CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND MISSION TO CHINA. PEKIN.

THE LANDING--CHINESE OVERTURES--TAKING OF THE FORTS--THE PEN TIENTSIN--

NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF--NEW PLENIPOTENTIARIES--AGREEMENT MADE--AGREEMENT

BROKEN--TREACHEROUS SEIZURE OF MR. PARKES AND OTHERS--ADVANCE ON PEKIN-

-RETURN OF SOME OF THE CAPTIVES--FATE OF THE REST--BURNING OF THE SUMMER

PALACE--CONVENTION SIGNED--FUNERAL OF THE MURDERED CAPTIVES--IMPERIAL

PALACE--PRINCE KUNG--ARRIVAL OF MR. BRUCE--RESULTS OF THE MISSION.

[Sidenote: The landing.]

On the 1st of August the landing of the allied troops was effected in

perfect order, without the slightest opposition on the part of the

inhabitants, at the point already mentioned, viz. near the little town of

Pey-tang which is situated at the mouth of a river of the same name, about

eight miles north of the mouth of the Peiho. What Lord Elgin saw of the

operations is described in the following letter:--

_August 2nd._--There have been a few days' interval since I wrote, and

I now date from Pey-tang, and from the General's ship the 'Granada,' a

Peninsular and Oriental steamer; for I owe it to him that I am here. I

need hardly tell you the events that have occurred--public events I

mean--since the 28th, as they will all be recorded by 'Our Own.' We

moved on the 29th to a different anchorage, some five miles nearer

Pey-tang. ... All the evidence was to the effect that the Pey-tang

Forts were undefended, at least that there were no barricades in the

river, and therefore that the best way of taking them would be to pass

them in the gunboats as we did the Peiho Forts in 1858, and as we also

passed Nankin that year ... but it was resolved that we should land a

quantity of men in the mud about a mile and a half below them. This

was to have taken place on the 30th, and those of my gentlemen who

intended to leave me, as better fun was to be found elsewhere, kept up

a tremendous bustle and noise from about 4 A.M. However, at about 6,

they were informed that the orders for landing were countermanded, on

the plea that there was too much sea to admit of the horses being

transferred from the vessels to the gunboats. Next day, the 31st, it

was raining, and the sea seemed rougher in the morning. However, at

about 9, the gunboats began to move. The General had agreed that I

should have his ship, and that I should move either over the bar or as

near to it as I could manage. ... I anchored the 'Granada' outside the

bar, and as I did not choose to lose the sight of the landing, I got

into my row-boat ... going at last on board the 'Coromandel,' the

Admiral's ship. The landing went on merrily enough. It was a lovely,

rather calm evening. We were within a long-range shot of the Forts;

and if shot or shell had dropped among the boats and men who were

huddled up on the edge of the mud-bank, it would have been

inconvenient. Our enemy, however, had no notion of doing anything so

ungenerous; so the landing went on uninterruptedly, the French

carrying almost all they wanted on their backs, our men employing

coolies, &c., for that purpose. We saw nothing of the enemy except the

movements of a few Tartar horsemen out of and into the town, galloping

along the narrow causeway on which our troops were to march. At

midnight eight gunboats--six English and two French--steamed past the

Forts. It was a moment of some excitement, because we did not know

whether or not they would be fired at. However, nothing of the kind

took place; and, about an hour after they had started, three rockets

that soared and burst over the village intimated that they had reached

the place appointed to them. Having witnessed this part of the

proceedings I lay down on the deck with my great-coat over me; but not

for long, for at half-past two, Captain Dew (my old friend)[1] arrived

with the announcement that, having been on an errand to the lines of

the troops, he had met a party of French soldiers who were obliging

some Chinese to carry a wooden gun which they had captured in the

fort, declaring that they had entered it, found it deserted, and

possessed of no defences but two wooden guns. It turned out that they

had not entered first, but that an English party, headed by Mr.

Parkes, had preceded them. This rather promised to diminish the

interest of the attack on the forts which had been fixed for half-past

four in the morning. But there was another fort on the opposite side

of the river, perhaps there might be some resistance there. Alas! vain

hope. Three shots were fired at it from the gunboats which had passed

through during the night, and some twenty labourers walked out of it

to seek a more secure field for their industry in some neighbouring

village. Afterwards our troops went in and found it empty as the

other; so ended the capture of Pey-tang.

We came over the bar in the evening, and I went to see Hope Grant at

the captured fort, where he has fixed his abode. While there we

discovered a strongish body of Tartar cavalry, at a distance of about

four miles along the causeway which leads from this to Tientsin and

Taku. I urged the General to send out a party to see what these gentry

were doing, lest they should be breaking up the causeway, or doing any

other mischief; and I heard from him this morning that he had arranged

with General Montauban to do so, and that a party of 2,000 men started

on that errand early. The Tartars seem to be in greater force than was

supposed. The officer in command (rightly or wrongly, I know not

which) resolved to consider the expedition merely a reconnaissance,

and to retire after staying on the ground a short time. Of course the

Tartars will consider this a victory, and will he elated by it; but

perhaps this is a good thing, as it may induce them to face us on the

open. The ground on which they were found is firm and fit for cavalry,

and is about four miles from the Peiho Forts. This is a very nasty

place. The country around is all under water, and it is impossible to

get through it except by moving along the one or two causeways that

intersect it. The military are, therefore, glad to find sound footing

at no great distance.

[Sidenote: Chinese overtures.]

Up to this time no communication of any kind had passed between the Special

Ambassadors and any Chinese officials. An _ultimatum_ had been presented by

Mr. Bruce in March, demanding an apology for the attack on our ships of

war, the immediate ratification of the Treaty, and prompt payment of the

indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as therein stipulated. As these demands had

been formally refused by the Chinese Government, there was no room for

diplomacy. Even the bare announcement of his arrival Lord Elgin feared they

might interpret as an invitation to treat, and use as an excuse for

dilatory and evasive negotiations. The justice of this view was proved by

what took place on the 5th of August. Having occasion to station one of his

ships near the shore for the purpose of getting water, the Admiral sent a

flag of truce to warn some Tartar troops posted near the spot, that 'his

ship had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it

would fire on the Tartars if they approached too near it.' The Governor-

General at once took advantage of the opening this gave him. Affecting to

believe that the flag of truce came from Lord Elgin, he addressed to him a

despatch full of professions of amity, and saying that he 'had received

instructions to discuss and dispose of all questions with the British

Minister,' but containing no mention of the _ultimatum_. To this and

numerous similar missives, which came for a time in rapid succession, Lord

Elgin had but one reply--that he could discuss nothing until the demands

already made had been satisfied.

_August 9th._--My diplomacy began yesterday, for I received in the

morning a communication from the Governor-General of the province, not

frankly conceding our demands, but making tolerably plausible

proposals for the sake of occasioning delay. I have refused to stay

the march of the military on such overtures; but the great slowness of

our operations is likely to lead me into diplomatic difficulties. The

Chinese authorities, if they become frightened, are clever enough to

advance propositions which it may be impossible to accede to without

compromising the main objects of this costly expedition, and by

refusing which I shall, nevertheless, expose myself to great

animadversion. There was a reconnaissance again this morning, and I

hope from the report of Crealock (who accompanied it, and who is doing

very well) that the enemy will prove quite as little formidable as I

have always expected. The serious advance was positively to have taken

place to-morrow, but I almost fear there will be another delay. I am

anxious to conclude peace as soon as possible after the capture of the

Peiho Forts, because, from what I have seen of the conduct of the

French here, I am sure that they will commit all manner of atrocities,

and make foreigners detested in every town and village they enter. Of

course their presence makes it very difficult to maintain discipline

among our own people.

[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]

The 'serious advance' took place on the 12th, and was completely

successful. On that day the Allies took possession of the little town of

Sinho: two days later they occupied Tangkow. The forts, however, which

guarded the entrance of the Peiho--the Taku Forts, from which the British

forces had been so disastrously repulsed the year before--remained untaken.

Opinions were divided as to the plan of operations. The French were for

attacking first the great fortifications on the right or southern bank of

the river; but Sir Robert Napier urged that the real key to the enemy's

position was the most northerly of the forts, on the left or northern bank.

