Lower deck 30 long 32-pounders.
Middle deck 30 long 24-pounders.
Main deck 32 long 12-pounders.
Upper deck 12 short 12-pounders.
104 Guns.
In 1793 she had four 32-pr. carronades substituted on upper deck, and
six 18-pr. carronades added on the poop, making her total number of
guns at this time 110. The six last were subsequently removed, as at
Trafalgar she had no guns on the poop. In 1803, two 68-pr. carronades
were placed on the forecastle, instead of two 32-pr., when the weight
of her broadside fired from 52 guns was 1160 pounds. It may here be
mentioned, for the sake of comparison, that the weight of the
broadside of the _Monarch_, a modern ironclad, carrying but six
guns,[A] is 2515 lbs., or more than twice that of the "VICTORY."
[A] Not including one that only fires aft.
As it happened, in 1765 England was at peace with all the world, so
the "VICTORY" lay quietly at her moorings at Chatham for 13 years,
but in 1778, when war with France became imminent, she was
commissioned by Captain Sir J. Lindsey on 15th March, and on Admiral
Hon. Augustus Keppel being appointed to the command of the Channel
Fleet he selected her as his flagship, and she was sent round to
Portsmouth, where, on May 16th, she hoisted his flag. On the 7th June
Keppel sailed from St. Helen's, with 21 sail of the line, 3 frigates,
and 3 sloops, having Sir Robert Harland and Sir Hugh Palliser as his
Vice-Admirals. His position was a peculiar and delicate one, as war
was not yet declared, though all chance of peace being maintained was
at an end, but it was known that large and rich fleets of merchantmen
from our East and West Indian possessions were on their way home, and
it was unadvisable to allow any French frigates to cruise at large and
carry intelligence of their whereabouts to Brest; besides this,
Admiral Byron with a small squadron was on the point of sailing to
reinforce our fleet on the American coast, and Keppel was expected to
cover his path. Under these circumstances, when two French frigates
hove in sight on the 17th June, Keppel determined to detain them; one,
the _Licorne_, submitted after firing one broadside, but the other,
the _Belle-Poule_, attempted to escape, was pursued, and after a long
chase, brought to action by the _Arethusa_, Captain Marshall. The two
frigates were nearly equal in force, and after one of the most
desperate contests on record, the fight terminated by the
_Belle-Poule_ drifting amongst the rocks of her own coast, leaving the
_Arethusa_ a dismantled hulk, to be found by the _Valiant_, and towed
home. This action is perpetuated in the well-known sea song, the
"Saucy Arethusa."
From the _Licorne_, Keppel learnt the unexpected and unpleasant
intelligence that the French fleet in Brest amounted to 32 sail of the
line and 12 frigates; as his own only numbered 21, prudence dictated a
return for reinforcement, and he very unwillingly turned his back on
France, anchoring at St. Helen's on the 27th of June, and detaining
another French frigate, the _Pallas_, on his way.
On the 10th of July, war being now declared, he again sailed, with 25
sail of the line, and was joined off Plymouth by 5 more, making his
total force 30 of the line and 4 frigates; with these he now proceeded
in search of the French Admiral D'Orvilliers, who, with 32 ships of
the line and many frigates, had left Brest a few days before, hearing
that the expected British merchant fleets were at hand. The object of
the French was, of course, the capture of these rich prizes, and they
naturally wished to avoid a meeting with the British men-of-war before
this was accomplished. On the other hand, the English longed for the
battle, as the shortest and safest mode of saving their convoys. So
when the two fleets sighted one another on the 23rd, the French, being
to windward, did their best to avoid an engagement, and held their
wind; on which Keppel finding he had no chance of overtaking them if
he kept his line of battle, hoisted the signal for a general chase,
and kept it flying.
Thus for four days were both fleets working to windward, during which,
two French line of battle ships were cut off, but from their superior
sailing escaped capture. Keppel hoped that D'Orvilliers would bear up
to their rescue, but the wily Frenchman knew that if he did, he would
have to give up all hopes of his prize, and preferred that his stray
vessels should trust to their heels, which as we have seen, bore them
in good stead on this occasion. However, this made the two fleets
numerically equal, and, on the forenoon of July 27th, being then some
100 miles west of Ushant, the joy in the British fleet was excessive,
when they found that a shift of wind brought them into such a position
that an engagement was inevitable. The French still tried to evade the
fight, and put about on the other tack, bringing the heads of the two
lines pointed in nearly opposite directions, and in this way the
British van, commanded by Sir R. Harland, came in action with the
French centre, and standing on until close to their line, ran along it
to leeward. The rest of the fleet followed, taking their positions in
the line as quickly as they could, the "VICTORY" being in about the
centre.
