FOREIGN POLICY
After a brief stay at Royat, whither doctor's orders had sent Lady
Dilke, Sir Charles returned with her, in September, 1886, to the little
riverside cottage at Dockett. Thence, as autumn drew on, they moved to
the other cottage that had been built among the pines on the sandy ridge
near Woking.
No longer having a seat in the House of Commons, Sir Charles again
resumed the pen, by which he had first gained distinction.
In the English home politics of 1887, the Irish Question predominated as
it had never done before: Home Rule was being thrashed out on every
platform. This was a matter on which Sir Charles, to use his own words,
'never clearly saw his way'; it was one that he naturally avoided, for
it had separated him from his most intimate political associate, and he
turned to the field of foreign affairs which had continuously occupied
him during his tenure of office, and which, save during the episode of
the franchise negotiations, had been his central concern.
For a moment he had the notion of entering into the business of
newspaper management. His object was not to secure literary reputation,
but to direct and influence public opinion. Early in 1887 he wrote to
his friend Mr. Thursfield of the _Times_:
'What I want is work on foreign affairs, or rather external affairs,
or foreign and colonial. I would prefer not to write, but to suggest
and supervise foreign news, and to work up the subjects of the
leaders which others would write. If I wrote, I think I should write
less well than other people, because I always write as I speak, and
not as people are taught to write.'
Nothing came of this idea; but it was a proposal remarkable in its
self-depreciation, because it was made when work from his pen was
already having a conspicuous success. Beginning in January, 1887, a
series of six articles dealing with the existing position of the six
Great Powers appeared in the _Fortnightly Review_, anonymously, but the
author was at once identified. They sent the _Review_ into repeated
editions. They appeared translated into French in the _Nouvelle Revue_,
and were discussed all over Europe. Later in the summer they were
published in book form, and called in English _The Present Position of
European Politics_ and in French _L'Europe en 1887_.
In the author's own words, the articles dealt with 'facts and
tendencies'; and though he would have been the last to hold himself a
prophet, saying that in the nature of things 'two years meant for ever
in politics,' much that he wrote is still of interest, and the
suggestion of Mr. Erskine Childers' hero that we should 'Read Dilke' is
not yet out of date. [Footnote: _Riddle of the Sands_, by Erskine
Childers, popular edition, p. 127. First published March, 1903.]
The keynote of the book is contained in the opening words, 'The present
position of the European world is one in which sheer force holds a
larger place than it has held in modern times since the fall of
Napoleon.' This reign of force the author traced back to 1878, the date
of the Treaty of Berlin, but it was originally due, as he pointed out,
to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, which had left a permanent
source of irritation in the European States system. Nevertheless, he
recognized that for the time the continuance of Prince Bismarck's
policy, based as it was on the maintenance of the Treaty, meant peace,
because Prince Bismarck believed peace to be necessary for the
maintenance in undiminished strength of the German Empire, wedged in
between France and Russia, the former always hostile, the latter an
uncertain quantity. An alliance with Austria-Hungary was necessary to
this policy: an alliance dictated by the fact that no other was likely
to be permanent. Italy, it was true, had recently joined the alliance;
but Italy, like Russia, was an uncertain factor, and Sir Charles Dilke
believed that, if a critical moment were to come, the desire to get the
Trentino would be stronger than the ties of any alliance. The policy of
Prince Bismarck was accordingly to prevent a Russo-French alliance, and
to help Russia to push into the Far East; to help her also in the
Balkans, but not beyond the point at which Austria might remonstrate;
and to prevent Austria from seeking anything calculated to precipitate a
war between herself and Russia, such as an attempt to add to the
position which she had obtained in the Balkan Peninsula under the Treaty
of Berlin. This policy also involved keeping Turkey quiet and preventing
a league of the Balkan States, lest such a league should irritate Russia
and Austria and produce a European conflagration.
General Fadejew, in a celebrated pamphlet [Footnote: General Fadejew,
_Über Russland's Kriegsmacht und Kriegspolitik_, Leipzig, 1870,
translated from the Russian.] which fluttered all the Chancelleries of
Europe in the early seventies, had said that the road from Russia to
Constantinople lay through Vienna; and Vienna, Sir Charles agreed with
the Russian general, was the centre to be watched, for it was there that
the key of European policy was to be found. 'Austria interests me,' he
wrote, when preparing his book, to Sir William White, the Ambassador at
Constantinople. 'I can't leave London, but I'm thinking of sending a man
to Vienna to tell me certain things. If so, to whom should he go?' And
he watched the strange development of events in Bulgaria. Early in
January he notes an interview with 'Dr. Stoiloff, the ablest man except
the brutal Stambuloff, and the leader of the Conservative party' in
Bulgaria, where the perpetual intrigues of Russian agents, official and
unofficial, had recently culminated, in August, 1886, in the kidnapping
of the reigning chief of the State, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and
had thereby created an Austrian party: events which were to have many
long-drawn-out consequences, as the following century to its own cost
was to find out. Bulgaria from this time began to move in an orbit of
her own, distinct from, and often unfriendly to, the other Balkan
States.
