addition to all the branches of elementary primary instruction,
the elements of geometry, and its common applications, especially
linear drawing and surveying, information on the physical sciences
and natural history, applicable to the uses of life, singing, the
elements of history and geography, and particularly of the history
and geography of France. According to the needs and the resources
of localities, the instruction shall receive such developments as
shall be deemed proper.”
A higher primary school was to be established in the chief towns
of the department and in all the communes which had a population
of more than six thousand souls. The law was executed in part. In
1841, one hundred and sixty-one schools were founded. But little
by little, the indifference of the government, and, above all, the
vanity of parents who preferred for their children worthless Latin
studies to a good and thorough primary instruction, discouraged
these first efforts.
The legislator of 1833 had good reason for thinking that a good
vest was worth more than a poor coat. His mistake was in thinking
that people would be persuaded to abandon the coat in order to
take the vest.[265] The higher schools were almost everywhere
annexed to the colleges of secondary instruction. To suppress their
independence and their own distinctive features was to destroy
them. The final blow was given them by the law of 1850, which
abstained from pronouncing their name, and which condemned them by
its silence.
614. CIRCULAR OF GUIZOT.--In transmitting to teachers the law of
June 28, 1833, Guizot had it followed by a celebrated circular,
which eloquently stated the proper office of the teacher, his
duties and his rights. Here are some passages from it:
“Do not make a mistake here, Sir. While the career of primary
instruction may be without renown, its duties interest the whole
of society, and it is an occupation which shares the importance
attached to public functions.... Universal primary instruction
is henceforth to be one of the guarantees of order and social
stability.”
The circular next examines the material advantages which the new
law assured to teachers, and it continues thus:--
“However, Sir, as I well know, the foresight of the law and
the resources at the disposal of public authority, will never
succeed in rendering the humble profession of a communal teacher
as attractive as it is useful. Society could not reward him who
devotes himself to this service for all that he does for it. There
is no fortune to gain; there is scarcely any reputation to acquire
in the difficult duties which he performs. Destined to see his life
spent in a monotonous occupation, sometimes even to encounter about
him the injustice and the ingratitude of ignorance, he would often
grow disheartened, and would perhaps succumb did he not draw his
strength and his courage from other sources than from the prospect
of an interest immediate and purely personal. It is necessary
that a profound sense of the moral importance of his work sustain
and animate him, and that the austere pleasure of having served
men and secretly contributed to the public good, become the noble
reward which his conscience alone can give. It is his glory to aim
at nothing beyond his obscure and laborious condition, to spend
himself in sacrifices scarcely counted by those who profit by them,
and, in a word, to work for men and to look for his reward only
from God.”
615. PROGRESS OF POPULAR INSTRUCTION.--It would be an interesting
history to relate in detail the progress of popular education
in France from the law of 1833 to our day. The public bills of
the Republic of 1848, the liberal propositions of Carnot and of
Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, the recoil of the law of March 15, 1850,
the _statu quo_ of the first years of the Second Empire, then
towards the end the praiseworthy efforts and tentatives of Duruy,
and, finally, under the Third Republic, the definite and triumphant
organization,--all this is sufficiently known and too recent to
justify us in dwelling on it here.
For successfully introducing anew into the laws the principles of
gratuity, obligation, and secularization, as proclaimed by the
French Revolution, not less than a century was necessary. And in
particular, the better spirits allowed themselves to be convinced
of the need of obligatory instruction only by slow degrees.
However, in 1833, Cousin, who reported the law of Guizot to the
Chamber of Peers, expressed himself as follows:--
“A law which should make of primary instruction a legal obligation
seems to me to be no more above the powers of the legislator than
the law on the national guard, and that which you have just made
on a forced appropriation for the public good. If reasons of
public utility justify the legislator in appropriating private
property, why do not reasons of a much higher utility justify him
in doing less,--in requiring that children receive the instruction
indispensable to every human creature, to the end that he may not
become dangerous to himself or to society as a whole?”
Cousin added that the commission of which he was the chairman would
not have receded from measures wisely combined to make instruction
obligatory, had it not been afraid of provoking difficulties, and,
in this way, of postponing a law that was awaited with impatience.
The evident necessity of instructing the people, the interests of
society, the interests of families and individuals,--all these
considerations have insensibly overcome the scruples or the
illusions of a false liberality, and it is no longer necessary,
to-day, to repeat the eloquent pleas of Carnot in his bill of 1848,
of Duruy, and of Jules Simon.
In 1873 Guizot expressed himself as follows:--
“The liberty of conscience and that of families are facts and
rights which, in this question, ought to be scrupulously respected
and guaranteed; but, under the condition of this respect and of
these guarantees, it may happen that the state of society and the
state of minds may render legal obligation, in respect of primary
instruction, legitimate, salutary, and necessary. _This is the
condition of things to-day._ The movement in favor of obligatory
instruction is sincere, serious, national. Powerful examples
authorize and encourage it. In Germany, in Switzerland, in Denmark,
in most of the American States, primary instruction has this
character, and civilization has reaped excellent fruits from it.
France and its government have reason to welcome this principle.”
616. PROGRAMMES OF PRIMARY INSTRUCTION.--At the same time that
primary instruction made progress by its ever-growing extension,
and by the participation in it of a greater number of individuals,
its programmes were also extended, and it is interesting to compare
in this respect the different laws which have regulated the matter
of instruction in our century.
The law of 1833 said: “Elementary primary instruction necessarily
comprises moral and religious instruction, reading, writing, the
elements of the French language and of computation, the legal
system of weights and measures.”
The bill presented, June 30, 1848, by Carnot, minister of public
instruction, expresses itself thus:--
“Primary instruction comprises: 1. reading, writing, the elements
of the French language, the elements of computation, the metric
system, the measure of distances, elementary notions of the
phenomena of nature, and the principal facts of agriculture and
of industry, linear drawing, singing, elementary notions on the
history and geography of France; 2. a knowledge of the duties and
the rights of man and citizen, the development of the sentiments
of liberty, equality, and fraternity; 3. the elementary rules of
hygiene, and useful exercises in physical development.”
“The religious instruction is given by the ministers of the
different communions.”
According to the bill of Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire (April 10, 1849),
elementary instruction for boys, necessarily comprised “moral,
religious, and civic instruction, reading, writing, the elements of
the French language, the elements of computation, the legal system
of weights and measures, linear drawing, elementary notions of
agriculture and of hygiene, singing and gymnastic exercises.
“According to the needs and resources of localities, elementary
primary instruction shall receive the developments which shall be
thought proper, and shall comprise, in particular, notions on the
history and geography of France.”
Finally, the law of March 15, 1850, is worded thus:--
“Art. 23. Primary instruction comprises moral and religious
instruction, reading, writing, the elements of the French language,
computation, and the legal system of weights and measures. It may
comprise in addition, arithmetic applied to practical operations,
the elements of history and geography, notions of the physical
sciences and of natural history applicable to the ordinary purposes
of life, elementary instruction on agriculture, trade, and hygiene,
surveying, leveling, linear drawing, singing and gymnastics.”
Progress has especially consisted, since 1850, in rendering
obligatory that which was simply optional. History, for example,
did not become a subject of instruction till 1867.
617. THE THEORISTS OF EDUCATION.--Along with the progress of
primary instruction, the historian of the pedagogy of the
nineteenth century would have also to follow the development of
secondary instruction and of superior instruction. He would have to
write the history of the University, reforming the methods of its
lycées and its colleges, and ever enlarging in a noble spirit of
liberty the studies of its faculties. But we should depart from the
limits of our plan, were we to undertake this order of inquiries,
and were we to enter into details which pertain to contemporary
history.
That which should engage our attention is the theoretical
reflections of the different thinkers who, in our century, have
discussed the principles and the laws of education, of those at
least who have become celebrated for their novel views.