It will be seen by this, that the fleets, after once meeting, were
parting each moment, and at the end of about two hours, their
respective rears were clear of one another. Keppel then did his best
to renew the battle, but from the French practice of aiming at the
spars, his ships were so crippled that the "VICTORY," and some four
others, were alone able to wear after the enemy. Under these
circumstances, and hoping to bring the enemy to action again next day,
as they also were much scattered and disabled, the English Admiral got
his ships together and repaired damages. Unfortunately, the wind came
fair for Brest in the night, and the French, having succeeded in
concealing their movements, by stationing their frigates to show
misleading lights, ran for, and gained that port. Their mast heads
only were visible in the morning, and Keppel, after chasing for two
hours, found it hopeless and gave up the pursuit.
Thus, for want of the manoeuvre of "breaking the line," which Rodney,
under precisely similar circumstances, so successfully practised four
years later, this engagement had no results beyond that of saving the
convoys, one of which passed the scene of action the very next day.
The "VICTORY" had, at one time, six enemy's ships on her, and was
much cut up in hull and rigging; her loss was 11 killed and 24
wounded, being the largest number rendered _hors de combat_ in any one
ship of the British fleet, save one, the _Formidable_. The total loss
was 113 killed and 373 wounded. The French loss was never correctly
ascertained, but, as it was the English custom to fire at the hulls,
it was probably much more severe. Keppel returned to port, and after
refitting, again sailed from Plymouth on the 23rd August, but never
again met the enemy, and eventually arrived at Portsmouth on the 28th
of October.
This is the history of a ship, and not of the times, so we have
strictly nothing to do with subsequent events that arose out of this
engagement; but, as they created great excitement, perhaps a short
account of the sequel may not be altogether out of place. At this
period of our history, the British public expected some tangible
proofs of our naval superiority whenever our fleets met an equal
enemy, in the shape of ships captured or destroyed; and the indecisive
results of the action of the 27th July, gave rise to a multitude of
paragraphs in the newspapers, commenting on the conduct of the
different Admirals, especially that of the Commander-in-Chief, and Sir
Hugh Palliser, and attributing blame to one or the other, as their
fancy, or rather their politics dictated: the principals themselves
(who were both members of the House of Commons, but of opposite
parties), in exculpating themselves, became involved in mutual
recriminations, and finally Sir Hugh Palliser preferred charges
against Admiral Keppel, for, in a few words not doing his best to
"burn, sink, and destroy." Suffice it to say, that a Court Martial to
try Admiral Keppel met at Portsmouth on January 7th, 1779, and sat at
the Governor's house, by special Act of Parliament, on account of the
bad health of the accused, until February 11th, when it honourably
acquitted him, and declared the charges "malicious and ill-founded."
Keppel, by his former victories and frank condescending manners, had
long rendered himself the idol of the navy and people, and the first
disappointment felt at the meagre results of his engagement had been
succeeded by a strong popular reaction in his favour, when it was
understood that he would be placed on his trial. The news of his
acquittal was received throughout the country with an extraordinary
burst of joy. On the sentence being made known, a signal gun was fired
at Portsmouth, upon which the ships at Spithead immediately cheered
and saluted, and a fleet of Indiamen, lying at the Mother Bank, fired
19 vollies. Nor were they behind hand on shore in manifesting their
delight; the bells of Portsmouth church rang for the day, the late
prisoner was escorted from the court by a vast crowd, attended by some
of the most illustrious in the land; and such was his popularity, that
not only Portsmouth, but other towns were illuminated, and the
inhabitants rejoiced in the most frantic way, as if for a great
national deliverance.
