THE REVISION OF THE TREATY.
I. PREPARATION.
Struggle for the observance of the treaty--Hope in the prospective
revision--Information gathered by British Minister--Chinese
apprehensive of force being used--Imperial Government consult
provincial officials--Interesting memorials in reply--Especially
from Li Hung-chang--His liberal views respecting foreigners--And
wise advice to the throne.
The conflict between foreign aggressions and Chinese resistance had
proceeded without intermission on either side for seven years. In the
struggle the Chinese had gained many successes, but the fruits of them had
not been secured beyond the risk of reprisal. Both sides were ill at ease.
The foreigners on their part had been buoyed up under their grievances
by the hope of a readjustment of international relations, which had been
provided for in the treaties of Tientsin and Peking.
The decennial period was at hand when revision of the treaty of Tientsin
might be claimed. To that important juncture all eyes looked forward. The
foreigners hoped for freer intercourse; the Chinese wished to restrict
what already existed. Great preparations were made for the revision
campaign. On the part of the foreigners opinions were invited from all the
trading-ports as to the points where modification could be advantageously
claimed, and memorials from the Chambers of Commerce both in China and in
Great Britain, from individuals, professional men, and from missionaries,
poured in upon the British Minister during the years 1867 and 1868,
extending even into 1869.
Sir R. Alcock had even taken every possible pains to acquaint himself
with the local circumstances of the various treaty ports by personal
inspection and personal communication--a practice which public opinion
urged in vain upon his successors, who had much greater need of such
local observations. Following up this tour of his own, he delegated to
a subordinate the task of studying the conditions under which trade was
carried on in the interior, in the districts most likely to be affected by
any probable changes in the treaty. Under this roving commission Consul
Swinhoe made an extensive tour through the canal district of the Yangtze
delta, and finished up with an expedition to Szechuan in 1869, on which
he was accompanied by delegates of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.
The importance attached by foreigners to the occasion naturally stirred
the Chinese Government also to make special exertions to meet the coming
contest. From the measures to which they resorted it is evident that they
were apprehensive lest force should be applied by the foreigners to gain
their ends; for the idea of free negotiation and of voluntary agreement
had not yet been assimilated by the Chinese. To them the foreigner
represented force and nothing else. They had never really comprehended
the reasons for the withdrawal of the Allies when in possession of Peking,
and though the immediate danger of war was removed, the shadow of it never
ceased to haunt the dreams of Chinese statesmen.
Mistrusting their own resources, the Central Government appealed to the
provinces for confidential advice; and as these communications throw light
on the inner--though not the innermost--thoughts of the Chinese, which it
is difficult otherwise to gauge, some of them are worth perusing in the
actual words of the writers.
The secret circular addressed by the Tsungli-Yamên to the high officials
throughout the empire in 1867 opened abruptly with the proposition, "The
barbarian question is one of old standing"; it then proceeded to review
the difficulties and the dangers of "our present conjuncture," arising
mainly from the improvement of communications and armaments combined
with the earth-hunger of the various European nations. The foreigner at
one time stood in awe of the Central Power, but that was before railways
and steamships had been invented; and while the numbers who came to
China were as yet insignificant, and were conveniently restricted to one
spot, where they could be managed, now they occupy so many positions as
to form a strategic cordon round the empire. Moreover, they are united
in interest, and cannot suddenly be either isolated or weakened. How,
then, can we confront them with our isolation and weakness? It is to
be feared that we have no one who, taking a comprehensive view of the
whole situation, can create disunion among our enemies through their own
rivalries and insatiable avarice. Yet it is just here that the germ of
an effective policy should be sought. If, however, circumstances render
such a scheme at present impracticable, its execution may be deferred. We
must be patient under suffering, diligently strengthening ourselves, and
abide in hope. We bear in mind the calamities of 1860, and how to save
the State the emperor was entreated to conclude a treaty. It was evident
that the treaty, hastily concluded, would remain a fruitful source of
future difficulty; nevertheless, good faith required that it should be
fulfilled, and even the very fulfilment of it be turned into a means of
limitation and restraint. The time for revision being now at hand, you are
requested to give your suggestions as to the means of avoiding a rupture
with foreigners, and in case of a rupture, what will ensure safety. The
principal points likely to be brought forward at the revision conferences
are here submitted for your consideration. To simply declare the whole
impracticable is easy; the difficulty will be to devise a plan for safely
avoiding concession. Deal with the matter, therefore, in a practical way,
and not by an empty thesis; and let your memorial reach us not later than
December. The points are--(1) The audience question. (2) The question
of an embassy to foreign countries, which had been repeatedly urged by
the various foreign Ministers in Peking. The arguments in favour of such
a measure are, that "to know your adversary as he knows you" is a maxim
of practical wisdom, and that it would be of great advantage to have the
means of appealing from an unreasonable foreign Minister in Peking to his
own Government. (3) Telegraphs and railways. (4) Residence of merchants in
the interior. (5) Salt trade and coal-mining. (6) Extension of missions.
Such was the substance of the Tsungli-Yamên's circular to the
governors-general and governors of provinces. The memorials in reply
were distinguished by some plain speaking. Amid a good deal that was
vaporous and fantastic, such as would characterise any general council,
there were propositions of sound statecraft, maxims which it would have
been good for the Central Government to lay to heart, and side-lights
on their traditional conceptions of national policy well deserving to be
studied by the Powers which have relations with the Chinese. One clause
in the memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan, for example, went to the root of the
administrative difficulties which caused then, and still cause, the major
portion of the angry friction between Chinese and foreign officials.
He reminded the emperor, in fact, that he had a court of appeal in the
provinces; so that though he might, under pressure, be forced to concede
points to the foreign nations in Peking, yet it was the memorialist
himself and his peers in the provinces who would have the last word to
say. The elliptic and allusive style usually assumed in Chinese documents
may allow this hint to be interpreted either as a veiled defiance of, or
as an assurance of support to, the throne--perhaps both subtly compounded.
But the practical inference remains, that, as experience has often proved,
the provinces revise the decisions of the capital, and the execution rests
with them.
[Illustration: LI HUNG-CHANG AT THE AGE OF FIFTY.
_From a photo by J. Thomson, Grosvenor Street, W._ ]
The memorial, however, which is most interesting to foreigners, because
the plainest to their comprehension, is that of Li Hung-chang, at that
period Governor-General of the Hu-kwang; and as it affords a key to that
statesman's subsequent career and the unique position he has occupied
in regard to the foreign relations of the empire, it seems well worthy
of reproduction. Omitting the preamble, and certain classic references
without which a Chinese State Paper would be no more complete than a
speech in Parliament or a leader in the 'Times' fifty years ago would
have been without a Latin quotation, the substance of the memorial runs
as follows:--
The humble opinion of the writer is, that in conducting business
with foreigners the point of the greatest importance is to avoid
exciting their contempt; that contempt once excited, they will
thwart us at every turn, and even in affairs that are really
practicable they will contrive a thousand schemes and devices to
throw obstacles in the way of their practicability. But if they
feel respect for China, all matters can be mutually arranged;
and even difficult questions can be settled by compromise or
agreement.
Foreigners, however, are not the only persons who are influenced
by this feeling: it animates alike the minds of the whole human
race.
