The Abyssinian expedition has, from the time it was first determined upon,
attracted an amount of attention, not only in Great Britain but throughout
the civilised world, altogether disproportionate to the strength of the
army employed, or to the extent of the interests at stake. The total force
engaged was under, rather than over, 10,000 men; not one-fifth the
strength of an army which we might ourselves put into the field for a
campaign in India; scarcely a fiftieth of the force at the command of
either of the great Continental Powers. It was clearly not the magnitude
of the expedition, then, which attracted attention: it was the
extraordinary and novel circumstances under which it was undertaken; the
almost insurmountable difficulties to be overcome; the unknown nature of
the country to be traversed, and the romantic disinterestedness of the
motives which led England to embark upon it, which has rendered it one of
the most interesting and notable campaigns ever undertaken. Since the
expedition of Pizarro and Cortes in the middle ages, no such novel and
hazardous expedition is on record. The country itself was like that of the
far-famed Prester John—everything about it smacked of the marvellous. It
was more mountainous, more inaccessible, more war-loving, more wild than
any other country in the world. The king with whom we waged war was a
potentate who by his military talents had raised himself from a
comparatively obscure position to the sovereignty of all Abyssinia: he was
enlightened beyond his race; patronised strangers, encouraged
manufactures, endeavoured in every way to improve the condition of his
country, and was yet a bloodthirsty tyrant. The people themselves were a
strange race, far more civilised than other African nations, Christians in
the midst of a Mahometan and Pagan continent, a mixture of many
races—African, Greek, Arab, and Jew. Altogether it was a land of romance.
Nor had travellers done much to enlighten us as to the country. Some had
described it as fertile in the extreme; others had spoken of it as a land
of mountain and defile, where no sustenance could be hoped for for the
army. They had united only in prophesying evil things—hunger and thirst,
inaccessible mountain and pathless wastes, fever, cholera, small-pox,
dysentery, the tetse-fly, tapeworm, and guinea-worm. We were to be
consumed with fire; we were to be annihilated with stones rolled upon us
when in ravines; we were to be cut off in detail upon our marches; we were
to be harassed to death by repeated night and day attacks. All these and
many other prophecies were freely uttered, and it really appeared as if
our expedition was to partake strongly of the nature of a forlorn-hope.
The friends of officers and men said good-bye to them as if they were
going to certain death, and insurance-offices doubled and trebled the
premium upon their lives. All this assisted to raise the public interest
and anxiety to the highest point. It is needless now to say that almost
the whole of the adverse predictions were entirely falsified, and that we
have met with no difficulties whatever beyond mountain and ravine, the
want of transport, and the scarcity of food.
Generally as the subject is known, it is yet necessary, before commencing
the history of the campaign, to say a few words upon the events which
preceded and caused it; and as the subject has been exhausted by Dr. Beke
in his able work on the Abyssinian captives, I cannot do better than
preface my story with a brief epitome of the facts recited in his volume.
Dr. Beke was well-acquainted with Mr. Plowden, our late Consul there, and
knew thoroughly the whole of the events which led to the captivity of the
English party, and he was in intimate communication with their friends
here. His statements are supported by numerous official documents; and
this volume, in which he now sets forth the state of the case, may be
apparently received with confidence as reliable in every particular.
The kingdom of Abyssinia is of extreme antiquity, and was once a great and
flourishing empire. It has been ruled by a succession of monarchs claiming
direct descent from Menilek, the son of King Solomon by the Queen of
Sheba. For the last century the legitimate monarch has had very little
power, the real authority being in the hands of the most powerful of the
chiefs of the various tribes composing the empire, and who, as in turns
they became dominant, assumed the title of ras or vizier, keeping the
puppet emperor in a state of honourable captivity, administering affairs
and carrying on wars without the slightest reference to his wishes and
opinions. The kingdom of Abyssinia consists of an immense elevated plateau
or table-land, of great fertility, and possessing a temperate and
agreeable climate. At its north-eastern extremity it approaches very
nearly to the sea, the port of Massowah at that point being its natural
outlet. Towards the south the table-land trends away from the sea, being
separated from it by a wide low-lying plain, inhabited by Mahometan
tribes. The religion of the natives of Abyssinia itself has been from very
early times Christian, and they possess a native version of the Scriptures
which dates from the fourth century of the Christian era. The laws of this
singular people are, like our own, founded upon the code of Justinian. The
various tribes which form the empire, although acknowledging the supremacy
of the emperor, are yet virtually independent, paying a mere nominal
tribute, and making war upon and deposing him whenever they feel strong
enough to do so. These tribes are very numerous, but the principal may be
considered to be those inhabiting Tigre, which is the province nearest to
Massowah, and therefore commanding the avenues of approach to the
interior; Amhara, the capital, lying to the south of Tigre, Lasta in the
centre, and Shoa, Godjam, and Kwara to the west. Of these Tigre is the
representative of the ancient kingdom. It is almost entirely surrounded by
the river Takkazye, which separates it from the rest of the empire; and
its inhabitants speak the language of the ancient Ethiopic, in which is
the early version of the Bible. Since the middle of the sixteenth century
the Turks have claimed the entire seaboard, but have only occupied the
Sawakin and Massowah.