In 1887 it was still a current belief--especially on the part of many of
Sir Charles's own political friends--that Germany was eagerly watching
for an opportunity to seize the German provinces of Austria, and that
Austria was eagerly watching for an opportunity 'to go to Salonica,' as
the current phrase had it. The two propositions were almost mutually
destructive, but, without insisting on this rather obvious
consideration, Sir Charles was well aware that (even apart from reasons
of international policy) Germany could not desire the disruption of
Austria, because the German provinces of Upper and Lower Austria and
Styria did not lie next to North Germany, but were cut off from it by
countries in which the most enterprising of all Slavonic peoples--the
Czechs of Bohemia--'hated the Germans with a deadly hatred,' and
already, even in 1887, had got the upper hand. Count Bismarck himself
had resisted--and successfully--the desire of the military party to
annex Bohemia in 1866 after Sadowa. The permanent exclusion of Austria
and the House of Hapsburg from Germany was also no sudden or ephemeral
policy. In the middle of the seventeenth century, as the author of the
_Holy Roman Empire_ had reminded his readers, it had been proposed by
the famous publicist Philippe Chemnitz, who wrote under the name of
'Hippolytus à Lapide,' as the surest means of securing a permanent unity
of some kind in Germany. [Footnote: See Bryce, _Holy Roman Empire_,
chap. xx., p. 386; Louis Léger, _Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie_, chap.
xv., p. 258.] It had been adopted by the leaders in the Frankfurt
Parliament of 1848-49, and Count Bismarck was the inheritor of these
traditions when he finally expelled the House of Hapsburg in 1866, and
thus translated ancient theories into modern facts. It was therefore
highly improbable, to say the least, that only a few years after the
Treaty of Berlin he should be engaged in an attempt to nullify his own
work. [Footnote: On January 14th, 1849, the Frankfurt Parliament voted
the exclusion of Austria from Germany.]
Austria, Sir Charles Dilke pointed out, some day by mere competition
with Russia, if that Power made further advances, might perhaps be
forced forward unwillingly to Salonica; but by thus seizing Macedonia--a
far larger proposition than that of the annexation of Bosnia and the
Herzegovina, and in many respects a different one--it was clear she
would 'increase her military weakness, would deeply offend the Servians,
the Greeks, and the Bulgarians, and by increasing the number of her
Slavonic subjects would only hasten her own break-up.' Here, in fact,
lay the real danger to the 'Eastern Empire.' Prince Bismarck, as a
matter of fact, was of all men in Europe the man who most desired to
keep Austria alive. 'It is a necessity to him that she should continue
to exist. Once destroy Austria, and Germany is left to fight it out with
France and Russia without assistance, for in this case Italy would not
move,' notwithstanding the recently renewed Triple Alliance. That a
military party existed in Austria which might desire to go to Salonica,
and would also rejoice in a war with Italy, Sir Charles was well aware;
but he saw no reason to believe that it would succeed in forcing these
adventures on the Ballplatz, or on the statesmen of Hungary, who above
all things dreaded an increase of the Slavonic elements in the Empire.
The Austria-Hungary of 1887 was the Austria-Hungary of the long rule of
Count Taafe at Vienna, of M. Koloman Tisza at Buda-Pesth, and of Count
Kalnoky at the Ballplatz; and it was not unreasonable at that time to
consider it possible that, 'after the division of the respective spheres
of influence of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, in Macedonia, Austria
might gradually increase her influence in the Balkan States; and if she
would take the bold step of making up an arrangement for evacuating part
of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, so as to show she had no intention of
going southwards to Salonica, she might bring together in a general
understanding with herself the small States and the Turks.' This,
however, Sir Charles admitted, was probably impracticable, 'as Austro-
Hungarian pride would effectually prevent the abandonment of any portion
of Bosnia.' But so late as 1909 Dilke told Lord Fitzmaurice, when, at
the time of her final annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina,
Austria-Hungary had retired from the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, that he
thought the British Foreign Office 'had made too great a fuss' over the
annexation, which had been certain to come, sooner or later. [Footnote:
Lord Fitzmaurice was then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and
represented the Foreign Office in the House of Lords. See further as to
Sir Charles Dilke's' views on the events of 1908, Chapter LVIII.]
