shall have done your utmost towards the end we
have in view, I shall make one effort for the safety of the
unfortunate women and children who are threatened with immediate
destruction or perpetual slavery. Pray let me have a decisive reply as
to what is to be done, and when."
General Church's reply is instructive. "I have read your letter with
great attention," he wrote, "and fully enter into your view of
affairs. The Hydriots are unquestionably the best to storm, if anybody
will storm. The soldiers that they say have taken their post were
placed to co-operate in a general assault, and I had made an
arrangement with a chief who certainly displayed considerable courage
the other day. I gave him directions to collect a band, or forlorn
hope, of volunteers to lead with, and he is to have five hundred
dollars for himself and five hundred for his band. Had it not
rained--however ridiculous it may seem to say so--I am sure that a
storming party would have advanced yesterday evening, and I hope it
will do so to-day. In fact, the rain yesterday almost dispersed the
whole camp, and many of our outposts were quite abandoned. If the
Hydriots will advance, I will order the others away immediately. You
have no idea of my anxiety to move on, and I cannot express it.
KaraÔskakes is at this moment going round his outposts. As soon as he
returns, I shall send for him and combine with him, _bon grÈ mal grÈ_,
an advance for to-night or to-morrow. I will let you know as soon as
we have had our conference. I think, my lord, that if the weather
clears up, we shall be able still to storm, and perhaps a little
firing again would have the effect of rousing the fellows."
Soldiers who could only fight in fine weather were hardly fit to
rescue Greece in the heaviest pressure of her misfortunes. On the
previous night something like a mutiny had been occasioned by Lord
Cochrane's complaints at their inactivity. Even KaraÔskakes
sympathised with his captains. "We shall not go well with these
English," he said; "I fear they will ruin us by their impatience. They
cannot restrain themselves. But we must make the best we can of them."
Sir Richard Church, fired with Lord Cochrane's ardour, would not be
made the best of, according to the views of KaraÔskakes and his
followers. The letter from him last quoted was followed within an hour
by a brief one:--"My lord, I have the honour to inform you that I have
given over the command to General KaraÔskakes."
KaraÔskakes and the Greek officers were thus left, at about ten
o'clock in the morning of the 28th, to work out their own devices. At
eleven, Lord Cochrane received orders to cease the firing which he had
reopened from the guns of the _Hellas_. The movements which, through
his telescope, he saw in process within the convent walls and at its
gate induced him to send strict orders to Major Urquhart to withdraw
his Hydriot marines from their post near the convent, and station them
on the summit of Munychia.
The Turks had again sent offers of capitulation, and KaraÔskakes, now
uncontrolled by Lord Cochrane or General Church, and in contempt of
his positive assertion, made two days before, that the garrison had
not a ration of provisions left and could easily be starved into utter
submission, had acceded to their terms. It was agreed that they were
to be allowed to surrender with all the honours of war. Bearing their
arms and all their property, they were to pass unmolested into the
Turkish camp on the hills. KaraÔskakes must be blamed for this excess
of generosity; but, to his credit be it stated, that, having agreed to
the capitulation, he took all reasonable care to have it honourably
observed. Along the road leading from the gate of the convent to the
fortifications on the hills he ranged soldiers on either side, in
order that the Turks might be protected from the crowd of less
disciplined soldiers. All looked well as the two hundred and seventy
men, women, and children who had been locked within the shattered
building passed out of it and began their march. But no sooner was the
convent evacuated than a swarm of Greeks rushed into it, each hoping
to seize the largest share of the booty which they expected to find.
They found nothing, and then angrily rushed out again to inform their
comrades of their disappointment.
Lord Cochrane watched their proceedings from the deck of the
_Unicorn_, General Gordon and Mr. Finlay, who was then serving as a
volunteer on Gordon's staff, being by his side. "All those men will be
murdered!" exclaimed Mr. Finlay, pointing to the retreating Turks.
Lord Cochrane, not yet initiated in all the depths of Greek treachery,
turned in horror to General Gordon and said, "Do you hear what he
says?" "My lord," answered Gordon, "I fear it is too true."[5]
[5] Finlay, vol. ii., p. 148.
