LETTER XCI

I will now, my dearest, my best beloved correspondent of all, begin,

since the tender age of my dear babies will not permit me to have

an eye yet to their _better_ part, to tell you what are the little

matters to which I am not quite so well reconciled in Mr. Locke: and

this I shall be better enabled to do, by my observations upon the

temper and natural bent of my dear Miss Goodwin, as well as by those

which my visits to the bigger children of my little school, and those

at the cottages adjacent, have enabled me to make; for human

nature, Sir, you are not to be told, is human nature, whether in the

high-born, or in the low.

This excellent author (Section 52), having justly disallowed of

slavish and corporal punishments in the education of those we would

have to be wise, good, and ingenuous men, adds, "On the other side, to

flatter children by rewards of things that are pleasant to them, is

as carefully to be avoided. He that will give his son apples, or

sugar-plums, or what else of this kind he is most delighted with, to

make him learn his book, does but authorize his love of pleasure, and

cockers up that dangerous propensity, which he ought, by all means,

to subdue and stifle in him. You can never hope to teach him to master

it, whilst you compound for the check you give his inclination in one

place, by the satisfaction you propose to it in another. To make a

good, a wise, and a virtuous man, 'tis fit he should learn to cross

his appetite, and deny his inclination to riches, finery, or pleasing

his palate, &c."

This, Sir, is well said; but is it not a little too philosophical and

abstracted, not only for the generality of children, but for the age

he supposes them to be of, if one may guess by the apples and the

sugar-plums proposed for the rewards of their well-doing?--Would not

this require that memory or reflection in children, which, in another

place, is called the concomitant of prudence and age, and not of

childhood?

It is undoubtedly very right, to check an unreasonable appetite, and

that at its first appearance. But if so small and so reasonable an

inducement will prevail, surely, Sir, it might be complied with.

A generous mind takes delight to win over others by good usage and

mildness, rather than by severity; and it must be a great pain to

such an one, to be always inculcating, on his children or pupils, the

doctrine of self-denial, by methods quite grievous to his own nature.

What I would then humbly propose, is, that the encouragements offered

to youth, should, indeed, be innocent ones, as the gentleman enjoins,

and not such as would lead to luxury, either of food or apparel; but

I humbly think it necessary, that rewards, proper rewards, should

be proposed as incentives to laudable actions: for is it not by this

method that the whole world is influenced and governed? Does not God

himself, by rewards and punishments, make it our interest, as well

as our duty, to obey him? And can we propose ourselves, for the

government of our children, a better example than that of the Creator?

This fine author seems to think he had been a little of the strictest,

and liable to some exception. "I say not this," proceeds he, (Section

53) "that I would have children kept from the conveniences or

pleasures of life, that are not injurious to their health or virtue.

On the contrary, I would have their lives made as pleasant and as

agreeable to them as may be, in a plentiful enjoyment of whatsoever

might innocently delight them."-And yet he immediately subjoins a very

hard and difficult proviso to this indulgence.--"Provided," says he,

"it be with this caution, that they have those enjoyments only as the

consequences of the state of esteem and acceptation they are in with

their parents and governors."

I doubt, my dear Mr. B., this is expecting such a distinction and

discretion in children, as they seldom have in their tender years, and

requiring capacities not commonly to be met with; so that it is not

prescribing to the _generality_, as this excellent author intended.

'Tis, I humbly conceive, next to impossible that their tender minds

should distinguish beyond facts; they covet this or that play-thing,

and the parent, or governor, takes advantage of its desires, and

annexes to the indulgence such or such a task or duty, as a condition;

and shews himself pleased with its compliance with it: so the child

wins its plaything, and receives the commendation so necessary to lead

on young minds to laudable pursuits. But shall it not be suffered

to enjoy the innocent reward of its compliance, unless it can give

satisfaction, that its greatest delight is not in having the thing

coveted, but in performing the task, or obeying the injunctions

imposed upon it as a condition of its being obliged? I doubt, Sir,

this is a little too strict, and not to be expected from children. A

servant, full-grown, would not be able to shew, that, on condition he

complied with such and such terms (which, it is to be supposed by the

offer, he would not have complied with, but for that inducement), he

should have such and such a reward;

I say, he would hardly be able to shew, that he preferred the pleasure

of performing the requisite conditions to the stipulated reward. Nor

is it necessary he should: for he is not the less a good servant, or

a virtuous man, if he own the conditions painful, and the reward

necessary to his low state in the world, and that otherwise he would

not undergo any service at all.--Why then should this be exacted from

a child?

