THE FALL OF KHARTOUM AND THE PENJDEH INCIDENT
'On the morning of Thursday, February 5th, 1885, at 3 a.m., Brett
went to Lord Granville with the news of the fall of Khartoum. He
used to tell how he had been wholly unable to find the old
gentleman, and how the servants had ultimately asserted that their
master was at Walmer--which he was not. At the same hour the news
was sold by a War Office messenger to one of the News Agencies. The
resident clerk at the War Office had written to Thompson, of the War
Office, in an unsealed envelope, instead of putting the despatch
into a box. It did not matter much on this occasion, but it might
matter in a great European war. A Cabinet was immediately summoned
for the next day. [Footnote: The following correspondence between
Mr. Brett (now Viscount Eslier) and Sir Charles throws light on the
summoning of the Cabinet:
War Office,
Thursday morning, 3 a.m.
Here is some bad news.
No Ministers in town, except you and Chamberlain!
Have tried Lord G. and Lord Northbrook. No results!
So things must take their chance. There ought to have been a Cabinet
to-morrow; but suppose it is not possible.
R.B.
Please return enclosed. Will send you a copy later. Have you any
suggestion to make?
You will see that W. proposes to keep this secret. Not possible for
long in this Office.
_Sir Charles Dilke to Mr. Brett._
Telegraph to _Mr. G. and Hartington to come up to-day_, and call a
Cabinet for to-morrow at 11 a.m. Make Hamilton telegraph to all
Ministers at once. I'm prepared to take it on myself if you like,
but you can send this to Chamberlain if he agrees.
I agree certainly.--J. C.
Local Government Board,
February 5th, 1885.
It is absurd not to make them come up _to-day_ in face of Wolseley's
"_It is most essential that I shall have the earliest possible
decision._"] Only three subjects were discussed: Khartoum, secrecy,
and the question of the Italians as against the Turks in the Red
Sea.'
On February 7th, 'The next matter was Wolseley, who had confused us by
greatly varying his statements.... Next came a proposal that Gordon
should be bought from the Mahdi.'
'On February 9th Mr. Gladstone mentioned his intention to bring in
Rosebery and Lefevre as members of the Cabinet. It was decided that
the Italians should be allowed to go to Kassala--a decision which
was afterwards reversed. The French views on Egyptian finance were
named, the despatch of Indian troops to Suakim again discussed.
Wolseley having asked that General Greaves should be sent to Suakim,
Childers said that the Queen and Duke of Cambridge had stopped that
officer's promotion because he "belonged to the Ashantee gang"
(Wolseley's friends), and that the Duke had now complained that he
did not know him. Chamberlain proposed that we should invite the
Canadian Government to send a force to Suakim; and, finally,
Childers was allowed to mention finance, which had been the object
for which the Cabinet was called.
'On February 10th I wrote to Chamberlain that Rosebery and Lefevre
would help the Cabinet with the public, but would weaken us in the
Cabinet.
'On February 11th there was another Cabinet, five members being
absent--namely, the Chancellor, Carlingford, Spencer, Chamberlain,
and Trevelyan--owing to the suddenness of the call. It was on the
Suakim command, Mr. Gladstone being very obstinate for Greaves, as
against Graham with Greaves for Chief of Staff--a compromise. I
supported Hartington--I do not know why--and we beat Mr. Gladstone
by 5 to 4. Both officers were inferior men, and Graham did but
badly. Probably Greaves would have done no better....
'Mr. Gladstone complained that he and Hartington had received at
Carnforth on the 5th a disagreeable telegram _en clair_ from the
Queen, and Mr. Gladstone was very anxious to know whether the Tories
had found it out, asking anxiously, "What are the station-master's
politics?"
'February 13th ... I was with Harcourt when Rosebery came to be
sworn in, so I took the opportunity of making Rosebery help us to
make Lord Derby uncomfortable for proposing to refuse the troops
offered by the colony of New South Wales.
'We began to discuss our Soudan policy with some anxiety.
'Courtney and Morley had insisted in private letters that we should
only rescue, and not attack the rebels, and the _Times_ agreed with
them--unless we intended to stay in the country and establish a
Government. Wolseley's policy would be represented as one of "smash
and retire," and it was for this reason that Chamberlain pressed
negotiations with the Mahdi, as he thought we should be stronger if
we could show that the Mahdi had rejected a fair offer. It was on
February 13th that Hartington most strongly pressed his proposal for
the Suakim railroad, and invited me to be a member of a Cabinet
Committee to consider the proposal.'
