THE TONGKING QUARREL.
Rapid advance of French towards China proper--The Black
Flags--Discussions between France and China--Attempted
negotiations--Conquest of Tongking decided upon--Chinese
feared attack on Canton--City defenceless--Negotiation with
France recommended--Captain Fournier concludes convention
with Li Hung-chang in Tientsin--Strong opposition in the
capital--Collision between forces in Tongking--French make war
on China--Peace concluded through customs agency, April 1885--The
Li-Fournier convention ratified.
The progress of the French in the annexation of Cochin China, Annam, and
Tongking was phenomenally rapid. These aggressions on her tributary States
were far from agreeable to China, but no effective means of resistance was
proposed. The Chinese policy, wrote Sir R. Alcock,[26] "has been one of
drift, and letting things slide into irretrievable confusion and disaster
for want of courage and decisive action at the right time. Between the
Dupuis and Garnier expeditions, in which a handful of men were seizing
towns, storming citadels, and terrorising the Annamite mandarins and
king into virtual submission to any terms dictated to them, and Captain
Rivière's very similar proceedings in 1883, there was abundant time and
opportunity for China either to fight or to negotiate with effect, but
she did neither."
When, however, the advance of the French brought them within measurable
distance of the southern provinces of China proper, a more serious view of
the invasion was forced upon the Government. A body of irregular troops,
called the Black Flags, for some time stood in the way of the French, who
designated them "pirates." The status of these Black Flags was, indeed,
somewhat ambiguous, as they had been virtually outlawed by the Chinese.
But when it was seen that they were harassing the French, the provincial
authorities recognised that they were fighting the battle of China and of
her tributary. The Annamese Government had, in the first instance, invited
the assistance of the Black Flags, and the Chinese Government officially
encouraged them, while hoping to evade direct responsibility for doing so.
The French had made the useless mistake of wounding China in a tender spot
by destroying the seal granted to the Annamese sovereign by the emperor,
and it was probably this insult rather than the territorial seizures which
induced China to reinforce the Black Flags by a body of imperial troops,
and to lay down distinctly the line which she would consider herself bound
to defend.
The annexation of Annam became the subject of protracted discussions
between France and China. The diplomacy of the Marquis Tsêng in Paris,
and of Li Hung-chang in China--a convention had actually been concluded
between the latter and the French Minister, Bourrée--failed to arrest the
progress of France, and the question between the two countries reached
a burning point after the capture by the French of Sontay and Bacninh in
the spring of 1884.
The Chinese envoy had declared to M. Ferry that a French advance on these
places would be regarded by his Government as a _casus belli_. Seeing,
however, that no action was taken by China after their actual capture,
the French took fresh courage, and their programme of conquest became so
much expanded that what had been the dream of a few became the definitive
policy of the Republic. "The conquest of Tongking had been decided upon
in principle," wrote Admiral Jaurèguiberry to Captain Rivière at the
time when M. de Freycinet was declaring that there should be no policy
of aggression. The taking of the two citadels sealed the policy of the
admiral and falsified that of the Foreign Minister. From that point may be
dated the important position which France has since assumed in claiming to
direct, in conjunction with Russia, the destinies of the Chinese Empire.
On the fall of the two cities the Chinese officials of the southern
provinces were filled with consternation. They feared that the successes
of the French would encourage them, if not to invade China, at least to
force a settlement with her on their own terms. They had before them the
brochure of Captain Rivière, commander of the French forces in Tongking,
in which he advocated a quarrel with China as a preliminary to the seizure
of the three southern provinces, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. An
obvious step towards the execution of such a design would be an attack on
the provincial capital, Canton, an event which was not only anticipated
by the authorities, but was thought feasible, and even probable, by
disinterested onlookers. How little prepared were the Chinese to resist
such an attack will be best understood by the measures they took to avert
it.