And so it proved. A Greek soldier, pushing through the guard, snatched
at the sword of one of the Turks passing along the line. The Turk
resisted, and a scuffle followed. Two or three other Turks raised
their muskets and fired. A score of Greeks at once retaliated. A
shadow of an excuse was thus afforded to the Christians for wreaking
vengeance for all the ills they had endured from the enemy, and for
giving vent to their anger at finding no prizes in the deserted
convent. A horrible massacre ensued. Two hundred or more Turks were
murdered. Less than seventy escaped. "Forgive me, as I forgive you,"
shouted KaraÔskakes to the Moslems, after vainly trying to stay the
slaughter; "I can do nothing more for you."
"Islanders," wrote Lord Cochrane, in a proclamation to his Hydriot
force, "I was no party to the capitulation this day. Fearing that some
outrage might be committed, I sent you an order to retire; and I glory
in the consciousness that I have saved you as well as myself from
being inculpated in the most horrid scene I ever beheld,--a scene
which freezes my blood, and which cannot be palliated by any
barbarities which the Turks have committed on you. I send you the
thousand dollars which I promised should be distributed, as a reward
for your valour and for your obedience to my directions, which you
will ever find lead to the path of honour and humanity and the duty we
owe to your country."
Utter confusion among the Greeks resulted, for a time, from the
barbarous massacre of Saint Spiridion. The soldiers quarrelled and
fought over the blood-stained spoil. The officers were occupied with
mutual recriminations and excuses regarding their several shares in
the atrocity. KaraÔskakes found himself unable to establish order, and
had to entreat Sir Richard Church to take back his surrendered
authority.
To this General Church assented on the promise that, if he did so, he
should be aided in bringing the chief wrong-doers to justice. Indeed,
both he and Lord Cochrane hoped, for a little while, that their very
misconduct, filling the Greeks with shame and penitence, would incline
them to listen to the counsels in which they both saw the only chance
of safety to the garrison of the Acropolis. "The destinies of Greece,"
wrote Lord Cochrane to KaraÔskakes, on the 29th of April, "the fate of
your army, and the character of its chiefs, are now wholly in the
hands of your excellency. You and you alone will be held responsible
for all that shall happen. The hour of clemency for Greece is past;
the sword alone can decide the contest. Courage is a characteristic of
men who deserve to be free. Let then the conduct of a few atrocious
individuals yesterday be effaced by a march direct to Athens, at least
to relieve the women and children now doomed to destruction, if prompt
exertions be not made to save them. Your excellency has hitherto
treated my friendly advice in a manner which I did not anticipate; but
the world will judge between the course you have taken and that which
I wished you, for the benefit of your country, to pursue. I shall wait
three days for your excellency's reply, when it will be my duty, if
the fortress be not relieved, to attend exclusively to naval affairs.
I hope you will reflect on the glory you may yet attain by saving your
country, and on the ruinous consequences of persevering in inaction
until the last resources of war shall be exhausted."
KaraÔskakes's only answer was that the army was in urgent need of
spades and shovels, with which he hoped that Lord Cochrane would
supply him, as without those means of making fresh tambourias he could
not move from his encampment. Lord Cochrane was reasonably indignant.
"I confess," he wrote in reply, "that I am now in despair of your
making any movement for the relief of the Acropolis, because I have
now ascertained that, all the obstacles which first presented
themselves to your excellency being overcome, others successively
present themselves, to put off the day of your march to the Acropolis.
I have made a diversion here this day in favour of your excellency,
which, by all the rules of military tactics, must increase the
relative strength of your army and facilitate its march. My time and
attention must now be devoted to naval matters, and unless you advance
this evening, I shall have deeply and bitterly to regret, for the sake
of Greece, that I ever put faith in anything being accomplished by
individuals to whom so many difficulties, which my experience has
taught me to be imaginary, present themselves. I recall to your
excellency's recollection your promises and assurances, and I call
upon you to make some effort to save your country from inevitable
ruin. I solemnly declare that it is my opinion that a thousand men who
would obey orders and do their duty are more than are necessary to
perform the task at which your excellency hesitates. I shall be
oppressed with grief if, after the scene of yesterday, I am compelled
to return, first, to the seat of Government, and next to Europe,
without having witnessed any deed that can tend to obliterate the
stain thereby affixed on the Grecian people."
"I am making my last effort," wrote Lord Cochrane to Dr. Gosse, "to
get KaraÔskakes to advance. The monastery is taken, its defenders are
destroyed, and now the sheepfold on the other side of the Phalerum is
the obstacle. We want mortars, shells, and fuses, shoes for the
seamen, and food for the mob denominated falsely the army of Greece."
