Stuttgart.
Many large granaries have been built, in which grain is stored on open
floors, in bulk or in sacks. A notable instance is the warehouse of
the city of Stuttgart. This is a structure of seven floors, including
a basement and entresol. An engine house accommodates two gas engines
as well as an hydraulic installation for the lifts. The grain is
received by an elevator from the railway trucks, and is delivered to a
weighing machine from which it is carried by a second elevator to the
top storey, where it is fed to a band running the length of the
building. A system of pipes runs from floor to floor, and by means of
the band conveyor with its movable throw-off carriage grain can be
shot to any floor. A second band conveyor is installed in the entresol
floor, and serves to convey grain either to the elevator, if it is
desired to elevate it to the top floor, or to the loading shed. A
second elevator runs through the centre of the building, and is
provided with a spout by means of which grain can be delivered into
the hopper feeding the cleaning machine, whence the grain passes into
a second hopper under which is an automatic weigher; directly under
this weigher the grain is sacked.
Mannheim.
A good example of a grain warehouse on the combined silo bin and floor
storage system is afforded by the granary at Mannheim on the Rhine,
which has the storage capacity of 2100 tons. The building is 370 ft.
in length, 78 ft. wide and 78 ft. high, and by means of transverse
walls it is divided into three sections; of these one contains silos,
in another section grain is stored on open floors, while the third,
which is situated between the other two, is the grain-cleaning
department. This granary stands by the quay side, and a ship elevator
of great capacity, which serves the cleaning department, can rapidly
clear any ship or barge beneath. The central or screening house
section contains machinery specially designed for cleaning barley as
well as wheat. The barley plant has a capacity of 5 tons per hour.
There are four main elevators in this warehouse, while two more serve
the screen house. The usual band conveyors fitted with throw-off
carriages are provided, and are supplemented by an elaborate system of
pipes which receive grain from the elevators and bands and distribute
it at any required point. The plant is operated by electric motors. If
desired the floors of the non-silo section can be utilized for storing
other goods than grain, and to this end a lift with a capacity of 1
ton runs from the basement to the top storey. The combined capacity
of the elevators and conveyors is 100 tons of grain per hour. The
mechanical equipment is so complete that four distinct operations are
claimed as possible. A ship may be unloaded into silos or into the
granary floors, and may simultaneously be loaded either from silos or
floors with different kinds of grain. Again, a cargo may be discharged
either into silos or upon the floors, and simultaneously the grain may
be cleaned. Grain may also be cleared from a vessel, mixed with other
grain already received, and then distributed to any desired point.
With equal facility grain may be cleaned, blended with other
varieties, re-stored in any section of the granary, and transferred
from one ship to another.
Dortmund.
A granary with special features of interest, erected on the quay at
Dortmund, Germany, by a co-operative society, is built of brick on a
base of hewn stone, with beams and supports of timber. It is 78 ft.
high and consists of seven floors, including basement and attic. Here
again there are two sections, the larger being devoted to the storage
of grain in low bins, while the smaller section consists of an
ordinary silo house. Grain in sacks may be stored in the basement of
the larger section which has a capacity of 1675 tons as compared with
825 tons in the silo department. Thus the total storage capacity is
2500 tons. In the silo house the bins, constructed of planks nailed
one over the other, are of varying size and are capable of storing
grain to a depth of 42 to 47 ft. Some of the bins have been specially
adapted for receiving damp grain by being provided internally with
transverse wooden arms which form square or lozenge-shaped sections.
The object of this arrangement is to break up and aerate the stored
grain. The arms are of triangular section and are slightly hollowed at
the base so as to bring a current of air into direct contact with the
grain. The air can be warmed if necessary. The other and larger
section of the granary is provided with 105 bins of moderate height
arranged in groups of 21 on the five floors between the basement and
attic. On the intermediate floors and the bottom floor each bin lies
exactly under the bin above. Grain is not stored in these bins to a
greater depth than 5 ft. The bins are fitted with removable side
walls, and damp grain is only stored in certain bins aerated for half
the area of their side walls through a wire mesh. The arrangements for
distributing grain in this warehouse are very complete. The uncleaned
grain is taken by the receiving elevator, with a lifting capacity of
20 tons per hour, to a warehouse separator, whence it is passed
through an automatic weigher and is then either sacked or spouted to
the main elevator (capacity 25 tons per hour) and elevated to the
attic. From the head of this main elevator the grain can either be fed
to a bin in one or other of the main granary floors, or shot to one of
the bins in the silo house. In the attic the grain is carried by a
spout and belt conveyor to one or other of the turntables, as the
appliances may be termed, which serve to distribute through spouts the
grain to any one of the floor or silo bins. Alternatively, the grain
may be shot into the basement and there fed back into the main
elevator by a band conveyor. In this way the grain may be turned over
as often as it is deemed necessary. At the bottom of each bin are four
apertures connected by spouts, both with the bin below and with the
central vertical pipe which passes down through the centre of each
group of bins. To regulate the course of the grain from bin to bin or
from bin to central pipe, the connecting spouts are fitted with valves
of ingenious yet simple construction which deflect the grain in any
desired direction, so that the contents of two or more bins may be
blended, or grain may be transferred from a bin on one floor to a bin
on a lower floor, missing the bin on the floor between. The valves are
controlled by chains from the basement.
With reference to the floor bins used at Dortmund, it may be observed
that there are granaries built on a similar principle in the United
Kingdom. It is probable that bins of moderate height are more suitable
for storing grain containing a considerable amount of moisture than
deep silos, whether made of wood, ferro-concrete or other material.
For one thing floor bins of the Dortmund pattern can be more
effectually aerated than deep silos. German wheat has many
characteristics in common with British, and, especially in north
Germany, is not infrequently harvested in a more or less damp
condition. In the United Kingdom, Messrs Spencer & Co., of Melksham,
have erected several granaries on the floor-bin principle, and have
adopted an ingenious system of "telescopic" spouting, by means of
which grain may be discharged from one bin to another or at any
desired point. This spouting can be applied to bins either with level
floors or with hoppered bottoms, if they are arranged one above the
other on the different floors, and is so constructed that an opening
can be effected at certain points by simply sliding upwards a section
of the spout.
_National Granaries._--Wheat forms the staple food of a large proportion
of the population of the British Isles, and of the total amount consumed
about four-fifths is sea-borne. The stocks normally held in the country
being limited, serious consequences might result from any interruption
of the supply, such as might occur were Great Britain involved in war
with a power or powers commanding a strong fleet. To meet this
contingency it has been suggested that the State should establish
granaries containing a national reserve of wheat for use in emergency,
or should adopt measures calculated to induce merchants, millers, &c.,
to hold larger stocks than at present and to stimulate the production of
home-grown wheat.
Amount of stocks.