An officer of the Chinese customs service, Mr G. Detring, returning from
furlough, brought with him the details of the Marquis Tsêng's abortive
negotiations in Paris. He arrived in China immediately after the capture
of the two strongholds of Sontay and Bacninh. In proceeding from Hongkong
to take up his official post at Canton he accepted a passage in the French
_aviso_ Volta, which conveyed Rear-Admiral Lespès to the latter city. She
was commanded by Commandant Fournier, with whom Mr Detring had been some
years before on terms of intimacy in the north of China. The principal
topic discussed on the passage was naturally Tongking, and, judging from
subsequent developments, it is reasonable to suppose that the seeds of the
settlement eventually concluded between China and France were sown during
that short but interesting voyage. When Mr Detring reported himself to the
provincial authorities they evinced the greatest anxiety as to what they
conceived to be the threatening attitude of the French against Canton.
Asked if their river defences were in a position to resist attack, they
frankly avowed that they were not; but yet, being personally responsible
for the defence, they dared not confess the true state of affairs to the
Imperial Government. The viceroy of Canton and the governor of Yunnan
were already under censure, and the military commanders in Tongking
were even threatened with decapitation "pour encourager les autres." The
Canton authorities were thus, in fact, in the dilemma in which Chinese
provincial officials have so frequently found themselves in dealing with
foreign exigencies--responsible yet helpless. Since they were avowedly
incapable of resistance, the viceroy and governor were advised at once
to open negotiations with the French, and, as a first step, to report the
actual position frankly to the Central Government,--in other words, to Li
Hung-chang, who in this, as in all other crises, had to bear the burden
of every initiative. Having had experience of the capacity of Mr Detring,
first in the negotiating of the Chefoo convention, and subsequently during
several years of official intercourse at Tientsin, Li Hung-chang moved
the Central Government to summon the Canton commissioner of customs to
Tientsin for consultation.
The way being thus partially opened to negotiation, Rear-Admiral Lespès
held himself in readiness to proceed to Tientsin in response to any
invitation that might be conveyed to him. Captain Fournier was sent on
in advance to the rendezvous at Chefoo, where he was to remain until
the real views of the Chinese Government respecting a settlement of the
Tongking dispute had been ascertained. The French having set their hearts
on extorting a large indemnity, it was emphatically declared to them that
China would never pay one farthing. Any negotiation, therefore, would be
futile unless this question was first eliminated. Having paved the way
with Li Hung-chang, Mr Detring next proceeded to Chefoo to invite Captain
Fournier to Tientsin. From previous good relations he was _persona grata_
with Li, and on that account was thought a not unfit agent with whom to
discuss preliminaries in anticipation of the arrival of his admiral. But
that there should be no mistake about the indemnity, Captain Fournier
was once more told that unless it were dropped it would be useless his
proceeding to Tientsin. His doing so, therefore, was a tacit withdrawal
of that important item in the French demands. Both parties being equally
desirous of a settlement, all official technical difficulties were
promptly overcome, and Captain Fournier, from a mere herald of the French
admiral, was by telegraphic instructions from Paris at once promoted to
the rank of plenipotentiary for France, and this notwithstanding that
there was an accredited representative of the Republic eighty miles off
in Peking. The two negotiators, in short, fell into each other's arms,
and the convention of May 11, 1884, was the result.
The peace so suddenly and irregularly patched up was not, however,
destined to endure. Li Hung-chang, knowing better than any of his
peers the risks of a war with France, had stretched his authority to
the uttermost in concluding a treaty which practically ceded Annam and
Tongking to that Power. For though in this as in all his other acts he
carried with him the approval of the empress-dowager, he knew that he
had to brave the ferocious opposition of the ignorant fanatics of the
capital, which he himself described as the "howling of dogs." The moment
the announcement was made, indeed, the furies were let loose upon him,
and he had practically no support but that of the empress-dowager; for
the Tsungli-Yamên, so far as they were not opposed to the treaty, were
invertebrate. It is necessary to bear in mind this critical position
of Li Hung-chang in order to understand the series of blunders,
misunderstandings, recriminations, and actual war which ensued.
