A GOD: AND HIS ATTRIBUTES.

I will commence with a noble, and, as I believe, an inspired sentence:

than which no truth uttered by philosophers ever was more clearly or

more sublimely expressed. "In the beginning was the Word: and the Word

was with God; and the Word was God." In its due course, we will consider

especially the difference between the Word and God; likewise the seeming

contradiction, but true concord, of being simultaneously God, and with

God. At present, and previously to the true commencement of our _à

priori_ thoughts, let us, by a word or two, paraphrase that brief but

comprehensive sentence, "In the beginning was the Word." Eternity has no

beginning, as it has no end: the clock of Time is futile there: it

might as well attempt to go in vacuo. Nevertheless, in respect to

finite intelligences like ourselves, seeing that eternity is an idea

totally inconceivable, it is wise, nay it is only possible, to be

presented to the mind piecemeal. Even our deepest mathematicians do not

scruple to speak of points "infinitely remote;" as if in that phrase

there existed no contradiction of terms. So, also, we pretend in our

emptiness to talk of eternity past, time present, and eternity to come;

the fact being that, muse as a man may, he can entertain no idea of an

existence which is not measurable by time: any more than he can conceive

of a colour unconnected with the rainbow, or of a musical note beyond

the seven sounds. The plain intention of the words is this: place the

starting-post of human thought as far back into eternity as you will, be

it what man counts a thousand ages, or ten thousand times ten thousand,

or be these myriads multiplied again by millions, still, in any such

Beginning, and in the beginning of all beginnings (for so must creatures

talk)--then was God. He Was: the scholar knows full well the force of

the original term, the philological distinctions between [Greek: eimi]

and [Greek: gignomai]: well pleased, he reads as of the Divinity [Greek:

ên], He self-existed; and equally well pleased he reads of the humanity

[Greek: egennêthê], he was born. The thought and phrase [Greek: ên]

sympathizes, if it has not an identity, with the Hebrew's unutterable

Name. HE then, whose title, amongst all others likewise denoting

excellence supreme and glory underivative, is essentially "I am;" HE

who, relatively to us as to all creation else, has a new name wisely

chosen in "the Word,"--the great expression of the idea of God; this

mighty Intelligence is found in any such beginning self-existent. That

teaching is a mere fact, known posteriorly from the proof of all things

created, as well as by many wonderful signs, and the clear voice of

revelation. We do not attempt to prove it; that were easy and obvious:

but our more difficult endeavour at present is to show how antecedently

probable it was that God should be: and that so being, He should be

invested with the reasonable attributes, wherewithal we know His

glorious Nature to be clothed.

Take then our beginning where we will, there must have existed in that

"originally" either Something, or Nothing. It is a clear matter to

prove, _à posteriori_, that Something did exist; because something

exists now: every matter and every derived spirit must have had a

Father; _ex nihilo nihil fit_, is not more a truth, than that creation

must have had a Creator. However, leaving this plain path (which I only

point at by the way for obvious mental uses), let us now try to get at

the great antecedent probability that in the beginning Something should

have been, rather than Nothing.

The term, Nothing, is a fallacious one: it does not denote an existence,

as Something does, but the end of an existence. It is in fact a

negation, which must prësuppose a matter once in being and possible to

be denied; it is an abstraction, which cannot happen unless there be

somewhat to be taken away; the idea of vacuity must be posterior to that

of fullness; the idea of no tree is incompetent to be conceived without

the previous idea of _a_ tree; the idea of nonentity suggests, _ex vi

termini_, a pre-existent entity; the idea of Nothing, of necessity,

prësupposes Something. And a Something once having been, it would still

and for ever continue to be, unless sufficient cause be found for its

removal; that cause itself, you will observe, being a Something. The

chances are forcibly in favour of continuance, that is of perpetuity;

and the likelihoods proclaim loudly that there should be an Existence.

It was thus, then, antecedently more probable, than in any imaginable

beginning from which reason can start, Something should be found

existent, rather than Nothing. This is the first probability.

