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THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING
THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING:
_SECOND EDITION_.
TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED,
A BRIEF SYSTEM OF
COMMON LIGHT INFANTRY DRILL;
A METHOD OF PRACTICE FOR
THE SPEEDY ACQUIREMENT OF PROFICIENCY IN THE USE OF THE RIFLE;
AND SHORT OBSERVATIONS ON SERVICEABLE APPOINTMENTS AND DRESS.
BY
COLONEL G. GAWLER, K.H.
_Late of the 52nd Light Infantry._
LONDON:
PARKER, FURNIVALL, AND PARKER,
MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL.
1852
LONDON:
SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS,
CHANDOS STREET.
TO
SIR JOHN MACDONALD, K.C.B.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO THE FORCES,
THE FOLLOWING REMARKS,
IN REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE
COMMITTED TO HIS ESPECIAL SUPERINTENDENCE,
ARE, BY PERMISSION,
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,
BY HIS VERY OBEDIENT
AND FAITHFUL SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.
_August, 1837._
CONTENTS.
I. The Essentials of Good 13
Skirmishing
II. A system of Common Light 35
Infantry Drill, adapted to the
Long Range Rifle
III. A Method of Practice for 51
the Speedy Acquirement of
Proficiency in the Use of the
Rifle
IV. Short Observations on 59
Dress and Appointments
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
Under the immense increase which is now taking place in the length of
range and accuracy in effect of small arms, there must, of necessity,
come an increase of the importance of skill in skirmishing. The
reconnoissances of mounted staff officers, the patrolling, skirmishing,
and menacing of charges by small bodies of cavalry, and even the action
of artillery on that very large proportion of the surface of the earth
in which vision is limited to at most one thousand yards, will be
greatly controlled by the accurate and distant infantry marksman. Nay,
even columns and lines of infantry will now only be able to repel his
power of destructive annoyance by meeting him with troops in extended
order. Of old, if he pressed too near to a closed body of infantry, an
impatient volley might sweep him and his comrades into annihilation, but
now, ensconced in his distant cover, he may “beard the lion in his den,”
a battalion of infantry in position, with something like impunity.
With this distant power of the individual skirmisher, however, there
stand connected increased difficulties of combination with his
surrounding and supporting comrades. Such general unity of action is
most important at times for reasonable security, and always for the
production of general and total effects.
These advantages must depend, more than ever, upon well-impressed
individual acquaintance with the essential principles of good
skirmishing.
Under these considerations the following pages, which were received at
the time of their first publication with public[1] and private
testimonials of approbation, are reprinted, with some corrections and
additions to make them suitable to the present standard of military
efficiency, and with remarks which may be useful, at this period, upon
light infantry drill, rifle practice, dress, and appointments.
Footnote 1:
Blackwood’s Magazine, Oct. 1837, page 521; United Service Journal,
Nov. 1837, page 415; Naval and Military Gazette, 1837; &c., &c., &c.
_February, 1852._
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
Some high continental military authorities have of late years proclaimed
that British soldiers are incapable, or next to incapable, of acting as
light infantry. Than this announcement there never was a clearer
illustration of the golden maxim, “Assertions are not proofs.” If our
censors had taken the trouble to search for evidence, southern and
western Europe would have told them, that in these portions of the
civilized world there have not been known, in the middle and modern
ages, light troops superior to those of Britain. In archers, the light
infantry of “the olden time,” by what nation in the world was England
surpassed? Her troops of this class, the direct forefathers of a large
proportion of our present soldiery, gained for themselves a name that
might, one would think, have sounded even to the shores of the Baltic,
which at least has rung upon every ear familiar with the tales of
Poictiers, Cressy, and Agincourt. All of these, as described by foreign
pens,[2] were won mainly by the skill and conduct of the British bowmen.
At Cressy 12,000 Genoese, then the most renowned light troops of
continental Europe, were driven like chaff before unerring cloth-yard
shafts from the tough old English yew.[3]
Had our critics inquired concerning more modern warfare, their Hessian
neighbours would have told them that in the North American revolutionary
contest, in that six years’ war of surprises, skirmishes, and
ambuscades, among unequalled woods and wildernesses, the British soldier
in himself was more than a match for the skirmisher-bred American
woodsman; and, to say the least, as alert and intelligent at the
outposts as his well-trained German fellow-combatants. The struggle,
indeed, ended unsuccessfully to Britain; but, let the blame rest where
it may, it cannot be thrown upon the British soldier; he never came
short of his duty.
In the protracted and astonishing conquest of Hindoostan, which had some
European inimical spectators, the flank companies of battalions did
three-fourths of the work; not only concentrated at the breach and
escalade, but also, when necessity required it, extended in the jungle.