Stocks of wheat (and of flour expressed in its equivalent weight of
wheat) are held by merchants, millers and farmers. Merchants' stocks are
kept in granaries at ports of importation and are known as first-hand
stocks. Stocks of wheat and flour in the hands of millers and of flour
held by bakers are termed second-hand stocks, while farmers' stocks only
consist of native wheat. Periodical returns are generally made of
first-hand or port stocks, nor should a wide margin of error be possible
in the case of farmers' stocks, but second-hand stocks are more
difficult to gauge. Since the last decade of the 19th century the
storage capacity of British mills has considerably increased. As the
number of small mills has diminished the capacity of the bigger ones has
increased, and proportionately their warehousing accommodation has been
enlarged. At the present time first-hand stocks tend to diminish because
a larger proportion of millers' holdings are in mill granaries and silo
houses. The immense preponderance of steamers over sailing vessels in
the grain trade has also had the effect of greatly diminishing stocks.
With his cargo or parcel on a steamer a corn merchant can tell almost to
a day when it will be due. In fact foreign wheat owned by British
merchants is to a great extent stored in foreign granaries in preference
to British warehouses. The merchant's risk is thereby lessened to a
certain extent. When his wheat has been brought into a British port, to
send it farther afield means extra expense. But wheat in an American or
Argentine elevator may be ordered wherever the best price can be
obtained for it. Options or "futures," too, have helped to restrict the
size of wheat stocks in the United Kingdom. A merchant buys a cargo of
wheat on passage for arrival at a definite time, and, lest the market
value of grain should have depreciated by the time it arrives, he sells
an option against it. In this way he hedges his deal, the option serving
as insurance against loss. This is why the British corn trade finds it
less risky to limit purchases to bare needs, protecting itself by option
deals, than to store large quantities which may depreciate and involve
their owners in loss.
Varying estimates have been made of the number of weeks' supply of
breadstuffs (wheat and flour) held by millers at various seasons of the
year. A table compiled by the secretary of the National Association of
British and Irish Millers from returns for 1902 made by 170 milling
firms showed 4.7, 4.9, 4.9 and 5 weeks' supply at the end of March,
June, September and December respectively. These 170 mills were said to
represent 46% of the milling capacity of the United Kingdom, and claimed
to have ground 12,000,000 qrs. out of 25,349,000 qrs. milled in 1902.
These were obviously large mills; it is probable that the other mills
would not have shown anything like such a proportion of stock of either
raw or finished material. A fair estimate of the stocks normally held by
millers and bakers throughout the United Kingdom would be about four
weeks' supply. First-hand stocks vary considerably, but the limits are
definite, ranging from 1,000,000 to 3,500,000 qrs., the latter being a
high figure. The tendency is for first-hand stocks to decline, but two
weeks' supply must be a minimum. Farmers' stocks necessarily vary with
the size of the crop and the period of the year; they will range from 9
or 10 weeks on the 1st of September to a half week on the 1st of August.
Taking all the stocks together, it is very exceptional for the stock of
breadstuffs to fall below 7 weeks' supply. Between the cereal years
1893-1894 and 1903-1904, a period of 570 weeks, the stocks of all kinds
fell below 7 weeks' supply in only 9 weeks; of these 9 weeks 7 were
between the beginning of June and the end of August 1898. This was
immediately after the Leiter collapse. In seven of these eleven years
there is no instance of stocks falling below 8 weeks' supply. In 21 out
of these 570 weeks and in 39 weeks during the same period stocks dropped
below 7-1/2 and 8 weeks' supply respectively. Roughly speaking the stock
of wheat available for bread-making varies from a two to four months'
supply and is at times well above the latter figure.
National reserve.
The formation of a national reserve of wheat, to be held at the disposal
of the state in case of urgent need during war, is beset by many
practical difficulties. The father of the scheme was probably _The
Miller_, a well-known trade journal. In March and April 1886 two
articles appeared in that paper under the heading "Years of Plenty and
State Granaries," in which it was urged that to meet the risk of hostile
cruisers interrupting the supplies it would be desirable to lay up in
granaries on British soil and under government control a stock of wheat
sufficient for 12 or alternatively 6 months' consumption. This was to be
national property, not to be touched except when the fortune of war sent
up the price of wheat to a famine level or caused severe distress. The
State holding this large stock--a year's supply of foreign grain would
have meant at least 15,000,000 qrs., and have cost about L25,000,000
exclusive of warehousing--was in peace time to sell no wheat except when
it became necessary to part with stock as a precautionary measure. In
that case the wheat sold was to be replaced by the same amount of new
grain. The idea was to provide the country with a supply of wheat until
sufficient wheat-growing soil could be broken up to make it practically
self-sufficing in respect of wheat. The original suggestion fell quite
flat. Two years later Captain Warren, R.N., read a paper on "Great
Britain's Corn Supplies in War," before the London Chamber of Commerce,
and accepted national granaries as the only practicable safeguard
against what appeared to him a great peril. The representatives of the
shipping interest opposed the scheme, probably because it appeared to
them likely to divert the public from insisting on an all-powerful navy.
The corn trade opposed the project on account of its great practical
difficulties. But constant contraction of the British wheat acreage kept
the question alive, and during the earlier half of the 'nineties it was
a favourite theme with agriculturists. Some influential members of
parliament pressed the matter on the government, who, acting, no doubt,
on the advice of their military and naval experts, refused either a
royal commission or a departmental committee. While the then technical
advisers of the government were divided on the advisability of
establishing national granaries as a defensive measure, the balance of
expert opinion was adverse to the scheme. Lord Wolseley, then
commander-in-chief, publicly stigmatized the theory that Great Britain
might in war be starved into submission as "unmitigated humbug."
Yerburgh committee.
In spite of official discouragement the agitation continued, and early
in 1897 the council of the Central and Associated Chambers of
Agriculture, at the suggestion to a great extent of Mr R. A. Yerburgh,
M.P., nominated a committee to examine the question of national wheat
stores. This committee held thirteen sittings and examined fifty-four
witnesses. Its report, which was published (L. G. Newman & Co., 12
Finsbury Square, London, E.C.) with minutes of the evidence taken,
practically recommended that a national reserve of wheat on the lines
already sketched should be formed and administered by the State, and
that the government should be strongly urged to obtain the appointment
of a royal commission, comprising representatives of agriculture, the
corn trade, shipping, and the army and navy, to conduct an exhaustive
inquiry into the whole subject of the national food-supply in case of
war. This recommendation was ultimately carried into effect, but not
till nearly five years had elapsed. Of two schemes for national
granaries put before the Yerburgh committee, one was formulated by Mr
Seth Taylor, a London miller and corn merchant, who reckoned that a
store of 10,000,000 qrs. of wheat might be accumulated at an average
cost of 40s. per qr.--this was in the Leiter year of high prices--and
distributed in six specially constructed granaries to be erected at
London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, Glasgow and Dublin. The cost of the
granaries was put at L7,500,000. Mr Taylor's scheme, all charges
included, such as 2-1/2% interest on capital, cost of storage (at 6d.
