V.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]

The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway,

and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.

Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it

made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.

Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe--

thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the

European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish

government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness

etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then

already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.

Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?

[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]

The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the

Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this

it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its

demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally,

therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible

party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum,

did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely

inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition

in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the

Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further

negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side,

that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the

form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of

points of minor importance.

The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may

now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting

only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of

negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains

to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their

lawful rights.

The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish

government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the

breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that

result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish

final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may

assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part

of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter

on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the

government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting

concessions.

It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could

not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations

it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian

political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a

defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish

government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the

proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the

Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure

position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in

the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish

government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on

the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old

standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction

with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to

the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that

it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of

the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical

laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular

office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be

provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This

question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling

to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian

Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the

Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its

original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign

affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTRÖM'S demands ought

undoubtedly to be seen.

It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian

government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish

government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish

Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the

Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an

expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its

own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from

the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old

Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by

the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were

dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the

negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the

negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the

Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old

lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of

taking matters into their own hands.

[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken

the covenant of the Communiqué._]

But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators'

(especially Mr BOSTRÖM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the

negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was

loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word,

had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden

became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically

pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation

contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest

by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of

plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent,

but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the

responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its

true light.

The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on

the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communiqué

to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the

same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian

demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This

supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communiqué naturally

implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be

satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however,

typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way

by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing

negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very

amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of

the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communiqué.

»Norwegians», he said, »are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with

them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken

great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their

demands».

Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had

violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the

Communiqué[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the

negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations,

and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he

announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The

Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and

offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded

the terms of the Communiqué. But the Norwegian government failed to

produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.

What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the

Communiqué that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority

of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned

shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish

government's evident plans to arrange a »hierarchal» relationship between

the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself,

undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an

honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the

light of their relation to the whole matter.

Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communiqué confirms among

other things that they shall »give guarantee that the Consuls do not

exceed the proper limits of their occupation.» What guarantee? The

Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision

in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best

guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian

Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object:

»that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communiqué, as this

had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian

consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the

Communiqué mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised

by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls».

If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult

to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the

Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not

exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs

were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal

relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive

for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish

government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this

interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct

orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a

hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian

Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a

concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communiqué. It had already been

made before the Communiqué was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be

included in the frame of the Communiqué. The so much-disputed claims of

Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional

conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within

the frame of the Communiqué.

In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for

breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the

Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the

agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and

Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the

preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been

made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets,

before the Communiqué existed.

It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the

negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct

opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the

breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the

references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the

Norwegian Storthing.

The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the

Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared

that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the

28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be

accepted by the Swedish Cabinet »it would find no support from

admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates.» Now, there

were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the

contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite

Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian

Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the

origin of the Communiqué, to the feigned conclusions of which the

Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was

the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the

proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the

contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired

into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a

»preliminary», as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that

the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish

Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the

origin of the Communiqué, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.

The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred,

seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly

adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister

to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined

themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their

agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet

with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian

Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not

even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to

them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally

understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his

Excellency BOSTRÖM brought forward casually several of the questions

which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the

right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made

objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular

Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and

during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended

laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two

Cabinets[45:1].

Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained

in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting

the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, »must be subjected to

further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature».

According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the

Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also

add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build

the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTRÖM

of breach of agreement[45:2].

With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the

Communiqué and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the

Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the

Communiqué to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different

quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in

unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communiqué it was not

intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during

these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as

the general decisions of the Communiqué, sensibly interpreted, were

observed.

To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if

it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before

the existence of the Communiqué, it was on account of the binding nature

of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has

endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view,

that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the

Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the

laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose

that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual

termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of

the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be

granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status

quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the

interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communiqué,

these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it

may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact

too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the

prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.

Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of

the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian

revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are

unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which

was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin

air.