[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communiqué in Sweden and Norway._]
Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was
supposed to characterise the Communiqué, its general contents roused no
unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate,
serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the
Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister
Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home)
was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless
referred to the resolution of 1893.
Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known
there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the
cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.
Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqué, the Norwegian Radicals
immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again
solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.
However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was
started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards
negotiating, and even BJÖRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause
of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical
Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was
suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for
negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though
not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the
Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable,
impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old
Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the
elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then
became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as
Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the
leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a
powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in
no favourable direction.
[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communiqué._]
In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms
were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the
basis of the Communiqué. They were carried on slowly during the Spring
1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the
proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government
the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.
[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign
affairs to the Consular service._]
It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real
authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the
Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest
of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a
purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was
responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should
be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way
connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to
hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development,
from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration
within the Union.
The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign
Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in
Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong
efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union
Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the
direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all
matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same
conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve
the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile
part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained
intact[30:1].
But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one
it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had
postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a
deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest
the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and
mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now
arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would
be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the
Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most
remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian
opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an »anomaly»,
in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made
it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part
of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State
Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.
From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the
right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere
forms. The evasive talk of the »spirit» of constitutional law, and the
administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in
public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very
great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold
in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of
Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must
presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its
branches_.
[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]
The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the
Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this
proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should
regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders
issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.
Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic
character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the
report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter,
under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.
Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no
account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.
This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection
between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration
was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever
that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come
into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a
deficiency so much the more serious as the Act § 1--c allowed the
Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less
diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to
Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.
Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the
Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to
secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not
compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause
for declaring from the Swedish side, »that the proposition includes
scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the
Communiqué, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their
office», and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the
acknowledged principles of the Communiqué_.
[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]
From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet
there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not
accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must
have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil
would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the
question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno,
till the autumn.
During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of
opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation
was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In
November His Excellency Mr BOSTRÖM went to Christiania and presented his
conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if
the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions
stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the
Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the
Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to
disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers,
the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King,
recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases,
should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].
After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP
made a written statement of his objections.
[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]
In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the
Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical
manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance,
though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee,
emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the
Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest
acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the
results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a
single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be
acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy
the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions
would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to
international and common law principles, and declared that from a
national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the
present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets
that Mr BOSTRÖM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not
touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil
Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic
Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTRÖM, would very
seldom occur.
[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]
It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTRÖM'S demand, that the
King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to
dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian
susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to
the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's
Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to
Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers,
as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for
identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.
The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict
with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it
naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the
Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further,
the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions,
suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not
necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors,
though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of
view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On
the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign
affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great
consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United
Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before
the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the
King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs
of that State.
[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]
What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently
perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]
It declares that it »stands to reason» that the Norwegian Consular Office
would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to
presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish
proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have
been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who
is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more
important points the unsuitability of a »hierarchal» relation between
Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of
the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the
Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian
government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the
Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that
the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to
refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest
in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of
course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of
the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqué. Finally the
Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions
unacceptable, and adds, that »if they should be adhered to further
discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless»[36:1]. Really a
formal ultimatum!
[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]
Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's
Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the
subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the
liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try,
if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of
the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af
decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet
firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially
emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the
power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the
limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly
indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend
operations into departments that had previously been considered as
belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian
Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian
Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was
met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for
Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls
instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of
affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of
Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the
unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the
guarantees presupposed by the Communiqué that the Consuls shall not
exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on
Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by
the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of
that kind was not intended in the Communiqué, as it had nothing to do
with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian
Consular Office.
On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to
modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions
of the Communiqué. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making
on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions,
but their essential items must »be adhered to». The Cabinet does not
consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally
to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.
[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]
To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the
reply, »that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further
communication on the matter.»