618. JACOTOT (1770-1840).--Jacotot, who has maintained scarcely any
celebrity in France except for the singularity of his paradoxes,
is perhaps of all French educators of the nineteenth century
the one who has received most attention abroad, particularly in
Germany. “Jacotot,” says Doctor Dittes, “has incited a lasting
improvement in the public instruction of Germany. The reform
which he introduced into the teaching of reading is important. He
started with an entire sentence, which was pronounced, explained,
and learned by heart by the children, and afterward analyzed into
its constituent parts.”[266] On the other hand, a French critic,
Bernard Perez, has drawn the following portrait of Jacotot:--
“He was the best and the most lovable of men. He had the firmness,
patience, honesty, and candor of superior minds, an inexhaustible
goodness and a universal charity which make him close all his
letters with this formula, ‘I especially commend to you the poor.’
This ardent philanthropy, as well as his enthusiasm and his zeal
for instruction, pervades even his writings, though full of
inequalities and verbal eccentricities.”[267]
619. PARADOXES OF JACOTOT.--In his principal work, _Universal
Instruction_,[268] Jacotot has set forth his principles, which are
so many paradoxes, “All intelligences are equal”; “Every man can
teach, and even teach that which he himself does not know”; “One
can instruct himself all alone”; “All is in all.”
Doubtless at the basis of Jacotot’s paradoxes there is an element
of truth; for example, the very just idea that the best teaching
is that which encourages young minds to think for themselves.
Doubtless also he qualified the exaggeration of his statement when
he said that the inequality of wills at once destroys the equality
of intelligences. But the violent and unreasonable form which he
gave to his ideas has compromised them in public opinion. That
which is true and fruitful in his system has been forgotten, and we
recall only the whimsical formulas in which he delighted.
620. ALL IS IN ALL.--The most famous of Jacotot’s paradoxes is the
formula, “All is in all.” The whole of Latin is in a page of Latin;
the whole of music is in a piece of music; the whole of arithmetic,
in a rule of computation.
In practice, Jacotot made his pupils learn the first six books of
the _Telemachus_. Upon this text, once learned, and recited twice
a week, there were constructed all sorts of exercises, and these
sufficed for the complete knowledge of the French language. In the
same way the _Epitome Historiæ Sacræ_, put in the hands of pupils,
and learned in two months, was almost the sole instrument for the
study of Latin. In fact, and aside from evident exaggerations,
Jacotot rightly thought that it is necessary, as he said, “to learn
something well, and to connect with this all the rest.”
621. THE FOLLOWERS OF SAINT SIMON AND OF FOURIER.--There is
little of practical value to be gathered from the writings of the
celebrated utopists, who, at the opening of this century, became
known by their plans of social organization. It is the chimerical
which characterizes their systems. Cabet demanded among other
absurdities that all ancient books be burned, and that no new
books be written except by command of the State. Besides, he would
have the school-code established by the children themselves.[269]
Victor Considerant suppressed, not books, but discipline and
authority. “The child,” he said, “shall no longer be disobedient,
because he shall no longer be commanded.”[270]
Saint Simon, in 1816, communicated to the _Society for Elementary
Instruction_, a brief essay which gave proof of his interest in
education. For him and his disciples, education is “the aggregate
of efforts to be employed in order to adapt each new generation to
the social order to which it is called by the march of humanity.”
This was to mark the contrast between modern tendencies which
aspire above all else to an earthly and a social end, with ancient
tendencies which were subservient to supernatural ideas. Æsthetic
sentiments, scientific methods, industrial activity,--such is
the triple development which special and professional education
should consider. But above this the Saint-Simonians place moral
education, too much neglected, as they think, which should consist
particularly in developing in the young the sympathetic and
affectionate faculties. The Saint-Simonians placed but little
dependence on science and abstract principles for assuring among
men the reign of morality. Sentiment, in their view, is the
true moral principle, and education, consequently, ought to be
essentially the education of the heart.
622. FOURIER (1772-1837).--Fourier, like Saint Simon, had
educational pretensions. There is nothing more curious than his
treatise on _Natural Education_. In it there is only here and
there a flash of good sense mingled with a multitude of grotesque
fancies.
Fourier renews the utopias of Plato, and confides infants to public
nurses. He is more reasonable when, in spite of his declamations
on the excellence of nature, he is really willing to recognize in
children a diversity of characters, and divides “the nurslings and
the babies” into three classes,--“the benign, the malign, and the
devilkins.”
We must also commend Fourier for his efforts to encourage
industrial activity. There is perhaps a valuable hint in those
walks which he recommends children to take through manufactories
and shops, so that at the sight of such or such a tool, their
particular vocation may be suggested to them!
The instincts of the child are sacred in the eyes of Fourier, even
the worst, their inclination to destroy, for example, or their
contempt for the rights of property. Far from opposing them, he
turns them to account and utilizes them, by employing destructive
and slovenly children in occupations in accord with their tastes;
for example, in the pursuit of reptiles, and in the cleansing of
sewers.
But it is useless to enter into longer details. The education of
the Fourierites is neither a discipline nor a rule of life; it
is simply a system of complaisant adherence, and even of ardent
provocation, to the instincts which the child inherits from nature.
It is no longer a question either of directing or of training; it
is simply necessary to emancipate and to excite.
623. AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857) AND THE POSITIVISTS.--The positivist
school, and its illustrious founder, Auguste Comte, could not
omit, in their encyclopædic works, a question so important as that
of education. The author of the _Course in Positive Philosophy_
had even announced a special treatise on pedagogy, “a great
subject,” he said, “which has not yet been undertaken in a manner
sufficiently systematic.”[271] The promise was not kept, but from
different passages in the writings of Auguste Comte it is possible
to reconstruct, in its principal features, the education which
would be derived from his system.
Comte took for his guide the natural and specific evolution of
humanity.
“Individual education can be adequately estimated only according to
its necessary conformity with collective evolution.”
As positivism represents, in the view of Comte, the supreme degree
of the evolution of humanity, the new education ought to be
_positive_.
“Right-minded men universally recognize the necessity of replacing
our European education, a system essentially theological,
metaphysical, and literary, by a _positive_ education, conformed
to the spirit of our epoch, and adapted to the needs of modern
civilization.”
The teaching of science, then, shall be the basis of education;
but this teaching will bear its fruits only on one condition,
and this is, that at last we renounce “the exclusive specialty,
the too pronounced isolation, which still characterizes our
manner of conceiving and cultivating the sciences.” The precise
purpose of the _Course in Positive Philosophy_ was to remedy the
deleterious influence of a too great specialization of research,
by establishing the relations and the hierarchy of the sciences.
Comte made of mathematics the point of departure in scientific
instruction. This was the very reverse of the modern tendency,
which consists in beginning with the concrete and physical studies.
Auguste Comte, in his project for social reform, demanded universal
instruction, and he bitterly complains of the indifference of the
ruling classes for the instruction of the poor.
“Nothing is more profoundly characteristic of the existing anarchy
than the shameful indifference with which the higher classes of
to-day habitually regard the total absence of popular education,
the exaggerated prolongation of which, however, threatens to exert
on their approaching destiny a frightful reaction.”
Comte does not go so far, however, as to dream of an identical
education for all men, an integral education, as it has been
called. He admits degrees in instruction, “which,” he says, “will
allow varieties of extension in a system constantly similar and
identical.”
624. DUPANLOUP (1803-1878).--Of all the ecclesiastical writers of
our century, he who has the most ardently studied the problems of
education is certainly Bishop Dupanloup. Important works give proof
of the educational zeal of the eloquent prelate. But they were
composed with more spirit than wisdom, and they betray the zeal of
the Christian apologist more than the inspiration of an impartial
love for the truth. Extravagances of language and exaggerations of
thought too often prevent the reader from feeling, as he ought, the
moral and religious inspiration out of which proceeded those books
of ardent and profound faith, but of faith more than of charity.
Notwithstanding their length and their vast proportions, these
books are pamphlets, works of combat. One should be on his guard
against taking them for scientific treatises. Serenity is lacking
in them, and from the very first, we feel ourselves enveloped in an
atmosphere of trouble and storm.
625. ANALYSIS OF THE TREATISE ON EDUCATION.--However, the three
volumes of the _Education_ will be read with profit. The first
volume treats of education in general, and contains three books. In
the first book the author determines the character of education,
which has for its purpose to _cultivate_ the faculties, to
_exercise_ them, to _develop_ them, to _strengthen_ them, and,
finally, to _polish_ them. In the following books the author
studies the nature of the child, of whom he sometimes speaks with
a touching tenderness; and examines the means of education, which
are “religion, instruction, discipline, and physical culture.”
