[Sidenote: _His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim's Proposal._]
His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM'S proposal implied an attempt to settle the
Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign
Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this,
he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised
afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work
of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent
the old attempts on Norway's side »to take matters into her own hands»,
to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way
could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from
distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to
have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they
would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a
definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the
grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.
In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt.
The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it
concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even
Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the
Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom
and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their
courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals
prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable
compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been
acceptable.
But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable
difficulties through which to pilot its way.
[Sidenote: _The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the
Consular Question._]
In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway
without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a
wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians
took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet
in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be
discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign
administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since
deviated in any way.
In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish
government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the
negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the
Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to
which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.
But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these
guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the
Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as
deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for
the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in
carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid
inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against
the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the
Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from
a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally
with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination
to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day.
»As to one's rights, no one negotiates». This has become well nigh the
axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to
one and all of her demands.--
[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._]
In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to
convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two
Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to
how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United
Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present
joint diplomatic representatives.
The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It
declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to
give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the
arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the
same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in
order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to
describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain
circumstances and nothing more.
The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own
consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign
affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would
be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these
alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look
at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit
of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under
authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be
an »anomaly». The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the
Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it,
nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the
advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by
continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration
of the Minister for Foreign affairs.
The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very
imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for
instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving
instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first
to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom
rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of
Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign
affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary
when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with
Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts
on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an
extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs
and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the
total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the
Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian
Consular Service would »duly value the importance of a loyal
co-operation.»
It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be
considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the
more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any
reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the
Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of
a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's
conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish
side for the solution of the question[22:1].
[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian
delegates._]
Mr. BOSTRÖM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the
autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced
between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The
conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined
and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in
Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the
matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual
agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off
on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the
Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well
known so-called Communiqué[23:1].
[Sidenote: _The Communiqué._]
This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the
preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though
it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments
themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the
Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.
Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the
Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of
Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general
agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign
affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the
Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe
for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in
January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were
evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a
Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.
With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare
that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in
itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent
in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be
»not impossible» that under certain circumstances a system with different
Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the
most important advantage of the political agreement between the two
countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the
question on the following basis:
1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the
authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same
wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
authorities of both Kingdoms.
It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the
position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should
remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the
establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to
regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the
Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.
The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do
not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time
secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and
the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].
When the Communiqué was issued, it was received with very great diversity
of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions
which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the
agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held,
contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially
concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and
as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great
importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give
some enlightenment on the point.
In the first part of the Communiqué, which decribes the offer of the
Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of
the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic
representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be
_altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of
both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws »which
cannot be altered by one of the parties», the word 'abolish' does not
occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission
had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTRÖM, in the
Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the
Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended
on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania
under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have
given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full
contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions
in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must
necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was
afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should
be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been
significant only through the connection which may be found to exist
between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the
extent to which the laws were to be changeable.
The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by
the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have
her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to
appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were
based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign
affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the
Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of
Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the
suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would
become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in
the matter.
In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqué to force Norway to
a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through
negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to
continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?
In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he
might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws
will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that
they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP,
and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
negotiations.
Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqué? It is
evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
the Communiqué must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
authority.
On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
foreign administration »into her own hands_.» The great fear of such a
contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqué by
the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2],
without an agreement with Sweden.
How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
could interpret the Communiqué as it did?
As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
is impossible to make any definite assertions.
The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
Communiqué did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could
scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the
Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of
that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to
the wording of the Communiqué on that point, and the Norwegian
governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the
Communiqué_.
Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact
remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect
by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the
Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqué_. This must be kept strictly
in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to
be obtained.