per qr.), and 2s. per qr. for cost of replacing wheat, involved an
annual expenditure of L1,250,000. The Yerburgh committee also considered
a proposal to stimulate the home supply of wheat by offering a bounty to
farmers for every quarter of wheat grown. This proposal has taken
different shapes; some have suggested that a bounty should be given on
every acre of land covered with wheat, while others would only allow the
bounty on wheat raised and kept in good condition up to a certain date,
say the beginning of the following harvest. It is obvious that a bounty
on the area of land covered by wheat, irrespective of yield, would be a
premium on poor farming, and might divert to wheat-growing land
unsuitable for that purpose. The suggestion to pay a bounty of say 3s.
to 5s. per qr. for all wheat grown and stacked for a certain time stands
on a different basis; it is conceivable that a bounty of 5s. might
expand the British production of wheat from say 7,000,000 to 9,000,000
qrs., which would mean that a bounty of L2,250,000 per annum, plus costs
of administration, had secured an extra home production of 2,000,000
qrs. Whether such a price would be worth paying is another matter; the
Yerburgh committee's conclusion was decidedly in the negative. It has
also been suggested that the State might subsidize millers to the extent
of 2s. 6d. per sack of 280 lb. per annum on condition that each
maintained a minimum supply of two months' flour. This may be taken to
mean that for keeping a special stock of flour over and above his usual
output a miller would be entitled to an annual subsidy of 2s. 6d. per
sack. An extra stock of 10,000,000 sacks might be thus kept up at an
annual cost of L1,250,000, plus the expenditure of administration, which
would probably be heavy. With regard to this suggestion, it is very
probable that a few large mills which have plenty of warehouse
accommodation and depots all over the country would be ready to keep up
a permanent extra stock of 100,000 sacks. Thus a mill of 10,000 sacks'
capacity per week, which habitually maintains a total stock of 50,000
sacks, might bring up its stock to 150,000 sacks. Such a mill, being a
good customer to railways, could get from them the storage it required
for little or nothing. But the bulk of the mills have no such
advantages. They have little or no spare warehousing room, and are not
accustomed to keep any stock, sending their flour out almost as fast as
it is milled. It is doubtful therefore if a bounty of 2s. 6d. per sack
would have the desired effect of keeping up a stock of 10,000,000 sacks,
sufficient for two to three months' bread consumption.
Royal commission, 1903-1905.
The controversy reached a climax in the royal commission appointed in
1903, to which was also referred the importation of raw material in war
time. Its report appeared in 1905. To the question whether the
unquestioned dependence of the United Kingdom on an uninterrupted supply
of sea-borne breadstuffs renders it advisable or not to maintain at all
times a six months' stock of wheat and flour, it returned no decided
answer, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the commission
was hopelessly divided. The main report was distinctly optimistic so far
as the liability of the country to harass and distress at the hands of a
hostile naval power or combination of powers was concerned. But there
were several dissentients, and there was hardly any portion of the
report in chief which did not provoke some reservation or another. That
a maritime war would cause freights and insurance to rise in a high
degree was freely admitted, and it was also admitted that the price of
bread must also rise very appreciably. But, provided the navy did not
break down, the risk of starvation was dismissed. Therefore all the
proposals for providing national granaries or inducing merchants and
millers to carry bigger stocks were put aside as unpractical and
unnecessary. The commission was, however, inclined to consider more
favourably a suggestion for providing free storage for wheat at the
expense of the State. The idea was that if the State would subsidize any
large granary company to the extent of 6d. or 5d. per qr., grain now
warehoused in foreign lands would be attracted to the British Isles. But
on the whole the commission held that the main effect of the scheme
would be to saddle the government with the rent of all grain stored in
public warehouses in the United Kingdom without materially increasing
stocks. The proposal to offer bounties to farmers to hold stocks for a
longer period and to grow more wheat met with equally little favour.
To sum up the advantages of national granaries, assuming any sort of
disaster to the navy, the possession of a reserve of even six months'
wheat-supply in addition to ordinary stocks would prevent panic prices.
On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of forming and
administering such a reserve are very great. The world grows no great
surplus of wheat, and to form a six months', much more a twelve months',
stock would be the work of years. The government in buying up the wheat
would have to go carefully if they would avoid sending up prices with a
rush. They would have to buy dearly, and when they let go a certain
amount of stock they would be bound to sell cheaply. A stock once formed
might be held by the State with little or no disturbance of the corn
market, although the existence of such an emergency stock would hardly
encourage British farmers to grow more wheat. The cost of erecting,
equipping and keeping in good order the necessary warehouses would be,
probably, much heavier than the most liberal estimate hitherto made by
advocates of national granaries. (G. F. Z.)
GRANBY, JOHN MANNERS, MARQUESS OF (1721-1770), British soldier, was the
eldest son of the third duke of Rutland. He was born in 1721 and
educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and was returned as
member of parliament for Grantham in 1741. Four years later he received
a commission as colonel of a regiment raised by the Rutland interest in
and about Leicester to assist in quelling the Highland revolt of 1745.
This corps never got beyond Newcastle, but young Granby went to the
front as a volunteer on the duke of Cumberland's staff, and saw active
service in the last stages of the insurrection. Very soon his regiment
was disbanded. He continued in parliament, combining with it military
duties, making the campaign of Flanders (1747). Promoted major-general
in 1755, three years later he was appointed colonel of the Royal Horse
Guards (Blues). Meanwhile he had married the daughter of the duke of
Somerset, and in 1754 had begun his parliamentary connexion with
Cambridgeshire, for which county he sat until his death. The same year
that saw Granby made colonel of the Blues, saw also the despatch of a
considerable British contingent to Germany. Minden was Granby's first
great battle. At the head of the Blues he was one of the cavalry leaders
halted at the critical moment by Sackville, and when in consequence that
officer was sent home in disgrace, Lieut.-General Lord Granby succeeded
to the command of the British contingent in Ferdinand's army, having
32,000 men under his orders at the beginning of 1760. In the remaining
campaigns of the Seven Years' War the English contingent was more
conspicuous by its conduct than the Prussians themselves. On the 31st of
July 1760 Granby brilliantly stormed Warburg at the head of the British
cavalry, capturing 1500 men and ten pieces of artillery. A year later
(15th of July 1761) the British defended the heights of Vellinghausen
with what Ferdinand himself styled "indescribable bravery." In the last
campaign, at Gravenstein und Wilhelmsthal, Homburg and Cassel, Granby's
men bore the brunt of the fighting and earned the greatest share of the
glory.
Returning to England in 1763 the marquess found himself the popular
hero of the war. It is said that couriers awaited his arrival at all the
home ports to offer him the choice of the Ordnance or the Horse Guards.