Happily his counsels prevailed. On the 21st this fort was taken by assault,

with but little loss of life; and the soundness of the judgment which

selected the point of attack was proved by the immediate surrender of all

the remaining defensible positions on both sides of the river.

During the greater part of this time Lord Elgin was on board the 'Granada,'

moored off Pey-tang, suffering all the anxieties of an active spirit

condemned to inactivity in the midst of action: responsible generally for

the fate of the expedition, yet without power to control any detail of its

operations; fretting especially at the delays which are, perhaps,

necessarily incident to a divided and subdivided command. Writing after the

surrender of the Taku Forts he said:--

I have torn up the earlier part of this letter, because it is needless

to place on record the anxieties I felt at that time. To revert to the

portion of my history which was included in the part of my letter that

I have destroyed, I must tell you that it was on the 12th that the

troops first moved out of Pey-tang. I saw them defile past, and in the

afternoon rode out to the camp, but was turned back by a large body of

Tartar cavalry, who menaced my flank, and as some of my people had

just discovered, in the apartment of the Tartar General at Sinho, a

letter stating that they were determined to capture the 'big barbarian

himself' this time, I thought it better to retrace my steps. The

second action took place on the 14th, and on the 15th I rode out to

see the General, and had a conference with him. On the 17th I went to

the gulf to see Gros. I have had dozens of letters from the Chinese

authorities, and I have answered some of them, not in a way to give

them much pleasure. All these details were given at full length in my

annihilated letter, but already they seem out of date.

_Tangkow.--August 23rd._--Grant has been marvellously favoured by the

weather, for the rain, which arrests all movements here, stopped the

day before he moved out of Pey-tang, and began again about an hour

after he had taken the Taku Fort, which led to the surrender of the

whole. I must also say that the result entirely justified the

selection which he made of his point of attack, and, as this was

against the written opinion of the French General, it is a feather in

Grant's cap. The Chinese are just the same as they were when I knew

them formerly. They fired the cannons with quite as little accuracy,

but there was one point of difference in their proceedings. On

previous occasions we have always found their forts open on one side;

so that, when they were turned, the troops left them and escaped. In

this instance they were enclosed with ditches, palisades, stakes, &c.,

so that the poor fellows had nothing for it but to remain in them till

they were pushed out by bayonets. Almost all our casualties occurred

during the escalade. I went through the hospitals yesterday, and found

very few who had been struck by round shot. A very small portion of

the force was engaged, so that my opinion of its unnecessary magnitude

is not shaken. I need not describe the action for you, as you will no

doubt see elsewhere a detailed account of it. My own personal history

will not be indifferent to you. I left the 'Granada' at about 5.30

P.M. on the 20th (Monday). Found some dinner and a tent at the camp at

Sinho. Started next morning at about 5.30 A.M.; rode into Tangkow,

where I now am, and mounted to the top of the Head-quarters' House,

whence I had a very good view of the operations. I was dislodged after

a while, because a battery opened fire at about fifteen hundred yards

from us, and some of the balls fell so near, that we began to think

they were perhaps firing at me. On being dislodged from my Belvidere,

I took some breakfast to console myself; and soon after, seeing the

British flag on the fort which we had been attacking, I rode over to

it. We met a good many of our own wounded, and all round the fort were

numbers of the poor Chinamen, staked and massacred in all sorts of

ways. I found the two Generals there, and soon after the Admiral came

up from his ship under a flag of truce. Two letters came to me from

the Chinese; but, true to my policy of letting the fighting men have

all the prestige of taking the Forts, I would not have anything to say

to them. The messengers were told that they must give up the forts to

the Commanders-in-Chief before I would listen to them; and that, in

the meantime, the army would proceed with its operations. They moved

on accordingly, and I returned to my post of observation at Tangkow. I

had hardly reached it when the rain began, and in about an hour the

roads had become absolutely impassable for artillery, and nearly so

for everything else. The troops met with no resistance at the second

fort, and the indefatigable Parkes having gone over to the unfortunate

Governor-General, extorted from him a surrender of the whole, which he

brought to the Commanders-in-Chief on the morning of the 22nd, having,

I believe, dictated its terms. Of course, Grant's triumph is complete,

and deservedly so. ... The system of our army involves such an

enormous transportation of provisions, &c., that we make, however, but

slow progress. I have, therefore, urged the Admiral, who has got

through the barriers at the mouth of the Peiho (and who is not

unwilling to go ahead), to proceed up the river with his gunboats: if

he meets with any obstructions which are serious, he can stop his

progress, and await the arrival of troops. If he meets none, he will

soon reach Tientsin.

_August 24th._--This morning, at about four, Grant awoke me with a

letter from the Admiral, saying that he had experienced in going up

the river exactly what we did in 1858--the poor people coming down in

crowds to offer submission and provisions, and no opposition of any

kind. He wrote from ten miles below Tientsin, which place he was going

to occupy with his small gunboat force. The General has agreed to

despatch a body of infantry in gunboats, and to make his cavalry march

by land; and I am only awaiting the return of the Admiral to move on.

So all is going on well. Grant has also agreed to send a regiment to

Shanghae in case there should be trouble there. ... It really looks

now as if my absence would not be protracted much beyond the time we

used to speak of before I started. ... At the same time, I do not like

to be too confident.

[Sidenote: The Peiho.]

_August 25th.--Noon._--High and dry at about fifteen miles below

Tientsin. This must remind you of some of my letters from the Yangtze,

two years ago. We started this morning at 6.30 in the 'Granada:' the

General and I, with both our staffs. We had gone on famously to this

point, scraping through the mud occasionally with success. In rounding

a corner, however, at which a French gunboat had already stuck before

us, we have run upon a bank. It is very strange to me to be going up

the Peiho river again. The fertility of the plain through which it

runs strikes me more than it did formerly. The harvest is at hand, and

the crops clothe it luxuriantly. The poor people in the villages do

not appear to fear us much. We treated them well before, and they

expect similar treatment again. The Admiral did his work of occupying

Tientsin well.... He has great qualities.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

_Tientsin.--Sunday, August 26th._--We reached this place about

midnight. It was about the most nervous operation at which I ever

assisted, going round the sharp turns with this long ship by

moonlight. I had a moment of painful _saisissement_ when I felt almost

certain that we should run into my dear colleague Gros, who had

grounded in a little gunboat at one of the worst bends of the river.

We only saved him by dropping an anchor from the stern, and going

backwards full speed. The Yangtze was bad enough, but we never used to

go on at night, and there was no danger of collisions. This ship looks

also as if she would go head over heels much more easily than the

'Furious.' I am waiting for Parkes and the General before I decide as

to landing, &c. Is it not strange to be here? Immediately ahead of us

is the yamun where Gros and I spent the eventful weeks in 1858, which

preceded the signature of the treaties of Tientsin! _Two P.M._--We are

to have the yamun in which Reed and Putiatine were lodged in 1858; a

much better quarter than our old one; and the General, Gros, and I are

all to lodge in it together.

[Sidenote: Chinese yamun.]

_Tientsin.--August 27th._--I had a very bad headache after I had sent

off the mail yesterday. ... Our ship had, moreover, got aground, and

was lying over so much on one side that it seemed possible that she

might topple over altogether. Under these circumstances, and having

the prospect of a very noisy night on board, I determined to land and

sleep in my yamun. The portion of it dedicated to me consists of a

regular Chinese garden, with rockwork and bridges, and ponds full of

lotus leaves, and flowerpots of all dimensions with shrubs and flowers

in them, surrounded on two sides by wooden buildings, containing rooms

with carved woodwork and other Chinese neatnesses. It is the only

house of a Chinese gentleman I have ever inhabited, for when I was

here before I dwelt in a temple. The mosquitoes were a little

troublesome at first, but I got my net up, and slept tolerably, better

than I should have done here; for the iron ships get so heated by the

sun during the day that they are never cool, however fresh the night

air may be.

[Sidenote: Negotiations.]