'On Monday, February 16th, the first matter discussed was the
Russian answer as regards Egyptian finance. The Soudan was put off
till the next day, Chamberlain making a strong speech first upon our
policy. Hartington asked for five million, to include the cost of
his Suakim-Berber railway, and for leave to call out reserves.
'On February 19th I had an interview with Mr. Gladstone, and found
him anxious to be turned out on the vote of censure. Indeed, he was
longing for it, in the firm belief that, if turned out, he would
come back after the dissolution in November, while, if not turned
out, he would be more likely to be beaten.
'On February 20th the subjects discussed were Egypt (Finance and
Suez Canal) and the sending a colonial force to Suakim. Chamberlain
had developed to Childers at the same meeting a proposal that
Hartington should form a Ministry to carry on the Soudan War, with
the loyal support of those of us who went out with Mr. Gladstone.
'On February 25th, Goschen having asked for assurances as to the
Berber railway, Chamberlain wrote to me saying that if Hartington
gave them, it might be a sufficient cause for our resignation, as we
were not prepared to commit the country to establishing settled
government in any part of the Soudan. Chamberlain proposed that we
should resign before the division, and that the Government being
beaten, there should then be brought about the establishment of what
he called the combination or patriotic Government, which meant a
Hartington administration. I, on the whole, preferred to go on as we
were, so I stopped a box of Hartington's which was going round the
Cabinet, and proposed an alteration of form which prevented
Chamberlain going out on these assurances.
'During the debate I went away to dine, and, not having heard the
middle of Harcourt's speech, asked Chamberlain whether Harcourt had
tried to answer any of Goschen's questions, to which Chamberlain
answered, "Not one. He asked questions in turn," which is a good
description of Harcourt's style. I then wrote on a slip of paper,
"Forster is taking notes"; and Chamberlain replied, "Forster--
against slavery, against Zebehr, [Footnote: Zebehr was arrested in
Cairo on the ground of treasonable correspondence with the Mahdi,
and interned at Gibraltar, but later was allowed to return to Cairo.
He died in January, 1903.] and of course generally in favour of a
crusade," a note which is also characteristic--of both these men.
'At four o'clock in the morning of February 28th, when we got our
majority of 14, after the first division, Mr. Gladstone, who wanted
to go out, said to Childers and myself, "That will do." This was
indeed a Delphic utterance.'
Sir Charles himself spoke, at Mr. Gladstone's request, at great length
in the third day's debate on February 26th, but it was 'only a debating
speech.'
'After we had had a sleep, we met in Cabinet on Saturday, February
28th. Lord Granville and Childers now anxious to go. Harcourt, who
had at night been against going, was now anxious to go. This was a
curious and interesting Cabinet. Lord Granville and Lord Derby, who
were at loggerheads both with Bismarck and with their colleagues,
were strong that we should resign, and they got some support from
Chamberlain, Northbrook, Childers, and Hartington. Lefevre,
[Footnote: Lord Eversley, then Mr. Shaw Lefevre, had joined the
Cabinet after the news from Khartoum. Lord Rosebery had accepted the
Privy Seal. Lord Eversley says that on February 28th opinions were
evenly divided, but that one member refused to express an opinion on
the ground of his recent admission. See, too, _Life of Granville_,
vol. ii., pp. 421-422.] who had only just come in, and Trevelyan
were strong for staying in, as was Carlingford; but the other
members of the Cabinet either wobbled backwards and forwards, or did
not care. At last it was decided by the casting vote of Mr.
Gladstone, if one may use the phrase when there was no actual
voting, that we should try to go on at present so as to carry the
Seats Bill ourselves.
'We then turned to the Berber railway, and decided that it should be
a temporary or contractor's line made only so far as might be
necessary for purely military reasons. We then decided that Wolseley
should not be allowed to make himself Governor-General of the
Soudan.
'After the Cabinet Chamberlain and I continued our discussion as to
his strong wish to resign. I told him that I wanted to finish the
Seats Bill, that I thought Lord Salisbury might refuse or make
conditions with regard to coming in, that Mr. Gladstone would not
lead in opposition, and that we should seem to be driving him into
complete retirement, and I asked whether we were justified in
running away.'