In the year 1810 the English Government, alarmed at the attempts of the
French to obtain a footing in Egypt, dispatched Mr. Salt, afterwards
Consul-General in Egypt, to Abyssinia, to open friendly relations with
that power; and that gentleman, being unable to penetrate beyond Tigre,
the chief of which country was at the time the ras, or most powerful chief
in the kingdom, delivered the letter from King George, and the
accompanying presents, to that personage. Almost simultaneously, however,
the power of the French in the Indian Ocean was annihilated, and a few
years afterwards the fall of Napoleon relieving the British Government of
all fear of French aggression in the East, the diplomatic relations
between England and Tigre came to an end. A constant jealousy and
struggle, however, appears to have been maintained between the Protestant
and Roman Catholic missions, which were alternately fostered and expelled
by the various sovereigns of the country.
In 1847 a British consulate was established, Mr. Plowden being selected
for the post. He unfortunately committed the great error of entering into
friendly relations with the potentate of Amhara, in place of the
independent chief of Tigre, who, possessing the only outlet of
communication, rendered an alliance with Amhara completely nugatory to
both parties. Mr. Plowden himself, when too late, seems to have discovered
that he had committed an error, and wrote to the Earl of Clarendon, who
was then Foreign Secretary, that he feared that little commercial
advantage could be obtained. His lordship replied that, having made the
treaty and established the consulate, her Majesty’s Government were
reluctant to renounce all hope of benefit, and begged him to suggest some
plan of establishing himself at Massowah or some other seaport, and of
keeping up a communication with the interior.
Mr. Plowden in his report gave full details as to the country, and
especially the northern portion, into which the Egyptians were constantly
making plundering expeditions, carrying off the cattle and inhabitants,
and selling the latter as slaves. Consul Plowden wrote strongly to the
Egyptian authorities upon their conduct, and in consequence of his
representations Lord Clarendon remonstrated energetically with the Viceroy
of Egypt upon his aggressions against Abyssinia. While this was going on,
a remarkable man had made his appearance. Dedjatj Kassai was chief of one
of the Kawra tribes. A man of great ambition and talent, he conceived the
design of making himself master of the whole of Abyssinia, and in turn
attacked and defeated the neighbouring potentates, and speedily conquered
the whole of the country, with the exception only of Tigre, and then
assumed the title of the Emperor Theodore. Theodore is described in Mr.
Plowden’s despatches as a man of good impulses, and a desire to rule well
and wisely, but of a violent temper, and an inordinate pride in his kingly
dignity and position. With him Mr. Plowden entered into negotiations for a
treaty with England, for the despatch of an embassy to this country, and
for the establishment of the British consulate in Abyssinia, with power
and jurisdiction in all cases in which a British subject might be
interested.
The Emperor objected to the clause conferring jurisdiction on the Consul,
but promised to give the matter his earnest attention when he should find
time to do so, as he was most favourably disposed towards England. Lord
Clarendon highly approved of the course Consul Plowden was pursuing, and
stated that the Queen would have much pleasure in receiving, and treating
with due honour, the ambassadors whom his Majesty might send to her Court.