Admiral Keppel was requested to retain the command of the fleet, but
refused, and was succeeded by Sir Charles Hardy, who hoisted his flag
in the "VICTORY," on the 19th March, 1779. Sir Charles found himself
with 37 ships of the line, which seems a large force, but the accounts
of the day state that a number of them were very badly manned; however
that may be, after sailing on June 16th, he was cruising off Ushant on
August 20th, when intelligence reached him that the French and Spanish
fleets had effected a junction at Cadiz, and were then off Plymouth;
he learnt also that they consisted of 67 sail of the line, besides
more than 30 frigates, and smaller vessels. Sir Charles made sail
after them, and sighted them on 1st September, off Scilly, when
finding that his information as to their force was correct, and
reflecting that the safety of the country would in a great measure
depend on him should the enemy attempt a landing, he retired to
Spithead. This is, we believe, the only time that the "VICTORY" was
ever forced to show her stern to an enemy.
The combined fleets, after making a great show, and indulging in a
parade off Plymouth, quitted the Channel without attempting any
enterprise. The British Admiral cruised till the end of the year, when
the "VICTORY" returned to Portsmouth with her division, and, being
placed in dock, was coppered for the first time. In the spring, whilst
preparing to take the sea again, Sir C. Hardy was seized with an
apoplectic fit, and died on 14th May, 1780.
Admiral Geary then hoisted his flag in the "VICTORY," on 24th May,
on succeeding to the command of the Channel fleet, and sailed early in
June, with 29 line-of-battle ships, 14 of them three-deckers. He
stationed himself off Brest, which he watched for three months, his
object being to prevent the French from getting out, and joining the
Spaniards fitting in Cadiz; when, having over 2500 sick on board his
fleet, he returned to Spithead on the 18th August. He captured a
valuable convoy of merchantmen during his cruise, but did not have a
chance of measuring his strength with the enemy. Feeling his health
failing, Admiral Geary resigned his command, and the "VICTORY"
struck his flag on the 28th August.
Vice-Admiral Darby, who was on board the _Britannia_, then took
command of the Channel fleet, and the "VICTORY" flew the flag of
Rear-Admiral Drake, the 3rd in seniority, but only for one cruise, as
being afflicted with severe attacks of gout, this officer resigned his
post on 29th December.
The "VICTORY" was next destined to be the flagship of a squadron
fitting for service in the North Sea, under Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker,
who hoisted his flag in her on March 20th, 1781, at Portsmouth. On May
20th, she sailed for the Downs, with five other ships; but a few days
after her arrival at that anchorage, Admiral Parker shifted his flag
to the _Fortitude_, a 74, as being better adapted for cruising in the
narrow seas to which he was bound, and the "VICTORY," returning to
Spithead, hoisted the broad pendant of Commodore Elliott, and bore it
for one cruise with the fleet, in which nothing of importance took
place.
In September of the same year, Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt, hoisted his
flag as fourth Admiral of Channel fleet and cruised with it for two
months; but in December he was detached in command of a squadron of 12
sail of the line and 5 frigates, to attempt to intercept M. de
Guichen, who had sailed from Brest, with a convoy, carrying troops and
laden with warlike stores intended for the Count de Grasse in the West
Indies.
Early on the 12th December, when 40 leagues west of Ushant, the look
out frigate, _Tisiphone_, Captain James Saumarez, made the signal for
an enemy's fleet, and boldly crowded all sail to close them. In a
short time, when the day was fully broke, Kempenfelt found to his
disgust, that the enemy was much stronger than he had been led to
expect, as he could count 19 line of battle ships amongst the crowd of
ships to leeward of him; he therefore decided to watch his opportunity
before attacking; and, after sailing along with, and to windward of
the French fleet for a few hours, his patience was rewarded by
perceiving that the van and centre, with most of the men-of-war, were
separated by a slight gap from the rear. He at once made a dash for
the opening, and, while with the "VICTORY" and some others, he
engaged the rear of the French centre, and prevented their returning
to the rescue, his other vessels passed to leeward and captured the
whole of that division of the convoy--15 ships--sinking four frigates
that rashly, but most gallantly, endeavoured to protect them.
As the wind was now fair for England, he formed his fleet round the
prizes, and keeping up a running fire, carried the whole of the
captured ships into Plymouth in the face of the enemy, and despite
their utmost endeavours to prevent him.
Kempenfelt then returned to Spithead with his squadron, of which he
retained command till the month of March next year, when he struck his
flag in the "VICTORY," and hoisted it on board the _Royal George_.
In this ship he was unhappily drowned on the 29th August, on her
capsizing at Spithead, when over 900 persons perished in a few
minutes. The "VICTORY" was a witness of the melancholy catastrophe,
and her boats saved many of the survivors.
