ANNEXATION MOVEMENT--REMEDIAL MEASURES--REPEAL OF THE NAVIGATION LAWS--
RECIPROCITY WITH THE UNITED STATES--HISTORY OF THE TWO MEASURES--DUTY OF
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY--VIEWS ON COLONIAL GOVERNMENT--COLONIAL INTERESTS THE
SPORT OF HOME PARTIES--NO SEPARATION!--SELF-GOVERNMENT NOT NECESSARILY
REPUBLICAN--VALUE OF THE MONARCHICAL PRINCIPLE--DEFENCES OF THE COLONY.
[Sidenote: Annexation movement]
The disturbances which followed the passing of the 'Rebellion Losses Bill'
have been described in the preceding chapter chiefly as they affected the
person of the Governor. But it may be truly said that this was the aspect
of them that gave him least concern. He felt, indeed, deeply the
indignities offered to the Crown of England through its representative. But
there was some satisfaction in the reflection that, by taking on himself
the whole responsibility of sanctioning the obnoxious Bill, he had drawn
down upon his own head the chief violence of a storm which might otherwise
have exploded in a manner very dangerous to the Empire. 'I think I might
say,' he writes, 'with less poetry but with more truth, what Lamartine said
when they accused him of coquetting with the _Rouges_ under the
Provisional Government: "_Oui, j'ai conspiré! J'ai conspiré comme le
paratonnerre conspire avec le nuage pour désarmer la foudre._"' But the
thunder-cloud was not entirely disarmed; and it burst in a direction which
popular passion in Canada has always been too apt to take, threats of
throwing off England and joining the American States. As far back as March
14, 1849, we find Lord Elgin drawing Lord Grey's attention to this subject.
There has been (he writes) a vast deal of talk about 'annexation,' as
is unfortunately always the case here when there is anything to
agitate the public mind. If half the talk on this subject were
sincere, I should consider an attempt to keep up the connection with
Great Britain as Utopian in the extreme. For, no matter what the
subject of complaint, or what the party complaining; whether it be
alleged that the French are oppressing the British, or the British the
French--that Upper Canada debt presses on Lower Canada, or Lower
Canada claims on Upper; whether merchants be bankrupt, stocks
depreciated, roads bad, or seasons unfavourable, annexation is invoked
as the remedy for all ills, imaginary or real. A great deal of this
talk is, however, bravado, and a great deal the mere product of
thoughtlessness. Undoubtedly it is in some quarters the utterance of
very sincere convictions; and if England will not make the sacrifices
which are absolutely necessary to put the colonists here in as good a
position commercially as the citizens of the States--in order to which
_free navigation and reciprocal trade with the States are
indispensable_--if not only the organs of the league but those of
the Government and of the Peel party are always writing as if it were
an admitted fact that colonies, and more especially Canada, are a
burden, to be endured only because they cannot be got rid of, the end
may be nearer at hand than we wot of.
In these sentences we have the germs of views and feelings which time only
made clearer and stronger;--indignation at that tendency, so common in all
minorities, to look abroad for aid against the power of the majority; faith
in the idea of Colonial Government, if based on principles of justice and
freedom; and, as regards the particular case of Canada, the conviction that
nothing was wanted to secure her loyalty but a removal of the commercial
restrictions which placed her at a disadvantage in competing with her
neighbours of the Union. To understand the scope of his policy during the
next few years, it will be necessary to dwell at some length on each of
these points; but for the present we must return to the circumstances which
gave occasion to the letter which we have quoted.
[Sidenote: Manifesto.]
While ready, as that letter shows, to make every allowance for the
utterances of thoughtless folly, or of well-founded discontent on the part
of the people, Lord Elgin felt the necessity of checking at once such
demonstrations on the part of paid servants of the Crown. Accordingly, when
an elaborate manifesto appeared in favour of 'annexation,' bearing the
signatures of several persons--magistrates, Queen's counsel, militia
officers, and others--holding commissions at the pleasure of the Crown, he
caused a circular to be addressed to all such persons with the view of
ascertaining whether their names had been attached with their own consent.
Some of these letters were answered in the negative, some in the
affirmative, and others by denying the right of the Government to put the
question, and declining to reply to it. Lord Elgin resolved, with the
advice of his executive council, to remove from such offices as are held
during the pleasure of the Crown, the gentlemen who admitted the
genuineness of their signatures, and those who refused to disavow them.
[Sidenote: Remedial measures.]
'In this course, says Lord Grey,[1] 'we thought it right to support him;
and a despatch was addressed to him signifying the Queen's approval of his
having dismissed from Her service those who had signed the address, and Her
Majesty's commands to resist to the utmost any attempt that might be made
to bring about a separation of Canada from the British dominions,' But the
necessity for such acts of severity only increased Lord Elgin's desire to
remove every reasonable ground of complaint and discontent; to shut out, as
he said, the advocates of annexation from every plea which could grace or
dignify rebellion. He felt, indeed, an assured confidence that, by carrying
out fearlessly the principle of self-government, he had 'cast an acorn into
time,' which could not fail to bring forth the fruit of political
contentment. But, in the meantime, for the immediate security of the
connection between the colony and the mother-country he thought, as we have
already seen, that two measures were indispensable, viz. the removal of the
existing restrictions on navigation, and the establishment of reciprocal
free trade with the United States.
Judging after the event we may, perhaps, be inclined to think that the
importance which he attached to the latter of these measures was
exaggerated; especially as the annexation movement had died away, and
content, commercial as well as political, had returned to the Province long
before it was carried. But we cannot form a correct view of his policy
without giving some prominence to a subject which occupied, for many years,
so large a share of his thoughts and of his energies.
Writing to Lord Grey on November 8, 1849, he says:--
[Sidenote: 'Reciprocity.']
The fact is, that although both the States and Canada export to the
same neutral market, prices on the Canada side of the line are lower
than on the American, by the amount of the duty which the Americans
levy. So long as this state of things continues there will be
discontent in this country; deep, growing discontent You will not, I
trust, accuse me of having deceived you on this point. I have always
said that I am prepared to assume the responsibility of keeping Canada
quiet, with a much smaller garrison than we have now, and without any
tax on the British consumer in the shape of protection to Canadian
products, if you put our trade on as good a footing as that of our
American neighbours; but if things remain on their present footing in
this respect, there is nothing before us but violent agitation, ending
in convulsion or annexation. It is better that I should worry you with
my importunity, than that I should be chargeable with having neglected
to give you due warning. You have a great opportunity before you--
obtain reciprocity for us, and I venture to predict that you will be
able shortly to point to this hitherto turbulent colony with
satisfaction, in illustration of the tendency of self-government and
freedom of trade, to beget contentment and material progress. Canada
will remain attached to England, though tied to her neither by the
golden links of protection, nor by the meshes of old-fashioned
colonial office jobbing and chicane. But if you allow the Americans to
withhold the boon which you have the means of extorting if you will, I
much fear that the closing period of the connection between Great
Britain and Canada will be marked by incidents which will damp the
ardour of those who desire to promote human happiness by striking
shackles either off commerce or off men.
Even when tendering to the Premier, Lord John Russell, his formal thanks on
being raised to the British peerage--an honour which, coming at that
moment, he prized most highly as a proof to the world that the Queen's
Government approved his policy--he could not forego the opportunity of
insisting on a topic which seemed to him so momentous.
