CHAPTER I

Transcriber’s Notes:

Italicized text is enclosed in _underscores_.

Narrow text within square brackets are sidenotes; numbers within square

brackets refer to footnotes at the end of this eBook.

“V^e” in Footnote 3 indicates that the “e” is a superscript.

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The New Universal Library

A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM

A GENERAL VIEW

OF POSITIVISM

Translated from the French of

AUGUSTE COMTE

By J. H. BRIDGES, M.B.

_Late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford_

A New Edition, with an Introduction (1908), by

FREDERIC HARRISON

And the Additional Notes in the last French

Edition (Paris, 1907)

[Illustration]

LONDON

GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LIMITED

NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.

_Published by the kind consent of Mrs. Bridges and the Positivist

Committee, to whom the copyright of this translation belongs._

Republic of the West

Order and Progress

A GENERAL VIEW OF

POSITIVISM

Or,

_SUMMARY EXPOSITION OF THE

SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

AND LIFE_

Adapted to the Great Western Republic, formed of the Five Advanced

Nations, the French, Italian, Spanish, British and German, which,

since the time of Charlemagne, have always constituted a Political

Whole

Réorganiser, sans dieu ni roi, par le culte systématique de

l’Humanité.

Nul n’a droit qu’à faire son devoir.

L’esprit doit toujours être le ministre du coeur, et jamais son

esclave.

Reorganisation, irrespectively of God or king, by the worship of

Humanity, systematically adopted.

Man’s only right is to do his duty.

The Intellect should always be the servant of the Heart, and should

never be its slave.

By

AUGUSTE COMTE

_Author of_ ‘_System of Positive Philosophy_’

PARIS, 1848

INTRODUCTION

By FREDERIC HARRISON

Although Positivism has been pretty widely discussed of late, not only

by those interested in philosophy and religion, but by the general

reader and the public press, perhaps but few of them, whether readers

or critics, have exactly grasped the full meaning of it as a system at

once of thought and of life. The vast range of the ground it covers and

the technical, allusive, and close style of Comte’s writings in the

original have made it difficult to master the subject as a whole. It

has accordingly been thought that the time has come to add to the ‘New

Universal Library’ a translation of _The General View of Positivism_,

i.e., the careful summary of the _Positive Polity_ which Auguste Comte

prefixed to the four volumes of his principal work. The translation

which was published by Dr. J. H. Bridges in 1865 is at the same time

a most accurate version by one of Comte’s earliest followers, and

also it is turned in an easy and simpler style, with the references

and allusions explained, marginal headings to the paragraphs, and a

complete analysis of the contents.

Positivism is not simply a system of Philosophy; nor is it simply a new

form of Religion; nor is it simply a scheme of social regeneration.

It partakes of all of these, and professes to harmonize them under

one dominant conception that is equally philosophic and social.

‘Its primary object,’ writes Comte, ‘is twofold: to generalize our

scientific conceptions and to systematize the art of social life.’

Accordingly Comte’s ideal embraces the three main elements of which

human life consists--Thoughts, Feelings and Actions.

Now it is clear that no such comprehensive system was ever before

offered to the world. Neither the Gospel nor any known type of religion

undertook to give a synthetic grouping of the Sciences. No synthetic

scheme of philosophy ever attempted to correlate religion, politics,

art, and industry. No system of Socialism, ancient or modern, started

with mathematics and led up to an ideal of a human devotion to duty,

with a ritual of worship, both public and private.

Now Comte’s famous _Positive Polity_ did attempt this gigantic task.

And the novelty and extent of such a work explains and accounts for the

extreme difficulty met with by readers of the original French, and also

for the fascination which it has maintained more than fifty years after

the author’s death. It has been talked about, criticized, and even

ridiculed, with an ignorance of its true character which can only be

excused by the abstract and severe form in which Comte thought right to

condense his thoughts. Comte was primarily a mathematician, and neither

Descartes nor Newton troubled themselves about ‘the general reader’.

Kepler, they say, declared himself satisfied if he had one convert

in a century; and philosophers have seldom had justice done them

until some generations have passed. The difficulties presented by the

scientific form of Comte’s works have been obviated for English readers

by the versions of his English followers, which are at once literal

translations, analyses, and elucidations. For the ‘general reader’

nothing could be more serviceable than Bridges’ clear presentation of

Comte’s own ‘general view’, or summary of his system.

The translation itself is a literary masterpiece. It renders an

extremely abstract and complex French type of philosophical dogmatism

into easy and simple English, whilst at the same time preserving and

even elucidating the somewhat cryptic allusions and _nuances_ of the

original. The thought in the French is full, pregnant, and suggestive,

at once subtle and abstract, and rich with words of a new coinage--such

as _altruism_, _sociology_, _dynamics_ (i.e., history), and old

words used in a special sense. This difficulty Dr. Bridges surmounts

by breaking up the involved sentences, supplying names and facts

indirectly referred to, and by transferring technical language into

popular English. The success of the translation has been proved by the

thousands of copies sold in the original 12mo edition of 1865, in the

8vo edition of 1875, and in the stereotyped reprint of 1881.

A pathetic interest attaches to the history of the translation. In

1860 Dr. Bridges, just settled as a physician in Melbourne, lost his

young wife by fever. He at once returned to England, bringing the

remains of his wife for interment in the family graveyard in Suffolk.

In those days of sailing vessels the voyage home round Cape Horn

occupied at least three months. Dr. Bridges resolved to conquer his

sorrow, shut himself in his cabin during the voyage home and completed

the translation (in 430 pages of print) within the time at sea:--

The sad mechanic exercise,

Like dull narcotics, numbing pain.

Auguste Comte always spoke of the _Positive Polity_ as ‘his principal

work’. The _Discours sur l’Ensemble_, or _General View of Positivism_,

formed the introduction to the four volumes. It forms a summary of the

entire work, and it is indeed a systematic application of the doctrine

to the actual condition of society. As the _Polity_, taken as a whole,

professes to embody a set of doctrines for the regulation of thought

and life, the present _Introduction_ is designed to show the need of

such a body of doctrine, the result that they would produce, and the

mode in which they are likely to work. Thus, one who desires to see in

one view the social purpose which Positivism proposes to effect would

find it in no single volume better than in this treatise.

The work consists of six chapters, treating Positivism respectively

in its intellectual aspect, its social aspect, its influence on the

working classes, on women, on art, and on religion. In other words it

illustrates the application of the system to Philosophy, Politics,

Industry, The Family, Poetry and The Future. It opens with a comparison

of Positivist doctrines with those of the leading extant philosophies.

It closes with a picture of society should those doctrines be realized.

It is thus both a criticism of current theories, and an utopia of a

possible Future. Of the intermediate chapters, the first deals with the

principal changes proposed in our actual political system: the next

chapter deals with the changes proposed in our present social system.

Then come the last two chapters, dealing with the principal agents,

Art, Poetry and Religion, by which those changes may be promoted. The

book is therefore a practical introduction to the subject as a whole;

for it sets forth the _aim_ of Positivism as a system, and then how it

seeks to effect that aim.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVISM 8

The object of Philosophy is to present a systematic view of

human life as a basis for modifying its imperfections--The

Theological Synthesis failed to include the practical side of

human nature--But the Positive spirit originated in practical

life--In human nature, and therefore in the Positive system,

Affection is the preponderating element--The proper function

of Intellect is the service of the Social Sympathies--Under

Theology the Intellect was the slave of the Heart; under

Positivism, its servant--The subordination of the Intellect to

the Heart is the subjective principle of Positivism--Objective

basis of the system: Order of the external World, as revealed

by Science--By it the selfish affections are controlled; the

unselfish strengthened--Our conception of this External Order

has been gradually growing from the earliest times, and is but

just complete--Even where not modifiable, its influence on the

character is of the greatest value--But in most cases we can modify

it; and in these the knowledge of it forms the systematic basis

of human action--The chief difficulty of the Positive Synthesis

was to complete our conception of the External Order by extending

it to Social Phenomena--By the discovery of sociological laws

social questions are made paramount; and thus our _subjective

principle_ is satisfied without danger to free thought--Distinction

between Abstract and Concrete laws. It is the former only

that we require for the purpose before us--In our Theory of

Development the required Synthesis of Abstract conceptions already

exists--Therefore we are in a position to proceed at once with

the work of social regeneration--Error of identifying Positivism

with Atheism, Materialism, Fatalism, or Optimism. Atheism, like

Theology, discusses insoluble mysteries--Materialism is due to the

encroachment of the lower sciences on the domain of the higher,

an error which Positivism rectifies--Nor is Positivism fatalist,

since it asserts the External Order to be modifiable--The charge

of Optimism applies to Theology rather than to Positivism. The

Positivist judges of all historical actions _relatively_, but does

not justify them indiscriminately--The word _Positive_ connotes all

the highest intellectual attributes, and will ultimately have a

moral significance.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF POSITIVISM 64

The relation of Positivism to the French Revolution--The

negative or destructive phase of the Revolution stimulated

the desire of Progress, and consequently the study of social

phenomena--The constructive phase of the Revolution. The first

attempts to construct failed, being based on destructive

principles--Counter-revolution from 1794 to 1830--Political

stagnation between 1830 and 1848--The present position, 1848-1850.

Republicanism involves the great principle of subordinating

Politics to Morals--It gives prominence to the problem of

reconciling Order and Progress--It brings the metaphysical

revolutionary schools into discredit--And it proves to all the

necessity of a true spiritual power; a body of thinkers whose

business is to study and to teach principles, holding aloof

from political action--The need of a spiritual power is common

to the whole Republic of Western Europe--This Republic consists

of the Italian, Spanish, British, and German populations,

grouped round France as their centre--Relation of Positivism

to the mediæval system, to which we owe the first attempt

to separate Spiritual from Temporal power--But the mediæval

attempt was premature; and Positivism will renew and complete

it--The Ethical system of Positivism--Subjection of Self-love

to Social love is the great ethical problem. The Social state

of itself favours this result; but it may be hastened by

organized and conscious effort--Intermediate between Self-love

and universal Benevolence are the domestic affections: filial,

fraternal, conjugal, paternal--Personal virtues placed upon a

social basis--Moral education consists partly of scientific

demonstration of ethical truth, but still more of culture of the

higher sympathies--Organization of Public Opinion--Commemoration

of great men--The political motto of Positivism: Order and

Progress--Progress, the development of Order--Analysis of Progress:

material, physical, intellectual, and moral--Application of our

principles to actual politics. All government must for the present

be provisional--Danger of attempting political reconstruction

before spiritual--Politically what is wanted is Dictatorship, with

liberty of speech and discussion--Such a dictatorship would be a

step towards the separation of spiritual and temporal power--The

motto of 1830, _Liberty and Public Order_--Liberty should be

extended to Education--Order demands centralization--Intimate

connexion of Liberty with Order.

CHAPTER III

THE ACTION OF POSITIVISM UPON THE WORKING CLASSES 140

Positivism will not for the present recommend itself to the

governing classes, so much as to the People--The working man who

accepts his position is favourably situated for the reception

of comprehensive principles and generous sympathies--This the

Convention felt; but they encouraged the People to seek political

supremacy, for which they are not fit--It is only in exceptional

cases that the People can be really ‘sovereign’--The truth

involved in the expression is that the well-being of the people

should be the one great object of government--The People’s

function is to assist the spiritual power in modifying the action

of government--Their combined efforts result in the formation

of Public Opinion--Public opinion involves, (1) principles of

social conduct, (2) their acceptance by society at large, (3) an

organ through which to enunciate them--Working men’s clubs--All

three conditions of Public Opinion exist, but have not yet

been combined--Spontaneous tendencies of the people in a right

direction. Their Communism--Its new title of Socialism--Property

is in its nature social, and needs control--But Positivism

rejects the Communist solution of the Problem. Property is to

be controlled by moral not legal agencies--Individualization

of functions as necessary as co-operation--Industry requires

its captains as well as War--Communism is deficient in the

historical spirit--In fact, as a system it is worthless, though

prompted by noble feelings--Property is a public trust, not to

be interfered with legally--Inheritance favourable to its right

employment--Intellect needs moral control as much as wealth--Action

of organized public opinion upon Capitalists. Strikes--Public

Opinion must be based upon a sound system of Education--Education

has two stages; from birth to puberty, from puberty to adolescence.