The ratification of this treaty and the sending the embassy were put off
in consequence of the constant wars in which Theodore was engaged with
rebellious tribes in various parts of his empire, but he always expressed
himself as willing to carry out these engagements as soon as he could find
leisure to enable him to do so. In March 1860, Consul Plowden was killed
during his journey back to Massowah, from which he had been absent at the
Court of Theodore for five years.
Mr. Layard most wrongfully accused Mr. Plowden, in a speech delivered in
the House of Commons on June 30th, 1865, of breach of duty. He stated that
Consul Plowden, “instead of attending to the object with which he was
placed there, that of encouraging commercial intercourse between Great
Britain and Abyssinia, plunged into local intrigues.... Her Majesty’s
Government at once sent out instructions for him to return to his post at
Massowah, and no longer to interfere in their local differences.” This
accusation brought forth an indignant protest upon the part of Consul
Plowden’s brother. He showed that Mr. Plowden was accredited to Abyssinia,
and not to Massowah, which is a Turkish port without trade, and with no
British subjects or interests to protect, and only valuable as the means
of entry into Abyssinia, and of communication with Europe, and obviously
for that reason only made the head-quarters of the consulate. The duties
of the Consul were to watch and counteract foreign intrigue, to keep peace
between Abyssinia and Egypt, to put down the slave-trade, and to encourage
commerce; duties which it is evident he could not perform if remaining at
Massowah, separated from the seat of the empire by a hostile tribe. Mr.
Plowden pointed out that his brother had commenced his consulship by going
into the interior with letters and presents to the reigning potentate, and
that he had during his whole term of office remained there with but few
intermissions, his last visit there lasting for five years without a
break. That during all this time he corresponded regularly with the
Foreign Office, who were aware of his movements, and by whose instruction
he was guided. Thus Mr. Plowden showed conclusively that the reckless
attack which Mr. Layard so chivalrously made, five years after his death,
upon an officer who had nobly performed most difficult duties, was
altogether without foundation. Upon Consul Plowden’s death Captain Cameron
was gazetted “her Majesty’s Consul in Abyssinia,” but it was only on
February 9th, 1862, that he arrived at Massowah. His instructions were
rather vague, a good deal being necessarily left to his own discretion,
but he was generally enjoined to carry on Consul Plowden’s policy, to
continue the negotiations for the treaty, and for the despatch of an
embassy to England. Massowah was of course to be his head-quarters, but no
injunctions were given him against going into the interior. On the
contrary, he was furnished with letters and presents to the Emperor, to
whom Earl Russell introduced him, and requested Theodore’s protection and
favour in his behalf. Captain Cameron, during the period which elapsed
between his appointment and his departure for his post, had been
thoroughly instructed in the progress which had been made in the
negotiations by Consul Plowden, and had full authority to take them up at
the point at which they were at that gentleman’s death, and Mr. Stern, the
missionary, was requested by Earl Russell himself to remain in London at
that time in order to discuss with Captain Cameron the contemplated
embassy and other matters. And yet, in the face of this, Mr. Layard
ventured to say, in his place in Parliament, on October 31, 1865, when
quoting Consul Cameron’s despatch on the subject, “Now this was altogether
contrary to the instruction he had received.” Consul Cameron was received
with great state and courtesy by the Emperor Theodore, who again expressed
his desire to send an embassy to England. But a day or two after the
Consul reached the Abyssinian Court the intelligence arrived that our
Consul at Jerusalem, who had been always looked upon, and who had acted as
the protector of the Abyssinian colony there, had received orders from the
Foreign Secretary to withdraw that protection, and that consequently their
convent had been plundered by the Armenians. This affair of the Jerusalem
Abyssinians is told by Dr. Beke with great clearness, but space forbids me
here to enter upon it; suffice it that Earl Russell without the smallest
cause or pretext withdrew the protection, or rather good offices, which
had been extended by Lord Malmesbury to the Abyssinian colony, and which
had been one cause of the goodwill with which England was regarded in
Abyssinia.