Mr. Robert Lowe is credited with having said that a metaphysician
resembled a blind man groping in a dark room for a black hat that was
not there. The comparison might almost have been applied to the Foreign
Minister of the Dual Empire, vainly seeking for a coherent policy among
the mists and cross-currents of rival nationalities. The charge to be
made against the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was, in fact, not
that she had got a policy--good or bad, ambitious or the reverse--but
that it was almost impossible as a rule to ascertain whether she had any
policy at all: the explanation being that her internal problems
paralyzed her action abroad. 'It was difficult to be a patriot in
Austria, for nobody exactly knew to the representatives of what race,
tongue, or language, his allegiance was due.' 'Austria was indeed of all
countries in the world by far the most difficult to govern, and as a
necessity of her condition she must before all things long for peace....
Under her many difficulties caused by racial divisions she had become
constitutionally timid and naturally slow to move, and the outlook was
far from promising ... nor had Prince Bismarck'--notwithstanding the
terms of the Triple Alliance--'bound Germany to espouse all the quarrels
of Austria, no matter where and with whom.' It had been said, and by
Prince Bismarck himself, that the bones of not a single Pomeranian
grenadier should be allowed to whiten in a Balkan quarrel. [Footnote:
Speech in the Reichstag, December 16th, 1876.] 'The only real question
worth asking was: Will Austria resist Russian pretensions, and will she,
if in danger of conquest, be supported by allies, or will she yield and
take her share of the spoils?' [Footnote: _The Present Position of
European Politics_, pp. 185, 193, 194, 205, 206, 219, 221-224.]
The long-standing jealousies, also, of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and
Greece, in regard to the future of the Adriatic coast, Sir Charles Dilke
felt were not sufficiently appreciated in England, where public opinion
was too much inclined to see the Turk and the Slav only in every
question concerned with the Balkan Peninsula. When Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs in 1880-81, he had given a strong support to the
proposals in regard to Albania of Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, which had the
approval of Mr. Goschen, then Special Ambassador to the Porte--proposals
which were framed with a view to the ultimate autonomy of the country,
and were not accepted by the European Commission of Reforms, mainly
owing to the opposition of Austria-Hungary. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord
Goschen_, vol. i, p. 215. These proposals were revived in 1912, and,
which is remarkable, by Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister of
Austria-Hungary, in a despatch in favour of 'progressive
decentralization.' See an article in the _Edinburgh Review_, April,
1913: 'Austria and Italy have been rivals for influence in Albania, as
Austria and Russia were rivals in Macedonia. It was because of this
rivalry that the Treaty of Berlin, so far as it applied to the European
provinces of Turkey, was never properly carried into effect. For the
same reason the Fitzmaurice proposal of 1880 was defeated by the
opposition of Vienna. The suggestion was that a greater Albania should
be created, which would have been autonomous under a European guarantee.
It is among the ironies of history that this scheme, rejected by Austria
when it came from a friendly and neutral source, should have been put
forward by the Austrian Foreign Office itself thirty-two years later.
Count Berchtold's Circular Note of August 14th, 1912, revived the
Fitzmaurice programme. The proposition came too late.'] But in _The
Present Position of European Politics_ it is seen how the author's
increasing confidence in the future of Greece led to a change of opinion
on this, the most intricate, perhaps, of all diplomatic questions
connected with the Near East. He now advocated as large an extension as
possible of the existing northern boundary of Greece, and held that the
rest of Albania should be joined to Greece by some form of personal
union, which ultimately might grow into a closer tie, bearing in mind
the friendly cooperation of Greeks and Albanians in the War of
Independence against Turkey, and the fact that a strong Albanian element
already existed in the Greek kingdom. [Footnote: _The Present Position
of European Politics_, pp. 146, 148, 193, 206, 214-217, 232, 237, 238.]
A European Congress seemed to him the only method to avoid the ultimate
arbitrament of war in this mass of tangled questions, but experience had
shown that a Congress was useless unless the Great Powers had settled
the main questions beforehand in agreement among themselves. Experience
had unfortunately also shown the extreme difficulty of obtaining any
such agreement.
'Austria ought to have been the heir of Turkey; the protector of a
Greece extended to include Albania, Macedonia, the Islands, and the
coast to Constantinople and down to Asia Minor; the friend of Servia and
Roumania, and what not.' But these things remained in the class of
visions, even if occasionally some Austrian or Hungarian statesman, like
Herr von Kallay, seemed disposed to grasp them, and to renew the
tradition of the forward policy attributed to Prince Eugène of Savoy and
the Archduke Charles. Hungary also had made Roumania her antagonist by
her illiberal policy in regard to the navigation of the Danube. Any
permanent confederation of the Balkan States as distinct from a
temporary alliance for some special and defined object, such as a
possible attack on Turkey, seemed therefore no longer possible,
especially after the recent events in Bulgaria. Meanwhile there was to
be peace, because Prince Bismarck so willed it. [Footnote: See _Der
Krimkrieg und die Österreichische Politik_, von Heinrich Friedjung,
chap, ii., p. 16 (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1907); Louis Léger, _Études
Slaves: L'Autriche-Hongrie et la Question d'Orient_, p. 395.]