His appointment to the Ordnance bore the date of the 1st of July 1763,
and three years later he became commander-in-chief. In this position he
was attacked by "Junius," and a heated discussion arose, as the writer
had taken the greatest pains in assailing the most popular member of the
Grafton ministry. In 1770 Granby, worn out by political and financial
trouble, resigned all his offices, except the colonelcy of the Blues. He
died at Scarborough on the 18th of October 1770. He had been made a
privy councillor in 1760, lord lieutenant of Derbyshire in 1762, and
LL.D. of Cambridge in 1769.
Two portraits of Granby were painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds, one of
which is now in the National Gallery. His contemporary popularity is
indicated by the number of inns and public-houses which took his name
and had his portrait as sign-board.
GRAN CHACO, an extensive region in the heart of South America belonging
to the La Plata basin, stretching from 20 deg. to 29 deg S. lat., and
divided between the republics of Argentine, Bolivia and Paraguay, with a
small district of south-western Matto Grosso (Brazil). Its area is
estimated at from 250,000 to 425,000 sq. m., but the true Chaco region
probably does not exceed 300,000 sq. m. The greater part is covered with
marshes, lagoons and dense tropical jungle and forest, and is still
unexplored. On its southern and western borders there are extensive
tracts of open woodland, intermingled with grassy plains, while on the
northern side in Bolivia are large areas of open country subject to
inundations in the rainy season. In general terms the Gran Chaco may be
described as a great plain sloping gently to the S.E., traversed in the
same direction by two great rivers, the Pilcomayo and Bermejo, whose
sluggish courses are not navigable because of sand-banks, barriers of
overturned trees and floating vegetation, and confusing channels. This
excludes that part of eastern Bolivia belonging to the Amazon basin,
which is sometimes described as part of the Chaco. The greater part of
its territory is occupied by nomadic tribes of Indians, some of whom are
still unsubdued, while others, like the Matacos, are sometimes to be
found on neighbouring sugar estates and estancias as labourers during
the busy season. The forest wealth of the Chaco region is incalculable
and apparently inexhaustible, consisting of a great variety of palms and
valuable cabinet woods, building timber, &c. Its extensive tracts of
"quebracho Colorado" (_Loxopterygium Lorentzii_) are of very great value
because of its use in tanning leather. Both the wood and its extract are
largely exported. Civilization is slowly gaining footholds in this
region along the southern and eastern borders.
GRAND ALLIANCE, WAR OF THE (alternatively called the War of the League
of Augsburg), the third[1] of the great aggressive wars waged by Louis
XIV. of France against Spain, the Empire, Great Britain, Holland and
other states. The two earlier wars, which are redeemed from oblivion by
the fact that in them three great captains, Turenne, Conde and
Montecucculi, played leading parts, are described in the article DUTCH
WARS. In the third war the leading figures are: Henri de
Montmorency-Boutteville, duke of Luxemburg, the former aide-de-camp of
Conde and heir to his daring method of warfare; William of Orange, who
had fought against both Conde and Luxemburg in the earlier wars, and was
now king of England; Vauban, the founder of the sciences of
fortification and siegecraft, and Catinat, the follower of Turenne's
cautious and systematic strategy, who was the first commoner to receive
high command in the army of Louis XIV. But as soldiers, these
men--except Vauban--are overshadowed by the great figures of the
preceding generation, and except for a half-dozen outstanding episodes,
the war of 1689-97 was an affair of positions and manoeuvres.
It was within these years that the art and practice of war began to
crystallize into the form called "linear" in its strategic and tactical
aspect, and "cabinet-war" in its political and moral aspect. In the
Dutch wars, and in the minor wars that preceded the formation of the
League of Augsburg, there were still survivals of the loose
organization, violence and wasteful barbarity typical of the Thirty
Years' War; and even in the War of the Grand Alliance (in its earlier
years) occasional brutalities and devastations showed that the old
spirit died hard. But outrages that would have been borne in dumb misery
in the old days now provoked loud indignation, and when the fierce
Louvois disappeared from the scene it became generally understood that
barbarity was impolitic, not only as alienating popular sympathies, but
also as rendering operations a physical impossibility for want of
supplies.
Character of the war.
Thus in 1700, so far from terrorizing the country people into
submission, armies systematically conciliated them by paying cash and
bringing trade into the country. Formerly, wars had been fought to
compel a people to abjure their faith or to change sides in some
personal or dynastic quarrel. But since 1648 this had no longer been the
case. The Peace of Westphalia established the general relationship of
kings, priests and peoples on a basis that was not really shaken until
the French Revolution, and in the intervening hundred and forty years
the peoples at large, except at the highest and gravest moments (as in
Germany in 1689, France In 1709 and Prussia in 1757) held aloof from
active participation in politics and war. This was the beginning of the
theory that war was an affair of the regular forces only, and that
intervention in it by the civil population was a punishable offence.
Thus wars became the business of the professional soldiers in the king's
own service, and the scarcity and costliness of these soldiers combined
with the purely political character of the quarrels that arose to reduce
a campaign from an "intense and passionate drama" to a humdrum affair,
to which only rarely a few men of genius imparted some degree of vigour,
and which in the main was an attempt to gain small ends by a small
expenditure of force and with the minimum of risk. As between a prince
and his subjects there were still quarrels that stirred the average
man--the Dragonnades, for instance, or the English Revolution--but
foreign wars were "a stronger form of diplomatic notes," as Clausewitz
called them, and were waged with the object of adding a codicil to the
treaty of peace that had closed the last incident.
Other causes contributed to stifle the former ardour of war. Campaigns
were no longer conducted by armies of ten to thirty thousand men. Large
regular armies had come into fashion, and, as Guibert points out,
instead of small armies charged with grand operations we find grand
armies charged with small operations. The average general, under the
prevailing conditions of supply and armament, was not equal to the task
of commanding such armies. Any real concentration of the great forces
that Louis XIV. had created was therefore out of the question, and the
field armies split into six or eight independent fractions, each charged
with operations on a particular theatre of war. From such a policy
nothing remotely resembling the crushing of a great power could be
expected to be gained. The one tangible asset, in view of future peace
negotiations, was therefore a fortress, and it was on the preservation
or capture of fortresses that operations in all these wars chiefly
turned. The idea of the decisive battle for its own sake, as a
settlement of the quarrel, was far distant; for, strictly speaking,
there was no quarrel, and to use up highly trained and exceedingly
expensive soldiers in gaining by brute force an advantage that might
equally well be obtained by chicanery was regarded as foolish.