Lord Howe next hoisted his flag in the "VICTORY" on assuming command
of the Channel Fleet, and cruised in the course of the summer of 1782,
but without any meetings with the enemy or incidents worth recording.
At this time, the attention of England, and indeed her enemies, was
almost entirely fixed on the defence of Gibraltar by General Elliot,
and the probable fate of that fortress, which though it had been
besieged by both sea and land for more than three years, had never
been so hardly pressed as now. Admiral Darby with a powerful fleet had
relieved the garrison from the greatest possible distress the year
before, but the supplies he then landed were now nearly exhausted, the
garrison were again commencing to feel the pangs of hunger, and it was
well known that the Spaniards had been for months making preparations
for an attack of a new kind, and on a grand scale, which they trusted
would compel the proud stronghold to lower its colours. The new
feature in the attack was the construction of ten large floating
batteries, so covered and protected as to be considered practically
invulnerable; these were armed with 154 pieces of the heaviest
ordnance, and backed up as they were by 48 French and Spanish sail of
the line, and 40,000 troops, the expected assault was enough to make
England tremble for the result. It was accordingly resolved to make a
great effort to relieve Gibraltar, and in such a manner that it
should be not only a temporary but a permanent relief and to this end
a fleet of 36 sail of the line was got together, which was to convoy a
large number of merchantmen, laden with every description of supplies,
and carrying troops to reinforce the garrison.
This fleet sailed on September 11th, with Lord Howe in the
"VICTORY," as Commander-in-Chief, and as Juniors, Vice-Admirals
Barrington and Millbank; and Rear-Admirals Alexander Hood and Hughes.
Before this succour could arrive, the grand attack on Gibraltar had
taken place. On September 9th the enemy's batteries, after a temporary
silence while preparing for the struggle, re-opened, and continued a
rain of shot and shell, with scarcely any intermission, to the 13th,
when the fleet and floating batteries being brought into their
assigned positions, joined in the bombardment.
It is not our province to relate the details of that memorable
day--enough to state that the arrangements which General Elliot's
energy had made were equal to the occasion; the invulnerable floating
batteries were set on fire, the fleet repulsed, the land attack took
no effect, and the baffled enemy, with enormous losses, withdrew from
active attack, to wait the results of the famine with which they well
knew the besieged were threatened, and which they hoped would effect
the capitulation their arms had failed to force.
But Howe was approaching, not rapidly, for foul winds detained him,
but surely, and the combined fleets lying off Algeciras were on the
_qui vive_ to prevent his landing any supplies, when on October 10th,
a terrific gale assailed them, which dismasted one, and drove five of
their number from their anchors; two of these got away into the
Mediterranean, but the other three went on shore in the bay, one of
them under our forts, where the crew were made prisoners.
The very next day, while the enemy was thus thrown into disorder, the
British fleet made its appearance in the Straits; and in the evening,
four of the transports succeeded in getting safe under the guns of
Gibraltar, without any attempt on the part of the combined fleets to
hinder them, much to the astonishment of Howe, who on learning some
days before of the failure of the grand attack, had also learnt the
avowed intention of the enemy to give him battle, and had called all
the Admirals on board the "VICTORY," and made known to them his
determination to force his way through at all hazards. The rest of the
convoy from light winds and bad management were swept past the Rock by
the current, and lost this favourable opportunity of accomplishing
their errand, a most fatal mischance, as ships once driven to the
eastward of Gibraltar, are sometimes weeks before they can gain their
anchorage on the western side. The men-of-war followed, and spent next
day in endeavouring to work up with the transport against the strong
easterly current, in hopes of getting them in, before the enemy, whose
misfortunes they had now heard of were enabled to interfere; but on
the morning of the 13th the combined fleets, having completed their
refitting, weighed, and sailed out of the bay, apparently intending to
engage the English ships, which were then but a few miles to the
eastward of Europa point, and in full sight of the garrison. Although
the gale of the 10th had reduced the enemy's force by six, yet they
still far out-numbered Howe's, as they mustered 80 sail of men-of-war,
forty-four of which were of the line, while Howe had but thirty-six
with which to protect his charge; nevertheless, he waited the advance
with impatience and confidence, having sent the merchant ships to the
Zaffarin Islands, as a rendezvous, until they should hear of the
result of the battle. But the enemy suddenly altered his course and
running past the British ships, disappeared in the dusk of evening.
