CHAPTER XII

IN 1844 Mr. Lincoln was again a candidate for elector on the Whig

ticket. Mr. Clay, as he has said himself, was his "_beau-ideal_ of a

statesman," and he labored earnestly and as effectually as any one else

for his election. For the most part, he still had his old antagonists

to meet in the Springfield region, chief among whom this year was John

Calhoun. With him and others he had joint debates, running through

several nights, which excited much popular feeling. One of his old

friends and neighbors, who attended all these discussions, speaks in

very enthusiastic terms of Mr. Calhoun, and, after enumerating his many

noble gifts of head and heart, concludes that "Calhoun came nearer of

whipping Lincoln in debate than Douglas did."

Mr. Lincoln made many speeches in Illinois, and finally, towards the

close of the campaign, he went over into Indiana, and there continued

"on the stump" until the end. Among other places he spoke at Rockport on

the Ohio,--where he had first embarked for New Orleans with Gentry,--at

Gentryville, and at a place in the country about two miles from the

cabin where his father had lived. While he was in the midst of his

speech at Gentryville, his old friend, Nat Grigsby, entered the room.

Lincoln recognized him on the instant, and, stopping short in his

remarks, cried out, "There's Nat!" Without the slightest regard for

the proprieties of the occasion, he suspended his address totally, and,

striding from the platform, began scrambling through the audience and

over the benches, toward the modest Nat, who stood near the door.

When he reached him, Lincoln shook his hand "cordially;" and, after

felicitating himself sufficiently upon the happy meeting, he returned to

the platform, and finished his speech. When that was over, Lincoln could

not make up his mind to part with Nat, but insisted that they must sleep

together. Accordingly, they wended their way to Col. Jones's, where that

fine old Jackson Democrat received his distinguished "clerk" with all

the honors he could show him. Nat says, that in the night a cat "began

mewing, scratching, and making a fuss generally." Lincoln got up, took

the cat in his hands, and stroking its back "gently and kindly," made

it sparkle for Nat's amusement. He then "gently" put it out of the door,

and, returning to bed, "commenced telling stories and talking over old

times."

It is hardly necessary to say, that the result of the canvass was a

severe disappointment to Mr. Lincoln. No defeat but his own could have

given him more pain; and thereafter he seems to have attended quietly to

his own private business until the Congressional canvass of 1846.

It was thought for many years by some persons well informed, that

between Lincoln, Logan, Baker, and Hardin,--four very conspicuous Whig

leaders,--there was a secret personal understanding that they four

should "rotate" in Congress until each had had a term. Baker succeeded

Hardin in 1844; Lincoln was elected in 1846, and Logan was nominated,

but defeated, in 1848. Lincoln publicly declined to contest the

nomination with Baker in 1844; Hardin did the same for Lincoln in 1846

(although both seem to have acted reluctantly), and Lincoln refused to

run against Logan in 1848. Col. Matheny and others insist, with great

show of reason, that the agreement actually existed; and, if such

was the case, it was practically carried out, although Lincoln was a

candidate against Baker, and Hardin against Lincoln, as long as either

of them thought there was the smallest prospect of success. They

might have done this, however, merely to keep other and less tractable

candidates out of the field. That Lincoln would cheerfully have made

such a bargain to insure himself a seat in Congress, there can be no

doubt; but the supposition that he did do it can scarcely be reconciled

with the feeling displayed by him in the conflict with Baker, or the

persistency of Hardin, to a very late hour, in the contest of 1846.

At all events, Mr. Lincoln and Gen. Hardin were the two, and the only

two, candidates for the Whig nomination in 1846. The contest was much

like the one with Baker, and Lincoln was assailed in much the same

fashion. He was called a deist and an infidel, both before and after his

nomination, and encountered in a less degree the same opposition from

the members of certain religious bodies that had met him before. But

with Hardin he maintained personal relations the most friendly. The

latter proposed to alter the mode of making the nomination; and, in

the letter conveying this desire to Mr. Lincoln, he also offered to

stipulate that each candidate should remain within the limits of his own

county. To this Mr. Lincoln replied, "As to your proposed stipulation

that all the candidates shall remain in their own counties, and restrain

their friends to the same, it seems to me, that, on reflection, you will

see the fact of your having been in Congress has, in various ways, so

spread your name in the district as to give you a decided advantage in

such a stipulation. I appreciate your desire to keep down excitement,

and I promise you to 'keep cool' under the circumstances."

On the 26th of February, 1846, "The Journal" contained Gen. Hardin's

card declining to be "longer considered a candidate," and in its

editorial comments occurred the following: "We have had, and now have,

no doubt that he (Hardin) has been, and now is, a great favorite with

the Whigs of the district. He states, in substance, that there was never

any understanding on his part that his name was not to be presented

in the canvasses of 1844 and 1846. This, we believe, is strictly true.

Still, the doings of the Pekin Convention did seem to point that way;

and the general's voluntary declination as to the canvass of 1844 was

by many construed into an acquiescence on his part. These things had led

many of his most devoted friends to not expect him to be a candidate

at this time. Add to this the relation that Mr. Lincoln bears, and has

borne, to the party, and it is not strange that many of those who are as

strongly devoted to Gen. Hardin as they are to Mr. Lincoln should prefer

the latter at this time. We do not entertain a doubt, that, if we could

reverse the positions of the two men, that a very large portion of those

who now have supported Mr. Lincoln most warmly would have supported Gen.

Hardin quite as warmly." This article was admirably calculated to soothe

Gen. Hardin, and to win over his friends. It was wise and timely. The

editor was Mr. Lincoln's intimate friend. It is marked by Mr. Lincoln's

style, and has at least one expression which was peculiar to him.

In its issue of May 7, "The Journal" announced the nomination as having

been made at Petersburg, on the Friday previous, and said further, "This

nomination was, of course, anticipated, there being no other candidate

in the field. Mr. Lincoln, we all know, is a good Whig, a good man, an

able speaker, and richly deserves, as he enjoys, the confidence of the

Whigs of this district and of the State."

Peter Cartwright, the celebrated pioneer Methodist preacher, noted for

his piety and combativeness, was Mr. Lincoln's competitor before the

people. We know already the nature of the principal charges against Mr.

Lincoln's personal character; and these, with the usual criticism upon

Whig policy, formed the staple topics of the campaign on the Democratic

side. But Peter himself did not escape with that impunity which might

have been expected in the case of a minister of the gospel. Rough

tongues circulated exaggerated stories of his wicked pugnacity and his

worldly-mindedness, whilst the pretended servant of the Prince of peace.

Many Democrats looked with intense disgust upon his present candidacy,

and believed, that, by mingling in politics, he was degrading his office

and polluting the Church. One of these Democrats told Mr. Lincoln what

he thought, and said, that, although it was a hard thing to vote

against his party, he would do it if it should be necessary to defeat

Cartwright. Mr. Lincoln told him, that on the day of the election he

would give him a candid opinion as to whether the vote was needed or

not Accordingly, on that day, he called upon the gentleman, and said, "I

have got the preacher,... and don't want your vote."

Clay's majority in this district in 1844 had been but nine hundred and

fourteen; whereas it now gave Mr. Lincoln a majority of fifteen hundred

and eleven, in a year which had no Presidential excitements to bring

out electors. In 1848 Gen. Taylor's majority was smaller by ten, and the

same year the Whig candidate for Congress was defeated by a hundred and

six.

In the following letter to Mr. Speed, he intimates that the first

sensations of pleasure attending his new distinction were not of long

duration; at least, that there were moments in which, if he did not

forget his greatness, it afforded him little joy.

Springfield, Oct. 22, 1846.

Dear Speed,--

You no doubt assign the suspension of our correspondence to the true

philosophic cause; though it must be confessed by both of us, that this

is rather a cold reason for allowing a friendship such as ours to die

out by degrees. I propose now, that, upon receipt of this, you shall

be considered in my debt, and under obligations to pay soon, and that

neither shall remain long in arrears hereafter. Are you agreed?

Being elected to Congress, though I am very grateful to our friends for

having done it, has not pleased me as much as I expected.

We have another boy, born the 10th of March. He is very much such a

child as Bob was at his age, rather of a longer order. Bob is "short

and low," and expect always will be. He talks very plainly,--almost as

plainly as anybody. He is quite smart enough. I sometimes fear he is one

of the little rare-ripe sort, that are smarter at about five than

ever after. He has a great deal of that sort of mischief that is the

offspring of much animal spirits. Since I began this letter, a messenger

came to tell me Bob was lost; but by the time I reached the house his

mother had found him, and had him whipped; and by now, very likely,

he is run away again. Mary has read your letter, and wishes to be

remembered to Mrs. S. and you, in which I most sincerely join her. As

ever yours.

A. Lincoln.

At the meeting of the Thirtieth Congress Mr. Lincoln took his seat, and

went about the business of his office with a strong determination to

do something memorable. He was the only Whig member from Illinois, and

would be carefully watched. His colleagues were several of them old

acquaintances of the Vandalia times. They were John McClernand, O. B.

Ficklin, William A. Richardson, Thomas J. Turner, Robert Smith, and

John Wentworth (Long John). And at this session that alert, tireless,

ambitious little man, Stephen A. Douglas, took his seat in the Senate.

The roll of this House shone with an array of great and brilliant names.

Robert C. Winthrop was the Speaker. On the Whig side were John Quincy

Adams, Horace Mann, Hunt of New York, Collamer of Vermont, Ingersoll of

Pennsylvania, Botts and Goggin of Virginia, Morehead of Kentucky,

Caleb B. Smith of Indiana, Stephens and Toombs of Georgia, Gentry of

Tennessee, and Vinton and Schenck of Ohio. On the Democratic side were

Wilmot of Pennsylvania, McLane of Maryland, McDowell of Virginia, Rhett

of South Carolina, Cobb of Georgia, Boyd of Kentucky, Brown and Thompson

of Mississippi, and Andrew Johnson and George W. Jones of Tennessee.

In the Senate were Webster, Calhoun, Benton, Berrien, Clayton, Bell,

Hunter, and William R. King.

The House organized on the 6th; and the day previous to that. Mr.

Lincoln wrote to his friend and partner, William H. Herndon:--

Washington, Dec. 5, 1847.