The fortress was, moreover, of immediate as well as contingent value to
a state at war. A century of constant warfare had impoverished middle
Europe, and armies had to spread over a large area if they desired to
"live on the country." This was dangerous in the face of the enemy (cf.
the Peninsular War), and it was also uneconomical. The only way to
prevent the country people from sending their produce into the
fortresses for safety was to announce beforehand that cash would be
paid, at a high rate, for whatever the army needed. But even promises
rarely brought this about, and to live at all, whether on supplies
brought up from the home country and stored in magazines (which had to
be guarded) or on local resources, an army had as a rule to maintain or
to capture a large fortress. Sieges, therefore, and manoeuvres are the
features of this form of war, wherein armies progressed not with the
giant strides of modern war, but in a succession of short hops from one
foothold to the next. This was the procedure of the average commander,
and even when a more intense spirit of conflict was evoked by the
Luxemburgs and Marlboroughs it was but momentary and spasmodic.
The general character of the war being borne in mind, nine-tenths of its
marches and manoeuvres can be almost "taken as read"; the remaining
tenth, the exceptional and abnormal part of it, alone possesses an
interest for modern readers.
In pursuance of a new aggressive policy in Germany Louis XIV. sent his
troops, as a diplomatic menace rather than for conquest, into that
country in the autumn of 1688. Some of their raiding parties plundered
the country as far south as Augsburg, for the political intent of their
advance suggested terrorism rather than conciliation as the best method.
The league of Augsburg at once took up the challenge, and the addition
of new members (Treaty of Vienna, May 1689) converted it into the "Grand
Alliance" of Spain, Holland, Sweden, Savoy and certain Italian states,
Great Britain, the emperor, the elector of Brandenburg, &c.
"Those who condemned the king for raising up so many enemies, admired
him for having so fully prepared to defend himself and even to forestall
them," says Voltaire. Louvois had in fact completed the work of
organizing the French army on a regular and permanent basis, and had
made it not merely the best, but also by far the most numerous in
Europe, for Louis disposed in 1688 of no fewer than 375,000 soldiers and
60,000 sailors. The infantry was uniformed and drilled, and the socket
bayonet and the flint-lock musket had been introduced. The only relic of
the old armament was the pike, which was retained for one-quarter of the
foot, though it had been discarded by the Imperialists in the course of
the Turkish wars described below. The first artillery regiment was
created in 1684, to replace the former semi-civilian organization by a
body of artillerymen susceptible of uniform training and amenable to
discipline and orders.
Devastation of the Palatinate, 1689.
In 1689 Louis had six armies on foot. That in Germany, which had
executed the raid of the previous autumn, was not in a position to
resist the principal army of the coalition so far from support. Louvois
therefore ordered it to lay waste the Palatinate, and the devastation of
the country around Heidelberg, Mannheim, Spires, Oppenheim and Worms was
pitilessly and methodically carried into effect in January and February.
There had been devastations in previous wars, even the high-minded
Turenne had used the argument of fire and sword to terrify a population
or a prince, while the whole story of the last ten years of the great
war had been one of incendiary armies leaving traces of their passage
that it took a century to remove. But here the devastation was a purely
military measure, executed systematically over a given strategic front
for no other purpose than to delay the advance of the enemy's army. It
differed from the method of Turenne or Cromwell in that the sufferers
were not those people whom it was the purpose of the war to reduce to
submission, but others who had no interest in the quarrel. It differed
from Wellington's laying waste of Portugal in 1810 in that it was not
done for the defence of the Palatinate against a national enemy, but
because the Palatinate was where it was. The feudal theory that every
subject of a prince at war was an armed vassal, and therefore an enemy
of the prince's enemy, had in practice been obsolete for two centuries
past; by 1690 the organization of war, its causes, its methods and its
instruments had passed out of touch with the people at large, and it had
become thoroughly understood that the army alone was concerned with the
army's business. Thus it was that this devastation excited universal
reprobation; and that, in the words of a modern French writer, the
"idea of Germany came to birth in the flames of the Palatinate."
As a military measure this crime was, moreover, quite unprofitable; for
it became impossible for Marshal Duras, the French commander, to hold
out on the east side of the middle Rhine, and he could think of nothing
better to do than to go farther south and to ravage Baden and the
Breisgau, which was not even a military necessity. The grand army of the
Allies, coming farther north, was practically unopposed. Charles of
Lorraine and the elector of Bavaria--lately comrades in the Turkish war
(see below)--invested Mainz, the elector of Brandenburg Bonn. The
latter, following the evil precedent of his enemies, shelled the town
uselessly instead of making a breach in its walls and overpowering its
French garrison, an incident not calculated to advance the nascent idea
of German unity. Mainz, valiantly defended by Nicolas du Ble, marquis
d'Uxelles, had to surrender on the 8th of September. The governor of
Bonn, baron d'Asfeld, not in the least intimidated by the bombardment,
held out till the army that had taken Mainz reinforced the elector of
Brandenburg, and then, rejecting the hard terms of surrender offered him
by the latter, he fell in resisting a last assault on the 12th of
October. Only 850 men out of his 6000 were left to surrender on the
16th, and the duke of Lorraine, less truculent than the elector,
escorted them safely to Thionville. Boufflers, with another of Louis's
armies, operated from Luxemburg (captured by the French in 1684 and
since held) and Trarbach towards the Rhine, but in spite of a minor
victory at Kochheim on the 21st of August, he was unable to relieve
either Mainz or Bonn.
In the Low Countries the French marshal d'Humieres, being in superior
force, had obtained _special permission_ to offer battle to the Allies.
Leaving the garrison of Lille and Tournay to amuse the Spaniards, he
hurried from Maubeuge to oppose the Dutch, who from Namur had advanced
slowly on Philippeville. Coming upon their army (which was commanded by
the prince of Waldeck) in position behind the river Heure, with an
advanced post in the little walled town of Walcourt, he flung his
advanced guard against the bridge and fortifications of this place to
clear the way for his deployment beyond the river Heure (27th August).
After wasting a thousand brave men in this attempt, he drew back. For a
few days the two armies remained face to face, cannonading one another
at intervals, but no further fighting occurred. Humieres returned to the
region of the Scheldt fortresses, and Waldeck to Brussels. For the
others of Louis' six armies the year's campaign passed off quite
uneventfully.
The war in Ireland, 1689-1691.