After the ratification of the treaty, arrangements had to be made for the
withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the territory which had been ceded
to France. Captain Fournier, in an interview with Li Hung-chang, presented
a memorandum fixing the dates on which the troops were to evacuate the
several positions specified. A long discussion appears to have taken
place, in which it is not difficult, from the circumstances above referred
to, to divine what the viceroy's attitude must have been. He wished
to avoid the invidious responsibility of asking the Central Government
to order the withdrawal of the troops from Langson, as to do so would
obviously add fuel to the fire of those powerful functionaries who were
clamouring for the repudiation of the treaty, and for the negotiator's
head. In vain endeavouring to obtain from Fournier an indefinite delay in
carrying out the stipulation for the retirement of the Chinese troops, Li
perhaps trusted that the French commanders in Tongking would themselves
cut the knot by marching forward with an adequate force and brushing away
the Chinese troops opposing them. The accomplished fact would then have
settled everything.
It has been said that the clever interpreter, instead of translating all
the viceroy's arguments and explaining his difficulties, summed the whole
up to Captain Fournier in two words, "Avancez donc"--advice which would no
doubt have been sufficient if only the French military commander, Colonel
Dugenne, had marched with a reasonable force, or even if he had carried
with him a competent interpreter, through whom he might have communicated
with the Chinese commander. The latter officer, however, when called upon
to evacuate the post, pleaded that he had received no instructions to
that effect, and asked for time to communicate with Peking. The letter
to the French commander containing these reasonable pleas for delay was
either wrongly translated or left untranslated for months. In the meantime
Colonel Dugenne advanced with a small party, and was forced to retreat
with loss, for which he was not unjustly recalled by his own authorities;
and thereupon ensued the Franco-Chinese war.
This was not, however, the only _contretemps_ in connection with this
lamentable outbreak. The Chinese commander had actually telegraphed
to Li Hung-chang for instructions; but, still unwilling to face the
responsibility, the latter left the reply to his council, among whom
there happened to be for the moment his evil genius, Chang Pei-lun, a
fire-eating member of the Tsungli-Yamên, who was on his way to take up
the post of governor of Fukien province and Imperial Commissioner of the
Foochow arsenal.
Laudable efforts were made to repair the mischief, and in the conferences
which followed in Paris peace was more than once all but assured; but
owing to a series of accidents and misunderstandings, in which the
authorities at Peking, the French representative there, the French
commanders on the Chinese coast, and the telegraph were all implicated,
the die was cast in August 1884, and the war was continued till the
following April.
For reasons of their own the French Government were averse to calling the
hostilities "war," preferring reprisals and "intelligent destruction." By
whatever name it may be called, the French did not distinguish themselves
greatly in the conduct of the operations. Their only feat of arms was
the destruction, at their anchorage in the river Min, of the Chinese
ships belonging to the Foochow squadron, and of the arsenal, which, as
Li Hung-chang bitterly reflected, had been erected by "French genius."
Admiral Courbet found his destructive work easy, having entered the river
and taken up a position in the rear of the batteries during time of peace.
The subsequent operations in Formosa were without result; and the French
Government refused permission to Admiral Courbet to attack Port Arthur,
on the non-military ground of wishing to save the prestige of "notre ami
Li Hung-chang." So far as the naval operations were concerned, even when
most successful in intelligent destruction, they were quite ineffective
towards ending the war until the method which has never failed to bring
the Chinese Government to terms was resorted to--the stoppage of the
grain-supply to the capital. This was accomplished by a patrol of the
coast for the purpose of intercepting vessels carrying rice to Tientsin.