Discipline consists in supporting, preventing, and repressing.
Discipline is to education “that which the bark is to the tree
which it surrounds. It is the bark which holds the sap, and forces
it to ascend to the heart of the tree.”
The general title of the second volume is, _On Authority and
Respect in Education_. Authority and respect, in the eyes of the
author, are the two fundamental things. From this point of view, he
studies what he calls the _personnel_ of education; that is, God,
the parents, the teacher, the child, and the schoolmate.
The third volume, entitled _Educational Men_, treats of
the qualities befitting the head master of an educational
establishment, and of his different colleagues.[272]
626. ERRORS AND PREJUDICES.--Although he wrote a beautiful chapter
entitled, _Of the Respect due the Dignity of the Child and the
Liberty of his Nature_, Dupanloup is still more struck with the
faults than with the virtues of childhood. He shudders in thinking
of his thoughtlessness, of his curiosity, of his sensuality, and
especially of his pride. So he distrusts commendation and rewards.
“In praising your pupils,” he says to the teacher, “do you not fear
to excite their pride? The pride of scholars is a terrible evil;
it begins in the ‘third,’ develops in the ‘second,’ blossoms in
‘rhetoric,’ and becomes established in ‘philosophy.’”[273]
To this mistrust of human nature is joined a singular pessimism
with respect to the functions of the teacher.
“There is found,” he says, “in this service, grave troubles.
Sometimes, if we are worthy of this service, if we sacrifice
ourselves to it, we can find consolations in it, but pleasure,
never!”
The verdict is severe and absolute, but it recoils in part on him
who pronounces it. How not mistrust an educator who declares that
there is no sweetness mingled with the fatigues of teaching, and
who condemns the teachers of youth to a life of complete sacrifice
and bitterness?
The greatest fault in the educational spirit of Dupanloup is that
he does not cross the narrow limits of an education in small
seminaries. Dupanloup wrote only for the middle classes. He had no
interest in popular education; he does not love the lay teacher; he
detests the University. Finally, he is the man who inspired the law
of May 15, 1850.
627. THE SPIRITUALISTIC SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY MEN.--The
philosophers of the French spiritualistic school have not in
general paid great attention to the theory of education. The most
illustrious of them, Cousin (1792-1868), at the same time that
he aided in organizing University instruction, carefully studied
educational institutions abroad, especially in his two works,
_Public Instruction in Holland_ (1837), and _Public Instruction in
Germany_ (1840). The works of Jules Simon have the same practical
character, but with a marked tendency to treat by preference
the questions of primary instruction. The _School_ (1864) is a
manifesto in favor of gratuity and obligation.
The University men, on their part, have, in this century, acted
rather than speculated. They have been intent rather on making
good pupils than on composing theories. There would, however,
be valuable truths to cull from the works of Cournot,[274] of
Bersot,[275] and especially of Michel Bréal.[276]
[628. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY.--1. One of the main characteristics of
the educational thought of this century is doubtless the effort
to deduce the rules of practice from certain first principles.
The principles of instruction are to be found, for the most part,
in the science of psychology, and the principles of education, in
part, in social science and even in jurisprudence.
2. The purpose of Napoleon to secure the perpetuity of his
dynasty through the influence of his Imperial University, is a
striking proof of the belief in the potency of ideas, and of
the belief in the potency of popular instruction as a means of
national strength.
3. The history of mutual instruction exhibits three important
facts: 1. the effect of agitation in arousing public interest
in educational questions; 2. the manner in which peculiar
circumstances suggest an expedient which can be justified on no
absolute grounds; 3. the danger of converting such an expedient
into a “system” for universal adoption.
4. Comenius, Pestalozzi, and Jacotot, attempted to make
instruction universal by simplifying its processes to such a
degree that every mother might be a teacher and every household
a school.
5. In Comte we see the re-appearance of Condillac’s doctrine,
that the historic education of the race is the type of individual
education. The same hypothesis will re-appear in Mr. Spencer’s
_Education_.]
FOOTNOTES:
[255] Fourcroy (1755-1809), a celebrated chemist, was
director-general of public instruction in 1801. He prepared, in the
following years, the decrees relative to the establishment of the
University.
[256] Fontanes (1757-1821), first Grand Master of the University.
[257] _Mémoire politique_ of Joseph de Maistre, Paris, 1858, p. 30.
[258] The Abbé Gaultier (1746-1818), author of a large number of
works on elementary instruction, and almost a reformer in his
way. He employed _teaching by sight_, and recommended varied
exercises, such as games where he introduced _counters_, tickets,
interrogations in the form of _lotteries_.
[259] See Gréard, _L’enseignement primaire à Paris de 1867
à 1877_. A memoir published in 1877, pp. 75-90. See also an
interesting study full of personal recollections of E. Deschamps,
_L’enseignement mutual_. Toulouse, 1883.
[260] Jomard (1777-1862), member of the Society for Elementary
Instruction, author of _Tableaux des écoles élémentaires_.
[261] The Comte de Laborde (1771-1842), author of a _plan
d’éducation pour les enfants_.
[262] Among the other propagators of mutual instruction, mention
should be made of the Abbé Gaultier, Larochefoucauld-Liancourt, De
Lasteyrie, etc.
[263] Two noted attempts to extend and popularize the monitorial
system are exhibited in the following works: Pillans,
_The Rationale of Discipline_ (Edinburgh, 1852); Bentham,
_Chrestomathia_ (London, 1816).
[264] It is at the same period, in 1832, that Gérando published his
_Cours normal des instituteurs_.
[265] Cournot, _Des institutions d’instruction publique_, p. 315.
[266] Dittes, _op. cit._ p. 272.
[267] See _Jacotot et sa méthode d’émancipation intellectuelle_, by
Bernard Perez. Paris, 1883.
[268] _Enseignement universel._ Paris, 1823.
[269] Cabet, _Voyage en Icarie_. Paris, 1842.
[270] Considerant, _Théorie d’éducation rationnelle et attrayante
du dix-neuvième siècle_. Paris, 1844.
[271] _Cours de philosophie positive_, second edition, 1864. Vol.
VI. p. 771.
[272] The principal educational works of Dupanloup are _Éducation_,
1851, three volumes; _De la haute éducation intellectuelle_, 1855,
three volumes; _Lettres sur l’éducation des filles_, 1879, one
volume.
[273] See note to page 131.
[274] Cournot published in 1864 a remarkable book under this title:
_Des institutions d’instruction publique_.
[275] See the _Essais de philosophie et de morale_, by E. Bersot,
and also _Études et discours_ (1879).
[276] See especially the well-known book of Bréal, _Quelques mots
sur l’instruction publique en France_.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.--HERBERT SPENCER AND ALEXANDER BAIN.
THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION; THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS; THE ENGLISH
PHILOSOPHERS; HERBERT SPENCER’S EDUCATION; PLAN OF THE WORK;
DEFINITION OF EDUCATION; HUMAN DESTINY; UTILITARIAN TENDENCIES;
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES; CRITICISM OF MR. SPENCER’S
CLASSIFICATION; EFFECTS ON EDUCATION; SCIENCE IS THE BASIS
OF EDUCATION; SCIENCE FOR HEALTH AND INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY;
SCIENCE FOR FAMILY LIFE; SCIENCE FOR ÆSTHETIC ACTIVITY;
EXAGGERATIONS AND PREJUDICES; INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION; LAWS OF
MENTAL EVOLUTION; PERSONAL EDUCATION; MORAL EDUCATION; SYSTEM
OF NATURAL PUNISHMENTS; DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION; RETURN TO
NATURE; PHYSICAL EDUCATION; GENERAL JUDGMENT; MR. BAIN AND THE
SCIENCE OF EDUCATION; GENERAL IMPRESSIONS; DIVISIONS OF THE BOOK;
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORDER AND LOGICAL ORDER; MODERN EDUCATION; ERRORS
IN THEORY; UTILITARIAN TENDENCIES; FINAL JUDGMENT; AMERICAN
EDUCATORS; CHANNING; HORACE MANN; CONCLUSION; ANALYTICAL SUMMARY.
629. THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.--To-day, thanks to important works,
the science of education is no longer an empty term, an object of
vague aspirations for philosophers, of easy ridicule for wits.
Doubtless it is far from being definitely established; but it
no longer conceals its name and its pretensions; it defines its
purpose and its methods; and manifests its youthful vitality in all
directions.
Up to the present period, philosophers had scarcely thought of
organizing pedagogy, of constructing it on a rational basis. On
the other hand, the practice of education is still less advanced
than the conceptions of philosophers. Here we the more often follow
a thoughtless routine, or the vague inspirations of instinct.
The methods in use are not co-ordinated. They present a curious
mixture of old traditions and modern surcharges. It is this lack of
definiteness, of co-ordination of ideas, and the spectacle of these
contradictions, which caused Richter[277] to say: “The education
of the day resembles the Harlequin of the Italian comedy who comes
on the stage with a bundle of papers under each arm. ‘What do you
carry under your right arm?’ he is asked. ‘Orders,’ he replies.
‘And under your left arm?’ ‘Counter-orders!’”
Quite a number of the philosophers of the nineteenth century have
attempted to remedy this incoherence, and, by appealing to the
scientific spirit, to regulate educational processes that have
fallen into excesses of empiricism or of routine. It is these
attempts which we are summarily to recite.
630. THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS.--Since Kant, and by his example, the
most of German philosophers have associated the theory of education
with their speculations on human nature.
Fichte (1762-1814), in his _Discourse to the German Nation_,
proclaimed the necessity of a national education to secure the
regeneration of his country and its restoration to its former
standing. The advocate of a public and common education, because he
would fight against the selfishness which family life encourages,
he contributed by his eloquent appeals to restore the intellectual
and moral grandeur, and consequently, the material grandeur, of
Germany.
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) wrote a _Doctrine of Education_, which
was not published till 1849. In this he develops, among other
ideas, this proposition, that religious education does not belong
to the school, but that it is the affair of the family and the
Church.
Herbart (1776-1841) has composed a series of pedagogical writings
which assign him a special place in the list of educational
philosophers. Let us call attention, in particular, to his _General
Pedagogy_ (1806), and the _Outline of my Lessons on Pedagogy_
(1840). That which distinguishes Herbart is his attempt to reduce
to a system all the rules of pedagogy by giving them for a basis
his own psychological theory. He inaugurated a new method in
psychology, which does not seem, however, to have given the results
that were expected from it,--the mathematical method. For him,
psychology is only the mechanism of the mind, and by means of
mathematical formula calculation may be applied to measure the
force of ideas. The soul does not possess innate faculties; it is
developed progressively.
But it would require long efforts to enter into the secrets of
Herbart’s original thought. Let it suffice to say, that nurtured
from an early period on the ideas of Pestalozzi, whose friend he
was, he has founded a real school of pedagogy.
Beneke (1798-1854) is the author of a _Doctrine of Education
and Instruction_, which is, in the opinion of Doctor Dittes, a
masterpiece of psychological pedagogy. Beneke agrees with Herbart
on a great number of points. His pedagogical methods have been
popularized by J. G. Dressler, director of the normal school at
Bauzen, who died in 1860.[278]
Charles Schmidt, who died in 1864, wrote a large number of works on
pedagogy, in which he is inspired by the phrenology of Gall and his
fantastical hypotheses. Doubtless this inspiration is not happy,
and the works of Schmidt are more valuable for their details,
for their special reflections, than for their general doctrine.
But from his undertaking there issues at least this truth, that
the science of education should have for its basis, not only
psychology, but physiology also, the science of the whole man, body
and mind.
There is no country where pedagogy has received a more
philosophical and a higher development than in Germany. Even the
great poets, Lessing, Herder, Gœthe, and Schiller, have contributed
through certain grand ideas to the construction of a science of
education.
631. THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS.--English philosophy, with its
experimental and practical character, and with its positive and
utilitarian tendencies, was naturally called to exercise a great
influence on pedagogy. There are more truths to gather from the
thinkers who, in different degrees, have followed Locke and Bain,
and who have preserved a taste for prudent observation and careful
experiments, than from the German idealists, enamored of hypothesis
and systematic constructions.
Without doubt this explains the considerable success which the
recent books of Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain have obtained
even in France.
632. THE BOOK OF HERBERT SPENCER.--If it were sufficient to
define with exactness the end to be attained, and to discover the
true method for constructing the science, Herbert Spencer’s book
on _Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical_,[279] would
be a satisfactory treatise; but it is one thing to comprehend
that psychology is the only solid basis of a complete and exact
pedagogy, and another thing to determine the real laws of
psychology.
“Education will not be definitely systematized,” says Mr. Spencer,
“till the day when science shall be in possession of a rational
psychology.”
This day has not yet come, and Herbert Spencer, who is the first
to recognize the fact, modestly presents his work only as an
essay. But if it does not yet contain a perfect and fully worked
out theory of education, the essay of the English philosopher is
at least a vigorous effort, and a notable step towards a rational
pedagogy, towards the science of education, which, as Virchow
expresses it, “ought forever to proscribe the gropings of an
ignorant education whose experiments are ever to be gone over anew.”
633. PLAN OF THE WORK.--Every system of education supposes at the
same time an ethics,--I mean a certain conception of life and of
human destiny, and a psychology,--that is, a knowledge more or
less exact of our faculties and of the laws which preside over
their development. There are, in fact, in education, two essential
questions: 1. What are the subjects of study and instruction,
proper to create the qualities, the aggregate of which constitutes
the type of the well-educated man? 2. By what methods shall we
teach the child rapidly and well that which it is proper for him
to learn? There are, in other terms, the question of end and the
question of means. Ethics is necessary to resolve the first, and
psychology, to illustrate the second.
It is in accordance with this plan that Mr. Spencer has arranged
the different parts of his work. The first chapter, entitled _What
Knowledge is of Most Worth?_ is in substance but a series of
reflections on the final purpose, on the different forms, of human
activity, and, consequently, on the relative importance, on the
rank, which should be assigned to the studies which go to compose
a complete education.
In the three other chapters, _Intellectual_, _Moral_, and _Physical
Education_, the author examines the methods which are deemed
the best for instructing the intelligence, perfecting the moral
character, and fortifying the body.
634. DEFINITION OF EDUCATION.--Herbert Spencer begins with a
definition of education:--
“Education,” he says, “is all that we do for ourselves, and all
that others do for us, for the purpose of bringing us nearer the
perfection of our nature.... The ideal of education would be to
furnish man with a complete preparation for life as a whole....
Do not attempt to give an exclusive development of one order of
knowledge at the expense of the rest, however important it may
be. Let us distribute our attention over the whole, and justly
proportion our efforts to their relative value.... In general,
the object of education ought to be to acquire as completely as
possible the knowledge that is best adapted to develop individual
and social life under all its aspects, and to do no more than
glance at the subjects which contribute the least to this
development.”[280]
This definition is wrong in being a little pretentious and in not
adapting itself to all the forms of education. It is true, perhaps,
if it is a question of the ideal to be attained in a complete
instruction, accessible to a few privileged men, but it could not
be applied to popular education. It soars too high above human
conditions and social realities.
635. HUMAN DESTINY.--The conception of human destiny, as Mr.
Spencer outlines it in the opening of his book, has very marked
utilitarian tendencies. His first complaint against the current
education is that it sacrifices the useful to the agreeable; that
as matters now go, everything which pertains to mental adornment
and display has precedence over the knowledge which might increase
our well-being and assure our happiness. As in the history of
dress, with savages for example, it is proved that the ornamental
in dress precedes the useful; so in instruction, ornamental studies
are preferred to useful studies. This is especially the case with
women, who have a decided preference for the qualities of pure
decoration.[281]
In his rather vigorous reaction against the luxuries which in
classical instruction would wrongly substitute themselves for more
necessary studies, Mr. Spencer goes so far as to say:--
“Just as the Orinoco Indian paints and tattooes himself, so the
child in this country learns Latin because it forms a part of the
education of a gentleman.”