The overmastering sense of the importance of whatever happened at Vienna
and Constantinople--of which every page of _The Present Position of
European Politics_ is the evidence--will largely explain Sir Charles
Dilke's views on another question. It has been seen that he was amongst
the strongest advocates of an active policy in Egypt in 1882, agreeing
in this with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington. But at an early period
after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir he pronounced himself, when the
question arose, in favour of the earliest possible evacuation of the
country, and contemplated it as a possibility of the immediate future.
[Footnote: Sir Charles wrote in the _Speaker_ of January 23rd, 1892, in
reply to Admiral Maxse: 'Admiral Maxse appears to think that my views in
favour of evacuation have been recently formed....' 'There was a time,
_before_ the intervention of the condominium with France by Lord Derby,
when I held a different view; but it was not only formed under
circumstances very different from those which have now existed for
fourteen years, but also at a time when I had not given special
consideration to our probable naval and military position in the event
of war.'] Egypt to him, considered from the point of view of British
interests, was subsidiary to Constantinople. All that really signified
was the right of passage through the Suez Canal, which could, he
believed, be secured by international arrangement and the neutralization
of the country, a plan for which, as already seen, was being actually
discussed by Mr. Gladstone's Government when it fell. Egypt, in fact, he
regarded as part of Asia rather than of Africa, and he believed that
time would make this more clear than ever, in proportion as railways
were developed in Syria, Arabia, and Asia Minor. In this connection
Constantinople, not Alexandria or Cairo, seemed to him the decisive
factor: an opinion which brought him into opposition with those who held
the view that since the occupation of Egypt by British troops events at
Constantinople had become comparatively unimportant to this country. He
also feared that if some great European crisis were to arise, in which
Great Britain was involved, the occupation of Egypt might be a hindrance
rather than a source of strength, and might hamper our exertions in
other lands.
He had, however, no fear of allowing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to
be opened under suitable conditions to the passage of Russian ships of
war, but only on the condition laid down by Sir William White, that the
right accorded to Russia must be accorded to the ships of war of other
nations; and this partly out of regard to the dignity of the British
flag, and partly because any exclusive right accorded to Russia would be
resisted by the States bordering on the Black Sea and by those
interested in the trade and navigation of the Danube. But the opening of
the Straits was one thing, the possession of Constantinople by Russia
was another, and in his opinion would cause a European convulsion; for
he saw in Constantinople what has since been termed 'the great strategic
centre of the world': [Footnote: The expression was used by Mr. Winston
Churchill in a speech on November 15th, 1915, in the House of Commons.]
the meeting-place and clearing-house of the trade and politics of three
continents.
'Russia at Constantinople,' he wrote, 'would mean the destruction of
Austria and the Russification of a large portion of her Slavs. When
Austria had disappeared or had been transformed out of all knowledge,
Germany, placed between France and Russia, would be still weaker in her
military position than she is at present. It is no doubt impossible that
Germany can really contemplate that contingency with complete
satisfaction. And if she cannot get other people to help Austria to keep
Russia away from Constantinople, it is probable that she would be forced
to interfere to help to do so, however stoutly her rulers may make the
opposite declaration. One of my most valued correspondents, whose
criticisms have been of the highest use to me, admits that to place
Turkey at the head of a Balkan Confederation would be "adding a badger
to your three unfriendly cats and altogether hostile dog"; but,
nevertheless, he thinks that such a combination would be possible on
account of the overwhelming dread of the danger of absorption by Russia;
and I think it right to state his view, although I am unable to modify
that which I have said as to the difficulties which the dispute for
Macedonia causes.' [Footnote: _The Present Position of European
Politics_, pp. 372, 373.]
In the autumn of 1891 this note occurs in the Memoir: 'John Morley
having made a speech in favour of the cessation of the Egyptian
occupation, I wrote to tell him how pleased I was, and in his reply he
asked why we should go on mechanically applauding Lord Salisbury's
foreign policy, which left this danger standing.'
Mr. Morley's satisfaction was, however, not shared by Mr. Chamberlain,
who wrote in January, 1892, 'to implore me to have regard to the opinion
of society about Egypt.'
'I do not mean fashionable society,' he added, 'but political society,
and the great majority of cultivated politicians. I think you do go out
of your way to offend them when you advocate evacuation of Egypt, and I
ask you to consider if it is worth your while. It is not necessary for
your constituents, and with regard to the others, there is no need to
add to their causes of anger against you. My advice is, "Be as Radical
as you like, be Home Ruler if you must, but be a little Jingo if you
can."'
