_First Premiss_: that man conceives universal (generic) notions wherein
a greater or less multitude participates, such as man at large, and
animal at large. And of these generic notions there are such as
he conceives through a particular [or partial, or an obligatory]
synthesis, and there are such others of these generic notions as he
does not conceive by any synthesis, but singly and individually. And
unless he shall have conceived the latter division (class, sett), it
is not possible for him to conceive the former. Further, he conceives
each one of these generic universal notions only under _one_ form,
wholly stripped (abstracted) from all relationship to its concrete
sensuous particulars, since the particulars of each one of the generic
notions are potentially endless [in variety and number] and no one of
the particulars has any right of priority over another particular in
respect of that _one_ form of the generic notion.
_Second Premiss_: that a form, whatsoever body it detaches, reduces,
and adorns, and in general whatsoever individual of divisible things
it so takes hold of, it clothes the same and exactly fits the same
in every one of its parts. And whatsoever clothes and exactly fits a
divisible thing in all its parts is itself divisible; and hence every
form that has clothed and exactly fitted any body whatsoever is itself
divisible.
_Third Premiss_: that in every generic (universal) form, if regard be
had, in the division of such form, purely and simply to its abstract
self, then it will not at all validly follow that the parts into
which it has been divided shall necessarily resemble the whole in its
complete notion; otherwise it must follow that the generic form, whose
division has been made in respect of its abstract self, has not been
itself divided, but that it has been divided into its constituents,
whether these be its various species or its numerous individuals,
whereas multiplicity of species or of individuals does not necessarily
entail division in the abstract generic notion itself. But it has been
laid down as a fact that such division has actually taken place, which
is a contradiction. Hence our assertion that the parts of the generic
form do not resemble it in its full and complete notion is a true
dictum.
_Fourth Premiss_: that in the mental form, if regard be had to its
division, it will not validly follow that its parts are denuded
(stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, if we
admit such total denudation, and assert that these parts are utterly
aloof from the complete conception of the generic whole, then the form
will arise, in such parts, only upon their assembling together, so
that they are in fact things devoid of that form which will arise in
them on their being set together, which is a quality of the parts of
materia capax or passive matter which occupies space ([Greek: dektikon:
δεκτικον]); [Note: The recipient is the acted upon, and it is called
matter, and also place.]; and hence the division has not been effected
in the generic form, but in its objective concrete materials. But it
has been asserted that the division has come to pass in it: this too is
a contradiction. Therefore our assertion: “It will not validly follow
that its parts are stripped of the totality of its notion” is a true
statement.
_Fifth Premiss_: which is the result of the two preceding: that in
the generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered
in it, then its parts are neither wholly devoid of the perfect form
nor are completely exhaustive of it, and are as it were [component,
constituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description).
Given then these premisses, we shall further unquestionably say that
a mentally-grasped form--in short all knowledge--claims some abode
somewhere, which abode is both an essence itself and a part of man’s
self, so that such essence will not be devoid of being either a
divisible (material) body or a non-corporeal indivisible essence. I
however say, that it is not licit that it be a corporeal body; because
a generic mentally-grasped form, if it abide in a body, then it is
inevitably possible for divisibility to befall it, as we have shown
above. Nor is it licit that its parts be otherwise than resembling
the whole from one standpoint, and contrasting with it from another
standpoint, in a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the
notion of the whole; whereas there is no generic form whatsoever but of
whose parts a compound can be formed that is partly like it and partly
unlike it save genera and differentia; consequently these parts are
genera and differentia, and hence each one of them is in its turn a
generic form; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above.
Inevitably this will end in a form that is no longer divisible into
genera and differentia, owing to the impracticability of progression
ad infinitum into parts differing in notions, even if it be established
that corporeal bodies are so divided into parts ad infinitum.
Moreover it is well-known that the generic (universal) form, concerning
which it is held that it is divisible only into genera and differentia,
if there be nevertheless some of these two that is not divisible into
genera and differentia, then _this some_ will be in itself utterly
indivisible in every sense and respect; and consequently what is
compounded, of these two of that _some_, will also be indivisible,
seeing that it is well-known, for example, that _man_ cannot be
conceived except along with the two conceptions _living_ and _rational_
(_speaking_). In short, it is not possible to conceive a generic
universal form that has genus and differens save by conceiving them
all together. Therefore, the form which we have described as having
taken up its abode in the body has not taken up its abode therein,
which is a contradiction, and therefore the diametrically contrary to
it is true, namely our assertion that a generic (universal) mental form
does not abide in any corporeal body whatsoever; and consequently the
essence in which a generic mental form abides is a spiritual essence,
not qualified with the qualities of bodies, which is what we call the
Rational Speaking Soul. And this is what we set out to show.