It is (he writes) of such vital importance that your Lordship should
rightly apprehend the nature of these difficulties, and the state of
public opinion in Canada at this conjuncture, that I venture, at the
hazard of committing an indiscretion, to add a single observation on
this head. Let me then assure your Lordship, and I speak advisedly in
offering this assurance, that the disaffection now existing in Canada,
whatever be the forms with which it may clothe itself, is due mainly
to commercial causes. I do not say that there is no discontent on
political grounds. Powerful individuals and even classes of men are, I
am well aware, dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs. But I make
bold to affirm that so general is the belief that, under the present
circumstances of our commercial condition, the colonists pay a heavy
pecuniary fine for their fidelity to Great Britain, that nothing but
the existence to an unwonted degree of political contentment among the
masses has prevented the cry for annexation from spreading, like
wildfire, through the Province. This, as your Lordship will perceive,
is a new feature in Canadian politics. The plea of self-interest, the
most powerful weapon, perhaps, which the friends of British connection
have wielded in times past, has not only been wrested from my hands,
but transferred since 1846 to those of the adversary. I take the
liberty of mentioning a fact, which seems better to illustrate the
actual condition of affairs in these respects than many arguments. I
have lately spent several weeks in the district of Niagara. Canadian
Niagara is separated from the state of New York by a narrow stream,
spanned by a bridge, which it takes a foot passenger about three
minutes to cross. The inhabitants are for the most part U.E.
loyalists,[2] and differ little in habits or modes of thought and
expression from their neighbours. Wheat is their staple product--the
article which they exchange for foreign comforts and luxuries. Now it
is the fact that a bushel of wheat, grown on the Canadian side of the
line, has fetched this year in the market, on an average, from
9_d_. to 1_s_. less than the same quantity and quality of
the same article grown on the other. Through their district council, a
body elected under a system of very extended suffrage, these same
inhabitants of Niagara have protested against the Montreal annexation
movement. They have done so (and many other district councils in Upper
Canada have done the same) under the impression that it would be base
to declare against England at a moment when England has given a signal
proof of her determination to concede constitutional Government in all
its plenitude to Canada. I am confident, however, that the large
majority of the persons who have thus protested, firmly believe that
their annexation to the United States would add one-fourth to the
value of the produce of their farms.
I need say no more than this to convince your Lordship, that while
this state of things subsists (and I much fear that no measure but the
establishment of reciprocal trade between Canada and the States, or
the imposition of a duty on the produce of the States when imported
into England, will remove it), arguments will not be wanting to those
who seek to seduce Canadians from their allegiance.
Shortly afterwards he writes to Lord Grey:--
It is not for me to dispute the point with free-traders, when they
allege that all parts of the Empire are suffering from the effects of
free-trade, and that Canadians must take their chance with others. But
I must be permitted to remark, that the Canadian case differs from
others, both as respects the immediate cause of the suffering, and
still more as respects the means which the sufferers possess of
finding for themselves a way of escape. As to the former point I have
only to say that, however severe the pressure in other cases attendant
on the transition from protection to free-trade, there is none which
presents so peculiar a specimen of legislative legerdemain as the
Canadian, where an interest was created in 1843 by a Parliament in
which the parties affected had no voice, only to be knocked down by
the same Parliament in 1846. But it is the latter consideration which
constitutes the specialty of the Canadian case. What in point of fact
_can_ the other suffering interests, of which the _Times_
writes, do? There may be a great deal of grumbling, and a gradual
move towards republicanism, or even communism; but this is an operose
and empirical process, the parties engaged in it are full of
misgivings, and their ranks at every step in advance are thinned by
desertion. Not so with the Canadians. The remedy offered to them, such
as it is, is perfectly definite and intelligible. They are invited to
form a part of a community, which is neither suffering nor free-
trading, which never makes a bargain without getting at least twice as
much as it gives; a community, the members of which have been within
the last few weeks pouring into their multifarious places of worship,
to thank God that they are exempt from the ills which afflict other
men, from those more especially which afflict their despised
neighbours, the inhabitants of North America, who have remained
faithful to the country which planted them.
Now, I believe, that if these facts be ignored, it is quite impossible
to understand rightly the present state of opinion in Canada, or to
determine wisely the course which the British Government and
Parliament ought to pursue. It may suit the policy of the English
free-trade press to represent the difficulties of Canada as the
consequence of having a fool for a Governor-General; but, if it be
permitted me to express an opinion on a matter of so much delicacy, I
venture to doubt whether it would be safe to act on this hypothesis.
My conviction on the contrary is, that motives of self-interest of a
very gross and palpable description are suggesting treasonable courses
to the Canadian mind at present, and that it is a political sentiment,
a feeling of gratitude for what has been done and suffered this year
in the cause of Canadian self-government, which is neutralising these
suggestions.
Again, on December 29,1849, he writes as follows:--
[Sidenote: Free navigation.]
I believe that the operation of the free navigation system will be
what you anticipate, to a great extent at least, and that it will tend
materially to equalise prices on the two sides of the line. At the
same time I do think, that there are circumstances in this country
which falsify, in some degree, the deductions at which one arrives
from reasoning founded on the abstract principles of political
economy. One of these circumstances is the power which the farmers in
the Western States, having no rents to pay, have of holding back their
grain when prices do not suit them. You must have observed what hoards
they poured forth when they were tempted by the famine prices of 1847;
and I cannot but think that this power of hoarding, coupled with an
indifferent harvest, must account for the great disparity of price,
which has obtained during the course of the present year in the New
York market for bonded grain, and grain for the home consumption. I
fully expect, however, to see the price of Canadian grain, bonded at
New York, rise, now that it can be exported to Liverpool in the New
York liners, which will carry it for ballast. Nevertheless, I think
that Sir Robert Peel's _dictum_ with respect to the Repeal of the
Corn Laws, on the day on which he retired last from office, when he
observed that thenceforward, even when the poor suffered from the high
price of bread, they would not ascribe that suffering to the fact of
their bread being taxed, applies with at least equal force to the
reciprocity question as affecting the Canadian farmers. For sure am I
that, so long as there is a duty on their produce when it enters the
States, and none on the introduction of United States produce into
England, they will ascribe to this cause alone the differences of
price that may occasionally rule to their disadvantage.
The history of the two measures which Lord Elgin so ardently desired, and
which in the foregoing and many similar letters he so urgently pressed, was
eminently characteristic of the two Legislatures, through which they had
respectively to be carried.
[Sidenote: Repeal of Navigation Laws.]
In England, the repeal of restrictive Navigation Laws was contended for by
thoughtful statesmen on grounds of public policy. The protective and
conservative instincts of the old country, fortified by the never-absent
spirit of party, resisted the change. When fairly beaten by force of
argument in the House of Commons, they entrenched themselves ha the House
of Lords; and it was only after a hot struggle that the Act was passed in
June 1849, of which one effect was, by lowering freights, to increase the
profits of the Canadian trade in wheat and timber, and thus to advance, in
a very important degree, the commercial prosperity of the colony.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaty.]