Next day, neither of the fleets were to be seen from the Rock, but
some of the transports that had slipped back, arrived, filling the
garrison with joy. Thus several days passed, when on the 18th, the
remainder of the convoy, who had heard of no engagement and ventured
to leave their retreat at Zaffarin, arrived in safety, completing the
primary object of their mission. Next morning both fleets were again
in sight from Gibraltar, with an easterly wind, the British nearest.
Howe had been following the enemy, who was searching in vain for the
missing convoy; but now, hearing that his charge were all safely at
anchor, and not wishing to fight in the narrow space of the Straits,
the British Admiral, after landing a further supply of powder,
collected from his ships as he passed, under sail for the open sea,
and having gained it, awaited a second time the enemy's attack.
The combined fleet, which had been reinforced by the junction of the
two ships that had been driven from Algeciras were thus to windward,
and had the entire option of time and distance in their hands; they
chose to advance very leisurely, and to keep at a great distance,
firing apparently at the spars of the British ships, and never giving
them the opportunity of getting into close action. After continuing
this distant cannonade for some hours, the enemy again hauled off,
having inflicted a loss of 68 killed, and 280 wounded on the English.
The "VICTORY" herself did not lose a man, or fire a single shot, and
the other ships only returned the fire very occasionally. Howe was
much blamed for not making greater exertions to engage the enemy, but
it is easier to talk of getting a fleet to windward than to do it, and
he does not seem to have had it in his power to do more than he did.
The morning after this skirmish, the enemy being nowhere to be seen,
Howe, according to orders, broke up his fleet in detachments to
reinforce various stations, and returned home himself in the
"VICTORY" to Portsmouth, which he reached on November 10th.
Preliminaries of peace were already at this time being discussed, and
were signed on 20th January following, and "VICTORY" was paid off at
Portsmouth on February 27th, after a commission of nearly five years,
during which she had established the character of being the best
sailing three-decker ever launched. This character she ever after
maintained, and it led to her being almost invariably chosen as
flagship, by every officer who had the chance of so doing.
On preparations being made in June 1790, in expectation of war with
Spain, the "VICTORY" was again commissioned. Lord Howe at first had
his flag in her, but when the _Queen Charlotte_ was ready, he went to
that ship, and Lord Hood succeeded him in the "VICTORY." She
remained at the North ready for service throughout that year, and part
of the next, when Hood was appointed to command the Northern Fleet,
fitting out in case our friendly relations with Russia, then trembling
in the balance, could not be maintained; but the difficulty passed
away, and in the summer of 1791 she was paid off and returned into
ordinary.
But in February, 1793, when the French Republic had sealed its former
acts of lawlessness by the execution of the King, Louis XVI, and had
further cut itself off from civilization by declaring war against the
world, or against such parts of the world as it was not already
fighting with, that war which is known in our annals as the "War with
the Republic," commenced in earnest.
England's fleets were at once brought forward, and the "VICTORY" was
again manned as the flagship of Lord Hood, who was now appointed
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. He hoisted his flag at
Portsmouth on the evening of the 6th of May, and his Lordship sailed
on the 22nd of the same month, accompanied by 6 two-deckers and 5
frigates, which composed the last detachment of the fleet he was to
command; 14 other line-of-battle ships and some frigates having
preceded him, under Vice-Admirals Hotham and Cosby, and Rear-Admirals
Goodall and Gell.
On the 24th a junction was effected with Admiral Hotham's divisions,
and after waiting off Scilly a fortnight for the passing of a convoy,
Hood bore away for Gibraltar with 11 sail of the line.
The first object of importance in the Mediterranean was the reduction
of Toulon if possible. In that port, the great Southern French
Arsenal, were known to be upwards of 30 sail of the line, 17 of them
ready for sea, under the orders of Admiral Trogoff, but as that
officer was a staunch monarchist, he was not expected to do anything
that would further the cause of republicanism, and the existence of a
strong royalist party in the south of France, favoured the supposition
that instead of resisting the British, the Toulonese would receive
them with open arms, as their only chance of protection from that
republic they so thoroughly hated and feared.
