HIS GREAT ADVENTURE
_All merit comes_
_From daring the unequal,_
_All glory comes from daring to begin._
--EUGENE WARE
Beginning with January, 1857, one thing is clearly disclosed and made
conclusive by the record of Brown's subsequent activities: that he
contemplated an armed invasion and conquest of the Southern States. His
correspondence, and the long line of historical incidents which touch
his life, during the time intervening between that date and the collapse
of his fortunes at Harper's Ferry, show that his mind was preoccupied
with plans for the accomplishment of that stupendous purpose. He
believed that the slaves could be induced to rise against their masters;
assassinate them and their families, and declare their freedom. From the
ranks of the freedmen, he planned to recruit an army for the occupation
of the territory affected by the insurrection, and for further invasion;
and to establish and maintain the authority of a provisional government.
His scheme for conquest was probably a result of his relations with Hugh
Forbes. Together the two adventurers planned the details for the
undertaking. It was in pursuance of their plans for this purpose that
Brown engaged Forbes's services, at a salary of a hundred dollars a
month; ordered the thousand spears; published the _Manual of the
Patriotic Volunteer_; planned to lure the soldiery of the Union from
their "service with Satan to the service of God"; planned to drive a
nail into Captain Kidd's treasure-chest--whatever that meant; planned
the War College, whereat the prospective generals for the prospective
army, and the prospective members for the prospective cabinet of the
prospective Provisional Government, were to be instructed, under the
direction of Forbes, in the science of war, and in the science of civil
government. It was for his civil and military leaders that he engaged
Stevens, Cook, Kagi, Tidd, Parsons, Realf, Gill, and others, and placed
them in the school of instruction.
To hedge against treason, he met with his embryonic generals and
secretaries at Chatham, Canada, and in convention assembled adopted a
"Constitution and Ordinances" for the Provisional Government, which,
among its provisions, declared the confiscation of the "entire personal
and real property of all persons known to be acting with or for the
enemy, or found wilfully holding slaves." This constitution had been
printed and copies of it were available at the Kennedy farm. Every man
who marched with Brown to Harper's Ferry had read it, or had heard it
read, and had sworn allegiance to the government it represented.
December 23, 1858, Merriam wrote to Brown: "I have heard vaguely of your
contemplated action and now Mr. Redpath and Mr. Hinton have told me your
contemplated action, in which I earnestly wish to join you in any
capacity you wish to place me as far as my small capacities go."[418] He
spent the winter in Hayti in company with Redpath, and knew how Brown
intended to "assail the Slave Power."[419]
The message that Brown requested Conductor Phelps to communicate to the
management of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, interdicting further
traffic over the road, was a declaration of war. It was the first and
only "Proclamation" issued by the commander-in-chief of the army of the
Provisional Government. At the time he gave out this declaration--1:25
A. M., October 17, 1859--he and his captains confidently believed their
insurrection to be in the full tide of successful initiation; that the
country in the vicinity was then in the throes of a slaughter that
spared neither sex nor age; that hordes of black fiends, like furies,
were surging over the land in a riot of unimaginable proportions. These
adventurers believed that their dreams of conquest were about to be
realized; and that the rioting thousands, excited into a frenzy by the
bloody deeds which had set them free, were already pressing in bands to
join them at the appointed rendezvous to fill the ranks of the "Army of
Liberation"; that it was solely a question of time--a few hours at
most--until these allies would be arriving, and they would have control
of an army sufficiently strong to establish and maintain their
authority.
That the slaves' sole way to freedom lay over the dead bodies of their
masters, was a self-evident proposition. The slaves knew by tradition
and by experience, and Brown and his captains knew, that if they--the
slaves--ran away from their masters to join his forces, the masters,
reënforced by the citizen soldiery, would pursue them immediately, and
recover them before they could organize for either defensive or
aggressive warfare. The problem of Harper's Ferry had been solved by the
philosophy of the Pottawatomie. The same questions were involved in each
venture: how to get the "goods" and keep them--how to get the slaves for
the Provisional Army and forestall pursuit. It was the Pottawatomie
amplified.