Dear William,--You may remember that about a year ago a man by the name

of Wilson (James Wilson, I think) paid us twenty dollars as an advance

fee to attend to a case in the Supreme Court for him, against a Mr.

Campbell, the record of which case was in the hands of Mr. Dixon of

St. Louis, who never furnished it to us. When I was at Bloomington last

fall, I met a friend of Wilson, who mentioned the subject to me, and

induced me to write to Wilson, telling him that I would leave the ten

dollars with you which had been left with me to pay for making abstracts

in the case, so that the case may go on this winter; but I came away,

and forgot to do it. What I want now is to send you the money to be used

accordingly, if any one comes on to start the case, or to be retained by

you if no one does.

There is nothing of consequence new here. Congress is to organize

to-morrow. Last night we held a Whig caucus for the House, and nominated

Winthrop of Massachusetts for Speaker, Sargent of Pennsylvania for

Sergeant-at-arms, Homer of New Jersey Doorkeeper, and McCormick of

District of Columbia Postmaster. The Whig majority in the House is

so small, that, together with some little dissatisfaction, leaves it

doubtful whether we will elect them all.

This paper is too thick to fold, which is the reason I send only a

halfsheet.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln.

Again on the 13th, to the same gentleman:--

Washington, Dec. 13, 1847.

Dear William,--Your letter advising me of the receipt of our fee in the

bank-case is just received, and I don't expect to hear another as good

a piece of news from Springfield while I am away. I am under no

obligations to the bank; and I therefore wish you to buy bank

certificates, and pay my debt there, so as to pay it with the least

money possible. I would as soon you should buy them of Mr. Ridgely, or

any other person at the bank, as of any one else, provided you can get

them as cheaply. I suppose, after the bank-debt shall be paid, there

will be some money left, out of which I would like to have you pay

Lavely and Stout twenty dollars, and Priest and somebody (oil-makers)

ten dollars, for materials got for house-painting. If there shall still

be any left, keep it till you see or hear from me.

I shall begin sending documents so soon as I can get them. I wrote you

yesterday about a "Congressional Globe." As you are all so anxious for

me to distinguish myself, I have concluded to do so before long.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln.

Mr. Lincoln was a member of the Committee on Post-offices and

Post-roads, and in that capacity had occasion to study the claim of a

mail-contractor who had appealed to Congress against a decision of the

Department. Mr. Lincoln made a speech on the case, in which, being

his first, he evidently felt some pride, and reported progress to his

friends at home:--

Washington, Jan. 8, 1848.

Dear William,--Your letter of Dec. 27 was received a day or two ago. I

am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken, and promise

to take, in my little business there. As to speech-making, by way of

getting the hang of the House, I made a little speech two or three days

ago, on a post-office question of no general interest. I find speaking

_here and elsewhere_ about the same thing. I was about as badly scared,

and no worse, as I am when I speak in court. I expect to make one within

a week or two, in which I hope to succeed well enough to wish you to see

it.

It is very pleasant to me to learn from you that there are some who

desire that I should be re-elected. I most heartily thank them for the

kind partiality; and I can say, as Mr. Clay said of the annexation of

Texas, that "_personally_ I would not object" to a re-election, although

I thought at the time, and still think, it would be quite as well for

me to return to the law at the end of a single term. I made the

declaration, that I would not be a candidate again, more from a wish to

deal fairly with others, to keep peace among our friends, and to keep

the district from going to the enemy, than for any cause personal to

myself; so that, if it should so happen _that nobody else wishes to be

elected_, I could not refuse the people the right of sending me again.

But to enter myself as a competitor of others, or to authorize any one

so to enter me, is what my word and honor forbid.

I get some letters intimating a probability of so much difficulty

amongst our friends as to lose us the district; but I remember such

letters were written to Baker when my own case was under consideration,

and I trust there is no more ground for such apprehension now than there

was then.

Remember I am always glad to receive a letter from you.

Most truly your friend,

A. Lincoln.

Thoroughly hostile to Polk, and hotly opposed to the war, Mr. Lincoln

took an active, although not a leading part in the discussions relating

to the commencement and conduct of the latter. He was politician enough,

however, to go with the majority of his party in voting supplies to the

troops, and thanks to the generals, whilst censuring the President

by solemnly declaring that the "war was unnecessarily and

unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." But

his position, and the position of the Whigs, will be made sufficiently

apparent by the productions of his own pen.

On the 22d of December, 1847, Mr. Lincoln introduced a preamble and

resolutions, which attained great celebrity in Illinois under the title

of "Spot Resolutions," and in all probability lost the party a great

many votes in the Springfield district. They were as follows:--

Whereas, The President of the United States, in his Message of May 11,

1846, has declared that "the Mexican Government not only refused

to receive him [the envoy of the United States], or listen to his

propositions, but, after a long-continued series of menaces, has at last

invaded _our territory_, and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on

_our own soil_;"

And again, in his Message of Dec. 8, 1846, that "we had ample cause of

war against Mexico long before the breaking out of hostilities; but even

then we forbore to take redress into our own hands until Mexico herself

became the aggressor, by invading _our soil_ in hostile array, and

shedding the blood of our citizens;"

And yet again, in his Message of Dec. 7, 1847, that "the Mexican

Government refused even to hear the terms of adjustment which he [our

minister of peace] was authorized to propose, and finally, under wholly

unjustifiable pretexts, involved the two countries in war, by invading

the territory of the State of Texas, striking the first blow, and

shedding the blood of our citizens on _our own soil_;" and,

Whereas, This House is desirous to obtain a full knowledge of all the

facts which go to establish whether the particular spot on which the

blood of our citizens was so shed was or was not at that time "_our own

soil_;" therefore,

Resolved by the House of Representatives, That the President of the

United States be respectfully requested to inform this House,--

1st. Whether the spot on which the blood of our citizens was shed, as

in his Messages declared, was or was not within the territory of Spain,

at least after the treaty of 1819, until the Mexican revolution.

2d. Whether that spot is or is not within the territory which was

wrested from Spain by the revolutionary government of Mexico.

3d. Whether that spot is or is not within a settlement of people, which

settlement has existed ever since long before the Texas revolution,

and until its inhabitants fled before the approach of the United States

army.

4th. Whether that settlement is or is not isolated from any and all

other settlements by the Gulf and the Rio Grande on the south and west,

and by wide, uninhabited regions on the north and east.

5th. Whether the people of that settlement, or a majority of them, or

any of them, have ever submitted themselves to the government or laws

of Texas or of the United States, by consent or by compulsion, either by

accepting office, or voting at elections, or paying tax, or serving on

juries, or having process served upon them, or in any other way.

6th. Whether the people of that settlement did or did not flee from the

approach of the United States army, leaving unprotected their homes and

their growing crops, _before_ the blood was shed, as in the Messages

stated; and whether the first blood, so shed, was or was not shed within

the enclosure of one of the people who had thus fled from it.

7th. Whether our _citizens_, whose blood was shed, as in his Messages

declared, were or were not at that time armed officers and soldiers,

sent into that settlement by the military order of the President,

through the Secretary of War.

8th. Whether the military force of the United States was or was not so

sent into that settlement after Gen. Taylor had more than once intimated

to the War Department, that, in his opinion, no such movement was

necessary to the defence or protection of Texas.

Mr. Lincoln improved the first favorable opportunity (Jan. 12, 1818), to

address the House in the spirit of the "Spot Resolutions."

In Committee of the Whole House, Jan. 12, 1848.

Mr. Lincoln addressed the Committee as follows:--

Mr. Chairman,--Some, if not at all, of the gentlemen on the other side

of the House, who have addressed the Committee within the last two days,

have spoken rather complainingly, if I have rightly understood them,

of the vote given a week or ten days ago, declaring that the war

with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the

President. I admit that such a vote should not be given in mere party

wantonness, and that the one given is justly censurable, if it have no

other or better foundation. I am one of those who joined in that vote,

and did so under my best impression of the _truth_ of the case. How I

got this impression, and how it may possibly be removed, I will now

try to show. When the war began, it was my opinion that all those who,

because of knowing too _little_, or because of knowing too _much_,

could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the President (in the

beginning of it), should, nevertheless, as good citizens and patriots,

remain silent on that point, at least till the war should be ended. Some

leading Democrats, including ex-President Van Buren, have taken this

same view, as I understand them; and I adhered to it, and acted upon it,

until since I took my seat here; and I think I should still adhere to

it, were it not that the President and his friends will not allow it

to be so. Besides the continual effort of the President to argue every

silent vote given for supplies into an indorsement of the justice and

wisdom of his conduct; besides that singularly candid paragraph in his

late Message, in which he tells us that Congress, with great unanimity

(only two in the Senate and fourteen in the House dissenting), had

declared that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico a state of war

exists between that government and the United States;" when the same

journals that informed him of this also informed him, that, when

that declaration stood disconnected from the question of supplies,

sixty-seven in the House, and not fourteen merely, voted against it;

besides this open attempt to prove by telling the _truth_ what he could

not prove by telling the _whole truth_, demanding of all who will not

submit to be misrepresented, in justice to themselves, to speak out;

besides all this, one of my colleagues [Mr. Richardson], at a very early

day in the session, brought in a set of resolutions expressly indorsing

the original justice of the war on the part of the President. Upon

these resolutions, when they shall be put on their passage, I shall be

_compelled_ to vote; so that I cannot be silent if I would. Seeing this,

I went about preparing myself to give the vote understandingly when it

should come. I carefully examined the President's Messages, to ascertain

what he himself had said and proved upon the point. The result of this

examination was to make the impression, that, taking for true all

the President states as facts, he falls far short of proving his

justification; and that the President would have gone further with his

proof, if it had not been for the small matter that the _truth_ would

not permit him. Under the impression thus made, I gave the vote

before mentioned. I propose now to give concisely the process of the

examination I made, and how I reached the conclusion I did.

The President, in his first Message of May, 1846, declares that the soil

was _ours_ on which hostilities were commenced by Mexico; and he repeats

that declaration, almost in the same language, in each successive annual

Message,--thus showing that he esteems that point a highly essential

one. In the importance of that point I entirely agree with the

President. To my judgment, it is the _very point_ upon which he should

be justified or condemned. In his Message of December, 1846, it seems

to have occurred to him, as is certainly true, that title, ownership

to soil, or any thing else, is not a simple fact, but is a conclusion

following one or more simple facts; and that it was incumbent upon him

to present the facts from which he concluded the soil was ours on which

the first blood of the war was shed.

