But even after these transferences Dacia remained an advanced position

on the left bank, covered by mountains and defences, with reference

to which it might well be doubtful whether it did more to promote or

to impede the general defensive attitude of the Romans. Hadrian, in

fact, had thought of giving up this territory, and so regarded its

incorporation as a mistake; after the step had once been taken, there

certainly preponderated the consideration, if not of the lucrative gold

mines of the country, at any rate of the Roman civilisation rapidly

developing itself in the region of the Marisus. But he caused at least

the superstructure of the stone bridge of the Danube to be removed,

as his apprehension of its being used by the enemy outweighed his

consideration for the Dacian garrison. The later period released itself

from this anxiety; but the eccentric position of Dacia in relation to

the rest of the frontier-defence remained.

The sixty years after the Dacian wars of Trajan were for the Danube

lands a time of peace and of peaceful development. No doubt there was

never entire quiet, particularly at the mouths of the Danube, and even

the hazardous expedient of purchasing the security of the frontier from

the adjoining restless neighbours, just as was done with Decebalus, by

the bestowal of yearly gratuities was further employed;[133] yet the

remains of antiquity show at this very time everywhere the flourishing

of urban life, and not a few communities, particularly of Pannonia,

name as their founder Hadrian or Pius. But upon this stillness

followed a storm such as the empire had not yet sustained, and which,

although properly but a frontier-war, by its extension over a series

of provinces and by its duration for thirteen years shook the empire

itself.

[Sidenote: Marcomanian war.]

The war named after the Marcomani was not kindled by any single

personage of the type of Hannibal or Decebalus. As little did

aggressions on the part of the Romans provoke this war; the emperor

Pius injured no neighbour, either powerful or humble, and set on

peace almost more than its just value. The realm of Maroboduus and

of Vannius had thereafter, perhaps in consequence of the partition

under Vangio and Sido (p. 216), become divided into the kingdom of

the Marcomani in what is now Bohemia and that of the Quadi in Moravia

and upper Hungary. Conflicts with the Romans do not appear to have

occurred here; the vassal-relation of the princes of the Quadi was even

formally recognised under the reign of Pius by the confirmation asked

for. Shiftings of peoples, which lay beyond the Roman horizon, were

the proximate cause of the great war. Soon after the death of Pius (†

161) masses of Germans, especially Langobardi from the Elbe, but also

Marcomani and other bodies of men, appeared in Pannonia, apparently to

gain new abodes on the right bank. Pressed hard by the Roman troops who

were despatched against them, they sent the prince of the Marcomani,

Ballomarius, and with him a representative of each of the ten tribes

taking part, to renew their request for assignation of land. But the

governor abode by his decision and compelled them to go back over the

Danube.

[Sidenote: Its beginning.]

[Sidenote: Invasion of Italy.]

This was the beginning of the great Danubian war.[134] The governor

of upper Germany, Gaius Aufidius Victorinus, the father-in-law of

Fronto known in literature, had already, about the year 162, to repel

an assault of the Chatti, which likewise may have been occasioned by

tribes from the Elbe pressing on their rear. Had equally energetic

steps been taken, greater mischief might have been averted. But just

then the Armenian war had begun, into which the Parthians soon entered;

though the troops were not actually sent away from the threatened

frontier to the east, for which there is at least no evidence,[135]

there was at any rate a want of men to take up the second war at once

with energy. This temporising severely avenged itself. Just when

people were triumphing in Rome over the kings of the east, on the

Danube the Chatti, the Marcomani, the Quadi, the Jazyges burst as

with a thunderclap into the Roman territory. Raetia, Noricum, the two

Pannonias, Dacia, were inundated at the same moment; in the Dacian

mine-district we can still follow the traces of this irruption. What

devastations they then wrought in those regions, which for long had

seen no enemy, is shown by the fact that several years afterwards

the Quadi gave back first 13,000, then 50,000, and the Jazyges even

100,000 Roman captives. Nor did the matter end with the injury done to

the provinces. There happened what had not occurred for three hundred

years and begun to be accounted as impossible--the barbarians broke

through the wall of the Alps and invaded Italy itself; from Raetia they

destroyed Opitergium (Oderzo); bands from the Julian Alps invested

Aquileia.[136] Defeats of individual Roman divisions must have taken

place in various cases; we learn only that one of the commandants of

the guard, Victorinus, fell before the enemy, and the ranks of the

Roman armies were sorely thinned.

[Sidenote: Pestilence.]

This grave attack befell the state at a most unhappy moment. No doubt

the Oriental war was ended; but in its train a pestilence had spread

throughout Italy and the west, which swept men away more continuously

than the war, and in more fearful measure. When the troops were

concentrated, as was necessary, the victims of the pestilence were all

the more numerous. As dearth always accompanies pestilence, so on this

occasion there appeared with it failure of crops and famine, and severe

financial distress; the taxes did not come in, and in the course of the

war the emperor saw himself under the necessity of alienating by public

auction the jewels of his palace.

[Sidenote: Verus and Marcus.]

There was lack of a fitting leader. A military and political task

so extensive and so complicated could, as things stood in Rome, be

undertaken by no commissioned general, but only by the ruler himself.

Marcus had, with a correct and modest knowledge of his shortcomings,

on ascending the throne, placed by his side with equal rights his

younger adopted brother Lucius Verus, on the benevolent assumption that

the jovial young man--as he was a vigorous fencer and hunter--would

also grow into an able general. But the worthy emperor did not

possess the sharp glance of one who knows men; the choice had proved

as unfortunate as possible; the Parthian war just ended had shown

the nominal general to be personally dissolute, and as an officer

incapable. The joint regency of Verus was nothing but an additional

calamity, which indeed was obviated by his death, that ensued not

long after the outbreak of the Marcomanian war (169). Marcus, by his

leanings more reflective than inclined to practical life, and not at

all a soldier, nor in general a strong personality, undertook the

exclusive and personal conduct of the requisite operations. He may, in

doing so, have made mistakes enough in detail, and perhaps the long

duration of the struggle is partly traceable to this; but the unity

of supreme command, his clear insight into the object for which the

war was waged, the tenacity of his statesmanly action, above all the

rectitude and firmness of the man administering his difficult office

with self-forgetful faithfulness, ultimately broke the dangerous

assault. This was a merit all the higher, as the success was due more

to character than to talent.

[Sidenote: Progress of the war.]

The character of the task set before the Romans is shown by the fact

that the government, despite the want of men and money in the first

year of this war, had the walls of the capital of Dalmatia, Salonae,

and of the capital of Thrace, Philippopolis, restored by its soldiers

and at its expense; certainly these were not isolated arrangements.

They had to prepare themselves to see the men of the north everywhere

investing the great towns of the empire; the terrors of the Gothic

expeditions were already knocking at the gates, and were perhaps for

this time averted only by the fact that government saw them coming.

The immediate superintendence of the military operations, and the

regulation, demanded by the state of the case, of the relations to

the frontier-peoples and reformation of the existing arrangements

on the spot, might neither be omitted nor left to his unprincipled

brother or individual leaders. In fact, the position of matters was

changed as soon as the two emperors arrived at Aquileia, in order

to set out thence with the army to the scene of war. The Germans

and Sarmatians, far from united in themselves, and without common

leading, felt themselves unequal to such a counter-blow. The masses of

invaders everywhere retreated; the Quadi sent in their submission to

the imperial generals, and in many cases the leaders of the movement

directed against the Romans paid for this reaction with their lives.