However, we do not construe this literally. Mr. Spencer does not
go so far as to suppress the disinterested studies which are as
much the more necessary as they seem to be the more superfluous. He
merely demands that instruction be not reduced to a training in the
trivial elegancies of a dead language, or to a study of trifles in
history, such as the dates of battles, and the birth and death of
princes.
636. UTILITARIAN TENDENCIES.--Utility, that is, the influence
on happiness,--such is the true criterion by which are to be
estimated, admitted or excluded, and finally classified, the
subjects proposed for the study of man as the elements of his
education. It is understood, however, that happiness is to be
considered in its widest and highest sense. Happiness does
not consist in the satisfaction of such or such a privileged
inclination. It consists in being all that it is possible to
be,--in complete living. To prepare us for a complete life,--such
is the function of education.
637. DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITY.--Complete life supposes
different kinds of activity, which ought to be subordinated one to
another according to their importance and dignity. The following
statement shows how Mr. Spencer proposes to classify these
different categories of activities according to an ascending scale
of progress:--
1. In the first rank is placed the activity which ministers simply
to self-preservation. It would be of no consequence to be an
eminent scholar, or a citizen and a patriot, or a devoted father;
or rather, all this would be impossible, if one did not first know
how to assure his safety and his life.
2. Then comes the series of activities which tend _indirectly_
to the same end of physical well-being, by the acquisition and
production of the material goods necessary for existence, that is,
industry and the different occupations.
3. In the third place, man employs his activities in the service of
his family,--he has children to support and to bring up.
4. Social and political life is the fourth object of his efforts.
This supposes, as a previous condition, the accomplishment of
family duties, just as family life itself supposes the normal
development of the individual life.
5. Finally, human existence is consummated and crowned, so to
speak, in the exercise of the activities which, in a single word,
we might call æsthetic, and which, taking advantage of the leisure
left from care and business, will find satisfaction in the culture
of letters and the arts.
638. CRITICISM OF THIS CLASSIFICATION.--What exceptions can be
taken to this exact and methodical table of the different elements
of an existence complete, normal, and consequently human? Is
it necessary to remark that the happiness thus understood does
not differ from what we call virtue? None of the five elements
distinguished by Mr. Spencer can be safely omitted. The first
could not be neglected without endangering the material reality of
life; nor the last, without impairing its moral dignity. In some
degree they are mutually necessary, in this sense, that the lower,
or selfish activities, are the conditions which make possible the
other parts of human duty; and that the higher, or disinterested
activities, become, as it were, the justification of the toil we
endure in order to exist and to satisfy material necessities.
We have, however, one grave reserve to make. Mr. Spencer is wrong
in putting into the last category of activities that which is the
crown of the others, all that which concerns the moral development
of the individual. Between the second and the third class of
activities we ask to interpolate another form of activity,--that
which constitutes the individual moral life, that which, in every
man, even the humblest and the poorest, calls into exercise the
conscience, the reason, and the will. Mr. Spencer’s system is
decidedly too aristocratic. It seems to reserve the moral life for
men of leisure. In a democratic society, which believes in equality
and which would not have this an empty term, there are efforts
which must be made for the moral development of the human being in
all conditions, and it would be wrong to reduce personal activity
to the care of health and material well-being.
639. EFFECTS ON EDUCATION.--It is now easy to comprehend the duties
of education. Conforming its efforts to nature, distributing its
lessons according to the exact division of human functions, it
will seek the branches of knowledge the most fit for making of the
pupil, first, a sound and healthy man, then a toiler, a workman,--a
man, in a word, capable of earning his livelihood; then it will
train him for the family and the State, by endowing him with all
the domestic and civic virtues; finally, it will open to him the
brilliant domain of art under all its forms.
640. SCIENCE IS THE BASIS OF EDUCATION.--When we have once divided
human life into a certain number of superimposed stages which
education should teach us to ascend one after another, it becomes
necessary to know what are the facts and the branches of knowledge
which correspond to each one of these different steps. To this
question Mr. Spencer replies that in all the grades of human
development that which is pre-eminently necessary, that which is
the basis of education, is science.
641. SCIENCE FOR HEALTH AND INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY.--It is in
the first part of education, that which has for its object
self-preservation, that science is the least useful. So far,
education may be in great part negative, because nature has taken
it upon herself to lead us to our destination. The child cries at
the sight of a stranger, and throws himself into the arms of his
mother when he feels the slightest sorrow. However, in proportion
to his growth, man has more and more need of science, and he could
not do without physiology and hygiene. By this means will he shun
all those little acts of imprudence, all those physical faults,
which shorten life, or pave the way for infirmities in old age. By
this means he will diminish the interval, which is so considerable,
between the length of life as it might be and the brevity of life
as it is. Evident truths, but too often unheeded!
“How many scholars,” exclaims Mr. Spencer, “who would blush
if caught saying Iphigénia instead of Iphigenía, show not the
slightest shame in confessing that they do not know where the
Eustachian tubes are, and what are the actions of the spinal cord!”
With respect to the activities which might be called lucrative, and
to the kind of instruction which they require, Mr. Spencer still
shows the utility of science. He knows how great a disposition
there is in modern society to promote professional or industrial
instruction; but he thinks, not without reason, that we do not
proceed as we should in order to be completely successful in this
direction. All the sciences, mathematics through its applications
to the arts, mechanics through its connection with industries
where machines play so great a part, physics and chemistry through
the knowledge they furnish on matter and its properties, even
the social sciences by reason of the relations of commerce with
politics,--all the sciences, in a word, contribute to develop the
skill and the prudence of the man who is employed in any trade or
occupation whatever.
642. SCIENCE FOR FAMILY LIFE.--A point in which the originality of
Mr. Spencer’s thought is distinctly marked, and which he develops
with an eloquent earnestness, is the necessity of enlightening
parents, and particularly mothers, upon their obligations and
duties, and of putting them in a condition to direct the education
of their children by teaching them the natural laws of body and
mind: “Is it not monstrous,” he says, “that the fate of a new
generation should be left to the chances of unreasoning custom,
impulse, fancy,--joined with the suggestions of ignorant nurses
and the prejudiced counsel of grandmothers.... In the actual state
of things the best instruction, even among the favored by fortune,
is scarcely more than an instruction of celibates.” We are ever
saying that the vocation of woman is to bring up her children,
and yet we teach her nothing of that which she ought to know in
order to fulfill worthily this great task. Ignorant as she is of
the laws of life and of the phenomena of the soul, knowing nothing
of the nature of the moral emotions or of physical disorders, her
intervention in the education of the child is often more disastrous
than her absolute inaction would be.
643. SCIENCE IN ÆSTHETIC EDUCATION.--Mr. Spencer next shows that
social and political activity also has need of being enlightened
by science. One is a citizen only on the condition of knowing the
history of his country.
That which it is more difficult to grant Mr. Spencer, is that
æsthetic education, in its turn, is based on science. Is there not
some exaggeration, for example, in asserting that poor musical
compositions are poor because they are lacking in truth? and that
they are lacking in truth “because they are lacking in science”?
Does one become a man of letters and an artist as one becomes a
geometrician? To cultivate with success those arts which are as the
flower of civilization, is there not required, besides talent and
natural gifts, a long practice, a slow initiation, something, in
a word, more delicate than the attention which suffices for being
instructed in science?
644. EXAGGERATIONS AND PREJUDICES.--We believe as thoroughly as
any one can in the efficiency and in the educational virtues
of science, and we would willingly make it, as Mr. Spencer
does, the basis of education. We must be on our guard, however,
against cultivating this religion of science until it becomes a
superstition. Our author is not completely exempt from this danger.
That science develops the intellectual qualities, such as judgment,
memory, reasoning, we admit; that it develops them better than
the study of the languages, let even this be granted! But it is
impossible for us not to protest when Mr. Spencer represents
science as endowed with the same efficacy for inspiring moral
qualities, such as perseverance, sincerity, activity, resignation
to the will of nature, piety even, and religion. Science appears
to us an infallible means of animating and exciting the different
energies of the soul; but will it also have the quality of
disciplining them? Thanks to science, man will know that which
it is proper to do, if he wishes to be a workman, a parent, or a
citizen, but on this express condition, that he _wills_; and this
education of the will, is it still science which shall be charged
with it? We may be allowed to doubt it.