It is often said that foreigners are crafty and malign and full
of unexpected ruses: but is it not the fact that Chinese are the
same; or rather that the outrageous craft and malignity of the
Chinese exceeds even that of foreigners? The truth is, that at
present foreigners are powerful and the Chinese feeble. And whence
arises the power of the former? It certainly is not innate in
them, but depends upon the fact that "the requisites of Government
are sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and
the confidence of the people in their ruler" (Confucian Analects).
And how is the weakness of China to be accounted for? This also is
not innate, but is a result of the truth of the above axiom not
being sufficiently recognised. The present condition of foreign
countries resembles that of China before the union, or is perhaps
even still more formidable.
In the course of time foreigners came to China, opened numerous
marts, and conveyed their merchandise everywhere. They traded
at as many as five ports, and all with no other object but that
of making the wealth of China contribute to their own. A little
consideration shows that those who ventured to come to this
country must have placed their reliance upon something to have
rendered them so fearless; and there is not the slightest reason
why that which they confided in should not also become a source
of confidence to China.
Many persons have offered their views upon the several questions
now under consideration, and it is useless to take the trouble
to recapitulate them. But all such appliances as telegraphs,
railways, locomotives, and steamships--the things on which
foreigners rely--can without exception be learned by the Chinese.
It is often alleged that these inventions are attended with
harm: how is it, then, that in foreign countries every district
has its trains and steamers, every locality its telegraphs and
railways? Natives of China, too, have travelled abroad and can
bear testimony that these things, so far from being harmful, are
advantageous.
Imperial audience is distinctly stipulated for in the treaty of
1860, and it is next to impossible to withdraw it; especially as
his sainted Majesty Kanghsi admitted Japanese to his presence,
and there will be no difficulty in ascertaining the ceremony then
employed. And again, during the negotiations with the Russians
on the boundary and trade questions, which took place about the
same period, they were treated as an equal Power. It is but right,
indeed, to consider such Powers as upon a footing of equality with
ourselves.
The idea of the writer is to wait until the majority of the
emperor, and then to receive all the representatives in a
side-hall as was done by his sacred Majesty Kanghsi. It will,
however, first be necessary to arrange distinctly whether such
interviews are to take place once or twice a-year. Otherwise an
impropriety will be caused by their constantly demanding audiences
every few days on frivolous questions.
Such a course presents no difficulties from our point of view, and
from theirs it is a _sine quâ non_. Moreover, they would see how
the imperial magnanimity extends to every region. Their request
may with great propriety be granted.
As to the appointment of an envoy, in the fourth year of Tungchih,
Pin Ch'un and others were sent on a visit to the several foreign
countries, and the Tsungli-Yamên has lately written to state
that Chih kang and others have now proceeded thither. Thus the
mission has been continuous, and it would be well to adhere to
this system.
The question of separate missions at the Courts of the several
Powers, however, still remains for deliberation. In discussing
these questions persons are apprehensive, either that the
emperor's commission will be disgraced, or that there will be an
extravagant expenditure of the imperial funds. But such persons
are not acquainted with the whole bearing of the subject.
Memorialist is of opinion that this question is eminently
susceptible of a satisfactory solution. After selecting reliable
and trustworthy men to reside at foreign Courts, it will be
necessary to appoint subordinates and interpreters, who can be
exchanged every three or every five years. Interpreters, indeed,
should be selected from each country to which an envoy proceeds--a
system which would give us the double advantage of facilitating
public business, and of affording us an opportunity to display
our amicable desires. Far from being detrimental, the project is
attended with great advantages.
The matter of missionary extension is beset with greater
difficulties than the rest, especially as it is not a State
question with foreign Governments.[15] At the present moment
innumerable churches are being erected in every province,
district, and department for the explanation of their canon and
the preaching of their faith; and the common people are one-half
of them deceived, and the other half led to join them for evil
purposes. Instructions should be issued to the superintendents
of northern and southern trade, as well as to the generals,
viceroys, governors, customs superintendents, and taotais, to
become intimate with the foreign officials with whom they are
in communication. Then, when anything is to be arranged, there
would be no harm in telling them distinctly that when the common
people misbehave the local functionaries must adjudicate; and
that when it happens that the people refuse to become proselytes,
the officials can on no account insist upon their doing so
against their will--for such a course would but raise riots and
disturbances, to the detriment of international amity. At the
approaching revision of the treaty all possible arguments must be
used with regard to this point, and on no account must any further
clause be added.
With reference to the remaining points--viz., coal mines,
importation of salt, erection of inland warehouses, inland
steam navigation, and the like--these, although comparatively
unimportant matters, nevertheless entail serious consequences. If
their introduction is harmless, there is no necessity to waste
words and ink in the raising of disputes and complications; but
if, on the other hand, there are among them concessions which
we are unwilling to make, it will be very proper to "explain the
circumstances to them and argue the rights of the case," and they
will hardly wish to press embarrassments upon us.
Should they, however, take advantage of their strength to
impose upon our weakness by dividing our territory and sharing
among them the fat of the land, in such a pressing crisis the
greatest firmness would be necessary. But there need be no great
apprehension of such a contingency, for the simple reason that,
with the exception of Russia, foreign countries are all too
distant from China, and the acquisition of its territory would be
nothing but an embarrassment to them.
The fact is, that the prosperity of foreign countries is
inseparably connected with the welfare of the Chinese people; and
instead of draining that people to the last drop, would they not
rather prefer to use, without exhausting--to take, and still leave
a residue?
The present occasion of treaty revision with the English is a
most important juncture. The English treaty once disposed of,
there will be no difficulty with the other Powers. The danger
to be apprehended is that during the revision of next year they
will employ coercion to extort concession. This, however, may be
known previously; and should it be the case, it will of course
be necessary to select experienced troops and able officers to
confront them. Should nothing of the sort occur, negotiations
should be entered upon.
In short, supposing we are to cherish a feeling of revenge and
devise schemes to subvert foreign Powers, it will be necessary to
wait until--with large armies and abundant supplies, with no rebel
or Mohammedan outbreaks in the provinces, and no difficulties in
the capital--we can cope with them without hesitation. We shall be
a match then for all adversaries; but otherwise we cannot engage
in a rash and random conflict. Even when it is supposed that we
are ready for the struggle, it will still be necessary to exercise
extreme and continual caution, and to wait until our spirit is
high, and our aspect, therefore, formidable. Then should there
be no war, the question would be disposed of; but in the event of
our taking the field, it would not be unvictoriously.
Memorialist, however, has had several years' experience in
conducting business with foreigners, and is thoroughly familiar
with their character. He has found that, no matter what they are
engaged in, they act honourably without deceit or falsehood. But
although it is possible to acquire a general knowledge of their
mode of action in the conduct of their own affairs, yet there is
no means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the details and
motives of their conduct. Their bearing, however, in military
matters affords clear evidence of their straightforwardness.
There is the instance of the Englishman Gordon, late
commander-in-chief at Soochow, who, having organised 3000 troops
of the Ever-Victorious Army, took the field against the rebels.
Subsequently, at the capture of Soochow, the memorialist himself
observed that officer personally leading in advance of his
troops with a courage and _sang-froid_ worthy of all praise. He
subsequently became the recipient of the imperial commendation
and reward.
The writer has also, in conjunction with Tsêng Kwo-fan, acting
viceroy of the two Kiang, been associated with foreigners in
organising foreign-drilled infantry and cavalry, and in making
arrangements for the building of steam-vessels. He is thoroughly
convinced that they are actuated by upright and amicable
principles, and entertain no feelings of animosity towards China.