The delays which retarded the settlement of the Reciprocity Treaty were due
to causes of another kind. The difficulty was to induce the American
Congress to pay any attention at all to the subject. In the vast
multiplicity of matters with which that Assembly has to deal, it is said
that no cause which does not appeal strongly to a national sentiment, or at
least to some party feeling, has a chance of obtaining a hearing, unless it
is taken up systematically by 'organizers' outside the House. The
Reciprocity Bill was not a measure about which any national or even party
feeling could be aroused. It was one which required much study to
understand its bearings, and which would affect different interests in the
country in different ways. It stood, therefore, especially in need of the
aid of professional organizers; a kind of aid of which it was of course
impossible that either the British or the Canadian Government should avail
itself. Session after session the Bill was proposed, scarcely debated, and
set aside. At last, in 1854, after the negotiations had dragged on wearily
for more than six years, Lord Elgin himself was sent to Washington in the
hope--'a forlorn hope,' as it seemed to those who sent him--of bringing the
matter to a successful issue. It was his first essay in diplomacy, but made
under circumstances unusually favourable. He was personally popular with
the Americans, towards whom he had always entertained and shown a most
friendly feeling. They appreciated, moreover, better perhaps than it was
appreciated at home, the consummate ability, as well as the rare strength
of character, which he had displayed in the government of Canada; and the
prestige thus attaching to his name, joined to the influence of his
presence, and his courtesy and _bonhomie_, enabled him in a few days
to smooth all difficulties, and change apathy into enthusiasm. Within a few
weeks from the time of his landing he had agreed with Mr. Marcy upon the
terms of a Treaty of Reciprocity, which soon afterwards received the
sanction of all the Governments concerned.
The main concessions made by the Provinces to the United States in this
treaty were, (1) the removal of duties on the introduction, for consumption
in the Provinces, of certain products of the States; (2) the admission of
citizens of that country to the enjoyment of the in-shore sea-fishery; (3)
the opening-up to their vessels of the St. Lawrence and canals pertaining
thereto.
A good deal of misconception prevailed at the time as to the amount of the
concession made under the second head. The popular impression on this point
was, that a gigantic monopoly was about to be surrendered; but this was far
from being the case. The citizens of the United States had already, under
the Convention of 1818, access to the most important cod-fisheries on the
British coasts. The new treaty maintained in favour of British subjects the
monopoly of the river and freshwater fisheries; and the concession which it
made to the citizens of the United States amounted in substance to this,
that it admitted them to a legal participation in the mackerel and herring
fisheries, from illegal encroachments on which it had been found, after the
experience of many years, practically impossible to exclude them.[3]
The duration of the Treaty was limited to ten years, and has not been
extended; but it is not too much to hope that it has had some effect in
engendering feelings of friendliness, and of community of interest, which
may long outlast itself.
[Sidenote: Views of Government.]
It has been already noticed that the 'annexation movement' of 1849 died
away without serious consequences; and extracts which have been given above
sufficiently show to what cause Lord Elgin attributed its extinction. The
powerful attraction of the great neighbouring republic had been
counteracted and overcome by the more powerful attraction of self-
government at home. The centrifugal force was no longer equal to the
centripetal. To create this state of feeling had been his most cherished
desire; to feel that he had succeeded in creating it was, throughout much
obloquy and misunderstanding, his greatest support.
[Sidenote: Duty of supporting authority,]
From the earliest period of his entrance into political life he had always
had the strongest sense of the duty incumbent on every public man of
supporting, even in opposition, the authority of Government. The bitterest
reproach which he cast upon the Whigs, in his first Tory 'Letter to the
Electors of Great Britain' in 1835, was that when they found they could not
carry on the government themselves, they tried to make it impossible for
any other party to do so. Nor was he less severe, on another occasion, in
his reprehension of 'a certain high Tory clique who are always cavilling at
royalty when it is constitutional; circulating the most miserable gossip
about royal persons and royal entertainments,' &c.; busily 'engaged in
undermining the foundations on which respect for human institutions rests.'
Writing, in May 1850, to Mr. Gumming Bruce, a Tory and Protectionist, he
said--
I shall not despair for England whether Free-traders or Protectionists
be in the ascendant, unless I see that the faction out of power abet
the endeavours of those who would make the Government of the country
contemptible. Read Montalembert's speeches. They are very eloquent and
instructive. He had as full a faith in his religion, and what he
considered due to his religion, as you can have in your Corn Laws. Yet
observe how bitterly he now repents having aided those who have
undermined in the French public all respect for authority and the
powers that be.
If all that your Protectionist friends want to do is to put
themselves, or persons in whom they have greater confidence than the
present Ministry, in office, their object is, I confess, a perfectly
legitimate one. What I complain of is the system of what is termed
damaging the Government, when resorted to by those who have no such
purpose in view; or at least no honest intention of assuming
responsibilities which they are endeavouring to render intolerable to
those who are charged with them.
[Sidenote: especially in Colonies.]
But if this 'political profligacy' was, in his judgment, the bane of party
government at home, a still stronger but, perhaps, more excusable tendency
to it threatened to defeat the object of responsible government in Canada.
Accustomed to look abroad for the source and centre of power, a beaten
minority in the Colonial Parliament, instead of loyally accepting its
position, was never without a hope of wresting the victory from its
opponents, either by an appeal to opinion in the mother-country, always
ill-informed, and therefore credulous, in matters of colonial politics, or
else by raising a cry of 'separation' or 'annexation.'
The evil effects of this state of things need hardly be pointed out. On the
one hand the constant reference to opinion in England, not in the shape of
constitutional appeal but by ex-parte statements, produced a state of
chronic irritation against the mother-country. 'There is nothing,' wrote
Lord Elgin, 'which makes the colonial statesman so jealous as rescripts
from the Colonial Office, suggested by the representations of provincial
cliques or interests, who ought, as he contends, to bow before the
authorities of Government House, Montreal, rather than those of Downing
Street.' On the other hand it was not easy to know how to deal with
politicians who did not profess to own more than a qualified and
provisional allegiance to the constitution of the Province and the Crown of
England. The one hope in both cases was to foster a 'national and manly
tone' of political morals; to lead all parties alike to look to their own
Parliament, and neither to the London press nor the American hustings, for
the solution of all problems of Provincial government.
But while thus zealously defending, the fortress of British connection
committed to his care, Lord Elgin was dismayed to find that its walls were
crumbling round him? undermined by the operations of his own Mends; that
there had arisen at home a school of philosophic statesmen, strong in their
own ability, and strengthened by the support of the Radical economists,
according to whom it was to be expected and desired that every colony
enjoying constitutional government should aim at emancipating itself
entirely from allegiance to the mother-country, and forming itself into an
independent Republic. With such views he had no sympathy. The 'Sparta'
which had fallen to his lot was the position of a colonial governor, and
that position he felt it his duty to 'adorn' and to maintain. Moreover,
believing firmly in the vitality of the monarchical principle, as well as
in its value, he contended that it is an error to suppose that a
constitutional monarchy, in proportion as it becomes more liberal, tends
towards republicanism; and further, that if such tendency existed it would
be retrograde rather than progressive.
The views of Colonial Government, its objects and its difficulties, which
have been here briefly epitomised, are displayed in full in the following
letters, together with a variety of opinions on kindred topics. They are
given as characteristic of Lord Elgin; but they may, perhaps, have an
interest of their own, as bearing on important questions which still await
solution.
_To the Earl Grey._
November 16,1849.
[Sidenote: Maintenance of British connection.]
Very much, as respects the result of this annexation movement, depends
upon what you do at home. I cannot say what the effect may be if the
British Government and press are lukewarm on the subject. The
annexationists will take heart, but in a tenfold greater degree the
friends of the connection will be discouraged. If it be admitted that
separation _must_ take place, sooner or later, the argument in
favour of a present move seems to be almost irresistible. I am
prepared to contend that with responsible government, fairly worked
out with free-trade, there is no reason why the colonial relation
should not be indefinitely maintained. But look at my present
difficulty, which may be increased beyond calculation, if indiscreet
expressions be made use of during the present crisis. The English
Government thought it necessary, in order to give moral support to
their representative in Ireland, to assert in the most solemn manner
that the Crown never would consent to the severance of the Union;
although, according to the O'Connell doctrine, the allegiance to the
Crown of the Irish was to be unimpaired notwithstanding such
severance. But when I protest against Canadian projects for
dismembering the empire, I am always told 'the most eminent statesmen
in England have over and over again told us, that whenever we chose we
might separate. Why, then, blame us for discussing the subject?'