Upon the day after this the Emperor saw Captain Cameron, told him that he
had well considered the subject of the treaty, about which there would be
no difficulty, and he presented him with a letter which he had written to
her Majesty. In this, after many expressions of regard and good wishes,
the Emperor expresses his intention of attacking the Turks on account of
their constant aggressions upon him, and requests her Majesty to arrange
for the safe-conduct of the ambassadors, whom he is prepared to send at
once to England. Upon receiving this letter Consul Cameron at once started
for the sea-coast. He was, however, stopped upon his way by a rebel chief;
but his letters were sent down by a native messenger, and arrived in
London the 12th February 1863. Captain Cameron himself, accompanied by the
Emperor’s representative and a strong escort, proceeded to Bogos, to
examine into the truth of the alleged inroads of the Turks or Egyptians,
as they are indifferently called, into that province. Finding that these
were still continued, Captain Cameron wrote to Consul-General Colquhoun at
Alexandria, begging him to remonstrate with the Egyptian Government. He
also wrote to Earl Russell from Bogos, and twice to the Emperor,
acquainting him with the steps he was taking for the protection of his
subjects, in these respects taking as guide the conduct of his
predecessor, Consul Plowden, acting, as the advocate of the cause of the
Christian Abyssinians against the Turks, in perfect accord with the
representative and favourite of the Emperor, who was his companion. It is
therefore clear that there is not the least foundation for Earl Russell’s
ill-advised allegation, “the chief cause of the Emperor’s anger with
Consul Cameron was this journey to Bogos.” His proceedings, however,
incurred the displeasure of both the Egyptian Government and the home
authorities. In Mr. Plowden’s time Egypt had been in a state of
disorganisation, and therefore the British Government had, on receiving
their Consul’s account of the atrocities executed by the Egyptian troops
upon the inhabitants of Bogos, addressed the energetic remonstrances of
our Foreign Minister to the Viceroy; but now things were changed. Egypt
was compact and strong, and Earl Russell would not for worlds offend so
well regulated an ally; therefore a sharp reproof was sent off to Captain
Cameron to mind his own business, and to return to Massowah. Such is the
effect of a changed state of things, and poor Consul Cameron, by not
reflecting on this, was blamed for doing precisely the same for which
Consul Plowden had gained much credit.
When Captain Cameron returned to the Court in July, after his lengthened
absence, his position was not a pleasant one, for he was still without an
answer to the Emperor’s letter to the Queen, which had been sent off
October 31st of the previous year; he had not, indeed, received as yet an
answer to his own despatch enclosing that letter; for owing to delays it
had not, as has been said, reached England until February the 12th, and
Earl Russell had not thought it of sufficient importance to answer it for
more than two months afterwards, and then without making the slightest
allusion to the Emperor’s letter which it enclosed.
After the Consul had parted with the Emperor’s representative at Bogos, he
had made a visit into the Egyptian province of Soudan, in accordance with
instructions he had received from the Foreign Office, to inquire into the
prospects of cotton-growing there, as the subject of Egyptian cotton was
then attracting great notice in England. This expedition added to the
anger which the Emperor Theodore felt at not having received an answer to
his letter to her Majesty. The following conversation took place at his
first interview with Captain Cameron, and plainly enough testifies as to
the real cause of the Emperor’s anger:
“Where have you been since you parted from Samuel at Bogos?”
“Into the frontier provinces of Soudan.”
“What for?”
“To see about cotton and trade, and so forth.”
“Who told you to go there?”
“The British Government.”
“Have you brought me an answer from the Queen of England?”
“No.”
“Why not?”
“Because I have not received any communication from the Government upon
the subject.”
“Why, then, do you come to see me now?”
“I request permission to return to Massowah.”
“What for?”
“Because I have been ordered by the Government to go there.”
“So,” exclaimed the exasperated monarch, “your Queen can give you orders
to go and visit my enemies the Turks, and then to return to Massowah; but
she cannot send a civil answer to my letter to her. You shall not leave me
till that answer comes.”
Captain Cameron then, in July 1863, became a prisoner,—not in bonds,
indeed, but a prisoner upon parole. In September the answer arrived from
the Emperor Napoleon, to whom Theodore had despatched a letter at the same
time as to the Queen. This answer gave great offence, as it was written by
Marshal O’Neil, and not by the Emperor himself. Its contents, too, were
singularly ill-judged, and the missive was torn to pieces before a council
of the dignitaries by the Emperor, and trodden under foot. The French
Consul and a companion were peremptorily ordered to quit the Abyssinian
territory.