The correspondence had begun in the autumn of 1891, when Sir Charles
wrote the following letter:
'Pyrford by Maybury,
'Near Woking,
'_October_ 19_th_, 1891.
'My Dear Chamberlain,
'I have never said that there are not conceivable circumstances in
which it would be better for us to be in Egypt. I'm going to try and
discuss them in the book I am at work on. _Re_ command of the sea
against France. We have not quite a sufficient force to blockade
Brest and Toulon. Lefevre and most of our sailors contemplate only
"masking" Toulon by a fleet at Gibraltar, and using the Cape route.
In this case we could not reinforce Egypt except from India, and
not, of course, from India if we were at war with Russia too.
'I am in favour of a stronger navy, and attempting blockade, though
it is not _certain_ that it can be made _for certain_ successful.
Still Colomb is a better authority than Beresford, etc. I mean
"Admiral Colomb," not Sir John. The difficulty, even if blockades
are possible, is that France keeps building after us so as always to
be without the limits which would make it possible. Lefevre will
support Mr. G. in cutting down the navy on this ground--i.e., will
prove by figures that every time we lay down nine ships the French
lay down six or seven.
'I think that in the long-run France will beat Germany. She will
fight her some day single-handed on a point in which Austria and
Italy will not move, nor Russia either. Then, if Germany gets the
best of it, the others will "mediate."
'Yours ever,
'Chs. W. D.'
'November, 1891, we spent in France.... While I was away I had a
correspondence with Chamberlain about his speech on Egypt' (in reply
to Morley), 'and pointed out to him,' says the Memoir,' that he had
changed his mind so completely about evacuation that it was hardly
prudent in him not frankly to admit the change of mind, as he had
done in at least one speech previously.' He replied:
'"I have looked the matter up, and I think it is quite true that in
1884 we were all for evacuation as early as possible. But I did not
then estimate properly the magnitude of the task we had undertaken,
nor did I know how splendidly it would be performed by Baring and
his colleagues. Baring himself began as a strong advocate for
evacuation."
'In my answer, I said that Baring had only changed his mind in the
way in which all people are apt to change their minds when they are
employed as the agents of a policy, and I combated Chamberlain's
military views, which were, in fact, for defending Egypt by the
fleet--that fleet which is expected to do everything!'
Sir Charles set out in an article in the _Speaker_ all the pledges to
evacuate which had been given by the Liberal Government and repeated by
Lord Salisbury. Thereupon Mr. Morley, whose general views on foreign
policy were not as a rule at all the same as those of Sir Charles, wrote
from Biarritz, where he was in Mr. Gladstone's company, that he had read
the _Speaker_ with enormous satisfaction. It would have a stimulating
effect in quarters where a little stimulus was much needed, and had
given much satisfaction to other people in Biarritz besides himself.
'"Quarters" of course meant Rosebery,' is Sir Charles's comment, and he
adds:
'In order to meet the Rosebery objection to evacuation, I wrote an
article for the January _Fortnightly_, of which the editor changed
nothing but the title. I had called it "Lords Salisbury and
Rosebery," and he changed it to "Conservative Foreign Policy."'
At a later date, in a letter [Footnote: This letter was apparently
written on April 14th, 1893:
'Those of us who bitterly dislike the occupation of Egypt by a
British force have been both to add to your work before and during a
session in which, not to speak of the ordinary demand on the time of
a Prime Minister, your unprecedented relation to the chief measure
makes it the duty of your supporters to confine themselves to
helping clear the road. Naught else could have excused us from
having hitherto refrained from pressing the state of Egypt on the
consideration of yourself, or of the House of Commons. It is only
because since the publication of a recent despatch we feel that the
time has nearly come for making up one's mind to be for ever silent
upon the question, and because I cannot do so, given the strong
feeling that I have with regard to it, without one last attempt to
cause some change in a "temporary" situation now crystallizing into
permanency, that I venture to address you. I ask for no reply. I
shall have to bring the question before the House of Commons. I have
no illusions as to what is likely to be the result of so doing. Sir
E. Grey will tell us that the occupation is still "temporary," but
must last, "for the sake of Egypt," till we can "with safety" leave:
and so it will continue, with all its dangers to ourselves, till the
next great war. Whoever else may again raise the Egyptian question
in the future, I shall not. Vote I must, whenever it comes before
the House, but I need not do more.