_August 29th._--I intended to have told you that I was sending a stiff

letter to my old friend Kweiliang; but, in fact, it has taken some

time and consultation with Gros to settle its terms, and it is only

now being translated. Yesterday afternoon the long-expected mail

arrived. ... Shall I really eat my Christmas dinner with you? Really

many things are more improbable than that. I hoped at one time that

this letter might be despatched from Pekin; but as we have to meet

Commissioners here, and to make a kind of supplementary treaty before

proceeding thither, it is doubtful whether we shall accomplish this. I

am not sure that I like my present domicile as well as I did my

domicile here in 1858, because, although it is a great deal more

_orné_, it is proportionably hotter, being surrounded by walls which

we cannot see over. It is a great place, with an infinite number of

courts and rooms of all sizes. I should think several families must

live in it, unless the establishment of a Chinese gentleman is very

large indeed. If Kweiliang and Co. come into our terms, my present

intention is to send at once to Frederick officially, and request him

to come on to Pekin. ... He has been having some very troublesome work

at Shanghae with the Rebels; indeed, there is at present work enough

for both of us in China.

_September 1st._--Kweiliang arrived last night, and sent me a hint

that he intended to call on me to-day. I sent one in return, to say

that I would not see him until he had answered my letter. I fear a

little more bullying will be necessary before we bring this stupid

Government up to the mark. Both yesterday and to-day I took a ride in

the morning with Grant. I rode a horse of his, a very nice one. The

sun becomes powerful very early, but it is a charming climate now. The

abundance of all things wonderful: beef and mutton at about threepence

a pound; peaches, grapes, and all sorts of vegetables in plenty; ice

in profusion. I daresay, however, that in six weeks' time it may be

very cold.

At one moment, on the 2nd of September, it really seemed as if the object

of the mission was achieved; for the Imperial Commissioners--one of whom

was the same Kweiliang who had conducted the negotiations in 1858--in a

formal despatch gave a positive assurance that the Treaty of Tientsin

should be faithfully observed, and that all the demands hitherto made

should be conceded in full. A draft of convention was accordingly prepared

on this basis; but, when it came to the point, Kweiliang and his colleagues

declared that they had no authority to sign it without referring to Pekin;

and it became obvious that he either did not possess, or did not at that

moment wish it to be supposed that he possessed, powers equal to those

which he held in 1858, although his previous language had been calculated

to convey the opposite impression.

[Sidenote: Broken off.]

Here was clearly a deliberate design to create delay, with the view of

dragging on negotiations into the winter. It was indispensable, Lord Elgin

thought, to check this policy by an act of vigour; and accordingly, with

the concurrence of Baron Gros, he intimated to the Imperial Commissioners

that, in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in

assuming the title of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the

authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity

of constant reference to Pekin would occasion, he had determined to proceed

at once to Tung-chow, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and to

enter into no further negotiations with them until he should have reached

that place.

_September 8th._--I am at war again! My idiotical Chinamen have taken

to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the

army on to Pekin. It would be a long affair to tell you all the ins

and outs, but I am sure from what has come to pass during the last few

days, that we must get nearer Pekin before the Government there comes

to its senses. The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just

long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point.

Here we are, then, with our base established in the heart of the

country, in a capital climate, with abundance around us, our army in

excellent health, and these stupid people give me a snub, which

obliges me to break with them. No one knows whether our progress is to

be a fight or an ovation, for in this country nothing can be foreseen.

I think it better that the olive-branch should advance with the sword.

I am afraid that this change in the programme--a hostile instead of a

peaceful march on Pekin--will keep me longer here, because I cannot

send for Frederick till peace is made; and I cannot, I suppose, leave

Pekin till he arrives there.

_Sunday, September 9th._--Kweiliang and Co. wanted very much to call

on me yesterday, but I would not receive them. The junior

Commissioner, who was at Canton with Parkes, and knows him well, told

him that, in fact, the people here had been urging them to make an

effort to prevent war, saying: 'If we were sure that the foreigners

would have the best of it, we should not care; but if they are worsted

they will fall back on us, and wreak their vengeance upon us.' This

does not seem a very formidable state of mind as far as we are

concerned. We have behaved well to the people, except at Peytang and

Sinho, and the consequence is that we can move through the country

with comparative ease. If the people tried to cut off our baggage, and

refused us supplies, we should find it very difficult to get on. ...

_Noon_.--I have just returned from a service on board the 'Granada,'

where the clergyman administered the sacrament to a small

congregation. At four we march to the wars; but as I go to bear the

olive, it is not so bad a Sunday's work. You may very likely hear

through Siberia of the result of our march before you receive this

letter announcing that it is to take place. I shall not, therefore,

speculate upon it.

_Yang-tsun, about twenty miles above Tientsin.--September 10th.--Two

P.M._--This morning we started at about five, and reached this

encampment soon after seven. A very nice ride, cool, and through a

succession of crops of millet; a stiff, reedy stem, some twelve or

fourteen feet high, with a tuft on the top, is the physiognomy of the

millet stalk. It would puzzle the Tartar cavalry to charge us through

this crop. As it is, we have seen no enemy; and Mr. Parkes has induced

the inhabitants to sell us a good many sheep and oxen. Our tents were

not pitched till near noon; so I sat during most of the forenoon under

the shade of a hedge. There has been thunder since, and a considerable

fall of rain. I hope it will not make the roads impassable; but if it

fills the river a little it will do us good, for we may then use it

for the transport of our supplies, and it is now too low. We do not

know much what is ahead of us, but we hear of Tartar troops farther

on; and at Tung-chow it is said that a large army is collected under

Sang-ko-lin-sin himself (their great general). I am now enjoying the

life of a camp; writing to you seated on my portmanteau, with my desk

on my only chair. It is perhaps better than my hothouse at Tientsin.

[Sidenote: New Plenipotentiaries.]

_September 11th.-Six A.M._--Parkes and Wade have just been in my tent

with a letter from two new Plenipotentiaries--really some of the

highest personages in the empire--stating that they are under orders

to come to Tientsin to settle everything, and deprecating a forward

movement.[2] I shall of course stick by my programme, and decline to

have anything to say to them till I reach Tung-chow. Of course this

proceeding on their part augurs well for peace. It poured all last

evening, and the General determined not to march this morning; but as

it is fine now, I think we may start at noon, and make out our

allotted march. It is cooler this morning, and I think it not

improbable that the thunder of yesterday may close the hot season.

However, the sun is coming out in his strength, so one cannot say what

the day may bring forth. _Ten_ A.M.--All our cart-drivers, with their

animals, disappeared during last night, leaving the carts behind them.

Probably they got a hint from the Chinese authorities. I am sorry for

it, for if we begin to resort to measures of violence to supply

ourselves, we may entirely alter the footing on which we have hitherto

stood with the people. We are putting all our surplus goods into

junks, in order to reduce our baggage.

[Sidenote: Chinese gentleman-farmer.]

_Nan-tsai-tsun.--September 12th._--Where will this letter be sent

from? It is begun at a small town on the close of our march of to-day,

which ought to have been our march of yesterday. It was a very mild

one--about eight miles--through a nice country, more wooded than

former marches, and with bright sunshine, and a fresh, almost frosty

air. The sunshine we had not at first, for we started before the sun

had appeared on the horizon. Instead of trusting to our tents, we have

this day taken up our abode in the house of a Chinese gentleman-

farmer, the owner of about 1,000 acres. It is nearly as large as the

house I occupied at Tientsin; at least it has nearly as many courts.

The gentleman has a good library, in which I have established myself;

and he seems, poor man, very anxious to accommodate us, though his

appearance is not that of a man entirely at his ease. As I was

starting this morning I got a second letter from the new

Plenipotentiaries, rather more defiant in its tone, and saying that

there are troops at our next station, with whom we shall come into

collision, if we advance with an army. Parkes is gone on with an

escort, and we shall soon know from him what the state of the case

really is.

[Sidenote: Ho-see-woo.]

[Sidenote: Monastery.]

