[Sidenote: _The Consul question._]
The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the
Union struggles during the last fourteen years--
[Sidenote: _The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885._]
The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the
Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always
allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1].
What was it then that happened in 1885?
[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._]
By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also
in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council
instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object
being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully
represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as
previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime
Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when
foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway
by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a
somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately
offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs,
which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway
on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the
majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason
for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council
in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in
the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's
leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal
right[9:1].
But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not
discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which,
being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we
Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to
be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to
the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be
more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could
receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885
the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish
Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more
dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have
become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the
state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary
responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the
Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now--
responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in
Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885
was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters
concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the
paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with
greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign
affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected
that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's
foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he
held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this
constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister
for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters
concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the
preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under
observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions
taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the
King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the
Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a
manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.
Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary
control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just
intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be
exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But
the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it
preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was
necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.
[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their
hands._]
The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in
1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran
leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated
»to take matters into our own hands». The system was founded on the
Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a
Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs,
its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved
with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union
between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a
Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and
boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having
granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian
Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay
in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway
were fixed by the Separatists[10:1].
It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able,
of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and
dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union
itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the
Union. A _Union_ policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely
revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union.
Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations
of fidelity to the Union--the last speech of this sort was heard a
short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away
to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of
duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain.
There was a cautious beginning with »their own Consuls»; it was too
venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their
own Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[Sidenote: _The real innecessity of having separate Consuls._]
On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests
of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is
an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no
essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of
having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter
in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners--were in opposition for a
long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the
Consular Committee's deliberations on the subject before the mercantile
authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the
matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that
»the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of
benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so
weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent
agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested,
or amongst the masses of the people». There are principally two reasons
for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different
Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and
Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the
different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and
not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the
fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their
business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give
reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is
also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been
expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the
Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears,
that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office,
partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact _that
for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls'
duties have, on Norway's side, been performed by one of the Norwegian
Government Departements_, proves how vain those fears were.
[Sidenote: _The real object of raising the consular question._]
Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a
moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides
the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian
Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture
of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth
striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular
Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic
representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. »Directly
they have got the wedge fixed into the small end», wrote in 1892
President HANS FORSSELL, »they will try to persuade us that there will be
no danger in letting them drive it in a bit». Above all they considered
that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the
administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the
dominating rôle interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our
day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.
[Sidenote: _Want of Union motives for Consular reform._]
The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any
motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism
has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and
its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the
Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any
time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have
usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union
demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national
sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right.
That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees
become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand
a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points
touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway.
[Sidenote: _Misinterpretation of the King's opposition._]
When therefore the King, in the interests of _the Union_, at first
opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it
out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only
the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish
veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has
gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this,
that has brought about the rupture of the Union.
[Sidenote: _The raising of the Consular question in 1891._]
Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which
at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual
diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in
the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision
by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was
established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter,
which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State
alone; on the other hand the _winding up_ of the joint Consular Service
would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal
Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called
Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which
according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions »concerning
the two Kingdoms[14:1].» And this one-sided right of decision was
maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes--the last in 1886
--having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact
that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that
Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian
Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might
certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the
winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a
separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it
would be Norway's prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up;
Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign
affairs from the joint Foreign administration.
Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the
Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed,
and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the
Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of
a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the
sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there
began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events
of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already
here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the
revolution, which has now broken out.
[Sidenote: _»The King and the Ministry» according to the Norwegian
Constitution._]
When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but
little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council
and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of
the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly
stated in the division of the Constitution. The King's veto over legal
questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless
tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly
responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the
King's Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of
his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own
judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of
Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for
instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly
refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring
that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the
King's Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but
this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement
of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers
on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National
Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize
something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were
not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the
Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment
a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical
Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the
Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this
means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way
into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the
responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must
naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation
of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of
refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the
old only possible forms.
[Sidenote: _The development of the Consular question._]
Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the
Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire.
Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the
consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently
set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the
King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters
becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the
initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr
MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and
the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian
masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the
dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence.
The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on
having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests
to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute
on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences
»that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present
constitution». This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on
behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed
a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary
Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced
intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King's
opposition, Sweden's and the King's of Sweden, not the King's of the
United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union.
It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a
question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the
disloyalty of the Radicals to the _Union_ was entirely ignored. The
Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the
country.
[Sidenote: _The position in 1895._]
In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete
standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted
on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish
Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to
an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a
matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had
the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of
her defence which of late years she has neglected.
[Sidenote: _The Union Committee 1895-1908._]
The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing
in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to
obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected
a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The
Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the
Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their
party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign
affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish
Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the
Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and
Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the
opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign
affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance,
the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the
possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the
Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller
portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1].
In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members
were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both
Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a
joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly
emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be
personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls
and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with
evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate
the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded,
that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might
have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2].
[Sidenote: _Norway prepares again to the Consular Question._]
The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for
another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared
to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time,
they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on
the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of
State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of
having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing
Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for
Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the
consequences of which brought about the present crisis.