SUB-SECTION B:--A second of the proofs, which corroborate this claim
and confirm (correct) it, is what I am now going to set forth. I say
then that body of and through itself does not effect conception of
mentally-grasped things, since all bodies have in common that they
are body, and differ amongst each other in capacity for conceiving
mentally-grasped things. Wherefore living (animal) bodies are qualified
to conceive mentally-grasped things only by and through certain powers
that are put within them. And if these powers conceive by and through
themselves, without the cooperation of the body, it follows that they
are in themselves fit and apt to be an abode for mental forms. And what
is thus qualified is itself an essence; consequently if such conception
is occurring, they, namely these powers, are essences. Now, it is clear
that this power conceives mentally-grasped things by and through itself
only, and not at all through cooperation of body; for, we contend,
concerning whatsoever perceives any thing through cooperation of body,
that the oftener wearying perceptibles are repeated upon it the more do
they tend towards ruining and spoiling it and producing dullness and
exhaustion in it, it being nothing but a frail instrument and organ
whose strength has been reduced, owing to the over-tasking imposed
upon it on the power’s employing it; and for this cause the seeing
power, for example, gets weaker the oftener it persists in looking
at the sun’s shape. So too the hearing power, if loud sounds reach it
repeatedly.
Whereas this power, to wit the one that conceives mentally-grasped
things, the more it perceives wearying mental conceptions the stronger
it becomes for its work [the more efficient it becomes], wherefore it
has no need for an instrument in its operation of perceiving, and hence
it perceives of itself. Now, we have already shown that every power
perceiving of its own self is an essence; so then this power is an
essence, which is what we set out to show.
SUB-SECTION C:--Among the proofs that guide to this claim is what I
shall now show, so I say as follows.
The indwelling (immanence) of form in body is at once both passive
and receptive--passivity of the form and receptivity of the body.
And whereas one and the same thing excludes the possibility of its
being both doer and done, it becomes clear unto us that a body is
not able of itself to dress itself in one mentally-grasped form and
strip off another. Yet nevertheless we see a man consciously and with
forethought conceiving and proceeding from one mentally-grasped form
unto another, which operation is not devoid of being either an act
peculiar to body, or else an act peculiar to the rational speaking
power, or finally an act commonly shared between them both. It has
been already shown [perhaps he here refers to the Second Section
of this Essay] that it is not licit to attribute action and doing
peculiarly and specially to body; nay I will say and not even to body
conjointly with the rational power; since body is a co-adjutor of that
power, helping towards affording an abode for any form whatsoever
in that body’s own self, seeing that it has become known to us that
body along with the power will both become fit subjects for this form
that has thus arisen; a subject however is to be stigmatized with
nothing beyond simple passivity alone, whereas both these two are
[aggressive] acts and deeds. Consequently this is an act peculiar to
the power. And everything that, in its act which emanates from its
own self, has had no need for another thing to help it, will not need
in its own structure anything beyond its own self to help it, seeing
that independence or isolation in the structure of self precedes
independence or isolation in the putting forth of self-emanating
action. Therefore this power is an essence standing of itself
[independent of body]; and consequently the rational soul is an essence.
SUB-SECTION D:--Among the proofs that guide (point) to the validity of
this contention is what I am now going to say.
No doubt a live body and live organs or instruments, if they accomplish
their growing age and the age of standstill, begin to wither and
diminish, to lose power and waste away, which [in human beings] is on
passing forty years. Now, were the rational reasoning power a corporeal
organic power, then there would be found not one single individual of
mankind at these years of his age but what this power of his would have
begun to diminish. But the case in most people is quite otherwise, nay
indeed it is usual amongst the majority that as to intellectual power
they improve in cleverness and increase in insight. Hence the structure
of the rational power is not upheld by the body nor by the organ; and
hence this power is an essence standing of itself, which is what we
wished to show.
SUB-SECTION E:--Among the proofs for the validity of this contention is
the following also.
So much at least is clear, namely that not one of the bodily powers
has the strength for performing infinite multifarious actions; and
this is so because the strength of the one half of such a body will
inevitably be found to be weaker than the strength of the whole; and
the weaker is less powerful to perform and overcome than the stronger;
and whatsoever, other than the infinite, gets less is itself finite;
hence the strength of each one of the two halves is finite; hence
too their sum is finite, since that the sum of two finites is itself
finite, whereas it has been contended that it is infinite, which is a
contradiction. Hence the sound view is that the powers of bodies are
not powerful enough to perform infinite manifold deeds. The rational
power however is powerful enough to perform many infinite deeds, seeing
that forms geometrical, arithmetical, and philosophical, which the
rational power has to perform among other of its acts, are infinite.
Therefore the rational power is not standing by and through the body,
and hence therefore it stands of itself and is an essence of itself.
Further, so much at least is clear that the corruption of one of two
conjoined essences does not entail and enjoin the corruption of the
other: wherefore the death of the body does not render obligatory the
death of the soul, which is what we wanted to show.