Brown intended to create the "Provisional Army" in the enemy's country;
hence, it was essential for him to commence the undertaking by striking
the most crushing blow that it was possible for him to deliver. The
success of the movement depended upon his ability to strike a blow so
terrible that the survivors of the carnage, dazed and paralyzed by the
horrors of the existing conditions, would be incapable of organizing and
sending any opposing force to attack him. Therefore the
assassinations--the destruction of the persons who, otherwise, would
pursue. That was the central feature of the movement, the base of the
scheme, the blow which he intended to strike. It was the only blow which
he could strike; the only weapon that he could use of which any one
stood in awe. The blow which he would have to strike if he would win,
was the blow which he had told his Eastern friends he could strike: a
blow that would shake the slave system to its foundation--the blow which
he had promised Gerrit Smith he would strike, and doubtless, told him
how he intended to strike it.
To the men from the Pottawatomie, a massacre was simply a means to an
end. Brown and his sons harbored no feelings of animosity toward the
Doyles, the Shermans, and Wilkinson; but they knew that these men would
not give up to them, peaceably, the property which they coveted,
therefore they murdered them and took their horses. They knew that the
owners of slaves and lands in the Southern States would not, peaceably,
relinquish their ownership of this property; therefore they planned to
incite the slaves to kill their masters while they slept--and having
_thus emancipated_ the slaves, confiscate the estates of the
slave-holders, and put the assassins and themselves in possession of
them. This massacre, the most horrible that was ever seriously
contemplated in the brain of man, was to be executed under the pretense
that it was an humanitarian measure. In the name of humanity, they
proposed to undertake the midnight assassination of millions of men,
women, and children, and to contend for justification for their actions.
The word, with Brown, was a convenience, or an interchangeable term. A
definition of it, in the sense in which he used the word, is found in
his personal understanding, or interpretation rather, of its
co-relation, "The Golden Rule." He is quoted by Sanborn and others as
having stated "more than once": "I believe in the Golden Rule and the
Declaration of Independence. I think that both mean the same thing; and
it is better that a whole generation should pass off the face of the
earth--men, women and children--by a violent death than that one jot of
either should fail _in this country_. I mean exactly _so_, sir."[420]
The possibility that the blacks in the South might attempt to gain their
freedom by a general massacre of the whites, was a condition co-existent
with their enslavement. After 1831 that possibility became a fixed
impending probability; and the question of means to prevent the
inevitable cataclysm of blood, was a matter of constant concern in the
economy of the Southern States; with the result that various preventive
measures were adopted to discourage the possibility of attempts, by the
slaves, to organize for such undertakings, or to fit themselves, by
education or otherwise, to promote such organizations.
In the philosophy of John Brown, what Nat Turner had done in a section
of Southampton County, Virginia, could, if properly promoted, be done in
any other section or locality; and, if in any locality, then in every
locality, or throughout the whole South. Therefore, an insurrection by
the slaves, having for its object the overthrow of the existing State
governments of the South, was a venture, from his point of view, which
might be undertaken with reasonable prospects for success; the ultimate
result depending largely upon his ability to organize the slaves
effectively for revolt; to equip them for the initial uprising, and
thereafter to capably direct the movement.
No disaster that ever befell our country, war not excepted, was in any
respect comparable with the horrors which would be incidental to a slave
insurrection; yet our people lived during more than half a century in
the shadow of that menace. They lived in a state of continual
apprehension that it, the most stupendous of conceivable calamities,
might at any time overwhelm them.
For years patrols had ridden the roads and men had watched
of night lest the negroes turn upon their masters. It was,
an ever present fear. That the Abolitionists wished the
slaves to rise and kill their masters in their beds was a
belief widely held in the South and often publicly
expressed, and no happening that could be imagined
contained a greater possibility of horror and
bloodshed.[421]
It has been said, and there is great force in the statement, that the
"Underground Railroad," instead of working hardship and great loss to
slave-holders, was, in reality "the safety-valve to the institution." It
was the sluice for the overflow of the dangerous class--the able and
discontented. The Underground was organized at the close of the
eighteenth century, and had on its rolls more than 30,000 "employees."
It carried away from the South, probably 75,000 slaves of the value of
more than $30,000,000. The slaves who thus sought and obtained their
liberty, taking the risk of arrest and punishment in their attempts to
gain it, were the ablest and the most influential among them. Had they
remained in slavery, these men would have further developed and become
leaders among the slaves, and would have organized them and led them
into insurrection. "Had they remained, the direful scenes of San Domingo
would have been enacted, and the hot, vengeful breath of massacre would
have swept the South as a tornado and blanched the cheek of the
civilized world."[422]
Brown knew about the hot vengeful breath which had swept the white
population from the fair face of San Domingo. And he was familiar with
the attempts which had been made to relight its fires in this country,
and to start the tornado of death. He was familiar with what his
predecessors in the insurrection business had done, and with what they
had tried to do. He knew, too, or thought he knew, why they had failed.