Accordingly, a little below the middle of page twelve, in the Message

last referred to, he enters upon that task; forming an issue and

introducing testimony, extending the whole to a little below the middle

of page fourteen. Now, I propose to try to show that the whole of this,

issue and evidence, is, from beginning to end, the sheerest deception.

The issue, as he presents it, is in these words: "But there are those

who, conceding all this to be true, assume the ground that the true

western boundary of Texas is the Nueces, instead of the Rio Grande; and

that, therefore, in marching our army to the east bank of the latter

river, we passed the Texan line, and invaded the Territory of Mexico."

Now, this issue is made up of two affirmatives, and no negative. The

main deception of it is, that it assumes as true, that one river or the

other is necessarily the boundary, and cheats the superficial thinker

entirely out of the idea that possibly the boundary is somewhere between

the two, and not actually at either. A further deception is, that it

will let in evidence which a true issue would exclude. A true issue made

by the President would be about as follows: "I say the soil _was ours_

on which the first blood was shed; there are those who say it was not."

I now proceed to examine the President's evidence, as applicable to

such an issue. When that evidence is analyzed, it is all included in the

following propositions:--

1. That the Rio Grande was the western boundary of Louisiana, as we

purchased it of France in 1803.

2. That the Republic of Texas always claimed the Rio Grande as her

western boundary.

3. That, by various acts, she had claimed it on paper.

4. That Santa Anna, in his treaty with Texas, recognized the Rio Grande

as her boundary.

5. That Texas _before_, and the United States _after_ annexation, had

_exercised_ jurisdiction _beyond_ the Nueces, _between_ the two rivers.

6. That our Congress _understood_ the boundary of Texas to extend beyond

the Nueces.

Now for each of these in its turn:--

His first item is, that the Rio Grande was the western boundary of

Louisiana, as we purchased it of France in 1803; and, seeming to expect

this to be disputed, he argues over the amount of nearly a page to prove

it true; at the end of which, he lets us know, that, by the treaty of

1819, we sold to Spain the whole country, from the Rio Grande eastward

to the Sabine. Now, admitting for the present, that the Rio Grande was

the boundary of Louisiana, what, under Heaven, had that to do with the

present boundary between us and Mexico? How, Mr. Chairman, the line that

once divided your land from mine can still be the boundary between us

after I have sold my land to you, is, to me, beyond all comprehension.

And how any man, with an honest purpose only of proving the truth, could

ever have thought of introducing such a fact to prove such an issue, is

equally incomprehensible. The outrage upon common right, of seizing as

our own what we have once sold, merely because it was ours before we

sold it, is only equalled by the outrage on common sense of any attempt

to justify it.

The President's next piece of evidence is, that "The Republic of Texas

always _claimed_ this river (Rio Grande) as her western boundary." That

is not true, in fact. Texas _has_ claimed it, but she has not _always_

claimed it. There is, at least, one distinguished exception. Her State

Constitution--the public's most solemn and well-considered act, that

which may, without impropriety, be called her last will and testament,

revoking all others--makes no such claim. But suppose she had always

claimed it. Has not Mexico always claimed the contrary? So that there is

but claim against claim, leaving nothing proved until we get back of the

claims, and find which has the better _foundation._

Though not in the order in which the President presents his evidence,

I now consider that class of his statements which are, in substance,

nothing more than that Texas has, by various acts of her Convention and

Congress, claimed the Rio Grande as her boundary--_on paper_. I mean

here what he says about the fixing of the Rio Grande as her boundary

in her old constitution (not her State Constitution), about forming

congressional districts, counties, &c. Now, all this is but naked

_claim_; and what I have already said about claims is strictly

applicable to this. If I should claim your land by word of mouth, that

certainly would not make it mine; and if I were to claim it by a deed

which I had made myself, and with which you had nothing to do, the claim

would be quite the same in substance, or rather in utter nothingness.

I next consider the President's statement that Santa Anna, in his

_treaty_ with Texas, recognized the Rio Grande as the western boundary

of Texas. Besides the position so often taken that Santa Anna, while a

prisoner of war, a captive, _could not_ bind Mexico by a treaty, which

I deem conclusive,--besides this, I wish to say something in relation

to this treaty, so called by the President, with Santa Anna. If any man

would like to be amused by a sight at that _little_ thing, which

the President calls by that _big_ name, he can have it by turning to

"Niles's Register," vol. 1. p. 336. And if any one should suppose that

"Niles's Register" is a curious repository of so mighty a document as

a solemn treaty between nations, I can only say that I learned, to a

tolerable degree of certainty, by inquiry at the State Department, that

the President himself never saw it anywhere else. By the way, I believe

I should not err if I were to declare, that, during the first ten years

of the existence of that document, it was never by anybody _called_

a treaty; that it was never so called till the President, in his

extremity, attempted, by so calling it, to wring something from it in

justification of himself in connection with the Mexican war. It has none

of the distinguishing features of a treaty. It does not call itself a

treaty. Santa Anna does not therein assume to bind Mexico: he assumes

only to act as president, commander-in-chief of the Mexican army and

navy; stipulates that the then present hostilities should cease, and

that he would not himself take up arms, nor influence the Mexican

people to take up arms, against Texas during the existence of the war of

independence. He did not recognize the independence of Texas; he did not

assume to put an end to the war, but clearly indicated his expectation

of its continuance; he did not say one word about boundary, and most

probably never thought of it. It is stipulated therein that the Mexican

forces should evacuate the Territory of Texas, _passing to the other

side of the Rio Grande;_ and in another article it is stipulated, that,

to prevent collisions between the armies, the Texan army should not

approach nearer than within five leagues,--of what is not said; but

clearly, from the object stated, it is of the Rio Grande. Now, if this

is a treaty recognizing the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas, it

contains the singular feature of stipulating that Texas shall not go

within five leagues of _her own_ boundary.

Next comes the evidence of Texas before annexation, and the United

States afterwards, exercising jurisdiction beyond the Nueces, and

between the two rivers. This actual exercise of jurisdiction is the very

class or quality of evidence we want. It is excellent so far as it goes;

but does it go far enough? He tells us it went beyond the Nueces; but he

does not tell us it went to the Rio Grande. He tells us jurisdiction

was exercised between the two rivers; but he does not tell us it was

exercised over all the territory between them. Some simple-minded people

think it possible to cross one river and go beyond it, without going

all the way to the next; that jurisdiction may be exercised between two

rivers without covering all the country between them. I know a man,

not very unlike myself, who exercises jurisdiction over a piece of land

between the Wabash and the Mississippi; and yet so far is this from

being all there is between those rivers, that it is just a hundred

and fifty-two feet long by fifty wide, and no part of it much within

a hundred miles of either. He has a neighbor between him and the

Mississippi,--that is, just across the street, in that direction,--whom,

I am sure, he could neither persuade nor force to give up his

habitation; but which, nevertheless, he could certainly annex, if it

were to be done by merely standing on his own side of the street and

claiming it, or even sitting down and writing a deed for it.

But next, the President tells us, the Congress of the United States

understood the State of Texas they admitted into the Union to extend

beyond the Nueces. Well, I suppose they did,--I certainly so understand

it,--but how far beyond? That Congress did not understand it to extend

clear to the Rio Grande, is quite certain by the fact of their joint

resolutions for admission, expressly leaving all questions of boundary

to future adjustment. And it may be added, that Texas herself is proved

to have had the same understanding of it that our Congress had, by

the fact of the exact conformity of her new Constitution to those

resolutions.

I am now through the whole of the President's evidence; and it is a

singular fact, that, if any one should declare the President sent the

army into the midst of a settlement of Mexican people, who had never

submitted, by consent or by force, to the authority of Texas or of the

United States, and that there, and thereby, the first blood of the war

was shed, there is not one word in all the President has said which

would either admit or deny the declaration. In this strange omission

chiefly consists the deception of the President's evidence,--an omission

which, it does seem to me, could scarcely have occurred but by design.

My way of living leads me to be about the courts of justice; and there I

have sometimes seen a good lawyer, struggling for his client's neck in a

desperate case, employing every artifice to work round, befog, and cover

up with many words, some position pressed upon him by the prosecution,

which he dared not admit, and yet could not deny. Party bias may help to

make it appear so; but, with all the allowance I can make for such bias,

it still does appear to me that just such, and from just such necessity,

are the President's struggles in this case.

Some time after my colleague (Mr. Richardson) introduced the

resolutions I have mentioned, I introduced a preamble, resolution, and

interrogatories, intended to draw the President out, if possible, on

this hitherto untrodden ground. To show their relevancy, I propose to

state my understanding of the true rule for ascertaining the boundary

between Texas and Mexico. It is, that, _wherever_ Texas was _exercising_

jurisdiction was hers; and wherever Mexico was exercising jurisdiction

was hers; and that whatever separated the actual exercise of

jurisdiction of the one from that of the other was the true boundary

between them. If, as is probably true, Texas was exercising jurisdiction

along the western bank of the Nueces, and Mexico was exercising it along

the eastern bank of the Rio Grande, then neither river was the boundary,

but the uninhabited country between the two was. The extent of our

territory in that region depended, not on any treaty-fixed boundary (for

no treaty had attempted it), but on revolution. Any people anywhere,

being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake

off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better.

This is a most valuable, a most sacred right,--a right which, we hope

and believe, is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to

cases in which the whole people of an existing government may choose to

exercise it. Any portion of such people that can may revolutionize, and

make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than

this, a _majority_ of any portion of such people may revolutionize,

putting down a _minority_, intermingled with or near about them, who

may oppose their movements. Such minority was precisely the case of the

Tories of our own Revolution. It is a quality of revolutions not to go

by old lines or old laws, but to break up both, and make new ones. As to

the country now in question, we bought it of France in 1803, and sold

it to Spain in 1819, according to the President's statement. After this,

all Mexico, including Texas, revolutionized against Spain; and, still

later, Texas revolutionized against Mexico. In my view, just so far

as she carried her revolution, by obtaining the _actual,_ willing or

unwilling, submission of the people, _so far_ the country was hers, and

no farther.