Meantime the financial business of the year had to go on, and part of it
was a demand for increased naval expenditure, to which, as has been seen
already, Mr. Gladstone was opposed.
'The Navy Estimates were first discussed, and then the Army, and a
sum asked for for the fortification of coaling-stations was refused,
and also a sum asked for for defending the home merchant ports. We
all of us were guilty of unwise haste on this occasion, for the
demand was right; but the chief blame must fall rather on Childers,
Hartington, and the others who had been at the War Office than upon
those who sinned in ignorance.'
This decision against naval expenditure was a cause of embarrassment to
the Government in the country, for a strong 'big navy' campaign
followed. The real question at issue in the Cabinet became that of
taxation. On March 2nd, and again in April, Sir Charles 'warned Mr.
Gladstone against Childers's proposed Budget'--the rock on which they
finally made shipwreck. 'Mr. Gladstone replied: "The subject of your
note has weighed heavily on my mind, and I shall endeavour to be
prepared for our meeting." I now sent him a memorandum after
consultation with Chamberlain.'
What Sir Charles wrote in 1885 is nowadays matter of common argument; it
was novel then in the mouth of a practical politician:
'I stated at length that, as head of the Poor Law department, I
ought to have knowledge of the pressure of taxation upon the incomes
of the poor. As Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Housing of
the Working Classes, I had had to hear a great deal of evidence upon
the subject of the income of the working classes, and as Chairman of
the recent Conference on Industrial Remuneration had had special
opportunities of further examining the question. It was my opinion
that the position of the agricultural labourers had declined, and
that the Whig or Conservative minority on my Commission, represented
by Mr. Goschen and Lord Brownlow, admitted this contention of mine
as regarded the south of England. The labourers of the south were
unable to procure milk, and relied largely on beer as an article of
food. Their wages had but slightly increased in the twenty years
since 1865, and had decreased considerably since 1879. Food had
slightly risen in price, clothes were nominally cheaper, but the
same amount of wear for the money was not obtainable, and house rent
(where house rent was paid by the labourers) had greatly risen. An
enormous proportion of the income of the rich escaped taxation:
fifty millions a year of their foreign income at the least. The
uncertainty of employment placed the labourer even lower as a
partaker in the income of the country than the statisticians placed
him. The calculations of employers, upon which the estimates of
statisticians were based, were founded upon the higher earnings of
the best workers; and when the matter was examined, it was found
that variation of wages, loss of time, and failure of work, much
lowered the average earnings. The taxation of the working classes
rose to a higher percentage than that of the upper and middle
classes. Mr. Dudley Baxter, who was a Conservative, had admitted
this, and had advocated a reduction in the tobacco duty and the malt
tax. Since that time the tobacco duty had been raised, and the
duties pressing upon beer had been rather raised than lowered.'
Sir Charles's insistence upon this matter is all the more notable
because foreign complications were rapidly accumulating, and they were
of a gravity which might well have seemed to dwarf all questions of the
incidence of taxation.
There were not only the difficulties with Germany. There was also the
Soudan, where a large body of British troops was engaged, in a country
the perils of which England had now to realize.
'On March 7th there was a Cabinet as to the Suakim-Berber railway.
Northbrook and I, soon joined by Harcourt and Chamberlain, were in
favour of stopping our impossible campaign. I argued that when we
decided to destroy the power of the Mahdi, it was on Wolseley's
telling us that he hoped possibly to take Khartoum at once. For some
weeks after that he had intended to take Berber. Then he had told us
that he at least could occupy Abu Hamed. Now he was in full retreat,
and both his lines of supply--namely, that up the Nile and that from
Suakim--seemed equally difficult. The Chancellor wrote on a slip of
paper for me: "We seem to be fighting three enemies at once. (1) The
Mahdi; (2) certain of our people here; (3) Wolseley." Nothing was
settled, and we passed on to Egyptian finance.'
March 11th, 'In the evening a despatch was circulated in which Wolseley
said: "Please tell Lord Granville that I cannot wait any longer, and I
must issue proclamation, and will do so on my own authority if I do not
receive answer to this by the 14th. I hope I may be allowed to issue it
as Governor-General."
'I at once wrote, "I understood that we had _decided_ that he was
not to be Governor-General, and that the proclamation should not be
issued in the terms proposed"; on which Lord Granville wrote, "Yes.