Naturally he sought to avoid the mistakes which they had committed, and
to safeguard his operations by improving upon their methods. The seizure
of Harper's Ferry was not a "Foray into Virginia," as Mr. Sanborn
chooses to call it: neither was it a "Raid" as Mr. Villard, with
conspicuous persistence, seeks to make it appear to have been; nor was
it either an "attack" upon the town or a "blow" or any other specious
form of movement. Brown selected the place and "occupied" it as the base
for his military operations, because he intended to use the generous
supplies of war material, which were then in store there, for the
equipment of the army that he planned to organize. The occupation was to
be permanent. It was a stratagem of his campaign, an incident in his
main design.
By the logic of the assassinations, Brown believed he would secure
immunity from an immediate, or counter assault. Instead of being
compelled to defend his position against attack by the militia, and by
companies of armed citizens, which might be improvised for the occasion,
he contemplated spending the first "few weeks" of the campaign in
comparative security; publishing, far and wide, the proclamation of the
Provisional Government, with its lure for adventurers in civil and
military life; debauching the citizenship of the country and the
soldiery of the Union. He also contemplated having leisure to attend
such diplomatic functions as might be incidental to the situation,
including negotiations with foreign nations, and the problems of
"Foreign intervention," Northern conventions, etc.[423]
Forbes's letter of May 14, 1858, heretofore quoted, discloses Brown's
theory of the invasion: it deals with the facts of Brown's secret
movement then pending in the untried future. These two men had agreed
upon an invasion of the South under cover of an "insurrection." The
opinion Forbes gave Dr. Howe therein is a dissenting one, for personal
reasons, from his agreement with Brown. In the revised opinion, Forbes
stated his belief that the insurrection would fail; that it would be
"either a flash in the pan, or it would leap beyond his control or any
control," and after having spent its force in a riot of blood would be
stamped out. Brown thought otherwise; he was "sure of a response," and
believed that he could safeguard against "a flash in the pan." With the
question of "losing control" of the insurrection he was not concerned;
that was a bridge which he would cross when he came to it. Under his
control, a whole generation was to pass off the face of the earth by a
violent death, and nothing much could occur in excess of that if the
insurrection did happen to get beyond it. The hurricane of horrors which
he proposed to unloose, could not sweep too far for his purposes; he
would have it spread to every Southern State, and in the language of
Jeremiah Goldsmith Anderson, "make this land of liberty and equality
shake to the center."[424]
That Brown expected to be strongly supported by a secret colored
military organization existing in the North, and "that had its
ramifications extended through most or nearly all of the Slave States,"
is more than probable. This organization was represented at the Chatham
convention by G. J. Reynolds, of Sandusky, Ohio, "a colored man (very
little colored, however)"; and after the convention adjourned, Geo. B.
Gill was sent to Oberlin, Berlin Heights, and Milan, Ohio, to verify the
statements which Reynolds had made concerning its forces. Gill met him
and "under the pledge of secrecy which we gave to each other at the
Chatham convention," he says. Reynolds took him to the room where they
held their meetings, and used as their arsenal, and showed him "a fine
collection of arms." "On my return to Cleveland," continues Gill, "he
passed me, through the organization, first to J. J. Pierce, colored, at
Milan, who paid my bill one night at the Eagle Hotel, and gave me some
money, and a note to E. Moore at Norwalk; who in turn paid my hotel
bill, and purchased a railroad ticket through to Cleveland for me."
Reynolds asserted that they were "only waiting for Brown or some one
else to make a successful initiative move, when their forces would be
put in motion."[425]
It must not be assumed, because Brown did not _publish_ a transcript of
his plans for the insurrection and invasion, that he was "without any
clear and definite plan of campaign," and that the consequences of his
plans had not been anticipated, and provided for in minutest detail, for
he was methodical. Also, secrecy was characteristic of his methods.
Salmon Brown said:[426] "Father had a peculiarity for insisting on
_order_.... He would insist on getting everything arranged just to suit
him before he would consent to make a move."