Lucius thought that the war had demanded victims enough, and advised

a return to Rome; but the Marcomani persevered in haughty resistance,

and the calamity which had come upon Rome, the hundred thousands of

captives dragged away, the successes achieved by the barbarians,

imperatively demanded a more vigorous policy and the offensive

continuance of the war. The son-in-law of Marcus, Tiberius Claudius

Pompeianus, as an extraordinary measure took the command in Raetia

and Noricum; his able lieutenant, the subsequent emperor, Publius

Helvius Pertinax, cleared the Roman territory without difficulty with

the first auxiliary legion called up from Pannonia. In spite of the

financial distress two new legions were formed, particularly from

Illyrian soldiers, in the raising of which no doubt many a previous

highway-robber was made a defender of his country; and, as was already

stated (pp. 161, 198), the hitherto slight frontier-guard of these

two provinces was reinforced by the new legion-camps of Ratisbon and

Enns. The emperors themselves went to the upper Pannonian camps. It was

above all of consequence to restrict the area within which the fire

of war was raging. The barbarians coming from the north, who offered

their aid, were not repelled, and fought in Roman pay, so far as they

did not--as also occurred--break their word and make common cause with

the enemy. The Quadi, who sued for peace and for the confirmation of

the new king Furtius, had the latter readily granted to them, and

nothing demanded of them but the giving back of the deserters and the

captives. Success in some measure attended the attempt to restrict the

war to the two chief opponents, the Marcomani and the Jazyges from of

old allied with them. Against these two peoples it was carried on in

the following years with severe conflicts and not without defeat. We

know only isolated details, which do not admit of being brought into

set connection. Marcus Claudius Fronto, to whom had been entrusted the

commands of upper Moesia and Dacia united as an extraordinary measure,

fell about the year 171 in conflict against Germans and Jazyges. The

commandant of the guard, Marcus Macrinius Vindex, likewise fell before

the enemy. They and other officers of high rank obtained in these years

honorary monuments in Rome at the column of Trajan, because they had

met death in defence of their fatherland. The barbaric tribes, who had

declared for Rome, again partially fell away--such as the Cotini and

above all the Quadi, who granted an asylum to the fugitive Marcomani

and drove out their vassal-king Furtius, whereupon the emperor Marcus

set a price of 1000 gold pieces on the head of his successor Ariogaesus.

[Sidenote: Its issue; and second war.]

Not till the sixth year of the war (172) does the complete conquest

of the Marcomani seem to have been achieved, and Marcus to have

thereupon assumed the well-deserved title of victory, Germanicus.

Then followed the overthrow of the Quadi; lastly in 175 that of the

Jazyges, in consequence of which the emperor received the further

surname of Conqueror of the Sarmatae. The terms which were laid down

for the conquered tribes show that Marcus designed not to punish but to

subdue. The Marcomani and the Jazyges, probably also the Quadi, were

required to evacuate a border-strip along the river to the breadth of

ten, subsequently modified to five, miles. In the strongholds on the

right bank of the Danube were placed Roman garrisons, which, among the

Marcomani and Quadi alone, amounted together to not less than 20,000

men. All the subdued had to furnish contingents to the Roman army; the

Jazyges, for example, 8000 horsemen. Had the emperor not been recalled

by the insurrection of Syria, he would have driven the latter entirely

from their country, as Trajan drove the Dacians. That Marcus intended

to treat the revolted Transdanubians after this model, was confirmed

by the further course of events. Hardly was that hindrance removed,

when the emperor went back to the Danube and began, just like Trajan,

in 178 the second definitive war. The ground put forward for thus

declaring war is not known; the aim is doubtless correctly specified

to the effect that he purposed to erect two new provinces, Marcomania

and Sarmatia. To the Jazyges, who must have shown themselves submissive

to the designs of the emperor, their burdensome imposts were for the

most part remitted, and, in fact, for intercourse with their kinsmen

dwelling to the east of Dacia the Roxolani, right of passage through

Dacia was granted to them under fitting supervision--probably just

because they were already regarded as Roman subjects. The Marcomani

were almost extirpated by sword and famine. The Quadi in despair wished

to migrate to the north, and to seek settlements among the Semnones;

but even this was not allowed to them, as they had to cultivate the

fields in order to provide for the Roman garrisons. After fourteen

years of almost uninterrupted warfare, he who was a warrior-prince

against his will reached his goal, and the Romans were a second time

face to face with the acquisition of the upper Elbe; now, in fact, all

that was wanting was the announcement of the wish to retain what was

won. Thereupon he died--not yet sixty years of age--in the camp of

Vindobona on 17th March 180.

[Sidenote: Results of the Marcomanian war.]

We must not merely acknowledge the resoluteness and tenacity of the

ruler, but must also admit that he did what right policy enjoined. The

conquest of Dacia by Trajan was a doubtful gain, although in this very

Marcomanian war the possession of Dacia not only removed a dangerous

element from the ranks of the antagonists of Rome, but probably also

had the effect of preventing the host of peoples on the lower Danube,

the Bastarnae, Roxolani, and others, from interfering in the war. But

after the mighty onset of the Transdanubians to the west of Dacia had

made their subjugation a necessity, this could only be accomplished in

a definitive way by embracing Bohemia, Moravia, and the plain of the

Theiss within the Roman line of defence, although these regions were

probably accounted, like Dacia, as having only the position of advanced

posts, and the strategical frontier-line was certainly meant to remain

the Danube.

[Sidenote: Conclusion of peace by Commodus.]

The successor of Marcus, the emperor Commodus, was present in the camp

when his father died, and as he had already for several years nominally

shared the throne with his father, he entered with the latter's death

at once into possession of unlimited power. Only for a brief time did

the nineteen years' old successor allow the men who had enjoyed his

father's confidence--his brother-in-law Pompeianus, and others who

had borne with Marcus the heavy burden of the war--to rule in his

spirit. Commodus was in every respect the opposite of his father; not

a scholar, but a fencing-master; as cowardly and weak in character,

as his father was resolute and tenacious of purpose; as indolent and

forgetful of duty, as his father was active and conscientious. He

not merely gave up the idea of incorporating the territory won, but

voluntarily granted even to the Marcomani conditions such as they

had not ventured to hope for. The regulation of the frontier-traffic

under Roman control, and the obligation not to injure their neighbours

friendly to the Romans, were matters of course; but the garrisons

were withdrawn from their country, and there was retained only the

prohibition of settlement on the border-strip. The payment of taxes

and the furnishing of recruits were doubtless stipulated for, but

the former were soon remitted, and the latter were certainly not

furnished. A similar settlement was made with the Quadi; and the

other Transdanubians must have been similarly dealt with. Thereby the

conquests made were given up, and the work of many years of warfare was

in vain; if no more was wished for, a similar arrangement of things

might have been reached much earlier. Nevertheless the Marcomanian war

secured in these regions the supremacy of Rome for the sequel, in spite

of the fact that Rome let slip the prize of victory. It was not by the

tribes that had taken part in it that the blow was dealt, to which the

Roman world-power succumbed.