Now, sir, for the purpose of obtaining the very best evidence as to

whether Texas had actually carried her revolution to the place where the

hostilities of the present war commenced, let the President answer the

interrogatories I proposed, as before mentioned, or some other similar

ones. Let him answer fully, fairly, and candidly. Let him answer

with _facts_, and not with arguments. Let him remember he sits where

Washington sat; and, so remembering, let him answer as Washington would

answer. As a nation should not, and the Almighty will not, be evaded,

so let him attempt no evasion, no equivocation. And if, so answering,

he can show that the soil was ours where the first blood of the war was

shed; that it was not within an inhabited country, or, if within such,

that the inhabitants had submitted themselves to the civil authority of

Texas, or of the United States, and that the same is true of the site

of Fort Brown, then I am with him for his justification. In that case,

I shall be most happy to reverse the vote I gave the other day. I have a

selfish motive for desiring that the President may do this: I expect

to give some votes, in connection with the war, which, without his so

doing, will be of doubtful propriety, in my own judgment, but which will

be free from the doubt if he does so. But if he cannot or will not do

this,--if, on any pretence, or no pretence, he shall refuse or omit

it,--then I shall be fully convinced of what I more than suspect

already,--that he is deeply conscious of being in the wrong; that he

feels the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to Heaven

against him; that he ordered Gen. Taylor into the midst of a peaceful

Mexican settlement, purposely to bring on a war; that, originally

having some strong motive--what I will not stop now to give my opinion

concerning--to involve the two countries in a war, and trusting to

escape scrutiny by fixing the public gaze upon the exceeding brightness

of military glory,--that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of

blood, that serpent's eye that charms to destroy,--he plunged into it,

and has swept on and on, till, disappointed in his calculation of the

ease with which Mexico might be subdued, he now finds himself he knows

not where. How like the half-insane mumbling of a fever-dream is the

whole war part of the late Message! At one time telling us that Mexico

has nothing whatever that we can get but territory; at another, showing

us how we can support the war by levying contributions on Mexico. At

one time urging the national honor, the security of the future, the

prevention of foreign interference, and even the good of Mexico herself,

as among the objects of the war; at another, telling us that, "to reject

indemnity by refusing to accept a cession of territory, would be to

abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war, bearing all its

expenses, without a purpose or definite object." So, then, the

national honor, security of the future, and every thing but territorial

indemnity, may be considered the no purposes and indefinite objects of

the war! But having it now settled that territorial indemnity is the

only object, we are urged to seize, by legislation here, all that he

was content to take a few months ago, and the whole province of Lower

California to boot, and to still carry on the war,--to take all we are

fighting for, and still fight on. Again, the President is resolved,

under all circumstances, to have full territorial indemnity for the

expenses of the war; but he forgets to tell us how we are to get the

excess after those expenses shall have surpassed the value of the

whole of the Mexican territory. So, again, he insists that the separate

national existence of Mexico shall be maintained; but he does not tell

us how this can be done after we shall have taken all her territory.

Lest the questions I here suggest be considered speculative merely, let

me be indulged a moment in trying to show they are not.

The war has gone on some twenty months; for the expenses of which,

together with an inconsiderable old score, the President now claims

about one-half of the Mexican territory, and that by far the better

half, so far as concerns our ability to make any thing out of it. It is

comparatively uninhabited; so that we could establish land-offices in

it, and raise some money in that way. But the other half is already

inhabited, as I understand it, tolerably densely for the nature of

the country; and all its lands, or all that are valuable, already

appropriated as private property. How, then, are we to make any thing

out of these lands with this encumbrance on them, or how remove the

encumbrance? I suppose no one will say we should kill the people,

or drive them out, or make slaves of them, or even confiscate their

property? How, then, can we make much out of this part of the territory?

If the prosecution of the war has, in expenses, already equalled the

better half of the country, how long its future prosecution will be in

equalling the less valuable half is not a speculative but a practical

question, pressing closely upon us; and yet it is a question which the

President seems never to have thought of.

As to the mode of terminating the war and securing peace, the President

is equally wandering and indefinite. First, it is to be done by a

more vigorous prosecution of the war in the vital parts of the enemy's

country; and, after apparently talking himself tired on this point, the

President drops down into a half-despairing tone, and tells us, that

"with a people distracted and divided by contending factions, and a

government subject to constant changes, by successive revolutions, _the

continued success of our arms may fail to obtain a satisfactory peace."_

Then he suggests the propriety of wheedling the Mexican people to desert

the counsels of their own leaders, and, trusting in our protection,

to set up a government from which we can secure a satisfactory peace,

telling us that, "_this may become the only mode of obtaining such a

peace_." But soon he falls into doubt of this, too, and then drops back

on to the already half-abandoned ground of "more vigorous prosecution."

All this shows that the President is in no wise satisfied with his own

positions. First, he takes up one, and, in attempting to argue us into

it, he argues himself out of it; then seizes another, and goes through

the same process; and then, confused at being able to think of nothing

new, he snatches up the old one again, which he has some time before

cast off. His mind, tasked beyond its power, is running hither and

thither, like some tortured creature on a burning surface, finding no

position on which it can settle down and be at ease.

Again, it is a singular omission in this Message, that it nowhere

intimates _when_ the President expects the war to terminate. At its

beginning, Gen. Scott was, by this same President, driven into disfavor,

if not disgrace, for intimating that peace could not be conquered in

less than three or four months. But now at the end of about twenty

months, during which time our arms have given us the most splendid

successes,--every department, and every part, land and water, officers

and privates, regulars and volunteers, doing all that men could do, and

hundreds of things which it had ever before been thought that men could

not do,--after all this, this same President gives us a long Message

without showing us that, _as to the end,_ he has himself even an

imaginary conception. As I have before said, he knows not where he is.

He is a bewildered, confounded, and miserably perplexed man. God grant

he may be able to show that there is not something about his conscience

more painful than all his mental perplexity.

This speech he hastened to send home as soon as it was printed; for,

while throughout he trod on unquestionable Whig ground, he had excellent

reasons to fear the result. The following is the first letter to Mr.

Herndon after the delivery of the speech, and notifying him of the

fact:--

Washington, Jan. 19, 1848.

Dear William,--Enclosed you find a letter of Louis W. Candler. What

is wanted is, that you shall ascertain whether the claim upon the note

described has received any dividend in the Probate Court of Christian

County, where the estate of Mr. Overton Williams has been administered

on. If nothing is paid on it, withdraw the note and send it to me, so

that Candler can see the indorser of it. At all events, write me all

about it, till I can somehow get it off hands. I have already been

bored more than enough about it; not the least of which annoyance is his

cursed, unreadable, and ungodly handwriting.

I have made a speech, a copy of which I will send you by next mail.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln.

About the last of January, or the first of February, he began to hear

the first murmurs of alarm and dissatisfaction from his district. He was

now on the defensive, and compelled to write long and tedious letters

to pacify some of the Whigs. Of this character are two extremely

interesting epistles to Mr. Herndon:--

Washington, Feb. 1, 1848.

Dear William,--Your letter of the 19th ult. was received last night, and

for which I am much obliged. The only thing in it that I wish to talk to

you about at once is, that, because of my vote for Ashmun's amendment,

you fear that you and I disagree about the war. I regret this, not

because of any fear we shall remain disagreed after you have read this

letter, but because if you misunderstand, I fear other good friends

may also. That vote affirms, that the war was unnecessarily and

unconstitutionally commenced by the President; and I will stake my life,

that, if you had been in my place, you would have voted just as I did.

Would you have voted what you felt and knew to be a lie? I know you

would not. Would you have gone out of the House,--skulked the vote? I

expect not. If you had skulked one vote, you would have had to skulk

many more before the end of the session. Richardson's resolutions,

introduced before I made any move, or gave any vote upon the subject,

make the direct question of the justice of the war; so that no man

can be silent if he would. You are compelled to speak; and your only

alternative is to tell the _truth or tell a lie_. I cannot doubt which

you would do.

This vote has nothing to do in determining my votes on the questions of

supplies. I have always intended, and still intend, to vote supplies;

perhaps not in the precise form recommended by the President, but in a

better form for all purposes, except Locofoco party purposes. It is

in this particular you seem mistaken. The Locos are untiring in their

efforts to make the impression that all who vote supplies, or take part

in the war, do, of necessity, approve the President's conduct in the

beginning of it; but the Whigs have, from the beginning, made and kept

the distinction between the two. In the very first act nearly all the

Whigs voted against the preamble declaring that war existed by the act

of Mexico; and yet nearly all of them voted for the supplies. As to the

Whig men who have participated in the war, so far as they have spoken to

my hearing, they do not hesitate to denounce as unjust the President's

conduct in the beginning of the war. They do not suppose that such

denunciation is directed by undying hatred to them, as "The Register"

would have it believed. There are two such Whigs on this floor (Col.

Haskell and Major James). The former fought as a colonel by the side of

Col. Baker, at Cerro Gordo, and stands side by side with me in the

vote that you seem dissatisfied with. The latter, the history of whose

capture with Cassius Clay you well know, had not arrived here when that

vote was given; but, as I understand, he stands ready to give just such

a vote whenever an occasion shall present. Baker, too, who is now here,

says the truth is undoubtedly that way; and, whenever he shall speak

out, he will say so. Col. Donaphin, too, the favorite Whig of Missouri,

and who overrun all Northern Mexico, on his return home, in a public

speech at St. Louis, condemned the administration in relation to the

war, if I remember. G. T. M. Davis, who has been through almost the

whole war, declares in favor of Mr. Clay; from which I infer that he

adopts the sentiments of Mr. Clay, generally at least. On the other

hand, I have heard of but one Whig who has been to the war attempting

to justify the President's conduct. That one was Capt. Bishop; editor of

"The Charleston Courier," and a very clever fellow. I do not mean this

letter for the public, but for you. Before it reaches you, you will have

seen and read my pamphlet speech, and, perhaps, scared anew by it. After

you get over your scare, read it over again, sentence by sentence, and

tell me honestly what you think of it. I condensed all I could for fear

of being cut off by the hour rule; and, when I got through, I had spoken

but forty-five minutes. Yours forever,

A. Lincoln.

Washington, Feb. 15, 1848.