And to Kagi Brown wrote July 10th:[427] "_Do not_ use much paper to put
names of persons & plans upon."
The nature of Brown's plans, and of his intentions, and of his
engagements, must therefore be drawn from the documentary evidence
obtainable, and from such reasonable inferences as can be derived from
the actions of the invaders: from the things which they did while they
were free to do as they pleased; while they were yet unrestrained by the
forces which later overcame them; and from such contemporaneous
testimony, relating to the subject, as may be available. What they said
when in prison, and in view of the impending gallows, about what they
intended to do, is not the best evidence of what their intentions were.
On the 19th of August, Mr. Frederick Douglass met John Brown, by
appointment, at an old stone quarry in the vicinity of Chambersburg. At
that interview, Brown disclosed to Mr. Douglass his intention to seize
Harper's Ferry. Mr. Douglass said:[428]
The taking of Harper's Ferry, of which Brown had merely
hinted before, was now declared his settled purpose, and he
wanted to know what I thought of it. I opposed it with all
the arguments at my command.... He was not to be shaken but
treated my views respectfully, replying that even if
surrounded he would find means to cut his way out.... In
parting, he put his arms around me in a manner more than
friendly, and said, "Come with me, Douglas; I will defend
you with my life. I want you for a special purpose. When I
strike the bees will begin to swarm, and I shall want you
to help hive them...."
The project that Brown had in view was clearly foreshadowed by Jeremiah
C. Anderson, in a letter which he wrote, late in September, to a brother
in Iowa. He said:[429]
Our mining company will consist of between twenty-five and
thirty men well equipped with tools. You can tell Uncle Dan
it will be impossible for me to see him before next spring.
If my life is spared I will be tired of work by that time,
and I shall visit my relatives and friends in Iowa, if I
can get leave of absence. At present I am bound by all that
is honorable to continue in the course. We go in to win, at
all hazards. So if you should hear of failure, it will be
after a desperate struggle, and loss of capital on both
sides. But this is the last of our thoughts. Everything
seems to work to our hands, and victory will surely perch
upon our banner. The old man has had this in view for
twenty years, and last winter was just a hint and trial of
what could be done. This is not a large place but a very
precious one to Uncle Sam, as he had a great many tools
here. I expect (when I start again travelling) to start at
this place and go through the State of Virginia and on
south, just as circumstances require; mining and
prospecting, and carrying the ore with us. I suppose this
is the last letter I shall write you before there is
something in the wind. Whether I shall have an opportunity
of sending letters then, I do not know, but when I have an
opportunity I shall improve it. But if you don't get any
from me, don't take it for granted that I am _gone up_ till
you know it to be so. I consider my life about as safe in
one place as another.
The following interesting and instructive document discloses the
formation of Andersen's mining company, and indicates the character of
the "mining" which the operators intended to engage in. It reads as
follows:
HEADQUARTERS WAR DEPARTMENT, PROVISIONAL ARMY.
_Harper's Ferry, October 10, 1859._
General Orders No. 1.
ORGANIZATION
The divisions of the provisional army and the coalition are
hereby established as follows:
1--_Company._
A company will consist of fifty-six privates, twelve
non-commissioned officers, (eight corporals, 4 sergeants)
three commissioned officers, (two lieutenants, a captain,)
and a surgeon.
The privates shall be divided into bands or messes of seven
each numbering from one to eight, with a corporal to each,
numbered like his band.
Two bands shall comprise a section. Sections shall be
numbered from one to four. A sergeant shall be attached to
each section and numbered like it.
Two sections shall comprise a platoon. Platoons will be
numbered one and two, and each commanded by a lieutenant
designated by like number.
2--_Battalion._
The battalion will consist of four companies complete. The
commissioned officers of the battalion will be a chief of
battalion, and a first and second major, one of whom shall
be attached to each wing.
3--_The Regiment._
The regiment will consist of four battalions complete. The
commissioned officers of the regiment will be a colonel and
two lieutenant colonels, attached to the wings.
4--_The Brigade._
The brigade will consist of four regiments complete. The
commissioned officer of the brigade will be a general of
brigade.
5--_Each General Staff._
Each of the above divisions will be entitled to a general
staff, consisting of an adjutant, a commissary, a musician,
and a surgeon.