'Not one word of blame of anyone will fall from me when I raise the
question on first going into Committee on Civil Estimates. It seems
to me, I confess--but I shall try to keep the opinion to myself--
that it would have been, on the whole, the safest course to have
done in 1892 that which Lord Granville, under your guidance, did in
1880, and to have ourselves proposed, on the very day of the
accession to office of the new Government, the policy which we
thought best in the interest of the country and had supported in
Opposition. Lord Granville congratulated himself, and with justice,
on the promptitude with which, before the Russians could say a word
to him as to the complete fulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin, he had
told the Ambassador, in the first minute of their first interview,
that the Government would insist on that fulfilment. Had the present
Secretary of State, at his first interview with the French
Ambassador, made a similar communication with regard to Egypt (at
least so far as to propose to resume the negotiations of 1887), we
should, perhaps, have avoided many evils. I share to the full the
belief, which you expressed in such admirable terms a couple of
years ago, that the long-lasting occupation of Egypt by our forces
is the cause of all the difficulties by which our foreign policy,
and even our position in Europe, are oppressed. Our hands are not
free, and never will be free, so long as the occupation continues.
But ills more direct are likely to fall upon us; and no one can look
forward without the gravest dread to the prospect of our being
drawn, step by step, into a situation in which we shall be driven to
arrest the persons of the young Khedive and those of his advisers
who possess the confidence of all that is intelligent among the
Egyptian people; or (as seems hinted in Lord Bosebery's despatch) to
insist upon a deposition.
'In the discussions as to the occupation of Egypt which occurred in
the Cabinet, before I was a member of it, in 1882, even before the
expedition (for the occupation was foreseen), I took a share, as
Lord Granville was good enough to consult me on the papers
circulated by his colleagues. As far as I am concerned, I have never
budged from the principles of a memorandum which I wrote on July
4th, 1882; but those principles were far more excellently stated by
you in a memorandum of the beginning of September, 1882--before
Tel-el-Kebir--a memorandum which was approved by men now so hostile
to your views as Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet. Sir E.
Baring, now, as Lord Cromer, so bitterly opposed to us, in a paper
of September or October, 1882, and Chamberlain in his paper of about
October 21st, 1882, both pointed out how essential it was that our
occupation should be really temporary, and that our condition--that
we should leave behind us a "stable" state of things--depended on
and meant what Chamberlain called "the extension of Egyptian
liberties": the convoking, if not of a truly representative
Assembly, at least of the Notables. Lord Dufferin, in December 1882,
wrote to me that he would sooner run any risk than abandon the
representative institutions proposed for Egypt in his famous scheme.
Yet now the French are bidding the Khedive call together, against
Lord Dufferin's virtual successor, this very Assembly of Notables,
which Lord Cromer, such is his present policy, dare not call. The
conception of this Assembly was the act of yourself, supported by
Lord Granville and Sir William Harcourt and supported on paper by
Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Baring, and opposed by Lord Hartington, by
the then Chancellor, and by Lord Northbrook. This "extension of
Egyptian liberties," which was our pride, which was our excuse for
that "short prolongation" of the occupation, to which I was myself
opposed--an extension of liberties which has not been carried into
practical effect by us--is certain to result in a declaration by the
Notables, when they meet, as within this year, through the French
Agent's influence, they will, that they are rootedly opposed to our
presence in their land.
'It may be said that neither the Turks nor the French have pressed
us, directly, to come out. The Turks will never really press us. The
Sultan is forced by Moslem public opinion to ask us to leave Egypt,
but he is in fact personally anxious that we should stay there to
keep Mahdism in the desert and representative institutions in the
shade. The French have also their inner policy--their Rothschilds to
keep in good humour--and two currents, one political and one
financial, with which to deal. M. Waddington expressed to you at
Hawarden a mere desire for exchange of views between the Cabinets.
He was naturally anxious not to be refused in any direct request.
But French public opinion is exasperated against us; only one man in
France believes a word we say, and our diplomatists and admirals
behave as though they represented German instead of neutral
interests. We are responsible for tempting Italy to stay in the
alliance of the Central Powers, to her own hurt.
'None of these things shall I be able to say when I bring the
question before the House of Commons. To do so would involve
statements based on private letters and statements as to Cabinet
differences of 1882, which I cannot make. We shall be compelled to
rely chiefly upon the declarations of Lord Salisbury, which were
summed up in his words of May, 1887, to the effect that the
occupation entails on us "heavy sacrifices, without adequate return
either in peace or in war."
'Having given attention for some years past to our general position
as a nation, feeling as I do, with you, how adversely it is affected
by the prolongation of the "temporary" occupation, which, as matters
stand, seems likely to endure till the next war, even should it be
postponed till half a century hence, I cannot but feel miserable at
the situation of this affair, and I once more ask your pardon for in
this way liberating my mind, or, I fear, rather discharging upon
you, regardless of your prodigious avocations, this last expression
of a regret deeper than that which I have previously entertained on
any public question.