And to come to those contests which offer the fairest estimate of the
British soldier as he now is, and with which all civilized military
critics may be expected to have become acquainted, the European
campaigns of the Duke of Wellington; it is not sounding an empty boast,
but a note of most sober and honest truth to say, that, than the British
light troops of his army, better never guarded a camp or fought in a
skirmish. In a fluctuating war of eight campaigns, over many hundred
miles of varying country, opposed to the bravest and most intelligent
soldiers of the continent, none were ever more constantly conquerors in
action or more successfully vigilant on outpost duty.
It is true, indeed, that the British light infantry man has a practical
system in some important particulars peculiar to himself; and in none
more so than that, under all circumstances, he continues the
well-disciplined soldier, never systematically assuming the character of
the loose, lawless, free-corps freebooter. From this last peculiarity
may have arisen the incorrect impressions of our foreign contemporaries.
We, however, glory in the difference, and affirm that stern discipline
and high soldier-like principle must form the basis of thorough military
efficiency to the full as much in the light and extended services, as in
those of a more concentrated description.
Free corps originate in long internal wars. Happily for Britain, she of
late has not been distinguished for such nurseries of irregular military
skill; but when her territories were desolated by them, there were not
wanting bodies of this description as active, intelligent, and
enterprising as any that ever graced the continent of Europe.
To assist in keeping up the remembrance of the essentials of the
practical system of the modern British light infantry man, in that
important branch of his duty, skirmishing; in order that foreigners,
whatever be their theories, may continue to receive, when necessity
requires it, practical evidence that British soldiers can act as light
infantry, is the principal object of the Author in submitting to the
army the following observations.
1837.
Footnote 2:
See “Le Nouveau Dictionnaire des Sièges et Batailles,” under these
articles.
Footnote 3:
La première ligne des Français etoit composée de douze mille archers
Génois. Meurdris et décomfits par les flèches que les archers Anglais
leur tiroient si vivement que ce sembloit neige, ils lâcherent le pied
et se renversèrent sur la seconde ligne.... Philippe, croyant qu’il y
avoit de la trahison de la part des Génois, s’ecria: Or tôt tuez cette
ribaudaille qui nous empêche la voie sans raison.—_Nouveau
Dictionnaire des Sièges et Batailles, article Crècy._
THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING.
Skirmishing is the art of fighting, with numbers insufficient to occupy,
in close order, the ground contested.
In light infantry or skirmishing drill, as in all other instruction, the
principal art is, to dwell _forcibly_ on things _really essential_;
_moderately_ on things _merely important_; and _lightly_ on things
_nearly indifferent_.
To good skirmishing there are _eight essentials_:—
1. Active Intelligence.
2. Correct Firing.
3. Daring Courage.
4. Making the best of Cover.
5. Presenting the smallest possible Marks to the Enemy’s Fire.
6. Maintaining Extension from, and Dependence on, a given File of
Direction.
7. Preserving a sufficient Readiness to resist Cavalry.
8. A judicious Employment of Supports and Reserves.
Very deficient in any of these qualifications, skirmishers cannot be of
the first order. Possessing them all in reasonable proficiency,
_skirmishers must be very good, let the character of their other
attainments and systems of drill be whatever it may_.
I.
The life and especial mark of the good skirmisher is ACTIVE
INTELLIGENCE.
In the ranks, the closer men attain to a state of unreflecting
mechanism, with nothing of mind but attention, the nearer they are to
true soldier-like perfection. Not a thought should arise, an eye-ball
turn, or a finger tremble, but in obedience, and that obedience should
be accurate and instantaneous as the word. Not so the skirmisher; within
certain limits he is his own general, and must think for himself. From
the moment that he “shakes out” from the elbows of his right and left
comrades, reflection must awake, and, in due dependence on a broad
established system, be energetically directed to gain every advantage on
the opposing foe.
The French as skirmishers excel in active intelligence. Every man
manœuvres as if the fate of the day depended upon his conceptions. Their
ability, in this particular, may spring in a great degree from the
looseness of their instruction practice of all field exercise. This,
while it is ill calculated to make steady soldiers at close order, is
well adapted to give free scope to the natural intelligence of
skirmishers.
The mechanical stiffness, formerly much seen in British light infantry,
arose, there can scarcely be a question, from the formality of our old
ordinary mode of applying the system of light infantry drill. The
automatonism, proper to the ranks, was extended to skirmishers, and they
also were taught to move only as they were wound up. The indignation of
the drill instructor was poured out, not upon men who failed in the
first-rate essentials of good skirmishing, but upon those who erred a
foot in dressing or in distance—who did not step off, halt, or fire,
precisely at the sound of the whistle or elevation of the signal
fire-lock—whose unmusical ears refused to distinguish amid the endless
variety of bugled orders—who could not run like racers, or who ran
bewildered in some of the intricate evolutions, which were supposed to
crown the very pinnacle of skirmishing perfection. Some corps did not
drill according to this erroneous method, others did not carry it to its
full extent; but, taking the army as a whole, unreflecting precision in
the details of skirmishing was its system, and to this day that system
has its votaries.