* * * * *
_To the Earl Grey._
January 14,1850.
[Sidenote: Colonial interests the sport of home parties.]
I am certainly less sanguine than I was as to the probability of
retaining the colonies under free-trade. I speak not now of the cost
of their retention, for I have no doubt but that, if all parties
concerned were honest, expenses might be gradually reduced. I am sure
also that when free-trade is fairly in operation it will be found that
more has been gained by removing the causes of irritation which were
furnished by the constant _tinkering_ incident to a protective
system, than has been lost by severing the bonds by which it tied the
mother-country and the colonies together. What I fear is, that when
the mystification in which certain questions of self-interest were
involved by protection is removed, factions both at home and in the
colonies will be more reckless than ever in hazarding for party
objects the loss of the colonies.[4] Our system depends a great deal
more on the discretion with which it is worked than the American,
where each power in the state goes habitually the full length of its
tether: Congress, the State legislatures, Presidents, Governors, all
legislating and _vetoing_, without stint or limit, till pulled up
short by a judgment of the Supreme Court. With us factions in the
colonies are clamorous and violent, with the hope of producing effect
on the Imperial Parliament and Government, just in proportion to their
powerlessness at home. The history of Canada during the past year
furnishes ample evidence of this truth. Why was there so much violence
on the part of the opposition here last summer, particularly against
the Governor-General? Because it felt itself to be weak in the
province, and looked for success to the effect it could produce in
England alone.
And how is this tendency to bring the Imperial and Local Parliaments
into antagonism, a tendency so dangerous to the permanence of our
system, to be counteracted? By one expedient as it appears to me only;
namely, by the Governor's acting with some assumption of
responsibility, so that the shafts of the enemy, which are intended
for the Imperial Government, may fall on him. If a line of demarcation
between the questions with which the Local Parliaments can deal and
those which are reserved for the Imperial authority could be drawn,
(as was recommended last session by the Radicals), it might be
different; but, as it is, I see nothing for it but that the Governors
should be responsible for the share which the Imperial Government may
have in the policy carried out in the responsible-government colonies,
with the liability to be recalled and disavowed whenever the Imperial
authorities think it expedient to repudiate such policy.
* * * * *
_To the Duke of Newcastle._
Quebec: February 18, 1853.
[Sidenote: Distribution of honours.]
Now that the bonds formed by commercial protection and the disposal of
local offices are severed, it is very desirable that the prerogative
of the Crown, as the fountain of honour, should be employed, in so far
as this can properly be done, as a means of attaching the outlying
parts of the empire to the throne. Of the soundness of this
proposition as a general principle no doubt can, I presume, be
entertained. It is not, indeed, always easy to apply it in these
communities, where fortunes are precarious, the social system so much
based on equality, and public services so generally mixed up with
party conflicts. But it should never, in my opinion, be lost sight of,
and advantage should be taken of all favourable opportunities to act
upon it.
There are two principles which ought, I think, as a general rule to be
attended to in the distribution of Imperial honours among colonists.
Firstly, they should appear to emanate directly from the Crown, on the
advice, if you will, of the Governors and Imperial Ministers, but not
on the recommendation of the local executives. And, secondly, they
should be conferred, as much as possible, on the eminent persons who
are no longer actively engaged in political life. If these principles
be neglected, such distinctions will, I fear, soon lose their value.
* * * * *
_To the Earl Grey._
Toronto: March 23,1850.
[Sidenote: Speech of Lord J. Russell.]
[Sidenote: Colonial existence not provisional.]
Lord John's speech on the colonies seems to have been eminently
successful at home. It is calculated too, I think, to do good in the
colonies; but for one sentence, the introduction of which I deeply
deplore--the sting in the tail. Alas for that sting in the tail! I
much fear that when the liberal and enlightened sentiments, the
enunciation of which by one so high in authority is so well calculated
to make the colonists sensible of the advantages which they derive
from their connection with Great Britain, shall have passed away from
their memories, there will not be wanting those who will remind them
that, on this solemn occasion, the Prime Minister of England, amid the
plaudits of a full senate, declared that he looked forward to the day
when the ties which he was endeavouring to render so easy and mutually
advantageous would be severed. And wherefore this foreboding? or,
perhaps, I ought not to use the term foreboding, for really to judge
by the comments of the press on this declaration of Lord John's, I
should be led to imagine that the prospect of these sucking
democracies, after they have drained their old mother's life-blood,
leaving her in the lurch, and setting up as rivals, just at the time
when their increasing strength might render them a support instead of
a burden, is one of the most cheering which has of late presented
itself to the English imagination. But wherefore then this
anticipation--if foreboding be not the correct term? Because Lord John
and the people of England persist in assuming that the Colonial
relation is incompatible with maturity and full development. And is
this really so incontestable a truth that it is a duty not only to
hold but to proclaim it? Consider for a moment what is the effect of
proclaiming it in our case. We have on this continent two great
empires in presence, or rather, I should say, two great Imperial
systems. In many respects there is much similarity between them. In so
far as powers of self-government are concerned it is certain that our
colonists in America have no reason to envy the citizens of any state
in the Union. The forms differ, but it may be shown that practically
the inhabitants of Canada have a greater power in controlling their
own destiny than those of Michigan or New York, who must tolerate a
tariff imposed by twenty other states, and pay the expenses of war
undertaken for objects which they profess to abhor. And yet there is a
difference between the two cases; a difference, in my humble judgment,
of sentiment rather than substance, which renders the one a system of
life and strength, and the other a system of death and decay. No
matter how raw and rude a territory may be when it is admitted as a
state into the Union of the United States, it is at once, by the
popular belief, invested with all the dignity of manhood, and
introduced into a system which, despite the combativeness of certain
ardent spirits from the South, every American believes and maintains
to be immortal. But how does the case stand with us? No matter how
great the advance of a British colony in wealth and civilisation; no
matter how absolute the powers of self-government conceded to it, it
is still taught to believe that it is in a condition of pupilage from
which it must pass before it can attain maturity. For one I have never
been able to comprehend why, elastic as our constitutional system is,
we should not be able, now more especially when we have ceased to
control the trade of our colonies, to render the links which bind them
to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the
component parts of the Union.... One thing is, however, indispensable
to the success of this or any other system of Colonial Government. You
must renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the Colonial is a
provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that, without
severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain
the degree of perfection, and of social and political development, to
which organised communities of free men have a right to aspire.
Since I began this letter I have, I regret to say, confirmatory
evidence of the justice of the anticipations I had formed of the
probable effect of Lord John's declaration. I enclose extracts from
two newspapers, an annexationist, the _Herald_ of Montreal, and a
_quasi_ annexationist, the _Mirror_ of Toronto. You will
note the use they make of it. I was more annoyed however, I confess,
by what occurred yesterday in council. We had to determine whether or
not to dismiss from his offices a gentleman who is both M.P.P., Q.C.,
and J.P., and who has issued a flaming manifesto in favour, not of
annexation, but of an immediate declaration of independence as a step
to it. I will not say anything of my own opinion on the case, but it
was generally contended by the members of the Board, that it would be
impossible to maintain that persons who had declared their intention
to throw off their allegiance to the Queen, with a view to annexation,
were unfit to retain offices granted during pleasure, if persons who
made a similar declaration with a view to independence were to be
differently dealt with. Baldwin had Lord John's speech in his hand. He
is a man of singularly placid demeanour, but he has been seriously
ill, so possibly his nerves are shaken--at any rate I never saw him so
much moved. 'Have you read the latter part of Lord J. Russell's
speech?' he said to me. I nodded assent. 'For myself,' he added, 'if
the anticipations therein expressed prove to be well founded, my
interest in public affairs is gone for ever. But is it not hard upon
us while we are labouring, through good and evil report, to thwart the
designs of those who would dismember the Empire, that our adversaries
should be informed that the difference between them and the Prime
Minister of England is only one of time? If the British Government has
really come to the conclusion that we are a burden to be cast off
whenever a favourable opportunity offers, surely we ought to be
warned.'