The first, consisting of physical and esthetic training, to

be given at home--The second part consists of public lectures

on the Sciences, from Mathematics to Sociology--Travels of

Apprentices--Concentration of study--Governmental assistance

not required, except for certain special institutions, and

this only as a provisional measure--We are not ripe for this

system at present; and Government must not attempt to hasten its

introduction--Intellectual attitude of the people. Emancipation

from theological belief--From metaphysical doctrines--Their

mistaken preference of literary and rhetorical talent to real

intellectual power--Moral attitude of the people. The workman

should regard himself as a public functionary--Ambition of power

and wealth must be abandoned--The working classes are the best

guarantee for Liberty and Order--It is from them that we shall

obtain the dictatorial power which is provisionally required.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM UPON WOMEN 227

Women represent the affective element in our nature, as

philosophers and people represent the intellectual and practical

elements--Women have stood aloof from the modern movement, because

of its anti-historic and destructive character--But they will

sympathize with constructive tendencies; and will distinguish

sound philosophy from scientific specialities--Women’s position

in society. Like philosophers and people, their part is not to

govern, but to modify--The united action of philosophers, women,

and proletaries constitutes Moral Force--Superiority of the

new spiritual power to the old. Self-regarding tendencies of

Catholic doctrine--The spirit of Positivism, on the contrary,

is essentially social. The Heart and the Intellect mutually

strengthen each other--Intellectual and moral affinities of women

with Positivism--Catholicism purified love, but did not directly

strengthen it--Women’s influence over the working classes and their

teachers--Their social influence in the _salon_--But the Family

is their principal sphere of action--Woman’s mission as a wife.

Conjugal love an education for universal sympathy--Conditions of

marriage. Indissoluble monogamy--Perpetual widowhood--Woman’s

mission as a mother--Education of children belongs to mothers.

They only can guide the development of character--Modern sophisms

about Woman’s rights. The domesticity of her life follows from

the principle of Separation of Powers--The position of the sexes

tends to differentiation rather than identity--Woman to be

maintained by Man--The education of women should be identical

with that of men--Women’s privileges. Their mission is in

itself a privilege--They will receive honour and worship from

men--Development of mediæval chivalry--The practice of Prayer, so

far from disappearing, is purified and strengthened in Positive

religion--The worship of Woman a preparation for the worship of

Humanity--Exceptional women. Joan of Arc--It is for women to

introduce Positivism into the Southern nations.

CHAPTER V

THE RELATION OF POSITIVISM TO ART 304

Positivism when complete is as favourable to Imagination, as, when

incomplete, it was unfavourable to it--Esthetic talent is for the

adornment of life, not for its government--The political influence

of literary men a deplorable sign and source of anarchy--Theory

of Art--Art is the idealized representation of Fact--Poetry is

intermediate between Philosophy and Polity--Art calls each element

of our nature into harmonious action--Three stages in the esthetic

process: Imitation, Idealization, Expression--Classification of

the arts on the principle of decreasing generality, and increasing

intensity--Poetry--Music--Painting. Sculpture. Architecture--The

conditions favourable to Art have never yet been combined--Neither

in Polytheism--Nor under the Mediæval system--Much less in

modern times--Under Positivism the conditions will all be

favourable. There will be fixed principles, and a nobler moral

culture--Predisposing influence of Education--Relation of Art

to Religion--Idealization of historical types--Art requires the

highest education; but little special instruction--Artists as

a class will disappear. Their function will be appropriated by

the philosophic priesthood--Identity of esthetic and scientific

genius--Women’s poetry--People’s poetry--Value of Art in the

present crisis--Construction of normal types on the basis furnished

by philosophy--Pictures of the Future of Man--Contrasts with the

Past.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION. THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY 355

Recapitulation of the results obtained--Humanity is the centre

to which every aspect of Positivism converges--With the

discovery of sociological laws, a synthesis on the basis of

Science becomes possible, science being now concentrated on

the study of Humanity--Statical aspects of Humanity--Dynamical

aspects--Inorganic and organic sciences elevated by their connexion

with the supreme science of Humanity--The new religion is even

more favourable to Art than to Science--Poetic portraiture of

the new Supreme Being, and contrast with the old--Organization

of festivals, representing statical and dynamical aspects of

Humanity--Worship of the dead. Commemoration of their service--All

the arts may co-operate in the service of religion--Positivism

the successor of Christianity, and surpasses it--Superiority of

Positive morality--Rise of the new Spiritual power--Temporal power

will always be necessary, but its action will be modified by the

spiritual--Substitution of duties for rights--Consensus of the

Social Organism--Continuity of the past with the present--Necessity

of a spiritual power to study and teach these truths, and thus

to govern men by persuasion, instead of by compulsion--Nutritive

functions of Humanity, performed by Capitalists, as the temporal

power--These are modified by the cerebral functions, performed

by the spiritual power--Women and priests to have their material

subsistence guaranteed--Normal relation of priests, people, and

capitalists--We are not yet ripe for the normal state. But the

revolution of 1848 is a step towards it--First revolutionary motto;

Liberty and Equality--Second motto; Liberty and Order--Third

motto; Order and Progress--Provisional policy for the period of

transition--Popular dictatorship with freedom of speech--Positive

Committee for Western Europe--Occidental navy--International

coinage--Occidental school--Flag for the Western Republic--Colonial

and foreign Associates of the Committee, the action of which will

ultimately extend to the whole human race--Conclusion. Perfection

of the Positivist ideal--Corruption of Monotheism.

A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM

‘We tire of thinking and even of acting; we never tire of loving.’

In the following series of systematic essays upon Positivism the

essential principles of the doctrine are first considered; I then

point out the agencies by which its propagation will be effected; and

I conclude by describing certain additional features indispensable to

its completeness. My treatment of these questions will of course be

summary; yet it will suffice, I hope, to overcome several excusable but

unfounded prejudices. It will enable any competent reader to assure

himself that the new general doctrine aims at something more than

satisfying the Intellect; that it is in reality quite as favourable to

Feeling and even to Imagination.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Positivism consists essentially of a Philosophy and a Polity. These can

never be dissevered; the former being the basis, and the latter the

end of one comprehensive system, in which our intellectual faculties

and our social sympathies are brought into close correlation with

each other. For, in the first place, the science of Society, besides

being more important than any other, supplies the only logical and

scientific link by which all our varied observations of phenomena

can be brought into one consistent whole[1]. Of this science it is

even more true than of any of the preceding sciences, that its real

character cannot be understood without explaining its exact relation in

all general features with the art corresponding to it. Now here we find

a coincidence which is assuredly not fortuitous. At the very time when

the theory of society is being laid down, an immense sphere is opened

for the application of that theory; the direction, namely, of the

social regeneration of Western Europe. For, if we take another point of

view, and look at the great crisis of modern history, as its character

is displayed in the natural course of events, it becomes every day

more evident how hopeless is the task of reconstructing political

institutions without the previous remodelling of opinion and of life.

To form then a satisfactory synthesis of all human conceptions is the

most urgent of our social wants: and it is needed equally for the sake

of Order and of Progress. During the gradual accomplishment of this

great philosophical work, a new moral power will arise spontaneously

throughout the West, which, as its influence increases, will lay down

a definite basis for the reorganization of society. It will offer a

general system of education for the adoption of all civilized nations,

and by this means will supply in every department of public and

private life fixed principles of judgment and of conduct. Thus the

intellectual movement and the social crisis will be brought continually

into close connexion with each other. Both will combine to prepare the

advanced portion of humanity for the acceptance of a true spiritual

power, a power more coherent, as well as more progressive, than the

noble but premature attempt of mediaeval Catholicism.

The primary object, then, of Positivism is two-fold: to generalize our

scientific conceptions, and to systematize the art of social life.

These are but two aspects of one and the same problem. They will form

the subjects of the two first chapters of this work. I shall first

explain the general spirit of the new philosophy. I shall then show its

necessary connexion with the whole course of that vast revolution which

is now about to terminate under its guidance in social reconstruction.

This will lead us naturally to another question. The regenerating

doctrine cannot do its work without adherents; in what quarter should

we hope to find them? Now, with individual exceptions of great value,

we cannot expect the adhesion of any of the upper classes in society.

They are all more or less under the influence of baseless metaphysical

theories, and of aristocratic self-seeking. They are absorbed in blind

political agitation and in disputes for the possession of the useless

remnants of the old theological and military system. Their action only

tends to prolong the revolutionary state indefinitely, and can never

result in true social renovation.

Whether we regard its intellectual character or its social objects, it

is certain that Positivism must look elsewhere for support. It will

find a welcome in those classes only whose good sense has been left

unimpaired by our vicious system of education, and whose generous

sympathies are allowed to develop themselves freely. It is among

women, therefore, and among the working classes that the heartiest

supporters of the new doctrine will be found. It is intended, indeed,

ultimately for all classes of society. But it will never gain much real

influence over the higher ranks till it is forced upon their notice by

these powerful patrons. When the work of spiritual reorganization is

completed, it is on them that its maintenance will principally depend;

and so too, their combined aid is necessary for its commencement.

Having but little influence in political government, they are the more

likely to appreciate the need of a moral government, the special object

of which it will be to protect them against the oppressive action of

the temporal power.

In the third chapter, therefore, I shall explain the mode in which

philosophers and working men will co-operate. Both have been prepared

for this coalition by the general course which modern history has

taken, and it offers now the only hope we have of really decisive

action. We shall find that the efforts of Positivism to regulate and

develop the natural tendencies of the people, make it, even from the

intellectual point of view, more coherent and complete.

But there is another and a more unexpected source from which Positivism

will obtain support; and not till then will its true character and

the full extent of its constructive power be appreciated. I shall

show in the fourth chapter how eminently calculated is the Positive

doctrine to raise and regulate the social condition of women. It is

from the feminine aspect only that human life, whether individually or

collectively considered, can really be comprehended as a whole. For the

only basis on which a system really embracing all the requirements

of life can be formed, is the subordination of intellect to social

feeling: a subordination which we find directly represented in the

womanly type of character, whether regarded in its personal or social

relations.

Although these questions cannot be treated fully in the present work, I

hope to convince my readers that Positivism is more in accordance with

the spontaneous tendencies of the people and of women than Catholicism,

and is therefore better qualified to institute a spiritual power. It

should be observed that the ground on which the support of both these

classes is obtained is, that Positivism is the only system which can

supersede the various subversive schemes that are growing every day

more dangerous to all the relations of domestic and social life. Yet

the tendency of the doctrine is to elevate the character of both of

these classes; and it gives a most energetic sanction to all their

legitimate aspirations.

Thus it is that a philosophy originating in speculations of the most

abstract character, is found applicable not merely to every department

of practical life, but also to the sphere of our moral nature. But

to complete the proof of its universality I have still to speak of

another very essential feature. I shall show, in spite of prejudices

which exist very naturally on this point, that Positivism is eminently

calculated to call the Imaginative faculties into exercise. It is by

these faculties that the unity of human nature is most distinctly

represented: they are themselves intellectual, but their field lies

principally in our moral nature, and the result of their operation is

to influence the active powers. The subject of women treated in the

fourth chapter, will lead me by a natural transition to speak in the

fifth of the Esthetic aspects of Positivism. I shall attempt to show

that the new doctrine by the very fact of embracing the whole range of

human relations in the spirit of reality, discloses the true theory of

Art, which has hitherto been so great a deficiency in our speculative

conceptions. The principle of the theory is that, in co-ordinating the

primary functions of humanity, Positivism places the Idealities of the

poet midway between the Ideas of the philosopher and the Realities of

the statesman. We see from this theory how it is that the poetical

power of Positivism cannot be manifested at present. We must wait

until moral and mental regeneration has advanced far enough to awaken

the sympathies which naturally belong to it, and on which Art in its

renewed state must depend for the future. The first mental and social

shock once passed, Poetry will at last take her proper rank. She will

lead Humanity onward towards a future which is now no longer vague and

visionary, while at the same time she enables us to pay due honour to

all phases of the past. The great object which Positivism sets before

us individually and socially, is the endeavour to become more perfect.

The highest importance is attached therefore to the imaginative

faculties, because in every sphere with which they deal they stimulate

the sense of perfection. Limited as my explanations in this work must

be, I shall be able to show that Positivism, while opening out a new

and wide field for art, supplies in the same spontaneous way new means

of expression.

I shall thus have sketched with some detail the true character of

the regenerating doctrine. All its principal aspects will have been

considered. Beginning with its philosophical basis, I pass by natural

transitions to its political purpose; thence to its action upon the

people, its influence with women, and lastly, to its esthetic power.

In concluding this work, which is but the introduction to a larger

treatise, I have only to speak of the conception which unites all these

various aspects. As summed up in the positivist motto, _Love, Order,

Progress_, they lead us to the conception of Humanity, which implicitly

involves and gives new force to each of them. Rightly interpreting this

conception, we view Positivism at last as a complete and consistent

whole. The subject will naturally lead us to speak in general terms of

the future progress of social regeneration, as far as the history of

the past enables us to foresee it. The movement originates in France,

and is limited at first to the great family of Western nations. I shall

show that it will afterwards extend, in accordance with definite laws,

to the rest of the white race, and finally to the other two great races

of man.