With the knowledge of these facts before us, it is possible to
draw our conclusions upon other matters.
It is from these considerations, therefore, that the writer
suggests the policy to be pursued in intercourse with foreigners.
There seems to be no necessity to dispose of the several
questions hastily and on the instant, nor do the resident foreign
Ministers at Peking apparently intend to insist upon an immediate
settlement.
It would be well if H.I.M. on attaining his majority were himself
to adopt the policy suggested, and in that case no difficult
questions would arise.
6th year, 11th month, 6th day.
As perhaps the best essay yet extant in translating the Chinese imperial
tradition into the language of the modern world, this paper of Li
Hung-chang's is full of instruction for foreign diplomatists. Read in
the light of the subsequent thirty years, we see that it sets forth
the principles which have inspired the whole public life of the most
prominent man in China. His recognition of the honourable character of
foreigners, as he knew them, represented a notable advance on the like
testimony of Commissioner Lin in 1841, inasmuch as Lin deduced from it
the ease by which their good faith could be abused, while Li made it
a ground of confidence in co-operation with them. His recommendation
to his contemporaries, to cultivate intimacy with foreign officials in
order to obviate misunderstandings in the execution of the treaties, was
only preaching that which he has consistently practised throughout his
official life. He was the first high official who braved public opinion by
sitting with open doors. This conciliatory temper and open mind has made
Li Hung-chang the lubricator in many jarring conflicts; and it kept him,
contrary to constitutional usage, for twenty-five years at the diplomatic
outpost of the capital.
His delicate handling of the suggestion of the Central Government,
to resist by hostile means the proposals of foreigners, is also
characteristic of the man who had seen war and hated it. While bowing to
the imperial will, he proposed postponement of its execution. In a similar
case many years afterwards a memorial of Li's was quoted as an incitement
to war with Japan, whereas it was an extinguisher, in diplomatic form,
put upon the bellicose proposal of another.
Not the least interesting part of Li's memorial is the ground on which
he advocates reform--the proved superiority of foreign nations. His
argument takes the identical form, and is expressed in the very words,
used by the Daimios of Japan; and the circumstances of the two countries
in their foreign relations were in the main so similar, that it cannot
but be instructive to observe how they comported themselves respectively
under the stress of the foreign irruption. Both had been overawed by
foreign forces, and both sought revenge by using the strength of their
opponents for their own regeneration. The difficulty, as we see it, in
the carrying out of the scheme of regeneration was of the same nature in
both countries--the want of unity and centralisation. Japan was divided
up into feudal principalities; China into provinces and prefectures as
independent as self-governing British colonies. The councils of the
Daimios bore a rough analogy to the consultations with the governors
and governors-general of China. The enemy was the same, and the means of
overcoming him are as clearly laid down in Li Hung-chang's memorial as in
the most perfervid of the Japanese manifestoes. How, then, did it come
about that the same leaven should have fermented with such miraculous
rapidity in the one country, while in the other it has been buried in a
torpid mass? Obviously this is a matter which will repay the consideration
of those who concern themselves with the state and prospects of China.
II. THE BURLINGAME MISSION.
Mysterious inception--American Minister becomes Chinese envoy
to Western countries--Objects of mission concealed--Its first
adventure--Mr Burlingame concludes treaty at Washington--Persuades
British Government to adopt new policy in China.
Three processes--separate, though not independent--were going on
simultaneously during the year 1868: the revision of the British treaty
in Peking; an epidemic of anti-foreign demonstrations in the provinces;
and the progress of the Burlingame mission in Europe. One of them cannot
be understood without the other; but taking the revision of the treaty
as the object towards which the other two converged, it will be simpler
to reserve the special consideration of the treaty question until we have
given a short outline of the accessory episodes.
Of the eight questions submitted to the provincials, one was disposed of,
and that in a surprisingly precipitate manner, a month before even the
memorials of the various authorities were sent in. An embassy to Europe
and America was appointed, equipped, and despatched in the month of
November 1867, and with a foreigner at its head. A proceeding so contrary
to Chinese tradition naturally excited curiosity as to its origin,--a
curiosity which has been tantalised but not to this day satisfied, though
the mission itself soon became ancient history. It is certain none of the
representatives of foreign Powers then in the capital were consulted,
or in any way taken into confidence with regard to the scheme--except,
of course, the one who transferred himself from the service of his own
country to that of China. "No one," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, "knew
that the Chinese were on the eve of a revolution which would materially
change the aspect of affairs." This by way of explaining an important
memorandum he had just written on the state of China, which would have
been of a different tenor had any hint of what was intended been given to
him.
As the embassy was the first that China had sent to a foreign country,
and as it was commissioned under some urgent demand which evidently
would brook no delay, its composition, character, and objects are all
interesting to the student of Chinese politics. There were three envoys,
two Chinese and one foreign. The latter was the Hon. Anson Burlingame,
Minister of the United States to China, who of course was the spokesman of
the mission. A better selection for the purpose could not have been made,
had even a larger choice of men been open to the Chinese. Mr Burlingame
had been an active politician in his time, and was a practised orator. If
we add the epithet "sophisticated rhetorician," which was ten years later
applied to a still more eminent personage, that is little more than to say
he was a special pleader. And he was engaged on special pleader's duty.
Whatever the genesis of the mission, therefore, it was a master stroke of
the Chinese Government, eclipsing all their other contrivances to resist
the expected demands of foreigners at the revision of the treaties. It was
the first open attempt by the Chinese to apply the homœopathic principle
to their international affairs in using the foreigner as an antidote to
the foreigner.
The Burlingame mission left Peking with the ostensible approval of
the foreign representatives. The support of the British Minister was
given in the most practical way by the permission granted to the acting
Chinese secretary, Mr J. McLeavy Brown, to accept the secretaryship of
the mission--a favour the more marked in that Mr Brown happened to be
the _locum tenens_ of Mr Wade, who had just gone on leave, so that his
departure left the British Legation destitute at a season of the year when
it was impossible to call up substitutes from the ports, and at a time
when the greatest burden of work was in prospect. And yet the true object
of the mission was concealed from Sir Rutherford Alcock. "I do not know
what Mr Burlingame's instructions may ultimately be," he wrote in January
1868, adding, "but it is very obvious what is the work which devolves upon
him." Sir Rutherford's judgment of its purpose seems to have been based on
his own inferences from the facts of the situation and his unquestioning
faith in Mr Burlingame's loyalty to his professed principles.
He had known Mr Burlingame for two years as the _doyen_ of the diplomatic
body, the most fervid champion of that "co-operative policy" whereby the
treaty Powers agreed to act as a united body in pursuit of identical
objects. He could not suppose that his late colleague had turned his
back on those common objects without notice. Although, therefore, the
suddenness and secrecy of the move might have suggested misgivings as
to the mission being intended to promote the views of the diplomatic
body in Peking, yet it is beyond question that Sir Rutherford Alcock
heartily favoured the embassy. His confidence in it is further attested
by a very long and elaborate memorandum which he addressed to Prince
Kung, indicating the uses to which the embassy should be put in bringing
about an understanding with the Powers, whereby Chinese interests would
be safeguarded while the treaty rights of foreigners should be amply
fulfilled. "I see in the mission a hope of improvement and a material
change in the whole aspect of affairs.... Proves there are Ministers with
power and influence in the councils of the emperor who believe the time
has come for breaking with the past.... After a long night of weariness
and futile efforts, daylight begins to appear.... I hail the appointment
of a representative to the Western Powers as the beginning of a new era."
