=Treating in Detail of the Five Senses, and of How they perceive.=
As to the seeing power, philosophers have differed on the question of
How they perceive. Thus one set among them asserts that they perceive
wholly and solely through a ray that shoots out beyond the eye, and so
encounters the sensible objects that are seen. This is Plato’s way.[13]
Others assert that the perceiving power itself encounters the sensible
objects that are seen, and so perceives them. Still others say that
visual perception consists in this:--When the intervening transparent
body becomes effectively transparent by light shining upon it, then an
impression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible
objects as are seen is effected in the cristalline[14] lens of the eye,
just such a pictorial impression as is effected in looking-glasses
(mirrors); indeed the two effects are so similar that were mirrors
possessed of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted in
them. This is Aristotle’s way; and it is the sound reliable opinion.
That Plato’s view is false, is quite clear. For, were it true that a
ray goes out from the seat of sight and encounters sensible objects,
then sight would be in no need of light, but would on the contrary
perceive in the dark, and would rather illuminate the air on its exit
into the dark. Moreover such a ray will not fail of one of two modes:
either it will subsist throughout the eye only, in which case Plato’s
opinion that it goes forth from the eye is wrong; or else it will
subsist throughout a body other than the material of which the eye is
composed; for it must inevitably have a vehicle to carry it, seeing
that a ray is an accidental quality or mode, and furthermore seeing
that that body which is other than the eye will not fail, in its turn,
of being, either, _firstly_, sent out from the eye, in which case it
will follow as a matter of course that the eye will not see all that is
beneath the clear blue of the sky, since one body will not penetrate
throughout the whole of another body, unless forsooth it moves the
latter away and occupies its place; and even should the disputer plead
a vacuum, not only does Plato deny the existence of a vacuum utterly,
but also if we accomodatingly yield this point and admit the existence
of a vacuum, yet for all this the body that goes forth from the eye
will penetrate throughout the body of water, for example, into such
of its pores as are empty only, and not into the whole of the water’s
bulk; so that even according to this opinion it will necessarily
so be that the eye will see only some places of all that is under
water;--or else, _secondly_, that body which is other than the eye
will not fail of being an intervening body intermediate between the
seer and the seen, in which case the light[I] which comes forth from
the eye will subsist through it; nevertheless this opinion too is
unsound, for the reason that every thing whatsoever is, in proximity
to its source, so much the stronger, and in this respect light has not
its equal; whence it follows as regards the object seen that, however
closely and nearly it approaches to the eye, our perception will then
be stronger; and thus if we do away with the intermediary body, the
eye will still perceive the object felt by its sense of sight, and
thus the intermediary which is the vehicle and carrier of light is no
longer needed, save accidentally (by chance); and then too there is no
need, in order to see, for an exit of light: this too is a falsehood.
Wherefore Plato’s opinion is worthless.
As for such as hold that the perceiver of the thing seen is the
imaginative power itself through the imprinting of the form (image)
of the sensible object upon it, these render the absent on the same
footing as the present, since in the imaginative power there may exist
the image of a sensible object, notwithstanding the absence afterwards
of the object that had been so felt: at which time however the living
being so preserving that image will not be qualified with sight but
with imagination and memory. Furthermore these theorists (opiners)
make a greater blunder still, seeing that they render a thing of
Nature’s make and composition wholly idle, useless, and unneeded in
the operation of visual perception; inasmuch as in their opinion the
imaginative power itself meets immediately sensible objects, and thus
spares Nature the task of adapting an instrument (organ), to wit the
complex eye.
Wherefore the sound theory is that the configurations of things stand
out in the transparent ambient--if it be effectively transparent on the
shining of a luminant upon it--and hence they do not appear but in a
polished body capable of receiving them, such as mirrors and the like;
and so too there is in the eye a crystalline lens (or humor) into which
the forms (pictures) of things are imprinted, just as their impression
into mirrors; and in it, i.e., the lens or the eye, has been fitted
up the seeing power; so that, if such forms are imprinted in it, it
perceives them. Moreover, the objects of perception belonging in truth
and deed to sight are the Colors.
As for the Hearing Power: it hears only sound. And sound is a motion
of air that the ear feels on two hard smooth bodies coming quickly
close up one to the other, the escaping of the air from between them,
its striking the ear, and its moving the air that is kept ready within
the instrument (organ) of hearing. Thus, if this inside air move the
instrument, and if this instrument’s motion act upon the nerve of
hearing, the hearing power (sense, faculty) perceives it in the measure
of the strength or weakness of that motion. Indeed hardness is a
_conditio sine qua non_; for, in the case of two soft bodies, the air
will not escape from them, but will dissipate itself throughout their
pores. Smoothness too is just such a condition; because, in the case
of rough (unsmooth) bodies, not the whole of the air will escape from
between them suddenly and violently, but will be witheld (shut up) in
the passages. And rapidity of contact also is a like condition; for if
it come about gently and slowly, the air would not escape violently.
The echo too will arise from the rebound of the air escaping from
between the two encountering bodies by reason of its hitting (slapping)
against another hard, flat or hollow body filled with air, because of
the air that is within it hindering the penetration of the escaped air,
and the latter’s striking the ear [again] after the first stroke; on
the same wise as in the first instance.