CHAPTER I

THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVISM

[The object of Philosophy

is to present a systematic

view of human life, as a

basis for modifying its

imperfections]

The object of all true Philosophy is to frame a system which shall

comprehend human life under every aspect, social as well as individual.

It embraces, therefore, the three kinds of phenomena of which our life

consists, Thoughts, Feelings, and Actions. Under all these aspects, the

growth of Humanity is primarily spontaneous; and the basis upon which

all wise attempts to modify it should proceed, can only be furnished

by an exact acquaintance with the natural process. We are, however,

able to modify this process systematically; and the importance of

this is extreme, since we can thereby greatly diminish the partial

deviations, the disastrous delays, and the grave inconsistencies to

which so complex a growth would be liable were it left entirely to

itself. To effect this necessary intervention is the proper sphere

of politics. But a right conception cannot be formed of it without

the aid of the philosopher, whose business it is to define and amend

the principles on which it is conducted. With this object in view the

philosopher endeavours to co-ordinate the various elements of man’s

existence, so that it may be conceived of theoretically as an integral

whole. His synthesis can only be valid in so far as it is an exact

and complete representation of the relations naturally existing. The

first condition is therefore that these relations be carefully studied.

When the philosopher, instead of forming such a synthesis, attempts

to interfere more directly with the course of practical life, he

commits the error of usurping the province of the statesman, to whom

all practical measures exclusively belong. Philosophy and Politics are

the two principal functions of the great social organism. Morality,

systematically considered, forms the connecting link and at the same

time the line of demarcation between them. It is the most important

application of philosophy, and it gives a general direction to polity.

Natural morality, that is to say the various emotions of our moral

nature, will, as I have shown in my previous work, always govern the

speculations of the one and the operations of the other. This I shall

explain more fully.

But the synthesis, which it is the social function of Philosophy to

construct, will neither be real nor permanent, unless it embraces

every department of human nature, whether speculative, effective, or

practical. These three orders of phenomena react upon each other so

intimately, that any system which does not include all of them must

inevitably be unreal and inadequate. Yet it is only in the present day,

when Philosophy is reaching the positive stage, that this which is her

highest and most essential mission can be fully apprehended.

[The Theological synthesis

failed to include the

practical side of human

nature]

The theological synthesis depended exclusively upon our affective

nature; and this is owing its original supremacy and its ultimate

decline. For a long time its influence over all our highest

speculations was paramount. This was especially the case during the

Polytheistic period, when Imagination and Feeling still retained their

sway under very slight restraint from the reasoning faculties. Yet

even during the time of its highest development, intellectually and

socially, theology exercised no real control over practical life. It

reacted, of course, upon it to some extent, but the effects of this

were in most cases far more apparent than real. There was a natural

antagonism between them, which though at first hardly perceived, went

on increasing till at last it brought about the entire destruction

of the theological fabric. A system so purely subjective could not

harmonize with the necessarily objective tendencies and stubborn

realities of practical life. Theology asserted all phenomena to

be under the dominion of Wills more or less arbitrary: whereas in

practical life men were led more and more clearly to the conception of

invariable Laws. For without laws human action would have admitted of

no rule or plan. In consequence of this utter inability of theology

to deal with practical life, its treatment of speculative and even of

moral problems was exceedingly imperfect, such problems being all more

or less dependent on the practical necessities of life. To present

a perfectly synthetic view of human nature was, then, impossible as

long as the influence of theology lasted; because the Intellect was

impelled by Feeling and by the Active powers in two totally different

directions. The failure of all metaphysical attempts to form a

synthesis need not be dwelt upon here. Metaphysicians, in spite of

their claims to absolute truth have never been able to supersede

theology in questions of feeling, and have proved still more inadequate

in practical questions. Ontology, even when it was most triumphant in

the schools, was always limited to subjects of a purely intellectual

nature; and even here its abstractions, useless in themselves, dealt

only with the case of individual development, the metaphysical spirit

being thoroughly incompatible with the social point of view. In my

work on Positive Philosophy I have clearly proved that it constitutes

only a transitory phase of mind, and is totally inadequate for any

constructive purpose. For a time it was supreme; but its utility lay

simply in its revolutionary tendencies. It aided the preliminary

development of Humanity by its gradual inroads upon Theology, which,

though in ancient times entrusted with the sole direction of society,

had long since become in every respect utterly retrograde.

[But the Positive spirit

originated in practical life]

But all Positive speculations owe their first origin to the occupations

of practical life; and, consequently, they have always given some

indication of their capacity for regulating our active powers, which

had been omitted from every former synthesis. Their value in this

respect has been and still is materially impaired by their want of

breadth, and their isolated and incoherent character; but it has

always been instinctively felt. The importance that we attach to

theories which teach the laws of phenomena, and give us the power of

prevision, is chiefly due to the fact that they alone can regulate

our otherwise blind action upon the external world. Hence it is that

while the Positive spirit has been growing more and more theoretical,

and has gradually extended to every department of speculation, it has

never lost the practical tendencies which it derived from its source;

and this even in the case of researches useless in themselves, and

only to be justified as logical exercises. From its first origin

in mathematics and astronomy, it has always shown its tendency to

systematize the whole of our conceptions in every new subject which

has been brought within the scope of its fundamental principle. It

exercised for a long time a modifying influence upon theological and

metaphysical principles, which has gone on increasing; and since the

time of Descartes and Bacon it has become evident that it is destined

to supersede them altogether. Positivism has gradually taken possession

of the preliminary sciences of Physics and Biology, and in these the

old system no longer prevails. All that remained was to complete the

range of its influence by including the study of social phenomena. For

this study metaphysics had proved incompetent; by theological thinkers

it had only been pursued indirectly and empirically as a condition of

government. I believe that my work on Positive Philosophy has so far

supplied what was wanting. I think it must now be clear to all that

the Positive spirit can embrace the entire range of thought without

lessening, or rather with the effect of strengthening its original

tendency to regulate practical life. And it is a further guarantee for

the stability of the new intellectual synthesis that Social science,

which is the final result of our researches, gives them that systematic

character in which they had hitherto been wanting, by supplying the

only connecting link of which they all admit.

This conception is already adopted by all true thinkers. All must

now acknowledge that the Positive spirit tends necessarily towards

the formation of a comprehensive and durable system, in which every

practical as well as speculative subject shall be included. But such

a system would still be far from realizing that universal character

without which Positivism would be incompetent to supersede Theology in

the spiritual government of Humanity. For the element which really

preponderates in every human being, that is to say, Affection, would

still be left untouched. This element it is, and this only, which

gives a stimulus and direction to the other two parts of our nature:

without it the one would waste its force in ill-conceived, or, at

least, useless studies, and the other in barren or even dangerous

contention. With this immense deficiency the combination of our

theoretical and active powers would be fruitless, because it would

lack the only principle which could ensure its real and permanent

stability. The failure would be even greater than the failure of

Theology in dealing with practical questions; for the unity of human

nature cannot really be made to depend either on the rational or the

active faculties. In the life of the individual, and, still more,

in the life of the race, the basis of unity, as I shall show in the

fourth chapter, must always be feeling. It is to the fact that theology

arose spontaneously from feeling that its influence is for the most

part due. And although theology is now palpably on the decline, yet

it will retain, in principle at least, some legitimate claims to the

direction of society so long as the new philosophy fails to occupy this

important vantage-ground. We come then to the final conditions with

which the modern synthesis must comply. Without neglecting the spheres

of Thought and Action it must also comprehend the moral sphere; and the

very principle on which its claim to universality rests must be derived

from Feeling. Then, and not till then, can the claims of theology be

finally set aside. For then the new system will have surpassed the old

in that which is the one essential purpose of all general doctrines.

It will have shown itself able to effect what no other doctrine has

done, that is, to bring the three primary elements of our nature into

harmony. If Positivism were to prove incapable of satisfying this

condition, we must give up all hope of systematization of any kind. For

while Positive principles are now sufficiently developed to neutralize

those of Theology, yet, on the other hand, the influence of theology

would continue to be far greater. Hence it is that many conscientious

thinkers in the present day are so inclined to despair for the future

of society. They see that the old principles on which society has been

governed must finally become powerless. What they do not see is that a

new basis for morality is being gradually laid down. Their theories are

too imperfect and incoherent to show them the direction towards which

the present time is ultimately tending. It must be owned, too, that

their view seems borne out by the present character of the Positive

method. While all allow its utility in the treatment of practical,

and even of speculative, problems, it seems to most men, and very

naturally, quite unfit to deal with questions of morality.

[In human nature, and

therefore in the Positive

system, Affection is the

preponderating element]

But on closer examination they will see reason to rectify their

judgment. They will see that the hardness with which Positive science

has been justly reproached, is due to the speciality and want of

purpose with which it has hitherto been pursued, and is not at all

inherent in its nature. Originating as it did in the necessities of our

material nature, which for a long time restricted it to the study of

the inorganic world, it has not till now become sufficiently complete

or systematic to harmonize well with our moral nature. But now that it

is brought to bear upon social questions, which for the future will

form its most important field, it loses all the defects peculiar to

its long period of infancy. The very attribute of reality which is

claimed by the new philosophy, leads it to treat all subjects from the

moral still more than from the intellectual side. The necessity of

assigning with exact truth the place occupied by the intellect and by

the heart in the organization of human nature and of society, leads to

the decision that Affection must be the central point of the synthesis.

In the treatment of social questions Positive science will be found

utterly to discard those proud illusions of the supremacy of reason,

to which it had been liable during its preliminary stages. Ratifying,

in this respect, the common experience of men even more forcibly than

Catholicism, it teaches us that individual happiness and public welfare

are far more dependent upon the heart than upon the intellect. But,

independently of this, the question of co-ordinating the faculties of

our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be

brought into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affection over

Reason, and even over Activity.

The fact that intellect, as well as social sympathy, is a distinctive

attribute of our nature, might lead us to suppose that either of these

two might be supreme, and therefore that there might be more than one

method of establishing unity. The fact, however, is that there is only

one; because these two elements are by no means equal in their fitness

for assuming the first place. Whether we look at the distinctive

qualities of each, or at the degree of force which they possess, it

is easy to see that the only position for which the intellect is

permanently adapted is to be the servant of the social sympathies.

If, instead of being content with this honourable post, it aspires to

become supreme, its ambitious aims, which are never realized, result

simply in the most deplorable disorder.

Even with the individual, it is impossible to establish permanent

harmony between our various impulses, except by giving complete

supremacy to the feeling which prompts the sincere and habitual desire

of doing good. This feeling is, no doubt, like the rest, in itself

blind; it has to learn from reason the right means of obtaining

satisfaction; and our active faculties are then called into requisition

to apply those means. But common experience proves that after all the

principal condition of right action is the benevolent impulse; with

the ordinary amount of intellect and activity that is found in men

this stimulus, if well sustained, is enough to direct our thoughts and

energies to a good result. Without this habitual spring of action they

would inevitably waste themselves in barren or incoherent efforts, and

speedily relapse into their original torpor. Unity in our moral nature

is, then, impossible, except so far as affection preponderates over

intellect and activity.

[The proper function of

Intellect is the Service of

the Social Sympathies]

True as this fundamental principle is for the individual, it is in

public life that its necessity can be demonstrated most irrefutably.

The problem is in reality the same, nor is any different solution of

it required; only it assumes such increased dimensions, that less

uncertainty is felt as to the method to be adopted. The various beings

whom it is sought to harmonize have in this case each a separate

existence; it is clear, therefore, that the first condition of

co-operation must be sought in their own inherent tendency to universal

love. No calculations of self-interest can rival this social instinct,

whether in promptitude and breadth of intuition, or in boldness and

tenacity of purpose. True it is that the benevolent emotions have in

most cases less intrinsic energy than the selfish. But they have this

beautiful quality, that social life not only permits their growth,

but stimulates it to an almost unlimited extent, while it holds their

antagonists in constant check. Indeed the increasing tendency in the

former to prevail over the latter is the best measure by which to judge

of the progress of Humanity. But the intellect may do much to confirm

their influence. It may strengthen social feeling by diffusing juster

views of the relations in which the various parts of society stand to

each other; or it may guide its application by dwelling on the lessons

which the past offers to the future. It is to this honourable service

that the new philosophy would direct our intellectual powers. Here

the highest sanction is given to their operations, and an exhaustless

field is opened out for them, from which far deeper satisfaction may be

gained than from the approbation of the learned societies, or from the

puerile specialities with which they are at present occupied.