Simultaneously with these operations, the Jacobite cause was being
fought to an issue in Ireland. War began early in 1689 with desultory
engagements between the Orangemen of the north and the Irish regular
army, most of which the earl of Tyrconnel had induced to declare for
King James. The northern struggle after a time condensed itself into
the defence of Derry and Enniskillen. The siege of the former place,
begun by James himself and carried on by the French general Rosen,
lasted 105 days. In marked contrast to the sieges of the continent,
this was resisted by the townsmen themselves, under the leadership of
the clergyman George Walker. But the relieving force (consisting of
two frigates, a supply ship and a force under Major-general Percy
Kirke) was dilatory, and it was not until the defenders were in the
last extremity that Kirke actually broke through the blockade (July
31st). Enniskillen was less closely invested, and its inhabitants,
organized by Colonel Wolseley and other officers sent by Kirke,
actually kept the open field and defeated the Jacobites at Newtown
Butler (July 31st). A few days later the Jacobite army withdrew from
the north. But it was long before an adequate army could be sent over
from England to deal with it. Marshal Schomberg (q.v.), one of the
most distinguished soldiers of the time, who had been expelled from
the French service as a Huguenot, was indeed sent over in August, but
the army he brought, some 10,000 strong, was composed of raw recruits,
and when it was assembled in camp at Dundalk to be trained for its
work, it was quickly ruined by an epidemic of fever. But James failed
to take advantage of his opportunity to renew the war in the north,
and the relics of Schomberg's army wintered in security, covered by
the Enniskillen troops. In the spring of 1690, however, more troops,
this time experienced regiments from Holland, Denmark and Brandenburg,
were sent, and in June, Schomberg in Ireland and Major-general
Scravemore in Chester having thoroughly organized and equipped the
field army, King William assumed the command himself. Five days after
his arrival he began his advance from Loughbrickland near Newry, and
on the 1st of July he engaged James's main army on the river Boyne,
close to Drogheda. Schomberg was killed and William himself wounded,
but the Irish army was routed.
No stand was made by the defeated party either in the Dublin or in the
Waterford district. Lauzun, the commander of the French auxiliary
corps in James's army, and Tyrconnel both discountenanced any attempt
to defend Limerick, where the Jacobite forces had reassembled; but
Patrick Sarsfield (earl of Lucan), as the spokesman of the younger and
more ardent of the Irish officers, pleaded for its retention. He was
left, therefore, to hold Limerick, while Tyrconnel and Lauzun moved
northward into Galway. Here, as in the north, the quarrel enlisted the
active sympathies of the people against the invader, and Sarsfield not
only surprised and destroyed the artillery train of William's army,
but repulsed every assault made on the walls that Lauzun had said
"could be battered down by rotten apples." William gave up the siege
on the 30th of August. The failure was, however, compensated in a
measure by the arrival in Ireland of an expedition under Lord
Marlborough, which captured Cork and Kinsale, and next year (1691) the
Jacobite cause was finally crushed by William's general Ginckell
(afterwards earl of Athlone) in the battle of Aughrim in Galway (July
12th), in which St Ruth, the French commander, was killed and the
Jacobite army dissipated. Ginckell, following up his victory, besieged
Limerick afresh. Tyrconnel died of apoplexy while organizing the
defence, and this time the town was invested by sea as well as by
land. After six weeks' resistance the defenders offered to capitulate,
and with the signing of the treaty of Limerick on the 1st of October
the Irish war came to an end. Sarsfield and the most energetic of King
James's supporters retired to France and were there formed into the
famous "Irish brigade." Sarsfield was killed at the battle of
Neerwinden two years later.
The campaign of 1690 on the continent of Europe is marked by two
battles, one of which, Luxemburg's victory of Fleurus, belongs to the
category of the world's great battles. It is described under FLEURUS,
and the present article only deals summarily with the conditions in
which it was fought. These, though they in fact led to an encounter that
could, in itself, fairly be called decisive, were in closer accord with
the general spirit of the war than was the decision that arose out of
them.
Luxemburg had a powerful enemy in Louvois, and he had consequently been
allotted only an insignificant part in the first campaign. But after the
disasters of 1689 Louis re-arranged the commands on the north-east
frontier so as to allow Humieres, Luxemburg and Boufflers to combine for
united action. "I will take care that Louvois plays fair," Louis said to
the duke when he gave him his letters of service. Though apparently
Luxemburg was not authorized to order such a combination himself, as
senior officer he would automatically take command if it came about. The
whole force available was probably close on 100,000, but not half of
these were present at the decisive battle, though Luxemburg certainly
practised the utmost "economy of force" as this was understood in those
days (see also NEERWINDEN). On the remaining theatres of war, the
dauphin, assisted by the duc de Lorge, held the middle Rhine, and
Catinat the Alps, while other forces were in Roussillon, &c., as before.
Catinat's operations are briefly described below. Those of the others
need no description, for though the Allies formed a plan for a grand
concentric advance on Paris, the preliminaries to this advance were so
numerous and so closely interdependent that on the most favourable
estimate the winter would necessarily find the Allied armies many
leagues short of Paris. In fact, the Rhine offensive collapsed when
Charles of Lorraine died (17th April), and the reconquest of his lost
duchy ceased to be a direct object of the war.
Fleurus, 1690.
Luxemburg began operations by drawing in from the Sambre country, where
he had hitherto been stationed, to the Scheldt and "eating up" the
country between Oudenarde and Ghent in the face of a Spanish army
concentrated at the latter place (15th May-12th June). He then left
Humieres with a containing force in the Scheldt region and hurried back
to the Sambre to interpose between the Allied army under Waldeck and the
fortress of Dinant which Waldeck was credited with the intention of
besieging. His march from Tournay to Gerpinnes was counted a model of
skill--the _locus classicus_ for the maxim that ruled till the advent of
Napoleon--"march always in the order in which you encamp, or purpose to
encamp, or fight." For four days the army marched across country in
close order, covered in all directions by reconnoitring cavalry and
advanced, flank and rear guards. Under these conditions eleven miles a
day was practically forced marching, and on arriving at
Jeumont-sur-Sambre the army was given three days' rest. Then followed a
few leisurely marches in the direction of Charleroi, during which a
detachment of Boufflers's army came in, and the cavalry explored the
country to the north. On news of the enemy's army being at Trazegnies,
Luxemburg hurried across a ford of the Sambre above Charleroi, but this
proved to be a detachment only, and soon information came in that
Waldeck was encamped near Fleurus. Thereupon Luxemburg, without
consulting his subordinate generals, took his army to Velaine. He knew
that the enemy was marking time till the troops of Liege and the
Brandenburgers from the Rhine were near enough to co-operate in the
Dinant enterprise, and he was determined to fight a battle at once. From
Velaine, therefore, on the morning of the 1st of July, the army moved
forward to Fleurus and there won one of the most brilliant victories in
the history of the Royal army. But Luxemburg was not allowed to pursue
his advantage. He was ordered to hold his army in readiness to besiege
either Namur, Mons, Charleroi or Ath, according as later orders
dictated; and to send back the borrowed regiments to Boufflers, who was
being pressed back by the Brandenburg and Liege troops. Thus Waldeck
reformed his army in peace at Brussels, where William III. of England
soon afterwards assumed command of the Allied forces in the Netherlands,
and Luxemburg and the other marshals stood fast for the rest of the
campaign, being forbidden to advance until Catinat--in Italy--should
have won a battle.
Staffarda.