As to the Smelling Power; it smells odors on the sniffing in of air
that has received its odor from an odoriferous body, as one body
receives its warmth from another warm body. Thus, if an animal snuffs
up air like this into its nose until such air touches the front of the
brain, and alters it to its own odor, the smelling power feels it.
As for Taste, it arises only on the coming to pass of the following
change: When the moisture of the tasting instrument (organ)--to wit the
tongue--becomes transformed into the juice of the newly-come food; and
when the mass of this instrument (organ) has received that juice, the
tasting power will perceive what has happened within the instrument.
As for Touch: it will only arise upon the organ’s (instrument’s)
receiving the quality of that which is touched, and upon the touching
power’s perceiving what has been thus presented (offered) within the
organ.
Furthermore, simple sensibles, that are at once primary and as such the
bases of all others, are in pairs, of which there are eight; and if we
make each into singles, they become sixteen, to wit:--
(a) Touch, four pairs:--1. heat and cold; 2. moisture and dryness; 3.
roughness and smoothness; 4. hardness and softness. The four remaining
senses, each having a pair, viz.,
(b) Smelling, one pair, which is fragrant odour, and fetid stinking
odour,
(c) Tasting, one pair, viz., sweet and bitter,
(d) Hearing, one pair, namely, heavy sound and sharp sound (or dull and
shrill),
(e) Sight, one pair, to wit, white and black.
All other sensibles are made up from these simples, and are
intermediates between some two of them, as for example grey (dusty
color) from white and black, lukewarm from hot and cold. Moreover all
sensibles are felt wholly and solely through a sort of gathering and
sundering, shrinking and spreading; except sounds, which are felt only
through sundering. Thus:--
1. [Warmth is felt through sundering]
2. Cold is felt through gathering
3. Moisture, through spreading
4. Dryness, through shrinking
5. Roughness, through sundering
6. Smoothness, through spreading
7. Hardness, through repelling, which is a sort of gathering and
shrinking
8. Softness, through being repelled, which is not devoid of spreading
and sundering
9. Sweetness, through spreading, devoid of sundering
10. Bitterness, through sundering and shrinking
11. Fragrant Odor, through spreading, devoid of sundering
12. Stinking Odor, through sundering and shrinking
13. Whiteness, through sundering
14. Blackness, through gathering
[15. and 16. Sounds: one pair, as above under “d.”]
As to the media (intermediaries) between the feeling powers and the
felt forms, they are themselves devoid of the forms of sensibles;
otherwise it would not be possible for them to be media, since their
own forms--if they had any--would then so engage the apposite power
as to divert it from perceiving any other forms. Such voidness or
freedom from forms is either voidness wholly and altogether, or else
relative voidness through equableness of the forms in the media, such
as the equable proportion of the qualities touched in meat, which is
a medium between the touching power and the quality touched, although
meat is incontestably made up of qualities that are touched, yet
notwithstanding this the equableness of the qualities has annihilated
the forms in it. Examples of the first division--absolute voidness
and freedom from form--are the freedom of air, of water, and of
what resembles them among the various media of sight, from color;
the freedom of air and of water, both which are the two mediums of
smelling, from odor; the freedom of water, which is the medium of
tasting, from flavor; and the steadiness of the air, which is the
medium of hearing, and its freedom from motion.
Further, each of these powers, to wit the five senses, if actually
functionating, perceives only through coming into relation with the
object felt, nay rather it only perceives at first so much as has
been traced in it of the form of the object felt. Thus, the eye only
perceives that form which has imprinted itself in it of the object
felt; so also the remainder of the powers (or senses). Again, in the
case of strong wearying sensibles, such as a loud noise, a strong
smell, a shining and a flashing light, if they are repeated upon the
organ (instrument), spoil and dullen it through their overworking it.
Again, each one of the five senses perceives, through the means of its
own rightful perception and besides the same, five other things, to
wit: 1. shape; 2. number; 3. size; 4. motion; 5. rest (quiet). That
sight, touch, and taste perceive them, is evident. As to hearing, it
perceives, in accordance (pursuance) with the variety of the number
of sounds, the number of the sound-emitting objects; and, through the
strength of the sounds, it perceives the size of the two objects that
are hitting against each other; and, in accordance with a kind of
change and fixedness of the sounds, it perceives motion and rest; and,
in accordance with their volume around the sound-emitter, be the latter
solid or hollow, it perceives some sorts of shapes. As to smelling, it
knows, in accordance with the change of directions whence the odors are
emitted and reach it, and through the variety of these odors in their
qualities, it knows I say the number of the things smelt; through the
measure of abundance of the smells, the size of such things; through
the measure of proximity and distance, changeableness and fixedness,
it recognizes their motion and their rest; and, in accordance with the
sides on which their odor reaches it from one and the same body, it
knows their shape. Still, these discriminations are very weak in this
power among mankind, owing to the weakness of the power itself in the
human race. [For all this, men have not the keen scent that many other
animals have, and therefore such discriminations are in men very weak.]