In fact, the ambitious claims which, ever since the hopeless decline

of the theological synthesis, have been advanced by the intellect,

never were or could be realized. Their only value lay in their solvent

action on the theological system when it had become hostile to

progress. The intellect is intended for service, not for empire; when

it imagines itself supreme, it is really only obeying the personal

instead of the social instincts. It never acts independently of

feeling, be that feeling good or bad. The first condition of command

is force; now reason has but light; the impulse that moves it must

come from elsewhere. The metaphysical Utopias, in which a life of pure

contemplation is held out as the highest ideal, attract the notice of

our men of science; but are really nothing but illusions of pride, or

veils for dishonest schemes. True there is a genuine satisfaction in

the act of discovering truth; but it is not sufficiently intense to

be an habitual guide of conduct. Indeed, so feeble is our intellect,

that the impulse of some passion is necessary to direct and sustain

it in almost every effort. When the impulse comes from kindly feeling

it attracts attention on account of its rarity or value; when it

springs from the selfish motives of glory, ambition, or gain, it is too

common to be remarked. This is usually the only difference between the

two cases. It does indeed occasionally happen that the intellect is

actuated by a sort of passion for truth in itself, without any mixture

of pride or vanity. Yet, in this case, as in every other, there is

intense egotism in exercising the mental powers irrespectively of all

social objects. Positivism, as I shall afterwards explain, is even more

severe than Catholicism in its condemnation of this type of character,

whether in metaphysicians or in men of science. The true philosopher

would consider it a most culpable abuse of the opportunities which

civilization affords him for the sake of the welfare of society, in

leading a speculative life.

We have traced the Positive principle from its origin in the pursuits

of active life, and have seen it extending successively to every

department of speculation. We now find it, in its maturity, and that

as a simple result of its strict adherence to fact, embracing the

sphere of affection, and making that sphere the central point of its

synthesis. It is henceforth a fundamental doctrine of Positivism, a

doctrine of as great political as philosophical importance, that the

Heart preponderates over the Intellect.

[Under Theology the

intellect was the slave of

the heart; under Positivism,

its servant]

It is true that this doctrine, which is the only basis for establishing

harmony in our nature, had been, as I before remarked, instinctively

accepted by theological systems. But it was one of the fatalities of

society in its preliminary phase, that the doctrine was coupled with

an error which, after a time, destroyed all its value. In acknowledging

the superiority of the heart the intellect was reduced to abject

submission. Its only chance of growth lay in resistance to the

established system. This course it followed with increasing effect,

till after twenty centuries of insurrection, the system collapsed.

The natural result of the process was to stimulate metaphysical and

scientific pride, and to promote views subversive of all social order.

But Positivism, while systematically adopting the principle here spoken

of as the foundation of individual and social discipline, interprets

that principle in a different way. It teaches that while it is for the

heart to suggest our problems, it is for the intellect to solve them.

Now the intellect was at first quite inadequate to this task, for which

a long and laborious training was needed. The heart, therefore, had to

take its place, and in default of objective truth, to give free play to

its subjective inspirations. But for these inspirations, all progress,

as I showed in my _System of Positive Philosophy_, would have been

totally impossible. For a long time it was necessary that they should

be believed absolutely; but as soon as our reason began to mould its

conceptions upon observations, more or less accurate, of the external

world, these supernatural dogmas became inevitably an obstacle to its

growth. Here lies the chief source of the important modifications which

theological belief has successively undergone. No further modifications

are now possible without violating its essential principles; and since,

meantime, Positive science is assuming every day larger proportions,

the conflict between them is advancing with increasing vehemence and

danger. The tendency on the one side is becoming more retrograde, on

the other more revolutionary; because the impossibility of reconciling

the two opposing forces is felt more and more strongly. Never was this

position of affairs more manifest than now. The restoration of theology

to its original power, supposing such a thing were possible, would have

the most degrading influence on the intellect, and, consequently, on

the character also; since it would involve the admission that our views

of scientific truth were to be strained into accordance with our wishes

and our wants. Therefore no important step in the progress of Humanity

can now be made without totally abandoning the theological principle.

The only service of any real value which it still renders, is that

of forcing the attention of Western Europe, by the very fact of its

reactionary tendencies, upon the greatest of all social questions. It

is owing to its influence that the central point of the new synthesis

is placed in our moral rather than our intellectual nature; and this,

in spite of every prejudice and habit of thought that has been formed

during the revolutionary period of the last five centuries. And while

in this, which is the primary condition of social organization,

Positivism, proves more efficient than Theology, it at the same time

terminates the disunion which has existed so long between the intellect

and the heart. For it follows logically from its principles, and also

from the whole spirit of the system, that the intellect shall be free

to exercise its full share of influence in every department of human

life. When it is said that the intellect should be subordinate to

the heart, what is meant is, that the intellect should devote itself

exclusively to the problems which the heart suggests, the ultimate

object being to find proper satisfaction for our various wants.

Without this limitation, experience has shown too clearly that it

would almost always follow its natural bent for useless or insoluble

questions, which are the most plentiful and the easiest to deal with.

But when any problem of a legitimate kind has been once proposed, it

is the sole judge of the method to be pursued, and of the utility of

the results obtained. Its province is to inquire into the present, in

order to foresee the future, and to discover the means of improving

it. In this province it is not to be interfered with. In a word the

intellect is to be the servant of the heart, not its slave. Under

these two correlative conditions the elements of our nature will at

last be brought into harmony. The equilibrium of these two elements,

once established, is in little danger of being disturbed. For since

it is equally favourable to both of them, both will be interested

in maintaining it. The fact that Reason in modern times has become

habituated to revolt, is no ground for supposing that it will always

retain its revolutionary character, even when its legitimate claims

have been fully satisfied. Supposing the case to arise, however,

society, as I shall show afterwards, would not be without the means

of repressing any pretensions that were subversive of order. There is

another point of view which may assure us that the position given to

the heart under the new system will involve no danger to the growth of

intellect. Love, when real, ever desires light, in order to attain its

ends. The influence of true feeling is as favourable to sound thought

as to wise activity.

[The subordination of the

intellect to the heart is

the _Subjective Principle_

of Positivism]

Our doctrine, therefore, is one which renders hypocrisy and oppression

alike impossible. And it now stands forward as the result of all the

efforts of the past, for the regeneration of order, which, whether

considered individually or socially, is so deeply compromised by the

anarchy of the present time. It establishes a fundamental principle by

which true philosophy and sound polity are brought into correlation; a

principle which can be felt as well as proved, and which is at once the

keystone of a system and a basis of government. I shall show, moreover,

in the fifth chapter, that the doctrine is as rich in esthetic beauty

as in philosophical power and in social influence. This will complete

the proof of its efficacy as the centre of a universal system. Viewed

from the moral, scientific, or poetical aspect, it is equally valuable;

and it is the only principle which can bring Humanity safely through

the most formidable crisis that she has ever yet undergone. It will

be now clear to all that the force of demonstration, a force peculiar

to modern times, and which still retains much of its destructive

character, becomes matured and elevated by Positivism. It begins

to develop constructive tendencies, which will soon be developed

more largely. It is not too much, then, to say that Positivism,

notwithstanding its speculative origin, offers as much to natures

of deep sympathy as to men of highly cultivated intellects, or of

energetic character.

[_Objective basis_ of the

system; External Order of

the World, as revealed by

Science]

The spirit and the principle of the synthesis which all true

philosophers should endeavour to establish, have now been defined. I

proceed to explain the method that should be followed in the task, and

the peculiar difficulty with which it is attended.

The object of the synthesis will not be secured until it embraces

the whole extent of its domain, the moral and practical departments

as well as the intellectual. But these three departments cannot be

dealt with simultaneously. They follow an order of succession which,

so far from dissevering them from the whole to which they belong, is

seen when carefully examined to be a natural result of their mutual

dependence. The truth is, and it is a truth of great importance, that

Thoughts must be systematized before Feelings, Feelings before Actions.

It is doubtless, owing to a confused apprehension of this truth, that

philosophers hitherto, in framing their systems of human nature, have

dealt almost exclusively, with our intellectual faculties.

The necessity of commencing with the co-ordination of ideas is not

merely due to the fact that the relations of these, being more

simple and more susceptible of demonstration, form a useful logical

preparation for the remainder of the task. On closer examination we

find a more important, though less obvious reason. If this first

portion of the work be once efficiently performed, it is the foundation

of all the rest. In what remains no very serious difficulty will

occur, provided always that we content ourselves with that degree of

completeness which the ultimate purpose of the system requires.

To give such paramount importance to this portion of the subject may

seem at first sight inconsistent with the proposition just laid down,

that the strength of the intellectual faculties is far inferior to that

of the other elements of our nature. It is quite certain that Feeling

and Activity have much more to do with any practical step that we take

than pure Reason. In attempting to explain this paradox, we come at

last to the peculiar difficulty of this great problem of human Unity.

The first condition of unity is a subjective principle; and this

principle in the Positive system is the subordination of the intellect

to the heart: Without this the unity that we seek can never be placed

on a permanent basis, whether individually or collectively. It is

essential to have some influence sufficiently powerful to produce

convergence amid the heterogeneous and often antagonistic tendencies of

so complex an organism as ours. But this first condition, indispensable

as it is, would be quite insufficient for the purpose, without some

objective basis, existing independently of ourselves in the external

world. That basis consists for us in the laws or Order of the phenomena

by which Humanity is regulated. The subjection of human life to this

order is incontestable; and as soon as the intellect has enabled us to

comprehend it, it becomes possible for the feeling of love to exercise

a controlling influence over our discordant tendencies. This, then, is

the mission allotted to the intellect in the Positive synthesis; in

this sense it is that it should be consecrated to the service of the

heart.

I have said that our conception of human unity must be totally

inadequate, and, indeed, cannot deserve the name, so long as it does

not embrace every element of our nature. But it would be equally fatal

to the completeness of this great conception to think of human nature

irrespectively of what lies outside it. A purely subjective unity,

without any objective basis, would be simply impossible. In the first

place any attempt to co-ordinate man’s moral nature, without regard

to the external world, supposing the attempt feasible, would have very

little permanent influence on our happiness, whether collectively or

individually; since happiness depends so largely upon our relations

to all that exists around us. Besides this, we have to consider the

exceeding imperfection of our nature. Self-love is deeply implanted in

it, and when left to itself is far stronger than Social Sympathy. The

social instincts would never gain the mastery were they not sustained

and called into constant exercise by the economy of the external world,

an influence which at the same time checks the power of the selfish

instincts.

[By it the selfish

affections are controlled;

the unselfish strengthened]

To understand this economy aright; we must remember that it embraces

not merely the inorganic world, but also the phenomena of our own

existence. The phenomena of human life, though more modifiable than

any others, are yet equally subject to invariable laws; laws which

form the principal objects of Positive speculation. Now the benevolent

affections, which themselves act in harmony with the laws of social

development, incline us to submit to all other laws, as soon as the

intellect has discovered their existence. The possibility of moral

unity depends, therefore, even in the case of the individual, but

still more in that of society, upon the necessity of recognizing our

subjection to an external power. By this means our self-regarding

instincts are rendered susceptible of discipline. In themselves they

are strong enough to neutralize all sympathetic tendencies, were it

not for the support that the latter find in this External Order. Its

discovery is due to the intellect; which is thus enlisted in the

service of feeling, with the ultimate purpose of regulating action.

Thus it is that an intellectual synthesis, or systematic study of

the laws of nature, is needed on far higher grounds than those of

satisfying our theoretical faculties, which are, for the most part,

very feeble, even in men who devote themselves to a life of thought. It

is needed, because it solves at once the most difficult problem of the

moral synthesis. The higher impulses within us are brought under the

influence of a powerful stimulus from without. By its means they are

enabled to control our discordant impulses, and to maintain a state of

harmony towards which they have always tended, but which, without such

aid, could never be realized. Moreover, this conception of the order of

nature evidently supplies the basis for a synthesis of human action;

for the efficacy of our action depends entirely upon their conformity

to this order. But this part of the subject has been fully explained in

my previous work, and I need not enlarge upon it further. As soon as

the synthesis of mental conceptions enables us to form a synthesis of

feelings, it is clear that there will be no very serious difficulties

in constructing a synthesis of actions. Unity of action depends upon

unity of impulse, and unity of design; and thus we find that the

co-ordination of human nature, as a whole, depends ultimately upon the

co-ordination of mental conceptions, a subject which seemed at first of

comparatively slight importance.