Next; of what nature and extent is this Something, this Being, likely to

be?--There will be either one such being, or many: if many, the many

either sprang from the one, or the mass are all self-existent; in the

former case, there would be a creation and a God: in the latter, there

would be many Gods. Is the latter antecedently more probable?--let us

see. First, it is evident that if many are probable, few are more

probable, and one most probable of all. The more possible gods you take

away, the more do impediments diminish; until, that is to say, you

arrive at that One Being, whom we have already proved probable.

Moreover, many must be absolutely united as one; in which case the many

is a gratuitous difficulty, because they may as well be regarded for all

purposes of worship or argument as one God: or the many must have been

in essence more or less disunited; in which case, as a state of any

thing short of pure concord carries in itself the seeds of dissolution,

needs must that one or other of the many (long before any possible

beginnings, as we count beginnings, looking down the past vista of

eternity), would have taken opportunity by such disturbing causes to

become absolute monarch: whether by peaceful persuasion, or hostile

compulsion, or other mode of absorbing disunions, would be indifferent;

if they were not all improbable, as unworthy of the God. Perpetuity of

discord is a thing impossible; every thing short of unity tends to

decomposition. Any how then, given the element of eternity to work in,

a one great Supreme Being was, in the created beginning, an _à priori_

probability. That all other assumptions than that of His true and

eternal Oneness are as false in themselves as they are derogatory to the

rational views of deity, we all now see and believe; but the direct

proofs of this are more strictly matters of revelation than of reason:

albeit reason too can discern their probabilities. Wise heathens, such

as Socrates and Cicero, who had not our light, arrived nevertheless at

some of this perception; and thus, through conscience and intelligence,

became a law unto themselves: because that, to them, as now to any one

of us who may not yet have seen the light, the anterior likelihood

existed for only one God, rather than more; a likelihood which prepares

the mind to take as a fundamental truth, "The Lord our God is one

Jehovah."

Next; Self-existence combined with unity must include the probable

attribute, or character, Ubiquity; as I now proceed to show. On the same

principle as that by which we have seen Something to be likelier than

Nothing, we conclude that the same Something is more probable to be

every where, than the same Nothing (if the phrase were not absurd), to

be any where: we may, so to speak, divide infinity into spaces, and

prove the position in each instance: moreover, as that Something is

essentially--not a unit as of many, but--unity involving all, it follows

as most probable that this Whole Being should be ubiquitous; in other

parlance, that the one God should be every where at once: also, there

being no limit to what we call Space, nor any imaginable hostile power

to place a constraint upon the One Great Being, this Whole Being must be

ubiquitous to a degree strictly infinite: "HE is in every place,

beholding the evil and the good."

Such a consideration (and it is a perfectly true one) renders necessary

the next point, to wit, that God is a Spirit. No possible substance can

be every where at once: essence may, but not substance. Corporeity in

any shape must be local; local is finite; and we have just proved the

anterior probability of a One great Existence being (notwithstanding

unity of essence) infinite. Illocal and infinite are convertible terms:

spirit is illocal; and, as God is infinite--that is, illocal--it is

clear that "God is a Spirit."

We have thus (not attempting to build up faith by such slight tools, but

only using them to cut away prejudice) arrived at the high probability

of a God invested with His natural qualities or attributes;

