BEGINNING OF THE HOME RULE SPLIT
DECEMBER, 1885, TO FEBRUARY, 1886
After the meeting of Radicals, December 5th to 7th, at Highbury, Sir
Charles went back to London.
'On Wednesday, December 9th, I spoke at the Central Poor Law
Conference.... I carried the assembly, which was one of Poor Law
Guardians, and therefore Conservative, along with me in the opinion
that it was desirable to elect directly the whole of the new bodies
in local government, instead of having either a special
representation of Magistrates or any system of indirect election or
choice of Aldermen.'
He argued in the belief that the next session might still see a Tory
Government in power. 'If the Conservatives propose a Local Government
Bill,' he said at Chelsea, 'it will be our Local Government Bill which
they will propose.' He notes: 'They proposed two-thirds of it, and
carried one-third, in 1888.'
'At this moment, not knowing how far Mr. Gladstone was willing to go
in the Home Rule direction, and that there was, therefore, any
chance of his securing the real support of the Irish party, I was
opposed to the attempt to turn out the Government and form a Liberal
Administration resting on the support of a minority, and I spoke in
that sense to my constituents. My view was that it would be
disastrous to advanced Liberalism to form a Government resting on a
minority, as it would be impossible to carry any legislation not of
a Conservative type.'
'Chamberlain wrote to me on December 15th, with regard to one of my
speeches, that I was too polite to the Tories. "This," he added, "is
where I never err."
'On December 18th I received some copies of important letters. Mr.
Gladstone's scheme had got out on the 16th, [Footnote: Lord Morley's
_Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., pp. 264,265, shows that the "scheme
got out" owing to Sir Charles Dilke's speech to his constituents.
Mr. Herbert Gladstone came to town on the 14th partly in consequence
of a speech "made a few days before by Sir Charles Dilke," and the
talk it caused. The speech was "taken to mean" that the two Radical
leaders preferred keeping the Tories in power "in the expectation
that some moderate measures of reform might be got from them, and
that meanwhile they would become committed with the Irishmen.
Tactics of this kind were equivalent to the exclusion of Mr.
Gladstone, for in every letter that he wrote he pronounced the Irish
Question urgent." Accordingly, on December 16th there came the
unauthorized version of Mr. Gladstone's scheme, given to the Press
through his son.] and on the 17th he wrote to Lord Hartington a
letter of which the latter sent me a long extract. [Footnote: The
letter, which has been printed both by Lord Morley and by Mr.
Bernard Holland, is that in which Mr. Gladstone detailed the
"conditions of an admissible plan" of Home Rule, and expressed a
determination "on no account to do or say anything which would
enable the Nationalists to establish rival biddings between us." It
is so germane to this discussion that part of it is again printed in
the appendix following this chapter (p. 208).]
'At the same time I received a letter from Chamberlain in which he
said:
'"Have I turned round? Perhaps I have, but it is unconsciously.
Honestly I thought you went beyond us in your speeches, but I feel
that your judgment is very likely better and certainly as good as
mine, and I should have said nothing but for the flood of letters I
received.
'"The situation changes every minute. The announcement of Mr. G.'s
plan makes it much more serious; and I altered my speech somewhat
to-night to meet it, but unless I have failed in my endeavour I have
not said anything which will embarrass you, and I had you constantly
in mind throughout. Please read it carefully and let me know exactly
what you think and how far I have succeeded. I would not put you in
a hole for a King's ransom if I could avoid it.
'"I agree entirely with you as to dissolution. The Tory game is to
exaggerate Mr. Gladstone's performance and to go to the country on
the 'integrity of the Empire.' I have endeavoured to reserve our
position, and, as to taking office, to make it clear that we are
opposed to it, unless we can get a big majority, which is
impossible. Unless I am mistaken, the Gladstone business will
exclusively occupy attention the next few days, and my speech will
pass without much notice. But again I say that I have tried (and I
hope and believe I have succeeded) to avoid anything which may
appear like contradiction or opposition to your line.