Dear William,--Your letter of the 29th January was received last night.

Being exclusively a constitutional argument, I wish to submit some

reflections upon it in the same spirit of kindness that I know actuates

you. Let me first state what I understand to be your position. It is,

that, if it shall become necessary _to repel invasion_, the President

may, without violation of the Constitution, cross the line, and _invade_

the territory of another country; and that whether such _necessity_

exists in any given case, the President is the _sole_ judge.

Before going farther, consider well whether this is, or is not, your

position. If it is, it is a position that neither the President himself,

nor any friend of his, so far as I know, has ever taken. Their only

positions are, first, that the soil was ours where the hostilities

commenced; and second, that, whether it was rightfully ours or not,

Congress had annexed it, and the President, for that reason, was bound

to defend it, both of which are as clearly proved to be false in fact

as you can prove that your house is mine. That soil was not ours; and

Congress did not annex, or attempt to annex it. But to return to your

position. Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he

shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so

_whenever he may choose to say_ he deems it necessary for such purpose,

and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix

_any limit_ to his power in this respect, after having given him so much

as you propose. If to-day he should choose to say he thinks it necessary

to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, how could

you stop him? You may say to him, "I see no probability of the British

invading us;" but he will say to you, "Be silent: I see it, if you

don't."

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to

Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons:

kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars,

pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the

object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all

kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that

_no one man_ should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.

But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where

kings have always stood.

Write soon again.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln.

But the Whig National Convention to nominate a candidate for the

Presidency was to meet at Philadelphia on the 1st of June, and Mr.

Lincoln was to be a member. He was not a Clay man: he wanted a candidate

that could be elected; and he was for "Old Rough," as the only available

material at hand. But let him explain himself:--

Washington, April 30, 1848.

Dear Williams,--I have not seen in the papers any evidence of a movement

to send a delegate from your circuit to the June Convention. I wish to

say that I think it all important that a delegate should be sent. Mr.

Clay's chance for an election is just no chance at all. He might get New

York; and that would have elected in 1844, but it will not now, because

he must now, at the least, lose Tennessee, which he had then, and in

addition the fifteen new votes of Florida, Texas, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

I know our good friend Browning is a great admirer of Mr. Clay, and

I therefore fear he is favoring his nomination. If he is, ask him to

discard feeling, and try if he can possibly, as a matter of judgment,

count the votes necessary to elect him.

In my judgment we can elect nobody but Gen. Taylor; and we cannot elect

him without a nomination. Therefore don't fail to send a delegate.

Your friend as ever,

A. Lincoln.

To Archibald Williams, Esq.

Washington, June 12, 1848.

Dear Williams,--On my return from Philadelphia, where I had been

attending the nomination of "Old Rough," I found your letter in a mass

of others which had accumulated in my absence. By many, and often, it

had been said they would not abide the nomination of Taylor; but, since

the deed has been done, they are fast falling in, and in my opinion we

shall have a most overwhelming, glorious triumph. One unmistakable

sign is, that all the odds and ends are with us,--Barnburners, Native

Americans, Tyler men, disappointed, office-seeking Locofocos, and the

Lord knows what. This is important, if in nothing else, in showing

which way the wind blows. Some of the sanguine men here set down all the

States as certain for Taylor but Illinois, and it is doubtful. Cannot

something be done even in Illinois? Taylor's nomination takes the Locos

on the blind side. It turns the war thunder against them. The war is now

to them the gallows of Haman, which they built for us, and on which they

are doomed to be hanged themselves.

Excuse this short letter. I have so many to write that I cannot devote

much time to any one.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln.

But his young partner in the law gave him a great deal of annoyance. Mr.

Herndon seems to have been troubled by patriotic scruples. He could

not understand how the war had been begun unconstitutionally and

unnecessarily by President Polk, nor how the Whigs could vote supplies

to carry on the war without indorsing the war itself. Besides all this,

he sent news of startling defections; and the weary Representative took

up his pen again and again to explain, defend, and advise:--

Washington, June 22,1848.

Dear William,--Last night I was attending a sort of caucus of the Whig

members, held in relation to the coming Presidential election. The whole

field of the nation was scanned; and all is high hope and confidence.

Illinois is expected to better her condition in this race. Under these

circumstances, judge how heart-rending it was to come to my room and

find and read your discouraging letter of the 15th. We have made no

gains, but have lost "H. R. Robinson, Turner, Campbell, and four or five

more." Tell Arney to reconsider, if he would be saved. Baker and I used

to do something, but I think you attach more importance to our absence

than is just. There is another cause: in 1840, for instance, we had two

Senators and five Representatives in Sangamon; now, we have part of one

Senator and two Representatives. With quite one-third more people than

we had then, we have only half the sort of offices which are sought by

men of the speaking sort of talent. This, I think, is the chief cause.

Now, as to the young men. You must not wait to be brought forward by the

older men. For instance, do you suppose that I should ever have got into

notice if I had waited to be hunted up and pushed forward by older men.

You young men get together and form a Rough and Ready Club, and have

regular meetings and speeches. Take in everybody that you can get.

Harrison, Grimsley, Z. A. Enos, Lee Kimball, and C. W. Matheny will do

to begin the thing; but, as you go along, gather up all the shrewd,

wild boys about town, whether just of age or a little under age,--Chris.

Logan, Reddick Ridgely, Lewis Zwizler, and hundreds such. Let every one

play the part he can play best,--some speak, some sing, and all hollow

(holler ED). Your meetings will be of evenings; the older men, and the

women, will go to hear you; so that it will not only contribute to

the election of "Old Zack," but will be an interesting pastime, and

improving to the intellectual faculties of all engaged. Don't fail to do

this.

You ask me to send you all the speeches made about "Old Zack," the war,

&c., &c. Now, this makes me a little impatient. I have regularly sent

you "The Congressional Globe" and "Appendix," and you cannot have

examined them, or you would have discovered that they contain every

speech made by every man in both Houses of Congress, on every subject,

during the session. Can I send any more? Can I send speeches that nobody

has made? Thinking it would be most natural that the newspapers would

feel interested to give at least some of the speeches to their readers,

I, at the beginning of the session, made arrangements to have one copy

of "The Globe" and "Appendix" regularly sent to each Whig paper of the

district. And yet, with the exception of my own little speech, which was

published in two only of the then five, now four, Whig papers, I do not

remember having seen a single speech, or even extract from one, in any

single one of those papers. With equal and full means on both sides, I

will venture that "The State Register" has thrown before its readers

more of Locofoco speeches in a month than all the Whig papers of the

district have done of Whig speeches during the session.

If you wish a full understanding of the war, I repeat what I believe I

said to you in a letter once before, that the whole, or nearly so, is

to be found in the speech of Dixon of Connecticut. This I sent you in

pamphlet, as well, as in "The Globe." Examine and study every sentence

of that speech thoroughly, and you will understand the whole subject.

You ask how Congress came to declare that war had existed by the act of

Mexico. Is it possible you don't understand that yet? You have at

least twenty speeches in your possession that fully explain it. I

will, however, try it once more. The news reached Washington of the

commencement of hostilities on the Rio Grande, and of the great peril of

Gen. Taylor's army. Everybody, Whigs and Democrats, was for sending them

aid, in men and money. It was necessary to pass a bill for this. The

Locos had a majority in both Houses, and they brought in a bill with a

preamble, saying, _Whereas_, War exists by the act of Mexico, therefore

we send Gen. Taylor money. The Whigs moved to strike out the preamble,

so that they could vote to send the men and money, without saying any

thing about how the war commenced; but, being in the minority, they were

voted down, and the preamble was retained. Then, on the passage of the

bill, the question came upon them, "Shall we vote for preamble and bill

both together, or against both together?" They did not want to vote

against sending help to Gen. Taylor, and therefore they voted for both

together. Is there any difficulty in understanding this? Even my little

speech shows how this was; and, if you will go to the library, you

may get "The Journal" of 1845-46, in which you can find the whole for

yourself.

We have nothing published yet with special reference to the Taylor race;

but we soon will have, and then I will send them to everybody. I made

an internal-improvement speech day before yesterday, which I shall

send home as soon as I can get it written out and printed,--and which I

suppose nobody will read.

Your friend as ever,

A. Lincoln.

Washington, July 10, 1848.

Dear William,--Your letter covering the newspaper slips was received

last night. The subject of that letter is exceedingly painful to me;

and I cannot but think there is some mistake in your impression of the

motives of the old men. I suppose I am now one of the old men; and I

declare, on my veracity, which I think is good with you, that nothing

could afford me more satisfaction than to learn that you and others of

my young friends at home were doing battle in the contest, and endearing

themselves to the people, and taking a stand far above any I have ever

been able to reach in their admiration. I cannot conceive that other old

men feel differently. Of course, I cannot demonstrate what I say; but

I was young once, and I am sure I was never ungenerously thrust back. I

hardly know what to say. The way for a young man to rise is to improve

himself every way he can, never suspecting that anybody wishes to hinder

him. Allow me to assure you that suspicion and jealousy never did help

any man in any situation. There may sometimes be ungenerous attempts to

keep a young man down; and they will succeed, too, if he allows his

mind to be diverted from its true channel, to brood over the attempted

injury. Cast about, and see if this feeling has not injured every person

you have ever known to fall into it.

Now, in what I have said, I am sure you will suspect nothing but

sincere friendship. I would save you from a fatal error. You have been a

laborious, studious young man. You are far better informed on almost all

subjects than I have ever been. You cannot fail in any laudable object,

unless you allow your mind to be improperly directed. I have some the

advantage of you in the world's experience, merely by being older; and

it is this that induces me to advise.

You still seem to be a little mistaken about "The Congressional Globe"

and "Appendix." They contain _all_ of the speeches that are published

in any way. My speech and Dayton's speech, which you say you got in

pamphlet form, are both, word for word, in the "Appendix." I repeat

again, all are there.

Your friend, as ever,

A. Lincoln.

The "internal-improvement" speech to which Mr. Lincoln alludes in one of

these letters was delivered on the 20th of June, and contained nothing

remarkable or especially characteristic. It was in the main merely the

usual Whig argument in favor of the constitutionality of Mr. Clay's

"American System."