The subjective principle of Positivism, that is, the subordination of

the intellect to the heart is thus fortified by an objective basis,

the immutable Necessity of the external world; and by this means it

becomes possible to bring human life within the influence of social

sympathy. The superiority of the new synthesis to the old is even more

evident under this second aspect than under the first. In theological

systems the objective basis was supplied by spontaneous belief in a

supernatural Will. Now, whatever the degree of reality attributed

to these fictions, they all proceeded from a subjective source; and

therefore their influence in most cases must have been very confused

and fluctuating. In respect of moral discipline they cannot be compared

either for precision, for force, or for stability, to the conception

of an invariable Order, actually existing without us, and attested,

whether we will or no, by every act of our existence.

[Our conception of this

External Order has been

gradually growing from the

earliest times, and is but

just complete]

This fundamental doctrine of Positivism is not to be attributed in the

full breadth of its meanings to any single thinker. It is the slow

result of a vast process carried out in separate departments, which

began with the first use of our intellectual powers, and which is only

just completed in those who exhibit those powers in their highest form.

During the long period of her infancy Humanity has been preparing

this the most precious of her intellectual attainments, as the basis

for the only system of life which is permanently adapted to our

nature. The doctrine has to be demonstrated in all the more essential

cases from observation only, except so far as we admit argument from

analogy. Deductive argument is not admissible, except in such cases

as are evidently compounded of others in which the proof given has

been sufficient. Thus, for instance, we are authorized by sound logic

to assert the existence of laws of weather; though most of these are

still, and, perhaps, always will be, unknown. For it is clear that

meteorological phenomena result from a combination of astronomical,

physical and chemical influences, each of which has been proved to

be subject to invariable laws. But in all phenomena which are not

thus reducible, we must have recourse to inductive reasoning; for a

principle which is the basis of all deduction cannot be itself deduced.

Hence it is that the doctrine, being so entirely foreign as it is to

our primitive mental state, requires such a long course of preparation.

Without such preparation even the greatest thinkers could not

anticipate it. It is true that in some cases metaphysical conceptions

of a law have been formed before the proof really required had been

furnished. But they were never of much service, except so far as they

generalized in a more or less confused way the analogies naturally

suggested by the laws which had actually been discovered in simpler

phenomena. Besides, such assertions always remained very doubtful and

very barren in result, until they were based upon some outline of a

really Positive theory. Thus, in spite of the apparent potency of

this metaphysical method, to which modern intellects are so addicted,

the conception of an External Order is still extremely imperfect in

many of the most cultivated minds, because they have not verified it

sufficiently in the most intricate and important class of phenomena,

the phenomena of society. I am not, of course, speaking of the few

thinkers who accept my discovery of the principal laws of Sociology.

Such uncertainty in a subject so closely related to all others,

produces great confusion in men’s minds, and affects their perception

of an invariable order, even in the simplest subjects. A proof of this

is the utter delusion into which most geometricians of the present day

have fallen with respect to what they call the Calculus of Chances;

a conception which presupposes that the phenomena considered are not

subject to law. The doctrine, therefore, cannot be considered as firmly

established in any one case, until it has been verified specially in

every one of the primary categories in which phenomena may be classed.

But now that this difficult condition has really been fulfilled by the

few thinkers who have risen to the level of their age, we have at last

a firm objective basis on which to establish the harmony of our moral

nature. That basis is, that all events whatever, the events of our

own personal and social life included, are always subject to natural

relations of sequence and similitude, which in all essential respects

lie beyond the reach of our interference.

[Even where not modifiable,

its influence on the

character is of the greatest

value]

This, then, is the external basis of our synthesis, which includes

the moral and practical faculties, as well as the speculative. It

rests at every point upon the unchangeable Order of the world. The

right understanding of this order is the principal subject of our

thoughts; its preponderating influence determines the general course

of our feelings; its gradual improvement is the constant object of

our actions. To form a more precise notion of its influence, let us

imagine that for a moment it were really to cease. The result would

be that our intellectual faculties, after wasting themselves in

wild extravagancies, would sink rapidly into incurable sloth; our

nobler feelings would be unable to prevent the ascendancy of the

lower instincts; and our active powers would abandon themselves to

purposeless agitation. Men have, it is true, been for a long time

ignorant of this Order. Nevertheless we have been always subject to

it; and its influence has always tended, though without our knowledge,

to control our whole being; our actions first, and subsequently

our thoughts, and even our affections. As we have advanced in our

knowledge of it, our thoughts have become less vague, our desires less

capricious, our conduct less arbitrary. And now that we are able to

grasp the full meaning of the conception, its influence extends to

every part of our conduct. For it teaches us that the object to be

aimed at in the economy devised by man, is wise development of the

irresistible economy of nature, which cannot be amended till it is

first studied and obeyed. In some departments it has the character

of fate; that is, it admits of no modification. But even here, in

spite of the superficial objections to it which have arisen from

intellectual pride, it is necessary for the proper regulation of human

life. Suppose, for instance, that man were exempt from the necessity

of living on the earth, and were free to pass at will from one planet

to another, the very notion of society would be rendered impossible by

the licence which each individual would have to give way to whatever

unsettling and distracting impulses his nature might incline him.

Our propensities are so heterogeneous and so deficient in elevation,

that there would be no fixity or consistency in our conduct, but

for these insurmountable conditions. Our feeble reason may fret at

such restrictions, but without them all its deliberations would be

confused and purposeless. We are powerless to create: all that we can

do in bettering our condition is to modify an order in which we can

produce no radical change. Supposing us in possession of that absolute

independence to which metaphysical pride aspires, it is certain that so

far from improving our condition, it would be a bar to all development,

whether social or individual. The true path of human progress lies in

the opposite direction; in diminishing the vacillation, inconsistency,

and discordance of our designs by furnishing external motives for those

operations of our intellectual, moral and practical powers, of which

the original source was purely internal. The ties by which our various

diverging tendencies are held together would be quite inadequate for

their purpose, without a basis of support in the external world, which

is unaffected by the spontaneous variations of our nature.

But, however great the value of Positive doctrine in pointing out the

unchangeable aspects of the universal Order, what we have principally

to consider are the numerous departments in which that order admits of

artificial modifications. Here lies the most important sphere of human

activity. The only phenomena, indeed, which we are wholly unable to

modify are the simplest of all, the phenomena of the Solar System which

we inhabit. It is true that now that we know its laws we can easily

conceive them improved in certain respects; but to whatever degree our

power over nature may extend, we shall never be able to produce the

slightest change in them. What we have to do is so to dispose our life

as to submit to these resistless fatalities in the best way we can; and

this is comparatively easy, because their greater simplicity enables

us to foresee them with more precision and in a more distinct future.

Their interpretation by Positive science has had a most important

influence on the gradual education of the human intellect: and it will

always continue to be the source from which we obtain the clearest and

most impressive sense of Immutability. Too exclusively studied they

might even now lead to fatalism; but controlled as their influence will

be henceforward by a more philosophic education, they may well become a

means of moral improvement, by disposing us to submit with resignation

to all evils which are absolutely insurmountable.

[But in most cases we can

modify it; and in these the

knowledge of it forms the

systematic basis of human

action]

In other parts of the external economy, invariability in all primary

aspects is found compatible with modifications in points of secondary

importance. These modifications become more numerous and extensive as

the phenomena are more complex. The reason of this is that the causes

from a combination of which the effects proceed being more varied and

more accessible, offer greater facilities to our feeble powers to

interfere with advantage. But all this has been fully explained in my

_System of Positive Philosophy_. The tendency of that work was to show

that our intervention became more efficacious in proportion as the

phenomena upon which we acted had a closer relation to the life of man

or society. Indeed the extensive modifications of which society admits,

go far to keep up the common mistake that social phenomena are not

subject to any constant law.

At the same time we have to remember that this increased possibility of

human intervention in certain parts of the External Order necessarily

coexists with increased imperfection, for which it is a valuable but

very inadequate compensation. Both features alike result from the

increase of complexity. Even the laws of the Solar System are very far

from perfect, notwithstanding their greater simplicity, which indeed

makes their defects more perceptible. The existence of these defects

should be taken into careful consideration; not indeed with the hope

of amending them, but as a check upon unreasoning admiration. Besides,

they lead us to a clearer conception of the true position of Humanity,

a position of which the most striking feature is the necessity of

struggling against difficulties of every kind. Lastly, by observing

these defects we are less likely to waste our time in seeking for

absolute perfection, and so neglecting the wiser course of looking for

such improvements as are really possible.

In all other phenomena, the increasing imperfection of the economy

of nature becomes a powerful stimulus to all our faculties, whether

moral, intellectual or practical. Here we find sufferings which can

really be alleviated to a large extent by wise and well-sustained

combination of efforts. This consideration should give a firmness and

dignity of bearing, to which Humanity could never attain during her

period of infancy. Those who look wisely into the future of society

will feel that the conception of man becoming, without fear or boast,

the arbiter, within certain limits, of his own destiny, has in it

something far more satisfying than the old belief in Providence, which

implied our remaining passive. Social union will be strengthened by the

conception, because every one will see that union forms our principal

resource against the miseries of human life. And while it calls out our

noblest sympathies, it impresses us more strongly with the importance

of high intellectual culture, being itself the object for which such

culture is required. These important results have been ever on the

increase in modern times; yet hitherto they have been too limited and

casual to be appreciated rightly, except so far as we could anticipate

the future of society by the light of sound historical principles.

Art, so far as it is yet organized, does not include that part of the

economy of nature which, being the most modifiable, the most imperfect,

and the most important of all, ought on every ground to be regarded as

the principal object of human exertions. Even Medical Art, specially

so called, is only just beginning to free itself from its primitive

routine. And Social Art, whether moral or political, is plunged in

routine so deeply that few statesmen admit the possibility of shaking

it off. Yet of all the arts, it is the one which best admits of being

reduced to a system; and until this is done it will be impossible to

place on a rational basis all the rest of our practical life. All these

narrow views are due simply to insufficient recognition of the fact,

that the highest phenomena are as much subject to laws as others. When

the conception of the Order of Nature has become generally accepted

in its full extent, the ordinary definition of Art will become as

comprehensive and as homogeneous as that of Science; and it will then

become obvious to all sound thinkers that the principal sphere of both

Art and Science is the social life of man.

Thus the social services of the Intellect are not limited to revealing

the existence of an external Economy, and the necessity of submission

to its sway. If the theory is to have any influence upon our active

powers, it should include an exact estimate of the imperfections

of this economy and of the limits within which it varies, so as to

indicate and define the boundaries of human intervention. Thus it will

always be an important function of philosophy to criticize nature in

a Positive spirit, although the antipathy to theology by which such

criticism was formerly animated has ceased to have much interest, from

the very fact of having done its work so effectually. The object of

Positive criticism is not controversial. It aims simply at putting

the great question of human life in a clearer light. It bears closely

on what Positivism teaches to be the great end of life, namely, the

struggle to become more perfect; which implies previous imperfection.

This truth is strikingly apparent when applied to the case of our own

nature, for true morality requires a deep and habitual consciousness of

our natural defects.

[The chief difficulty of

the Positive Synthesis was

to complete our conception

of the External Order, by

extending it to Social

phenomena]

I have now described the fundamental condition of the Positive

Synthesis. Deriving its subjective principle from the affections, it

is dependent ultimately on the intellect for its objective basis. This

basis connects it with the Economy of the external world, the dominion

of which Humanity accepts, and at the same time modifies. I have left

many points unexplained; but enough has been said for the purpose of

this work, which is only the introduction to a larger treatise. We

now come to the essential difficulty that presented itself in the

construction of the Synthesis. That difficulty was to discover the true

Theory of human and social Development. The first decisive step in this

discovery renders the conception of the Order of Nature complete. It

stands out then as the fundamental doctrine of an universal system, for

which the whole course of modern progress has been preparing the way.

For three centuries men of science have been unconsciously co-operating

in the work. They have left no gap of any importance, except in the

region of Moral and Social phenomena. And now that man’s history has

been for the first time systematically considered as a whole, and has

been found to be, like all other phenomena, subject to invariable laws,

the preparatory labours of modern Science are ended. Her remaining task

is to construct that synthesis which will place her at the only point

of view from which every department of knowledge can be embraced.

In my _System of Positive Philosophy_ both these objects were aimed

at. I attempted, and in the opinion of the principal thinkers of our

time successfully, to complete and at the same time co-ordinate Natural

Philosophy, by establishing the general law of human development,

social as well as intellectual. I shall not now enter into the

discussion of this law, since its truth is no longer contested.