'"Finally, my view is that Mr. G.'s Irish scheme is death and
damnation; that we must try and stop it; that we must not openly
commit ourselves against it yet; that we must let the situation
shape itself before we finally decide; that the Whigs are our
greatest enemies, and that we must not join them if we can help it;
that we cannot take office, but must not offer assistance to the
Tories publicly; that we must say all we can as to their shameful
bargain and surrender of principle; that even if they bring in good
measures they will also bring in bad, which we shall be forced to
oppose; and that the less we speak in public for the present, the
better."
'I had told Chamberlain that his speech had given the impression
that he had turned round.'
Sir Charles, in a further speech to his constituents at Chelsea,
reaffirmed the principles which he had already publicly laid down.
'In speaking on the night of Friday, December 18th, at Chelsea, I
declared that we ought not to allow ourselves to be driven either
forward or backward from the principles that we had put forward with
regard to Ireland, and that our course should be to continue to
propose the measures which we had previously proposed without
reference to the Parnellite support of Conservative candidates. The
scheme which I had put forward at the General Election was the one
to which I adhered. If it had been generally adopted when first
suggested, it would have received very large support in Ireland.'
He then quotes from the report of his speech this sentence: 'We are told
that now it is too late, but for my part I should not be inclined to
recede from it because it does not meet with general support.'
On this Chamberlain wrote:
'_December 19th_, 1885.
'My Dear Dilke,
'The papers this morning seem to show that I have succeeded in
avoiding any kind of conflict with you. Your own speech was most
judicious. What a mess Mr. G. has made of it! What will be the end
of it all? Why the d---- could he not wait till Parnell had
quarrelled with the Tories? I fancy that a large number, perhaps the
majority, of Liberals will support _any_ scheme of Mr. G.'s, but I
doubt if the country will endorse it. The Tories, if they are wise,
will throw everything else aside and go for the "Empire in danger,"
dissolving at the earliest possible opportunity. The Liberals would
be divided and distracted, and I think we shall be beaten into a
cocked hat. Our game--yours and mine--is to avoid definite committal
for the moment. Circumstances change every hour. Harcourt is coming
to me on Saturday and Sunday.'
'On the next day Chamberlain sent me a copy of a letter to him from
Mr. Gladstone:
'"_December 18th_, 1885.
'"My Dear Chamberlain,
'"I thank you very much for your references to me in your speech
last night.
'"In this really serious crisis we must all make efforts to work
together; and I gladly recognize your effort.
'"Moreover, reading as well as writing hastily, I think we are very
much in accord.
'"Both reflection and information lead me to think that time is very
precious, and that the hour-glass has begun to run for a definitive
issue.
'"But I am certainly and strongly of opinion that only a Government
can act, that especially this Government should act, and that we
should now be helping and encouraging them to act as far as we
legitimately can.
'"In reply to a proposal of the Central News to send me an
interviewer, I have this morning telegraphed to London: 'From my
public declarations at Edinburgh _with respect to the Government_,
you will easily see that I have no communication to make.'
'"Be _very incredulous_ as to any statements about my views and
opinions. Rest assured that I have done and said _nothing_ which in
any way points to negotiation or separate action. The time may come,
but I hope it will not. At present I think most men, but I do not
include you, are in too great a hurry to make up their minds. Much
may happen before (say) January 12th. The first thing of all is to
know _what will the Government do?_ I know they have been in
communication with Parnellites, and I hope with Parnell.
'"I remain always,
'"Sincerely yours,
'"W. E. Gladstone."
'I fancy that I was the cause of Chamberlain receiving this letter,
as I had told Brett (who at once wrote to Hawarden) that Chamberlain
was angry at not having been consulted.'
'On December 21st we went down to Pyrford, which was now just
finished, to stay there for the first time, and remained until
Christmas Eve. On December 22nd I received a letter from Chamberlain
from Highbury.'
In this letter Mr. Chamberlain chronicled Sir William Harcourt's
visit--who, after 'raving against the old man and the old cause,' had
left in better spirits. Mr. Chamberlain was in much doubt whether Mr.