But, after the nominations at Baltimore and Philadelphia, everybody

in either House of Congress who could compose any thing at all "on his

legs," or in the closet, felt it incumbent upon him to contribute at

least one electioneering speech to the political literature of the day.

At last, on the 27th of July, Mr. Lincoln found an opportunity to make

his. Few like it have ever been heard in either of those venerable

chambers. It is a common remark of those who know nothing of the

subject, that Mr. Lincoln was devoid of imagination; but the reader of

this speech will entertain a different opinion. It opens to us a mind

fertile in images sufficiently rare and striking, but of somewhat

questionable taste. It must have been heard in amazement by those

gentlemen of the House who had never known a Hanks, or seen a New Salem.

SPEECH ON THE PRESIDENCY AND GENERAL POLITICS.

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE, JULY 27, 1848.

Mr. Speaker,--Our Democratic friends seem to be in great distress

because they think our candidate for the Presidency don't suit us. Most

of them cannot find out that Gen. Taylor has any principles at all;

some, however, have discovered that he has one, but that that one is

entirely wrong. This one principle is his position on the veto power.

The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Stanton), who has just taken his

seat, indeed, has said there is very little, if any, difference on this

question between Gen. Taylor and all the Presidents; and he seems to

think it sufficient detraction from Gen. Taylor's position on it, that

it has nothing new in it. But all others whom I have heard speak

assail it furiously. A new member from Kentucky (Mr. Clarke) of very

considerable ability, was in particular concern about it. He thought it

altogether novel and unprecedented for a President, or a Presidential

candidate, to think of approving bills whose constitutionality may not

be entirely clear to his own mind. He thinks the ark of our safety

is gone, unless Presidents shall always veto such bills as, in their

judgment, may be of doubtful constitutionality. However clear Congress

may be of their authority to pass any particular act, the gentleman from

Kentucky thinks the President must veto it if he has doubts about it.

Now, I have neither time nor inclination to argue with the gentleman

on the veto power as an original question; but I wish to show that Gen.

Taylor, and not he, agrees with the earliest statesmen on this question.

When the bill chartering the first Bank of the United States passed

Congress, its constitutionality was questioned; Mr. Madison, then in

the House of Representatives, as well as others, had opposed it on

that ground. Gen. Washington, as President, was called on to approve or

reject it. He sought and obtained, on the constitutional question, the

separate written opinions of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Edmund Randolph;

they then being respectively Secretary of State, Secretary of the

Treasury, and Attorney-General. Hamilton's opinion was for the power;

while Randolph's and Jefferson's were both against it. Mr. Jefferson,

in his letter dated Feb. 15, 1791, after giving his opinion decidedly

against the constitutionality of that bill, closed with the paragraph

which I now read:--

"It must be admitted, however, that, unless the President's mind, on

a view of every thing which is urged for and against this bill, is

tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the Constitution; if the pro

and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect

for the wisdom of the Legislature would naturally decide the balance in

favor of their opinion; it is chiefly for cases where they are clearly

misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the Constitution has placed

a check in the negative of the President."

Gen. Taylor's opinion, as expressed in his Allison letter, is as I now

read:--

"The power given by the veto is a high conservative power, but, in my

opinion, should never be exercised, except in cases of clear violation

of the Constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by

Congress."

It is here seen, that, in Mr. Jefferson's opinion, if, on the

constitutionality of any given bill, the President doubts, he is not to

veto it, as the gentleman from Kentucky would have him to do, but is

to defer to Congress, and approve it. And if we compare the opinions of

Jefferson and Taylor, as expressed in these paragraphs, we shall find

them more exactly alike than we can often find any two expressions

having any literal difference. None but interested fault-finders can

discover any substantial variation.

But gentlemen on the other side are unanimously agreed that Gen. Taylor

has no other principle. They are in utter darkness as to his opinions on

any of the questions of policy which occupy the public attention. But

is there any doubt as to what he will do on the prominent question, if

elected? Not the least. It is not possible to know what he will or would

do in every imaginable case, because many questions have passed away,

and others doubtless will arise, which none of us have yet thought

of; but on the prominent questions of currency, tariff, internal

improvements, and Wilmot Proviso, Gen. Taylor's course is at least as

well defined as is Gen. Cass's. Why, in their eagerness to get at Gen.

Taylor, several Democratic members here have desired to know whether, in

case of his election, a bankrupt-law is to be established. Can they tell

us Gen. Cass's opinion on this question? (Some member answered, He is

against it.") Ay, how do you know he is? There is nothing about it in

the platform, nor elsewhere, that I have seen. If the gentleman knows

any thing which I do not, he can show it. But to return: Gen. Taylor, in

his Allison letter, says,--

"Upon the subject of the tariff, the currency, the improvement of our

great highways, rivers, lakes, and harbors, the will of the people,

as expressed through their Representatives in Congress, ought to be

respected and carried out by the Executive."

Now, this is the whole matter: in substance, it is this: The people say

to Gen. Taylor, "If you are elected, shall we have a national bank?"

He answers, "Your will, gentlemen, not mine"--"What about the

tariff?"--"Say yourselves."--"Shall our rivers and harbors be

improved?"--"Just as you please."--"If you desire a bank, an alteration

of the tariff, internal improvements, any or all, I will not hinder you:

if you do not desire them, I will not attempt to force them on you. Send

up your members of Congress from the various districts, with opinions

according to your own, and if they are for these measures, or any of

them, I shall have nothing to oppose: if they are not for them, I shall

not, by any appliances whatever, attempt to dragoon them into their

adoption." Now, can there be any difficulty in understanding this? To

you, Democrats, it may not seem like principle; but surely you cannot

fail to perceive the position plain enough. The distinction between it

and the position of your candidate is broad and obvious, and I admit

you have a clear right to show it is wrong, if you can; but you have

no right to pretend you cannot see it at all. We see it, and to us it

appears like principle, and the best sort of principle at that,--the

principle of allowing the people to do as they please with their own

business. My friend from Indiana (Mr. C. B. Smith) has aptly asked, "Are

you willing to trust the people?" Some of you answered substantially,

"We are willing to trust the people; but the President is as much the

representative of the people as Congress." In a certain sense, and to a

certain extent, he is the representative of the people. He is elected by

them as well as Congress is. But can he, in the nature of things, know

the wants of the people as well as three hundred other men coming from

all the various localities of the nation? If so, where is the propriety

of having a Congress? That the Constitution gives the President a

negative on legislation, all know; but that this negative should be so

combined with platforms and other appliances as to enable him, and, in

fact, almost compel him, to take the whole of legislation into his own

hands, is what we object to, is what Gen. Taylor objects to, and is what

constitutes the broad distinction between you and us. To thus transfer

legislation is clearly to take it from those who understand with

minuteness the interests of the people, and give it to one who does not

and cannot so well understand it. I understand your idea,--that if a

Presidential candidate avow his opinion upon a given question, or rather

upon all questions, and the people, with full knowledge of this, elect

him, they thereby distinctly approve all those opinions. This, though

plausible, is a most pernicious deception. By means of it, measures are

adopted or rejected contrary to the wishes of the whole of one party,

and often nearly half of the other. The process is this: Three, four, or

half a dozen questions are prominent at a given time; the party selects

its candidate, and he takes his position on each of these questions.

On all but one his positions have already been indorsed at former

elections, and his party fully committed to them; but that one is new,

and a large portion of them are against it. But what are they to do? The

whole are strung together, and they must take all or reject all. They

cannot take what they like, and leave the rest. What they are already

committed to being the majority, they shut their eyes and gulp the

whole. Next election, still another is introduced in the same way. If

we run our eyes along the line of the past, we shall see that almost, if

not quite, all the articles of the present Democratic creed have been at

first forced upon the party in this very way. And just now, and just so,

opposition to internal improvements is to be established if Gen. Cass

shall be elected. Almost half the Democrats here are for improvements,

but they will vote for Cass; and, if he succeeds, their votes will have

aided in closing the doors against improvements. Now, this is a process

which we think is wrong. We prefer a candidate, who, like Gen. Taylor,

will allow the people to have their own way, regardless of his private

opinion; and I should think the internal-improvement Democrats, at

least, ought to prefer such a candidate. He would force nothing on them

which they don't want; and he would allow them to have improvements

which their own candidate, if elected, will not.

Mr. Speaker, I have said Gen. Taylor's position is as well defined as is

that of Gen. Cass. In saying this, I admit I do not certainly know what

he would do on the Wilmot Proviso. I am a Northern man, or, rather, a

Western Free State man, with a constituency I believe to be, and with

personal feelings I know to be, against the extension of slavery.

As such, and with what information I have, I hope and _believe_ Gen.

Taylor, if elected, would not veto the proviso; but I do not _know_ it.

Yet, if I knew he would, I still would vote for him. I should do so,

because, in my judgment, his election alone can defeat Gen. Cass; and

because, _should_ slavery thereby go into the territory we now have,

just so much will certainly happen by the election of Cass, and, in

addition, a course of policy leading to new wars, new acquisitions of

territory, and still farther extensions of slavery. One of the two is to

be President; which is preferable?

But there is as much doubt of Cass on improvements as there is of Taylor

on the proviso. I have no doubt myself of Gen. Cass on this question,

but I know the Democrats differ among themselves as to his position. My

internal-improvement colleague (Mr. Wentworth) stated on this floor the

other day, that he was satisfied Cass was for improvements, because he

had voted for all the bills that he (Mr. W.) had. So far, so good.

But Mr. Polk vetoed some of these very bills; the Baltimore Convention

passed a set of resolutions, among other things, approving these vetoes;

and Cass declares, in his letter accepting the nomination, that he has

carefully read these resolutions, and that he adheres to them as firmly

as he approves them cordially. In other words, Gen. Cass voted for the

bills, and thinks the President did right to veto them; and his friends

here are amiable enough to consider him as being on one side or the

other, just as one or the other may correspond with their own respective

inclinations. My colleague admits that the platform declares against the

constitutionality of a general system of improvement, and that Gen. Cass

indorses the platform; but he still thinks Gen. Cass is in favor of some

sort of improvements. Well, what are they? As he is against _general_

objects, those he is for must be particular and local. Now, this

is taking the subject precisely by the wrong end.