Such being the posture of affairs, Hood hurried out to his station,
watering his ships at Cadiz, (for Spain was now our ally against the
common enemy) and Gibraltar. From the latter place the fleet sailed,
on June 27th, and on the 7th July fell in with a Spanish fleet of 24
sail whose Admiral sent a message to Lord Hood, to say that he had
1900 men sick and was going into Carthagena, and, said the Captain of
the frigate "no wonder, for we have been 60 days at sea." This speech
did not raise their new allies in the estimation of the British, who
laughed at such a notion, and left the Spaniards to follow to Toulon,
which was sighted on the 19th July, and a flag of truce was sent in to
propose an exchange of prisoners. To this the enemy would not accede,
but they were now acquainted with the presence of Lord Hood's fleet
off the port, and those causes of dissension we have mentioned began
to operate, with the most important final results.
Lord Hood cruised for a fortnight in sight of Toulon, then sailed for
Nice to show himself there, and on his return on 20th August, heard
that proposals were being made in Toulon to put themselves under his
protection. On the 23rd, Commissioners came on board the "VICTORY"
from Marseilles with full powers to treat for peace, offering a
conditional surrender of Toulon and all the shipping, declaring a
monarchical government the leading object of their negotiation, and
praying for speedy help against the armies of the convention that were
at that moment approaching.
Our space will not permit a full account of the proceedings at this
time, and we must satisfy ourselves by stating that Toulon was taken
possession of on the 27th August, without a blow, despite the
threatened opposition of Admiral St. Julien, the second in command,
who was thorough republican; the Spanish fleet hove in sight the same
day, and Toulon was soon occupied by the combined forces, and vigorous
steps taken to keep possession of our "extraordinary acquisition," as
Nelson in one of his letters calls it. But the enemy were at hand,
mustering stronger and stronger every day, and by November, General
Dugommier was besieging the town with 40,000 men, while the defenders,
who only mustered 16,000, were of different nationalities and had to
man a line 15 miles in length. On December 16th a position on the
heights commanding Toulon was carried by the besiegers, and a council
of war, hastily summoned, determined to evacuate the town, carry off
as many ships as possible, and burn the rest. The evacuation was
carried out successfully, the troops and seamen were all embarked, and
15,000 of the inhabitants took refuge from the rage of their
countrymen on board the fleets. But the rest of the programme was not
so completely performed; the Spaniards had charged themselves with the
destruction of the ships in the inner harbour, but either by
carelessness or treachery, they very imperfectly performed their task.
They did _not_ fire the ships of war but _did_ set alight to the
powder vessels which it was arranged should be scuttled; these blew
up, nearly destroying Captain Sidney Smith, who was burning the ships
in the outer mole; he gallantly attempted to repair the omission, but
was repulsed by the fire of the republicans who were already in the
town, and had to retire, leaving the work but half done. Of 58 ships
in the port when Lord Hood arrived, 14 were destroyed, 19 carried off,
and 25 left to the French.
In all these operations the men of the "VICTORY," if not the ship
herself, bore an active part, as they were landed, and helped to man
the batteries with the other ship's companies, and suffered great
losses in the continual bombardment to which they were exposed. On one
occasion, indeed, the ship was like to have become the heroine of an
adventure which might have ended her days, for, on October 23rd, in
one of the disputes, which, as might be expected, were not unfrequent
between our quondam enemies the Spaniards and ourselves, Don Juan de
Langara, the Spanish Admiral, placed three of his three-deckers round
the "VICTORY," as she lay in the outer road of Toulon, as a "gentle
moral persuasion" on behalf of his demands. As the English fleet at
that time was reduced by the absence of detachments to 10 sails, and
their crews were weakened by the landing parties, the Spanish Admiral
with his 17 sail, could have destroyed our ships, had he dared to
carry matters so far; but Lord Hood was firm, and the Spanish ships
resumed their former positions without any further demonstrations.
The British fleet now withdrew to Hyères, where they lay and
revictualled; and on the 24th of January, 1794, thinking that
something might yet be done to assist the royalist faction in Corsica,
Lord Hood proceeded with a fleet of 60 sail, including transports, for
the Bay of Fiorenzo. While on the passage, a furious gale arose which
dispersed them, and the "VICTORY," amongst others, was nearly
disabled, losing her mainyard and many of her sails, and was at one
time in danger of being lost. The scattered fleet put into Porto
Ferrajo on the 29th. Detachments of ships were sent from here, with
the troops, to attack San Fiorenzo, the principal port of Corsica; and
on the 19th February, after standing a bombardment of eleven days,
this town capitulated. By this time the "VICTORY" herself had
arrived.