In October arrived Earl Russell’s answer to Captain Cameron, but without
the slightest allusion to Theodore’s letter. Up to this time no cause of
dispute whatever had arisen between Messrs. Stern and Rosenthal and the
Emperor; but the fury which Theodore felt at the slight so wantonly passed
upon him by the British Foreign Secretary now burst upon the heads of the
whole of that nation. On October the 15th Captain Cameron’s servant, or
messenger, was seized and beaten; and in the evening of the same day Mr.
Stern’s two servants were seized and beaten so cruelly that they both died
the same night. Mr. Stern himself, who was standing by at the time,
happened, in his horror at the proceeding, to place his hand to his mouth.
It was at once said he was biting his thumb at the Emperor, which is
considered a threat of revenge; and he was accordingly seized and cruelly
beaten, and his life was also for some time despaired of. For some time
nothing further took place, and then the Emperor, who desired to justify
in some way his fit of rage against a man with whom he had had no dispute
or cause of complaint, had all Mr. Stern’s and Mr. Rosenthal’s books and
papers examined and read, this office being performed by a Frenchman named
Bardel, who appears throughout to have been a treacherous and bitter enemy
of the English party. Enough criminatory matter was found here, in the
shape of remarks in their diaries upon the conduct of the Emperor, and
they were condemned to death; but this was commuted to imprisonment.
On Nov. 22d a young Irishman named Kearns arrived with another despatch
from the Foreign Office,—probably the one of August 13th, but which
contained no allusion whatever to the Emperor’s letter. This naturally
exasperated Theodore more than ever, and Captain Cameron was now ordered
to be chained upon both hands. On the 4th of January Captain Cameron, his
attendants, and the missionaries, were all put in fetters, and confined in
the common prison. The cause of this fresh proof of the wrath of the King
is reported by Mr. Steiger, a member of the Scottish mission, to have been
the arrival of the head of the Abyssinian convent at Jerusalem with the
news that the British Consul there had declined to interfere in their
behalf. Is anything further necessary to establish the fact that the
treatment of the unfortunate missionaries was a mere episode incidental to
the main question, which was entirely between the Emperor Theodore and the
British Government?
As to the long imprisonment, the torture and indignities inflicted upon
the captives, they are already well known to the public. Let us now see
what steps were taken by the late Government to procure their release.
The news of the imprisonment of Captain Cameron appeared in the Paris and
London papers of the 15th of December; but no one could believe it, the
favour in which the British Consul stood being a matter of notoriety. Lord
Clarendon, however, stated in the House of Lords, in the debate on
February 9, 1866, that the news had been received at the early date given
of the Consul’s detention; but it was only upon March 16, 1864, or three
months after it was known at the Foreign Office, that the London Society
for promoting Christianity among the Jews received and made public the sad
intelligence. Mrs. Stern wrote a petition to the Queen, asking her to send
a letter under the sign-manual, written by herself to the Emperor. Lord
Shaftesbury handed this letter to Earl Russell, adding his own prayer to
that of Mrs. Stern’s, and requesting him to present the petition to the
Queen. On the following day, May 7th, Earl Russell returned the petition,
unpresented, to Lord Shaftesbury, saying that “after much deliberation he
had come to the conclusion that he ought not to advise the Queen to write
to the King of Abyssinia.”
So matters might have remained to the present day had not a note which
Captain Cameron had written during his captivity been received by his
relatives, and by them most indiscreetly published in the papers. In this
he said that there was no hope of his release unless an answer was sent to
the Emperor’s letter. Everyone was filled with indignation at the delay of
fourteen months which had taken place in sending an answer to so important
a document, and Earl Russell and his colleagues came to the conclusion
that after all they ought to advise her Majesty to reply to the letter,
which she accordingly did, and towards the end of June the letter was sent
off. But so inefficiently was this done, that after it had reached Cairo
it was sent back to England to have alterations made in it, and even then
it was not perfect, for it was discovered many months afterwards that the
royal signet had not been attached, and a fresh letter was accordingly
sent out in February or March 1865. The person selected to carry out this
delicate business was a Mr. Rassam, who had acted as paymaster to the men
employed by Mr. Layard at Nineveh, and who was instructed to demand the
release of Consul Cameron, but that as the other captives were not British
subjects, he was not to speak too authoritatively in their behalf. But Mr.