Gladstone would go on or would retire after Lord Hartington's letter to
the Press, [Footnote: This is a reference to Lord Hartington's letter in
the Press of December 21st, 1885, which he alludes to, in writing to Mr.
Gladstone, as "published this morning" (_Life of Duke of Devonshire_,
vol. ii., p. 103).] and had written to Mr. Gladstone to say that he did
not think the country would stand an independent Parliament. He saw
nothing between National Councils and Separation, and wondered whether
Mr. Gladstone thought that--in the event of a separate Irish
Legislature--Ireland could be governed by a single Chamber, and England
and Scotland by two.
'On December 26th Chamberlain wrote:
'"I do not envy you the opportunity of speaking on the 31st. It is a
dangerous time, and I am inclined myself to 'lie low.' Is it
desirable to say anything? If it is right to speak at all, I think
something like a full expose of motifs is necessary, and I put the
following before you as the heads of a discourse.
'"At present there are two different ideas, for settlement of
Ireland, before the public imagination, viz.: (A) National Councils;
(B) Separation.
'"As to A, the fundamental principles are supremacy of Imperial
Parliament and extension of local liberties on municipal lines. It
is a feasible, practical plan. But it has the fatal objection that
the Nationalists will not accept it. It is worse than useless to
impose on them benefits which they repudiate. As to B, everyone
professes to reject the idea of separation. If it were adopted, I
have no doubt it would lead to the adoption of the conscription in
Ireland; then to the conscription in England, and increase of the
navy; fresh fortifications on the west coast, and finally a war in
which Ireland would have the support of some other Power, perhaps
America or France. Between these alternatives there is the hazy idea
of Home Rule visible in Morley's speech and Gladstone's assumed
intention. It is dangerous and mischievous to use vague language on
such a subject. Those who speak ought to say exactly what they mean.
It will be found that Home Rule includes an independent separate
Irish Parliament, and that all guarantees and securities, whether
for the protection of minorities or for the security of the Empire,
are absolutely illusory.
'"At the same time we are to continue to receive Irish
representatives at Westminster in the Imperial Parliament, and we
shall not even get rid of their obstruction and interference here by
the concession of their independence in Ireland. To any arrangement
of this kind, unworkable as I believe it to be, I prefer
separation--to which, indeed, it is only a step.
'"Is there any other possible arrangement which would secure the
real integrity of the Empire for Imperial purposes, while allowing
Irishmen to play the devil as they like in Ireland?
'"Yes, there is. But it involves the entire recasting of the British
Constitution and the full and complete adoption of the American
system. According to this view you might have five Parliaments, for
England, Scotland, Wales, Ulster, [Footnote: This is the first
suggestion of a scheme under which part of Ireland would be
separated from the rest.] and the three other provinces combined.
Each Parliament to have its own Ministry, responsible to it and
dependent on its vote. In addition an Imperial Parliament or
Reichsrath with another Ministry dealing with foreign and colonial
affairs, army, navy, post-office, and customs.
'"To carry out this arrangement a Supreme Court or similar tribunal
must be established, to decide on the respective attributes of the
several local legislatures and the limits of their authority.
'"The House of Lords must go, or you must establish a separate
Second Chamber for each legislature.
'"It is impossible to suppose that the authority of the Crown could
survive these changes for long. One or other of the local
legislatures would refuse to pay the expense, and, as it would have
some kind of local militia at its back, it is not likely that the
other legislatures would engage in civil war for the sake of
reimposing the nominal authority of the Sovereign.
'"As a Radical all these changes have no terrors for me, but is it
conceivable that such a clean sweep of existing institutions could
be made in order to justify the Irish demand for Home Rule? Yet this
is the only form of federal government which offers any prospect of
permanence or union for Imperial purposes.
'"If English Liberals once see clearly that indefinite talk about
Home Rule means either separation or the entire recasting of the
whole system of English as well as Irish government, they will then
be in a position to decide their policy. At present they are being
led by the _Daily News_ and Morley and Co. to commit themselves in
the dark."