Mr. Spencer himself now seems to share this doubt, if we may trust
one of his recent works.[282] “Faith in books and in nature,” it is
there said, “is one of the superstitions of our times.” We deceive
ourselves, says the author, when we establish a connection between
the intelligence and the will, for conduct is determined not by
knowledge but by emotion.
“He who would hope to teach geometry by giving lessons in Latin,
would scarcely be more unreasonable than those who count on
producing better sentiments by means of a discipline of the
intellectual faculties.”
To tell the truth, Mr. Spencer has here fallen into another
extreme, and he seems to us at one time to have granted too much,
and at another too little, to the influence of instruction on
morality.
645. INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.--So far we have examined along with
Mr. Spencer only the nature of the objects and of the knowledge
which befit the education of man. It remains to inquire how the
mind can assimilate this knowledge. Pedagogy has not only to draw
up in theory a brilliant programme of necessary studies, but it
also searches out the means and the methods to be employed, in
order that these studies may be presented to the mind, and may have
the greater chance of being thus presented with profit.
In this somewhat more practical part of his work, Mr. Spencer
thinks that pedagogy should be guided by the idea of evolution;
that is, of the progressive course of a being who makes himself,
who creates himself little by little, and who develops in
succession, according to fixed laws, powers originally enveloped
in the germs that he has received from nature, or that have been
transmitted to him by heredity.
646. LAWS OF INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION.--In other terms, Mr.
Spencer shows that the precepts of pedagogy cannot be definitely
deduced until the laws of mental evolution have been accurately
established, and he attempts to determine some of these laws.
He proves that the mind passes naturally from the simple to the
complex, from the indefinite to the definite, from the concrete to
the abstract, from the empirical to the rational; that the genesis
of the individual is the same as the genesis of the race; that the
intelligence assimilates by preference that which it discovers for
itself; finally, that all culture which profits the pupil is, at
the same time, an exercise which stimulates him and delights him.
From this there result these practical consequences: that it
is necessary first to present to the child simple subjects of
study, individual things, sensible objects, for the purpose of
starting him gradually on his way towards complex truths, abstract
generalities, conceptions of the reason; that nothing can be
exacted of the child’s intelligence but vague and incomplete
notions which the travail of the mind will gradually clarify
and elaborate; that education ought to be _in petto_, for each
individual, a repetition and a copy of the general march of
civilization and of the progress of humanity; that it is necessary
to count more on the personal effort of the pupil than upon the
action of the teacher; that, finally, it is necessary to find the
methods which interest, and even those which amuse. Hence the
educator, instead of opposing nature, instead of disconcerting her
in her course and in the insensible steps of her real development,
will restrict himself to following her step by step, and education
will be no longer a force which obstructs, which represses,
which smothers; but, on the contrary, a force which sustains and
stimulates by associating with itself the work of the spontaneous
powers of the soul.
647. SELF-EDUCATION.--Mr. Spencer attaches great importance
to that maxim which recommends us to encourage above all else
self-education:--
“In education the process of self-development should be encouraged
to the fullest extent. Children should be led to make their own
investigations, and to draw their own inferences. They should be
_told_ as little as possible, and induced to _discover_ as much as
possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; and
that to achieve the best results, each mind must progress somewhat
after the same fashion, is continually proved by the marked
success of self-made men. Those who have been brought up under
the ordinary school-drill, and have carried away with them the
idea that education is practicable only in that style, will think
it hopeless to make children their own teachers. If, however, they
will call to mind that the all-important knowledge of surrounding
objects which a child gets in its early years is not without
help,--if they will remember that the child is self-taught in the
use of its mother tongue,--if they will estimate the amount of
that experience of life, that out-of-school wisdom which every boy
gathers for himself,--if they will mark the unusual intelligence
of the uncared-for London _gamin_, as shown in all the directions
in which his faculties have been tasked,--if further, they will
think how many minds have struggled up unaided, not only through
the mysteries of our irrationally-planned _curriculum_, but
through hosts of other obstacles besides; they will find it a not
unreasonable conclusion, that if the subjects be put before him in
right order and right form, any pupil of ordinary capacity will
surmount his successive difficulties with but little assistance.”
648. MORAL EDUCATION.--Moral education, without furnishing
occasion for as complete a theory as intellectual education, has,
nevertheless, suggested to Mr. Spencer some important reflections.
Mr. Spencer expressly declares that he does not accept the dogma
of Lord Palmerston, or what would be called in France the dogma of
Rousseau, namely, that all children are born good. He would incline
the rather toward the contrary opinion, which, “though untenable,”
he says, “seems to us less wide of the truth”! Doubtless, we must
not expect too much moral goodness of children; but it may be
found that Mr. Spencer exaggerates a little, and draws too dark
a portrait of the child when he says, “The child resembles the
savage; his physical features, like his moral instincts, recall the
savage.” Taken literally, such pessimism would lead logically to an
over-severe moral discipline, wholly repressive and restraining.
Such, however, is not the conclusion of Mr. Spencer, who recommends
a course of tolerance and mildness, a system of relative letting
alone which we might almost think dictated by the optimism of
Rousseau. He censures the brutal discipline of the English schools.
Finally, he would have the child treated, not as an incorrigible
rebel who is obedient only to force, but as a reasonable being
capable of readily comprehending the reasons and the advantages
of obedience, from the simple fact that he takes into account the
connection of cause and effect.
649. SYSTEM OF NATURAL PUNISHMENTS.--The true moral discipline,
according to Mr. Spencer, is that which puts the child in a state
of dependence on nature, who teaches him to detest his faults
by reason of the natural consequences which they involve. It is
necessary to renounce artificial punishments, which are almost
always irritating and taken amiss, and to have recourse, as a
rule, only to the privations and the inconveniencies which are the
necessary consequences, and, as it were, the inevitable reactions,
of the acts which have been committed.
A boy, for example, puts his room in disorder. In this case, the
method of natural punishment requires that he himself shall repair
the mischief; and in this way he will soon correct himself of a
turbulence from which he will be the first to suffer.
A little girl, through indolence, or through tarrying too long over
her toilet, has made herself late for a walk. Let her be punished
by not waiting for her, by leaving her at home. This is the best
means of curing her in the future of her indolence and coquetry.
The system which tends thus to substitute the lessons of nature
for artificial penalties, certainly offers great advantages. It
subjects the child, not to the authority of a passing teacher, or
of parents who will one day die, but to a law whose action neither
ceases nor ever relents. Artificial punishments often provoke
the resistance of the child because he does not comprehend their
meaning, and because, proceeding from the human will, they can be
taxed with injustice and caprice. Could one as easily refuse to
bow before the impersonal force of nature,--a force which exactly
adjusts the punishment to the fault,[283] which accepts no excuse,
against which there is no appeal, and which, without threats,
without anger, rigorously and silently executes the law?
650. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION.--Mr. Spencer’s principle is
excellent, but the opportunities for applying it are far less
frequent than our philosopher believes. The child, in most cases,
is too little reflective, too little reasonable, to comprehend, and
especially to heed, the suggestions of personal interest.
Let us add that this principle is wholly negative, that it
furnishes at most only the means of shunning evil; that even in
according to it an efficacy it does not have, it would still be
necessary to reproach it with narrowing moral culture by reducing
it to the rather mean solicitude for simple utility; finally,
that it exercises no influence on the development of the positive
virtues, on the disinterested education of morality in what is
noble and exalted.
Finally, the system of natural punishments would incur the danger
of often being cruel, and of causing the child an irreparable
injury. Let pass the pin-cushion, the boiling water, and the
candle-flame,--examples which Mr. Spencer proposes; but what shall
we say of the bar of red-hot iron which he lets the child pick up?
What shall be said, above all, of the grave consequences entailed
by the faults of a young man left to himself?