The letter to KaraÔskakes had some effect. On the 30th of April,
General Church wrote to say that he had persuaded the Greek captains
to agree unanimously to an immediate movement against Athens. Two
thousand men were to go, during the following night, by water to the
neighbourhood of Cape Colias, and thence march stealthily to a hill
about a mile south of Athens, which they hoped to seize and secure
under cover of the darkness. During the next evening, a force about
twice as large was to join them by the same route, and all were to do
their best to drive the Turks from their encampments round the
Acropolis. This was Lord Cochrane's plan; and there can be no doubt
that it would have been successful had the Greeks acted upon it and
done their duty.
Unfortunately they did neither. Having promised overnight, they found
reasons in the morning for breaking their promises. Nothing was done
on the 1st of May, and Lord Cochrane, tired of their excuses for
procrastination, paid a brief visit to the authorities at Poros. The
result was, that he thought of going without the Greek leaders. "I
have seen the Government," he wrote to Sir Richard Church on the 2nd,
"and prepared them for the worst, should things go on as they have
hitherto done. They are incapable of applying any remedy. Therefore,
the more credit will be due to you if you shall be enabled to save the
garrison of the Acropolis; in which endeavour count on my utmost
exertions and most unlimited co-operation. I hope now you will be able
to act without KaraÔskakes. In addition to your own people, I can
provide two thousand marines, seamen, and volunteers. With these, if
you land at night to the eastward, you may be in the neighbourhood of
Athens in two hours; and then there is the garrison of fifteen hundred
in addition to co-operate, making in the whole a force of nearly five
thousand, without taking a soldier from KaraÔskakes's tambourias. If,
however, you judge well to have volunteers from KaraÔskakes's camp, I
shall offer 200,000 piastres amongst all who will accompany you or
meet you at Athens; by which means I have little doubt you will find
KaraÔskakes deserted, and the whole mob at the gates of Athens. All
the vessels are at your service."
Sir Richard Church feared to undertake the exploit without the
co-operation of KaraÔskakes, and, on again consulting him, he was
informed that a fresh supply of entrenching tools was necessary. Lord
Cochrane immediately sent messengers to procure them, but was none the
less annoyed at what seemed to him an unnecessary excuse, and again
threatened to take his ships where they could do good work for Greece.
"You have done everything in your power," wrote Sir Richard to him on
the 3rd of May, "and so have I. The soldiers will not embark without
the entrenching tools. All we could collect do not amount to two
hundred and fifty. I would have gone without one, but no one will
follow me. I cannot say more; but to-morrow we may be more fortunate.
I cannot say to you stay or otherwise. If you go, I cannot deplore it
more than yourself."
Lord Cochrane consented to wait till the morrow, and on the morrow an
incident occurred which caused a little further delay. On the 4th of
May a small body of Greeks, chiefly Hydriots, went on a skirmishing
expedition. At first they were successful, and they had nearly won a
redoubt, when a large force of Turks suddenly assailed them on the
flank, and drove them back to Phalerum with a loss of nearly a hundred
men. KaraÔskakes, hearing of this reverse, hurried to the rescue, and
with the bravery which was never wanting to him when in actual battle,
sought to rally the fugitives. He was on the point of leading them
back, when a ball from a pistol struck him in the belly. He was
conveyed, in a dying state, to General Church's schooner. Regret at
his previous vacillations seems to have filled his mind. "Where is
Cochrane? Bring Cochrane to me!" he exclaimed over and over again.
Lord Cochrane soon arrived. KaraÔskakes, on seeing him, murmured
repeated thanks to him for his forbearance towards himself and his
devotion to the cause of the Greeks. In his eagerness, he seized the
interpreter, Mr. Masson, by the beard, and, pointing towards Cape
Colias, said, with all the strength he could muster, "Tell them to be
sure to land the division over there to-morrow." Then, not doubting
that the expedition would be successful, he uttered solemn thanks to
Heaven that he was dying in the moment of victory. Then he made his
will--a soldier's will. "I leave my sword and my gun to my son. Tell
him to remember they belonged to KaraÔskakes." He had little else to
leave, having always been free from the avarice by which many of his
countrymen were disgraced. He died in the night, and in him Greece
lost the worthiest of her native warriors. His faults were the faults
of his nation. Many of his virtues were his own. Had his followers
been as brave and honest as he was in his best moments, he might have
led them on to easy victory. But they wavered and procrastinated, and,
in listening to their excuses, he lost his chance of triumph and
subjected himself to blame, for which his brave death only half
atoned.