[Sidenote: The colonate.]

Another permanent consequence of this war was connected with the

removals, to which it gave occasion, of the Transdanubians over into

the Roman empire. Of themselves such changes of settlement had occurred

at all times; the Sugambri, transplanted under Augustus to Gaul, the

Dacians sent to Thrace, were nothing but new subjects or communities

of subjects added to those formerly existing, and probably not much

different were the 3000 Naristae, whom Marcus allowed to exchange their

settlements westward of Bohemia for such settlements within the empire,

while the like request was refused to the otherwise unknown Astingi on

the Dacian north frontier. But the Germans settled by him not merely in

the land of the Danube, but in Italy itself at Ravenna, were neither

free subjects nor strictly non-free persons; these were the beginnings

of the Roman villanage, the colonate, the influence of which on the

agricultural economy of the whole state is to be set forth in another

connection. That Ravennate settlement, however, had no permanence;

the men rose in revolt and had to be conveyed away, so that the new

colonate remained restricted primarily to the provinces, particularly

to the lands of the Danube.

[Sidenote: The advancing Northmen.]

The great war on the middle Danube was once more followed by sixty

years' time of peace, the blessings of which could not be completely

neutralised by the internal misgovernment that was constantly

increasing during its course. No doubt various isolated accounts show

that the frontier, especially the Dacian, which was most exposed,

remained not without trouble; but above all, the stern military

government of Severus did its duty here, and at least Marcomani and

Quadi appear even under his immediate successors in unconditional

dependence, so that the son of Severus could cite a prince of the Quadi

before him and lay his head at his feet. The conflicts occurring

at this epoch on the lower Danube were of subordinate importance.

But probably at this period a comprehensive shifting of peoples

from the north-east towards the Black Sea took place, and the Roman

frontier-guard on the lower Danube had to confront new and more

dangerous opponents. Up to this time the antagonists of the Romans

there had been chiefly Sarmatian tribes, among whom the Roxolani came

into closest contact with them; of Germans there were settled here at

that time only the Bastarnae, who had been long at home in this region.

Now the Roxolani disappear, merged possibly among the Carpi apparently

akin to them, who thenceforth were the nearest neighbours of the Romans

on the lower Danube, perhaps in the valleys of the Seret and Pruth.

[Sidenote: Goths.]

By the side of the Carpi came, likewise as immediate neighbours of

the Romans at the mouth of the Danube, the people of the Goths. This

Germanic stock migrated, according to the tradition which has been

preserved to us, from Scandinavia over the Baltic towards the region of

the Vistula, and from this to the Black Sea; in accordance with this

the Roman geographers of the second century know them at the Vistula,

and Roman history from the first quarter of the third at the north-west

coast of the Black Sea. Thenceforth they appear here constantly on the

increase; the remains of the Bastarnae retired before them to the right

bank of the Danube under the emperor Probus, the remains of the Carpi

under the emperor Diocletian, while beyond doubt a great part of the

former as of the latter mingled among the Goths and joined them. On

the whole this catastrophe may be designated as that of the Gothic war

only in the sense in which that which set in under Marcus is called the

war of the Marcomani; the whole mass of peoples set in movement by the

stream of migration from the north-east to the Black Sea took part in

it; and took part all the more, seeing that these attacks took place

just as much by land over the lower Danube as by water from the north

coasts of the Black Sea, in an inextricable complication of landward

and maritime piracy. Not unsuitably, therefore, the learned Athenian

who fought in this war and has narrated it, prefers to term it the

Scythian, as he includes under this name--which, like the Pelasgian,

forms the despair of the historian--all Germanic and non-Germanic

enemies of the empire. What is to be told of these expeditions will

here be brought together, so far as the confusion of tradition, which

is only too much in keeping with the confusion of these fearful times,

allows.

[Sidenote: Gothic wars.]

The year 238--a year also of civil war, when there were four

emperors--is designated as that in which the war against those here

first named Goths began.[137] As the coins of Tyra and Olbia cease with

Alexander († 235), these Roman possessions situated beyond the boundary

of the empire had doubtless become some years earlier a prey to the

new enemy. In that year they first crossed the Danube, and the most

northerly of the Moesian coast towns, Istros, was the first victim.

Gordianus, who emerged out of the confusions of this time as ruler, is

designated as conqueror of the Goths; it is more certain that the Roman

government at any rate under him, if not already earlier, agreed to buy

off the Gothic incursions.[138] As was natural, the Carpi demanded the

same as the emperor had granted to the inferior Goths; when the demand

was not granted, they invaded the Roman territory in the year 245. The

emperor Philippus--Gordianus was at that time already dead--repulsed

them, and energetic action with the combined strength of the great

empire would probably here have checked the barbarians.

[Sidenote: Decius.]

[Sidenote: His death.]

[Sidenote: Loss of Dacia.]

But in these years the murderer of an emperor reached the throne as

surely as he found in turn his own murderer and successor; it was

just in the imperilled regions of the Danube that the army proclaimed

against the emperor Philippus first Marinus Pacatianus, and, after he

was set aside, Traianus Decius, which latter in fact vanquished his

antagonist in Italy, and was acknowledged as ruler. He was an able and

brave man, not unworthy of the two names which he bore, and entered, so

soon as he could, resolutely into the conflicts on the Danube; but what

the civil war waged in the meanwhile had destroyed, could no longer be

retrieved. While the Romans were fighting with one another the Goths

and the Carpi had united, and had under the Gothic prince Cniva invaded

Moesia denuded of troops. The governor of the province, Trebonianus

Gallus, threw himself with his force into Nicopolis on the Haemus, and

was here besieged by the Goths; these at the same time pillaged Thrace

and besieged its capital, the great and strong Philippopolis; indeed

they reached as far as Macedonia, and invested Thessalonica, where

the governor Priscus found this just a fitting moment to have himself

proclaimed as emperor. When Decius arrived to combat at once his rival

and the public foe, the former was doubtless without difficulty set

aside, and success also attended the relief of Nicopolis, where 30,000

Goths are said to have fallen. But the Goths, retreating to Thrace,

conquered in turn at Beroë (Alt-Zagora), threw the Romans back on

Moesia, and reduced Nicopolis there as well as Anchialus in Thrace

and even Philippopolis, where 100,000 men are said to have come into

their power. Thereupon they marched northwards to bring into safety

their enormous booty. Decius projected the plan of inflicting a blow

on the enemy at the crossing of the Danube. He stationed a division

under Gallus on the bank, and hoped to be able to throw the Goths upon

this, and to cut off their retreat. But at Abrittus, a place on the

Moesian frontier, the fortune of war, or else the treachery of Gallus,

decided against them. Decius perished with his son, and Gallus, who was

proclaimed as his successor, began his reign by once more assuring to

the Goths the annual payments of money (251).[139] This utter defeat

of Roman arms as of Roman policy, the fall of the emperor, the first

who lost his life in conflict with the barbarians--a piece of news

which deeply moved men's minds even in this age demoralised by its

familiarity with misfortune--the disgraceful capitulation following

thereon, placed in fact the integrity of the empire at stake. Serious

crises on the middle Danube, threatening probably the loss of Dacia,

must have been the immediate consequence. Once more this was averted;

the governor of Pannonia, Marcus Aemilius Aemilianus, a good soldier,

achieved an important success of arms, and drove the enemy over the

frontier. But Nemesis bore sway. The consequence of this victory,

achieved in the name of Gallus, was, that the army renounced allegiance

to the betrayer of Decius and chose their general as his successor.