_Ho-see-woo.--September 14th._--We had a charming march to this place

yesterday morning. The country much more beautiful than before, and

hills in the distance. All around us the most luxuriant crops, and

hamlets embosomed in clumps of willows. The temperature was delicious;

almost too cold at starting, but, later, a fresh breeze in our faces

gave the requisite coolness and no more. Our march was about twelve

miles, and on reaching its close I was conducted to a temple where I

now am. It is a monastery, with very nice apartments, and quantities

of stabling, grain, agricultural implements, &c., all indicative of a

very prosperous community. I have seen no _bonzerie_ on anything like

so comfortable a scale. I had a second letter from my Commissioners in

the evening of the last day on which I wrote a page of this journal,

more humble in its tone then the preceding one, and as my General was

getting uneasy about his supplies, &c., I thought it necessary to make

a kind of proposition for an arrangement. ... Our soldiers do so

little for themselves, and their necessities are so great, that we

move but slowly. Our present party consists of about 1,500 fighting

men; but we count about 4,000 mouths, and all must have abundantly of

the best. The French (I admit that they take more out of the country,

and sometimes perhaps by rougher methods) carry on their backs several

days' provisions. They work in all sorts of ways for the army. The

contrast is, I must say, very striking. ... I therefore thought it

better to send Wade and Parkes to the new Imperial Commissioners, to

see whether they intended to resist or not, and to make a proposal to

test this. They set out last night, and I have just heard from them,

that, as they did not find the Commissioners at the place they

expected (Matow), they are gone on to Tung-chow, the place where I

intend to sign the Convention. Parkes is one of the most remarkable

men I ever met; for energy, courage, and ability combined, I do not

know where I could find his match; and this, joined to a facility of

speaking Chinese, which he shares only with Lay, makes him at present

_the_ man of the situation.

[Sidenote: Terms agreed to.]

After eight hours' discussion the Chinese Commissioners conceded every

point; agreeing among other things that the army should advance to a place

called Five-li Point, within six miles of Tung-chow, and there remain while

the Ambassador proceeded with an escort of 1,000 men to Pekin. In the high

character and standing of the two Commissioners, one the Minister of War,

the other a Prince of the Blood Imperial, and in their repeated assurances

that 'what they signed was as though the Emperor signed it,' and that 'no

comparison could be drawn between the authority vested in them and that

held' by previous Commissioners, there appeared to be everything necessary

to justify the belief that their word might be trusted. Unhappily the

confidence which the Allies were thus led to repose in them was destined to

be deceived; not however, so far as appears, owing to bad faith on their

part, but owing to the fact that their pacific influence at court was

overborne on this occasion by that of the war party, headed by the

Commander-in-Chief, Sang-ko-lin-sin.[3]

On the return of the two secretaries from the conference, Lord Elgin at

once acquainted Baron Gros and Sir Hope Grant with its results; and it was

agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should move forward on Monday the 17th

from Ho-se-woo to the place already mentioned, Five-li Point, which they

expected to reach in two days' march; and that, at the same time, or rather

before the departure of the army, Mr. Parkes and some members of the

Ambassador's suite should proceed to Tung-chow to prepare for his

reception, and to procure means of transport, accompanied by an officer of

the Quarter-master General's Department, and another of the Commissariat,

and escorted by a small body of troops.[4]

_Sunday, September 16th_.--We have had service in my temple. The

General and Staff attended. ... Wade and Parkes did good work at Tung-

chow. It is arranged now that the General and bulk of the force

proceed to-morrow on their way to the point at which (if the Chinese

Plenipotentiaries come in to all our terms) we are to stay the

progress of the main body, going on from that point with an escort of

1,000 men. This place is about five miles from Tung-chow, and twenty

from Pekin; and so I hope to effect my pacific entry into Pekin. ...

This place has been, I am sorry to say, much maltreated, for the

people ran away, and when that takes place, it is impossible to

prevent plundering. The present plan is, that I remain here till the

army has taken up its new position, and all is arranged for my

reception at Pekin and Tung-chow, when I shall move on. Gros is here.

He has just been with me, and is in a great state because our

soldiers, in their zeal to drive away all Chinese robbers, have driven

away all his coolies.

_September 17th_.--I rode out very early this morning to see my

General before he started, and to give him a hint about the _looting_,

which has been bad here. He disapproves of it as much as I do. ...

Parkes went off again this morning to Tung-chow, with another missive

from me to my Prince (the new Plenipotentiary), rather stiff and

plain-spoken; and Loch is gone with him to get carts, &c., as I have

no means of conveying my goods and chattels. I shall probably hear to-

morrow whether there is any hitch; but even if all be right, I hardly

expect to get on before Thursday, for want of transport.

[Sidenote: Agreement broken.]

_September 18th.--Noon._--There is firing in front of us; and I have a

letter from Parkes from Tung-chow, stating that the Prince and his

colleagues made great difficulties about an _audience_ with the

Emperor. If I was sure that Parkes and Co. were well out of Tung-chow,

and that we should push on well, I should not regret the firing.

_Five P.M._--M. de Bastard, Gros' secretary, has just returned from

Tung-chow. He reports that the Tartars this morning were in possession

of the ground on which, according to the understanding entered into

with the Prince and Co., we were to have encamped. He had to ride

through their army, to his no small alarm; but he met Parkes (who

knows not what fear is) riding back to Tung-chow to tell the Prince,

&c., of the position of the Tartar army, and that they should be held

responsible for the consequences. Loch was with the General. I wonder

he is not come to inform me of what has happened.

[Sidenote: Treacherous seizure of Mr. Parkes and others.]

At the time when these words were written, nearly the whole of the party

which had ridden forth the morning before, 'in high spirits at the prospect

of an early and successful termination of the war,' had been treacherously

seized by the soldiers of Sang-ko-lin-sin, and Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were

being violently hurried off, with their hands tied behind their backs, in a

rude springless cart, over a badly-paved road, to the prisons of Pekin. The

details of their capture and imprisonment, together with such particulars

as could afterwards be ascertained of their companions' fate, may be read

in the very interesting narrative of one of the victims.[5] We can here

touch only upon those points in which their story is mixed up with public

events.

[Sidenote: Cause of the change.]

As to the origin and cause of the renewal of hostilities, it is impossible

to speak with certainty; nor is it probable that we shall ever arrive at a

better opinion on the subject, than that which was formed by Lord Elgin on

the spot. In his report to the Government he wrote:--

To hazard conjectures as to the motives by which Chinese functionaries

are actuated is not a very safe undertaking; and it is very possible

that further information may modify the views which I now entertain on

this point. I am, however, disposed at present to doubt there having

been a deliberate intention of treachery on the part of Prince Tsai

and his colleague; but I apprehend that the General-in-Chief, Sang-ko-

lin-sin, thought that they had compromised his military position by

allowing our army to establish itself so near his lines at Chang-kia-

wan. He sought to counteract the evil effect of this by making a great

swagger of parade and preparation to resist when the Allied armies

approached the camping-ground allotted to them. Several of our people,

Colonel Walker, with his escort, my private Secretary, Mr. Loch, Baron

Gros' Secretary of Embassy, Comte de Bastard, and others, passed

through the Tartar army during the course of the morning on their way

from Tung-chow without encountering any rudeness or ill-treatment

whatsoever. At about a quarter to ten, however, a French Commissariat

officer was assaulted by some Tartar soldiers under circumstances

which are not very clearly ascertained; and this incident gave rise to

an engagement, which soon became general. On the whole, I come to the

conclusion that, in the proceedings of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries

and Commander-in-Chief in this instance, there was that mixture of

stupidity, want of straightforwardness, suspicion, and bluster, which

characterises so generally the conduct of affairs in this country; but

I cannot believe that, after the experience which Sang-ko-lin-sin had

already had of our superiority in the field, either he or his civil

colleagues could have intended to bring on a conflict in which, as the

event has proved, he was so sure to be worsted.

[Sidenote: Firm measures.]