On the evening of the 4th, Lord Cochrane assembled the Greek captains
at Munychia, and telling them of their leader's dying message, asked
whether they were ready to obey it. For some time they made no answer.
At length, on the question being repeated, they replied that they
thought they had only been brought thither to hear from the Admiral
words of consolation for the loss they had sustained in the death of
the brave and wise KaraÔskakes. Being asked a third time whether they
would obey the dying injunction of the leader for whom they now
mourned so much, they answered that they were not ready, that the army
was in disorder, that some of them were occupied in burying the slain,
that some were tending the wounded, and that all desired to stay near
their chief as long as the soul was in his body, and to have at any
rate the opportunity of kissing his body before its burial.
With some bitterness, Lord Cochrane replied that such an excess of
grief was inopportune, and that their love for KaraÔskakes would be
best shown in obeying his last command. He added that, if they really
refused to go to the rescue of the Acropolis, they would not need his
presence on the coast and could not complain of his going to serve
Greece elsewhere. Having said that, he returned to his ship.
He had not been long on board, however, when a messenger followed him
with intelligence that the army would adopt his plan and be ready,
without fail, to proceed to the Acropolis on the following evening.
There was no further procrastination, and throughout the next day
preparations were being made for what one historian of the Greek
Revolution calls "a whim,"[6] and another "an insane scheme."[7]
[6] Trikoupes, vol. iv., p. 152.
[7] Gordon, vol. ii., p. 392.
"The scheme," says one who was in close attendance on Lord Cochrane
all through this time, Mr. Edward Masson, "was anything but insane. It
was one of the most sober, safe, and practicable plans ever formed.
The first and fundamental condition on which Lord Cochrane consented
to co-operate in any plan of landing troops at Cape Colias was, that
the troops landed should not expose themselves to an attack of cavalry
in the plains, but should, on being landed, proceed by a night march,
in compact order, and without halting, to a specified rocky height
beyond the temple of Jupiter Olympus, a position which, it was
admitted by all, they could hold with perfect safety during the day.
From this position, the leaders were to try to communicate, by signals
or otherwise, with the garrison, and in concert with it, act as
circumstances might dictate. Should the garrison resolve to make a
sortie, the main body of the Greek army advancing simultaneously from
the Phalerum, it was confidently hoped that the combined attack on the
enemy would prove victorious; or, at least, would be so far
successful, as to enable the Greeks to save the garrison and bring
away the families. The great characteristic of the plan was, that
nothing should be risked in reference to the enemy's cavalry, and that
if the detachment should find they could accomplish nothing, they
should, on the following night, return as they went, in safety, and be
embarked for the Phalerum."
Unfortunately, the two main points on which Lord Cochrane had insisted
were neglected, and thereby what must otherwise have been a brilliant
victory was turned into a miserable defeat. He had insisted upon the
movement from Cape Colias being aided by the march of the main body of
the army direct from the PirÊus to the hills, thus diverting the
attention of many of the Turks while the advancing party and the
garrison were uniting; but Zavella, to whom this part of the work had
been entrusted, never moved at all. He had urged yet more strongly
that the preparations for the advance should be so hastened as that
all the ground should be travelled over during the night-time, while
the Turks were in ignorance of it; but instead of that, the Greeks,
though they were embarked at Phalerum by midnight, and landed at Cape
Colias before two o'clock in the morning, loitered near the shore till
daylight, so that their whole enterprise was exposed to the enemy. The
critics who have laid the blame of the disaster on Lord Cochrane have
neglected to show how these circumstances caused the failure of the
enterprise.
The story of the disaster of the 6th of May will be best told in the
words of an eye-witness. "About three thousand soldiers," said Dr.
Gosse, in a letter written to M. Eynard on the 23rd, "were embarked in
the night between the 5th and the 6th of May, in a clear moonlight,
and in the most perfect order, and promptly landed on the other shore.