6--_Appointment._
Non-commissioned officers will be chosen by those whom they
are to command.
Commissioned officers will be appointed and commissioned by
this department.
The staff officers of each division will be appointed by
the respective commanders of the same.
(This document is in the handwriting of J. H. Kagi.)[430]
Oliver Brown and Jeremiah G. Anderson were captains in the provisional
army. A copy of Brown's commission is published herewith:
GREETING:
HEADQUARTERS WAR DEPARTMENT.
Near Harper's Ferry Maryland.
Whereas _Oliver Brown_ has been nominated a _captain_ in
the army established under the provisional constitution,
Now, therefore, in pursuance of the authority vested in us
by said constitution, we do hereby appoint and commission
the said _Oliver Brown a captain_.
Given at the office of the Secretary of War, this day,
October 15, 1859.
JOHN BROWN,
_Commander in Chief_.
J. H. KAGI. _Secretary of War_.
(This document is printed in the original, with the exception of the
words in italics and the figures, which are in the handwriting of Kagi,
with the exception of the signature of John Brown, which is in his own
hand.)[431]
Except as to Mr. Sanborn and Mr. Stearns, it is hard to believe that the
members of Brown's war committee were ignorant of his intention to
incite a slave insurrection, and invade the South. Rev. Theodore Parker
said:
I should like of all things to see an insurrection of the
Slaves. It must be tried many times before it succeeds, as
at last it must.[432]
Dr. Howe also knew of the impending insurrection. Mr. Sanborn says:[433]
Dr. Howe, returning from Cuba, (whither he accompanied
Theodore Parker in February 1859), journeyed through the
Carolinas, and there accepted the hospitality of Wade
Hampton, and other rich planters; and it shocked him to
think that he might be instrumental in giving up to fire
and pillage their noble mansions.
Thaddeus Hyatt, of New York, too, seems to have known what Brown
intended to do, and from whence he derived his inspirations. Also the
indiscriminate massacre of non-combatants, white women and children, by
the negroes of Hayti seems to have had his approbation. He presented to
the Black Republic a portrait[434] of the man, John Brown, who in 1859
sought to incite the negroes of the Southern States to do what the
negroes of San Domingo did, when "one August night, in the year 1791 the
whole plain of the north was swept with fire and drenched with blood.
Five hundred thousand negro slaves in the depths of barbarism revolted,
and the horrors of the massacre made Europe and America shudder."[435]
August 27, 1859, Gerrit Smith wrote the following letter to the "Jerry
Rescue Committee":[436]
It is, perhaps, too late to bring slavery to an end by
peaceable means,--too late to vote it down. For many years
I have feared, and published my fears, that it would go out
in blood. These fears have grown into a belief. So
debauched are the white people by slavery that there is not
virtue enough left in them to put it down.... The feeling
among the blacks that they must deliver themselves gains
strength with fearful rapidity. No wonder, then, is it that
intelligent black men in the States _and in Canada_ should
see no hope for their race in the practice and policy of
white men.... Whoever he may be that foretells the horrible
end of American slavery, is held at the North and the South
to be a lying prophet,--another Cassandra. The South would
not respect her own Jefferson's prediction of servile
insurrection; how then can it be hoped that she will
respect another's?... And is it entirely certain that these
insurrections will be put down promptly, and before they
can have spread far? Will telegraphs and railroads be too
swift for the swiftest insurrections? Remember that
telegraphs and railroads can be rendered useless in an
hour. Remember too that many who would be glad to face the
insurgents would be busy in transporting their wives and
daughters to places where they would be safe from the worst
fate that husbands and fathers can imagine for their wives
and daughters. I admit that but for this embarrassment
Southern men would laugh at the idea of an insurrection and
would quickly dispose of one. But trembling as they would
for beloved ones, I know of no part of the world, where, so
much as in the South, men would be like, in a formidable
insurrection, to lose the most important time, and be
distracted and panic stricken.
Commenting upon this letter, Mr. Sanborn, after quoting from Mr. Smith's
biographer the expression "This Cassandra spoke from certainty," says
that he (Smith) "knew what Brown's purpose was; and his last
contribution to Brown's campaign was made about the time the Syracuse
letter was written." Referring to the same letter, his biographer,
Frothingham, says:
It is hard to believe that the writer of these passages had
not had John Brown's general plan in mind. There was no
visible sign of peril. The blacks, North and South, were to
all appearances quiet.... But for the whole-handed
destruction of documents immediately on the failure of the
project, Mr. Smith's participation in John Brown's general
plans could be made to appear still closer.