“Would it not be,” says Gréard justly, “to condemn the child to
a régime so severe as to be an injustice, to count solely on the
effects of natural reactions and inevitable consequences, for the
purpose of disciplining his will? The penalty which they provoke
is the most often enormous as compared with the fault which has
produced them, and man himself demands for his conduct other
sanctions than those of a harsh reality. He desires that we judge
the intention as well as the fact; that he be commended for his
efforts; that in the first instance extreme measures be not taken
against him; that the blow fall on him if needs be, but without
crushing him, and while extending to him a hand to help him
up.”[284]
651. RETURN TO NATURE.--However it may be, Mr. Spencer is to
be commended for having shown that for moral education as for
intellectual education, the method which approaches nature the
nearest is also the best. The return to nature which was the
characteristic of Rousseau’s theories and of Pestalozzi’s practice,
is also the dominant trait of Mr. Spencer’s pedagogy.
If we look closely into the matter, this decided purpose to follow
nature implicates something besides the superficial condemnation
of methods introduced by art and human device. It supposes a
fundamental belief,--the belief in the beneficent purpose of
natural instincts. To have confidence in nature, to fall back on
the spontaneous forces of the soul, because we discern behind
them or in them a higher providence or an internal foresight, is
a belief generally useful and suggestive for conducting human
affairs, but particularly necessary for directing the education
of man. It is not without some surprise that we discover this
belief at the basis of Mr. Spencer’s pedagogy, as though, by a
contradiction which is not new, the evolutionist philosophy,
which seems to exclude final causes from the conception of the
universe, had been practically constrained to bow before them, and
to proclaim, at least in the matter of education, the salutary
efficacy of the theory which admits them.
Thus, in speaking of physical education, Mr. Spencer remarks that
the sensations are the natural guides, which it would be dangerous
not to follow.
“Happily, that all-important part of education which goes to secure
direct self-preservation, is in great part already provided for.
Too momentous to be left to our own blundering, Nature takes it
into her own hands.”
Speaking in another place of the instincts which induce the child
to move himself and to seek in physical exercise the basis of
physical well-being, he declares that to oppose these instincts
would be to go counter to the means “_divinely_ arranged” for
assuring the development of the body.
652. PHYSICAL EDUCATION.--The chapter devoted by Mr. Spencer to
physical education, is such as might be expected from a thinker
who is wholly exempt from idealistic prejudices and who does not
hesitate to write:--
“The history of the world shows that the well-fed races have been
the energetic and dominant races.”
It is necessary first and above all to establish physical force in
man, and to create within him “a robust animal.”
“The actual education of children is defective in several
particulars: in an insufficiency of food, in an insufficiency of
clothing, in an insufficiency of exercise, and in an excess of
mental application.”
Mr. Spencer complains that modern education has become wholly
intellectual, and that it neglects the body. He reminds us that
“the preservation of health is one of our duties,” and that there
exists a thing which might be called “physical morality.”
Here, as everywhere, Mr. Spencer demands that we follow the
indications of nature. He explains on physiological grounds the
apparently inordinate appetite which children show for certain
foods,--sugar, for example. He urgently entreats that preference
shall be given to play and to free and spontaneous exercise, over
gymnastics.
653. GENERAL JUDGMENT.--That which, in our opinion, attests the
truth of the pedagogical laws which we have just discussed, is
that they are in agreement with the general opinions of the great
modern reformers in education. It is thus that Spencer’s ideas are
in close harmony with those which Pestalozzi had employed at Stanz.
The success which he obtained there, as Mr. Spencer has remarked,
depended on two things: first, on the attention which he used in
determining what kind of instruction the children had need of, and
next, on the pains he took to associate the new knowledge with that
which they already possessed.
Mr. Spencer’s essay, then, deserves the attention of educators.
There is scarcely a book in which a keen scent for details comes
more agreeably to animate a fund of solid arguments, and from
which it is more useful to extract the substance. However, it
must not be read save with precaution. The brilliant English
thinker sometimes fails in justness and measure, and his bold
generalizations need to be tested with care.
654. ALEXANDER BAIN AND EDUCATION AS A SCIENCE.--Less brilliant
than the work of Mr. Spencer, the book of Mr. Bain, _Education
as a Science_, recommends itself by merits of studied analysis
and scholarly minuteness. Others surpass Mr. Bain in brilliancy
of imagination, in originality and in enthusiasm; but no one
equals him in richness of details, in acuteness and abundance of
observations. After the more venturesome have taken the lead and
have published the original sketch, Mr. Bain appears and writes
the methodical and complete manual. His own work resembles that
of a conscientious guard who marches in the rear of a victorious
army, and by a wise organization makes sure the positions conquered
by the march of an impetuous commander-in-chief. His book, in
other terms, is but the studious and thorough development of Mr.
Spencer’s principles.
655. GENERAL IMPRESSION.--It is impossible in an analysis to
bring out the merit of a book which is especially valuable for
the multiplicity of the questions which the author discusses
in it, and for the infinite variety of the solutions which he
proposes. There are landscapes which discourage the painter,
because, notwithstanding their beauty, they are too vast, too full
of details, to admit of being crowded into a frame. We may say
the same of Mr. Bain’s book. One must have studied it himself in
order to form an estimate of its value. Professors of all classes
will here find pages of well-considered counsels, and judicious
reflections upon educational methods. The nature of studies, the
sequence of subjects, the gradation of difficulties, the choice
of exercises, the comparison of oral instruction with text-book
instruction, modes of discipline,--nothing escapes a thinker who is
not a mere theorist or an amateur educator, but a professional man,
a competent teacher, an experienced professor.
Indeed, no one should allow himself to be deceived by this fine
phrase, _Education as a Science_, which might disconcert and turn
aside whole classes of readers, such as those who, in works on
education, especially desire a guide for practice. On the contrary,
they will have every reason to commend a book which passes very
quickly from generalities to applications, and which is above all
else a manual of practical and technical pedagogy. The study of it
will be profitable not merely to professors who are teaching the
higher branches of literature and science, but even to the humblest
instructors, and even--for Mr. Bain overlooks no detail--to
teachers of reading and writing.
656. DIVISION OF THE WORK.--_Education as a Science_ comprises
three parts: 1. psychological data; 2. methods; 3. modern education.
The author first inquires in what order the faculties are
developed, and what effect this order should have on the
distribution of studies. This is the psychological part. Then
follows a discussion of what Mr. Bain calls the logical order, that
is, of the relations which exist between the studies themselves
and their different parts. This is the “analytical problem” of
education.[285]
These preliminaries being established, Mr. Bain enters upon the
principal theme,--the methods of instruction. He discusses one
after another the first elements of reading, object-lessons,
“which, more than any other means of instruction, require to be
practised with care, for without this, an admirable process might,
in unskillful hands, be nothing more than a thing of seductive
appearance, but without value”; then methods relating to history,
geography, the sciences, and the languages.
Finally, in his third book, Mr. Bain exhibits a new plan of study,
with particular reference to secondary instruction.
657. PSYCHOLOGICAL ORDER AND LOGICAL ORDER.--In his reflections on
the development of the mind and upon the distribution of studies,
Mr. Bain is inspired by the principles which have guided Mr.
Spencer.
“Observation precedes reflection. The concrete comes before the
abstract.”
In education, then, the sequence should be from the simple to the
complex, from the particular to the general, from the indefinite to
the definite, from the empirical to the rational, from analysis to
synthesis, from the outline to details; finally, from the material
to the immaterial.
Such would be the ideal order in education; but Mr. Bain remarks
that in practice all sorts of obstacles come to disturb this
rigorous sequence.
658. MODERN EDUCATION.--The plan of secondary studies which Mr.
Bain recommends to the reformers of teaching is the result and the
_résumé_ of all these observations.
Intellectual education, common to all young people who receive a
liberal instruction, would henceforth comprise three essential
parts: 1. the sciences; 2. the humanities; 3. rhetoric and the
national literature. We see at once what is to be understood by
this last item; but the two others have need of some explanations.
The sciences are divided into two groups: those which are to be
mastered,--arithmetic, geometry, algebra, physics, chemistry,
biology, psychology; and the natural sciences, which should be
studied only superficially because they would overwhelm the memory
under the weight of too large a number of facts. Geography, which,
one does not know why, is included in the sciences, while history
is attached to the humanities, will complete the programme of
scientific studies.