Once more therefore civil war took precedence of frontier-defence;

and, while Aemilianus no doubt vanquished Gallus in Italy but soon

afterwards succumbed to his general Valerianus (254), Dacia was lost

for the empire--how, and to whom, we know not.[140] The last coin

struck by this province, and the latest inscription found there, are

of the year 255, the last coin of the neighbouring Viminacium in upper

Moesia of the following year; in the first years of Valerianus and

Gallienus therefore the barbarians occupied the Roman territory on the

left bank of the Danube, and certainly also pressed across to the

right.

Before we pursue further the development of affairs on the lower

Danube, it appears necessary to cast a glance at piracy, as it was then

in vogue in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, and the maritime

expeditions of the Goths and their allies originating from it.

[Sidenote: Piracy on the Black Sea.]

That the Roman fleet could at no time be dispensed with on the Black

Sea, and piracy there was probably never extirpated, was implied in

the very nature of the Roman rule as it had taken shape on its coasts.

The Romans were in firm possession only from about the mouths of the

Danube as far as Trapezus. It is true that on the one hand Tyra at

the mouth of the Dniester and Olbia on the bay at the mouth of the

Dnieper, on the other side the Caucasian harbours in the regions

of the modern Suchum-Kaleh, Dioscurias and Pityus, were Roman. The

intervening Bosporan kingdom in the Crimea also stood under Roman

protection, and had a Roman garrison subject to the governor of Moesia.

But on these shores, for the most part far from inviting, there were

only those posts formerly held either as old Greek settlements or

as Roman fortresses; the coast itself was desolate or in the hands

of the natives filling the interior, who, comprehended under the

general name of Scythians, mostly of Sarmatian descent, never were,

or were to become, subject to the Romans; it was enough if they did

not directly lay hands on the Romans or their clients. Accordingly,

it is not to be wondered at, that even in the time of Tiberius the

pirates of the east coast not merely made the Black Sea insecure, but

also landed and levied contributions on the villages and towns of the

coast. If, under Pius or Marcus, a band of the Costoboci dwelling on

the north-western shore fell upon the inland town Elateia situated

in the heart of Phocis, and came to blows under its walls with the

citizens, this event, which certainly only by accident stands forth

for us as isolated, shows that the same phenomena which preceded the

downfall of the government of the senate were now renewed, and even

with the imperial power maintaining itself outwardly unshaken not

merely individual piratical ships, but squadrons of pirates cruised

in the Black and even in the Mediterranean seas. The decline of the

government, clearly discernible after the death of Severus, and above

all after the end of the last dynasty, manifested itself then, as

was natural, especially in the further decay of marine police. The

accounts, in detail far from trustworthy, mention already in the time

before Decius the appearance of a great fleet of pirates in the Aegean

Sea; then under Decius the plundering of the Pamphylian coast and of

the Graeco-Asiatic islands; under Gallus maraudings of pirates in

Asia Minor as far as Pessinus and Ephesus.[141] These were predatory

expeditions. These comrades plundered the coasts far and wide, and made

even, as we see, bold raids into the interior; but nothing is mentioned

of the destruction of towns, and the pirates shunned coming into

collision with Roman troops; the attack was chiefly directed against

such regions as had no troops stationed in them.

[Sidenote: Maritime expeditions of the Goths and allies.]

[Sidenote: To Trapezus.]

Under Valerian these expeditions assume a different character. The

nature of the raids varies so much from the earlier, that the raid,

in itself not specially important, of the Borani against Pityus under

Valerian could be designated by intelligent reporters precisely as the

beginning of this movement,[142] and that the pirates were for a long

time called in Asia by the name of this tribe not otherwise known to

us. These expeditions proceed no longer from the old native dwellers

beside the Black Sea, but from the hordes pressing behind them. What

had hitherto been piracy begins to form a portion of that migratory

movement of peoples to which the advance of the Goths on the lower

Danube belongs. The peoples taking part in it are very varied and in

part little known; in the later expeditions the Germanic Heruli, then

dwelling beside the Maeotis, appear to have played a leading part. The

Goths also took part, but, so far as sea-voyages are concerned--and

tolerably exact reports of these are before us--not in a prominent

manner; strictly speaking, these expeditions are more correctly termed

Scythian than Gothic. The maritime centre of these aggressions was

the mouth of the Dniester, the port of Tyra.[143] The Greek towns of

the Bosporus, abandoned through the bankruptcy of the imperial power,

without protection to the hordes pressing onward, and expecting to be

besieged by them, consented, half under compulsion, half voluntarily,

to convey in their vessels, and by their mariners, the inconvenient new

neighbours over to the nearest Roman possessions on the north coast

of Pontus--for which these neighbours themselves lacked the needful

means and the needful skill. It was thus that the expedition against

Pityus was brought about. The Borani were landed and, confident of

success, sent back the ships. But the resolute commander of Pityus,

Successianus, repelled the attack; and the assailants, fearing the

arrival of the other Roman garrisons, hastily withdrew, for which they

had difficulty in procuring the necessary transports. But the plan was

not given up; in the next year they came back, and, as the commandant

had meanwhile been changed, the fortress surrendered. The Borani, who

this time had retained the Bosporan vessels and had them manned by

pressed mariners and Roman captives, possessed themselves of the coast

far and wide, and reached as far as Trapezus. Into this well fortified

and strongly garrisoned town all had fled, and the barbarians were not

in a position for a real siege. But the leadership of the Romans was

bad, and the military discipline so on the decline that not even the

walls were occupied; so the barbarians scaled them by night, without

encountering resistance, and in the great and rich city enormous booty,

including a number of ships, fell into their hands. They returned

successful from the far distant land to the Maeotis.

[Sidenote: To Bithynia.]

Excited by this success, a second expedition of other but neighbouring

Scythian bands was in the following winter directed against Bithynia.

It is significant of the unsettled state of things that the instigator

of this movement was Chrysogonus, a Greek of Nicomedia, and that he

was highly honoured by the barbarians for its successful result. This

expedition was undertaken--as the necessary number of ships was not

to be procured--partly by land, partly by water; it was only in the

neighbourhood of Byzantium that the pirates succeeded in possessing

themselves of a considerable number of fishing-boats, and so they

arrived along the Asiatic coast at Chalcedon, whose strong garrison

on this news ran off. Not merely this town fell into their hands, but

also along the coast Nicomedia, Chios, Apamea; in the interior Nicaea

and Prusa; Nicomedia and Nicaea they burnt down, and reached the river

Rhyndacus. Thence they sailed home, laden with the treasures of the

rich land and of its considerable cities.

[Sidenote: To Greece.]