Lord Hood then tried to persuade General Dundas, who commanded the
troops, of the practicability of taking Bastia, the capital of the
island; but that officer differed, and not only refused to take any
part in the attempt, but would not even lend a mortar or gun, or any
stores for the service, so that Hood had actually to send to Naples
for these most necessary articles for a siege; for, probably believing
that the energy of Nelson, then Captain of the _Agamemnon_, who had
borne a most prominent part in these previous undertakings, was
sufficient to carry anything through with success, the Admiral
determined to attempt it alone with his sailors, and 1000 men of
different regiments who were embarked in the ship as marines. He
cruised in the "VICTORY" for some days, before Bastia, and then
returned to San Fiorenzo, leaving everything to the direction of
Nelson, who worked as he always did, untiringly. On April 4th Hood
again went round and assisted with his men, etc., in raising the shore
batteries; and on the 11th, when all was ready, a boat from the
"VICTORY" went in to demand the capitulation of the town. This was
refused with scorn, by the brave Frenchman, St. Michel, who replied,
that he "had red-hot shot for our ships, and bayonets for our men;"
the "VICTORY," on receiving this reply, hoisted a red flag, the
preconcerted signal, and immediately the batteries opened. The town
replied, and for some weeks the siege went on with varying success.
During this period General D'Aubant, who had succeeded General Dundas,
would ride over with his staff from San Fiorenzo, a distance of only
twelve miles, and watch the operations, his own men remaining inactive
the while, and it was his extraordinary conduct that urged the seamen
to exertions of which they might otherwise have been incapable. The
fire of the besiegers grew hotter and hotter; new batteries were
erected, and guns mounted on heights deemed insurmountable, and on
19th May, their efforts were rewarded by a boat from the town coming
on board the "VICTORY," with a proposal of surrender.
The preliminaries were speedily arranged, and on the 22nd the town
and two frigates were given up. "When I reflect on what we have
achieved," says Nelson in a letter to his wife, "I am all
astonishment. I always was of opinion, have ever acted up to it, and
never have had any reason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal
to three Frenchmen."
Calvi, the other principal town in Corsica, was now looked upon as a
desirable acquisition, but before anything could be done, Hood
received intelligence that the French fleet had left Toulon, and
immediately sailed in pursuit. He met Admiral Hotham's squadron next
day, and with 13 sail of the line, sighted the Frenchmen on June 10th.
The enemy were chased for two days, but before they could be overtaken
they escaped into Gourjean Bay, where it was found impossible to
attack them, and Lord Hood returned with the "VICTORY" and three
other ships to Martello Bay, leaving Vice-Admiral Hotham, with the
remainder, to watch the French, which we may remark, he did for five
months without success.
Nelson had been sent back to Bastia with his ship, as soon as the
inferiority of the enemy's fleet had been ascertained, and as General
Stuart, who had arrived with a reinforcement, and was now in command
of the troops, was a very different man to either of his successors,
and as anxious as Nelson himself to lose no time in attacking Calvi,
the _Agamemnon_ and transports went at once from Bastia to a small bay
about 3 miles from Calvi, where they arrived on June 19th, and
proceeded to land. On the same day the "VICTORY" and _Britannia_
anchored in Martello Bay, and after sending parties of men by land to
join Stuart and Nelson, they came round to Calvi on the 27th, with all
the munitions of war they could muster, and lay off and on during the
siege.
The "VICTORY" landed 7 of her own lower deck guns for the batteries,
as well as some guns she had from the _Commerce de Marseilles_, and
sent a strong party of seamen to assist, but was not able to get into
action herself from the strength of the sea defences of the town. The
seamen from _Agamemnon_, "VICTORY," and transports, guided and
incited by Nelson's indomitable energy, again performed prodigies in
the way of work; they once more dragged guns up to positions
considered by the troops unattainable, made the batteries, and fought
them, and gained the warm praise and thanks of General Stuart, for the
valuable assistance they afforded.
The town surrendered on August 10th, after enduring a siege of 51
days. In these operations, several officers and men of the "VICTORY"
were killed and wounded.
Nelson himself was nearly slain, but got off with the loss of an eye.
His wound was never reported, and he only casually mentioned that he
had received a slight hurt which laid him up one day. All this time,
Lord Hood, on whose health the anxious work at Toulon had told
considerably, remained on board the "VICTORY" and sent supplies to
the shore parties when required. The ship was once blown off by a
gale, but resumed her position after an absence of a week.