Rassam had, Dr. Beke affirms, another and far more delicate mission. “He
was to make a good case for the British Government—to remove the blame
from their shoulders, even if it were thrown on those of anyone else. It
did not matter who might be the scapegoat as long as the Government were
exonerated. This is said quite advisedly.” Mr. Rassam went to Massowah,
where he remained a year doing apparently nothing whatever. Dr. Beke
thinks that all along, both in this and in his subsequent conduct, when he
went into the interior and saw the Emperor, his conduct was not, to say
the least of it, judicious. The release of the prisoners when Mr. Rassam
did at last see the Emperor and present the Queen’s letter, and their
subsequent imprisonment, together with Mr. Rassam, are known to all.
Throughout all the numerous debates in the Houses of Parliament during
this period, Earl Russell and Mr. Layard persistently endeavoured to burke
all discussion by declaring that it would come to the ears of the Emperor;
but when at last the House insisted upon being no longer put off with
vague generalities, these two gentlemen, who had so deprecated anything
being said which might hurt the feelings of the Emperor Theodore, were now
guilty of applying the strongest and most offensive epithets to him,
which, had they come to the knowledge of the Emperor, would have insured
the instant execution of his captives. This was, to say the least of it, a
strange and peculiar instance of inconsistency upon the part of these
thoughtful statesmen. In consequence of these debates in the House, Earl
Russell at length found that it was a matter which could no longer be
tampered with, and he himself appointed Mr. Palgrave to start for
Abyssinia to endeavour to effect the release of the Consul and his
companions in captivity. Mr. Rassam, however, prevented anything being
done by this gentleman. Nothing, indeed, if Dr. Beke is to be trusted, can
be more extraordinary than the conduct of this person. He received the
news of his recall while he was, as usual, waiting quietly at Massowah.
Instantly he embarked in the steamer which brought the intelligence,
steamed to Suez, and from there telegraphed to her Majesty’s agent and
Consul-General in Egypt that Consul Cameron had been released. This is
proved to have been utterly without foundation, but it had the desired
effect of putting a stop to Mr. Palgrave’s progress, that gentleman having
arrived at Cairo, and being upon the point of proceeding up the Nile. Mr.
Rassam declined all fellowship with Mr. Palgrave, and refused to agree to
the proposition that one should proceed up the Nile and the other _viâ_
Massowah. Mr. Rassam then took the presents brought by Mr. Palgrave, and
started back for Massowah, from whence he did what there is no apparent
reason why he should not have done at first, started for the interior. Mr.
Palgrave remained at Cairo to await the result of Mr. Rassam’s mission.
There he remained when the news came, in March 1866, that the captives
were released, and were on their way to the coast; there he remained until
Mr. Flad arrived in Egypt with the news of the detention of Mr. Rassam and
the captives; and then, extraordinary to state, when it would seem that he
might be of use, he started off by the first steamer to England.
As Dr. Beke says, the whole matter is an enigma which requires solution.
This sudden passage of Mr. Rassam to Egypt upon the news of his recall
being received by him, the untrue telegram which he sent off from thence,
and which put a stop to Mr. Palgrave’s expedition—in short, every incident
connected with the conduct of Mr. Layard’s ex-paymaster requires a most
searching investigation.
Such is the account given by Dr. Beke; and as Mr. Layard, although openly
attacked, has never disproved a single statement alleged against him, but
has contented himself with vehement personal attacks upon Dr. Beke
(probably upon the principle of the lawyer—“when you have no case,
blackguard your opponent”), it must be assumed that in all material points
Dr. Beke’s statements are correct.
Such was the state of things when the Conservative Ministry came into
power; and after another fruitless effort to ransom the prisoners, war was
determined upon as the only resource remaining.
The announcement of the intention of Government was received with general
satisfaction. It was not a war for which any enthusiasm was felt; there
was no national glory to be gained, no national advantage; but a national
stain was to be wiped off, and a party of our countrymen rescued from a
position into which they had fallen by no fault whatever of their own, but
by the disgraceful _lâches_ of the Government they served; therefore it
may be said that England in general, if it did not enter heartily into the
war, and winced a little at the thought of the probable enormous expense,
yet cordially acquiesced in its necessity. War once determined upon, the
columns of the newspapers were inundated with suggestions from everyone
who had ever been in Abyssinia, and from a vast number of persons who had
not; and these, although they differed upon almost every point, yet agreed
upon piling danger upon difficulty, and horror upon horror, until the very
air, earth, and water of Abyssinia seemed to swarm with worms and other
creeping things. In the mean time the preparations went steadily on.