_Particularity_--expending the money of the _whole_ people for an

object which will benefit only a _portion_ of them--is the greatest real

objection to improvements, and has been so held by Gen. Jackson, Mr.

Polk, and all others, I believe, till now. But now, behold, the objects

most general, nearest free from this objection, are to be rejected,

while those most liable to it are to be embraced. To return: I cannot

help believing that Gen. Cass, when he wrote his letter of acceptance,

well understood he was to be claimed by the advocates of both sides

of this question, and that he then closed the door against all further

expressions of opinion, purposely to retain the benefits of that double

position. His subsequent equivocation at Cleveland, to my mind, proves

such to have been the case.

One word more, and I shall have done with this branch of the subject.

You Democrats and your candidate, in the main, are in favor of laying

down in advance a platform,--a set of party positions, as a unit; and

then of enforcing the people, by every sort of appliance, to ratify

them, however unpalatable some of them may be. We and our candidate are

in favor of making Presidential elections and the legislation of the

country distinct matters; so that the people can elect whom they please,

and afterward legislate just as they please, without any hinderance,

save only so much as may guard against infractions of the Constitution,

undue haste, and want of consideration. The difference between us is

clear as noonday. That we are right, we cannot doubt. We hold the true

republican position. In leaving the people's business in their hands, we

cannot be wrong. We are willing, and even anxious, to go to the people

on this issue.

But I suppose I cannot reasonably hope to convince you that we have any

principles. The most I can expect is, to assure you that we think we

have, and are quite contented with them. The other day, one of the

gentlemen from Georgia (Mr. Iverson), an eloquent man, and a man of

learning, so far as I can judge, not being learned myself, came down

upon us astonishingly. He spoke in what "The Baltimore American" calls

the "scathing and withering style." At the end of his second severe

flash I was struck blind, and found myself feeling with my fingers for

an assurance of my continued physical existence. A little of the bone

was left, and I gradually revived. He eulogized Mr. Clay in high

and beautiful terms, and then declared that we had deserted all our

principles, and had turned Henry Clay out, like an old horse, to root.

This is terribly severe. It cannot be answered by argument; at least, I

cannot so answer it. I merely wish to ask the gentleman if the Whigs

are the only party he can think of, who sometimes turn old horses out

to root? Is not a certain Martin Van Buren an old horse which your own

party have turned out to root? and is he not rooting a little to your

discomfort about now? But, in not nominating Mr. Clay, we deserted our

principles, you say. Ah! in what? Tell us, ye men of principles, what

principle we violated? We say you did violate principle in discarding

Van Buren, and we can tell you how. You violated the primary,

the cardinal, the one great living principle of all Democratic

representative government,--the principle that the representative is

bound to carry out the known will of his constituents. A large majority

of the Baltimore Convention of 1844 were, by their constituents,

instructed to procure Van Buren's nomination if they could.

In violation, in utter, glaring contempt of this, you rejected

him,--rejected him, as the gentleman from New York (Mr. Birdsall), the

other day expressly admitted, for _availability_,--that same "general

availability" which you charge upon us, and daily chew over here, as

something exceedingly odious and unprincipled. But the gentleman from

Georgia (Mr. Iverson) gave us a second speech yesterday, all well

considered and put down in writing, in which Van Buren was scathed

and withered a "few" for his present position and movements. I cannot

remember the gentleman's precise language, but I do remember he put Van

Buren down, down, till he got him where he was finally to "stink" and

"rot."

Mr. Speaker, it is no business or inclination of mine to defend Martin

Van Buren. In the war of extermination now waging between him and his

old admirers, I say, Devil take the hindmost--and the foremost. But

there is no mistaking the origin of the breach; and, if the curse of

"stinking" and "rotting" is to fall on the first and greatest violators

of principle in the matter, I disinterestedly suggest, that the

gentleman from Georgia and his present co-workers are bound to take it

upon themselves.

While I have Gen. Cass in hand, I wish to say a word about his political

principles. As a specimen, I take the record of his progress on the

Wilmot Proviso. In "The Washington Union" of March 2, 1847, there is a

report of the speech of Gen. Cass, made the day before in the Senate,

on the Wilmot Proviso, during the delivery of which, Mr. Miller of New

Jersey is reported to have interrupted him as follows, to wit:--

"Mr. Miller expressed his great surprise at the change in the sentiments

of the Senator from Michigan, who had been regarded as the great

champion of freedom in the North-west, of which he was a distinguished

ornament. Last year the Senator from Michigan was understood to be

decidedly in favor of the Wilmot Proviso; and, as no reason had been

stated for the change, he (Mr. Miller) could not refrain from the

expression of his extreme surprise."

To this, Gen. Cass is reported to have replied as follows, to wit:--

"Mr. Cass said, that the course of the Senator from New Jersey was

most extraordinary. Last year he (Mr. Cass) should have voted for the

proposition had it come up. But circumstances had altogether changed.

The honorable Senator then read several passages from the remarks as

given above which he had committed to writing, in order to refute such a

charge as that of the Senator from New Jersey."

In the "remarks above committed to writing," is one numbered 4, as

follows, to wit:--

"4th. Legislation would now be wholly imperative, because no territory

hereafter to be acquired can be governed without an act of Congress

providing for its government. And such an act, on its passage, would

open the whole subject, and leave the Congress called on to pass it free

to exercise its own discretion, entirely uncontrolled by any declaration

found in the statute-book."

In "Niles's Register," vol. lxxiii., p. 293, there is a letter of Gen.

Cas? to A. O. P. Nicholson of Nashville, Tenn., dated Dec. 24, 1847,

from which the following are correct extracts:--

"The Wilmot Proviso has been before the country some time. It has been

repeatedly discussed in Congress, and by the public press. I am strongly

impressed with the opinion that a great change has been going on in the

public mind upon this subject,--in my own as well as others; and that

doubts are resolving themselves into convictions, that the principle it

involves should be kept out of the national Legislature, and left to the

people of the Confederacy in their respective local governments.

"Briefly, then, I am opposed to the exercise of any jurisdiction by

Congress over this matter; and I am in favor of leaving the people of

any territory which may be hereafter acquired, the right to regulate it

themselves, under the general principles of the Constitution. Because,

"1. I do not see in the Constitution any grant of the requisite power

to Congress; and I am not disposed to extend a doubtful precedent

beyond its necessity,--the establishment of territorial governments when

needed,--leaving to the inhabitants all the rights compatible with the

relations they bear to the Confederation."

These extracts show, that, in 1846, Gen. Cass was for the Proviso _at

once_; that, in March, 1847, he was still for it, _but not just then_;

and that in December, 1847, he was _against_ it altogether. This is a

true index to the whole man. When the question was raised in 1846, he

was in a blustering hurry to take ground for it. He sought to be in

advance, and to avoid the uninteresting position of a mere follower; but

soon he began to see glimpses of the great Democratic ox-gad waving in

his face, and to hear indistinctly a voice saying, "Back!" "Back, sir!"

"Back a little!" He shakes his head, and bats his eyes, and blunders

back to his position of March, 1847; but still the gad waves, and the

voice grows more distinct, and sharper still,--"Back, sir!" "Back, I

say!" "Further back!" and back he goes to the position of December,

1847; at which the gad is still, and the voice soothingly says, "So!"

"Stand still at that."

Have no fears, gentlemen, of your candidate: he exactly suits you, and

we congratulate you upon it. However much you may be distressed about

our candidate, you have all cause to be contented and happy with your

own. If elected, he may not maintain all, or even any, of his positions

previously taken; but he will be sure to do whatever the party exigency,

for the time being, may require; and that is precisely what you want. He

and Van Buren are the same "manner of men;" and, like Van Buren, he will

never desert you till you first desert him.

[After referring at some length to extra "charges" of Gen. Cass upon the

Treasury, Mr. Lincoln continued:---]

But I have introduced Gen. Cass's accounts here chiefly to show the

wonderful physical capacities of the man. They show that he not only did

the labor of several men at the same _time_, but that he often did it,

at several _places_ many hundred miles apart, _at the same time_. And

at eating, too, his capacities are shown to be quite as wonderful. From

October, 1821, to May, 1822, he ate ten rations a day in Michigan, ten

rations a day here in Washington, and nearly five dollars' worth a day

besides, partly on the road between the two places. And then there is an

important discovery in his example,--the art of being paid for what one

eats, instead of having to pay for it. Hereafter, if any nice young man

shall owe a bill which he cannot pay in any other way, he can just board

it out. Mr. Speaker, we have all heard of the animal standing in doubt

between two stacks of hay, and starving to death: the like of that would

never happen to Gen. Cass. Place the stacks a thousand miles apart, he

would stand stock-still, midway between them, and eat them both at once;

and the green grass along the line would be apt to suffer some, too, at

the same time. By all means make him President, gentlemen. He will feed

you bounteously--if--if--there is any left after he shall have helped

himself.

But as Gen. Taylor is, par excellence, the hero of the Mexican War, and

as you Democrats say we Whigs have always opposed the war, you think it

must be very awkward and embarrassing for us to go for Gen. Taylor.

The declaration that we have always opposed the war is true or false

accordingly as one may understand the term "opposing the war." If to

say "the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the

President," by opposing the war, then the Whigs have very generally

opposed it. Whenever they have spoken at all, they have said this; and

they have said it on what has appeared good reason to them: the marching

an army into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening

the inhabitants away, leaving their growing crops and other property

to destruction, to you may appear a perfectly amiable, peaceful,

unprovoking procedure; but it does not appear so to us. So to call such

an act, to us appears no other than a naked, impudent absurdity, and we

speak of it accordingly. But if when the war had begun, and had become

the cause of the country, the giving of our money and our blood, in

common with yours, was support of the war, then it is not true that we

have always opposed the war. With few individual exceptions, you have

constantly had our votes here for all the necessary supplies. And, more

than this, you have had the services, the blood, and the lives of our

political brethren in every trial, and on every field. The beardless

boy and the mature man, the humble and the distinguished,--you have had

them. Through suffering and death, by disease and in battle, they have

endured and fought and fallen with you. Clay and Webster each gave a

son, never to be returned. From the State of my own residence, besides

other worthy but less known Whig names, we sent Marshall, Morrison,

Baker, and Hardin: they all fought, and one fell, and in the fall of

that one we lost our best Whig man. Nor were the Whigs few in number,

or laggard in the day of danger. In that fearful, bloody, breathless

struggle at Buena Vista, where each man's hard task was to beat back

five foes or die himself, of the five high officers who perished, four

were Whigs.