It is no small proof of the strength of natural intelligence in British
soldiers, that, when brought into actual service, they broke through the
fettered stiffness of their instruction drill, let go what was
indifferent in it, clung to that which was important, and soon rivalled
their intelligent and experienced opponents.
The true summit of perfection in skirmishing is, _the preservation of
order in disorder_ and _of system in confusion_; for the circumstances
which accompany skirmishes of necessity produce, almost always, more or
less mixture, inversion, and general irregularity. In hot contests over
large extents of intricate ground, men of different companies regiments,
brigades, and even divisions, mingle with each other. Soldiers should
therefore be drilled, _not indeed to fall into such irregularities on
principle, but to be ready for them in practice_. They should be made at
times to skirmish in inverted companies, mixed companies, and mixed
regiments—to form good skirmishing lines out of confused masses—to
concentrate from similar mixed bodies into squares to resist cavalry, or
into lines or columns for the purposes of charging or defending streets
of villages, or other defiles—to extend again rapidly, and to perform
every necessary evolution as if no mixture or irregularity had occurred.
_Such movements, when inculcated as necessary exceptions to good order,
do not unfit soldiers for more regular manœuvres; but, by the contrast,
increase order and intelligence in them._
Soldiers who have not been drilled on this principle, or who have not
acquired it by experience, are, when extended under fire, continually
liable to be transformed into unmanageable mobs. Skirmishers who
understand it, will always show a formidable front, be ready for every
changing event, and, under the worst possible circumstances, act
together in the mighty energy of mutual confidence.
Unreflecting mechanical precision is at direct variance with such
practice, active intelligence and a wise well-defined general system are
its component elements. Active intelligence, therefore, in every point
of view, is invaluable to the skirmisher; and the attention of all drill
superintendents and instructors should be unremittingly directed to
stamp it on his mind and to mix it with his practice.
II.
The soldier at close order always has, or should have, a large mark for
his fire. Nothing can be more unsteady or unsoldierlike than for a
closed body to pour a volley upon mere skirmishers: from troops
concentrated, no object but an opposing mass or line within 200 yards
should provoke a single shot.[4] The skirmisher has not this advantage,
his mark is generally small and often indistinct; besides which, the
temptation to careless aim is much greater to him, who fires away sixty
or one hundred and twenty rounds over hedge and ditch without
intermission, than to the battalion soldier, who seldom expends more
than twenty at any one time. Hence the peculiar necessity for practising
light troops to cool steady aim and accurate firing.
The immense importance of very great attention to the ball practice[5]
of this branch of the service, is too obvious to require an enforcing
observation; but it ought to be impressively remarked, that good
practical aim is not to be acquired _only_ in front of the target, _but
to the full as much_ in the every day drill firings, with or without
blank cartridge.
It is not the case that careful firing is provoked by the sight of an
enemy; on the contrary, arithmetical calculation has repeatedly proved,
to the blush of the good soldier, that under no circumstances are balls
so wildly and carelessly thrown away as in those moments when the
fortunes of empires are thrown away along with them. In action, the
greater number of the musquets are pointed _generally_ at masses of dust
and smoke, and not _precisely_ at the dark active figures which they
envelop.
For these reasons, on the drill field, instead of the loose careless
practice too common in this particular, the soldier, and especially the
skirmisher, should be unsparingly compelled to go through the motions of
aiming and firing at a precise object, as accurately as if at actual
ball practice, until the habit be engraven too deep on his mind to be
obliterated by any circumstances of confusion.
III.
Daring courage, as an acknowledged essential to the thorough soldier of
every class, it would scarcely have been necessary to have noticed in
the present enumeration, did not an opinion appear to obtain, much on
the continent and with some in Great Britain, that light troops are
required to exercise it in a less desperate degree than men at close
order.
Foreigners, when extended, often spend systematically much time in long
shots and shy fighting, and give way, as a matter of course, before
troops in weightier formations. In the British service this opinion does
not prevail; there is no good reason why it should, and it is of great
importance to the thorough efficiency of skirmishers that it should not.
The British soldier is as much a grenadier at heart, with a green tuft
in his cap skirmishing through a wood, with no close support but his
tried and trusty rear-rank man, as he is in designation, when mounting a
breach, under a black bear-skin, with ten thousand bayonets at his back.
In extended order he is just as ready, as at any other time, to fix his
bayonet and dash to close quarters, if the enemy, on tolerably equal
terms, will stand for him; and if his piquet be pressed by a heavy
attacking column, he sees no more reason than at any other time, to
surrender an inch of ground, as long as he can stand upon it. Very
remarkable instances of this kind occurred during the Peninsular war.[6]
It is well that it should be so; for if it be indeed true, as some
insinuate, that the British soldier falls somewhat below his continental
brethren in the policy of skirmishing, this important essential,
_persevering unflinching courage_, will ever, as it always has done,
make up for minor deficiencies, and carry him triumphantly through.