The expedition against Bithynia had already been undertaken in part by

land; all the more were the attacks that were directed against European

Greece composed of piratical expeditions by land and sea. If Moesia

and Thrace were not permanently occupied by the Goths, they yet came

and went there as if they were at home, and roved from thence far into

Macedonia. Even Achaia expected under Valerian invasion from this side;

Thermopylae and the Isthmus were barricaded, and the Athenians set to

work to restore their walls that had lain in ruins since the siege by

Sulla. The barbarians did not come then, nor by this route. But under

Gallienus a fleet of five hundred sail, this time chiefly Heruli,

appeared before the port of Byzantium, which, however, had not yet

lost its capacity of defence; the ships of the Byzantines successfully

repulsed the robbers. These sailed onward, showed themselves on the

Asiatic coast before Cyzicus not formerly attacked, and arrived

from thence by way of Lemnos and Imbros at Greece proper. Athens,

Corinth, Argos, Sparta, were pillaged and destroyed. It was always

something that, as in the times of the Persian wars, the citizens of

the destroyed Athens, two thousand in number, laid an ambush for the

retiring barbarians, and, under the leadership of their equally learned

and brave captain, Publius Herennius Dexippus, of the old and noble

family of the Kerykes, with support of the Roman fleet, inflicted a

notable loss on the pirates. On the return home, which took place in

part by the land route, the emperor Gallienus attacked them in Thrace

at the river Nestus and put to death a considerable number of their

men.[144]

[Sidenote: The imperial government of the Gothic period.]

In order completely to survey the measure of misfortune, we must take

into account that in this empire going to shreds, and above all in

the provinces overrun by the enemy, one officer after another grasped

at the crown, which hardly any longer existed. It is not worth the

trouble to record the names of these ephemeral wearers of the purple;

it marks the situation that, after the devastation of Bithynia by the

pirates, the emperor Valerian omitted to send thither an extraordinary

commandant, because every general was, not without reason, regarded

by him as a rival. This co-operated to produce the almost thoroughly

passive attitude of the government in presence of this sore emergency.

Yet, on the other hand, undoubtedly a good part of this irresponsible

passiveness is to be traced to the personality of the rulers: Valerian

was weak and aged, Gallienus vehement and dissolute, and neither the

one nor the other was equal to the guidance of the vessel of the state

in a storm. Marcianus, to whom Gallienus after the invasion of Achaia

had committed the command in these regions, operated not without

success; but the matter did not gain any real turn for the better so

long as Gallienus occupied the throne.

[Sidenote: Gothic victories of Claudius.]

[Sidenote: Renewed fortifying of the Danube-frontier.]

After the murder of Gallienus (268), perhaps on the news of it, the

barbarians, again led by the Heruli, but this time with united forces,

undertook an assault on the imperial frontier, such as there had not

been hitherto, with a powerful fleet, and probably at the same time by

land from the Danube.[145] The fleet had much to suffer from storms in

the Propontis; then it divided, and the Goths advanced partly against

Thessaly and Greece, partly against Crete and Rhodes; the chief mass

resorted to Macedonia and thence penetrated into the interior, beyond

doubt in combination with the bands that had marched into Thrace. But

the emperor Claudius, who marched up in person with a strong force,

brought relief at length to the Thessalonians oft besieged but now

reduced to extremity; he drove the Goths before him up the valley of

the Axius (Vardar) and onward over the mountains to upper Moesia; after

various conflicts, with changing fortune of war, he achieved here in

the Morava valley near Naissus a brilliant victory, in which 50,000

of the enemy are said to have fallen. The Goths retired broken up,

first in the direction towards Macedonia, then through Thrace to the

Haemus, in order to put the Danube between themselves and the enemy. A

quarrel in the Roman camp, this time between infantry and cavalry, had

almost given them once more a respite; but, when it came to fighting,

the cavalry could not bear to leave their comrades in the lurch, and

so the united army was once more victorious. A severe pestilence,

which raged in all the years of distress, but especially then in those

regions, and above all in the armies, did great injury doubtless to the

Romans--the emperor Claudius himself succumbed to it--but the great

army of the Northmen was utterly extirpated, and the numerous captives

were incorporated in the Roman armies or made serfs. The hydra of

military revolutions, too, was in some measure subdued; Claudius, and

after him Aurelian, were masters in the empire after another fashion

than could be said of Gallienus. The renewal of the fleet, towards

which a beginning had been made under Gallienus, would not be wanting.

The Dacia of Trajan was, and remained, lost; Aurelian withdrew the

posts still holding out there, and gave to the possessors dislodged or

inclined for emigration new dwellings on the Moesian bank. But Thrace

and Moesia, which for a time had belonged more to the Goths than to the

Romans, returned under Roman rule, and at least the frontier of the

Danube was once more fortified.

[Sidenote: Character of the Gothic wars.]

We may not assign to these Gothic and Scythian expeditions by land and

by sea, which fill up the twenty years 250-269, such significance, as

if the hordes moving forth had been minded to take permanent possession

of the countries which they traversed. Such a plan cannot be shown to

have existed even for Moesia and Thrace, to say nothing of the more

remote coasts; hardly, moreover, were the assailants numerous enough

to undertake invasions proper. As the bad government of the last

rulers, and above all the untrustworthiness of the troops, far more

than the superior power of the barbarians, called forth the flooding

of the territory by land and sea robbers, so the re-establishment

of internal order and the energetic demeanour of the government of

themselves brought its deliverance. The Roman state could not yet be

broken if it did not break itself. But still it was a great work to

rally the government again as Claudius had done it. We know somewhat

less even of him than of most regents of this time, as the probably

fictitious carrying back of the Constantinian pedigree to him has

repainted his portrait after the tame pattern of perfection; but this

very association, as well as the numberless coins struck in his honour

after his death, show that he was regarded by the next generation

as the deliverer of the state, and in this it cannot have been

mistaken. These Scythian expeditions were at all events a prelude of

the later migration of peoples; and the destruction of cities, which

distinguishes them from the ordinary piratic voyages, took place at

that time to such an extent that the prosperity as well as the culture

of Greece and Asia Minor never recovered from it.

[Sidenote: The Danubian wars to the end of the 3d century.]

On the re-established frontier of the Danube Aurelian consolidated the

victory achieved, inasmuch as he conducted the defensive once more

offensively, and, crossing the Danube at its mouth, defeated beyond it

not only the Carpi, who thenceforth stood in client-relation to the

Romans, but also the Goths under king Canabaudes. His successor Probus

took, as was already stated, the remains of the Bastarnae, hard pressed

by the Goths, over to the Roman bank, just as Diocletian in the year

295 took the remnant of the Carpi. This points to the fact that beyond

the river the empire of the Goths was consolidating; but they came

no further. The border-fortresses were reinforced; counter-Aquincum

(_contra Aquincum_, Pesth) was constructed in the year 294. The piratic

expeditions did not entirely disappear. Under Tacitus hordes from

the Maeotis appeared in Cilicia. The Franks, whom Probus had settled

on the Black Sea, procured for themselves vessels, and sailed home

to their North Sea, after plundering by the way on the Sicilian and

African coasts. By land, too, there was no cessation of arms, as indeed

all the numerous Sarmatian victories of Diocletian, and a part of his

Germanic, would fall to the regions of the Danube; but it was only

under Constantine that matters again came to a serious war with the

Goths, which had a successful issue. The preponderance of Rome was

re-established after the Gothic victory of Claudius as firmly as before.