Let, therefore, innocent rewards be proposed, and let us be contented

to lead on the ductile minds of children to a love of their duty, by

obliging them with such: we may tell them what we expect in this case;

but we ought not, I humbly conceive, to be too rigorous in exacting

it; for, after all, the inducement will naturally be the uppermost

consideration with the child: not, as I hinted, had it been offered to

it, if the parent himself had not thought so. And, therefore, we can

only let the child know his duty in this respect, and that he _ought_

to give a preference to that; and then rest ourselves contented,

although we should discern, that the reward is the chief incentive,

of it. For this, from whatever motive inculcated, may beget a habit

in the child of doing it: and then, as it improves in years, one may

hope, that reason will take place, and enable him, from the most solid

and durable motives, to give a preference to the duty.

Upon the whole, then, can we insist upon it, that the child should

so nicely distinguish away its little _innate_ passions, as if we

expected it to be born a philosopher? Self-denial is, indeed, a most

excellent doctrine to be inculcated into children, and it must be done

_early_: but we must not be too severe in our exacting it; for a duty

too rigidly insisted upon, will make it odious. This Mr. Locke, too,

observes in another place, on the head of too great severity; which he

illustrates by a familiar comparison: "Offensive circumstances," says

he, "ordinarily infect innocent things which they are joined with. And

the very sight of a cup, wherein any one uses to take nauseous physic,

turns his stomach; so that nothing will relish well out of it,

though the cup be never so clean and well-shaped, and of the richest

materials."

Permit me to add, that Mr. Locke writes still more rigorously on the

subject of rewards; which I quote, to shew I have not misunderstood

him: "But these enjoyments," says he, "should _never_ be offered

or bestowed on children, as the rewards of this or that particular

performance that they shew an aversion to, or to which they would not

have applied themselves without that temptation." If, dear Sir,

the minds of children can be led on by innocent inducements to the

performance of a duty, of which they are capable, what I have humbly

offered, is enough, I presume, to convince one, that it _may_ be done.

But if ever a particular study be proposed to be mastered, or a bias

to be overcome (that is not an _indispensable_ requisite to his future

life of morals) to which the child shews an aversion, I would not,

methinks, have him be too much tempted or compelled to conquer or

subdue it, especially if it appear to be a _natural_ or rivetted

aversion. For, permit me to observe, that the education and studies of

children ought, as much as possible, to be suited to their capacities

and inclination, and, by these means, we may expect to have always

_useful_ and often _great_ men, in different professions; for that

genius which does not prompt to the prosecution of one study, may

shine in another no less necessary part of science. But, if the

promise of innocent rewards _would_ conquer this aversion, yet they

should not be applied with this view; for the best consequences that

can be hoped for, will be tolerable skill in one thing, instead of

most excellent in another.

Nevertheless, I must repeat, that if, as the child grows up, and is

capable of so much reason, that, from the love of the _inducement_,

one can raise his mind to the love of the _duty_, it should be done

by all means. But, my dear Mr. B., I am afraid that _that_ parent

or tutor will meet with but little success, who, in a child's tender

years, shall refuse to comply with its foibles, till he sees it value

its duty, and the pleasure of obeying his commands, beyond the little

enjoyment on which his heart is fixed. For, as I humbly conceive, that

mind which can be brought to prefer its duty to its appetites, will

want little of the perfection of the wisest philosophers.

Besides, Sir, permit to me say, that I am afraid this perpetual

opposition between the passions of the child and the duty to be

enforced, especially when it sees how other children are indulged (for

if this regimen could be observed by _any_, it would be impossible it

should become _general_, while the fond and the inconsiderate parents

are so large a part of mankind), will cow and dispirit a child, and

will, perhaps produce, a necessity of making use of severity, to

subdue him to this temper of self-denial; for if the child refuses,

the parent must insist; and what will be the consequence? must it not

introduce a harsher discipline than this gentleman allows of?--and

which, I presume to say, did never yet do good to any but to slavish

and base spirits, if to them; a discipline which Mr. Locke every where

justly condemns.

See here, dear Sir, a specimen of the presumption of your girl: "What

will she come to in time!" you will perhaps say, "Her next step will

be to arraign myself." No, no, dear Sir, don't think so: for my duty,

my love, and my reverence, shall be your guards, and defend you from

every thing saucy in me, but the bold approaches of my gratitude,

winch shall always testify for me, how much I am _your obliged and

dutiful servant_,

Pamela, Volume II · 第 246 / 276 题