Late on the night of the 18th, Lord Elgin received at the same time the

report of a successful engagement, and the intelligence of the capture of

his friends. From this moment he felt that, until the prisoners were given

up, there could be no further negotiation. A notification was at once

issued, that 'all English and French subjects were required to return to

the head-quarters of their respective armies; and that if any impediment

was put in the way of their return, the city of Pekin would forthwith be

attacked and taken.' Even when offers came that they should be restored on

condition of his withdrawing his troops, he refused to listen to such

terms; convinced that any sign of yielding on his part would be as

dangerous to their safety as it would be fatal to all hope of success in

the objects of his mission.[6]

_September 23rd_.--I have had a very busy time since I last wrote in

this journal. I have, moreover, been separated from it, and from all

my effects. On the 21st we had another battle with the Tartars. I

accompanied the army, and saw it all. Considering that the Tartars are

so wretchedly armed and led, they did pretty well. We are now about

six miles from Pekin, but I believe the Generals will not move for a

week. We learn that Parkes and his companions, viz. Loch, De Norman,

Bowlby, Captain Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, nineteen Sikhs, and one

of the Dragoon Guards, are in Pekin, but we have had no communication

with them yet.

[Sidenote: Pali-chiao]

_Pali-chiao.--September 27th_.--I closed my last letter somewhat in

haste, for I had been separated for three days from it and my desk,

and when we met again, I was busy with my despatches, &c. The arrest

of Parkes and the others is a very disagreeable incident, and we do

not yet know what it may lead to. I sent word yesterday to the

Emperor's brother, who is now named to treat with me, that unless they

are returned to the camp within three days' time, and a pledge is

given that the Convention I drew up at Tientsin is signed, Pekin will

be assaulted. We are anxious, until we receive an answer to this

_ultimatum_. It was a reply to a letter from the Prince to me, in

which he coolly stated that the prisoners should be returned when our

army and fleet had retired from the country. ... Meantime we have an

army in excellent health, abundantly supplied, and which, in five

actions with the enemy, has lost some twenty killed! ... I think I

told you at the close of my last letter, that at midnight on the 18th

I received a note in pencil from the General, telling me what had led

to the conflict of that day. At 3.30 A.M. I sent an answer by

Crealock, and at five set off with an escort of thirty Irregulars, to

ride about twenty miles to the General's camp.

We then agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should send a notification

to the chief mandarin of Tung-chow, to the effect that, unless our

countrymen were forthwith restored, Pekin would be assaulted. No

notice was taken of this. So on the 21st we advanced, and attacked a

large body of Tartars, encamped between Tung-chow and Pekin. I

accompanied the infantry and artillery during the day's proceedings.

We encamped after the battle, where we now are, among some trees. We

sleep in tents, but we have a house where we mess. I am living with

the General, as my establishment has not yet been brought up from Ho-

see-woo. I rode over yesterday to see the Russian Minister, who, with

his sixteen Cossacks, is occupying the village, or rather town, of

Chin-kia-wan, which was taken after the affair of the 18th. It is a

sad scene of desolation. General Ignatieff was very obliging and

friendly, as I have indeed found him to be throughout. He and I

entirely agree as to how the Chinese should be fought. ... I may be

very near the close of this China business, or I may be at the

commencement of a new series of difficulties. All is very uncertain at

present. ... The climate is pleasant here, were it not for the

quantity of dust, which is overwhelming. We have abundance of grapes,

and some other good fruit.

_September 29th._--At midnight of the 27th I was roused by Wade, who

brought me a letter from Prince Kung (the Emperor's brother), a good

deal milder than the last, but still implying that Parkes, &c., were

not to be returned until the treaty, &c., was signed. The comparative

mildness of the tone of this communication was clearly attributable to

the firmness of my last letter, and I therefore induced those with

whom I act to agree to nay adhering to it in my reply. I accordingly

wrote to say that the army would advance unless the prisoners should

return in the course of to-day; but that I do not intend to add to the

Convention which I have already furnished to the Chinese

Plenipotentiaries, and that I will sign that at once, and close the

war, if they choose. I hardly expect to see our friends to-day. The

Generals will not advance to-morrow, but they say they will on Monday.

Meanwhile it is raining; a sort of English rain, not tropical; and if

we have not too much of it, it will do good.

_October 1st._--Yesterday morning came another letter, proposing that

the army should retire to Chin-kia-wan, and that then the treaty

should be signed and the prisoners restored. This was clearly

inadmissible, as the Chinese would infer from it that whenever they

had a difficulty with us they had only to kidnap some of our people to

bring us to terms. So we have again handed the matter over to the

Generals, from whose hands indeed it would not now have been taken if

they had not urged me to make this last overture to Prince Kung. I do

not know when they will advance.

_October 3rd_.--We have moved about two miles, and are now lodged in a

mosque--a nice building, a good deal ornamented--which is for the

nonce turned to profane uses. The army was to have advanced to attack

Sang-ko-lin-sin's force to-morrow, but now I am told the French are

not ready. ... These delays give the Chinese fresh heart, and they are

beginning to send people to fire on our convoys, &c., coming up from

Tientsin. ... There was a letter sent to me yesterday by Prince Kung,

signed by Loch and Parkes. Loch managed in his signature to convey to

us in Hindostanee that the letter was written under compulsion. As it

was in Chinese the information was hardly necessary. It said that

_they two_ were well treated, complimented Prince Kung, and asked for

some clothes. We have heard nothing about the others who are missing.

[Sidenote: Advance on Pekin.]

_October 5th._--We left our mosque this morning at about seven. The

whole army was drawn up in contiguous columns of regiments, and had a

good appearance. The cavalry on the right, then the artillery, and

then the infantry. The French were on our left. In this way we

advanced about four miles, when we reached a place from which we saw

one of the gates of Pekin at about a mile and a half distance. We met

with no enemy, but we heard of him about three miles farther on.

However, the French declined to go any farther; so here we remain for

the night, and we have got into a joss-house, which is lucky, for we

have no tents with us--only a very light kit and three days'

provisions for each person. We hear that the Emperor has left for

Tartary, which is very probable. We might have stopped him if we had

marched on immediately after the 21st ultimo; but that was, in the

judgment of the Generals, impossible.

[Sidenote: Suburbs.]

_October 6th.--Five P.M._--We are lodged in a _Lamaserie_ in the

north-west suburb of Pekin. Our move began at seven. We streamed along

narrow roads in a long line. I got a scolding from the General for

outflanking the skirmishers, which I did to get out of the dust. At

about nine we reached a brick-kiln, from whence we had a view of

Pekin, and of a mound, behind which, as we were assured, Sang-ko-lin-

sin and his army were encamped. We halted for some time and then

advanced; we on the right, the French on the left, towards these

supposed camps. The French were to attack in front, we were to take

the enemy in flank. I was with the second division of our force. When

we arrived abreast of the entrenchment we could see nothing of an

enemy. After a while I rode to the top of the mound at the corner of

the entrenchment, and found the French General and Staff. The Tartars

had all decamped the night before. I then rejoined our army and

advanced with it to this point. With the exception of a few shots

exchanged with a picket of the enemy, we know of no fighting which has

taken place to-day; but, strange to say, our cavalry which went off

far to the right in the morning has not been heard of yet, and we

cannot discover what has become of the French. It is a nice country,

covered with clumps of trees and suburban villas. The temperature of

the air is cool, but the sun was very hot all day.

[Sidenote: The Summer Palace.]

_Sunday, October 7th._--We hear this morning that the French and our

cavalry have captured the Summer Palace of the Emperor. All the big-

wigs have fled, nothing remains but a portion of the household. We are

told that the _prisoners_ are all in Pekin. ... _Five P.M._--I have

just returned from the Summer Palace. It is really a fine thing, like

an English park--numberless buildings with handsome rooms, and filled

with Chinese _curios_, and handsome clocks, bronzes, &c. But, alas!

such a scene of desolation. The French General came up full of

protestations. He had prevented _looting_ in order that all the

plunder might be divided between the armies, &c. &c. There was not a

room that I saw in which half the things had not been taken away or

broken to pieces. I tried to get a regiment of ours sent to guard the

place, and then sell the things by auction; but it is difficult to get

things done by system in such a case, so some officers are left who

are to fill two or three carts with treasures which are to be sold....

Plundering and devastating a place like this is bad enough, but what

is much worse is the waste and breakage. Out of 1,000,000 _l_. worth

of property, I daresay 50,000 _l_. will not be realised. French

soldiers were destroying in every way the most beautiful silks,

breaking the jade ornaments and porcelain, &c. War is a hateful

business. The more one sees of it, the more one detests it.

[Sidenote: Return of some of the captives.]

