[Sidenote: _The object of the Union dispute._]
Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented
itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in
reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.
[Sidenote: _The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union._]
The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden,
from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the
responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political
affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians
on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time
shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the
same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of
detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden,
that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims
of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of
State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial
Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839
the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two
later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side
complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this
Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have
been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844
concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were
refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the
administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more
general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--,
NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as »90 years' labour to
procure a supremacy for Sweden»,--ought to appear in its true
colours[2:1].
[Sidenote: _Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to
gain the supremacy._]
The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy
have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly
the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union,
partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.
Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents
of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union
itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the
unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character
of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or
less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that
Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has
especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from
the first, placed in Sweden's hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has
also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian
writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side
have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed
on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right,
for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under
this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her
conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting
»designs of supremacy».
Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do
with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most
extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans--to
mention one, the late professor OSCAR ALIN--have on different occasions
maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality
within the Union, and it must be asserted that _no Swedish political
party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway_[3:2].
[Sidenote: _The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming
the Union._]
That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the
reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable
oppositions in opinions concerning _the manner_ and _the aim_ for a
reform.
Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the _entire_ reorganization, Norway the
_partial_--the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the
so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden
has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the
interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by
concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not
gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was
complete[4:1].
Sweden has furthermore insisted on _negotiations_ and _agreements_, as
the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself
to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.
Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the _aim_ of
the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a
Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a
safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing
overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a
purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as
the main object in view.
The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in
Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian
programme, especially since 1885.
Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were
forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to
the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in
need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that
the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian
people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a
mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the
political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife.
The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the
utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJÖRNSON and
other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden
increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJÖRNSON as the only
enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their
(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the
»Norwegians of the Future» buried themselves deeper and deeper in the
study of »Ancient Glorious Norway». Imagination was fed on Norwegian
heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of
Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place
for renewed worship[5:2].
This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and
all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and
the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less
importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian
Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the
Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years
played a dominating rôle in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the
more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the
cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in
Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were
scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political
responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in
need, of BJÖRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this.
It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long
time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the
King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the
fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds
has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at
the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost
entirely vanished from the »national junction.»
[Sidenote: _Sweden's later Union policy._]
During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians
have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.
But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint
administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they
like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
sort of »_confusion_»; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents
of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union
Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish
majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented
itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against
the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining
the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the
present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the
principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and
Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by
Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter
of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its
claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on
account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union,
but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the
enticing reward--harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting
Norway honestly to meet her half way--has been sufficiently uncertain,
in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a
remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.