As late as 1867, Mr. Smith disclaimed having any knowledge of Brown's
plans or of his intentions. He denied that he gave money with the
purpose of aiding the insurrection. Concerning this Mr. Frothingham
continues:
Did Gerrit Smith really think that this was a complete and
truthful statement of his relations with John Brown? A
statement in which nothing true was suppressed, and nothing
untrue suggested? A statement that would be satisfactory to
Edward Morton, and F. B. Sanborn and Dr. Howe and other
friends of the Martyr?... We must believe that his insanity
obliterated a certain class of impressions, while another
class of impressions on the same subject remained distinct.
The theory of Brown's operations being the conquest of the South through
an insurrection of the slaves, the collapse of the scheme was coincident
with the failure of the slaves to execute the part assigned to them in
the plan of the invasion. It is herein that Brown's leadership may be
criticised. The creation of the army depended upon the success of the
insurrection. The latter, therefore, should have been made safe--beyond
the possibility of failure--before he committed any subordinate
irremediable acts.
At Cleveland, Brown took credit for never having killed anybody, but
said, in a self conscious manner, referring to his Kansas successes,
that on "some occasions he had _shown his young men with him_ how some
things might be done as well as others and that they had done them."
Brown plainly attributed the failure of the insurrection, and his
consequent failure, to a cause which he could have controlled--to his
failure to do things which he could have done, and which he then
reproached himself for not having done.
"It is my own fault," he said, October 18th, "that I have been taken. I
could easily have saved myself from it, had I exercised my own better
judgment rather than yielded to my feelings."
"You mean if you had escaped immediately?" inquired Mr. Mason.
"No," he said, "I had the means to make myself secure without any
escape, but I allowed myself to be surrounded by a force by being too
tardy."
Brown had planned how to prevent being surrounded, and continuing said:
"I do not know that I should reveal my plans. I am here a prisoner and
wounded because I foolishly allowed myself to be so. You overrate
yourself in supposing I could have been taken if I had not allowed it."
Nat Turner had shown his followers how to start an insurrection. He
personally spilled the first blood, the blood which turned loose the
furies in Southampton County, and Brown now saw, too late, that if he
and his captains had each led a party of negroes, as Turner had led; and
shown them how to kill, as Turner had shown his followers; they too
might have turned loose the furies of which Brown and Forbes dreamed,
and launched the hurricane of death. Then, with thousands of rioting
slaves, brandishing their bloody spears, the occupation of Harper's
Ferry would have been but an incident of minor importance in this
history.
Forbes perceived the weak link in the chain of Brown's forecast, and
made the point, that unless the slaves were "already in a state of
agitation, there might be no response, or a feeble one." But Brown,
carried away by an enthusiasm inspired by a continuous contemplation of
the grandeur of his scheme, failed to give the warning the consideration
which its importance deserved. He dismissed Forbes's caution with the
confident assertion that he "_was sure of a response_" His
over-confidence led to his immediate undoing. Upon the rock that Forbes
had pointed out foundered the new-born ship of state. The great uprising
of the blacks upon which he relied, failed to materialize; the thousands
of reënforcements which he looked for, appeared not at all.[437] The
plans for the conquest of the Southern States, and for the establishment
of the Provisional Government miscarried.
Concerning Brown and his plans Mr. Vallandigham said:
It is in vain to underestimate the man or the conspiracy.
Captain John Brown is as brave and resolute a man as ever
headed an insurrection, and, in a good cause, and with a
sufficient force, would have been a consummate partisan
commander. He has coolness, daring, persistency, the stoic
faith and patience, and a firmness of will and purpose
unconquerable. He is the farthest possible removed from the
ordinary ruffian, fanatic or madman. Certainly it was the
best planned and best executed conspiracy that ever
failed.[438]
John Brown was not a pioneer in the slave insurrection business, nor
does his plan of procedure at Harper's Ferry suggest any novelties or
anything original in the way of such insurrections. He had before him a
long line of precedents and examples which he studied; and ideals,
written in blood, which he sought to emulate. His heroes were Toussaint
L'Ouverture and Nat Turner, their hands red with the blood of innocence.