'Next day, December 27th, Chamberlain wrote:
'"The situation (Irish) is now as follows:
'"(1) The Government have been informed that Mr. Gladstone thinks
this great question should not be prejudiced by party feeling, and
that he will support them in any attempt they may make to give Home
Rule to Ireland.
'"(2) Mr. Gladstone has been informed that the Government will see
him damned first.
'"(3) The Irishmen have been informed that Mr. Gladstone will not
move a step till the Government have spoken or until the Irish have
put them in a minority.
'"(4) In either of these events he will do his best to effect a
thorough settlement. 'He will go forward or fall.'
'"(5) I gather that he will not, as he ought, challenge Parnell to
say publicly exactly what he wants, but that he will propose his own
scheme, which is an Irish legislature with a veto reserved to the
Crown--to be exercised on most questions on the advice of the Irish
Ministry, but on questions of religion, commerce, and taxation, on
the advice of the Imperial Ministry.
'"(6) The Irish are suspicious, and have not made up their minds.
Parnell says nothing, but the rank and file are inclined to give Mr.
Gladstone his chance and turn him out again if they are not
satisfied with his proposals.
'"The Tories hope to get out Mr. Gladstone's intentions in debate on
Address, and threaten another immediate dissolution if they are
placed in a minority; I think, however, their true policy is and
will be to let Mr. Gladstone come in and make his proposals. This
will divide the Liberal party, and in all probability alarm and
disgust the country.
'"Was there ever such a situation? Test Mr. Gladstone's scheme in
practice. The Irish Ministry insist on necessity of restoring Irish
manufactures by protection. The Imperial Parliament veto their
proposals. Thereupon the Irish representatives join the Tories and
turn out the Government on a foreign and colonial debate, the same
Government being in a great majority on all English and Scotch
questions. How long can such a state of things last? Mr. Gladstone
will have the support of a portion of the Liberal party--Morley, for
instance, Storey, the Crofters' representatives, and probably some
of the Labour representatives. How many more will he get? Will he
have the majority of the Radicals? Will he have the majority of the
Liberals, following the party leader like sheep? It is curious to
see the _Scotsman_ and the _Leeds Mercury_ leading in this
direction. What are we to do? Certainly I will not join a Government
pledged to such a mad and dangerous proposal. But this may mean
isolation for a long time.
'"The prospect is not an inviting one.
'"I have told Harcourt the facts as in the numbered paragraphs. Do
not say a word to anyone else. Harcourt is perplexed and hesitating.
I think he is impressed with the danger of Fenian outrages,
dynamite, and assassination.
'"For myself, I would sooner the Tories were in for the next ten
years than agree to what I think the ruin of the country."
'On New Year's Eve, the 31st, we went to Rugby, where I had to make
the speech alluded to in Chamberlain's letter. I had received an
invitation, dated December 29th, to a meeting at Devonshire House.
Hartington wrote:
'"My Dear Dilke,
'"You know, no doubt, that Harcourt has had a good deal of
communication with Chamberlain lately. I hear that Chamberlain will
be in town on Friday (New Year's Day), and it is proposed that he,
Harcourt, you, and I, should meet here on Friday at four to talk
over matters, especially Irish. I have asked Granville to come up if
he likes. I do not think there would be any advantage in having any
others, unless Rosebery?
'"Yours sincerely,
'"Hartington."
'I sent this letter to Chamberlain with an inquiry as to what he
knew about the meeting, and he replied on New Year's Eve:
'"The meeting to-morrow was arranged by telegraph.... I suspect Mr.
Gladstone is inclined to hedge. He refuses to satisfy the Irish by
any definite statements. I hope they may continue suspicious and
keep the Tories in for some time."'