Self-existence, Unity, the faculty of being every where at once and that

every where Infinitude; and essentially of a Spiritual nature, not

material. His moral, or accidental attributes (so to speak), were,

antecedently to their expression, equally easy of being proved

probable. First, with respect to Power: given no disturbing cause--(we

shall soon consider the question of permitted evil, and its origin; but

this, however disturbing to creatures, will be found not only none to

God, but, as it were, only a ray of His glory suffered to be broken for

prismatic beauty's sake, a flash of the direction of His energies

suffered to be diverted for the superior triumph of good in that day

when it shall be shown that "God hath made all things for himself, yea,

even the wicked for the time of visitation")--with the _datum_ then of

no disturbing cause obstructing or opposing, an infinite being must be

able to do all things within the sphere of such infinity: in other

phrase, He must be all-powerful. Just so, an impetus in vacuity suffers

no check, but ever sails along among the fleet of worlds; and the innate

Impulse of the Deity must expand and energize throughout that

infinitude, Himself. For a like reason of ubiquity, God must know all

things: it is impossible to escape from the strong likelihood that any

intelligent being must be conversant of what is going on under his very

eye. Again; in the case both of Power and Knowledge, alike with the

coming attributes of Goodness and Wisdom--(wisdom considered as morally

distinct from mere knowledge or awaredness; it being quite possible to

conceive a cold eye seeing all things heedlessly, and a clear mind

knowing all things heartlessly)--in the case, I say, of all these

accidental attributes, there recurs for argument, one analogous to that

by which we showed the anterior probability of a self-existence. Things

positive must precede things negative. Sight must have been, before

blindness is possible; and before we can arrive at a just idea of no

sight. Power must be precursor to an abstraction from power, or

weakness. The minor-existence of ignorance is an impossibility, unless

you prëallow the major-existence of wisdom; for it amounts to a debasing

or a diminution of wisdom. Sin is well defined to be, the transgression

of law; for without law, there can be no sin. So, also, without wisdom,

there can be no ignorance; without power, there can be no weakness;

without goodness, there can be no evil.

Furthermore. An affirmative--such as wisdom, power, goodness--can exist

absolutely; it is in the nature of a Something: but a negative--such as

ignorance, weakness, evil--can only exist relatively; and it would,

indeed, be a Nothing, were it not for the previous and now simultaneous

existence of its wiser, stronger, and better origin. Abstract evil is as

demonstrably an impossibility as abstract ignorance, or abstract

weakness. If evil could have self-existed, it would in the moment of its

eternal birth have demolished itself. Virtue's intrinsic concord tends

to perpetual being: vice's innate discord struggles always with a force

towards dissolution. Goodness, wisdom, power have existences, and have

had existences from all eternity, though gulphed within the Godhead; and

that, whether evidenced in act or not: but their corruptions have had no

such original existence, but are only the same entities perverted. Love

would be love still, though there were no existent object for its

exercise: Beauty would be beauty still, though there were no created

thing to illustrate its fairness: Power would be power still, though

there be no foe to combat, no difficulty to be overcome. Hatred,

ill-favour, weakness, are only perversions or diminutions of these.

Power exists independently of muscles or swords or screws or levers;

love, independently of kind thoughts, words, and actions; beauty,

independently of colours, shapes, and adaptations. Just so is Wisdom

philosophically spoken of by a truly royal and noble author:

"I, wisdom, dwell with prudence, and find out the knowledge of clever

inventions. Counsel is mine, and sound wisdom; I am understanding; I

have strength. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before

his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or

ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth;

before the mountains were fixed, or the hills were made. When He

prepared the heavens, I was there; when he set a compass upon the face

of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened

the foundations of the deep: Then was I by him, as one brought up with

him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing

in the habitable parts of his earth; and my delights were with the sons

of men."

King Solomon well knew of Whom he wrote thus nobly. Eternal wisdom,

power, and goodness, all prospectively thus yearning upon man, and

incorporate in One, whose name, among his many names, is Wisdom. Wisdom,

as a quality, existed with God; and, constituting full pervasion of his

essence, was God.

But to return, and bind to a conclusion our ravelled thoughts. As,

originally, the self-existent being, unbounded, all-knowing, might take

up, so to speak, if He willed, these eternal affirmative excellences of

wisdom, power, and goodness; and as these, to every rational

apprehension, are highly worthy of his choice, whereas their derivative

and inferior corruptions would have been most derogatory to any

reasonable estimate of His character; how much more likely was it that

He should prefer the higher rather than the lower, should take the

affirmative before the negative, should "choose the good, and refuse the

evil,"--than endure to be endowed with such garbled, demoralizing,

finite attributes as those wherewith the heathen painted the Pantheon.

What high antecedent probability was there, that if a God should be (and

this we have proved highly probable too)--He should be One, ubiquitous,

self-existent, spiritual: that He should be all-mighty, all-wise, and

all-good?

Probabilities : An aid to Faith · 第 9 / 28 题