I replied that while I regretted as much as he could do the paragraph
to which he referred, I thought he somewhat mistook its import: that I
believed no man living was more opposed to the dismemberment of the
Empire than Lord J. Russell: that I did not conceive that he had any
intention of deserting the Colonies, or of inviting them to separate
from England; but that he had in the sentence in question given
utterance to a purely speculative, and in my judgment most fallacious,
opinion, which, was shared, I feared, by very many persons both in
England and the Colonies: that I held it to be a perfectly unsound and
most dangerous theory, that British Colonies could not attain maturity
without separation, and that my interest in labouring with them to
bring into full play the principles of Constitutional Government in
Canada would entirely cease if I could be persuaded to adopt it. I
said all this I must confess, however, not without misgiving, for I
could not but be sensible that, in spite of all my allegations to the
contrary, my audience was disposed to regard a prediction of this
nature, proceeding from a Prime Minister, less as a speculative
abstraction than as one of that class of prophecies which work their
own fulfilment. I left the Council Chamber disheartened, with the
feeling that Lord J. Russell's reference to the manhood of Colonies
was more likely to be followed by practical consequences than
Lamartine's famous '_quand l'heure aura sonné_' invocation to
oppressed nationalities. It is possible, indeed, that I exaggerate to
myself the probable effects of this declaration. Politicians of the
Baldwin stamp, with distinct views and aims, who having struggled to
obtain a Government on British principles, desire to preserve it, are
not, I fear, very numerous in Canada; the great mass move on with very
indefinite purposes, and not much inquiring whither they are going. Of
one thing, however, I am confident; there cannot be any peace,
contentment, progress, or credit in this colony while the idea obtains
that the connection with England is a millstone about its neck which
should be cast off, as soon as it can be conveniently managed. What
man in his senses would invest his money in the public securities of a
country where questions affecting the very foundations on which public
credit rests are in perpetual agitation; or would settle in it at all
if he could find for his foot a more stable resting-place elsewhere? I
may, perhaps, be expressing myself too unreservedly with reference to
opinions emanating from a source which I am no less disposed than
bound to respect. As I have the means, however, of feeling the pulse
of the colonists in this most feverish region, I consider it to be
always my duty to furnish you with as faithful a record as possible of
our diagnostics. And, after all, may I not with all submission ask, Is
not the question at issue a most momentous one? What is it indeed but
this: Is the Queen of England to be the Sovereign of an Empire,
growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its
roots deep into fresh earth and drawing new supplies of vitality from
virgin soils? Or is she to be for all essential purposes of might and
power, Monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely--her place and that
of her line in the world's history determined by the productiveness of
12,000 square miles of a coal formation, which is being rapidly
exhausted, and the duration of the social and political organization
over which she presides dependent on the annual expatriation, with a
view to its eventual alienization, of the surplus swarms of her born
subjects? If Lord J. Russell, instead of concluding his excellent
speech with a declaration of opinion which, as I read it, and as I
fear others will read it, seems to make it a point of honour with the
Colonists to prepare for separation, had contented himself with
resuming the statements already made in its course, with showing that
neither the Government nor Parliament could have any object in view in
their Colonial policy but the good of the Colonies, and the
establishment of the relation between them and the mother-country on
the basis of mutual affection; that, as the idea of maintaining a
Colonial Empire for the purpose of exercising dominion or dispensing
patronage had been for some time abandoned, and that of regarding it
as a hot-bed for forcing commerce and manufactures more recently
renounced, a greater amount of free action and self-government might
be conceded to British Colonies without any breach of Imperial Unity,
or the violation of any principle of Imperial Policy, than had under
any scheme yet devised fallen to the lot of the component parts of any
Federal or imperial system; if he had left these great truths to work
their effect without hazarding a conjecture which will, I fear, be
received as a suggestion, with respect to the course which certain
wayward members of the Imperial family may be expected to take in a
contingency still confessedly remote, it would, I venture with great
deference to submit, in so far at least as public feeling in the
Colonies is concerned, have been safer and better.
[Sidenote: 'Separation' and 'annexation.']
You draw, I know, a distinction between separation with a view to
annexation and separation with a view to independence. You say the
former is an act of treason, the latter a natural and legitimate step
in progress. There is much plausibility doubtless in this position,
but, independently of the fact that no one advocates independence in
these Colonies except as a means to the end, annexation, is it really
tenable? If you take your stand on the hypothesis that the Colonial
existence is one with which the Colonists ought to rest satisfied,
then, I think, you are entitled to denounce, without reserve or
measure, those who propose for some secondary object to substitute the
Stars and Stripes for the Union Jack. But if, on the contrary, you
assume that it is a provisional state, which admits of but a stunted
and partial growth, and out of which all communities ought in the
course of nature to strive to pass, how can you refuse to permit your
Colonies here, when they have arrived at the proper stage in their
existence, to place themselves in a condition which is at once most
favourable to their security and to their perfect national
development? What reasons can you assign for the refusal, except such
as are founded on selfishness, and are, therefore, morally worthless?
If you say that your great lubberly boy is too big for the nursery,
and that you have no other room for him in your house, how can you
decline to allow him to lodge with his elder brethren over the way,
when the attempt to keep up an establishment for himself would
seriously embarrass him?
* * * * *
_To the Earl Grey._
Toronto: November 1, 1850.
Sir H. Bulwer spent four days with us, and for many reasons I am glad
that he has been here. He leaves us knowing more of Canada than he did
when he came. I think too that both he and Sir E. Head return to their
homes re-assured on many points of our internal policy, on which they
felt doubtful before, and much enlightened as to the real position of
men and things in this province.
[Sidenote: Self-government not republican.]
With one important truth 1 have laboured to impress them, and I hope
successfully. It is this: that the faithful carrying out of the
principles of Constitutional Government is a departure from the
American model, not an approximation to it, and, therefore, a
departure from republicanism in its only workable shape. Of the
soundness of this view of our case I entertain no doubt whatever; and
though I meet with few persons to whom it seems to have occurred (for
the common belief of superficial observers is that we are
republicanising the colonies), I seldom fail in bringing it borne to
the understanding of any intelligent person with whom I have occasion
to discuss it. The fact is, that the American system is our old
Colonial system with, in certain cases, the principle of popular
election substituted for that of nomination by the Crown. Mr. Filmore
stands to his Congress very much in the same relation in which I stood
to my Assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective
responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of
concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The
whole business of legislation in the American Congress, as well as in
the State Legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway
business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to
be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the
British Parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance our
Reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session, just
as a Railway Bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in
Parliament. There was no Government to deal with. The interests of the
Union, as a whole and distinct from local and sectional interests, had
no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of
canvassing this member of Congress or the other. It is easy to
perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the
exception but the rule.