Such was the Minister's valediction in his report to the Foreign Office.
But he had been mightily deceived. The night had indeed been long, but
it was not the true dawn which was welcomed with this joyful acclamation.
How quickly the gloom settled down again on that scene of fruitless toil
will presently be seen.
The mission was introduced to the notice of the world by a humorous
prelude, which may be quoted for the sake of the light it incidentally
throws on the chronic state of China. On their way from Peking to
Tientsin, seventy or eighty miles, the envoys halted at a large
market-town, where a report met them of a phenomenon not very uncommon
in those parts, especially in winter--a band of marauders who had been
annoying the neighbourhood. The mission took refuge in an inn, resolved
to stand a siege until aid should come. In this strait Mr Burlingame
seems never to have thought of applying either to the local authorities
of the town or to the Government he was serving, but despatched urgent
messages to Peking, where there were escorts kept at the Russian and
British Legations, and to Tientsin, where was the British gunboat Dove.
His appeals were answered with alacrity from both sides. From Peking came
a relief party of British and Russian soldiers in charge of members of
the two Legations; from Tientsin a party of mounted bluejackets under
Lieutenant Dunlop. They met at the half-way house where the mission lay,
but nothing could be seen or heard of the besiegers. Mr Burlingame's
party reached their port of embarkation without further adventure. Indeed
the only serious matter that arose out of the imbroglio was a difference
of opinion between one Vodkansky of the Cossack guard and Mulvaney, a
sturdy Hibernian of the British escort, which the latter proposed to
settle by the means in vogue among heroes before the days of Agamemnon.
Tragic consequences were, however, averted by the soothing diplomacy
of the representative of her Majesty's Legation, Mr Conolly, and the
two Burlingame relief expeditions returned to their respective stations
nothing the worse for a couple of days' outing in the bracing November
air.
Mr Burlingame made his _début_ in the United States, first by eloquent
speeches in San Francisco, and next by what assumed the form of
serious negotiations at Washington. An orator cannot reasonably be held
accountable for every detail of his orations, but Mr Burlingame's mission
may be most favourably summarised by a few carefully chosen words of his
own:--
1st. It was the object of the mission to disabuse the foreign
Powers of an impression they were supposed to entertain, that the
Chinese Government had entered upon a retrograde policy.
2nd. To deprecate a precipitate and unfriendly attempt on their
part to enter upon a policy which might make all progress
impossible from its menacing tone and "violent shock to the
feelings, and even prejudices, of the people."
Translated into practice, these propositions meant that China wished
to be let alone; and that, we may safely assume, represented the whole
extent of Mr Burlingame's instructions. This claim was embodied in a
convention which he made at Washington, comprising certain "additional
articles" to the American treaty of 1858, the purport of which was that
the United States undertook to apply no pressure to China, which, it may
be presumed, that Power had never the intention of doing. The convention
was for several reasons not welcomed at Peking, but it served the only
purpose which perhaps it was ever expected to serve, that of giving the
keynote to the representations which the envoy was afterwards to make to
the various Powers in Europe.
The next Government to which Mr Burlingame addressed himself was that
of Great Britain, over which he obtained a more important success than
over that of the United States. In fact, he persuaded Lord Clarendon
to discard all the information that ever reached the Foreign Office
from its own responsible agents in China--men who were bound by every
consideration of loyalty and public duty to report only what was true,
and to accept instead thereof the protestations of an agent hired to
make out a case; for it is superfluous to add that Mr Burlingame was
far indeed from representing the true state of facts. He succeeded in so
altering the course of the British Government that their agent in China
was discredited, stultified, and rendered powerless to effect the objects
for which he had been labouring. This was the first step of the Foreign
Office in the new departure which had many evil results--that, namely, of
taking their cue not from agents in their own pay, but from others over
whom they could exercise no control, and who had alien interests to serve.
From the Chinese point of view the Burlingame mission was a decided
success.
III. CHINESE OUTRAGES--YANGCHOW AND FORMOSA.
Missions attacked at Yangchow--Redress refused by Chinese
and enforced by consul--With naval assistance--Satisfactory
issue--Continuous outrages in Formosa--Government affords no
relief--Disturbances quelled by British forces--Lawlessness near
Swatow--Communications with interior controlled by bandits--Order
restored by Consul Alabaster with naval force--Peace and
good feeling between Chinese and foreigners resulting from
these various measures--Which were approved by Imperial
Government--Disapproved by British Government in consequence of Mr
Burlingame's representations--Consuls punished--Lord Clarendon,
prompted by Mr Burlingame, sends fresh instructions to Minister
and consuls.
The year 1868 was marked by serious anti-foreign outbreaks in widely
distant provinces of the empire. At Yangchow, a wealthy city on the Grand
Canal, twelve miles from the left bank of the Yangtze river, a favourite
resort for retired officials, rich salt merchants, and gentry, the Inland
missionaries under the orders of Mr Hudson Taylor established themselves.
In no locality in China could they have been less welcome, for there they
met their natural enemies in the greatest force. Before long an attack
on them was organised at the instigation of the literati and gentry, and
with the connivance of the local authorities. "The onslaught was sudden
and severe, the mob set fire to the premises, the ladies and children of
the mission had to be thrown out of the windows to save their lives."
There was no mistake, therefore, as to the murderous intentions of the
assailants. The nearest British consul was at Shanghai, the consulate at
Chinkiang, twelve miles from the scene of the outrage, being in charge
of an assistant, Mr Clement Allen. That young officer hastened instantly
to the assistance of the missionaries, and made his protest against the
culpable negligence, to say no more, of the Chinese officials, who on
their part made a great to-do of hushing the matter up and repairing the
injured house. Consul Medhurst promptly followed up the representations
made by Mr Allen by personal appeal to the viceroy at Nanking, fifty miles
distant. The mind of that high official had already been prejudiced by
ingeniously falsified reports of the transaction supplied to him by the
prefect of Yangchow, and in consequence he refused Mr Medhurst's request
to depute an official to accompany him to that city for the purpose of
investigating the facts. Thereupon Mr Medhurst, availing himself of the
arrival of H.M.'s ship Rinaldo at Chinkiang, obtained from her commander
a sufficient escort to accompany him to Yangchow; and then only did the
viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, appoint an officer, though of totally inadequate
rank, to co-operate with the consul. The Chinese officer did not, however,
keep his appointment, and Mr Medhurst proceeded without him, and placed
in the hands of the prefect at Yangchow a written demand for redress, one
of the items being the seizure and punishment of the gentry, whose names
were submitted. The prefect at once declared his inability to deal with
men of such influence, all being of higher rank than himself. As nothing,
therefore, could be settled at Yangchow, the prefect agreed to accompany
Mr Medhurst to Nanking to lay the whole matter before the viceroy.