[Sidenote: Illyrising of the military force and of the government.]

The war-history which we have just unfolded did not fail to react

with general and lasting effect upon the internal organisation of the

Roman political and military system. It has already been pointed out

that the corps of the Rhine, holding in the early imperial period the

leading position in the army, yielded their primacy already under

Trajan to the legions of the Danube. While under Augustus six legions

were stationed in the region of the Danube and eight in that of the

Rhine, after the Dacian wars of Domitian and Trajan in the second

century the Rhine-camps numbered only four, the camps of the Danube

ten, and after the Marcomanian war even twelve, legions. Inasmuch as

since Hadrian's time the Italian element, apart from the officers, had

disappeared from the army, and, taken on the whole, every regiment

was recruited in the district in which it was quartered, the most of

the soldiers of the Danubian army, and not less the centurions who

rose from the ranks, were natives of Pannonia, Dacia, Moesia, Thrace.

The new legions formed under Marcus proceeded from Illyricum, and

the extraordinary supplemental levies which the troops then needed

were probably likewise taken chiefly from the districts in which the

armies were stationed. Thus the primacy of the Danubian armies, which

the war of the three emperors in the time of Severus established and

increased, was at the same time a primacy of Illyrian soldiers; and

this reached a very emphatic expression in the reform of the guard

under Severus. This primacy did not, properly speaking, affect the

higher spheres of government, so long as the position of officer still

coincided with that of imperial official, although the equestrian

career was accessible to the common soldier through the intervening

link of the centurionate at all times, and thus the Illyrians early

found their way into that career; as indeed, already, in the year 235,

a native Thracian, Gaius Julius Varus Maximinus, in the year 248 a

native Pannonian, Trajanus Decius, had in this way attained even to

the purple. But when Gallienus, in a distrust certainly but too well

justified, excluded the class of senators from serving as officers,

what had hitherto held good as to the soldiers became necessarily

extended to the officers also. It was thus simply a matter of course

that the soldiers belonging to the army of the Danube, and mostly

springing from Illyrian districts, played thenceforth the first

part also in government, and, so far as the army made the emperors,

these were likewise as to the majority Illyrians. Thus Gallienus was

followed by Claudius the Dardanian, Aurelianus from Moesia, Probus

from Pannonia, Diocletianus from Dalmatia, Maximianus from Pannonia,

Constantius from Dardania, Galerius from Serdica; as to the last

named, an author writing under the Constantinian dynasty brings into

prominence their descent from Illyricum, and adds that they, with

little culture but good preliminary training by labour in the field

and service in war, had been excellent rulers. Such service as the

Albanians for a long time rendered to the Turkish empire, their

predecessors likewise rendered to the Roman imperial state, when this

had arrived at similar disorder and similar barbarism. Only, the

Illyrian regeneration of the Roman imperial order may not be conceived

of as a national reorganisation; it was simply the propping up, by

soldiers, of an empire utterly reduced through the misgovernment of

rulers of gentler birth. Italy had wholly ceased to be military; and

history does not acknowledge the ruler's right without the warrior's

power.

Footnotes.

[118: The baptistery is perhaps the tomb of the emperor.]

[119: That there were no legions stationed on the Danube itself in the

year 50, follows from Tacitus, _Ann._ xii. 29; otherwise it would not

have been necessary to send a legion thither to receive the accession

of the Suebi. The laying out also of the Claudian Savaria suits better,

if the town was then Norican, than if it already belonged to Pannonia;

and, as the assignment of this town to Pannonia coincides certainly as

to time with the like severance of Carnuntum and with the transference

of the legion thither, all this may probably have taken place only in

the period after Claudius. The small number also of inscriptions of

Italici found in the camps of the Danube (_Eph. Ep._ v. p. 225) points

to their later origin. Certainly there have been found in Carnuntum

some epitaphs of soldiers of the 15th legion which, from their outward

form and from the absence of cognomen, appear to be older (Hirschfeld,

_Arch. Epigraph. Mittheilungen_, v. 217). Such determinations of date

cannot claim full certainty, where a decade is concerned; nevertheless

it must be conceded that the former arguments also furnish no full

proofs, and the translocation may have begun earlier, possibly under

Nero. For the construction or extension of this camp by Vespasian we

have the evidence of the inscription, attesting such a structure, of

Carnuntum, dating from the year 73 (Hirschfeld, _l.c._).]

[120: We know whole sets of Thracian, Getic, Dacian names of places

and persons. Remarkable in a linguistic point of view is a group

of personal names compounded with _-centhus_: _Bithicenthus_,

_Zipacenthus_, _Disacenthus_, _Tracicenthus_, _Linicenthus_ (_Bull. de

Corr. Hell._ vi. 179), of which the first two also frequently occur

isolated in their other half (_Bithus_, _Zipa_). A similar group

is formed by the compounds with _-poris_, such as _Mucaporis_ (as

Thracian, _Bull._ _l.c._, as Dacian in numerous cases), _Cetriporis_,

_Rhaskyporis_, _Bithoporis_, _Dirdiporis_.]

[121: Tacitus, _Ann._ ii. 64, says this expressly. Of free Thracians,

viewed from the Roman stand-point, there were at that time none;

but the Thracian mountains, and especially the Rhodope of the

Bessi, maintained even in the state of peace an attitude as regards

the princes installed by Rome, that could hardly be designated as

subjection; they acknowledged the king doubtless, but obeyed him, as

Tacitus says (_l.c._ and iv. 46, 51), only when it suited them.]

[122: We have still a Greek epigram, dedicated to Cotys by Antipater of

Thessalonica (_Anthol. Planud._ iv. 75), the same poet who celebrated

also the conqueror of the Thracians, Piso (p. 24), and a Latin epistle

in verse addressed to Cotys by Ovid (_ex Ponto_, ii. 9).]

[123: It is one of the most seriously felt blanks of the Roman imperial

history that the standing quarters of the two legions, which formed

under the Julio-Claudian emperors the garrison of Moesia, the 4th

Scythica and the 5th Macedonica (at least these were stationed there

in the year 33; _C. I. L._ iii. 1698) cannot hitherto be pointed out

with certainty. Probably they were Viminacium and Singidunum in what

was afterwards upper Moesia. Among the legion-camps of lower Moesia,

of which that of Troesmis in particular has numerous monuments to

show, none appear to be older than Hadrian's time; the remains of the

upper-Moesian are hitherto so scanty that they at least do not hinder

our carrying back their origin a century further. When the king of

Thrace in the year 18 takes arms against the Bastarnae and Scythians

(Tacitus, _Ann._ ii. 65), this could not have been put forward even as

a pretext, had lower-Moesian legionary camps been already at that time

in existence. This very narrative shows that the warlike power of this

vassal-prince was not inconsiderable, and that the setting aside of an

uncompliant king of Thrace demanded caution.]