Now I feel very strongly, that when a people have been once thoroughly
accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they
never will consent to revert to this clumsy irresponsible mechanism.
Whether we shall be able to carry on the war here long enough to allow
the practice of Constitutional Government and the habits of mind which
it engenders to take root in these provinces, may be doubtful. But it
may be worth your while to consider whether these views do not throw
some light on affairs in Europe. If you part with constitutional
monarchies there, you may possibly get something much more democratic;
but you cannot, I am confident, get American republicanism. It is the
fashion to say, 'of course not; we cannot get their federal system;'
but this is not the only reason, there are others that lie deeper.
Look at France, where they are trying to jumble up the two things, a
head of the State responsible to the people who elect him, and a
ministry responsible to the Parliament.
* * * * *
_To the Duke of Newcastle._
March 26, 1853.
It is argued that, by the severance of the connection, British
statesmen would be relieved of an onerous responsibility for colonial
acts of which they cannot otherwise rid themselves. Is there not,
however, some fallacy in this? If by conceding absolute independence
the British Parliament can acquit itself of the obligation to impose
its will upon the Colonists, in the matter, for instance, of a Church
Establishment, can it not attain the same end by declaring that, as
respects such local questions, the Colonists are free to judge for
themselves? How can it be justifiable to adopt the former of these
expedients, and sacrilegious to act upon the latter?
The true policy, in my humble judgment, is to throw the whole weight
of responsibility on those who exercise the real power, for, after
all, the sense of responsibility is the best security against the
abuse of power; and, as respects the connection, to act and speak on
this hypothesis--that there is nothing in it to check the development
of healthy national life in these young communities. I believe that
this policy will be found to be not only the safest, but also (an
important consideration in these days) the most economical.
* * * * *
_To the Earl Grey._
Toronto: December 17, 1850.
Although, as you observe, it seems to be rather idle in us to
correspond on what may be termed speculative questions, when we have
so much pressing business on hand, I venture to say a few words in
reply to your letter of the 23rd ult., firstly, because I presume to
dissent from some of the opinions which you advance in it; and,
secondly, because I have a practical object of no small importance in
view in calling your attention to the contrasts which present
themselves in the working of our institutions, and those of our
neighbours in the States. My practical object is this: when you
concede to the Colonists Constitutional Government in its integrity,
you are reproached with leading them to Republicanism and the American
Union. The same reproach is hurled with anathemas against your humble
servant. Lord Stanley, if I rightly remember, in the debate on
Ryland's case last year, stated amid cheers, that if you were in the
habit of consulting the Ministers of the Crown in the Colony before
you placed persons on the colonial pension List, he had no hesitation
in saying you had already established a republic in Canada! Now I
believe, on the contrary, that it may be demonstrated that the
concession of Constitutional Government has a tendency to draw the
Colonists the other way; firstly, because it slakes that thirst for
self-government which seizes on all British communities when they
approach maturity; and, secondly, because it habituates the Colonists
to the working of a political mechanism, which is both intrinsically
superior to that of the Americans, and more unlike it than our old
Colonial system.
Adopting, however, the views with respect to the superiority of the
mechanism of our political system to that of our neighbours, which I
have ventured to urge, you proceed to argue that the remedy is in
their hands; that without abandoning their republicanism they and
their _confrères_ in France have nothing to do but to dismiss
their Presidents and to substitute our constitution without a King,
the body without the head, for their own, to get rid of the
inconveniences which they now experience; and you quote with
approbation, as an embodiment of this idea, the project submitted by
M. Grévy and the Red Republicans to the French Constituent Assembly.
[Sidenote: Value of the monarchical principle.]
Now here I confess I cannot go along with you, and the difference
between us is a very material one; for if the monarch be not an
indispensable element in our constitutional mechanism, and if we can
secure all the advantages of that mechanism without him, I have drawn
the wrong moral from the facts. You say that the system the Red
Republicans would have established in France would have been the
nearest possible approach to our own. It is possible, I think, that we
may be tending towards the like issues. It is possible, perhaps
probable, that as the House of Commons becomes more democratic in its
composition, and consequently more arrogant in its bearing, it may
cast off the shackles which the other powers of the State impose on
its self-will, and even utterly abolish them; but I venture to believe
that those who last till that day comes, will find that they are
living under a very different constitution from that which we now
enjoy; that they have traversed the interval which separates a
temperate and cautious administration of public affairs resting on the
balance of powers and interests, from a reckless and overbearing
tyranny based on the caprices and passions of an absolute and
irresponsible body. You talk somewhat lightly of the check of the
Crown, although you acknowledge its utility. But is it indeed so light
a matter, even as our constitution now works? Is it a light matter
that the Crown should have the power of dissolving Parliament; in
other words, of deposing the tyrant at will? Is it a light matter that
for several months in each year the House of Commons should be in
abeyance, during which period the nation looks on Ministers not as
slaves of Parliament but servants of the Crown? Is it a light matter
that there should still be such respect for the monarchical principle,
that the servants of that visible entity yclept the Crown are enabled
to carry on much of the details of internal and foreign administration
without consulting Parliament, and even without its cognisance? Or do
you suppose that the Red Republicans, when they advocated the
nomination of a Ministry of the House of Assembly with a revocable
_mandat_, intended to create a Frankenstein endowed with powers
in some cases paramount to, and in others running parallel with, the
authority of the omnipotent body to which it owed its existence? My
own impression is, that they meant a set of delegates to be appointed,
who should exercise certain functions of legislative initiation and
executive patronage so long as they reflected clearly, in the former
the passions, and in the latter the interests of the majority for the
time being, and no longer.
It appears to me, I must confess, that if you have a republican form
of government in a great country, with complicated internal and
external relations, you must either separate the executive and
legislative departments, as in the United States, or submit to a
tyranny of the majority, not the more tolerable because it is
capricious and wielded by a tyrant with many heads. Of the two evils I
prefer the former.
Consider, for a moment, how much more violent the proceedings of
majorities in the American Legislatures would be, how much more
reckless the appeals to popular passion, how much more frequently the
permanent interests of the nation and the rights of individuals and
classes would be sacrificed to the object of raising political capital
for present uses, if debates or discussions affected the tenure of
office. I have no idea that the executive and legislative departments
of the State can be made to work together with a sufficient degree of
harmony to give the maximum of strength and of mutual independence to
secure freedom and the rights of minorities, except under the
presidency of Monarchy, the moral influence of which, so long as a
nation is monarchical in its sentiments, cannot, of course, be
measured merely by its recognised power.
[Sidenote: Influence of a Governor, under responsible Government.]
Those who are most ready to concur in these views of Colonial Government,
and to admire the vigour with which they were defended, and the consistency
with which they were carried out, may still be inclined to ask whether the
maintenance of them did not involve a species of official suicide: whether
the theory of the responsibility of provincial Ministers to the provincial
Parliament, and of the consequent duty of the Governor to remain absolutely
neutral in the strife of political parties, had not a necessary tendency to
degrade his office into that of a mere _Roi fainéant_. He had in 1849,
as Sir C. Adderley expresses it, 'maintained the principle of responsible
Government at the risk of his life.' Was the result of his hard-won victory
only to empty himself of all but the mere outward show of power and
authority?
Such questions he was always ready to meet with an uncompromising negative.
'I have tried,' he said, both systems. In Jamaica there was no responsible
Government: but I had not half the power I have here with my constitutional
and changing Cabinet.' Even on the Vice-regal throne of India, he missed,
at first, at least, something of the authority and influence which had been
his, as Constitutional Governor, in Canada.[5] He was fully conscious,
however, of the difficult nature of the position, and that it was only
tenable on condition of being penetrated, or _possessed_, as he said,
with the idea of its tenability. In this strain he wrote to his intimate
friend. Mr. Cumming Bruce, in September 1852, with reference to a report
that he was to be recalled by the Ministry which had recently come into
power.