In this quarter the armed neutrality of the duke of Savoy had long
disquieted the French court. His personal connexions with the imperial
family and his resentment against Louvois, who had on some occasion
treated him with his usual patronizing arrogance, inclined him to join
the Allies, while on the other hand he could hope for extensions of his
scanty territory only by siding with Louis. In view of this doubtful
condition of affairs the French army under Catinat had for some time
been maintained on the Alpine frontier, and in the summer of 1690 Louis
XIV. sent an ultimatum to Victor Amadeus to compel him to take one side
or the other actively and openly. The result was that Victor Emmanuel
threw in his lot with the Allies and obtained help from the Spaniards
and Austrians in the Milanese. Catinat thereupon advanced into Piedmont,
and won, principally by virtue of his own watchfulness and the high
efficiency of his troops, the important victory of Staffarda (August
18th, 1690). This did not, however, enable him to overrun Piedmont, and
as the duke was soon reinforced, he had to be content with the
methodical conquest of a few frontier districts. On the side of Spain, a
small French army under the duc de Noailles passed into Catalonia and
there lived at the enemy's expense for the duration of the campaign.
In these theatres of war, and on the Rhine, where the disunion of the
German princes prevented vigorous action, the following year, 1691, was
uneventful. But in the Netherlands there were a siege, a war of
manoeuvres and a cavalry combat, each in its way somewhat remarkable.
The siege was that of Mons, which was, like many sieges in the former
wars, conducted with much pomp by Louis XIV. himself, with Boufflers and
Vauban under him. On the surrender of the place, which was hastened by
red-hot shot (April 8th), Louis returned to Versailles and divided his
army between Boufflers and Luxemburg, the former of whom departed to the
Meuse. There he attempted by bombardment to enforce the surrender of
Liege, but had to desist when the elector of Brandenburg threatened
Dinant. The principal armies on either side faced one another under the
command respectively of William III. and of Luxemburg. The Allies were
first concentrated to the south of Namur, and Luxemburg hurried thither,
but neither party found any tempting opportunity for battle, and when
the cavalry had consumed all the forage available in the district, the
two armies edged away gradually towards Flanders. The war of manoeuvre
continued, with a slight balance of advantage on Luxemburg's side,
until September, when William returned to England, leaving Waldeck in
command of the Allied army, with orders to distribute it in winter
quarters amongst the garrison towns. This gave the momentary opportunity
for which Luxemburg had been watching, and at Leuze (20th Sept.) he fell
upon the cavalry of Waldeck's rearguard and drove it back in disorder
with heavy losses until the pursuit was checked by the Allied infantry.
In 1692[2] the Rhine campaign was no more decisive than before, although
Lorge made a successful raid into Wurttemberg in September and foraged
his cavalry in German territory till the approach of winter. The Spanish
campaign was unimportant, but on the Alpine side the Allies under the
duke of Savoy drove back Catinat into Dauphine, which they ravaged with
fire and sword. But the French peasantry were quicker to take arms than
the Germans, and, inspired by the local gentry--amongst whom figured the
heroine, Philis de la Tour du Pin (1645-1708), daughter of the marquis
de la Charce--they beset every road with such success that the small
regular army of the invaders was powerless. Brought practically to a
standstill, the Allies soon consumed the provisions that could be
gathered in, and then, fearing lest the snow should close the passes
behind them, they retreated.
Siege of Namur, 1692.
Steenkirk.
In the Low Countries the campaign as before began with a great siege.
Louis and Vauban invested Namur on the 26th of May. The place was
defended by the prince de Barbancon (who had been governor of Luxemburg
when that place was besieged in 1684) and Coehoorn (q.v.), Vauban's
rival in the science of fortification. Luxemburg, with a small army,
manoeuvred to cover the siege against William III.'s army at Louvain.
The place fell on the 5th of June,[3] after a very few days of Vauban's
"regular" attack, but the citadel held out until the 23rd. Then, as
before, Louis returned to Versailles, giving injunctions to Luxemburg to
"preserve the strong places and the country, while opposing the enemy's
enterprises and subsisting the army at his expense." This negative
policy, contrary to expectation, led to a hard-fought battle. William,
employing a common device, announced his intention of retaking Namur,
but set his army in motion for Flanders and the sea-coast fortresses
held by the French. Luxemburg, warned in time, hurried towards the
Scheldt, and the two armies were soon face to face again, Luxemburg
about Steenkirk, William in front of Hal. William then formed the plan
of surprising Luxemburg's right wing before it could be supported by the
rest of his army, relying chiefly on false information that a detected
spy at his headquarters was forced to send, to mislead the duke. But
Luxemburg had the material protection of a widespread net of outposts as
well as a secret service, and although ill in bed when William's advance
was reported, he shook off his apathy, mounted his horse and, enabled by
his outpost reports to divine his opponent's plan, he met it (3rd
August) by a swift concentration of his army, against which the Allies,
whose advance and deployment had been mismanaged, were powerless (see
STEENKIRK). In this almost accidental battle both sides suffered
enormous losses, and neither attempted to bring about, or even to risk,
a second resultless trial of strength. Boufflers's army returned to the
Sambre and Luxemburg and William established themselves for the rest of
the season at Lessines and Ninove respectively, 13 m. apart. After both
armies had broken up into their winter quarters, Louis ordered Boufflers
to attempt the capture of Charleroi. But a bombardment failed to
intimidate the garrison, and when the Allies began to re-assemble, the
attempt was given up (19th-21st Oct.). This failure was, however,
compensated by the siege and capture of Furnes (28th Dec. 1692-7th Jan.
1693).
In 1693, the culminating point of the war was reached. It began, as
mentioned above, with a winter enterprise that at least indicated the
aggressive spirit of the French generals. The king promoted his admiral,
Tourville, and Catinat, the _roturier_, to the marshalship, and founded
the military order of St Louis on the 10th of April. The grand army in
the Netherlands this year numbered 120,000, to oppose whom William III.
had only some 40,000 at hand. But at the very beginning of operations
Louis, after reviewing this large force at Gembloux, broke it up, in
order to send 30,000 under the dauphin to Germany, where Lorge had
captured Heidelberg and seemed able, if reinforced, to overrun south
Germany. But the imperial general Prince Louis of Baden took up a
position near Heilbronn so strong that the dauphin and Lorge did not
venture to attack him. Thus King Louis sacrificed a reality to a dream,
and for the third time lost the opportunity, for which he always longed,
of commanding in chief in a great battle. He himself, to judge by his
letter to Monsieur on the 8th of June, regarded his action as a
sacrifice of personal dreams to tangible realities. And, before the
event falsified predictions, there was much to be said for the course he
took, which accorded better with the prevailing system of war than a
Fleurus or a Neerwinden. In this system of war the rival armies, as
armies, were almost in a state of equilibrium, and more was to be
expected from an army dealing with something dissimilar to itself--a
fortress or a patch of land or a convoy--than from its collision with
another army of equal force.
Neerwinden.