The work performed during the winter and spring of 1885 by the French
cruisers, in keeping the sea without any base and performing their patrol
duties in all weathers, excited the admiration of seamen. It should be
mentioned that they were precluded from acting offensively against the
Yangtze by tacit understanding with Great Britain and other Powers.
If the breach of the peace between France and China was a historical
curiosity, the eventual settlement of the dispute resembled a dramatic
extravaganza. The final incident of the war in Tongking was the defeat
of the French, followed by a panic, caused apparently by General Négrier
being wounded. The force then made a disorderly retreat before imaginary
pursuers. In the meantime the empress-dowager had given positive orders
that peace should be made on any terms. Both parties had thus come round
to the _status quo ante bellum_--that is to say, they were both equally
urgent to obtain peace, as they had been in May 1884. The agent in
bringing this about was Sir Robert Hart; and it was effected, as great
things usually are, by the adroit use of very simple means. During the
blockade of Formosa a small Chinese lighthouse tender was captured by the
French admiral and detained. As she was essentially non-combatant, and was
serving the interests of humanity in supplying the numerous lighthouses
on the coast of China for the benefit of the commerce of all nations, Sir
Robert Hart instructed his very capable London agent, Mr Duncan Campbell,
to go to Paris and represent the case to the French Ministers, with a
view to obtaining the release of so useful and harmless a vessel. In
this manner the door was opened to the larger negotiation. Mr Campbell
executed his delicate mission with so much tact, that in the amicable
conversations which ensued between him and certain French officials the
idea of putting an end to a war of which both parties were tired, and
which, moreover, seemed objectless, was ventilated; and in a few days
authority was telegraphed from Peking to Mr Campbell to sign a protocol.
This was done before the news of the French reverse at Langson reached
Paris. After such a military success M. Jules Ferry could not imagine
that the Chinese Government would adhere to the terms of the protocol,
and therefore he kept the whole negotiation secret from the Chambers. In
the meanwhile the mishap to the French troops, being greatly exaggerated,
excited such intense feeling in France that M. Ferry, _le Tonkinois_,
was obliged to resign, with the treaty which might have saved him in his
pocket. As for the empress-dowager, she recked nothing of the success of
her brave troops on the outskirts of the empire, but thought only of the
enormous expense of the war, which had been unpleasantly brought home to
her, and of matters affecting her own convenience. She therefore had no
thought of going back on the treaty, but was even more urgent than before
to have it promptly signed and ratified. The honours of the peace thus
fell in a few days to M. Ferry's successor.
And what was the outcome of a year's fighting which cost China 100,000,000
taels and France some proportionate amount? A simple reaffirmation of the
Li-Fournier convention of May 1884! The convention itself was short and
simple--one clause only exciting much interest during the negotiations,
and that provoked a hot discussion, not on the substance, but on the
verbal form. It was a stipulation by which the two contracting parties
consciously meant different things, and each fought hard for a phrase
sufficiently subtle to allow each to interpret it in his own way when the
time came for the fulfilment of the treaty provisions. The French were
most desirous of binding the Chinese to employ French industries in all
their new undertakings. China was equally resolute in avoiding any such
obligation. In the end each was satisfied that he could read the treaty
clause in his own favour. But the final victory in the struggle would go
to the side that was most persistent in forcing its meaning into practice.
The French Ministry had announced to the Chambers a great victory for
French manufacturing industries, which were represented as having by it
obtained a monopoly in China. The text of the treaty, even in the French
version, did not, indeed, bear this out; but the French had the _primâ
facie_ argument on their side, that the introduction of a clause in a
treaty referring to the Chinese patronage of French industries, however
worded, must have meant something more than merely to register the common
fact that China was at liberty to deal with whom she pleased. In the
end a compromise was effected by China's giving to a French syndicate
the contract for excavating the basin and dock at Port Arthur and
certain orders for material, among which was a famous military balloon,
wonderfully symbolic of the whole proceeding.
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTE:
[26] 'Contemporary Review,' December 1884.