Officers were sent from England to Egypt, Spain, and various parts of the
Mediterranean to purchase mules; Woolwich was busied with the preparation
of mountain guns; transports were taken up, hospital-ships were fitted
out, and large quantities of tents and other stores sent out from the
Tower. This was nearly all which England was to contribute, for it was
determined that the expedition should be entirely an Indian one, and that
Bombay should have the honour as well as the responsibility of all the
arrangements.
As soon as orders were received from England to fit out an expedition with
all speed, Sir Seymour FitzGerald, the Governor of Bombay, and Sir Robert
Napier, Commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, set to work in earnest. The
greatest credit is undoubtedly due to the former for his untiring zeal and
earnestness; he was indefatigable: but at the same time I doubt greatly
the wisdom of committing the arrangements connected with a great
expedition of this sort to a civilian, who necessarily must be
unacquainted with the requirements of an army, and who must be entirely
guided by the advice of his council. The consequence was that Sir Robert
Napier was obliged to consult the Governor on every point, and the
Governor again had to consult his own military adviser, an officer
necessarily of far less standing than Sir Robert Napier, who was thus
liable to be overruled, nominally by the Governor, but in reality by a
subordinate officer. Thus, as one instance out of many, Sir Robert
Napier’s plan for a transport train, which was sent in to the Governor for
sanction early in September, was entirely put aside, and the new scheme
was not issued by the Governor for two months afterwards; thus Sir Robert,
who when he once arrived in Abyssinia was solely responsible, was liable
to have the whole of his arrangements destroyed by the break-down of a
transport train, with the organisation of which he had nothing whatever to
do.
As the present is merely a narrative of the march of the army to Magdala,
I must pass cursorily over the preparations in Bombay. I will, however,
give a few extracts from the memoranda issued by Sir Robert Napier, and
which will be sufficient to show how accurately he estimated the
difficulties of the work to be done, and how thoroughly he thought over
every detail.
In his memorandum of August 8th, Sir Robert Napier estimates that he will
require 12,000 men, for that 2000 must remain at the port, and at Post
No. 1 upon the high land (Senafe); 2000 men at Antalo, or at some similar
point in advance; and 2000 men to keep open communication with the
advanced column, and to support it if necessary.
In minute of August 31st, he farther develops his plans. He there speaks
of Post No. 1 as at Zulla, Post No. 2 as at Senafe, Post No. 3 as at
Antalo, which, he says, “will be one of great importance, and should be
very strong.” “Post No. 4 will probably be not far from Socota, which will
also be a very vital point. It is in a difficult and rugged country, and
will be our last main base of supplies from which the operating force will
be supported.” Farther on he says: “It will be necessary to convey to our
extreme base, which for convenience I will call Socota, for the force
required to hold that mountainous country, and for the corps of operation
(probably in all 7000 men), supplies for four months.” In the same minute
he says: “On advancing from Post No. 2 (Senafe) the leading division will
move forward at once to Antalo, and the remainder of the advancing force
will take post upon the road to cover the transit of supplies for five
months from No. 2 to No. 3, being posted at stations where they may obtain
water and forage, and then supplies will be passed on to the front for
9000 men. From Antalo the same process will be repeated until the supplies
for 7000 men shall have been carried to Post No. 4 at Socota. From that
point the operative column will act with supplies for one or two months as
may be convenient.”
These extracts are exceedingly interesting, as they show the original
plans of the campaign as laid down by Sir Robert Napier. In the course of
the narrative, it will be seen how entirely this plan had to be deviated
from, owing to the scarcity of food and forage, and the partial break-down
of the transport train; how Post No. 4, described as of “vital”
importance, had to be altogether dispensed with; and how, in consequence,
the army, when within five or six days of Magdala, were almost destitute
of supplies, while their base at Antalo was two hundred miles distant.
On September 12th Sir Robert issued an excellent memorandum on the
fitting-up of the ships and the appliances for landing animals, and making
many suggestions for the health and comfort of the troops.