As respects the _matter_ of the report, I am disposed to believe
that, viewing the question with reference to personal interests
exclusively, my removal from hence would not be any disadvantage to
me. But, as to my work here--there is the rub. Is it to be all undone?
On this point I must speak frankly. I have been possessed (I use the
word advisedly, for I fear that most persons in England still consider
it a case of _possession_) with the idea that it is possible to
maintain on this soil of North America, and in the face of Republican
America, British connection and British institutions, if you give the
latter freely and trustingly. Faith, when it is sincere, is always
catching; and I have imparted this faith, more or less thoroughly, to
all Canadian statesmen with whom I have been in official relationship
since 1848, and to all intelligent Englishmen with whom I have come in
contact since 1850--as witness Lord Wharncliffe, Waldegrave,
Tremenheere, &c. &c. Now if the Governor ceases to possess this faith,
or to have the faculty of imparting it, I confess I fear that, ere
long, it will become extinct in other breasts likewise. I believe that
it is equally an error to imagine with one old-fashioned party, that
you can govern such dependencies as this on the antiquated
bureaucratic principle, by means of rescripts from Downing Street, in
defiance of the popular legislatures, and on the hypothesis that one
local faction monopolises all the loyalty of the Colony; and to
suppose with the Radicals that all is done when you have simply told
the colonists 'to go to the devil their own way.' I believe, on the
contrary, that there is more room for the exercise of influence on the
part of the Governor under my system than under any that ever was
before devised; an influence, however, wholly moral--an influence of
suasion, sympathy, and moderation, which softens the temper while it
elevates the aims of local polities. It is true that on certain
questions of public policy, especially with regard to Church matters,
views are propounded by my ministers which do not exactly square with
my pre-conceived opinions, and which I acquiesce in, so long as they
do not contravene the fundamental principles of morality, from a
conviction that they are in accordance with the general sentiments of
the community.
It is true that I do not seek the commendation bestowed on Sir F. Head
for bringing men into his councils from the liberal party, and telling
them that they should enjoy only a partial confidence; thereby
allowing them to retain their position as tribunes of the people in
conjunction with the _prestige_ of advisers of the Crown by
enabling them to shirk responsibility for any acts of government which
are unpopular. It is true that I have always said to my advisers,
'while you continue my advisers you shall enjoy nay unreserved
confidence; and _en revanche_ you shall be responsible for all
acts of government.'
But it is no less certain that there is not one of them who does not
know that no inducement on earth would prevail with me to bring me to
acquiesce in any measures which seemed to me repugnant to public
morals, or Imperial interests; and I must say that, far from finding
in my advisers a desire to entrap me into proceedings of which 1 might
disapprove, I find a tendency constantly increasing to attach the
utmost value to my opinion on all questions, local or generals that
arise.
The deep sense which he entertained of the importance of a correct
understanding on this point is shown by his devoting to it the closing
words of the last official despatch which he wrote from Quebec, on December
18, 1854.
I readily admit that the maintenance of the position and due influence
of the Governor is one of the most critical problems that have to be
solved in the adaptation of Parliamentary Government to the Colonial
system; and that it is difficult to over-estimate the importance which
attaches to its satisfactory solution. As the Imperial Government and
Parliament gradually withdraw from legislative interference, and from
the exercise of patronage in Colonial affairs, the office of Governor
tends to become, in the most emphatic sense of the term, the link
which connects the Mother-country and the Colony, and his influence
the means by which harmony of action between the local and imperial
authorities is to be preserved. It is not, however, in my humble
judgment, by evincing an anxious desire to stretch to the utmost
constitutional principles in his favour, but, on the contrary, by the
frank acceptance of the conditions of the Parliamentary system, that
this influence can be most surely extended and confirmed. Placed by
his position above the strife of parties--holding office by a tenure
less precarious than the ministers who surround him--having no
political interests to serve but that of the community whose affairs
he is appointed to administer--his opinion cannot fail, when all cause
for suspicion and jealousy is removed, to have great weight in the
Colonial Councils, while he is set at liberty to constitute himself in
an especial manner the patron of those larger and higher interests--
such interests, for example, as those of education, and of moral and
material progress in all its branches--which, unlike the contests of
party, unite instead of dividing the members of the body politic. The
mention of such influences as an appreciable force in the
administration of public affairs may provoke a sneer on the part of
persons who have no faith in any appeal which is not addressed to the
lowest motives of human conduct; but those who have juster views of
our common nature, and who have seen influences that are purely moral
wielded with judgment, will not be disposed to deny to them a high
degree of efficacy.
[Sidenote: Defence of the colony,]
Closely akin to the question of the maintenance of the connection between
the Colony and Great Britain, especially when viewed as affected by the
commercial and financial condition of the former, was the question of
throwing upon it the expense of defending itself; a problem which was then
only beginning to attract the attention of liberal statesmen. For though it
may be true that the practice of defending the Colonies with the troops and
at the cost of the mother-country was an innovation upon the earlier
Colonial system, introduced at the time of the great war, it is not the
less certain that to the generation of colonists that had grown up since
that time the abandonment of it had all the effect of novelty. It was a
question on which, as affecting Canada, Lord Elgin was in a peculiar degree
'between two fires;' exposed to pressure at once from the Government at
home and from his own Ministers, and seeing much to agree with in the views
of both.
[Sidenote: against internal disorder;]
In the first place, as regards the preservation of order within the
province, he thought it clear that, as a general rule, the cost of this
should fall on the Colony itself wherever it enjoyed self-government; but
there were peculiar circumstances in Canada which made him hesitate to
apply the doctrine unreservedly there. Owing to the contiguity of the
United States, the abettors of any mischief in the Colony might count on
help constantly at hand, not indeed from the Government of the Union, which
never acted disloyally,[6] but from the Unruly spirits that were apt to
infest the borders; and it seemed to him at least doubtful, whether both
justice and policy did not require that Great Britain should afford to the
supporters of order some material aid to counterbalance this. Again, the
peculiar social and political state of Lower Canada, arising mainly from
the conditions under which it had passed into the hands of England, and
from the manner in which England had fulfilled those conditions, created
special difficulties as to the maintenance of internal quiet. On the one
hand England's respect for treaty obligations had induced her to resist all
attempts to break down by fraud or violence those rights and usages of the
French population, which had tended to keep alive among them feelings of
distinctive nationality; while on the other hand the effect of the working
of the old system of colonial administration had been to confer upon
British or American settlers a disproportionate share in the government of
the province. It followed that the French-Canadian majority and the Anglo-
Saxon minority were dwelling side by side in that section of the Colony
without, to any sensible extent, intermingling, and under conditions of
equilibrium which could never have been established but for the presence on
the same scene of a directing and overruling power. In this state of
things, while confidently hoping that an impartial adherence to the
principles of constitutional government would by degrees obliterate all
national distinctions, he saw reason to fear that the sudden withdrawal of
Britain's moderating control, whether as the result of separation or of a
change of Imperial policy, would be followed at no distant period by a
serious collision between the races.
[Sidenote: against foreign attack.]