Cabinet to-morrow.--G."
'On Thursday, March 12th, the first matter discussed was that of the
arrest of Zebehr. Then came Wolseley's proclamation, which was
vetoed. We decided that he should not be allowed to make himself
Governor-General of the Soudan.'
It now seemed more than likely that the British Government would have
work on its hands which would render the employment of an army in the
Soudan very undesirable; for more serious than the Mahdi's movements on
the Nile, more serious than the operations of German Admirals in the
Pacific, was the menace of a Russian advance upon Afghanistan.
Arrangements had been made for the demarcation of the Afghan frontier
which Sir Charles had persistently urged. A British Commissioner had
been appointed in July, 1884, but at the end of the following November
Russia was still parleying on questions of detail. These, however,
seemed to have been at length resolved; and in January, 1885, the
British Commissioner was waiting in the neighbourhood of Herat for the
Russian Commissioners to join in the work of fixing the boundaries. But
the Russians did not appear; they were, says Sir Charles, 'intriguing at
Penjdeh, and preparing for the blow which later on they struck against
the Afghans.' The Amir evidently felt this, for he renewed the proposal
that he should pay a state visit to the Viceroy, and on January 23rd
Dilke wrote to Grant Duff that this had been accepted.
February 4th, 'On this day I received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman
at Quetta, in which he thanked me for the assistance that I had given
him in the retention of Sibi, Pishin, and the Khojak. "It was greatly
due to your support of my representations on the subject that our
influence on this frontier is at present all-powerful."'
On February 5th, a few hours after the fall of Khartoum was published,
'there was a meeting of Ministers as to Central Asia. We decided on
a reply to Russia drawn up by myself and Kimberley, Lord Granville
and Northbrook somewhat dissenting, and Fitzmaurice and Philip
Currie taking no part.
'On February 18th we had a meeting of the Central Asia Committee at
the Foreign Office with regard to the Russian advance in the
direction of Penjdeh, Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook,
Kimberley, myself, Fitzmaurice, and Currie. We ordered Sir Peter
Lumsden' (Chief of the Boundary Commission), 'in the event of a
Russian advance on Herat, to throw himself and escort into that
city, and to aid the Afghan defence.'
On March 12th, after deciding to limit Lord Wolseley's schemes in the
Soudan, 'we took a decision that war preparations against Russia should
be made in India.'
'On the 20th we decided that if the Russians continued to advance,
20,000 troops should be concentrated at Quetta. We next gave
instructions to Lord Dufferin with regard to what he was to say to
the Amir of Afghanistan at the interview which was about to take
place between them, and authorized him to renew our guarantee. There
was either a regular or irregular Cabinet on March 24th. We decided
that if the Russians advanced upon Herat, the advance should be
treated as a _casus belli_, and orders to this effect were sent to
Dufferin. At the meeting on April 2nd the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin,
assured the Amir in the presence of his Prime Minister, of Mr.
Durand, and of Captain Talbot, "that a Russian advance on Herat
should be met by war all over the world."'
'On April 8th, in public durbar, the Amir, without contradiction
from Lord Dufferin, said: "The British Government has declared it
will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy."'
Sir Charles was now discussing by letter with Sir Frederick Roberts the
proposals which were preferred by the Defence Committee in India for the
defence of the North-West Frontier, with special emphasis on the further
question whether there was any point at which England could strike at
Russia. [Footnote: See Appendix following on this chapter, pp. 122,
123.]
Early in April sittings of the Housing Commission in Scotland occasioned
Dilke's absence from a Cabinet at which important phases of the Central
Asian question were discussed.
April 4th, 'Chamberlain wrote to me an account of all that passed,
pointing out that the Russian answer bade us "give up everything, and
they offer us absolutely nothing by way of concession in return. This
attitude really leaves us no alternative. I am very uncomfortable about
it, because the more I study the matter the more I think that the
Russians are right both in form and in substance--i.e., they have the
pretexts on their side, and they also have a strong argument in favour
of their line, both on the matter of territorial right, and also on the
ground that this line is the only one which insures any chance of
permanent peace. But we cannot have the pill forced down our throats by
Russia without inquiry, or discussion on equal terms.... Harcourt
declares that we have 'closed the door of Peace and opened the door of
War.' The only difference between us is that he is inclined to accept
the alternative of the Russian zone which has been already refused, and
as to which the present Note says in effect that, though they are ready
to go back to this zone, yet it will be of no use, as they are
determined in the end to stick to their line."'