It is useful to observe, how much the flinching practice of foreign
light infantry has influenced, and perhaps been influenced by, their
systems of drill. The old method, which we borrowed from them, of firing
advancing by alternate ranks or files, may be practicable with long
shots and cautious movements, but is only partially applicable to the
service practice of British light infantry, who, even when close to
their enemy, count it most unsoldier-like to fire without an immediately
important purpose in view; who seldom fire at all until within two
hundred yards of their object;[7] and who, after a few quiet shots to
get within the length of their breath and to draw on the enemy’s fire,
dash at the opposing line of defence with that peculiar rush which may
be called “the skirmishers’ charge.”[8]
The present established mode of advancing firing by “single line,” is
that into which daring skirmishers always do, and of necessity always
must, fall. On the drill ground, when required, this mode may be
completed to a perfect copy of “the skirmishers’ charge,” by the sound
“double quick” at about eighty yards from the supposed enemy’s line of
defence. The whole then, still partially firing, dash on at an
accelerated pace, until, the cover gained, “the halt” is sounded, to
take breath behind it, and prepare for another forward effort.
IV.
Conduct which in some cases, under fire, is disgraceful, in others is
meritorious. The man in the ranks who shrinks away from a shell or
cannon ball, or who goes out of his commanded course to cover himself
from musquetry, has little claim to the name of a _brave_ soldier; while
he who in a trench or battery does not bow low at the cry “shot,” or
fall prostrate before a blazing shell, _or who in a skirmish neglects to
make the best of every foot of cover_, has no right, to the title of a
wise one.
The difference arises from the line of military perfection being struck,
not according to what will suit or save the individual, but by that
which will benefit the general service.
Between the duties peculiar to compact fighting and skirmishing, the
distinction should be drawn broad and deep on the drill field; because
on the battle field, it is natural on either side to be forgetful.
There are two kinds of cover—_ball proof_ cover, and _mere concealing_
cover. Ragged rocks, large trees, brick and stone walls and buildings,
stout fences and thick mud-banks, constitute generally the first class;
young plantations, gorse and underwood, hedges, abattis, slight fences
and narrow sand hills, the second.
It is for the first that the eye of the good skirmisher continually
seeks. The second, after fire completely opens, turned even to best
advantage, _is worth but little more than no cover at all_; and is worse
than no cover at all, if the men, which they are much disposed to do,
collect in groups behind it.
In this way, that very frequent out-lying piquet defence, abattis across
roads, is often more injurious to friends than to foes. Instead of being
planted, as an obstacle to the enemy, 100 yards in front of the intended
line of defence, it is but too commonly placed _on_ that line, and when
the struggle comes, is thickly occupied as a sort of rampart. On such
striking objects the enemy’s fire concentrates, every ball goes through,
and the loss behind is severe.
Skirmishers must not only seek for cover, but _make the best of it_.
Good cover loses half its advantages if stupidly occupied, and ingenuity
will often make bad cover ball-proof.
However, notwithstanding all that may be said in favour of “making the
best of cover,” it must be thoroughly remembered, that this duty, at the
moment of a close attack, is altogether secondary to those of courage
and activity.
When it comes to short distances, the quicker the affair is settled the
less will be the loss of the assailants; and the more daring the front
exhibited, the greater the probabilities of success.
At every change of situation supports should, if possible, be placed
under cover by their commanders; if exposed, as large bodies they form
most inviting marks to the enemy’s long shots. This precaution, when
opportunities offer, should not be forgotten on the drill field.[9]
V.
One man at 200 yards[10] is a very small mark. Two abreast together, a
tolerably good one; three abreast together should almost always be hit,
and four never be missed. Our opponents, therefore, in skirmishing,
cannot serve us better than by grouping together; and that which we
would wish them to do, we ourselves must carefully avoid. Skirmishers
should move in single files,[11] except in thick “concealing cover,”
when two or three together may, without exposure, increase mutual
confidence; or behind patches of “ball-proof cover,” on which small
groups may concentrate as to temporary breast-works; in either case
extending again at once when good cover ceases. Even in single files,
men loading should incessantly cover with precision their file leaders,
so as to offer marks of but one in front.
_In skirmishing, more than in any other branch of warfare, men may be
uselessly thrown away_; and therefore in this, more than in any other,
economy of life and limb should form a paramount object of attention.
On British soldiers also, perhaps more than on any others, it is
important to impress these observances; for there is in them such a
peculiarly strong national perception of that great military maxim,
“concentration is strength,” that overlooking its exceptions, they are
always powerfully impelled the hotter the fire to group the closer
together.
Nothing but deeply impressed instruction, or dearly bought experience,
can break in them the bonds of a propensity so thoroughly at variance
with good skirmishing.
VI.