A deputy from the viceroy, however, met Mr Medhurst at Chinkiang and
endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding to Nanking, offering instead
to accompany him back to Yangchow, according to the original programme. Mr
Medhurst, in his turn, persuaded the deputy to return with him to Nanking
on H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, which was to start from Chinkiang the following
morning. But the deputy Chang did not keep that appointment, any more
than he had kept his previous one. The prefect of Yangchow also found
means of evading his promise to accompany the consul into the presence
of the viceroy. After much pressure on the one side and evasion on the
other, the viceroy offered to settle the matter by a charitable gratuity
to the missionaries in lieu of damages, and showed his anxiety to get
the affair patched up quickly by sending an official of rank to follow
Mr Medhurst on board H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, where he spent two hours in
attempting to persuade the consul to accept the terms offered. Matters
were, in fact, in a fair way of settlement when, "just at this juncture,"
the commander of the Rinaldo fell sick and determined to proceed with
his ship to Shanghai, the consul being thus left in a humiliating and
helpless position, as Sir Rutherford Alcock describes it. The Chinese
officials at once changed their tone, withdrew from negotiations, and
nothing more could be done with them. The action of the naval officer
in abandoning the consul was freely criticised at the time, and being in
consequence asked by the Admiralty for an explanation, he stated, among
other things, "that it never entered his head that the presence simply
of a small man-of-war could have the effect of influencing the viceroy."
He also stated that he had "been given to understand that the viceroy had
expressed his willingness to comply with Mr Medhurst's requests, and would
send a letter to that effect that night or the next morning." The gallant
officer did not appear to perceive that the withdrawal of his ship before
the viceroy's promise had been fulfilled completely changed the situation.
Nothing was left for the consul, then, but to lay the whole case before
H.M.'s Minister, and in doing so he made these observations: "I can call
to mind, out of my experience of British relations with China, scarcely
one instance in which the outrage complained of has been more unprovoked
on the part of the sufferers, and in which the evidence of neglect and
culpability on the part of the local authorities has been more marked
and incontrovertible. Few cases can have occurred, moreover, in which the
power to grant prompt and reasonable redress was more within the reach of
the supreme provincial authority."
The Minister, in his turn, had no resource but to call upon the admiral
on the station "to repair the mischief by sending such naval force
to the mouth of the Grand Canal as shall enable him, if necessary, to
apply effective pressure both on the local authorities and populace at
Yangchow and on the viceroy at Nanking," to whom the consul was once
more instructed to address himself. Of course the Minister had before
this applied in the usual form to the Tsungli-Yamên, and with the usual
result. They deprecated hasty conclusions until they themselves had
full information from the local authorities; but they admitted without
hesitation that, assuming the facts, full redress must be granted.
The Minister's representations to the Central Government were renewed
with greater emphasis on receipt of the news of the collapse of the
consul's negotiations. Prince Kung then expressed his readiness to
make the compensations demanded; but as regarded the punishment of the
instigators of the outrage, he contented himself with tacitly indorsing
the plea of the viceroy, "that the gentry indicated were men of high
rank, and incapable of wilful disregard of treaty provisions, for which
reason they need not be called to account." In reply the Minister stated
that immunity to such offenders, more especially if highly placed, is
wholly incompatible with the treaty rights of foreigners. A new inquiry,
however, was instituted at Yangchow, and the Viceroy Tsêng, who had just
been gazetted to another post, was warned not to leave Nanking until the
affair was concluded. After an interval of two months, Consul Medhurst,
escorted by a naval force despatched to his aid by Admiral Keppel, sent
his cards once more to the Nanking viceroy. The old tactics were repeated,
and negotiations threatened to be indefinitely protracted, but eventually
promises were given for the full redress demanded. Promises, however, had
been given before, and it was deemed not unreasonable in the circumstances
to demand a material guarantee. There happened to be lying at anchor
opposite the city a small steamer recently built for the viceroy, which
he was induced to place under the orders of Captain Heneage, R.N.,
pending the execution of the arrangements. The end of the discussion
was a complete and satisfactory settlement of the whole affair, which
included the deprivation of the prefect and the magistrate of Yangchow.
The after-effects have been no less satisfactory. For the last thirty
years Yangchow has been the most peaceable missionary field in the whole
empire. We have set forth this incident in some detail, because it was
typical, isolated, and free from all obscurities.
While these events were passing on the Yangtze, similar troubles, which
had been threatening for some time, came to a head in the island of
Formosa. Outbreaks of mob-violence against the property and person of
both missionaries and merchants took place in different parts of the
island. At Banca, in the Tamsui district, two English merchants, Messrs
Kerr and Bird, were murderously assaulted by a ferocious armed mob, and
Mr Holt, the acting vice-consul at Tamsui, reported in October 1868 that
"remonstrance, expostulation, despatches, letters, messages, and visits
having alike failed in securing common justice" from the mandarin, he
might be "driven at any moment to strike his consular flag and close
communication with the authorities. Our lives are threatened by people
who have proved that the will to murder us is not wanting," and with whom
the authorities either could not or would not interfere. Mr Holt held
his ground until assistance reached him, and he made no secret of his
intention to back his diplomacy by a show of force whenever he got the
chance. "Short of destruction of life and property," he wrote, "I intend
using any means in my power to enforce that justice that the people who
are supposed to administer it deny me. On the arrival of the gunboat I
will at once inform your Excellency of the measures concerted between the
commander and myself." Vice-Admiral Keppel reported to the Admiralty in
December that "the opportune arrival of H.M. gunboat Janus and the United
States Aroostook was followed by a full compliance with the demands of
her Majesty's consul."
Matters did not run quite so smoothly at the other end of the island,
where missionaries as well as merchants were the object of attack. The
campaign was carried on with vigour for some six months. Redress was
not only unobtainable from the Chinese authorities, but even personal
access to them was rendered impossible by the obstruction of the mob.
Mr George Jamieson was obliged to forego a visit to the magistrate
at Taiwan in April on the latter confessing that he could not protect
him from violence. Mr Gibson, five months later, found his road to the
mandarin ambuscaded by three parties of sixty or seventy men each, armed
with jingalls, swords, and spears. Outrage succeeded outrage during the
whole period. The state of affairs was of course a subject of serious
remonstrance with the Central Government, of whom the Minister first
demanded, as in the Yangchow case, a joint inquiry into the facts. For
this purpose the consul, Mr Swinhoe, who had been absent on other duty,
was ordered to his proper post. At the same time Vice-Admiral Keppel was
requested to send an adequate naval force to support the consul's position
and prevent further outbreaks.
The Yamên went through the form of ordering to the spot a commissioner,
who, however, left it again immediately, thus turning the orders of the
Yamên into ridicule. This proceeding naturally encouraged the hostility
of the local officials and of the mob who executed their behests. The
situation became most threatening.
The squadron detached by Admiral Keppel for active operations at Takow
and its neighbourhood consisted of three corvettes and five gunboats, to
be reinforced if necessary by the flagship Rodney, carrying eighty-two
guns. Before this imposing force arrived, however, the task they were
intended to achieve had been already accomplished. "Driven to despair,
and believing life and property to be in great danger, Mr Gibson, without
waiting for instructions, called upon Lieutenant Gurdon of the gunboat
Algerine to take possession of the Chinese fort, which resulted in a loss
of life and a destruction of Government stores."
Mr Gibson's action was somewhat euphemistically described as "without
waiting for instructions," seeing that he had positive instructions
to maintain his ground until a naval force should arrive. Both the
operation itself and certain details of its execution were adverted
upon so severely, first by Sir Rutherford Alcock and then by the British
Government, that, notwithstanding Commodore Jones's commendation of "the
most brilliant exploit I have heard of in these seas," Lieutenant Gurdon
fell under the displeasure of the Lords of the Admiralty, as the acting
consul did under that of the Foreign Office. The object of the joint
adventure, however, was attained, and the spirit of outrage among the
Chinese completely subdued. This happened in December.