The "VICTORY" next proceeded to Genoa, and in the first week of
November, she left for England, taking Lord Hood with her, his health
not being able to stand the fatigues of the command any longer. She
arrived at Portsmouth in December, and Lord Hood went on leave, but
rehoisted his flag on the 14th April following, after the ship had had
a thorough refit.
On May 1st, 1795, the "VICTORY" was again a spectator of the
destruction of a sister first rate, the _Boyne_ of 98 guns, which
caught fire and blew up at Spithead, where remnants of her remain to
this day off Southsea Castle, marked by a green buoy.
On 2nd of May, as Lord Hood was on the point of leaving to resume his
command, he was ordered to strike his flag, and "VICTORY" sailed out
on 24th May, as a private ship,[B] with Rear-Admiral Man, who was
taking a reinforcement out to Admiral Hotham, then confirmed
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Man joined Hotham's fleet off
Minorca on June 14th, and on 8th July, on the fleet weighing from San
Fiorenzo Bay, to pursue the enemy, he shifted his flag to the
"VICTORY."
[B] "A private ship" is a man-of-war that does not have an
Admiral on board.
The French fleet of 17 sail, under Admiral Martin, were sighted off
Hyères at daylight on July 13th, and the signal for a general chase
was thrown out by the _Britannia_, Admiral Hotham's flagship.
The "VICTORY" was always celebrated for her good sailing qualities,
and on this occasion they shone out particularly conspicuous, for, at
half-past noon, she, with the _Culloden_ and _Cumberland_, came within
range of the rearmost of the enemy, while the rest of their companions
were astern at distances ranging from 1 to 9 miles, the
Commander-in-Chief being one of the farthest, for the _Britannia_ was
as bad a sailer as the "VICTORY" was a good one. They opened fire,
but at this moment the wind unfortunately failed, and they were unable
to get into close action, though at the end of an hour the _Alcide_, a
seventy-four, struck. They still hoped to make more prizes, but had by
four o'clock drifted so near the shore, that the signal to discontinue
the action was made, and the French escaped through the shoals, the
passages between which they were familiar with, into Fréjus Bay.
The _Alcide_, which had made a most gallant defence, unluckily took
fire shortly after striking, and blew up with the loss of all her
crew, save 200. In the skirmish, the "VICTORY" was the greatest
sufferer, having her rigging much cut, and all her lower masts badly
wounded. She lost 5 killed (2 officers), and 16 wounded.
Man retained his flag in her until October, when he shifted to the
_Windsor Castle_, and was succeeded by Vice-Admiral Robert Linzee, who
flew his flag in the "VICTORY" for a month only. During this period
she was cruising with a fleet, watching Toulon, and going from port to
port in that vicinity, until the 3rd of December, 1795, when being at
San Fiorenzo in Corsica, Sir John Jervis, who had arrived from England
a few days before, hoisted his flag in her as Commander-in-Chief, and
at once proceeded off Toulon. He remained cruising between that port
and Minorca, with a fleet of about 13 sail, until the autumn of 1796,
but up to this time no incidents took place that are worth recording.
Spain had made a peace with France in 1794; and now in August 1796, an
alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the two
powers. This put Sir John Jervis in a very critical position, as the
united French and Spanish fleets amounted to 38 ships of the line,
while Sir John, who was at Martello Bay, had but 15. It was determined
accordingly, to evacuate Corsica, as the power of the French republic,
and the deeds of their countryman, Buonaparte, were awaking feelings
in the inhabitants that were not amicable to England. This was
completed on the 2nd November, and Sir John and all his fleet sailed
from Corsica, and escorted the transports to Gibraltar, which was
reached on December 11th. On the 16th he went on to Lisbon to meet
some expected reinforcements from home.
Here he remained until the 18th January, when he sailed with 10 ships
only; but on February 6th 5 more joined from England, when his force
consisted of the following line-of-battle ships, with which he
cruised, awaiting news of the enemy.
{ Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B.
110 "VICTORY" { Captain Robert Calder.
{ Captain George Grey.
100 _Britannia_ { Vice-Admiral Charles Thompson.
{ Captain Thomas Foley.
{ _Barfleur_ { Vice-Admiral Hon. W. Waldegrave.
{ { Captain James R. Dacres.
{
98 { _Prince George_ { Rear-Admiral William Parker.
{ { Captain John Irwin.
{
{ _Blenheim_ Captain Thomas L. Frederick.