Turner had killed between fifty and sixty white people, mostly women and
children, and Mr. Redpath tells us that Brown "admired this negro
patriot equally with George Washington." Turner was his most recent and
most direct example. It was from what Turner had done, that Brown and
Forbes formed their estimates of what they could do. From the example
furnished by this ideal patriot, they framed the Maryland-Virgina
equation. They reasoned in this way: If an ignorant slave, with a score
of poorly armed negro followers, who were also slaves, could kill sixty
white people in a day, how many white people could a thousand negroes,
who are well equipped for midnight slaughter, kill in a single night?
Their solution of that problem found expression in the order which they
placed, in March, 1857, with the Collinsville blacksmith. It was Brown's
answer to this question, expanded as Brown sought to expand it at
Harper's Ferry, that was to "make slavery totter from its foundations."
Upon several occasions--notably, once in South Carolina, and twice in
Virginia--the slaves of this country had engaged in conspiracies against
their masters. In each instance the men who promoted the revolt were
themselves slaves. In two instances the insurgents planned to seize the
arsenals, and public arms and ammunition, as Brown planned to do, and
did, at Harper's Ferry. In each instance the revolt was to be
accomplished by a general massacre of the white inhabitants. Brown and
Forbes, in 1857, studied the trails that had been blazed on these
occasions, and planned with reference to the experiences of the men who
had directed the efforts.
The first attempt at insurrection in this country was led by "General"
Gabriel in September, 1800. The date agreed upon was Saturday [Monday],
September 1st. The place of rendezvous was on a brook six miles from
Richmond, Virginia. The force was to comprise eleven hundred men,
divided into three divisions. The attack was to have been made upon
Richmond, then a town of eight thousand population, under cover of the
night.[439]
The plan for the occupation of Richmond was similar in some respects to
Brown's plans at Harper's Ferry. One of the divisions of the army was to
take the penitentiary, which had been improvised into an arsenal.
Another division was to seize the powder-house. A statement of the
trouble was published in the _United States Gazette_ of Philadelphia,
September 8, 1800:
The penitentiary held several thousand stand of arms; the
powder-house was well stocked; the capitol contained the
State Treasury; the mills would give them bread; the
control of the bridge across the James river would keep off
enemies from beyond. Thus secured and provided, they
planned to issue proclamations, summoning to their standard
"their fellow negroes and the friends of humanity
throughout the continent." In a week they estimated they
would have 50,000 men on their side, when they would
possess themselves of other towns.[440]
A formidable insurrection was attempted in 1822 by Denmark Vesey. The
slaves involved in this plot were distributed over a territory of
forty-five to fifty miles in extent around Charleston, South Carolina.
Vesey's plan of revolt contemplated the wholesale slaughter of the white
population and the occupation of the country by the blacks.
"Every slave enlisted was sworn to secrecy. Household
servants were rarely trusted. Talkative and intemperate
persons were not enlisted. Women were excluded from
participation in the affair that they might take care of
the children. Peter Poyas, it is said, had enlisted six
hundred without assistance.
"During the excitement and the trial of the supposed
conspirators, rumor proclaimed all, and doubtless more than
all the horrors of the plot. The city was to be fired in
every quarter. The arsenal, in the immediate vicinity, was
to be broken open, and the arms distributed to the
insurgents and an universal massacre of the white
inhabitants was to take place. Nor did there seem to be any
doubt in the minds of the people that such would actually
have been the result, had not the plot, fortunately, been
detected before the time appointed for the outbreak. It
was believed, as a matter of course, that every black in
the city would join in the insurrection, and that, if the
original design had been attempted and the city taken by
surprise, the negroes would have achieved an easy victory,
nor does it seem at all impossible that such might have
been, or yet may be the case, if any well arranged and
resolute rising should take place." The plot failed because
a negro, William Paul, "made enlistments without authority,
and revealed the scheme to a house servant. The leaders of
this attempt at insurrection died as bravely as they had
lived; and it is one of the marvels of the remarkable
affair, that none of this class divulged any of the secrets
to the court. The men who did the talking were those who
knew but little."[441]
Two promoters of slave insurrections were born during the year 1800:
John Brown and Nat Turner. The latter was born in Southampton County,
Virginia, October 2d. Turner became a preacher, and later, saw visions.