'Yet it was Chamberlain who was to turn out the Tories. On New
Year's Eve, at Rugby, referring to the Irish Question, I praised the
speech made by Trevelyan on the previous night as being "a
declaration in favour of that scheme of National Councils which he
supports for Ireland at least, and which was recommended in an able
article in the _Fortnightly Review_ for Scotland, Ireland, and
Wales." I said: "I am one of those who have never limited my views
upon the subject to Ireland. Mr. Trevelyan last night spoke as
though it were only in Ireland that it was necessary to institute
some local body to deal with purely local questions--with those
questions which now come before nominated boards or branches of the
Executive Government." I went on to speak in the sense of Mr.
Gladstone's letter, in favour of the Conservatives being encouraged
to propose such Irish remedial legislation.
'On New Year's Day, 1886, an important meeting took place at
Devonshire House between Hartington, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and
myself. I did not see my way clearly, and did not say much; the
other three arguing strongly against Mr. Gladstone's conduct in
having sent Herbert Gladstone to a news agency to let out his views
for the benefit of the provincial Press, in such a way as to put
pressure on his colleagues. It seemed to me that the pressure,
though no doubt unfair and indefensible, had nevertheless been
pretty successful, as neither Harcourt nor Chamberlain saw their way
to opposing Mr. Gladstone, although both of them disliked his
scheme. Hartington only said that he "thought he could not join a
Government to promote any such scheme." But, then, he would not, I
pointed out, be asked to do so. He would be asked to join a
Government to consider something. The practical conclusion come to
was to write to Mr. Gladstone to urge him to come to London to
consult his colleagues. On January 4th I heard from Hartington that
Mr. Gladstone informed him that he had nothing to add to his
previous letter dated December 17th. Hartington wrote:
'"I have heard from Mr. Gladstone. He declines to hasten his arrival
in London, but will be available on the 11th after 4 p.m. for any
who may wish to see him. He will be at my sister-in-law's (Lady F.
Cavendish), 21, Carlton House Terrace.... He has done nothing and
will do nothing to convert his opinions into intentions, for he has
not the material before him. There is besides the question of
Parliamentary procedure (this refers to action on the Address). For
considering this, he thinks the time available in London will be
ample."
'In forwarding the correspondence to Chamberlain with a copy of the
letter of December 17th, 1885, as I was requested by Hartington to
do, I added that Mr. Gladstone could hardly be said not to have done
anything which had enabled the Nationalists to establish rival
biddings between the two sides (to use his phrase), because we knew
that he had asked Arthur Balfour to go to Lord Salisbury with a
message from him promising his support if the Government would bring
in a Home Rule scheme. This he had let out to the Irish.
'After this we were in consultation as to whether we ought to see
Mr. Gladstone separately; and Hartington wrote to me on January
10th, 1886, from Hardwick, that he did not see how we could decline
to see Mr. Gladstone separately, but that we might be as reticent as
we pleased, and could all combine in urging further collective
consultations; and it was arranged that Hartington himself should
see Mr. Gladstone on January 12th--the day of the election of the
Speaker. Mr. Gladstone then informed us all that he would see such
of us as chose on the afternoon of January 11th, and Chamberlain
then wrote:
'"As far as I know, only Harcourt is going on Monday, and I on
Tuesday morning. If for _any_ reason you think it well to go, there
is really not the least objection."
'I went on the 11th, but nothing of the least importance passed, and
the same was the case with Chamberlain's interview on the 12th.
Harcourt was present on the 11th, and evidently in full support of
Gladstone.
'On the 15th Labouchere gave a dinner to Chamberlain and Randolph
Churchill, but I do not think that anything very serious was
discussed. There was a sharp breach at this moment between
Chamberlain and Morley, Chamberlain telling Morley that his speeches
were "foolish and mischievous," and that he was talking "literary
nonsense--the worst of all."
'On January 21st we had a meeting of all the ex-Cabinet at Lord
Granville's. Chamberlain breakfasted with me before the meeting, and
he drew and I corrected the amendment which was afterwards accepted
at the meeting as that which should be supported by the party on the
Queen's Speech, and which was that moved by Jesse Collings by which
the Government were turned out on the 26th. The adoption of our
amendment was very sudden. The leaders had met apparently without
any policy, and the moment Chamberlain read our "three acres and a
cow" amendment, they at once adopted it without discussion as a way
out of all their difficulties and differences. [Footnote: This
amendment was carried by seventy-nine votes, and the Government thus
overthrown.] The Government resigned on the 28th, and on the 29th I
had an interview with Chamberlain as to what he should do about
taking office.