Up to that time everything favoured our enterprise; but the treason
and negligence of the chiefs, and the indolence of some of the
soldiers, altogether destroyed it. Instead of marching directly to
Athens during the night, they employed themselves in constructing
redoubt after redoubt, as bad as they were useless, of the sort called
by them tambourias. We counted a dozen. Only the Suliots, the
Candiots, commanded by Demetrius Kalerdji, two hundred regular troops,
under the orders of Inglesi and D'aujourd'hui, and twenty-two
Philhellenes, went in advance. Without any hindrance, they reached
within cannon-shot of the Acropolis, towards Philippapus, so that, as
I have heard, they could even speak with the besieged; but, having
received no orders to enter, they waited until the day rendered their
position hazardous. The enemy thus had time to ascertain their
weakness and to send against them eight hundred horsemen. Thrice these
troops were repulsed. Vasso and Notaras, however, who covered the
right flank, abandoned their posts, as they had done in the affair of
the unfortunate Bourbakes, and thereby they caused confusion among the
troops in the centre. The latter defended themselves with renewed
valour, but yielded at last to the sabres of the Dehli cavalry. Then
was exhibited such a panic as cannot be described. The soldiers who
occupied the redoubts in the rear, and near to the place of
debarkation, began to flee almost at the same time as those of Vasso,
and threw themselves into the sea at the risk of being drowned. I was
at this time with Lord Cochrane, who did not wish to mix himself up
with the affair, when the sudden flight forced us at once to rejoin
our boat, and even this was not done without great difficulty. General
Church was also on the shore, and he too was only saved by the sloop
which was waiting for him. The Turkish cavalry, after having killed or
captured all the advanced party, rushed into the plain and made
terrible havoc among the Greeks. Seven hundred of them were killed;
and two hundred and forty were taken prisoners. The rest, numbering
about two thousand, rushed down towards the sea, and would soon have
been all destroyed by the Turkish guns placed on the hills if the fire
from the vessels off the coast had not kept the enemy at a respectful
distance. They passed the day in a terrible uncertainty, but were
sustained by the courage of certain chiefs, especially of Nicolo
Serva, a Suliot captain; and in the following night they were embarked
and carried back to Phalerum. While this portion of the army was being
thus troubled, the Greeks, under the orders of Kisso Zavella, remained
inactive. That chief quietly smoked his pipe, and when implored to
march, was content to answer coldly, 'When they pay me I will go.' The
troops of Kolokotrones the younger, and of Sessinis, deserted in the
direction of Livonia. The Turks, taking advantage of the disorganized
condition of the Greeks, attacked the Phalerum on the night of the
6th, but were repulsed."
Lord Cochrane's account of the battle sent to the Government on the
7th of May, though more general, supplies some other details. "The
plan concocted previous to the death of General KaraÔskakes," he said,
"was carried into effect on the 6th, by his excellency General Church,
with this difference in the execution of the service, that his
excellency and myself were anxious that a rapid march should be made
from the place of debarkation direct to Athens, by a body of four
thousand men, in order to return with the women and children and the
wounded, whereas the officers of the army insisted upon entrenchments
being made in the line of their progress--an operation which required
so much time as to preclude the possibility of effecting the object
surprised and unopposed. The redoubts were in progress of
construction, and the work continued with unremitting labour until
about nine o'clock in the morning, when the enemy's cavalry, having
collected from all quarters, broke in upon the unfinished redoubts and
vigorously attacked those who had advanced the furthest, and who, from
the number of subdivisions left, according to the custom of the
country, in these redoubts during their progress, had become so
weakened as to be incapable of making effectual resistance. The loss
on our side has been very considerable. I had to lament this day that
the Greeks still continue their aversion to that regularity of
movement and honesty of action which constitute the strength of
armies, and I grieve to see great bravery rendered useless to their
country and dangerous to themselves, and wasted in desultory and
unsupported personal efforts. The use of the bayonet and very slight
military instruction would have saved most of those who fell on this
occasion, and would have rendered unnecessary those redoubts which
delay the progress of your arms, and destroy more men in insignificant
enterprises which tend to no result, than would be required for the
deliverance of your country. The affairs of Greece require energy, and
that remedy be at once applied to whatever impedes the progress of
affairs."
Lord Cochrane testified to the excellent soldiership of the Turkish
horsemen. With sabres and short muskets, they dashed in and out of the
crowd of retreating Greeks, who, having no bayonets and no weapons
adapted for close fighting, were utterly defenceless. He himself,
having landed with Dr. Gosse to watch the operations from the shore,
was so hard pressed by these formidable antagonists that he was only
rescued by his own bravery and the daring of Dr. Gosse, who retained
possession of the boat which was waiting for him on the shore until
his chief had time to force his way back to it through the crowd of
fighting Turks and Greeks and through the waves beating up to his
neck. It was only when he was again on board the _Hellas_, and able to
direct the firing of the guns, that the Turks were driven back, and
the remnant of the Greek force was allowed to collect and prepare for
the return to Phalerum.