In speaking of this, I mean no odious comparison between the

lion-hearted Whigs and Democrats who fought there. On other occasions,

and among the lower officers and privates on that occasion, I doubt not

the proportion was different. I wish to do justice to all. I think of

all those brave men as Americans, in whose proud fame, as an American,

I, too, have a share. Many of them, Whigs and Democrats, are my

constituents and personal friends; and I thank them,--more than thank

them,--one and all, for the high, imperishable honor they have conferred

on our common State.

But the distinction between the _cause of the President in beginning

the war,_ and the _cause of the country after it was begun_, is a

distinction which you cannot perceive. To you, the President and the

country seem to be all one. You are interested to see no distinction

between them; and I venture to suggest that possibly your interest

blinds you a little. We see the distinction, as we think, clearly

enough; and our friends, who have fought in the war, have no difficulty

in seeing it also. What those who have fallen would say, were they alive

and here, of course we can never know; but with those who have returned

there is no difficulty. Col. Haskell and Major Gaines, members here,

both fought in the war; and one of them underwent extraordinary perils

and hardships; still they, like all other Whigs here, vote on the record

that the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the

President. And even Gen. Taylor himself, the noblest Roman of them all,

has declared that, as a citizen, and particularly as a soldier, it is

sufficient for him to know that his country is at war with a foreign

nation, to do all in his power to bring it to a speedy and honorable

termination, by the most vigorous and energetic operations, without

inquiring about its justice, or any thing else connected with it.

Mr. Speaker, let our Democratic friends be comforted with the assurance

that we are content with our position, content with our company, and

content with our candidate; and that although they, in their generous

sympathy, think we ought to be miserable, we really are not, and that

they may dismiss the great anxiety they have on our account.1

1 The following passage has generally been omitted from this

speech, as published in the "Lives of Lincoln." The reason

for the omission is quite obvious.

"But the gentleman from Georgia further says, we have deserted all our

principles, and taken shelter under Gen. Taylor's military coat-tail;

and he seems to think this is exceedingly degrading. Well, as his faith

is, so be it unto him. But can he remember no other military coat-tail,

under which a certain other party have been sheltering for near a

quarter of a century? Has he no acquaintance with the ample military

coat-tail of Gen. Jackson? Does he not know that his own party have run

the last five Presidential races under that coat-tail? and that they are

now running the sixth under the same cover? Yes, sir, that coat-tail was

used, not only for Gen, Jackson himself, but has been clung to with

the grip of death by every Democratic candidate since. You have never

ventured, and dare not now venture, from under it. Your campaign papers

have constantly been 'Old Hickories,' with rude likenesses of the old

general upon them; hickory poles and hickory brooms your never-ending

emblems. Mr. Polk himself was 'Young Hickory.' 'Little Hickory,' or

something so; and even now your campaign paper here is proclaiming that

Cass and Butler are of the 'Hickory stripe.' No, sir, you dare not give

it up. Like a horde of hungry ticks, you have stuck to the tail of the

Hermitage lion to the end of his life; and you are still sticking to it,

and drawing a loathsome sustenance from it, after he is dead. A fellow

once advertised that he had made a discovery by which he could make a

new man out of an old one, and have enough of the stuff left to make a

little yellow dog. Just such a discovery has Gen. Jackson's popularity

been to you. You not only twice made President of him out of it, but

you have enough of the stuff left to make Presidents of several

comparatively small men since; and it is your chief reliance now to make

still another.

"Mr. Speaker, old horses and military coat-tails, or tails of any sort,

are not figures of speech such as I would be the first to introduce into

discussions here; but, as the gentleman from Georgia has thought fit

to introduce them, he and you are welcome to all you have made, or can

make, by them. If you have any more old horses, trot them out; any more

tails, just cock them, and come at us.

"I repeat, I would not introduce this mode of discussion here; but

I wish gentlemen on the other side to understand, that the use of

degrading figures is a game at which they may find themselves unable to

take all the winnings. ["We give it up."] Ay, you give it up, and well

you may; but for a very different reason from that which you would have

us understand. The point--the power to hurt--of all figures, consists

in the _truthfulness_ of their application; and, understanding this, you

may well give it up. They are weapons which hit you, but miss us.

"But, in my hurry, I was very near closing on this subject of military

tails before I was done with it. There is one entire article of the sort

I have not discussed yet; I mean the military tail you Democrats are now

engaged in dovetailing on to the great Michigander. Yes, sir, all his

biographers (and they are legion) have him in hand, tying him to a

military tail, like so many mischievous boys tying a dog to a bladder of

beans. True, the material is very limited, but they are at it might and

main. He invaded Canada without resistance, and he _out_vaded it without

pursuit. As he did both under orders, I suppose there was, to him,

neither credit nor discredit; but they are made to constitute a large

part of the tail. He was not at Hull's surrender, but he was close by;

he was volunteer aid to Gen. Harrison on the day of the battle of the

Thames; and, as you said in 1840 Harrison was picking whortleberries

two miles off while the battle was fought, I suppose it is a just

conclusion, with you, to say Cass was aiding Harrison to pick

whortleberries. This is about all, except the mooted question of the

broken sword. Some authors say he broke it; some say he threw it away;

and some others, who ought to know, say nothing about it. Perhaps it

would be a fair historical compromise to say, if he did not break it, he

did not do any thing else with it.

"By the way, Mr. Speaker, did you know I am a military hero? Yes sir:

in the days of the Black-Hawk War, I fought, bled, and came away.

Speaking of Gen. Cass's career reminds me of my own. I was not at

Stillman's defeat, but I was about as near it as Cass was to Hull's

surrender; and, like him, I saw the place very soon afterwards. It is

quite certain I did not break my sword, for I had none to break; but I

bent my musket pretty badly on one occasion. If Cass broke his sword,

the idea is, he broke it in desperation: I bent the musket by accident.

If Gen. Cass went in advance of me picking whortleberries,

I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. If he saw any

live fighting Indians, it was more than I did, but I had a good many

bloody struggles with the mosquitoes; and, although I never fainted from

loss of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry, "Mr. Speaker,

if ever I should conclude to doff whatever our Democratic friends may

suppose there is of black-cockade Federalism about me, and, thereupon,

they shall take me up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest

that they shall not make fun of me, as they have of Gen. Cass, by

attempting to write me into a military hero."

Congress adjourned on the 14th of August; but Mr. Lincoln went up to

New England, and made various campaign speeches before he returned home.

They were not preserved, and were probably of little importance.

Soon after his return to Washington, to take his seat at the second

session of the Thirtieth Congress, he received a letter from his father,

which astonished and perhaps amused him. His reply intimates grave

doubts concerning the veracity of his correspondent.

Washington, Dec. 24, 1848. My dear Father,--Your letter of the 7th

was received night before last. I very cheerfully send you the twenty

dollars, which sum you say is necessary to save your land from sale. It

is singular that you should have forgotten a judgment against you; and

it is more singular that the plaintiff should have let you forget it

so long; particularly as I suppose you always had property enough to

satisfy a judgment of that amount. Before you pay it, it would be well

to be sure you have not paid, or at least that you cannot prove you have

paid it.

Give my love to mother and all the connections.

Affectionately your son,

A. Lincoln.

The second session was a quiet one. Mr. Lincoln did nothing to attract

public attention in any marked degree. He attended diligently and

unobtrusively to the ordinary duties of his office, and voted generally

with the Whig majority. One Mr. Gott, however, of New York, offered a

resolution looking to the abolition of the slave-trade in the District

of Columbia, and Mr. Lincoln was one of only three or four Northern

Whigs who voted to lay the resolution on the table. At another time,

however, Mr. Lincoln proposed a substitute for the Gott resolution,

providing for gradual and compensated emancipation, with the consent

of the people of the District, to be ascertained at a general election.

This measure he evidently abandoned, and it died a natural death among

the rubbish of "unfinished business." His record on the Wilmot Proviso

has been thoroughly exposed, both by himself and Mr. Douglas, and in the

Presidential campaign by his friends and foes. He said himself, that he

had voted for it "about forty-two times." It is not likely that he had

counted the votes when he made this statement, but spoke according to

the best of his "knowledge and belief."

The following letters are printed, not because they illustrate the

author's character more than a thousand others would, but because they

exhibit one of the many perplexities of Congressional life.

Springfield, April 25, 1849.

Dear Thompson,--A tirade is still kept up against me here for

recommending T. R. King. This morning it is openly avowed that my

supposed influence at Washington shall be broken down generally, and

King's prospects defeated in particular. Now, what I have done in this

matter, I have done at the request of you and some other friends in

Tazewell; and I therefore ask you to either admit it is wrong, or come

forward and sustain me. If the truth will permit, I propose that you

sustain me in the following manner: copy the enclosed scrap in your own

handwriting, and get everybody (not three or four, but three or four

hundred) to sign it, and then send it to me. Also, have six, eight, or

ten of our best known Whig friends there to write me individual letters,

stating the truth in this matter as they understand it. Don't neglect

or delay in the matter. I understand information of an indictment having

been found against him about three years ago for gaming, or keeping a

gaming-house, has been sent to the Department. I shall try to take care

of it at the Department till your action can be had and forwarded on.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln.

Washington, June 5, 1849.

Dear William,--Your two letters were received last night. I have a great

many letters to write, and so cannot write very long ones. There must be

some mistake about Walter Davis saying I promised him the Post-office. I

did not so promise him. I did tell him, that, if the distribution of the

offices should fall into my hands, he should have something; and, if

I shall be convinced he has said any more than this, I shall be

disappointed.

I said this much to him, because, as I understand, he is of good

character, is one of the young men, is of the mechanics, and always

faithful, and never troublesome, a Whig and is poor, with the support

of a widow-mother thrown almost exclusively on him by the death of his

brother. If these are wrong reasons, then I have been wrong; but I

have certainly not been selfish in it, because, in my greatest need of

friends, he was against me and for Baker.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln.

P. S.--Let the above be confidential.