'On Thursday, April 9th, there was a Cabinet, which I also missed,
and which considered the conflict at Penjdeh.' [Footnote: On March
20th, General Komarof with a Russian force had attacked and routed
an Afghan army in the valley of Penjdeh.]
Every day now had its Cabinet. On April 11th, 13th, and 14th evacuation
of the Soudan was discussed, but Lord Hartington, by a threat of
resignation, secured repeated postponements.
'This question was mixed up by some members of the Cabinet with that
of Afghanistan, inasmuch as they said that we could not fight Russia
in Afghanistan, and go on in the Soudan as well; upon which Mr.
Gladstone said of the Soudan, "I am not prepared to go on upon any
terms, Russia or no Russia."
A new trouble was added when the Egyptian Government suppressed the
_Bosphore Égyptien_, a local paper published in French, and closed the
printing office. Against this the French protested, and in the course of
the quarrel actually broke off diplomatic relations with the Egyptian
Government, which, considering the relations between that Ministry and
the protecting force of Great Britain, pushed unfriendliness very far.
Ultimately the _Bosphore_ was allowed to appear and to print what it
chose, until it died a natural death.
'On Monday, April 13th, came a proposal from the Russian Ambassador,
made through Lefevre and Brett, but which was really from Stead;
Brett meaning Stead. Curiously enough, it was a proposal of
Chamberlain's, of which he had previously told us, which had come
back to him in this way. Chamberlain consulted me as to whether he
should tell Mr. Gladstone that it was his, and I told him that I
thought he had better not, as I thought it was more likely to be
successful as coming from the Russian Ambassador and Stead than as
coming from him. It virtually amounted to the plan of Arbitration
which was ultimately adopted, although as a fact the Arbitration
never took place.'
'On Wednesday, 15th, there was an informal Cabinet, at which I was
not present, because the Seats Bill was in Committee in the House at
the same time. A form of words with regard to the Soudan was agreed
upon which united Hartington with the others.'
'On Thursday, the 16th, Mr. Gladstone misinformed the House of
Commons--the inevitable result from time to time of his habit of
answering without notice questions upon dangerous subjects. A
meeting had taken place between Lord Granville, Kimberley, and
Philip Currie on our side, and Staal, the Russian Ambassador, and
Lessar, the Russian expert, at which Lord Granville showed that we
meant to let Penjdeh go. Lessar paid a newspaper for its support by
telling them. Mr. Gladstone was asked, and replied that he knew
nothing about the matter, while he suggested that Penjdeh was not to
be given up.'
'On the 18th the Queen agreed to retirement from the Soudan, with
reservation of future liberty of action.' Whatever happened about
Penjdeh, it was certain that resistance would be offered to Russia.
'On this day, Monday, April 20th, there was a Cabinet, at which it
was decided to ask for eleven millions in the vote of credit. We
then discussed Lumsden's despatch of explanation as to the Penjdeh
incident, which we decided should be published. The vote of credit
was really partly for Russia and partly for the Soudan, and a
question arose whether it should be proposed as one or as two, and
we decided for one. After which we went back again to the Budget,
and the minority proposed a penny increase on the income tax as
against the increase on beer, after which the Budget was adjourned
to April 30th, it being decided then that the vote of credit should
be taken first.'
'On April 20th I received from the Communalist General Cluseret a
long letter in which he offered, on the ground of his profound
sympathy, his services to England against Russia in the event of
war--a document which would have done him little good had it seen
the light when he afterwards stood successfully for my electoral
division in the Var, at a time when French sympathy for Russia was
predominant.
'On Tuesday, April 21st, after the Cabinet, I had told Mr. Gladstone
that I could not agree to the increase of the taxation on beer, and
Mr. Gladstone wrote to me twice on that day about the matter. I was
not very sure of Harcourt standing by us, and knew that the pressure
was great, inasmuch as, in addition to the two letters from Mr.