'On January 30th Mr. Gladstone offered Chamberlain the Admiralty,
after Hartington had refused to join the Government. Chamberlain
came and saw me, and was to go back to Mr. Gladstone at six. He
thought he had no alternative but to accept a place in the
Government, although he did not like the Admiralty. Mr. Gladstone
showed him a form of words as to Irish Home Rule. It was equivalent
to a passage in Sexton's [Footnote: Home Rule M.P. for S. Sligo,
1885-1886; Belfast W., 1886-1892.] speech on the 22nd, at which Mr.
Gladstone had been seen to nod in a manner which implied that he had
suggested the words. The proposal was, as we knew it would be, for
inquiry. Chamberlain did not object to the inquiry, but objected to
the Home Rule. Chamberlain, before returning to Mr. Gladstone, wrote
him a very stiff letter against Home Rule, which somewhat angered
him. On Sunday, January 31st, Chamberlain wrote that for personal
reasons he had sooner not accept the Admiralty. Mr. Gladstone saw
Chamberlain again later in the day, on the Sunday, and asked what it
was then that he wanted; to which Chamberlain replied, "The
Colonies," and Mr. Gladstone answered, "Oh! A Secretary of State."
Chamberlain was naturally angry at this slight, and being offered by
Mr. Gladstone the Board of Trade, then refused to return to it.
After leaving Mr. Gladstone he went to Harcourt, and told Harcourt
that he would take the Local Government Board, "but not very
willingly." On Monday, February 1st, I asked Chamberlain to
reconsider his decision about the Admiralty, and found that he would
have been willing to have done so, but that it was now too late. On
the 2nd Mr. Gladstone wrote me a very nice letter quoted above,
[Footnote: Chapter XLII., p.172.] about the circumstances relating
to the trial then coming on which made it impossible for him to
include me in the Ministry. Morley wrote: "Half my satisfaction and
confidence are extinguished by your absence. It may and will make
all the difference."'
Mr. Morley's apprehension was justified by events.
In 1880 the position of the Radical leaders, while only private members,
had been of such strength that Sir Charles had been able to secure, from
a reluctant Prime Minister, the terms agreed on between Mr. Chamberlain
and himself. He had obtained for both positions in the Government, and
procured Cabinet rank for Chamberlain. Now that the power of one of the
allies was demolished, and Mr. Chamberlain stood alone, Mr. Gladstone's
view of the changed situation was apparent. The 'slight' to Chamberlain
was followed by that course of action which resulted in his breach with
the Liberal party. Together the two men could, from a far stronger point
of vantage than in 1880, have made their terms; with Mr. Chamberlain
isolated Mr. Gladstone could impose his own. The alteration in the
course of English political history which the next few months were to
effect was made finally certain by Sir Charles Dilke's fall.
Lord Rosebery wrote on February 3rd to say that he had been appointed
Foreign Secretary, an office which in happier circumstances would, he
said to Sir Charles, 'have been yours by universal consent.' The letter
went on to state in very sympathetic words how 'constantly present to
his mind' was his own inferiority in knowledge and ability to the man
who had been set aside.
'I had written to Rosebery at the same moment, and our letters had
crossed. I replied to his:
'"My Dear Rosebery,
'"Our letters crossed, but mine was a wretched scrawl by the side of
yours. I do not know how, with those terrible telegrams beginning to
fly round you, you find time to write such letters. I could never
have taken the Foreign Office without the heaviest misgiving, and I
hope that whenever the Liberals are in, up to the close of my life,
you may hold it. My 'knowledge' of foreign affairs _is_, I admit to
you, great, and I can answer questions in the Commons, and I can
negotiate with foreigners. But these are _not_ the most important
points. As to the excess of 'ability' with which you kindly and
modestly credit me, I do not admit it for a moment. I should say
that you are far more competent to advise and carry through a
policy--far more competent to send the right replies to those
telegrams which are the Foreign Office curse. As to questions, these
are a mere second curse, but form a serious reason why the Secretary
of State should be in the Lords.