Fuller consideration of it is reserved for the third volume of my new

treatise. It lays down, as is generally known, that our speculations

upon all subjects whatsoever, pass necessarily through three successive

stages: a Theological stage, in which free play is given to spontaneous

fictions admitting of no proof; the Metaphysical stage, characterized

by the prevalence of personified abstractions or entities; lastly,

the Positive stage, based upon an exact view of the real facts of

the case. The first, though purely provisional, is invariably the

point from which we start; the third is the only permanent or normal

state; the second has but a modifying or rather a solvent influence,

which qualifies it for regulating the transition from the first stage

to the third. We begin with theological Imagination, thence we pass

through metaphysical Discussion, and we end at last with positive

Demonstration. Thus by means of this one general law we are enabled to

take a comprehensive and simultaneous view of the past, present, and

future of Humanity.

In my _System of Positive Philosophy_, this law of Filiation has always

been associated with the law of Classification, the application of

which to Social Dynamics furnishes the second element requisite for

the theory of development. It fixes the order in which our different

conceptions pass through each of these phases. That order, as is

generally known, is determined by the decreasing generality, or

what comes to the same thing, by the increasing complexity of the

phenomena; the more complex being naturally dependent upon those that

are more simple and less special. Arranging the sciences according to

this mutual relation, we find them grouped naturally in six primary

divisions[2]; Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology,

and Sociology. Each passes through the three phases of developments

before the one succeeding it. Without continuous reference to this

classification the theory of development would be confused and vague.

The theory thus derived from the combination of this second or

statical law with the dynamical law of the three stages, seems at

first sight to include nothing but the intellectual movement. But my

previous remarks will have shown that this is enough to guarantee

its applicability to social progress also; since social progress has

invariably depended on the growth of our fundamental beliefs with

regard to the economy that surrounds us. The historical portion of

my _Positive Philosophy_ has proved an unbroken connexion between

the development of Activity and that of Speculation; on the combined

influence of these depends the development of Affection. The theory

therefore requires no alteration: what is wanted is merely an

additional statement explaining the phases of active, that is to say,

of political development. Human activity, as I have long since shown,

passes successively through the stages of Offensive warfare, Defensive

warfare, and Industry. The respective connexion of these states with

the preponderance of the theological, then metaphysical, or the

positive spirit leads at once to a complete explanation of history. It

reproduces in a systematic form the only historical conception which

has become adopted by universal consent; the division, namely, of

history into Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern.

Thus the foundation of Social science depends simply upon establishing

the truth of this theory of development. We do this by combining the

dynamic law, which is its distinctive feature, with the statical

principle which renders it coherent; we then complete the theory by

extending it to practical life. All knowledge is now brought within

the sphere of Natural Philosophy; and the provisional distinction by

which, since Aristotle and Plato, it has been so sharply demarcated

from Moral Philosophy, ceases to exist. The Positive spirit, so long

confined to the simpler inorganic phenomena, has now passed through

its difficult course of probation. It extends to a more important and

more intricate class of speculations, and disengages them for ever from

all theological or metaphysical influence. All our notions of truth

are thus rendered homogeneous, and begin at once to converge towards a

central principle. A firm objective basis is consequently laid down for

that complete co-ordination of human existence towards which all sound

Philosophy has ever tended, but which the want of adequate materials

has hitherto made impossible.

[By the discovery of

Sociological laws social

questions are made

paramount; and thus our

_subjective principle_ is

satisfied without danger to

free thought]

It will be felt, I think, that the principal difficulty of the Positive

Synthesis was met by my discovery of the laws of development, if

we bear in mind that while that theory completes and co-ordinates

the objective basis of the system, it at the same time holds it in

subordination to the subjective principle. It is under the influence

of this moral principle that the whole philosophical construction

should be carried on. The inquiry into the Order of the Universe is

an indispensable task, and it comes necessarily within the province

of the intellect; but the intellect is too apt to aim in its pride at

something beyond its proper function, which consists in unremitting

service of the social sympathies. It would willingly escape from all

control and follow its own bent towards speculative digressions; a

tendency which is at present favoured by the undisciplined habits of

thought naturally due to the first rise of Positivism in its special

departments. The influence of the moral principle is necessary to

recall it to its true function; since if its investigations were

allowed to assume an absolute character, and to recognize no limit,

we should only be repeating in a scientific form many of the worst

results of theological and metaphysical belief. The Universe is to be

studied not for its own sake, but for the sake of Man or rather of

Humanity. To study it in any other spirit would not only be immoral,

but also highly irrational. For, as statements of pure objective

truth, our scientific theories can never be really satisfactory. They

can only satisfy us from the subjective point of view; that is, by

limiting themselves to the treatment of such questions as have some

direct or indirect influence over human life. It is for social feeling

to determine these limits; outside which our knowledge will always

remain imperfect as well as useless, and this even in the case of the

simplest phenomena; as astronomy testifies. Were the influence of

social feeling to be slackened, the Positive spirit would soon fall

back to the subjects which were preferred during the period of its

infancy; subjects the most remote from human interest, and therefore

also the easiest. While its probationary period lasted, it was natural

to investigate all accessible problems without distinction; and this

was often justified by the logical value of many problems that,

scientifically speaking, were useless. But now that the Positive

method has been sufficiently developed to be applied exclusively to

the purpose for which it was intended, there is no use whatever in

prolonging the period of probation by these idle exercises. Indeed the

want of purpose and discipline in our researches is rapidly assuming

a retrograde character. Its tendency is to undo the chief results

obtained by the spirit of detail during the time when that spirit was

really essential to progress.

Here, then, we are met by a serious difficulty. The construction of

the objective basis for the Positive synthesis imposes two conditions

which seem, at first sight, incompatible. On the one hand we must

allow the intellect to be free, or else we shall not have the full

benefit of its services; and, on the other, we must control its natural

tendency to unlimited digressions. The problem was insoluble, so long

as the study of the natural economy did not include Sociology. But

as soon as the Positive spirit extends to the treatment of social

questions, these at once take precedence of all others, and thus the

moral point of view becomes paramount. Objective science, proceeding

from without inwards, falls at last into natural harmony with the

subjective or moral principle, the superiority of which it had for

so long a time resisted. As a mere speculative question it may be

considered as proved to the satisfaction of every true thinker, that

the social point of view is logically and scientifically supreme

over all others, being the only point from which all our scientific

conceptions can be regarded as a whole. Yet its influence can never be

injurious to the progress of other Positive studies; for these, whether

for the sake of their method or of their subject matter, will always

continue to be necessary as an introduction to the final science.

Indeed the Positive system gives the highest sanction and the most

powerful stimulus to all preliminary sciences, by insisting on the

relation which each of them bears to the great whole, Humanity.

Thus the foundation of social science bears out the statement made at

the beginning of this work, that the intellect would, under Positivism,

accept its proper position of subordination to the heart. The

recognition of this, which is the subjective principle of Positivism,

renders the construction of a complete system of human life possible.

The antagonism which, since the close of the Middle Ages, has arisen

between Reason and Feeling, was an anomalous though inevitable

condition. It is now for ever at an end; and the only system which can

really satisfy the wants of our nature, individually or collectively,

is therefore ready for our acceptance. As long as the antagonism

existed, it was hopeless to expect that Social Sympathy could do much

to modify the preponderance of self-love in the affairs of life. But

the case is different as soon as reason and sympathy are brought into

active co-operation. Separately, their influence in our imperfect

organization is very feeble; but combined it may extend indefinitely.

It will never, indeed, be able to do away with the fact that practical

life must, to a large extent, be regulated by interested motives; yet

it may introduce a standard of morality inconceivably higher than any

that has existed in the past, before these two modifying forces could

be made to combine their action upon our stronger and lower instincts.

[Distinction between

Abstract and Concrete laws.

It is the former only that

we require for the purpose

before us]

In order to give a more precise conception of the intellectual basis

on which the system of Positive Polity should rest, I must explain the

general principle by which it should be limited. It should be confined

to what is really indispensable to the construction of that Polity.

Otherwise the intellect will be carried away, as it has been before, by

its tendency to useless digressions. It will endeavour to extend the

limits of its province; thereby escaping from the discipline imposed

by social motives, and putting off all attempts at moral and social

regeneration for a longer time than the construction of the philosophic

basis for action really demands. Here we shall find a fresh proof of

the importance of my theory of development. By that discovery the

intellectual synthesis may be considered as having already reached the

point from which the synthesis of affections may be at once begun; and

even that of actions, at least in its highest and most difficult part,

morality properly so called.

With the view of restricting the construction of the objective basis

within reasonable limits, there is this distinction to be borne in

mind. In the Order of Nature, there are two classes of laws; those

that are simple or Abstract, those that are compound or Concrete. In

my work on _Positive Philosophy_, the distinction has been thoroughly

established, and frequent use has been made of it. It will be

sufficient here to point out its origin and the method of applying it.

Positive science may deal either with objects themselves as they exist,

or with the separate phenomena that the objects exhibit. Of course we

can only judge of an object by the sum of its phenomena; but it is

open to us either to examine a special class of phenomena abstracted

from all the beings that exhibit it, or to take some special object,

and examine the whole concrete group of phenomena. In the latter case

we shall be studying different systems of existence; in the former,

different modes of activity. As good an example of the distinction as

can be given is that, already mentioned, of Meteorology. The facts of

weather are evidently combinations of astronomical, physical, chemical,

biological, and even social phenomena; each of these classes requiring

its own separate theories. Were these abstract laws sufficiently

well known to us, then the whole difficulty of the concrete problem

would be so to combine them, as to deduce the order in which each

composite effect would follow. This, however, is a process which

seems to me so far beyond our feeble powers of deduction, that, even

supposing our knowledge of the abstract laws perfect, we should still

be obliged to have recourse to the inductive method.

Now the investigation of the economy of nature here contemplated is

evidently of the abstract kind. We decompose that economy into its

primary phenomena, that is to say, into those which are not reducible

to others. These we range in classes, each of which, notwithstanding

the connexion that exists between all, requires a separate inductive

process; for the existence of laws cannot be proved in any one of them

by pure deduction. It is only with these simpler and more abstract

relations that our synthesis is directly concerned: when these are

established, they afford a rational groundwork for the more composite

and concrete researches. The great complexity of concrete relations

makes it probable that we shall never be able to co-ordinate them

perfectly. In that case the synthesis would always remain limited to

abstract laws. But its true object, that of supplying an objective

basis for the great synthesis of human life, will none the less be

attained. For this groundwork of abstract knowledge would introduce

harmony between all our mental conceptions, and thereby would make it

impossible to systematize our feelings and actions, which is the object

of all sound philosophy. The abstract study of nature is therefore

all that is absolutely indispensable for the establishment of unity

in human life. It serves as the foundation of all wise action; as the

_philosophia prima_, the necessity of which in the normal state of

humanity was dimly foreseen by Bacon. When the abstract laws exhibiting

the various modes of activity have been brought systematically before

us, our practical knowledge of each special system of existence ceases

to be purely empirical, though the greater number of concrete laws may

still be unknown. We find the best example of this truth in the most

difficult and important subject of all, Sociology. Knowledge of the

principal statical and dynamical laws of social existence is evidently

sufficient for the purpose of systematizing the various aspects of

private or public life, and thereby of rendering our condition far

more perfect. Should this knowledge be acquired, of which there is

now no doubt, we need not regret being unable to give a satisfactory

explanation of every state of society that we find existing throughout

the world in all ages. The discipline of social feeling will check

any foolish indulgence of the spirit of curiosity, and prevent the

understanding from wasting its powers in useless speculations; for

feeble as these powers are, it is from them that Humanity derives

her most efficient means of contending against the defects of the

External Order. The discovery of the principal concrete laws would no

doubt be attended by the most beneficial results, moral as well as

physical; and this is the field in which the science of the future

will reap its richest harvest. But such knowledge is not indispensable

for our present purpose, which is to form a complete synthesis of

life, effecting for the final state of humanity what the theological

synthesis effected for its primitive state. For this purpose Abstract

philosophy is undoubtedly sufficient; so that even supposing that

Concrete philosophy should never become so perfect as we desire, social

regeneration will still be possible.

[In my Theory of

Development, the required

Synthesis of Abstract

conceptions already exists]

Regarded under this more simple aspect, our system of scientific

knowledge is already so far elaborated, that all thinkers whose nature

is sufficiently sympathetic may proceed without delay to the problem

of moral regeneration; a problem which must prepare the way for that

of political reorganization. For we shall find that the theory of

development of which we have been speaking, when looked at from another

point of view, condenses and systematizes all our abstract conceptions

of the order of nature.

This will be understood by regarding all departments of our knowledge

as being really component parts of one and the same science; the

science of Humanity. All other sciences are but the prelude or the

development of this. Before we can enter upon it directly, there

are two subjects which it is necessary to investigate; our external

circumstances, and the organization of our own nature. Social life

cannot be understood without first understanding the medium in which

it is developed, and the beings who manifest it. We shall make no

progress, therefore, in the final science until we have sufficient

abstract knowledge of the outer world and of individual life to define

the influence of these laws on the special laws of social phenomena.