'Through the mischiefs of the occupation there now seems to come no
single ray of light. The present year will not pass over without a
change in the local situation at Cairo, from which a conference is
likely to result. A passage near the end of Lord Rosebery's despatch
shows that he is prepared to have a conference forced upon him. Had
we invited it, such a conference would be to us the blessing that it
will be to others. Would it not at least be best that we should call
that conference on the first opportunity rather than have it thrust
down our throats?
'This letter has not been shown to anyone, and needs, as I said, no
reply, but I should be glad if it were not handed to anyone outside
of your own circle. It has not been mentioned to anyone except Mr.
Herbert Gladstone.']
to Mr. Gladstone during his last Premiership, Dilke summed up his views
when a debate was about to take place in the House of Commons, and four
days later he notes: 'On April 18th I had a long interview with Mr.
Gladstone, who sent for me, on my letter. The only thing he said worth
remembering was, "Jingoism is stronger than ever. It is no longer war
fever, but earth hunger."'
In 1887 the possibility of a German attempt to violate the neutrality of
Belgian territory, notwithstanding the treaty of guarantee of 1839,
which Prussia herself had signed, was again attracting attention owing
to a sudden renewal of warlike apprehensions on the Continent. The
position of Luxemburg was a kindred question, though the international
guarantee was of a far more uncertain character than in the case of
Belgium. Sir Charles, as already related, had returned from his work in
France during the war of 1870 with a profound conviction that a spirit
of reckless violence was abroad in Germany, which would stop at nothing
if favourable circumstances offered a temptation to action; and in his
opinion the absence of any fortifications at Liége and Namur afforded
such a temptation. The point had been till then little discussed in
England, though General Brialmont had written in the _Revue de Belgique_
on the subject. Sir Charles's view having been questioned, that the
danger to Belgium's neutrality for military and other reasons was from
Germany alone, he drew attention to the enormous accumulation of
supplies of every kind in the entrenched camp of Cologne as of itself
sufficient in military eyes to prove the truth of what he said. He
considered also that the reduction of our horse artillery greatly
impaired the possibility of Great Britain affording really effectual
military assistance to Belgium, and that the recent utterances of the
principal organ of the Conservative party, the _Standard_, and of the
writers in the _National Review_, that intervention in support of
Belgium 'would be not only insane but impossible,' showed that the
public opinion of Great Britain was no longer unanimous as it had been
in 1870-71. [Footnote: The questions connected with the Belgian and
Luxemburg guarantees are very fully discussed in a recent work,
_England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg_, by C. P. Sanger and H.
T. J. Norton. See also chapter i. of _War: Its Conduct and Legal
Results_, by Dr. Baty and Prof. J. H. Morgan; _The Present Position of
European Politics_, pp. 42-48, 73, 321-323.] This dispassionate
consideration of the chances of England's intervening single-handed and
without allies, in the case of a European war, to protect the neutrality
of an unfortified Belgium, led to statements that he was opposed to such
a step, and he had to point out in reply that for years he had
consistently expressed the contrary view, but that he was now dealing
with facts and tendencies, not with his own wishes. [Footnote: _British
Army_, chap. ii., p. 55.] Shortly after the appearance of this article,
discussion in Belgium led to the introduction of a Government Bill for
the fortification of the towns upon the Meuse, and it was afterwards
decided to fortify Namur and Liége.
Estimating the probabilities of a Continental war, he thought that
Russia came next to England in staying power, because her enormous army
formed a smaller proportion of her working class than in the case of any
other great Continental Power. Notwithstanding his suspicions of her
policy, he spoke of Russia with a deep and discriminating interest born
of numerous visits to all parts of her dominions, and deprecated the
attitude of those Englishmen whose dislike of Russia had done harm to
the cause of sense and truth by exaggeration, and had led them to ignore
'her power and the marvellous patriotism of her people.' 'In the union
of patriotism with religion I know no nation which can approach them.'
There could be no doubt in any reasonable mind of her real and lasting
strength. But her unlimited power of self-deception; the necessary
instability of a policy resting upon the will of a single man; her
misgovernment of Poland and her alienation of Bulgaria, constituted
dangers which it was idle to ignore. He, however, set against these
weaknesses her popularity with all the Slav nations; her influence in
the Baltic provinces of Germany, and even with the Poles, 'who, like
everyone else of Slavonic race, seem born with a hatred of the Teutons.'
'The only foreigner who is known to the Russian peasantry is the
German, and the name for German and for foreigner with the peasantry
is the same, and the hatred of the "dumb men," as they call their
German neighbours, is intense. The peasantry know little of the
English, and if you listen to their sentiments you discover that it
is their belief that one day there will be between _them_ and
Germany a war compared with which, their soldiers say, that of 1870
will be child's play, and that if Germany wins this will not be the
end, but that war after war will follow until Germany is destroyed.'