In all systems of movement composed of many distinct bodies, there must
be a common centre of direction, connexion and extension, or unity of
purpose and effect must cease, and confusion, dispersion or
concentration ensue. Such a centre there is in the minutely regular
mighty moving system of the universe; and from it, down through every
degree of importance, to that in the more mob-like progress of a swarm
of bees.
_Perhaps the greatest defect in modern skirmishing is, that, in
extensive affairs, this principle of an established point of direction
is not well maintained._ However much it may be recognised in mere
theory, it is not, in instruction, explained in sufficient fulness, or
required with sufficient rigour; and from these neglects arise, in a
great degree, the inversions, mixtures, and other irregularities in
actual service before noticed.
It is most injudicious to encumber the minds of men and officers with a
multitude of intricate or non-essential recollections; but the principle
in point involves nothing of this character; it is at the same time very
simple and highly essential.
For all skirmishers of the same battalion acting together, until they
become thoroughly mixed with other corps—in all cases of movement,
excepting only those of changes of front on the principle of the wheel
on the fixed pivot, and those of taking ground to a flank obliquely or
directly; _the centre, or right centre file[12] of their own battalion
skirmishers is_ THE POINT OF DIRECTION, _unless at the time_ OTHERWISE
ESPECIALLY ORDERED.
When detachments from several battalions skirmish together, the
battalion of direction for the line in rear, is that of direction for
the skirmishers in front, unless _at the time_ otherwise ordered. If no
such battalion has been pointed out, the officer commanding the extended
line names to the officers in command of detachments the battalion
skirmishers of direction, and takes care to keep these last to their
true course and object.
Every officer in command of the skirmishers of a battalion has the
option, in responsible dependence on the maintenance of the general
alignement and proper communication, of changing his point of direction,
_by order at and for the time being_, to the flank file nearest to the
battalion skirmishers of direction, or otherwise as circumstances may
appear to require.
In all changes of front on the principle of the wheel on a fixed pivot,
that pivot is, of necessity, _during the evolution_, the file of
direction.
In taking ground to a flank obliquely or directly, the leading file
always becomes, during this movement, _and no longer, unless especially
ordered at the time_, the file of direction.
When skirmishers become mixed and unmanageable, and there is neither
time nor opportunity for re-forming them at close order on their
covering serjeants, the officer in command fixes upon _any man_ as a
point of direction, the others instantly extend away right and left
(unless at the time especially ordered to extend to either flank in
particular), without regard to their original proper places—double into
files—take up the general alignment—officers and non-commissioned
officers with alertness take charge of proper portions, and the whole
move and act upon this new centre, as if no inversion or mixture had
occurred.
Upon such simple rules, well impressed and strictly maintained, any
number of skirmishers may fight over large extents of the most intricate
ground, perfectly in hand and without confusion. Or, should
extraordinary events produce irregularity, officers in command may
easily, in an instant, under the worst circumstances, restore good
fighting order, until leisure permits a more regular formation.
In extensive skirmishes, the eyes and feelings of men retiring are
powerfully drawn towards the most apparently important points of
defence; and upon these, without direct orders, they more or less
concentrate. Assailants follow the same impulse, and direct their force
principally against these identical strongly occupied points.
Hence follow of necessity on both sides a massing into large marks for
the fire of opposing musquetry, sometimes even of artillery—great
unnecessary bloodshed in violent struggles, and a neglect on the
defensive side of ground which ought to be occupied, and on the
assailing side of points which ought to be attacked. Nothing but keeping
men in hand by the principle of well understood and well maintained
centres of direction can prevent similar evils.
Supports, in their movements, should be guided by the same general
principle as skirmishers—that is, the centre or right centre support of
each battalion should be, unless otherwise ordered, the support of
direction, except in the cases of wheeling on a fixed pivot, or of
taking ground to a flank. In the first exception, all conform to the
pivot, and in the last to the leading division, _unless at the time
otherwise ordered_. Supports, not belonging to the battalion of
direction, except in the two cases just noticed, conform under the
orders of their senior officer to the movements of those which do belong
to it, with due regard to their primary duty—_the proper support of
their own skirmishers_.
VII.
Skirmishers, by the looseness of their formation, are dangerously
exposed to charges from small parties of the enemy’s light cavalry; and
in districts destitute of continuous fences, but abounding in hollows,
isolated patches of wood, or other features convenient for concealment,
such attacks may burst forth with most confusing suddenness. Except in
ground absolutely impracticable for cavalry, skirmishers must move in
constant expectation of them.
The eye of the officer should be accustomed to recognise habitually
those frequently occurring posts of defence against cavalry, copses,
walls, hedges, ditches, &c., which are preferable to small squares; and
the minds of men should be well prepared by previous instruction _and
explanation_, to recollect, in an instant, in what their strength in
such cases consists, and to be undaunted in it.
Against great charges of cavalry, large squares are unquestionably the
safest and most efficient; but, in opposition to the small dashes which
occur in skirmishing, large squares are often impracticable, and small
ones more advisable, as being more rapidly formed and broken up.