And this is necessary from the logical as well as from the scientific

point of view. The feeble faculties of our intellect require to be

trained for the more difficult speculations by practice in the easier.

For the same reasons, the study of the inorganic world should take

precedence of the organic. For, in the first place, the laws of the

more universal mode of existence have a preponderating influence over

those of the more special modes; and in the second place it is clearly

incumbent on us to begin the study of the Positive method with its

simplest and most characteristic applications. I need not dwell further

upon principles so fully established in my former work.

Social Philosophy, therefore, ought on every ground to be preceded by

Natural Philosophy in the ordinary sense of the word; that is to say

by the study of inorganic and organic nature. It is reserved for our

own century to take in the whole scope of science; but the commencement

of these preparatory studies dates from the first astronomical

discoveries of antiquity. Natural Philosophy was completed by the

modern science of Biology, of which the ancients possessed nothing but

a few statical principles. The dependence of biological conditions upon

astronomical is very certain. But these two sciences differ too much

from each other and are too indirectly connected to give us an adequate

conception of Natural Philosophy as a whole. It would be pushing the

principle of condensation too far to reduce it to these two terms. One

connecting link was supplied by the science of Chemistry which arose

in the Middle Ages. The natural succession of Astronomy, Chemistry,

and Biology leading gradually up to the final science, Sociology, made

it possible to conceive more or less imperfectly of an intellectual

synthesis. But the interposition of Chemistry was not enough: because,

though its relation to Biology was intimate, it was too remote from

Astronomy. For want of understanding the mode in which astronomical

conditions really affected us, the arbitrary and chimerical fancies

of astrology were employed, though of course quite valueless except

for this temporary purpose. In the seventeenth century, however, the

science of Physics specially so called, was founded; and a satisfactory

arrangement of scientific conceptions began to be formed. Physics

included a series of inorganic researches, the more general branch of

which bordered on Astronomy, the more special on Chemistry. To complete

our view of the scientific hierarchy we have now only to go back to

its origin, Mathematics; a class of speculations so simple and so

general, that they passed at once and without effort into the Positive

stage. Without Mathematics, Astronomy was impossible: and they will

always continue to be the starting-point of Positive education for the

individual as they have been for the race. Even under the most absolute

theological influence they stimulate the Positive spirit to a certain

degree of systematic growth. From them it extends step by step to the

subjects from which at first it had been most rigidly excluded.

We see from these brief remarks that the series of the abstract

sciences naturally arranges itself according to the decrease in

generality and the increase in complication. We see the reason for the

introduction of each member of the series, and the mutual connexion

between them. The classification is evidently the same as that before

laid down in my theory of development. That theory therefore may be

regarded, from the statical point of view, as furnishing a direct basis

for the co-ordination of Abstract conception, on which, as we have

seen, the whole synthesis of human life depends. That co-ordination

at once establishes unity in our intellectual operations. It realizes

the desire obscurely expressed by Bacon for a _scala intellectûs_,

a ladder of the understanding, by the aid of which our thoughts may

pass with ease from the lowest subjects to the highest, or vice versa,

without weakening the sense of their continuous connexion in nature.

Each of the six terms of which our series is composed is in its central

portion quite distinct from the two adjoining links; but it is closely

related in its commencement to the preceding term, in its conclusion

to the term which follows. A further proof of the homogeneousness and

continuity of the system is that the same principle of classification,

when applied more closely, enables us to arrange the various theories

of which each science consists. For example, the three great orders of

mathematical speculations, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Mechanics, follow

the same law of classification as that by which the entire scale is

regulated. And I have shown in my _Positive Philosophy_ that the same

holds good of the other sciences. As a whole, therefore, the series

is the most concise summary that can be formed of the vast range of

Abstract truth; and conversely, all rational researches of a special

kind result in some partial development of this series. Each term in

it requires its own special processes of induction; yet in each we

reason deductively from the preceding term, a method which will always

be as necessary for purposes of instruction as it was originally for

the purpose of discovery. Thus it is that all our other studies are

but a preparation for the final science of Humanity. By it their mode

of culture will always be influenced and will gradually be imbued with

the true spirit of generality, which is so closely connected with

social sympathy. Nor is there any danger of such influence becoming

oppressive, since the very principle of our system is to combine a

due measure of independence with practical convergence. The fact that

our theory of classification, by the very terms of its composition,

subordinates intellectual to social considerations, is eminently

calculated to secure its popular acceptance. It brings the whole

speculative system under the criticism, and at the same time under the

protection of the public, which is usually not slow to check any abuse

of those habits of abstraction which are necessary to the philosopher.

The same theory then which explains the mental evolution of Humanity,

lays down the true method by which our abstract conceptions should be

classified; thus reconciling the conditions of Order and Movement,

hitherto more or less at variance. Its historical clearness and its

philosophical force strengthen each other, for we cannot understand

the connexion of our conceptions except by studying the succession of

the phases through which they pass. And on the other hand, but for the

existence of such a connexion, it would be impossible to explain the

historical phases. So we see that for all sound thinkers, History and

Philosophy are inseparable.

[Therefore we are in a

position to proceed at once

with the work of social

regeneration]

A theory which embraces the statical as well as the dynamical aspects

of the subject, and which fulfils the conditions here spoken of, may

certainly be regarded as establishing the true objective basis on

which unity can be established in our intellectual functions. And

this unity will be developed and consolidated as our knowledge of its

basis becomes more satisfactory. But the social application of the

system will have far more influence on the result than any overstrained

attempts at exact scientific accuracy. The object of our philosophy

is to direct the spiritual reorganization of the civilized world. It

is with a view to this object that all attempts at fresh discovery

or at improved arrangement should be conducted. Moral and political

requirements will lead us to investigate new relations; but the search

should not be carried farther than is necessary for their application.

Sufficient for our purpose, if this incipient classification of our

mental products be so far worked out that the synthesis of Affection

and of Action may be at once attempted; that is, that we may begin

at once to construct that system of morality under which the final

regeneration of Humanity will proceed. Those who have read my _Positive

Philosophy_ will, I think, be convinced that the time for this attempt

has arrived. How urgently it is needed will appear in every part of the

present work.

[Error of identifying

Positivism with Atheism,

Materialism, Fatalism,

or Optimism. Atheism,

like Theology, discusses

insoluble mysteries]

I have now described the general spirit of Positivism. But there are

two or three points on which some further explanation is necessary, as

they are the source of misapprehensions too common and too serious to

be disregarded. Of course I only concern myself with such objections as

are made in good faith.

The fact of entire freedom from theological belief being necessary

before the Positive state can be perfectly attained, has induced

superficial observers to confound Positivism with a state of pure

negation. Now this state was at one time, and that even so recently as

the last century, favourable to progress; but at present in those who

unfortunately still remain in it, it is a radical obstacle to all sound

social and even intellectual organization. I have long ago repudiated

all philosophical or historical connexion between Positivism and what

is called Atheism. But it is desirable to expose the error somewhat

more clearly.

Atheism, even from the intellectual point of view, is a very imperfect

form of emancipation; for its tendency is to prolong the metaphysical

stage indefinitely, by continuing to seek for new solutions of

Theological problems, instead of setting aside all inaccessible

researches on the ground of their utter inutility. The true Positive

spirit consists in substituting the study of the invariable Laws of

phenomena for that of their so-called Causes, whether proximate or

primary; in a word, in studying the _How_ instead of the _Why_. Now

this is wholly incompatible with the ambitious and visionary attempts

of Atheism to explain the formation of the Universe, the origin of

animal life, etc. The Positivist comparing the various phases of human

speculation, looks upon these scientific chimeras as far less valuable

even from the intellectual point of view than the first spontaneous

inspirations of primeval times. The principle of Theology is to explain

everything by supernatural _Wills_. That principle can never be set

aside until we acknowledge the search for _Causes_ to be beyond our

reach, and limit ourselves to the knowledge of _Laws_. As long as men

persist in attempting to answer the insoluble questions which occupied

the attention of the childhood of our race, by far the more rational

plan is to do as was done then, that is, simply to give free play to

the imagination. These spontaneous beliefs have gradually fallen into

disuse, not because they have been disproved, but because mankind has

become more enlightened as to its wants and the scope of its powers,

and has gradually given an entirely new direction to its speculative

efforts. If we insist upon penetrating the unattainable mystery of

the essential Cause that produces phenomena, there is no hypothesis

more satisfactory than that they proceed from Wills dwelling in them

or outside them; an hypothesis which assimilates them to the effect

produced by the desires which exist within ourselves. Were it not for

the pride induced by metaphysical and scientific studies, it would

be inconceivable that any atheist, modern or ancient, should have

believed that his vague hypotheses on such a subject were preferable

to this direct mode of explanation. And it was the only mode which

really satisfied the reason, until men began to see the utter inanity

and inutility of all search for absolute truth. The Order of Nature is

doubtless very imperfect in every respect; but its production is far

more compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent Will than with

that of a blind mechanism. Persistent atheists therefore would seem

to be most illogical of theologists: because they occupy themselves

with theological problems, and yet reject the only appropriate

method of handling them. But the fact is that pure Atheism even in

the present day is very rare. What is called Atheism is usually a

phase of Pantheism, which is really nothing but a relapse disguised

under learned terms, into a vague and abstract form of Fetichism.

And it is not impossible that it may lead to the reproduction in one

form or other of every theological phase as soon as the check which

modern society still imposes on metaphysical extravagance has become

somewhat weakened. The adoption of such theories as a satisfactory

system of belief, indicates a very exaggerated or rather false view

of intellectual requirements, and a very insufficient recognition of

moral and social wants. It is generally connected with the visionary

but mischievous tendencies of ambitious thinkers to uphold what they

call the empire of Reason. In the moral sphere it forms a sort of

basis for the degrading fallacies of modern metaphysicians as to the

absolute preponderance of self-interest. Politically, its tendency is

to unlimited prolongation of the revolutionary position: its spirit

is that of blind hatred to the past: and it resists all attempts to

explain it on Positive principles, with a view of disclosing the

future. Atheism, therefore, is not likely to lead to Positivism except

in those who pass through it rapidly as the last and most short-lived

of metaphysical phases. And the wide diffusion of the scientific

spirit in the present day makes this passage so easy that to arrive at

maturity without accomplishing it, is a symptom of a certain mental

weakness, which is often connected with moral insufficiency, and is

very incompatible with Positivism. Negation offers but a feeble and

precarious basis for union: and disbelief in Monotheism is of itself

no better proof of a mind fit to grapple with the questions of the

day than disbelief in Polytheism or Fetichism, which no one would

maintain to be an adequate ground for claiming intellectual sympathy.

The atheistic phase indeed was not really necessary, except for the

revolutionists of the last century who took the lead in the movement

towards radical regeneration of society. The necessity has already

ceased; for the decayed condition of the old system makes the need of

regeneration palpable to all. Persistence in anarchy, and Atheism is

the most characteristic symptom of anarchy, is a temper of mind more

unfavourable to the organic spirit, which ought by this time to have

established its influence, than sincere adhesion to the old forms.

This latter is of course obstructive: but at least it does not hinder

us from fixing our attention upon the great social problem. Indeed

it helps us to do so: because it forces the new philosophy to throw

aside every weapon of attack against the older faith except its own

higher capacity of satisfying our moral and social wants. But in the

Atheism maintained by many metaphysicians and scientific men of the

present day, Positivism, instead of wholesome rivalry of this kind,

will meet with nothing but barren resistance. Anti-theological as such

men may be, they feel unmixed repugnance for any attempts at social

regeneration, although their efforts in the last century had to some

extent prepared the way for it. Far, then, from counting upon their

support, Positivists must expect to find them hostile: although from

the incoherence of their opinions it will not be difficult to reclaim

those of them whose errors are not essentially due to pride.

[Materialism is due to the

encroachment of the lower

sciences on the domain of

the higher: an error which

Positivism rectifies]

The charge of Materialism which is often made against Positive

philosophy is of more importance. It originates in the course of

scientific study upon which the Positive system is based. In answering

the charge, I need not enter into any discussion of impenetrable

mysteries. Our theory of development will enable us to see distinctly

the real ground of the confusion that exists upon the subject.

Positive science was for a long time limited to the simplest subjects:

it could not reach the highest except by a natural series of

intermediate steps. As each of these steps is taken, the student is

apt to be influenced too strongly by the methods and results of the

preceding stage. Here, as it seems to me, lies the real source of that

scientific error which men have instinctively blamed as _materialism_.