There remained, however, yet another centre of turbulence which greatly
impeded the operation of the treaty, at the port of Swatow. The villages
which lie between that seaport and the district city of Chow-chow-fu,
some 12 miles up the river Han, had banded themselves together to oppose
foreign intercourse with the latter city. Not only were the business and
property of foreign merchants interfered with, but a British man-of-war
gig in the river was fired upon, and when the men landed to identify the
offender they were overpowered by the whole population of the nearest
village. This hostile attitude, resembling very much that of the Canton
villages twenty years before, steadily increased until the native
officials themselves were not safe in passing to and from the district
city. Strong representations were made to the high authorities of the
province at Canton. The viceroy had promised to send a military force to
quell the riotous villages, but before he had proved the sincerity of his
intention the Gordian knot was cut by British initiative in January 1869.
The late Sir Challoner Alabaster, a man of uncommon resolution, was at
that time acting consul at Swatow; and he, having secured the co-operation
of Commodore Jones, led a force of marines and bluejackets against the
offending villages. A stout resistance was offered at first, but when
several of the villages had been taken and destroyed the whole eighteen
made their submission. Thereafter the district enjoyed perfect peace
and security. In the following March Sir Rutherford Alcock was able to
telegraph to Lord Clarendon that "the accounts from all the ports showed
that peace and order had been restored; that at Yangchow and Formosa
entire security and an improved position had been obtained; that there
was no more cause for anxiety at any point; that the best understanding
existed with the foreign body at Peking; and that the relations with China
had never been more satisfactory."
The bearing of these occurrences on the revision of the treaty may not at
first sight be quite clear, but it is interesting to note in what manner
they were connected with that operation in the mind of Sir Rutherford
Alcock. He calculated that the necessity of using force to vindicate
foreign treaty rights, of which both he and his predecessor had constantly
warned them, would bring home to the Peking authorities the alternative
which they would always have to face in case of failure to carry out the
treaties. How very differently these outrages and the enforced redress
affected the situation in Peking will now be seen.
The action taken at Yangchow and in Formosa having been fully explained
to the Tsungli-Yamên, Wênsiang and the other Ministers expressed their
entire concurrence. But what satisfied the Government of China produced
quite another impression on that of Great Britain. Lord Stanley, as
Foreign Secretary, had written on November 20, 1868: "Mr Medhurst appears
to have acted with great prudence and firmness, and you will convey to
him my approval of his proceedings.... I have to instruct you [Sir R.
Alcock] to press the case in question upon the Chinese Government." Two
months later Mr Medhurst was reprimanded by Lord Clarendon for his action,
and the "full satisfaction for the outrage" was attributed exclusively
to the "readiness with which the Central Government took measures that
proved effectual." The change of Government which had in the interval
taken place in England (December 9, 1868) was hardly sufficient to account
for so diametrical a change of view in a matter of imperial concern.
Another agency had effected the conversion of the British Government.
Mr Burlingame had arrived fresh from fervid denunciations in the United
States of the "tyrannic policy" and the "throat policy" of Great Britain
as applied to China, and adroitly seizing on the repression of the
Yangchow and Formosa outrages as flagrant examples, he succeeded in
incensing Lord Clarendon against the various British officials concerned
in these troubles, whom his lordship visited with punishment which
scarcely stopped short of vindictiveness. Mr Medhurst, indeed, a man of
long and distinguished service, had only a black mark set against his
name; but Mr Gibson was publicly censured and degraded, and ordered to
make an apology to the Chinese officials whose lawless aggressions he
had lawlessly repelled. With some inconsistency, Lord Clarendon, about
the same time, approved the conduct of Acting-Consul Holt at Tamsui, who
succeeded in adjusting most serious misunderstandings with the Chinese
through no other means than the visible force of the small gunboat Janus,
for whose arrival he waited before preferring his demands.
That the sudden change in the policy of the British Government was the
work of Mr Burlingame was frankly avowed by Lord Clarendon himself, who
based the fresh instructions to the Minister in China on the arrangements
he had concluded with the Chinese representative. In his letter of
condemnation, January 14, 1869, he, moreover, intimated that he could not
wait before pronouncing judgment for Sir Rutherford Alcock's complete
report on the Yangchow affair, because his "communication with Mr
Burlingame ... rendered it necessary that he should not defer making his
observations." That a British Secretary of State could have so demeaned
his office would not have been believed save on his own confession. He
of course carried the Admiralty with him, and the same influence which
inspired the new instructions issued to the Minister and consuls inspired
those issued to the commanding officers on the China station.
Taken textually, the negotiations between Mr Burlingame and Lord Clarendon
were of a platonic character. H.M.'s Government undertook to apply
no pressure to China. It would have been a simple matter to refrain
from applying pressure, and a tacit resolution to that effect with
corresponding instruction to the Minister in Peking would have secured the
object. To make it a subject of direct pledge to the Chinese Government
seemed one of those gratuitous acts which all diplomatic experience
condemns as fraught with future embarrassments. To save appearances,
however, a nominal equivalent was taken. "Mr Burlingame was requested to
bear in mind, and to make known to the Chinese Government, that we should
henceforward have a right to expect on its part the faithful fulfilment
of treaty engagements, the prompt redress of grievances referred to the
Central Government, and friendly treatment of British subjects by the
Chinese authorities"--as if all that had not been already stipulated for
under the solemn sanction of the existing treaty.
IV. REVISION NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUSION.
Lukewarmness of British Government--Sir R. Alcock's misgivings
as to success--Mixed commission in Peking to consider
details--Mr Hart's predominance--Treaty becomes a custom-house
concern--Increase of duties being the Chinese aim--Sir
Rutherford Alcock attributes failure to Mr Burlingame's
misrepresentations--Merchants oppose the treaty--Ratification
refused by British Government--Inferences from this
fiasco--Chinese influenced by force alone.
Let us now revert to the cause and origin of the Burlingame mission--the
revision of the treaty of Tientsin. The instruction for revision was
given by Lord Stanley on August 16, 1867, in such general terms as the
following:--
Her Majesty's Government neither wish, nor have they the
right, to impose sacrifices on China, even though they may be
convinced that the inconvenience of such sacrifices will be only
temporary, whereas the benefit which will result from them will be
lasting.... We must reconcile ourselves to waiting for the gradual
development of that [better] system, and content ourselves with
reserving for revision at a future period any new arrangement we
may come to in 1868.... You will of course act openly with the
representatives of other Powers, inviting and availing yourself
of their co-operation.
A note of misgiving as to the policy of asking for the revision runs
through the whole correspondence. After the preliminary labours of sifting
the voluminous memorials from merchants and others, Sir Rutherford Alcock
sums up their demands thus: "All their wants turn upon three or four
cardinal defects, not of the treaties so much as in their execution." And
he adds the significant reflection: "The question arises, if nothing is to
be gained by demanding a revision, ... whether much would not be lost, and
an opportunity thrown away, which might, by reserving the right, be turned
to better account when the emperor's majority is declared. I believe the
true policy of foreign Powers would be to wait; ... to this conclusion
... all the representatives of foreign Powers now in Peking are led." "The
Chinese," he also says, "would go much faster and better if left alone."
The question naturally suggested by these remarks--why a task involving
enormous labour, of which only negative results were to be expected, was
entered upon at all at such an inopportune moment--remains unanswered.