Pressed thus closely up to the walls of the capital, the Chinese

Regent--for the Emperor had retired to Tartary, 'being obliged by law to

hunt in the autumn'--yielded at last to save the storming of the city. In

the afternoon of the 8th of October the English and French prisoners

detained in Pekin, numbering eight in all, were sent into the camp.[7]

_October 9th._--Yesterday at 4 P.M., Parkes, Loch, and one of Fane's

Irregulars arrived. With them were four French soldiers and M.

d'Escayrac (the head of a scientific commission). The hands and wrists

of the latter were in a sad condition, they had been so hurt by the

cords tied round them. Bowlby, De Norman, and the rest, do not seem to

be in Pekin as we had hoped. Parkes and Loch were very badly treated

for the first ten days; since then, conciliation has been the order of

the day, and, I have no doubt, because I stood firm. If I had wavered,

they would have been lost; because the Chinese, finding they had a

lever with which they could move us, would have used their advantage

unsparingly. Parkes and Loch have behaved very well under

circumstances of great danger. The narrative of their adventures is

very interesting, but I cannot attempt to give it in this letter. They

seem to be in good health notwithstanding the hardships they have gone

through.

In a public despatch of the same date, announcing the restoration of the

captives, he wrote:-

To no one of their numerous friends is the return of these gentlemen a

matter of more heartfelt gratification than it is to me. Since the

period of their arrest, I have been compelled, by a sense of duty, to

turn a deaf ear to every overture for their restoration which has

involved the slightest retrograde movement of our army, or the

abandonment of any demands previously preferred by me against the

Chinese Government. I have felt that any such concession on my part

would have established a most fatal precedent, because it would have

led the Chinese to suppose that by kidnapping Englishmen they might

effect objects which they are unable to achieve by fair fighting or

diplomacy. I confess that I have been moreover, throughout, of

opinion, that in adopting this uncompromising tone, and boldly setting

the national above the personal interest, I was in point of fact best

consulting the welfare of our friends who were in durance. But it was

not to be expected that all persons would view in the same light a

question of policy so obscure; and apart from the warm personal

interest which I feel in their safety, your Lordship can well

understand that it relieves me from a great load of anxiety to learn

from the result that the course which I have followed was not ill-

calculated to promote it.[8]

Later in the same despatch he expressed himself anxiously yet hopefully

about the captives who were still missing:--

It is a matter of great concern to me, that we know as yet nothing

certain respecting the fate of Mr. Bruce's Attaché, Mr. de Norman, Mr.

Bowlby, the special correspondent of the _Times_, and the nineteen

troopers (consisting of eighteen Sikhs and one Dragoon) who formed the

escort, and were under the command of Lieutenant Anderson, of Fane's

Irregular Horse. This portion of the party became separated from

Messrs. Parkes and Loch, when the latter, at the commencement of the

conflict of the 18th ultimo, were taken up to Sang-ko-lin-sin, for the

ostensible object of obtaining a safe-conduct from him. Since that

time we have heard nothing authentic about them, but we are assured

that, though they are not now in Pekin, they will soon be restored to

us.

[Sidenote: Fate of the rest.]

Unhappily the hopes thus raised were not destined to be realised. On the

12th of October nine more prisoners were returned to the camp--eight

troopers of Fane's Irregular Horse and one French soldier; but the evidence

given by them left no doubt that two at least of the remainder, Lieutenant

Anderson and Mr. De Norman had perished, having sunk under circumstances of

much suffering from the consequences of the maltreatment to which they were

subjected. 'I was not personally acquainted' wrote Lord Elgin, 'with

Lieutenant Anderson, but he is spoken of by all who knew him as an

excellent officer. Mr. De Norman was a young man of remarkable promise.

With considerable abilities, great assiduity, singular steadiness of

character, and courage of no mean order, he had every promise of achieving

eminence in his profession. We all mourn most bitterly his untimely

end.'[9]

There were others whose fate remained at that time unknown; among them Mr.

Bowlby, the correspondent of the _Times_, whose corpse was afterwards

recovered and recognised. The warmth of regard which Lord Elgin had learnt

to feel for him, is shown in many passages of his journal. Officially he

wrote, 'I deplore his loss, not only because he was a highly-accomplished

and well-informed gentleman, but also because, from the conscientious and

liberal spirit in which he addressed himself to the investigation of the

singularly complicated problems presented by the moral, social, political,

and commercial condition of China, I had conceived the hope that he would

be the means of diffusing sound information on many points on which it is

most important for the national interests that the British public should be

correctly informed.'[10]

The journal, during these anxious and troubled days, is naturally

imperfect. One brief entry sums up his feeling on the main subject.

_Camp near Pekin.--October 14th_.--We have dreadful news respecting

the fate of some of our captured friends. It is an atrocious crime,

and, not for vengeance, but for future security, ought to be severely

dealt with.

[Sidenote: Burning of the Summer Palace.]

The form which the retribution took is well known. The Palace of Yuen-ming-

yuen, the Summer-palace of the Emperor, the glory and boast of the Chinese

Empire, was levelled with the ground.

The reasons which led Lord Elgin to decide upon this act are fully stated

in a despatch dated the 25th of October. After dwelling on the necessity of

inflicting some punishment at once severe and swift, that should leave

Pekin untouched (for he had engaged not to harm the city) and should fall

specially on the Emperor, who was personally responsible for the crimes

that had been committed, he goes on to discuss the different courses that

were open to him. He might inflict a fine; but it could not be exacted

except by appropriating a further portion of the Chinese revenue, already

seriously trenched upon by our previous demands. Or he might require the

surrender of the individuals guilty of violating the flag of truce: but if

he named no one, some miserable subordinates would be given up; if he

specified the real culprit, Sang-ko-lin-sin, the demand would infallibly be

refused and could not be enforced. Dismissing these alternatives he

proceeds:--

Having, to the best of my judgment, examined the question in all its

bearings, I came to the conclusion that the destruction of Yuen-ming-

yuen was the least objectionable of the several courses open to me,

unless I could have reconciled it to my sense of duty to suffer the

crime which had been committed to pass practically unavenged. I had

reason, moreover, to believe that it was an act which was calculated

to produce a greater effect in China, and on the Emperor, than persons

who look on from a distance may suppose.

It was the Emperor's favourite residence, and its destruction could

not fail to be a blow to his pride as well as to his feelings. To this

place he brought our hapless countrymen, in order that they might

undergo their severest tortures within its precincts. Here have been

found the horses and accoutrements of the troopers seized, the

decorations torn from the breast of a gallant French officer, and

other effects belonging to the prisoners. As almost all the valuables

had already been taken from the palace, the army would go there, not

to pillage, but to mark, by a solemn act of retribution, the horror

and indignation with which we were inspired by the perpetration of a

great crime. The punishment was one which would fall, not on the

people, who may be comparatively innocent, but exclusively on the

Emperor, whose direct personal responsibility for the crime committed

is established, not only by the treatment of the prisoners at Yuen-

ming-yuen, but also by the edict, in which he offered a pecuniary

reward for the heads of the foreigners, adding, that he was ready to

expend all his treasure in these wages of assassination.

On Thursday, the 18th of October, the extensive buildings of the palace

were given to the flames; and during the whole of the 19th they were still

burning. 'The clouds of smoke,' says Mr. Loch, 'driven by the wind, hung

like a vast black pall over Pekin;' well calculated to enforce with their

lurid gloom the lesson conveyed to the citizens in a proclamation which

Lord Elgin had caused to be affixed in Chinese to all the buildings and

walls in the neighbourhood, to the effect 'that no individual, however

exalted, could escape from the responsibility and punishment which must

always follow the commission of acts of treachery and deceit; and that

Yuen-ming-yuen was burnt as a punishment inflicted on the Emperor for the

violation of his word, and the act of treachery to a flag of truce.'

[Sidenote: Convention signed.]

Five days later, on the 24th of October, the Convention, which had been the

subject of so much dispute, was finally signed, and Lord Elgin exchanged

with the Emperor's brother the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin.