'"I have always said that, if kept for no other reason, the Lords
should remain as a place for the Secretary of State for the Foreign
Department, and _I_ think also for the Prime Minister. Between
ourselves, you will not have quite a fair chance in being Secretary
of State for the Foreign Department under Mr. Gladstone, because Mr.
Gladstone _will_ trust to his skill in the House of Commons, and
_will_ speak and reply when the prudent Under-Secretary would ask
for long notice or be silent. Lord Granville was always complaining,
and Mr. Gladstone always promising never to do it again, and always
doing it every day. [Footnote: See supra, p. 51 and note.] I am
going to put down a notice to-day to strengthen your hands against
France in _re_ Diego Suarez."
'From Bryce I heard that he had been appointed Under-Secretary of
State for the Foreign Department, and asking me whom he should take
as his private secretary; and I told him Austin Lee, and he took him
at once.'
'To the Prince of Wales I wrote to say that I should not attend the
Levee, and had from him a reply marked by that great personal
courtesy which he always shows.'
Thus came into being Mr. Gladstone's third Administration. In 1885 the
continuance of Mr. Gladstone's leadership had seemed necessary in order
to bridge the gap between Lord Hartington and the Radicals. Now in 1886
Lord Hartington was out, to mark his opposition, not to Chamberlain, but
to Gladstone; and Chamberlain was in, though heavily handicapped. Yet
none of these contradictions which had defied anticipation was so
unforeseen as the exclusion of Sir Charles Dilke.
APPENDIX
See p. 196. Letter of Mr. Gladstone to Lord Hartington, December 17th,
1885:
'The whole stream of public excitement is now turned upon me, and I
am pestered with incessant telegrams which I have no defence against
but either suicide or Parnell's method of self-concealment. The
truth is I have more or less of opinions and ideas, but no
intentions or negotiations. In these ideas and opinions there is, I
think, little that I have not more or less conveyed in public
declarations: in principle, nothing. I will try to lay them before
you. I consider that Ireland has now spoken, and that an effort
ought to be made by the _Government_ without delay to meet her
demand for the management, by an Irish legislative body, of Irish as
distinct from Imperial affairs. Only a Government can do it, and a
Tory Government can do it more easily and safely than any other.
'There is first a postulate--that the state of Ireland shall be such
as to warrant it.
'The conditions of an admissible plan, I think, are--
'(1) Union of the Empire and due supremacy of Parliament.
'(2) Protection for the minority. A difficult matter on which I have
talked much with Spencer, certain points, however, remaining to be
considered.
'(3) Fair allocation of Imperial charges.
'(4) A statutory basis seems to me to be better and safer than the
revival of Grattan's Parliament, but I wish to hear more upon this,
as the minds of men are still in so crude a state on the whole
subject.
'(5) Neither as opinions nor as intentions have I to anyone alive
promulgated these ideas as decided on by me.
'(6) As to intentions, I am determined to have none at present--to
leave space to the Government--I should wish to encourage them if I
properly could--above all, on no account to say or do anything which
would enable the Nationalists to establish rival biddings between
us.
'If this storm of rumours continues to rage, it may be necessary for
me to write some new letter to my constituents, but I am desirous to
do nothing, simply leaving the field open for the Government, until
time makes it necessary to decide. Of our late colleagues, I have
had most communication with Granville, Spencer, and Rosebery. Would
you kindly send this on to Granville? I think you will find it in
conformity with my public declarations, though some blanks are
filled up. I have in truth thought it my duty, without in the least
committing myself or anyone else, to think through the subject as
well as I could, being equally convinced of its urgency and its
bigness.'
The remainder of this letter is not quoted in the Memoir.