It would be insufferably tedious, and of no practical utility, to track
the windings of a maze leading nowhere, for the revised treaty was never
ratified. But the labours of two whole years could not but leave landmarks
to guide succeeding travellers over the same ground. It could not be but
that with so much beating of the bushes the game would be started, if not
brought to bag. It was a reconnaissance in force which, for the first
time, compelled the respective parties to the struggle to reveal their
true character and intentions. Such a discovery was perhaps not too dearly
bought by the time and trouble expended on it.
The first definite step in the process of revision was the nomination of
a mixed commission of British and Chinese "to devise means of securing a
more prompt redress of commercial grievances." The members were Mr Fraser,
second secretary to the British Legation; Mr Hart, Inspector-General of
Customs; and two secretaries of the Tsungli-Yamên--a heavy preponderance
on the Chinese side of the question. To the same commission was added
another British member, Mr Adkins. And here it is not impertinent to
observe that the absence of both the Chinese secretary, Mr Wade, and the
acting Chinese secretary, Mr Brown, left the Legation in a condition too
crippled to engage on work which would have taxed its full strength. The
members of the commission held many sittings, reporting proceedings from
time to time to their respective principals, the Tsungli-Yamên and the
British Minister.
It needs no great effort of imagination to divine, in a body thus
composed, whose would be the dominant voice. Mr Hart conducted the
proceedings throughout. The discussion had not gone far when it was found
hopeless to revise the provisions of the treaty in any sense compatible
with progress or freer intercourse; and the dangerous questions which had
caused the Government so much anxiety, and which had inspired both the
Burlingame mission and the various secret memorials, being thus happily
ruled outside the controversy, the Chinese Ministers seem to have given
themselves no further concern about the revision. This distant attitude
of theirs was severely commented on by a contemporary writer in 'Fraser's
Magazine,' who said:--
After ten years of conciliatory blandishments on our part, the
high Chinese authorities had so far disobeyed the spirit of the
treaty that, although they had not actually prevented our Minister
from corresponding and visiting with them, yet they had had the
audacity to render all such intercourse absolutely nugatory,
and had constrained him, after a long and successful diplomatic
career, to descend to the extremely humiliating position of
treating with them indirectly through the medium of Mr R. Hart.
As, however, the proceedings became focussed on a tariff revision destined
to add to the duty receipts, a "collector of revenue wanting money," as Mr
Hart described himself, was the most fitting negotiator, and the Chinese
ministers were well pleased to leave him free to make his own bargain, so
long as it yielded that result.
To give colour to the Chinese demand for higher duties a bold formula was
resorted to, and supported by equally bold reasoning. The expedient was
a rearrangement of the method of collection of inland dues on foreign
merchandise, which was then, as it continues to be, the great bone of
contention between foreign traders and the Chinese authorities. The
treaties conferred on merchants the right of compounding for all inland
taxation of their merchandise by a single payment at the port of entry;
but the practices of the Chinese officials had rendered the privilege a
nullity. In the new negotiations Mr Hart, on the part of the Chinese,
took the high ground of maintaining, with subtle dialectic, that the
protection which foreigners claimed was not in fact given by the treaties.
So strongly did the Chinese entrench themselves in this contention, that
heavy artillery was required to dislodge them. "Could any negotiators
be so dull or incompetent," wrote Sir R. Alcock in reply, "as to sign a
treaty of commerce with an Eastern potentate, extorted at the point of
the bayonet, and leave this unlimited power in his hands to turn against
us the next moment, or whenever he pleased, and nullify all that had been
stipulated, destroying the trade for which alone war had been made?"
Defeated in argument, the Chinese next begged that what they could not
claim as a right might yet be accorded to them as a favour, thus copying
the tactics of the Japanese in an analogous case.
As this proved to be the crux of the whole transaction, the rock on which
the convention eventually split, it is useful to consider how the subject
was treated in the negotiations. The treaties of Nanking, 1842, and of
Tientsin, 1858, provided for the transit of British goods throughout
the empire on payment of a fixed charge. But in securing exemption from
arbitrary imposts in the interior, the treaty of Nanking signally failed;
that of Tientsin had proved equally ineffective, and why? From inherent
difficulties in the nature of things--obstacles absolutely insuperable
so long as the country remained under the same organic conditions. Such
were the propositions with which the British Minister entered upon the
discussion of the subject; and as no proposal was made for changing the
organic conditions of the empire, the prospect of obtaining a satisfactory
fulfilment of those treaty provisions did not seem very encouraging.
But then a suggestion, apparently emanating from Consul Robertson at
Canton, was made for simplifying the problem by doing away with the option
which had been reserved in the treaties for foreign merchants, either
to pay the commutation at the port of landing, or to allow their goods
to run the gantlet of the Chinese customs stations. Instead of this, it
was suggested that a single compulsory payment, amounting to half the
import tariff, might be levied on the landing of the goods, which should
thereafter be freed from all other imposts throughout the empire. It
was not unnatural that a "collector of revenue" should appropriate this
conception, and introduce it into the revised treaty; but then the doubt
immediately arose on the other side, whether the promised exemption would
be any more of a reality than it had been under the existing _régime_. If
the difficulties in the way of fulfilling the stipulation in the treaty
of Tientsin and Nanking were really insuperable, would they now disappear
merely because the Chinese Government received an increased import duty?
In considering Mr Hart's proposal, "the question would be," according to
Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Could we obtain a sufficient guarantee that such
additional import due would effectually exempt British goods from all
other dues, local, provincial, and what not?" And again, "Security for
exemption from all but the fixed 2½ per cent was the one question on which
depended the value of any revision."
A necessary condition of any successful treaty was the assent of
all the other Powers to its provisions, seeing that under their
most-favoured-nation clauses any one of them by holding aloof could
render the treaty inoperative. The various foreign representatives were
therefore kept informed of the progress of negotiations. In this way their
opinions were obtained from time to time as to the merits of the various
proposals. On the subject of the compulsory payment of transit dues the
opinions which the British Minister received from his colleagues were
all unfavourable. They considered that some "additional guarantee would
be necessary against failure, and as against security for additional
losses which would be entailed upon the merchants." To give effect to
the new proposals an edict was to be published acquainting all provincial
officials with what had been agreed upon. But still the diplomatic body
maintained "that nothing is really certain but the addition of 2½ per
cent to the import duties. This will be rigorously exacted and paid;
but whether the equivalent exemption from all other taxation will be
obtained must be held doubtful, ... seeing that in the past the same
provincial authorities have shown the most persistent disregard of
treaty stipulations and proclamations." "Under such circumstances," Sir
Rutherford adds, "it would seem reasonable that, during the first year
at least, all amounts collected under the new arrangements ... should be
carried to a separate account ... to meet claims for compensation." In the
end, however, he saw reason to waive this proviso, to disregard the views
of his colleagues, and to assent to the new impost, without any guarantee.
Attempts to obtain concessions from the Chinese in the way of freer
intercourse proved, as we have said, hopeless from the first. The renewal
of the Chinese demand to establish a customs station in Hongkong--that
"immense smuggling depot"--was refused on the British side; while the
British request for recognition of Hongkong as a port of call for goods
in transit to Canton was in like manner refused on the Chinese side,
because it "would give the place a respectable name" as well as make it
the "great emporium of the south." Hongkong, it is fair to remember, was,
not unnaturally, odious in the eyes of the Chinese. The more prosperous
the colony became, the more they hated it; and the more patriotic among
them--as, for instance, the Minister Wênsiang--detested it the most.