Squares have a moral strength in proportion to the mutual acquaintance
of the men and officers who compose them. Men of the same company stand
better together than those of mixed companies, and men of the same
regiment better than those of different corps. However, as in the field
thorough mixtures do occur, and as they, if observed, are likely above
all other things to bring on charges from the enemy’s cavalry, squares
of mixed masses should, in instruction, at times be practised.
It is not necessary to describe the different modes by which, on the
drill field, men may be thrown into confusion. When this state of things
has been brought about, mixed, irregular, rallying squares can be formed
by adding the “double quick” to the ordinary sounds for squares against
cavalry.[13]
The “double quick” is required to mark the necessity for instantaneous
irregular masses, in contradistinction to the more regular squares,
_which on the drill field skirmishers should always endeavour to form,
unless at the time otherwise ordered_. It cannot be too constantly
upheld as a permanent principle that, even in skirmishing, _order is the
rule and irregularity the exception_.
On the signal “double quick” in immediate succession to the sounds
established for the formation of squares,[14] officers, exercising most
actively their intelligence, in proper numbers and at proper distances,
hold up their swords or caps, and the men rush round them into masses of
defence without any regard to company or other distinctions.
These mixed squares, as well as all others, may “commence firing”—“cease
firing”—“advance”—“retire”—“take ground to a flank,”—or “close” to any
particular square, by order, or by the simple sounds for these
movements. The “close” may be important to form a large square from
several small ones, the cavalry still hovering near.
To these mixed squares also, the word or sound to “extend” may be given.
The men then, without regard to regular places, extend away to the right
and left from each square, and double into files.
When the ground is nearly occupied, the officer in command fixes on a
point of direction, to which the whole conform.
In the event of infantry skirmishers pressing forward to harass a
square, or of cavalry endeavouring to prevent its movements by hovering
near without charging, one or two ranks from the rear face may, by
order, move briskly round by the right and left—double into files—cover
the front at a short distance, and rush round again to their places
whenever there appears a necessity for the square itself to fire.
In drill in general, and in that of light infantry in particular,
instructors confine themselves by far too closely to mere formal
directions, to the neglect of pithy practical explanations. In nothing
is this last addition more required than in reference to charges of
cavalry.
A column of horsemen, coming rapidly on with all its denseness, its
height, its dust, its shouts, and its clangour, appears to the untrained
mind as altogether irresistible. But appearances are not in themselves
realities—let cavalry to the utmost stretch of mortal might,—
“Come as the winds come when forests are rended;”
And “come as the waves come when navies are stranded;”
one thing only will be required to enable squares of infantry, like
deep-rooted rocks, to disperse these wild winds and waves, right and
left, in dust, froth, and confusion—_a well impressed knowledge of their
own strength_; accompanied as a natural consequence, by a deliberate
employment of that, _when properly used_, most destructive weapon, the
musket.[15] Nor can more blame attach to cavalry for such results, than
would apply to infantry for failing, in clear day-light, before
well-barricadoed buildings or well-scarped redoubts. Neither in similar
cases owe success, when they get it, to their own conduct or efficiency,
but to the needless panic of their enemy.
Such conclusions as to the relative strength of cavalry, are established
by a string of facts more or less evident, stretching from Ilium,
through Pharsalia, to Waterloo; and every fact is worth a thousand
opposing ingenious speculations.
VIII.
Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all
kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well
nigh all is lost.
In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not
only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of
misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the
extended line.
In _attacks_, supports are useful for filling up accidental gaps in the
front line—for prolonging its flanks or covering them obliquely or
perpendicularly—for strengthening the skirmishers at any moment that
these may find their numbers unequal to important work before them—for
relieving them when they or their ammunition become exhausted—for coming
up in close order to charge bridges, streets, villages, or other
defiles, too strongly occupied to be forced by the skirmishers, and to
serve as bases, when time allows it, for the formation of squares
against cavalry.
In _defences_, in addition to the foregoing duties reversed as to bodies
retiring, supports have the highly important responsibilities of leading
the skirmishers in the true and best line of retreat—of opening that
line in all suitable places for their convenient passage, and of taking
care that it be not intercepted by the enemy.
Reserves, particularly so called, supply the places of supports when
necessary, and go to the front for any object requiring the intervention
of a particularly strong, steady, and concentrated force.
Without express orders, supports should not move forward to occupy
accidental gaps in the extended line, except on ground so intricate, or
under circumstances so emergent, that the skirmishers themselves cannot
readily regain their lost communications.
In most movements, set unvarying sentences of command promote alertness
and prevent mistakes.
For prolonging in the same direction the flanks of the extended line—for
covering them perpendicularly or obliquely—for strengthening the
skirmishers by mixing others with them, or for relieving them; the
following set, concise orders to supports obviously present themselves:—
NO. —— SUPPORT.: PROLONG THE —— FLANK.