Similarly, as regards defence against foreign attack, while agreeing that a
self-governing colony should be self-dependent, Lord Elgin felt that the
peculiar position of Canada, having no foreign attack to apprehend except
hi quarrels of England's making, made her case somewhat exceptional. And
any wholesale withdrawal of British troops he strongly deprecated, as
likely to imperil her connection with the mother-country, if it took place
suddenly, before the old notion--the 'axiom affirmed again and again by
Secretaries of State and Governors, that England was bound to pay all
expenses connected with the defence of the Colony'--had lost its hold on
men's minds, and a feeling of the responsibilities attaching to self-
government had had time to grow up.
His first letter on the subject is to Lord Grey, written so early as April
26,1848:--
The question which you raise in your last letter respecting the
military defence of Canada is a large one, and, before irrevocable
steps be taken, it may be well to look at it on all sides.
The first consideration which offers itself in connection with this
subject is this, 'Why does Canada require to be defended, and against
whom?' A very large number of persons in this community believe that
there is only one power from which they have anything to dread, and
that this power would be converted into the fastest friend, bone of
their bone, and flesh of their flesh, if the connection with Great
Britain were abandoned.
In this respect the position of Canada is peculiar. When you say to
any other colony 'England declines to be longer at the expense of
protecting you,' you at once reveal to it the extent of its dependence
and the value of Imperial support. But it is not so here. Withdraw
your protection from Canada, and she has it in her power to obtain the
security against aggression enjoyed by Michigan or Maine: about as
good security, I must allow, as any which is to be obtained at the
present time.
But you may observe in reply to this, 'You cannot get the security
which Michigan and Maine enjoy for nothing; you must purchase it by
the surrender of your custom houses and public lands, the proceeds of
which will be diverted from their present uses and applied to others,
at the discretion of a body in which you will have comparatively
little to say.' The argument is a powerful one, so long as England
consents to bear the cost of the defence of the Colony, but its force
is much lessened when the inhabitants are told that they must look to
their own safety, because the mother-country can no longer afford to
take care of them.
On the other hand very weighty reasons may be adduced in favour of the
policy of requiring the province to bear some portion at least of the
charge of its own protection. The adoption of free-trade, although its
advocates must believe that it tends to make the Colonies in point of
fact less chargeable than heretofore, will doubtless render the
English people more than ever jealous of expenditure incurred on their
behalf. I am, moreover, of opinion, that the system of relieving the
colonists altogether from the duty of self-defence is attended with
injurious effects upon themselves. It checks the growth of national
and manly morals. Men seldom think anything worth preserving for which
they are never asked to make a sacrifice.
My view, therefore, would be that it is desirable that a movement in
the direction which you Lave indicated should take place, but that it
ought to be made with much caution.
The present is not a favourable moment for experiments. British
statesmen, even Secretaries of State, have got into the habit lately
of talking of the maintenance of the connection between Great Britain
and Canada with so much indifference, that a change of system in
respect of military defence incautiously carried out, might be
presumed by many to argue, on the part of the mother-country, a
disposition to prepare the way for separation. Add to this, that you
effected, only a few years ago, a union between the Upper and Lower
Provinces by arbitrary means, and for objects the avowal of which has
profoundly irritated the French population; that still more recently
you have deprived Canada of her principal advantages in the British
markets; that France and Ireland are in flames, and that nearly half
of the population of this Colony are French, nearly half of the
remainder Irish.
That Canada felt no need of bulwarks except against England's foes was a
point on which he constantly insisted. On one occasion he wrote:--
Only one absurdity can be greater, pardon me for saying so, than the
absurdity of supposing that the British Parliament will pay £200,000
for Canadian fortifications; it is the absurdity of supposing that
Canadians will pay it themselves.
£200,000 for defences! and against whom? against the Americans. And
who are the Americans? Your own kindred, a flourishing swaggering
people, who are ready to make room for you at their own table, to give
you a share of all they possess, of all their prosperity, and to
guarantee you in all time to come against the risk of invasion, or the
need of defences, if you will but speak the word!
[Sidenote: Recommends gradual reduction of forces.]
On the whole he was of opinion that the Government should quietly, and
_sans phrase_, remove their troops altogether from some points, reduce
them in others, and 'aim at the eventual substitution of a Major-General's
command for that of a Lieutenant-General in Canada; but that nothing should
be done hastily or _per saltum_, so as to alarm the Colonists with the
idea that some new and strange principle was going to be applied to them.'
You may if you please (he wrote) largely reduce the staff, and more
moderately the men, leaving the remainder in the best barracks. I
think you may do this without, in any material degree, increasing the
tendency towards annexation; provided always that you make no noise
about it.... But, I repeat it, you must not, unless you wish to drive
the Colony away from you, impose new burdens upon the Colonists at
this time.[7]
The course thus sketched out he himself steadily pursued; and his last
letters on the subject, written early in 1853 to the Duke of Newcastle, who
had recently become Secretary for the Colonies, were occupied in
recommending a continuance of the same quietly progressive policy:
When I came here we had a Commander-in-Chief and two Major-Generals.
We have now only one General on the Station, and the staff has
undergone proportional diminution. If further reductions are to be
made, let them be effected in the same quiet way without parade or the
ostentatious adoption of new principles as applicable to the defence
of colonies which are exposed, as Canada is by reason of their
connection with Great Britain, to the hazard of assaults from
organised powers.
Continue then, if you will pardon me for so freely tendering advice,
to apply in the administration of our local affairs the principles of
Constitutional Government frankly and fairly. Do not ask England to
make unreasonable sacrifices for the Colonists, but such sacrifices as
are reasonable, on the hypothesis that the Colony is an exposed part
of the empire. Induce her if you can to make them generously and
without appearing to grudge them. Let it be inferred from your
language that there is in your opinion nothing in the nature of things
to prevent the tie which connects the Mother-country and the Colony
from being as enduring as that which unites the different States of
the Union, and nothing in the nature of our very elastic institutions
to prevent them from expanding so as to permit the free and healthy
development of social, political, and national life in these young
communities. By administering colonial affaire in this spirit you will
find, I believe, even when you least profess to seek it, the true
secret of the cheap defence of nations. If these communities are only
truly attached to the connection and satisfied of its permanence (and,
as respects the latter point, opinions here will be much influenced by
the tone of statesmen at home), elements of self-defence, not moral
elements only but material elements likewise, will spring up within
them spontaneously as the product of movements from within, not of
pressure from without. Two millions of people, in a northern latitude,
can do a good deal in the way of helping themselves when their hearts
are in the right place.
[1] Colonial Policy, i. 232.
[2] 'United Empire Loyalists,' i.e. descendants of the original Loyalists
of the American War.
[3] Despatch of the Earl of Elgin, Dec. 18, 1854.
[4] Compare _Junius_:--'Unfortunately for his country, Mr. Grenville
was at any rate to be distressed, because he was Minister: and Mr.
Pitt and Lord Camden were to be the patrons of America, because they
were in opposition. Their declaration gave spirit and argument to the
Colonies; and while, perhaps, they meant no more than the ruin of a
Minister, they in effect divided one half of the empire from the
other.'
[5] 'Perhaps I may see reason after a little more experience here to modify
my opinion on these points. If I were to tell you what I now think of
the relative amount of influence which I exercised over the march, of
affairs in Canada, where I governed on strictly constitutional
principles, and with a free Parliament, as compared with that which
the Governor-General wields in India _when at peace_, you would
accuse me of paradox.'--_Letter to Sir C. Wood, December 9,1862._
[6] Vide infra, p. 159.
[7] In entire accordance with this view, Be recommended that Great Britain
should take upon herself the payment of the Governor's salary, 'with a
view to future contingencies, and to calls which at a period more or
less remote we may have to make on the loyalty and patriotism of
Canadians.'