The fall of the Acropolis soon followed this terrible defeat. By it
the Greeks were utterly disorganized. Lord Cochrane, finding it
impossible to persuade them to another attempt, returned to Poros with
the fleet on the 10th of May. Sir Richard Church remained at Munychia,
his army being every hour reduced by desertions, till the 27th, when
he and the two thousand starving men who were left to him abandoned
their position. Fabvier and the garrison, through the intervention of
the French Captain Le Blanc and Admiral De Rigny, capitulated on the
5th of June. It was then found that the Acropolis still contained
stores of food and ammunition sufficient for four months' use, and
that their reports of destitution had been deliberate falsehoods,
intended only to force their friends outside to come speedily to their
relief.
Those falsehoods had been particularly mischievous. By them, as has
been shown, Lord Cochrane was induced to listen to the entreaties of
KaraÔskakes and the Government, and take his ships to Phalerum,
instead of carrying out his plan of stopping the Turkish supplies in
the Negropont and at Oropos. Had that plan been adhered to, it seems
as if a very different issue might easily have been brought about.
The work on which he had been engaged having terminated so
unfortunately, Lord Cochrane was much blamed for it by critics who had
private reasons for being jealous. We have shown, however, that he
only entered upon that work at the request of men whose power and
influence he could not gainsay; that, having undertaken it, he set
himself shrewdly and earnestly to render it successful; and that the
failure was occasioned, not by adoption of his plans, but by their
perversion or rejection. If he erred, he erred only in expecting too
much patriotism and valour from the people whom he was doing his
utmost to serve.
If anything further need be said in explanation and defence of Lord
Cochrane's position up to this time, it will be best done by quoting
part of a letter addressed to M. Eynard on the 27th of May, in which
he concisely repeated the whole story. "On my arrival in Greece," he
wrote, "I found that the authority was claimed by two factions, that
nothing like a navy existed, and that a number of individuals called
an army were collected to raise the siege of Athens,--but wholly
deficient in military talent on the part of the commanders, or in
obedience and discipline on the part of the troops. As soon as I had
accepted my commission, I commenced active exertions to save the
Acropolis. I advised KaraÔskakes to embark and land to the southward
and eastward of the Phalerum, and, marching direct to the Acropolis,
bring out the women and children. But my counsel was in vain, as he
had no idea of any combined naval and military movement, nor indeed of
any military plan, except that of advancing by slow steps, after the
manner of the Turks, who construct little fortifications, called
tambourias, at every few hundred yards, which are again opposed by
others of the adverse party; and, as neither army attacks these forts
by active force, the whole, after a few hours, are brought to a stand,
and the result of the contest depends on who can the longest continue
to furnish pay and provisions. Such was the state of the military
contest when General Church took the command. The battle at Phalerum,
though brilliant, was accidental, and, not being followed up, was
productive of no result. KaraÔskakes fell, and General Church embarked
the troops in order to execute the movement that ought to have taken
place a month before. The moment was more inauspicious than we were
aware of; for the Turkish commander had that very night been joined by
a large body of cavalry and a number of infantry from Negropont and
elsewhere. This, however, would not have proved decisive, had not
General Church, with a view to conciliate the officers under his
command, and indeed in order to induce them to embark at all upon the
expedition, conformed to their absurd views of military movement, and
permitted them to carry entrenching tools to form their usual numerous
positions on the line of their route, the construction of which wholly
defeated the intention of surprise, and enabled the enemy to surround
their advanced guard or van, weakened by the division of the troops
into fourteen garrisons left in a line in their advance, whereas the
whole body might, with perfect safety and in two hours, have reached
the Acropolis. The slaughter which the Turks made in the advanced
posts of the Greeks was horrible, and the panic which took possession
of those who remained on the Phalerum, at three leagues' distance from
the scene of action, was as disgraceful as the conduct of their chief,
Zavella, who made no movement even to create a diversion, but sat
coolly looking at the slaughter of his countrymen. With six thousand
men under his command he remained totally inactive. This expedition to
Athens cost upwards of twenty-five thousand dollars of the naval money
and destroyed most of our provisions. At the same time, I believed it
to be my duty to act as I did, and I have not since regretted any step
that I took, because, if Fabvier and the garrison fall into the hands
of the Turks and are destroyed, I shall at least have the consolation
of knowing that my utmost efforts were made to avert their fate."