In the same direction as the general line understood.
DO. —— DO.: COVER THE —— FLANK,
_perpendicularly_; with moderate licence, according to the features
of the ground, understood.
DO. —— DO.: COVER OBLIQUELY THE —— FLANK.
_An obliquity of one-eighth of the circle_, with the same licence,
understood.
DO. —— DO.: STRENGTHEN NO. ——.
To prevent mistakes, the word “strengthen” to be repeated with
sufficient distinctness by the officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Support to which it is given, when they arrive near
to the skirmishers or the skirmishers near to them.
DO. —— DO.: RELIEVE NO. ——.
The word “relieve” to be repeated in like manner, for the same
reason.
With regard to strengthening the extended line by mixing its supports
with it, it may be objected that, in such cases, when there are no
reserves at hand, the great rule of never fighting without them is
rejected. It is true, the rule is violated; the party if actually
engaged is fighting at a desperate risk, but there are cases in which
desperate risks are wise and lawful ventures. These are in the not
uncommon events with skirmishers of desperate extremities; at such
moments methodical prudence is ill-masked imbecility.
On the 10th of December, 1813, some of the piquets of the light
division, in thick weather and a close country, were suddenly assailed
by the heads of heavy columns. The division in the rear was scattered in
straggling houses. One of the companies on piquet was forced back upon
another in support, near the point of junction of two important roads
leading directly into the cantonments. Both companies were instantly
extended, without any support, into a thick skirmishing line; nothing
less would have been effectual. The ground was held with little
variation for at least two hours—two heavy attacks were repulsed, every
round of ammunition was expended, the brigade immediately in the rear
allowed to pack and send off its baggage, and steadily to take up its
fighting position, and the piquets to fall back upon it without further
molestation. Similar circumstances have no doubt occurred, and may often
occur again. The great maxim alluded to therefore has its exceptions,
_and these, if carefully marked as exceptions_, may _sometimes_ with
propriety be admitted into instruction skirmishing.
To attack or defend, with concentrated supports, a bridge, the street of
a village, or other peculiarly important point, the word is simply
passed, “Supports, close on No. ——,” the support in front of, or on,
that point. Near this division of formation the officer in command
places himself; and as each severally arrives gives his
direction—“line,” “double column,” “open,” “close,” “quarter distance,”
“half distance column,” or otherwise, as may be thought necessary. The
support of formation in all cases standing fast as the basis.
To break up the formation, “Supports to your proper places, threes right
and left shoulders forward, quick march,” will speedily restore all to
common skirmishing order.
No duties of supports are more important than those in retrograde
movements, of leading their skirmishers in proper lines of retreat; and
of opening those lines sufficiently, but not more than sufficiently, for
their passage. Circumstances have actually occurred, and, in intricate
countries, are likely often to be repeated, of fine fellows, slowly
retiring before an overwhelming enemy, their whole attention absorbed
upon their front, suddenly finding further retreat intercepted by
impassable obstacles, with no alternative remaining but to surrender, or
fight their way right and left at the risk of almost utter destruction.
The principles advanced in the foregoing remarks, are not, in the main,
of a character to be limited to the details of particular movements; but
are rather to be kept continually on the mind, for the purpose of being
thrown into effect as circumstances may require. _Practical_ differs
from _formal_ skirmishing, even more by the style than by the method of
its execution.
Not one sentence, it is believed, will be found to stand in opposition
to the British established system. The few points in which they may at
first sight appear to differ from it, consist simply in an application
of principles already established to a practical extent somewhat beyond
that usually adopted. If an officer who did not act upon this extent of
application, were to succeed in the command of a corps to one who had
adopted it, neither he nor those under him would experience any
difficulty from the previous practice.
It should not be forgotten, that the thorough spirit of practical
skirmishing is not to be communicated or maintained, with only one or
two companies at a time, on the level, restricted, drill field.
Soldiers, after having been _thoroughly_ grounded in elementary details
and permanent principles, should be often taken out _in large bodies_ to
skirmish, _with strict, universal and incessant attention to the duty_,
across extensive and intricate tracts of country.
Such tracts are often to be found without restrictions in foreign
stations; and at proper seasons of the year, a little management and
promises of repairing damages will generally procure access to admirable
skirmishing ground from British farmers and landed proprietors.
The writer is conscious that he can have advanced little, if anything,
that must not have occurred to officers who have had experience in this
branch of warfare, or that may not have been brought into instruction
practice by them. He has not, however, seen the foregoing practical
application of essential principles thrown _broadly_ into print; and it
appears to him important that it should be so exhibited, in order that
the spirit of actual skirmishing may not be confined to the regimental
locality, or cease with the regimental employment of those who witnessed
it.