Gladstone, I received one from Edward Hamilton, also dated the 21st,
in which he made the strongest appeal to me on personal grounds not
to worry Mr. Gladstone by resignations. He said that Mr. Gladstone
was overburdened, and that it would take very little to break him
down. Edward Hamilton wrote: "It is a peculiarity of his ... that,
while he can stand the strain of a grave political crisis such as a
question involving peace or war, he succumbs to the strain of a
personal question.... Mr. Gladstone, I know, feels that any
secession, especially of one who has a reputation not confined to
this country, would necessarily weaken greatly the Government, and
from a national point of view this is of all times a moment when
there ought to be a strong Government which can confront Europe and
face the varied difficulties. No one would more gladly escape from
office than Mr. G. himself; but the more attractive is the prospect
of freedom, the less does he dare allow himself to contemplate it."'
Mr. Gladstone wrote saying that such a secession at such a time would be
serious for the Government, but also, he thought, serious for the
seceder, and Sir Charles replied:
Local Government Board,
Whitehall,
April 21st, 1885.
'I should always let the consideration of what was due to my friends
weigh with me as much as any man, I feel sure, and I am also certain
that considerations of personal loyalty to yourself are as strong
with me now as they are with any member of the Cabinet. I should
never let the other class of considerations--i.e., those personal
to myself--weigh with me at all. Because I am fond of work I am
supposed to be ambitious; but I fancy few politicians are less so,
and I do not mind unpopularity, which, after all, generally rights
itself in the course of years. I knew that this matter would be a
very serious one before I went into it, and I should not have said
what I did had I not felt forced to do so.
'If others go with me, the extent of our unpopularity and consequent
loss of future usefulness will depend on our own conduct, and if we
do our duty by firmly supporting the Government through its foreign
and general difficulties, I do not think that even the party will be
ungenerous to us.'
But Sir Charles finally yielded, and drove a bargain.
'On April 24th I had decided at Chamberlain's strong wish to yield
to Childers as to the beer duty; Childers promising in return to
take the Princess Beatrice Committee of Inquiry demand upon himself.
'May 9th, the Queen now wished for immediate inquiry--that is, in
other words, preferred the Parliament she knew to the new
Parliament. The Government proposed "next year." It was agreed that
the Government were to guide the Committee whenever it might sit,
and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be in the Chair.
'Mr. Gladstone wrote me a letter to ease off my surrender on beer
duties, by pointing out the importance of the proposals which were
being made to put realty in the same position as personalty as to
Death Duties. "This must in all likelihood lead to a very serious
struggle with the Tories, for it strikes at the very heart of
class-preference, which is the central point of what I call the
lower and what is now the prevalent Toryism."'
In the great debate of April 27th, in which Mr. Gladstone proposed a
vote of credit for eleven millions, of which six and a half were for war
preparation in view of the collision between the Afghans and Russians at
Penjdeh,
'Mr. Gladstone made perhaps the most remarkable speech that even he
ever delivered, and I have his notes for it with a map I drew for
him before he spoke, to show him the position of the various places.
[Footnote: On this speech see the _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., p.
184; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 440.] At this time I wrote to
Hartington to suggest that if we were forced into war with Russia we
should attack the Russians at Vladivostock, and the Intelligence
Department wrote a memorandum upon the subject. I also sent round a
paper pointing out that we should fight at the greatest advantage
from a Pacific base, that the help of China would be of moment, and
that Chinese troops drilled and officered by Englishmen would be
irresistible; and Northbrook strongly backed me up. Lumsden was
sending us most violent telegrams, and while I was preparing for war
I was also asking for the recall of Lumsden in favour of Colonel
Stewart. Lord Granville wrote: "Lumsden was a bad appointment, and I
for a moment wished to recall him. But it would be condemned here as
an immense knock-under." [Footnote: See the _Life of Granville_,
vol. ii., pp. 441, 442.] I also suggested that the engineers for
whom the Amir had asked should be carefully picked, and should have
a private Indian allowance for keeping us informed of what passed at
Kabul, and Lord Granville conveyed the suggestion by telegraph to
Lord Dufferin. (This was afterwards done.)'
Russia unexpectedly withdrew.
'On May 2nd there was a sudden Cabinet on the Russian acceptance of
arbitration, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and Carlingford being absent.
Kimberley, the Chancellor, Northbrook, Derby, and I were for
immediate acceptance of the offer; Hartington against; Lord
Granville for amiably getting out of it; Trevelyan and Lefevre
silent; Rosebery late. Mr. Gladstone at first sided with Lord
Granville, then came half way to us, and then proposed that we
should wait a bit till Condie Stephen reached us. I replied by
showing that Condie Stephen was a Jingo, the friend of Drummond
Wolff and of Bowles of _Vanity Fair_, and would make things worse.