_Camp near Pekin.--October 26th._--This will be one of the shortest

letters which you have received from me since we parted, and yet

perhaps it will not be the one which you will welcome the least,

because it will convey to you the news that I have signed my treaty,

and that the specific object for which I came out is therefore

accomplished. I have not written my daily journal lately, because it

would have been filled with my difficulties. ... However, I have

succeeded at last in a sort of way. Loch is going home with the

treaty, and will make a point of seeing you, and giving you all our

news. ... I cannot decide as to my own return until I see Frederick.

... The deaths of poor Bowlby and the others who were with him were

very sad! Loch's escape was most providential. With 5,000 men led on

without delay, as ought to be done in China, nothing of this kind

would have occurred. I told Palmerston so before I started; but the

delays incident to conveying so large an army as ours without risking

anything, have nearly made the whole thing break down.

_October 27th.--Nine A.M._--Loch tells me he must be off, so I must

end my brief epistle. I take up my abode in Pekin to-day, in the

palace of the Prince of I., who played me false at Tung-chow.

_Pekin, Prince of I.'s Palace.--October 30th._--I have been in bed for

two days with an attack of influenza, but I am better to-day, though

not by way of going out. Here we (the General and I) are occupying a

great enclosure containing a series of one-storied wooden buildings

with covered passages and verandahs. There is a good deal of

aristocratic seclusion about the place, as it is surrounded by walls,

and entirely cut off from the world without; but there is little

appearance of luxury and comfort about it. It rained yesterday and the

day before, and I had considerable difficulty in reading in my bed, as

my paper windows, which keep out the cold pretty well, keep out also a

good deal of light. They are not transparent, so the view through them

is not lively. To-day there is a beautiful sunshine, and I have been

walking about a little in the court before my room door. The present

arrangement is that we remain here till the 8th. I had some difficulty

in obtaining this; but it is of great importance that, before the army

goes, I should get a decree from the Emperor sanctioning the

publication of the Treaty all over the empire. ... The French General

will not, however, consent to remain.

[Sidenote: Funeral of the murdered captives.]

_October 31st._--Another fine day, but I have not left the house,

partly from consideration for the remains of my cold, and partly

because I have had letters to finish. I have had visits from both my

colleagues, Gros and Ignatieff. The latter and I are always very good

friends. Perhaps he takes advantage of my simplicity; but at any rate

we always seem to agree remarkably. He is wide awake to the Jesuit

intrigues here. By the way, I should mention that the French had a

wonderful funeral on Sunday, in honour of the murdered captives. I

could not attend, being in bed at the time. Several speeches in bad

taste were delivered, and a remarkable series of performances took

place. Among other things, each soldier (this is, I believe, the

French practice on such occasions) fired his musket _into_ the grave,

so that the coffins were covered with cartridges. The Chinese say that

it was because they were not sure whether the occupants were really

dead. On the day following, they inaugurated the old Jesuit cathedral,

which they have recovered from the Chinese Government; and the bishop

who preached, in order to make amends for the omission of all

reference to us at the ceremony of the funeral, complimented Queen

Victoria and her _digne représentant_ for having come to China to set

up the Roman Catholic cathedral in Pekin. This reflection will comfort

----[11] when he comes to vote next year the balance of the

£10,000,000 spent. I have no news of Frederick yet; so I am no further

advanced with my own plans than I was when Loch left me.

[Sidenote: Imperial Palace.]

[Sidenote: Visit from Kung.]

_Pekin.--November 2nd._--Yesterday, after the mail had left, I mounted

on horseback, and with an escort, and Parkes and Crealock, proceeded

to the Imperial City, within which is the Imperial Palace. We obtained

access to two enclosures, forming part of the Imperial Palace

appendages: both elevated places, the one ascended by a pathway in

regular Chinese rockwork on a large scale, and really striking in its

way; and the other being a well-wooded park-like eminence, crowned by

temples with images of Buddha. The view from both was magnificent.

Pekin is so full of trees, and the houses are so low, that it hardly

had the effect of looking down on a great city. Here and there temples

or high gateways rose above the trees, but the general impression was

rather that of a rich plain densely peopled. In the distance the view

was bounded by a lofty chain of mountains, snow-capped. From the

park-like eminence we looked down upon the Imperial Palace--a large

enclosure crowded with yellow-roofed buildings, generally low, and a

few trees dotted among them. It is difficult to imagine how the

unfortunates shut up there can ever have any exercise. I don't wonder

that the Emperor preferred Yuen-ming-yuen. The yellow roofs,

interspersed here and there with very deep blue ones, had, however, a

very brilliant effect in the sunshine. After enjoying these views I

went to the Russian Minister's, and found him installed in a house got

up _à l'Européenne_, and looking very comfortable, with his national

stoves. He showed me his chapel also. This morning I got a letter from

Gros telling me that, in opposition to my advice, he had been to see

Prince Kung. I told him he ought to let the Prince come to him first;

but the Jesuits think that they can curry favour with the Chinese by

making him _condescend_. They are quite wrong, as I am sure the result

will prove. The Prince came to see me to-day before returning Gros'

visit, which goes for something in this land of ceremony. I received

the Prince with all honour, and had a good deal of talk with him

through the interpreters, in a style which reminded me of the dialogue

at the commencement of 'Eothen.' I have, I believe, secured the edict

for which we have been waiting; so I have done everything except see

the Emperor, which I am not likely to do, as he is at Jehol. We ended

by photographing the Prince, a proceeding which I do not think he much

liked.

[Sidenote: Return visit.]

_November 7th._--There has not been much to report since the 2nd. I

returned Kung's visit the next day, and we had a more _coulant_

conversation than I have before had with any Chinese authority. It is

something to get at men who are so high placed that they are not

afraid--or at any rate are less afraid--of being denounced if they

listen to foreigners. I dined the night before with the Russian

Minister, who was very hospitable. On Sunday I went to see two temples

in the Chinese city, the one being that to which the Emperor goes four

times a year to offer sacrifices to Heaven, the other the Temple of

Agriculture.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Mr. Bruce.]

[Sidenote: Interview with Prince Kung.]

_November 10th._--I had got so far when a note from Frederick reached

me, saying that he had started at 1 A.M. on the 6th from Tientsin to

ride to Pekin, and had been obliged, by fatigue, to rest at Ho-see-

woo. We were to have left Pekin on the 8th, so I was obliged to send

to beg one day's respite from the General. It was impossible to make

Frederick start back to Tientsin on the very day following his

arrival. At about noon he reached Pekin. It was a great relief to me,

because I had been choosing a house for him, and there were other

matters concerning which it was most important that he should be

consulted. I found him very well disposed to stay on at Pekin, but on

finding that both Gros and Ignatieff were opposed to leaving their

legations there for the moment, we both agreed that it would be better

to act as they had resolved to do. I therefore wrote to Prince Kung

acknowledging the good faith which he had shown about the Emperor's

edict and the publication of the treaty (both of which things have

been done in the most complete manner), and adding that the English

army would, in accordance with the terms of the convention, retire at

once from Pekin. I went on to inform him that I proposed to call on

him to take leave, and at the same time to introduce to him Mr. Bruce,

who had just arrived at Pekin. We proceeded, accordingly, to his

palace, at 4 P.M. on the 8th, with an imposing military escort. After

we had conversed some time together, I told Parkes to explain to the

Prince that in England the individual who represents the sovereign,

whatever his personal rank, always takes precedence of all others;

that, as my task in China was completed, Mr. Bruce would henceforward

occupy that position, and that, therefore, with the Prince's

permission, I would give up to him the seat of honour on which I was

placed and take his seat instead. I then rose and changed seats with

Frederick. This little bit of acting answered very well. It put

Frederick into direct relations with the Prince, and did away with the

impression (if it existed) of my having superior rank to him. The

Prince was civil, and said, rather neatly, that he hoped they would

conduct business satisfactorily, not only because he was British

Minister, but brother to Lord Elgin, with whom he had had such

pleasant relations. On the following day (the 9th), before we started,

he came to our abode to return our visit. I made Frederick receive

him, telling the interpreters to say that I had no business to speak

of, but that I should come into the room before he left the house to

take leave of him. The consequence was that Frederick had a long and,

to all appearance, satisfactory conversation with him.

[Sidenote: Leaves Pekin.]