The ruling factor in eliminating all measures of progress from the
negotiations and reducing the whole to a customs question was Mr
Burlingame.
After the arrival of the mission to Washington [wrote Sir
Rutherford on February 27, 1869] the hopes which the signature
of the additional articles was calculated to excite undoubtedly
exercise a very prejudicial effect on my efforts.... With Mr
Burlingame's enthusiastic reception, and the prompt signature
of the convention by which the United States Government pledged
itself to leave China free to adopt or reject all such innovations
and internal improvements, and even to use its influence with
other Powers for the same end, they gained precisely the assurance
they wanted.... From that moment further progress or successful
negotiation became impossible.
He added in a subsequent despatch to Lord Clarendon:--
One result stands out more clearly than any other, and it is this:
what we have gained by the last year's preliminary negotiations is
not likely to be withdrawn. But if it was difficult to negotiate
for large concessions before the assurance authoritatively given
by your lordship to Mr Burlingame, ... it is now out of the
question to hope for more than has already been conceded....
Strong in the assurances of two of the treaty Powers, ... it is
quite certain that no further progress can be made at present. It
simply remains for her Majesty's Government to determine whether
they will carry out the revision on the basis proposed and already
assented to by the Chinese Government, or defer the revision
altogether to some later period.
The provisional report of the negotiations having been submitted by the
Foreign Office to the other treaty Powers for their opinion, most of
them contented themselves with amicable generalities, the only definite
criticism elicited being that of the North German Confederation. Going
straight to the core of the matter, in May 1869, Count Bernstorff wrote
as follows, basing his remarks upon the opinion of the German merchants:--
Although the advantages which are to be expected for trade in
general from the abolition of the "lekin taxes" would not be
too dearly bought by this extension of the transit duty to all
commodities, yet, on the other hand, the treaty Powers certainly
have the right of demanding the abolition of the taxes levied
contrary to treaty, even without giving anything in return,
and they might probably obtain this result by common action.
And then, moreover, it appears, from existing circumstances
in China, exceedingly questionable whether this tax, even if
abolished by imperial edict in consequence of a treaty, would not,
nevertheless, still be levied by the mandarins, although perhaps
in another shape, since now indeed they have their assignments
thereon.
Doubts on the part of the Foreign Office led to further correspondence
backwards and forwards, closing with the following ambiguous despatch,
dated 29th September, which was transmitted by telegram, a very slow
process in those days:--
If you should not have concluded an arrangement before this
reaches you, her Majesty's Government think it would be better
to protract negotiations rather than accept now a limited
arrangement, which would be binding for so long a period as ten
years, and which would not comprise a satisfactory arrangement
respecting transit duties, and which might compromise the right
of her Majesty's Government to take part in the negotiations of
other Powers for a revision of their treaties.
Should you, however, have completed any arrangement, you may be
assured that the best view will be taken of it here.
The supplementary convention was, in fact, signed in October, and Sir
Rutherford Alcock took his leave immediately after, visiting the Yangtze,
Shanghai, Hongkong, and India on his way to Europe. At these places
he explained in general terms the bearing of the treaty, the Indian
Government being specially concerned in the increase of the Chinese import
duty on opium, to which the trade generally were absolutely indifferent.
The supplementary convention was exhaustively reviewed by the Shanghai
General Chamber of Commerce in a memorial addressed to Lord Clarendon
(December 31, 1869). To the practical view of the merchants the treaty
consisted of three clauses: one making compulsory what had previously been
optional--the payment of half the import duty in commutation of inland
dues on foreign merchandise; one doubling the export duty on raw silk;
and the third more than doubling the import duty on opium. Of these, the
first alone was deemed important. The consideration offered by the Chinese
Government for the compulsory payment--that they would frank imported
goods through nine of the eighteen provinces of China--was not regarded as
an equivalent; for the treaty of Tientsin contained the same undertaking
without the geographical limitation, but it had not been fulfilled. The
ground alleged for this non-observance of the existing treaty had been
the existence of insurmountable obstacles in connection with provincial
and imperial finance. These obstacles, the merchants observed, were
"now assumed to have been suddenly overcome," an assumption which they
considered illusory. The question of transit dues was not new to them:
it had been threshed out on all sides during weary years; it was the
recurrent topic of the day with them, as it was destined to continue to
be for a generation longer; and the merchants could not therefore believe
that the difficulties against which they had been hopelessly struggling
were suddenly removed by magic. They were not shown how the revolution was
to be effected. In short, "the conclusion," they said, "was irresistible,
that to a very great extent the commutation of transit dues, which is
made compulsory by the new treaty, will simply become an additional tax
on trade without any return whatever; and that the provincial authorities
will as heretofore tax goods in transit very much as they please, the
treaty stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding,"--a conclusion
supported by arguments which could not be refuted.
Sir Thomas Wade some years later expressed the same views as the merchants
had done. "I doubted," he said, "the good faith of officials when breach
of faith could only be established by the evidence of those subject to
their authority and entirely in their power.... I have since found reason
to believe that the control of taxation in the provinces is a matter of
no small trouble to the Central Government as at present constituted,
if indeed it be possible at all." Nevertheless, he adds, "I have found
occasion to regret that the convention has not been allowed at least a
term of probation." A term of probation was the alternative suggested by
the merchants also, but it seems never to have received any consideration
from the Foreign Office.
The representation which the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce based upon
their review of the treaty was adopted by influential commercial bodies in
England, who in a "monstrous deputation," as Mr Hammond called it, urged
on the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the non-ratification of the treaty.
The British Government gave way, not, as they candidly admitted, convinced
by the reasoning, but overawed by the electoral pressure of the merchants;
and the supplementary convention was allowed to fall through.
Thus ended the first attempt to negotiate a treaty with China as a
perfectly free agent. The conclusion to be drawn not only from the
negative result, but from the whole process of the negotiations--from the
memorials from the provinces, and still more from the Privy Council, the
six boards, and the censorates--is, as stated by Sir Rutherford Alcock in
May 1869, "that the old spirit of arrogance of the days of Lin and Yeh is
still in full vigour, and the assumption of superiority over the barbarian
absolutely unmeasured. That the anti-foreign element amongst the official
and educated classes has suffered no diminution whatever; that if some
two or three leading men take a clearer view of the political situation,
they are evidently without power to take action upon it; and so the vessel
of State is allowed to drift whichever way the tide of prejudice and
ignorance may set. There are still some documents," he added, "wanting to
complete the series, especially the answer of Li Hung-chang and a second
memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan [p. 184 _seq._], which it would be desirable to
obtain as showing the policy advocated by two of the most prominent men
in the empire at this moment."
One sentence of Sir Rutherford Alcock sums up the case China _v._ the
West: "Pressure, indeed, there must always be here if anything is to be
achieved for the advancement of foreign interests and commerce. In one
way or other, however we may disguise it, our position in China has been
created by force--naked, physical force; and any intelligent policy to
improve or maintain that position must still look to force in some form,
latent or expressed, for the results." Whether the Western nations,
singly or collectively, are justified in using their force for such a
purpose is a question which is not affected by this plain statement of the
case. That the policy of the Western Powers has been largely influenced
by sentimental consideration towards China is true; but their action
has never been consistent with their professions, and their oscillation
between coercion and submission has led to disastrous consequences.
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTE:
[15] He now knows better.