In regard to the selection of the troops to form the expedition, Sir
Robert himself chose the various regiments. A considerable discussion
arose between the different Presidencies, Madras and Bengal naturally
wishing to contribute as large a quota as possible. Upon this subject the
General wisely said, September 5th: “I consider it especially of advantage
to have the native regiments, if possible, of one army, as they work in
harmony with and rely upon each other; if they are of different
Presidencies, feelings of great bitterness arise when one or other is left
in the rear, and partialities are conjured up as the reason why one or
other is not taken to the front.”
Considerable correspondence took place in relation to the formation and
constitution of the pioneer force, concerning which the General’s opinion
was overruled by that of his excellency the Governor. The following
extract from memorandum of September 8th fully shows this: “I concluded
that I should receive some formal and definite information of any change
in his excellency’s views or plans, and I was therefore not prepared to
learn from Colonel Marriott, when the expedition was nearly ready to
proceed, that his Excellency had decided to submit entirely to Colonel
Merewether the responsible duty of determining finally the point of
debarkation, and of converting the reconnoissance into an occupation of
the coast by a body of about 1500 men. Of all the various circumstances
which may have led his Excellency to this conclusion, I am not fully
informed; but I entertain strong objections to the question being left
entirely to Colonel Merewether’s decision,—he being, in compliance with
his Excellency’s opinion (expressed in his Excellency’s note to Colonel
Marriott), in military command of the party,—because, while concurring
entirely with his Excellency in his high estimation of that officer, it
has seemed to me that Colonel Merewether has strong preconceived opinions
in favour of a line of route which from the most recent reports,
especially that of M. Munsinger, appears to me to be one that would be
dangerous to the success of the expedition, and that his selection of a
point of debarkation will be sensibly influenced by such very strong and
sincere opinions.” Sir Robert Napier’s protest was attended to, and other
officers were associated with Colonel Merewether; but this extract is
sufficient to show how much was done by the Governor of Bombay without the
concurrence or even consultation of Sir Robert Napier.
The general instructions to the pioneer force were precise: they were
directed to select a place of landing, and then to inquire about the
question of obtaining carriage and supplies from the natives (this last
being Colonel Merewether’s special duty); and to Colonel Wilkins, R.E.,
was assigned specially to determine the adaptability of the shore for
landing, the erection of piers, floating wharves, and shelter of all
kinds; he was also ordered to advise upon the military value of positions
selected, and to assist in general reconnoissance. But the point upon
which above all others General Napier laid stress was, that the pioneer
force should on no account push forward into the high land; he knew that
there could be no possible utility in their so doing, and that it would
entail a great and unnecessary labour to provision them at a distance from
the sea, especially up so difficult a country. Both upon Colonel
Merewether and Colonel Phayre did he impress this point. In his letter of
the 9th October to the former officer he said, “_It is not at all intended
that this force shall take up a position on the high ground_, for which
its strength and composition are unfitted.” Farther on he says, “If news
is satisfactory, Staveley’s brigade will sail, and _upon its arrival_ the
advance may be made.” To Colonel Phayre he was equally explicit. In a
letter to him dated 9th October he says, “_It is not of course intended
that Colonel Field should move to the high table-land_ at Dexan, &c., but
merely to take up such position as will cover the dépôt and protect the
cattle.” And again farther on, “You will understand that it is _not my
desire to precipitate a lodgment upon the table-land_, which we should
have to maintain too long before advancing.”
How these officers carried out the instructions thus clearly and strongly
laid down, we shall see hereafter.
It is needless now to enter into any detail of the preparations at Bombay,
but it may be said that they were of the most extensive and complete
character. Everything which could be thought of was provided for the
health and comfort of the troops. Money was lavished like water; but, in
the haste and bustle which prevailed, there is no question that the
authorities were in many cases grossly imposed upon, and that stores were
sent out of quality so utterly bad as to be perfectly useless. I may
mention as an example the boots for the drivers of the transport train,
which never lasted over a week, and very few of which attained even that
comparatively respectable age. As with these, so with many other stores;
but it is probable that cases of this sort are inseparable from a
hastily-prepared expedition. The stores which were subsequently forwarded
were very much better in quality.
After these introductory remarks, I begin my narrative from the date of my
own sailing from Bombay.