Footnote 4:
With long range rifles, this limit will probably now be eight hundred
yards.—(_Second edition._)
Footnote 5:
In this branch of instruction, there is unquestionably a very wide
field for practicable improvement. In addition to some advances nearer
to perfection in the construction of the musquet itself, _very much_
might be done towards the art of using it, in the ways of systematical
scientific instruction, and improved local conveniences for ball
practice. These of necessity would entail some public expense, but
every reasonable outlay towards the maintenance of national military
efficiency is true economy, and the neglect of it real
extravagance.—(_First edition._)
Footnote 6:
The characteristic difference between British and foreign ideas of
good light infantry is quietly portrayed at a stroke by Napier, when,
in answer to St. Cyr’s remark, that “the Migueletes are the best light
troops in the world,” he observes, “If, instead of _fifteen thousand_
Migueletes, the _four thousand_ men composing Wellington’s light
division had been on the heights of Cardadeu, _General St. Cyr’s sixty
rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to
Barcelona_,”—_Peninsular War_, vol. ii. page 104.
Footnote 7:
_Eight_ hundred yards, again, must now be about the proper limit.
Footnote 8:
With the long range, “the skirmishers’ charge” and “single line” must
become _the exception_, and advancing by “alternate ranks” _the
general practice_.
Footnote 9:
Exposed to the long range, it would appear that supports will be often
obliged to loosen into extended order.
Footnote 10:
600 yards may be the distance now proper for this sentence.
Footnote 11:
Now, on exposed ground, often in _single rank_: at the word “form
single rank,” the rear rank men taking ground to the left, and
dressing up into the front line half way between their own front rank
man and the man on his left.
Footnote 12:
This file should be calculated by the flanks and centres of divisions,
and not by total arithmetical numbers—also small odd portions of
divisions, which may happen to fall into the general formation, must
not be taken into account.
Footnote 13:
Or, of course, by the word “rallying squares” from officers in
command.
Footnote 14:
Sounds.—“Alarm” to excite attention, followed by “assembly” for
_regular squares_ on the supports, or by “assembly” and “double quick”
for instantaneous “rallying squares.”
Footnote 15:
If this were true in the days of the musket, how much more must it now
apply to cavalry charges made for one thousand yards under deadly
discharges from the rifle! unless indeed artillery be brought against
the squares with greatly increased powers of destruction.
A BRIEF SYSTEM OF COMMON LIGHT INFANTRY DRILL, ADAPTED TO THE LONG RANGE
RIFLE.
Ordinary Rules.
1. The company or division of _about_ sixty men, is the _unit_ of
extended Light Infantry, in the same manner as the battalion of about
six hundred men, is the _unit_ of a large military force at close order.
Every company, or portion of a company, acting as Light Infantry, is
therefore kept in hand by its immediate commander.
2. Extensions from close to skirmishing order, are always from _the
centre_ of the company or portion of the company, unless at the time
otherwise ordered.
3. Closings from skirmishing to compact order are always to _the
centre_, unless at the time otherwise ordered.
(In both of the foregoing cases the word “centre” is _usually uttered_,
but the rules are necessary for the prevention of uncertainty in
circumstances of rapidity.)
4. Extensions are in single files six paces apart, and firings are
carried on by alternate ranks, front rank commencing. The front rank and
rear rank man must never be unloaded together.
_When not firing._
5. All movements are in “quick time.”
6. Skirmishers when halted, _stand_, with arms ordered.
_When firing has commenced_.
7. All movements of skirmishers are at the “double quick.”
8. Skirmishers while halting, on open ground drop on the right knee;
on intersected ground they make the best of any cover near them,
choosing their own bodily position.
9. In advancing, men whose rifles are loaded always pass by the
_right_ of those who are loading; and in like manner in retiring,
men who are not loaded pass to _the proper left_ of those who are
nearly ready to fire.
10. In advancing, _all_ load “as front rank,” rifles on the left
side, muzzles to the front; in retiring _all_ load “as rear rank,”
rifles on the right side, muzzles to the rear.
11. In all movements directly to the front or rear, the right centre
file of the company skirmishers, is the proper _file of direction_, to
whose course all others conform, and from towards which they keep their
relative distances.
12. In all movements directly or obliquely to a flank, the leading file
of that flank is, _for the time being_, the file of direction.
13. In all changes of front on a fixed pivot, the file which is that
pivot is, of necessity, _for the time being_, the file of direction.
(See on this most important particular of “the file of direction,”
Article VI. of “The Essentials.”)
14. Troops skirmishing at a greater distance than three hundred yards
from the line or column, should retain one half of their number in
support. (See on this subject Article VIII. of “The Essentials.”)
15. Skirmishers ordered to “form square,” close upon their supports.
16. If the bugle be employed, the less of it the better, provided the
order be distinct to all concerned in it.
17. The _last_ note of a bugle order marks the moment for the
_commencement_ of obedience to it.
18. All verbal orders and bugle commands not understood by the
skirmishers, should be repeated in a low but distinct tone by officers
and non-commissioned officers in charge of sections.