Then Mr. Gladstone came completely to our side. Childers drew up in
Cabinet the form for the declaration as to the Select Committee on
the Civil List, and I agreed to it. I wrote what had passed to
Chamberlain, who was at Birmingham, and he replied on the next day
that he trusted that the information about Russia would be
immediately communicated to the House, and went on: "But, then, what
becomes of the vote of credit and the Budget? It seems cheeky to ask
for 6 1/2 millions of Preparations when the matter is practically
settled."
'On May 7th the Herat boundary was discussed and a line settled, and
it was decided that either the German Emperor or the King of Denmark
should be named as the Arbitrator about Penjdeh.' Later, 'There was
a meeting of the Commons Ministers to discuss the situation created
by the refusal by Russia of the German Emperor as Arbitrator, the
Queen having previously refused the King of Denmark. The Queen had
ultimately to yield. But, as I have said, the arbitration, although
agreed on, never took place at all.'
The demarcation of frontier for which Sir Charles had so long contended
was carried through without any marked incident, largely owing to the
skill of Sir J. West Ridgeway, who had succeeded Sir Peter Lumsden.
APPENDIX
The Memoir gives the following account of the proposals made for defence
of the North-West Frontier in India in the spring of 1885, and some
observations arising from them:
'The general idea was to hold the northern route by an entrenched
position, and, as regards the southern or flank road, to fortify the
mountains before Quetta. Roads and railways were to be made for
concentration in the direction of Kandahar, and Sir Frederick
Roberts afterwards very wisely noted, "It is impossible to threaten
Russia's base, but we should do all in our power to keep it as far
away as possible." Unfortunately, Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards
forgot this, and suggested the possibility of advance upon Herat
with the view to attack Russia at her Sarakhs base. The suggestions
made in 1885 with regard to Kashmir and the Gromul Pass were acted
upon in 1890. Sir Donald Stewart, however, went on to recommend a
railway extension from Peshawur towards Kabul, and Sir Frederick
Roberts, with greater judgment, on succeeding him, vetoed this
scheme. Lord Kitchener revived it, but was not allowed to complete
his work. Sir Donald Stewart's committee recommended the tunnel at
the Khojak, which was carried out. Roberts reported against it, and
he was right.
'On the whole, when Sir Frederick Roberts sent me his view on the
defence proposals, I was struck with the contrast between the
completeness of the manner in which a defence scheme for India has
been considered, and the incompleteness, to say the least of it, of
all strategic plans at home. Sir Charles Macgregor put on record at
the same time his view that a mere offensive on the North-West
Frontier of India would be folly, if not madness, and that it would
be necessary also to undertake offensive operations against Russia.
Quite so, according to all rules of war, and if ultimate defeat is
to be avoided. Unfortunately, however, it is not easy to attack
Russia, and the proposals made by Sir Charles Macgregor would not
bear investigation. Sir Frederick Roberts himself afterwards tried
his hand at proposals of his own in a Memorandum entitled, "What are
Russia's vulnerable points?" But I do not know that he was more
successful, and I fear that his first question, "Has Russia any
vulnerable points?" must, if we are looking to permanency, and not
to merely temporary measures, be answered in the negative, except as
regards Vladivostock--a case I put. After much correspondence with
me on this last memorandum, Sir Frederick Roberts quoted me, without
naming me, as having, to his regret, informed him that English
public opinion would oppose a Turkish alliance, that a Turkish
alliance would not be of much use if we could obtain it, and that
apart even from these considerations we could not obtain it if we
wished.'
The importance which Sir Charles attached to Vladivostock, as the
vulnerable point at which Russia could be attacked in time of war,
explains his regret when Port Hamilton, which threatened Vladivostock,
was abandoned. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p.
440; and _Europe and the Far East_, by Sir Robert K. Douglas, pp. 190,
248, 249.]
'May, 1885.--The Port Hamilton matter began about this time. We had
seized it, and, as Northbrook and I agreed, "for naval reasons we
ought to keep it." Northbrook also wrote that he was laying a cable
from Shanghai to Port Hamilton, which he thought a most important
precaution in time of war; but Port Hamilton was afterwards given up
because the sailors found it dull--an insufficient reason.'