After this we set out for Tung-chow. We had to wait there all night,

as our boats were not ready, and we are now (_10th November, noon_)

gliding down the river, each in a _chop_ boat (a little boat with a

very convenient cabin, in which one can sleep, read, write, &c.), on a

lovely autumn day, low temperature, and bright sunshine. I think that

this wind-up at Pekin was very promising. It is probable that there

may be some reaction when the Emperor and the bad advisers whom he has

about him return, and even Ignatieff did not choose to remain at Pekin

during that moment of reaction. At the same time, it is evident that

Kung, who is his brother, has committed himself to the peace policy,

and that his intercourse with us has been much more satisfactory to

him than he at one time expected. It is probable that the Emperor will

for once hear something of the truth. Kung will claim credit for

having induced us to remove from Pekin to Tientsin, while the fact

that we are still as near as Tientsin will be an _in terrorem_

argument in support of his policy of conciliation. If Kung weathers

the difficult moment which he will have to traverse when the Emperor

returns, I have hopes that all the benefit which I have expected to

derive from our minister's residence at Pekin will be achieved. Our

_Sinologues_ are fine fellows. It is refreshing to see their spirit

and pluck. Wade, Parkes, and Morrison, all put their services at our

disposal, and offered to remain alone at Pekin. My choice, however,

fell on a younger man, of whom I have a very good opinion, and who has

been with me as assistant-interpreter.[12] I thought it better, for

many reasons, to leave a person who had smaller pretensions than any

of those I have named. The gossip is that the Emperor is occupying his

time at Jehol by marrying a fourth wife (a rather expensive

proceeding) and getting tipsy. I am afraid he is not much worth;

although, if the papers in the vermilion pencil, which we found in the

Summer Palace, are his writing, he is not such a fool as people

suppose. ... Frederick brought with him your letters to September

10th. I pray that you may now be rejoicing in the belief that Bruce is

getting on well and happily at school.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

[Sidenote: Its climate.]

_Tientsin.--November 14th._--Here I am again in the house which I

occupied two and a half months ago, and which is by far the nicest

Chinese house I have seen, and its exposure to the sun is now most

agreeable. The climate is at present charming. If nothing else had

been done by these recent proceedings, the fact of placing our troops

and embassy here, instead of in the south of China, would have been

almost worth the trouble. It is also a much drier climate than that of

Shanghae. We have had about seven days of rain in all, since I left

Shanghae in July. Frederick had nineteen days consecutively just

before he left Shanghae. He was not well himself then, but he is all

right now. His ride to Pekin--eighty miles in thirty hours--set him up

again. I found the Admiral very cordial. ... Gros is not yet come, and

I do not like to depart from here without seeing him.

He was detained at Tientsin for several days, arranging a variety of

matters of detail; and it was not till the morning of the 26th of November

that he found himself once more afloat on the Gulf of Pecheli, on board the

'Ferooz,' homeward bound.

[Sidenote: Results of the mission.]

The general results obtained by the mission thus happily terminated cannot

be better summed up than in the words of the despatch in which the Foreign

Minister, Lord J. Russell, conveyed to Lord Elgin Her Majesty's 'full

approbation of his conduct in the various particulars' above described.

'The convention,' he wrote, 'which you concluded with the Prince of Kung on

the 24th of October is entirely satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

It records the reparation made by the Emperor of China for his disregard in

the previous year of his Treaty engagements; it sets Her Majesty's

Government free from an implied engagement not to insist in all particulars

on the fulfilment of those engagements; it imposes upon China a fine, in

the shape of an augmented rate of indemnity; it affords an additional

opening for British trade; it places on a recognised footing the emigration

of Chinese coolies, whose services are so important to Her Majesty's

colonial possessions; it relieves Her Majesty's colony of Hong Kong from a

source of previous annoyance; and it provides for bringing generally to the

knowledge of the Chinese the engagements into which the Emperor has entered

towards Great Britain.

'These are all solid advantages; and, coupled with the provisions of the

Treaty of Tientsin, they will, it may be hoped, place the relations between

the two countries on a sound footing, and insure the continuance of peace

for a long period to come.'

[1] Captain Roderick Dew had been engaged at the capture of Canton in

December, 1857, and also in May, 1858, at the taking of the Taku

forts.

[2] The new Plenipotentiaries were Tsai, Prince of I., a cousin of the

Emperor, and Muh-yin, President of the Board of War: with whom was

joined Hang-ki, a member of the previous commission.

[3] 'A prisoner taken on the 21st of September, in the course of

conversation, volunteered the remark that the fighting was all the

doing of Sang-ko-lin-sin, who was as anxious for it as Prince Tsai was

opposed to it. This accords with other reports.'--Mr. Wade's

Memorandum.

[4] In view of the tragic events which followed, the reflection will

naturally arise that, if this party had not been thus sent forward in

advance of the army, those events would not have occurred. On the

other hand it must be borne in mind, (1) that it was a matter of

necessity that some one should go forward to arrange with the Chinese

authorities as to the place where the Allied armies were to encamp;

(2) that the practice of sending one or other of the Chinese scholars

within the enemy's lines had long been habitual, having been followed,

with the best results, on many occasions, not only in this but in

former expeditions; and that the Chinese, whatever might be their

faults, had never shown any disposition to disregard a flag of truce;

(3) that, accordingly, no one concerned appears to have had any idea

that there was danger to be braved; and that, putting aside Lord

Elgin, Baron Gros, and Sir Hope Grant, the readiness of Mr. Parkes,

not only to go himself--that in one who 'knew not what fear was'

proves nothing--but to take with him several friends who were not

called by duty, shows that, in the judgment of a man of great

shrewdness and unrivalled knowledge of the Chinese character, who was

moreover fully cognisant of all the circumstances, there existed no

ground for apprehension; (4) lastly, that all the evils that followed

were due, so far as it is possible now to judge, to a circumstance

which no one could have foreseen at the time, viz. to a change of

policy and of party within the Chinese Government.

[5] 'Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy

to China,' 1860. By Henry Brougham Loch, Private Secretary to the Earl

of Elgin.

[6] With generous candour, Mr. Loch, in his 'Narrative,' bears testimony

to the correctness of this view.

[7] The British subjects thus restored were Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and a

trooper of Probyn's Horse; the French subjects were M. l'Escayrac de

Lauture, who was at the head of a scientific mission, and four

soldiers.

[8] In a subsequent letter, Lord Elgin paid to Mr. Parkes this well-merited

tribute. 'Mr. Parkes' consistent refusal to purchase his own safety by

making any pledges, or even by addressing to me any representations

which might have embarrassed me in the discharge of my duty, is a rare

example of courage and devotion to the public interest; and the course

which he followed in this respect, by leaving my hands free, enabled

me to work out the policy which was best calculated to secure his own

release, as well as the attainment of the national objects entrusted

to my care.'

[9] The language used by Mr. Bruce, in reporting to the Foreign Office Mr.

De Norman's death, is still more striking; and it has an additional

interest as being eminently characteristic of the writer: 'It has not

been my fortune,' he says, 'to meet with a man whose life was so much

in harmony with the Divine precept, "not slothful in business, serving

the Lord." With a consistency unparalleled in my experience he brought

to bear on the discharge of every duty, and to the investigation of

every subject however minute, the complete and undivided attention of

the sound abilities, the good sense, and the indefatigable industry

with which God had endowed him. A character so morally and

intellectually conscientious, striving to do everything in the most

perfect manner, neglecting no opportunity of acquiring fresh and of

consolidating previous knowledge, promised a career honourable to

himself, and, what he valued far more, advantageous to the public, had

it pleased God to spare him.

'Now there remains to those who knew him intimately only this

consoling conviction, that death, however sudden, could not find him

unprepared.'

[10] The only English prisoner ultimately unaccounted for was Captain

Brabazon, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General of Artillery, an

officer whose finished talent and skill in drawing had often been of

the greatest service in taking sketches of the country for the

military operations. His body was never found; but it was believed

that he had been beheaded by order of a Chinese General in his

exasperation at a wound received in the action of the 21st of October.

[11] A well-known Protestant M.P.

[12] Mr. Adkins.

Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin · 第 13 / 16 章