Thus Luxemburg obtained his last and greatest opportunity. He was still
superior in numbers, but William at Louvain had the advantage of
position. The former, authorized by his master this year "_non seulement
d'empecher les ennemis de rien entreprendre, mais d'emporter quelques
avantages sur eux_," threatened Liege, drew William over to its defence
and then advanced to attack him. The Allies, however, retired to another
position, between the Great and Little Geete rivers, and there, in a
strongly entrenched position around Neerwinden, they were attacked by
Luxemburg on the 29th of July. The long and doubtful battle, one of the
greatest victories ever won by the French army, is briefly described
under NEERWINDEN. It ended in a brilliant victory for the assailant, but
Luxemburg's exhausted army did not pursue; William was as unshaken and
determined as ever; and the campaign closed, not with a treaty of peace,
but with a few manoeuvres which, by inducing William to believe in an
attack on Ath, enabled Luxemburg to besiege and capture Charleroi
(October).
Marsaglia.
Neerwinden was not the only French victory of the year. Catinat,
advancing from Fenestrelle and Susa to the relief of Pinerolo
(Pignerol), which the duke of Savoy was besieging, took up a position in
formal order of battle north of the village of Marsaglia. Here on the
4th of October the duke of Savoy attacked him with his whole army, front
to front. But the greatly superior regimental efficiency of the French,
and Catinat's minute attention to details[4] in arraying them, gave the
new marshal a victory that was a not unworthy pendant to Neerwinden. The
Piedmontese and their allies lost, it is said, 10,000 killed, wounded
and prisoners, as against Catinat's 1800. But here, too, the results
were trifling, and this year of victory is remembered chiefly as the
year in which "people perished of want to the accompaniment of _Te
Deums_."
In 1694 (late in the season owing to the prevailing distress and
famine) Louis opened a fresh campaign in the Netherlands. The armies
were larger and more ineffective than ever, and William offered no
further opportunities to his formidable opponent. In September, after
inducing William to desist from his intention of besieging Dunkirk by
appearing on his flank with a mass of cavalry,[5] which had ridden
from the Meuse, 100 m., in 4 days, Luxemburg gave up his command. He
died on the 4th of January following, and with him the tradition of
the Conde school of warfare disappeared from Europe. In Catalonia the
marshal de Noailles won a victory (27th May) over the Spaniards at the
ford of the Ter (Torroella, 5 m. above the mouth of the river), and
in consequence captured a number of walled towns.
Later campaigns of the war.
In 1695 William found Marshal Villeroi a far less formidable opponent
than Luxemburg had been, and easily succeeded in keeping him in
Flanders while a corps of the Allies invested Namur. Coehoorn directed
the siege-works, and Boufflers the defence. Gradually, as in 1692, the
defenders were dislodged from the town, the citadel outworks and the
citadel itself, the last being assaulted with success by the "British
grenadiers," as the song commemorates, on the 30th of August.
Boufflers was rewarded for his sixty-seven days' defence by the grade
of marshal.
By 1696 necessity had compelled Louis to renounce his vague and
indefinite offensive policy, and he now frankly restricted his efforts
to the maintenance of what he had won in the preceding campaigns. In
this new policy he met with much success. Boufflers, Lorge, Noailles
and even the incompetent Villeroi held the field in their various
spheres of operations without allowing the Allies to inflict any
material injury, and also (by having recourse again to the policy of
living by plunder) preserving French soil from the burden of their own
maintenance. In this, as before, they were powerfully assisted by the
disunion and divided counsels of their heterogeneous enemies. In
Piedmont, Catinat crowned his work by making peace and alliance with
the duke of Savoy, and the two late enemies having joined forces
captured one of the fortresses of the Milanese. The last campaign was
in 1697. Catinat and Vauban besieged Ath. This siege was perhaps the
most regular and methodical of the great engineer's career. It lasted
23 days and cost the assailants only 50 men. King William did not stir
from his entrenched position at Brussels, nor did Villeroi dare to
attack him there. Lastly, in August 1697 Vendome, Noailles' successor,
captured Barcelona. The peace of Ryswijk, signed on the 30th of
October, closed this war by practically restoring the _status quo
ante_; but neither the ambitions of Louis nor the Grand Alliance that
opposed them ceased to have force, and three years later the struggle
began anew (see SPANISH SUCCESSION, WAR OF THE).
Austro-Turkish wars, 1682-1699.
Concurrently with these campaigns, the emperor had been engaged in a
much more serious war on his eastern marches against the old enemy,
the Turks. This war arose in 1682 out of internal disturbances in
Hungary. The campaign of the following year is memorable for all time
as the last great wave of Turkish invasion. Mahommed IV. advanced from
Belgrade in May, with 200,000 men, drove back the small imperial army
of Prince Charles of Lorraine, and early in July invested Vienna
itself. The two months' defence of Vienna by Count Rudiger Starhemberg
(1635-1701) and the brilliant victory of the relieving army led by
John Sobieski, king of Poland, and Prince Charles on the 12th of
September 1683, were events which, besides their intrinsic importance,
possess the romantic interest of an old knightly crusade against the
heathen.
But the course of the war, after the tide of invasion had ebbed,
differed little from the wars of contemporary western Europe. Turkey
figured rather as a factor in the balance of power than as the
"infidel," and although the battles and sieges in Hungary were
characterized by the bitter personal hostility of Christian to Turk
which had no counterpart in the West, the war as a whole was as
methodical and tedious as any Rhine or Low Countries campaign. In 1684
Charles of Lorraine gained a victory at Waitzen on the 27th of June
and another at Eperies on the 18th of September, and unsuccessfully
besieged Budapest.
In 1685 the Germans were uniformly successful, though a victory at
Gran (August 16th) and the storming of Neuhausel (August 19th) were
the only outstanding incidents. In 1686 Charles, assisted by the
elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, besieged and stormed Budapest (Sept.
2nd). In 1687 they followed up their success by a great victory at
Mohacz (Aug. 12th). In 1688 the Austrians advanced still further, took
Belgrade, threatened Widin and entered Bosnia. The margrave Louis of
Baden, who afterward became one of the most celebrated of the
methodical generals of the day, won a victory at Derbent on the 5th of
September 1688, and next year, in spite of the outbreak of a general
European war, he managed to win another battle at Nisch (Sept. 24th),
to capture Widin (Oct. 14th) and to advance to the Balkans, but in
1690, more troops having to be withdrawn for the European war, the
imperialist generals lost Nisch, Widin and Belgrade one after the
other. There was, however, no repetition of the scenes of 1683, for in
1691 Louis won the battle of Szlankamen (Aug. 19th). After two more
desultory if successful campaigns he was called to serve in western
Europe, and for three years more the war dragged on without result,
until in 1697 the young Prince Eugene was appointed to command the
imperialists and won a great and decisive victory at Zenta on the
Theiss (Sept. 11th). This induced a last general advance of the
Germans eastward, which was definitively successful and brought about
the peace of Carlowitz (January 1699). (C. F. A.)