[124: That the _regnum Vannianum_ (Plin. _H. N._ iv. 12, 81), the

Suebian state (Tacitus, _Ann._ xii. 29; _Hist._ iii. 5, 21), must be

referred, not merely, as might appear from Tacitus, _Ann._ ii. 63,

to the dwellings of the people that went over with Maroboduus and

Catualda, but to the whole territory of the Marcomani and Quadi, is

shown clearly by the second report, _Ann._ xii. 29, 30, since here,

as opponents of Vannius alongside of his own insurgent subjects,

there appear the peoples bordering on Bohemia to the west and north,

the Hermunduri and Lugii. As boundary towards the east Pliny _l.c._

designates the region of Carnuntum (_Germanorum ibi confinium_) more

exactly the river Marus or Duria, which separates the Suebi and the

_regnum Vannianum_ from their eastern neighbours, whether we may refer

the _dirimens eos_ with Müllenhoff (_Sitzungsberichte der Berliner

Akademie_ 1883, p. 871) to the Jazyges, or, as is more natural, to

the Bastarnae. In reality both doubtless bordered, the Jazyges on the

south, the Bastarnae on the north, with the Quadi of the March valley.

Accordingly the Marus is the March, and the demarcation is formed by

the small Carpathians that stretch between the March and the Waag.

If thus those retainers were settled _inter flumen Marum et Cusum_,

then the Cusus not elsewhere mentioned is, provided the statement is

correct, not the Waag, or even, as Müllenhoff supposed, the Eipel

falling into the Danube below Gran, but an affluent of the Danube

westward of the March, perhaps the Gusen near Linz. The narrative in

Tacitus xii. 29, 30, also requires the territory of Vannius to have

reached to the west even beyond the March. The subscription to the

first book of the _Meditations_ of the emperor Marcus ἐν Κουάδοις πρὸς

τῷ Γρανούᾳ, proves doubtless that then the state of the Quadi stretched

as far as the river Gran; but this state is not coincident with the

_regnum Vannianum_.]

[125: _Regibus Bastarnarum et Roxolanorum filios, Dacorum fratrum

captos aut hostibus ereptos remisit_ (Orelli, 750) is miswritten; it

must run _fratres_, or at any rate _fratrum filios_. In like manner

afterwards _per quae_ is to be read for _per quem_ and _rege_ instead

of _regem_.]

[126: In Pannonia there were stationed about the year 70 two legions,

the 13th Gemina and the 15th Apollinaris, in room of which latter

during its participation in the Armenian war for some time the 7th

Gemina came in (_C. I. L._ iii. p. 482). Of the two legions added

later, 1st Adiutrix and 2d Adiutrix, the first still at the beginning

of the reign of Trajan lay in upper Germany (p. 159, note 1), and can

only have come to Pannonia under Trajan; the second stationed under

Vespasian in Britain can only have come to Pannonia under Domitian

(p. 174, note 4). The Moesian army numbered after the union with the

Dalmatian under Vespasian probably but four legions, consequently as

many as the two armies together previously--the later upper-Moesian,

4th Flavia and 7th Claudia, and the later lower-Moesian, 1st Italica

and 5th Macedonica. The positions shifted by the marching to and fro of

the year of the four emperors (Marquardt, _Staatsverw._ ii. 435), which

temporarily brought these legions to Moesia, need not deceive us. The

subsequent third lower-Moesian legion, the Eleventh, was still under

Trajan stationed in upper Germany.]

[127: Josephus, _Bell. Iud._ vii. 4, 3: πλείοσι καὶ μείζοσι φυλακαῖς

τὸν τόπον διέλαβεν ὡς εἶναι τοῖς βαρβάροις τὴν διάβασιν τελέως

ἀδύνατον. By this seems meant the transference of the two Dalmatian

legions to Moesia. Whither they were transferred we do not know.

According to the Roman custom elsewhere it is more probable that they

were stationed in the environs of the previous headquarters Viminacium

than in the remote region of the mouths of the Danube. The camp there

probably originated only at the division of the Moesian command and

at the erection of the independent province of lower Moesia under

Domitian.]

[128: The chronology of the Dacian war is involved in much uncertainty.

That it had begun already before the war with the Chatti (83), we

learn from the Carthaginian inscription (_C. I. L._ viii. 1082) of

a soldier decorated three times by Domitian, in the Dacian, in the

German, and again in the Dacian war. Eusebius puts the outbreak of

the war, or rather the first great conflict, in the year Abr. 2101 or

2102 = A.D. 85 (more exactly 1 Oct. 84-30 Sept. 85) or 86, the triumph

in the year 2106 = 90; these numbers indeed have no claim to complete

trustworthiness. With some probability the triumph is placed in the

year 89 (Henzen, _Acta Arval._ p. 116).]

[129: The fragment, Dio, lxvii. 7, 1, Dind., stands in the sequence of

the Ursinian excerpts before lxvii. 5, 1, 2, 3, and belongs also in the

order of events to a time before the negotiation with the Lugii. Comp.

_Hermes_, iii. 115.]

[130: Arrian, _Tact._ 44, mentions among the changes which Hadrian

introduced into the cavalry, that he allowed to the several divisions

their national battle-cries: Κελτικοὺς μὲν τοῖς Κελτοῖς ἱππεῦσιν,

Γετικοὺς δὲ τοῖς Γέταις, Ῥαιτικοὺς δὲ ὅσοι ἐκ Ῥαίτων.]

[131: The walls, which, three mètres in height and two mètres in

thickness, with broad outer fosse and many remains of forts, stretch

in two almost parallel lines, partly--to the length of ninety-four

miles--from the left bank of the Pruth by way of Tabak and Tatarbunar

to Dniester-Liman, between Akerman and the Black Sea; partly--to the

length of sixty-two miles--from Leowa on the Pruth to the Dniester

below Bendery (Petermann, _Geograph. Mittheilungen_, 1857, p. 129),

may perhaps be also Roman; but there has not been as yet any exact

settlement of this point.]

[132: According to von Vincke's estimate (_Monatsberichte über die

Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde in Berlin_ in the years

1839-40, p. 197 f.; comp. in von Moltke's _Briefe über Zustände in

der Turkei_, the letter of 2d Nov. 1837), as well as according to the

delineations and plans of Dr. C. Schuchhardt communicated to me, three

barriers were here constructed. The south-most and probably oldest is

a simple earthen wall with (singularly) a fosse in front of it towards

the south; whether of Roman origin may be doubtful. The two other lines

are an earthen wall, even now at many places as high as three mètres,

and a lower wall, once lined with stones, which often run close beside

each other and elsewhere again are miles apart. We might hold them as

the two lines of defence of a fortified road, though in the eastern

half the earthen wall, in the more southern half the stone-wall, is

the more northerly, and they cross in the middle. At one spot the

earthen wall (here more southerly) forms the rear of a fort constructed

behind the stone-wall. The earthen wall is covered on the north side

by a deep, on the south side by a shallow, fosse; each fosse is closed

off by a bank. A fosse lies also in front of the stone-wall to the

north. Behind the earthen wall, and mostly resting on it, are found

forts distant from each other seven hundred and fifty mètres; others

at irregular distances of the like kind behind the stone-wall. All the

lines keep behind the Karasu-lakes as the natural basis of defence;

from the point where this ceases, they are carried as far as the sea

with slight regard to the character of the ground. The town Tomis lies

outside of the wall and to the north of it; but its fortress-walls are

put in connection with the barrier-fortification by a special wall.]

[133: _Vita Hadriani_ 6: _cum rege Roxolanorum qui de imminutis

stipendiis querebatur cognito negotio pacem composuit_.]