'Because Russia is very violent in her language and her acts, we
often fail to see how a peasantry, which an aristocratic government
or a government of political economists could never win, is won over
by her to her rule. The Moscow men failed in Bulgaria, but in Poland
they succeeded, and in the Baltic provinces, too, their methods and
their policy have not been wanting, and the problems that have so
long perplexed this country in her relations with Ireland would have
been solved in a week by Samarin, or Miliutin, or Prince
Teherkasky.' [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, pp.
125, 134.]
The popular phrases which dubbed Sir Charles Dilke as 'anti-German' or
'anti-Russian' were never more curiously misapplied. The flaw to be
found even in the mental constitution of Gambetta's great personality,
as shown by his antagonism to Russia, had no part in his friend's
outlook; nor did Sir Charles's friendship for all things French make him
an enemy to Germany, though the possibility of conjuring 'the German
peril' was ever in his mind. But he doubted the wisdom of the wavering
counsels which began with 'lying down to Germany,' and were to be marked
by the cession of Heligoland. Strong men and strong Governments
recognize and respect one another; and in dealing with Germany he
believed that it was necessary never to forget this trite yet valuable
warning.
If personal friendships and political sympathy made Sir Charles, as the
previous chapters have shown, look constantly to France as the natural
ally of Great Britain, and also her most desirable ally, neither
friendships nor sympathies could blind him to the constant danger
arising from the instability of French Administrations, and the
consequent difficulty of relying on any certainty in arrangements
projected for joint action. Of this the events connected with Egypt had
been a most conspicuous illustration. Nor were these the only dangers:
for the best friends of France were painfully aware of the immense
influence exercised by powerful financial interests both in her domestic
and in her foreign affairs, and by the growth of fierce antagonisms on
home questions which seemed to tear the country asunder and paralyze her
position abroad. Numerous questions, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere in
Africa; the old quarrels about the Newfoundland fisheries, on which Sir
Charles was constantly putting his finger as a possible cause of a
serious quarrel; and increasing jealousies in the Pacific, contributed
to produce a condition of permanent tension for many years in the
relations of the two countries, until the Fashoda incident in 1898
brought a crisis which cleared the air. Two of the ablest men in France,
M. Jules Ferry and M. Hanotaux, were, to say the least, not friendly to
Great Britain, and a plan which Sir Julian Pauncefote [Footnote: Then
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Lord
Pauncefote and Ambassador at Washington.] had suggested in 1884, of
attempting to bring all outstanding questions with France into one great
settlement, fell still-born, to be vivified, but twenty years later, by
Lord Lansdowne in more favourable circumstances.
In all possible complications Sir Charles relied much on Italy's close
friendship for England--notwithstanding her entry into the Triple
Alliance--a friendship due to permanent gratitude for the support which
she had received from Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Palmerston,
at the crisis of her fate in 1859; and also to the offer to her of a
joint occupation of Egypt in 1882--an offer rejected indeed, but
fruitful of good feeling.
But more important even than any question of alliances was, he insisted,
the necessity that Great Britain should know her own mind, and have a
definite policy in regard to the future of Constantinople and of Egypt,
and in regard to the Belgian guarantee. Army organization itself
obviously depended on policy, and in this connection there was a danger
at home greater, perhaps, than any originating abroad.
'It is too much the case with us in England,' he wrote, 'that when
we are occupied with the consideration of the Irish problem, or
dealing with the circumstances which most often lead to the rise and
fall of Ministries, we allow the foreign affairs of the country to
be transacted in the dark: with an absence of control which, owing
to the efficiency of our Foreign Office, may produce no ill, but
also with an absence of knowledge which cannot be advantageous. On
the other hand, when some awkward circumstance arises, a
disproportionate weight is attached to it by those who have wilfully
remained in ignorance of the true position, and the diplomacy of the
country is suddenly unduly hampered by criticism which rests on no
foundation of fact.'
Speaking from experience, he uttered a warning as to the danger of
uninstructed debates and foolish questions--then so frequent--on foreign
affairs in the House of Commons, and the harm done by them abroad. He
spoke of the tendency to take advantage of some rebuff in foreign
affairs for party motives, and urged that, as secrecy was not to be
hoped for, members should at least try to inform themselves and the
electorate, and avoid 'periods of ignorant calm' or 'equally ignorant
panic.' In this connection he never ceased to insist on the weakness of
our position abroad, owing to the deficient strength and want of
organization of our army; the small results shown for the immense amount
spent; the insufficient stock of arms and ammunition, and the poor
reserves of rifles; and he urged that, whatever our economies, none
should fall upon equipment or reserves of material. Such economies he
stigmatized as a 'horrible treachery to the interests of the country.'
[Footnote: The military situation as a whole is discussed in chapter vi.
of _The Present Position of European Politics_, 'The United Kingdom.']