The name is just, because the tendency indicated is one which degrades

the higher subjects of thought by confounding them with the lower. It

was hardly possible that this usurpation by one science of the domain

of another should have been wholly avoided. For since the more special

phenomena do really depend upon the more general, it is perfectly

legitimate for each science to exercise a certain deductive influence

upon that which follows it in the scale. By such influence the special

inductions of that science were rendered more coherent. The result,

however, is that each of the sciences has to undergo a long struggle

against the encroachments of the one preceding it; a struggle which,

even in the case of the subjects which have been studied longest, is

not yet over. Nor can it entirely cease until the controlling influence

of sound philosophy be established over the whole scale, introducing

juster views of the relations of its several parts, about which at

present there is such irrational confusion. Thus it appears that

Materialism is a danger inherent in the mode in which the scientific

studies necessary as a preparation for Positivism were pursued.

Each science tended to absorb the one next to it, on the ground of

having reached the Positive stage earlier and more thoroughly. The

evil then is really deeper and more extensive than is imagined by

most of those who deplore it. It passes generally unnoticed except

in the highest class of subjects. These doubtless are more seriously

affected, inasmuch as they undergo the encroaching process from all

the rest; but we find the same thing in different degrees, in every

step of the scientific scale. Even the lowest step, Mathematics, is

no exception, though its position would seem at first sight to exempt

it. To a philosophic eye there is Materialism in the common tendency

of mathematicians at the present day to absorb Geometry or Mechanics

into the Calculus, as well as in the more evident encroachments of

Mathematics upon Physics, of Physics upon Chemistry, of Chemistry,

which is more frequent, upon Biology, or lastly in the common tendency

of the best biologists to look upon Sociology as a mere corollary of

their own science. In all cases it is the same fundamental error:

that is, an exaggerated use of deductive reasoning; and in all it is

attended with the same result; that the higher studies are in constant

danger of being disorganized by the indiscriminate application of the

lower. All scientific specialists at the present time are more or less

materialists, according as the phenomena studied by them are more or

less simple and general. Geometricians, therefore, are more liable to

the error than any others; they all aim consciously or otherwise at a

synthesis in which the most elementary studies, those of Number, Space,

and Motion, are made to regulate all the rest. But the biologists who

resist this encroachment most energetically, are often guilty of the

same mistake. They not unfrequently attempt, for instance, to explain

all sociological facts by the influence of climate and race, which

are purely secondary; thus showing their ignorance of the fundamental

laws of Sociology, which can only be discovered by a series of direct

inductions from history.

This philosophical estimate of Materialism explains how it is that

it has been brought as a charge against Positivism, and at the same

time proves the deep injustice of the charge. Positivism, far from

countenancing so dangerous an error, is, as we have seen, the only

philosophy which can completely remove it. The error arises from

certain tendencies which are in themselves legitimate, but which have

been carried too far; and Positivism satisfies these tendencies in

their due measure. Hitherto the evil has remained unchecked, except by

the theologico-metaphysical spirit, which, by giving rise to what is

called Spiritualism, has rendered a very valuable service. But useful

as it has been, it could not arrest the active growth of Materialism,

which has assumed in the eyes of modern thinkers something of a

progressive character, from having been so long connected with the

cause of resistance to a retrograde system. Notwithstanding all the

protests of the spiritualists, the lower sciences have encroached upon

the higher to an extent that seriously impairs their independence and

their value. But Positivism meets the difficulty far more effectually.

It satisfies and reconciles all that is really tenable in the rival

claims of both Materialism and Spiritualism; and, having done this,

it discards them both. It holds the one to be as dangerous to Order

as the other to Progress. This result is an immediate consequence of

the establishment of the encyclopædic scale, in which each science

retains its own proper sphere of induction, while deductively it

remains subordinate to the science which precedes it. But what really

decides the matter is the fact that such paramount importance, both

logically and scientifically, is given by Positive Philosophy to social

questions. For these are the questions in which the influence of

Materialism is most mischievous, and also in which it is most easily

introduced. A system therefore which gives them the precedence over all

other questions must hold Materialism to be quite as obstructive as

Spiritualism, since both are alike an obstacle to the progress of that

science for the sake of which all other sciences are studied. Further

advance in the work of social regeneration implies the elimination of

both of them, because it cannot proceed without exact knowledge of

the laws of moral and social phenomena. In the next chapter I shall

have to speak of the mischievous effects of Materialism upon the Art

or practice of social life. It leads to a misconception of the most

fundamental principle of that Art, namely, the systematic separation

of spiritual and temporal power. To maintain that separation, to carry

out on a more satisfactory basis the admirable attempt made in the

Middle Ages by the Catholic Church, is the most important of political

questions. Thus the antagonism of Positivism to Materialism rests upon

political no less than upon philosophical grounds.

With the view of securing a dispassionate consideration of this

subject, and of avoiding all confusion, I have laid no stress upon the

charge of immorality that is so often brought against Materialism.

The reproach, even when made sincerely, is constantly belied by

experience, indeed it is inconsistent with all that we know of human

nature. Our opinions, whether right or wrong, have not, fortunately,

the absolute power over our feelings and conduct which is commonly

attributed to them. Materialism has been provisionally connected

with the whole movement of emancipation, and it has therefore often

been found in common with the noblest aspirations. That connexion,

however, has now ceased; and it must be owned that even in the most

favourable cases this error, purely intellectual though it be, has to

a certain extent always checked the free play of our nobler instincts,

by leading men to ignore or misconceive moral phenomena, which were

left unexplained by its crude hypothesis. Cabanis gave a striking

example of this tendency in his unfortunate attack upon mediaeval

chivalry.[3] Cabanis was a philosopher whose moral nature was as pure

and sympathetic as his intellect was elevated and enlarged. Yet the

materialism of his day had entirely blinded him to the beneficial

results of the attempts made by the most energetic of our ancestors to

institute the Worship of Woman.

We have now examined the two principal charges brought against the

Positive system, and we have found that they apply merely to the

unsystematic state in which Positive principles are first introduced.

But the system is also accused of Fatalism and of Optimism; charges

on which it will not be necessary to dwell at great length, because,

though frequently made, they are not difficult to refute.

[Nor is Positivism

fatalist, since it asserts

the External Order to be

modifiable]

The charge of Fatalism has accompanied every fresh extension of

Positive science, from its first beginnings. Nor is this surprising;

for when any series of phenomena passes from the dominion of Wills,

whether modified by metaphysical abstractions or not, to the dominion

of Laws, the regularity of the latter contrasts so strongly with the

instability of the former, as to present an appearance of fatality,

which nothing but a very careful examination of the real character of

scientific truth can dissipate. And the error is the more likely to

occur from the fact that our first types of natural laws are derived

from the phenomena of the heavenly bodies. These, being wholly beyond

our interference, always suggest the notion of absolute necessity, a

notion which it is difficult to prevent from extending to more complex

phenomena, as soon as they are brought within the reach of the Positive

method. And it is quite true that Positivism holds the Order of Nature

to be in its primary aspects strictly invariable. All variations,

whether spontaneous or artificial, are only transient and of secondary

import. The conception of unlimited variations would in fact be

equivalent to the rejection of Law altogether. But while this accounts

for the fact that every new Positive theory is accused of Fatalism,

it is equally clear that blind persistence in the accusation shows a

very shallow conception of what Positivism really is. For, unchangeable

as the Order of Nature is in its main aspects, yet all phenomena,

except those of Astronomy, admit of being modified in their secondary

relations, and this the more as they are more complicated. The Positive

spirit, when confined to the subjects of Mathematics and Astronomy, was

inevitably fatalist; but this ceased to be the case when it extended to

Physics and Chemistry, and especially to Biology, where the margin of

variation is very considerable. Now that it embraces Social phenomena,

the reproach, however it may have been once deserved, should be heard

no longer, since these phenomena, which will for the future form its

principal field, admit of larger modification than any others, and that

chiefly by our own intervention. It is obvious then that Positivism,

far from encouraging indolence, stimulates us to action, especially to

social action, far more energetically than any Theological doctrine. It

removes all groundless scruples, and prevents us from having recourse

to chimeras. It encourages our efforts everywhere, except where they

are manifestly useless.

[The charge of Optimism

applies to Theology rather

than to Positivism. The

positivist judges of

all historical actions

_relatively_, but

does not justify them

indiscriminately]

For the charge of Optimism there is even less ground than for that

of Fatalism. The latter was, to a certain extent, connected with

the rise of the Positive spirit; but Optimism is simply a result

of Theology; and its influence has always been decreasing with the

growth of Positivism. Astronomical laws, it is true, suggest the idea

of perfection as naturally as that of necessity. On the other hand,

their great simplicity places the defects of the Order of Nature in so

clear a light, that optimists would never have sought their arguments

in astronomy, were it not that the first elements of the science had

to be worked out under the influence of Monotheism, a system which

involved the hypothesis of absolute wisdom. But by the theory of

development on which the Positive synthesis is here made to rest,

Optimism is discarded as well as Fatalism, in the direct proportion

of the intricacy of the phenomena. It is in the most intricate that

the defects of Nature, as well as the power of modifying them, become

most manifest. With regard, therefore, to social phenomena, the most

complex of all, both charges are utterly misplaced. Any optimistic

tendencies that writers on social subjects may display, must be due

to the fact that their education has not been such as to teach them

the nature and conditions of the true scientific spirit. For want

of sound logical training, great misuse has been made in our own

time of a property peculiar to social phenomena. It is that we find

in them a greater amount of spontaneous wisdom than might have been

expected from their complexity. It would be a mistake, however, to

suppose this wisdom perfect. The phenomena in question are those of

intelligent beings who are always occupied in amending the defects

of their economy. It is obvious, therefore, that they will show less

imperfection than if, in a case equally complicated, the agents could

have been blind. The standard by which to judge of action is always

to be taken relatively to the social state in which the action takes

place. Therefore all historical positions and changes must have at

least some grounds of justification; otherwise they would be totally

incomprehensible, because inconsistent with the nature of the agents

and of the actions performed by them. Now this naturally fosters a

dangerous tendency to Optimism in all thinkers, who, whatever their

powers may be, have not passed through any strict scientific training,

and have consequently never cast off metaphysical and theological modes

of thought in the higher subjects. Because every government shows a

certain adaptation to the civilization of its time, they make the loose

assertion that the adaptation is perfect; a conception which is of

course chimerical. But it is unjust to charge Positivism with errors

which are evidently contrary to its true spirit, and merely due to

the want of logical and scientific training in those who have hitherto

engaged in the study of social questions. The object of Sociology is

to explain all historical facts; not to justify them indiscriminately,

as is done by those who are unable to distinguish the influence of the

agent from that of surrounding circumstances.

[The word _Positive_

connotes all the highest

intellectual attributes, and

will ultimately have a moral

significance]

On reviewing this brief sketch of the intellectual character of

Positivism, it will be seen that all its essential attributes

are summed up in the word _Positive_, which I applied to the new

philosophy at its outset. All the languages of Western Europe agree in

understanding by this word and its derivatives the two qualities of

_reality_ and _usefulness_. Combining these, we get at once an adequate

definition of the true philosophic spirit, which, after all, is nothing

but good sense generalized and put into a systematic form. The term

also implies in all European languages, _certainty_ and _precision_,

qualities by which the intellect of modern nations is markedly

distinguished from that of antiquity. Again, the ordinary acceptation

of the term implies a directly _organic_ tendency. Now the metaphysical

spirit is incapable of organizing; it can only criticize. This

distinguishes it from the Positive spirit, although for a time they

had a common sphere of action. By speaking of Positivism as organic,

we imply that it has a social purpose; that purpose being to supersede

Theology in the spiritual direction of the human race.

But the word will bear yet a further meaning. The organic character

of the system leads us naturally to another of its attributes, namely

its invariable _relativity_. Modern thinkers will never rise above

that critical position which they have hitherto taken up towards the

past, except by repudiating all absolute principles. This last meaning

is more latent than the others, but is really contained in the term.

It will soon become generally accepted, and the word _Positive_ will

be understood to mean relative as much as it now means _organic_,

_precise_, _certain_, _useful_, and _real_. Thus the highest attributes

of human wisdom have, with one exception, been gradually condensed

into a single expressive term. All that is now wanting is that the

word should denote what at first could form no part of the meaning,

the union of moral with intellectual qualities. At present, only the

latter are included; but the course of modern progress makes it certain

that the conception implied by the word Positive, will ultimately have

a more direct reference to the heart than to the understanding. For

it will soon be felt by all that the tendency of Positivism, and that

by virtue of its primary characteristic, reality, is to make Feeling

systematically supreme over Reason as well as over Activity. After all,

the change consists simply in realizing the full etymological value of

the word _Philosophy_[4]. For it was impossible to realize it until

moral and mental conditions had been reconciled; and this has been now

done by the foundation of a Positive science of society.