[134: _Vita Marci_ 14: _gentibus quae pulsae a superioribus barbaris

fugerant nisi reciperentur bellum inferentibus_. Dio, in Petrus

Patricius, _fr._ 6, says: Λαγγιβάρδων καὶ Ὀβίων (otherwise unknown)

ἑξακισχιλίων Ἴστρον περαιωθέντων τῶν περὶ Βίνδικα (perhaps already then

_praef. praetorio_, in which case the guard would be marched out on

account of this occurrence), ἱππέων ἐξελασάντων καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ Κάνδιδον

πεζῶν ἐπιφθασάντων εἰς παντελῆ φυγήν οἱ βάρβαροι ἐτράποντο· ἐφ' οἷς

οὗτω πραχθεῖσιν ἐν δέει καταστάντες ἐκ πρώτης ἐπιχειρήσεως οἱ βάρβαροι

πρέσβεις παρὰ Αἴλιον Βάσσον τὴν Παιονίαν διέποντα στέλλουσι Βαλλομάριόν

τε τὸν βασιλέα Μαρκομάνων καὶ ἑτέρους δέκα, κατ' ἔθνος ἐπιλεξάμενοι

ἕνα· καὶ ὅρκοις τὴν εἰρήνην οἱ πρέσβεις πιστωσάμενοι οἴκαδε χωροῦσιν.

That this incident falls before the outbreak of the war, is shown by

its position; _fr._ 7 of Patricius is an excerpt from Dio, lxxi. 11, 2.]

[135: The Moesian army gave away soldiers to the Armenian war

(Hirschfeld, _Arch. epig. Mitth._ vi. 41); but here the frontier was

not endangered.]

[136: The participation of the Germans on the right of the Rhine is

attested by Dio, lxxi. 3, and only thereby are the measures explained

which Marcus adopted for Raetia and Noricum. The position of Oderzo

also speaks for the view that these assailants came over the Brenner.]

[137: The alleged first mention of the Goths in the biography of

Caracalla, c. 10, rests on a misunderstanding. If really a senator

allowed himself the malicious jest of assigning to the murderer of Geta

the name Geticus, because he on his march from the Danube to the east

had conquered some Getic hordes (_tumultuariis proeliis_), he meant

Dacians, not the Goths, scarcely at that time dwelling there and hardly

known to the Roman public, whose identification with the Getae was

certainly only a later invention.--We may add that the statement that

the emperor Maximinus (235-238) was the son of a Goth settled in the

neighbouring Thrace, carries us still further back; yet not much weight

is to be attached to it.]

[138: Petrus Patricius _fr._ 8. The administration of the legate of

lower Moesia here mentioned, Tullius Menophilus, is fixed by coins

certainly to the time of Gordian, and with probability to 238-240

(Borghesi, _Opp._ ii. 227). As the beginning of the Gothic war and

the destruction of Istros are fixed by Dexippus (_vita Max. et Balb._

16) at 238, it is natural to bring into connection with these events

the undertaking of tribute; at any rate it was then renewed. The vain

sieges of Marcianopolis and Philippopolis by the Goths (Dexippus,

_fr._ 18, 19) may have followed on the capture of Istros. Jordanes,

_Get._ 16, 92, puts the former under Philippus, but is in chronological

questions not a valid witness.]

[139: The reports of these occurrences in Zosimus, i. 21-24, Zonaras,

xii. 20, Ammianus, xxxi. 5, 16, 17 (which accounts, down to that

concerning Philippopolis, are fixed as belonging to this time by the

fact that the latter recurs in Zosimus), although all fragmentary or in

disorder, may have flowed from the report of Dexippus, of which _fr._

16, 19, are preserved, and may be in some measure combined. The same

source lies at the bottom of the imperial biographies and Jordanes; but

both have disfigured and falsified it to such a degree that use can be

made of their statements only with great caution. Victor, _Caes._ 29,

is independent.]

[140: Perhaps the irruption of the Marcomani in Zosimus, i. 29, refers

to this.]

[141: Ammianus, xxxi. 5, 15; _duobus navium milibus perrupto Bosporo

et litoribus Propontidis Scythicarum gentium catervae transgressae

ediderunt quidem acerbas terra marique strages: sed amissa suorum

parte maxima reverterunt_; whereupon the catastrophe of the Decii

is narrated, and into this is inwoven the further notice: _obsessae

Pamphyliae civitates_ (to which must belong the siege of Side in

Dexippus himself, fr. 23), _insulæ populatæ complures_, as also the

siege of Cyzicus. If in this retrospect all is not confused--which

cannot well be assumed to be the case with Ammianus--this falls before

those naval expeditions which begin with the siege of Pityus, and are

more a part of the migration of peoples than piratical raids. The

number of the ships might indeed be transferred hither by error of

memory from the expedition of the year 269. To the same connection

belongs the notice in Zosimus, i. 28, as to the Scythian expeditions

into Asia and Cappadocia as far as Ephesus and Pessinus. The account

as to Ephesus in the biography of Gallienus, c. 6, is the same, but

transposed as to time.]

[142: In the case of Zosimus himself we should not expect complete

understanding of the matter; but his voucher Dexippus, who was a

contemporary and took part in the matter, knew well why he termed the

Bithynian expedition the δευτέρα ἔφοδος (Zos. i. 35); and even in

Zosimus we discern clearly the contrast, intended by Dexippus, between

the expedition of the Borani against Pityus and Trapezus and the

traditional piratic voyages. In the biography of Gallienus the Scythian

expedition to Cappadocia, narrated at c. 11, under the year 264, must

be that to Trapezus, just as the Bithynian therewith connected must

be that which Zosimus terms the second; here indeed everything is

confused.]

[143: This is said by Zosimus, i. 42, and follows also from the

relation of the Bosporans to the first (i. 32), and that of the first

to the second expedition (i. 34).]

[144: The report of Dexippus as to this expedition is given in extract

by Syncellus, p. 717 (where ἀνελόντος must be read for ἀνελόντες),

Zosimus, i. 39, and the biographer of Gallienus, c. 13. _Fr._ 22 is

a portion of his own narrative. In the continuator of Dio, on whom

Zonaras depends, the event is placed under Claudius, through error or

through falsification, which grudged this victory to Gallienus. The

biography of Gallienus narrates the incident apparently twice, first

shortly in c. 6 under the year 262; then better, under or after 265, in

c. 13.]

[145: In our traditional accounts this expedition appears as a pure

sea-voyage, undertaken with (probably) 2000 ships (so the biography

of Claudius; the numbers 6000 and 900, between which the tradition in

Zosimus, i. 42, wavers, are probably both corrupt) and 320,000 men. It

is, however, far from credible that Dexippus, to whom these statements

must be traced back, can have put the latter figure in this way. On the

other hand, considering the direction of the expedition, in the first

instance against Tomis and Marcianopolis, it is more than probable that

in it the procedure described by Zos. i. 34 was followed, and a portion

marched by land; and under this supposition even a contemporary might

well estimate the number of assailants at that figure. The course of

the campaign, particularly the place of the decisive battle, shows that

they had by no means to do merely with a fleet.]

The Provinces of the Roman Empire, from Caesar to Diocletian. v. 1 · 第 9 / 13 章