He saw visions of conflicts "between white spirits and black spirits
engaged in battle; and the sun was darkened, the thunder rolled in the
heavens, and blood flowed in the streams...." Afterward he had another
vision in which an angel told him that "the time is fast approaching
when the 'first shall be last and the last first'"; which he interpreted
as foreshadowing the promotion of the blacks to control in public
affairs, and the subordination of the whites. Encouraged by his
conclusion, he determined to attempt the promotion of the blacks by
eliminating the whites. In pursuance of this he planned a general
uprising of the slaves and massacre of their white masters. His blow was
struck on the night of August 21, 1831, near Jerusalem Court House,
Virginia.
Turner trusted his plans to four men: Sam Edwards, Hark Travis, Henry
Porter, and Nelson Williams. After the plans had been completed. Turner
made a speech appropriate to the occasion. He said: "Our race is to be
delivered from slavery, and God has appointed us as the men to do his
bidding; and let us be worthy of our calling. I am told to slay all the
whites we encounter without regard to age or sex. We have no arms or
ammunition but we will find these in the homes of our oppressors; and,
as we go on, others can join us. Remember we do not go for the sake of
blood and carnage, but it is necessary that in the commencement of this
revolution, all the whites we meet should die, until we have an army
strong enough to carry on the war on a Christian basis. Remember that
ours is not war for robbery nor to satisfy our passions; it is a
_struggle for freedom_. Ours must be deeds, not words. Then let us away
to the scene of action." In his confession after sentence of death had
been passed upon him, Turner described the scenes of the murders which
they committed. Of the attack upon the home of Joseph Travis, his
master, he said:[442]
On returning to the house, Hark went to the door with an
axe, for the purpose of breaking it open, as we knew we
were strong enough to murder the family, should they be
awakened by the noise; but, reflecting that it might create
an alarm in the neighborhood, we determined to enter the
house secretly, and murder them whilst sleeping. Hark got a
ladder and set it against the chimney, on which I ascended,
and, hoisting a window, entered and came down stairs,
unbarred the doors, and removed the guns from their places.
It was then observed that I must spill the first blood, on
which, armed with a hatchet and accompanied by Will, I
entered my master's chamber. It being dark, I could not
give a death blow. The hatchet glanced from his head. He
sprang from the bed and called his wife. It was his last
word. Will laid him dead with a blow of his axe.
After they had taken the lives of the Travis family, "they went from
plantation to plantation, dealing death blows to every white man, woman
and child they found." A list of the "dead that have been buried" was
published August 24th: At Mrs. Whitehead's, 7; Mrs. Waller's, 13; Mr.
Williams's, 3; Mr. Barrow's, 2; Mr. Vaughn's, 5; Mrs. Turner's, 3; Mr.
Travis's, 5; Mr. J. Williams's, 5; Mr. Reece's, 4; names unknown, 10;
total, 57.
The news of the massacre spread rapidly, and the excited whites quickly
armed themselves to suppress the insurrection. As a result, "Arms and
ammunition were dispatched in wagons to the county of Southampton. The
four volunteer companies of Petersburg, the dragoons and Lafayette
Artillery Company of Richmond, one volunteer company from Norfolk and
one from Portsmouth, and the regiments of Southampton and Sussex, were
at once ordered out. The cavalry and infantry took up their line of
march on Tuesday evening, while the artillery embarked on the steamer
'Norfolk' and landed at Smithfield."[443]
A Mr. Gray, to whom Turner made his confession, said of him:
... I shall not attempt to describe the effects of his
narrative, as told, and commented on by himself, in the
condemned hole of the prison; the calm, deliberate
composure with which he spoke of his late deeds and
intentions; the expression of his fiend-like face, when
excited by enthusiasm; still bearing the stains of the
blood of helpless innocence about him, clothed with rags
and covered with chains, yet daring to raise his manacled
hands to Heaven with a spirit soaring above the attributes
of man.
And yet, such were the phenomenal inconsistencies occurring in the
philosophy of persons who professed, and who, perhaps, believed
themselves to be humane, this negro's crime was exultingly approved of
by Brown's Eastern supporters. Mr. William Lloyd Garrison, at a meeting
called to witness "John Brown's resurrection" said in his speech:
... As a peace man--an "ultra" peace man--I am prepared to
say: "Success to every slave insurrection at the South,
and in every slave country." And I do not see how I
compromise or stain my peace profession in making that
declaration....[444]