As to the humanities, Mr. Bain preserves scarcely more than
the name while suppressing the thing; for in the curtailed and
disfigured domain which he persists in calling by this name,
he cuts off precisely that which has always been considered as
constituting its essence,--the study of the dead languages. He
excludes from it even the living languages, and that which he
still decorates with the fine title of humanities, is still
science,--moral science, it is true,--“history and sociology with
political economy and jurisprudence.”
A course in universal literature, but, be it understood, without
original texts, _might_ afterwards be added to this pretended
teaching of the humanities.
Two or three hours a week would be devoted parallelly, during the
whole course of study, which would last six years, to each of the
three departments of instruction which Mr. Bain thinks equally
important.
As to the real humanities, dead or living languages, they should no
longer be included in education save as optional and extra studies,
on the same basis as the accomplishments. And, appealing to the
future, Mr. Bain even predicts that “a day will come when it will
be found that this is still granting them too large a place in
education.”
Mr. Bain, then, gives all his preferences to scientific studies,
and his book might properly be entitled, not only _Education as a
Science_, but also _Science in Education_.
659. THEORETICAL ERRORS.--Mr. Bain reproaches letters with giving
the mind the habit of servility. By what singular revulsion of
thought can the liberal studies _par excellence_ be represented
as a school of intellectual servitude? It is rather to scientific
instruction that we may properly return the accusation of enslaving
the spirit. By their inexorable evidence and by their very
exactness, do not the sciences sometimes smother the originality
and the free flight of the imagination?
This defect, however, does not cut them off from a right to a
place, and to a large place, in the programme of intellectual
education. Let us accept with favor their alliance, let us admit
them to a certain degree of fellowship, but do not let us tolerate
their encroachments. In a word, the object of the sciences is
either pure abstractions or material realities. He who studies
mathematics and physics first acquires real knowledge of high
value; and, on the other hand, he strengthens his mind through
the habits engendered by the rigorous methods which the sciences
employ. We cheerfully grant to Mr. Bain that the sciences are at
the same time admirable sources of useful truths and valuable
instruments of mental discipline. By cultivating them we gain not
only the positive knowledge which they teach respecting the world,
but also the power, rigor, and exactness which they impose on their
adepts.
660. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE SCIENCES.--But the question is to know
whether the sciences, so useful and so necessary for enriching and
disciplining the mind, are also the best agents for training it.
The educator is not in the situation of the farmer who has only
two things to do,--to plow and sow the field which he cultivates.
The work of education is vast in another direction. It has to do
with developing the aptitudes or latent energies, that which the
philosophy of the day hardly allows us longer to call faculties,
but that which they re-establish under another name, that of the
unconscious forces of the soul; it has to do, not with laboring on
a soil almost entirely prepared by nature, but in great part with
creating the soil itself. Now, the sciences are indeed the seed
which it will be proper by and by to sow on the field, but they are
not the substance which nourishes and fertilizes it.
661. SENSUALISTIC TENDENCIES.--If we go to the bottom of Mr. Bain’s
thought and doctrine on the mind, we shall find the secret of his
ardent preference for the teaching of the sciences. His errors in
practical pedagogy proceed from theoretical errors on human nature.
For him, as for Locke, there are not, properly speaking,
intellectual forces independent of the facts which succeed one
another in the consciousness. Consequently, there is not an
education of the faculties. Memory or imagination, considered as a
distinct power, as an aptitude more or less happy, is but a word.
It is nothing apart from the recollections or the images which are
successively graven in the mind. For Mr. Bain, as for Locke, the
best education is that which places items of knowledge side by side
in the mind, which accumulates facts there, but not that which
seeks to enkindle in the soul a flame of intelligence.
That which also warps the theoretical views of Mr. Bain is that
he accords no independence, no individual life, to the mind; and
that for him, back of the facts of consciousness, there come to
view, without any intermedium, the cerebral organs. Now the brain
is developed of itself; it acquires fatally, with the progress
of years, more weight and more volume; it passes from the age of
concrete things to the age of abstractions. Hence a reduction,
an inevitable contraction, of the sphere of education. There is
nothing more to do than to let nature have her way, and to fill the
vase which she charges herself with constructing.
662. UTILITARIAN TENDENCIES.--Finally, to conclude this indication
of the general ideas which dominate and which mar the pedagogy of
Mr. Bain, let us observe that a positive and practical utility, a
vulgar utility, mingles too many of its inspirations with it. The
criterion of utility is sometimes applied to it with an artless
extravagance. Thus, in the languages, only those words should be
learned which occur the most often, and in the sciences, only the
parts which are of the most frequent use. Even in moral education,
as it is conceived by the English philosopher, are to be found, as
we might expect, these utilitarian and narrow views.
Would one believe, for example, that Mr. Bain makes the fear of the
penal code the mainspring of the teaching of virtue?[286] Here,
at least, we must acknowledge that science is insufficient. “To
pretend, for example, that physiology can teach us moderation in
the sexual appetite is to attribute to it a result which no science
has yet been able to give.” But must we count any more, as Mr. Bain
would have us, for example, on social influences and on personal
experience? In this truly experimental education in virtue, ethics
would be learned just as the mother tongue is learned, by use, by
the imitation of others; and moral instruction, properly so called,
would be a sort of grammar which is to rectify vicious practices.
663. FINAL JUDGMENT.--But our criticisms on the general tendencies
of Mr. Bain’s pedagogy subtract nothing from our admiration of
the sterling qualities of his _Education as a Science_. Doubtless
there would also be errors of detail to notice, or some particular
methods to discuss; for example, that of never doing more than
one thing at a time, or the propriety of first teaching to
children the history of their country. Mr. Bain forgets that
mythological history and sacred history, by their legendary and
fabulous character, offer a particular attraction to the childish
imagination, and are better adapted than history proper to infant
minds. But, aside from the portions which are debatable, how
many wise observations to gather on the different processes of
instruction, on the transition from the concrete to the abstract,
on the discretion which must be employed in object-lessons, the
use of which so easily degenerates into abuse! Even through its
absolute theories, _Education as a Science_ will render great
services; for, to illustrate the march of thought, nothing is so
valuable as opinions which are exclusive and sincere. It were even
desirable, if one did not fear to experiment on human souls, _in
anima sublimi_, that according to Mr. Bain’s plan, the experiment
should be tried of an education exclusively scientific.
664. AMERICAN EDUCATORS. CHANNING (1780-1842).--The general
fault of English pedagogy is its aristocratic character. For Mr.
Spencer and Mr. Bain, as for Locke, it is simply a question of
the education of a _gentleman_. It is in America, in the writings
of Channing and Horace Mann, that we must seek the elements of a
theory of democratic education, and of popular instruction.[287]
Channing, a Unitarian minister, associated religious sentiment and
philosophic reason, and desired that in theology itself everything
should issue in the supremacy of the human judgment. The most
interesting of his writings are the public lectures which he
gave in Boston in 1838, and the object of which is the education
one gives himself, and the elevation of the working classes. We
lack the space to give an analysis of these lectures, but a few
quotations will make known the general spirit of the American
reformer:--
“I am not discouraged by the objection that the laborer, if
encouraged to give time and strength to the elevation of his mind,
will starve himself and impoverish the country, when I consider the
energy, and the efficiency of Mind.”
“The highest force in the universe is Mind. This created
the heavens and earth. This has changed the wilderness into
fruitfulness, and linked distant countries in a beneficent ministry
to one another’s wants. It is not to brute force, to physical
strength, so much as to art, to skill, to intellectual and moral
energy, that men owe their mastery over the world. It is mind
which has conquered matter. To fear, then, that by calling forth
a people’s mind, we shall impoverish and starve them, is to be
frightened at a shadow.”
“It is chiefly through books that we enjoy intercourse with
superior minds, and these invaluable means of communication are
in the reach of all. In the best books, great men talk to us,
give us their most precious thoughts, and pour their souls into
ours. God be thanked for books. They are the voices of the distant
and the dead, and make us heirs of the spiritual life of past
ages. Books are the true levellers. They give to all, who will
faithfully use them, the society, the spiritual presence, of the
best and greatest of our race. No matter how poor I am; no matter
though the prosperous of my own time will not enter my obscure
dwelling; if the sacred writers will enter and take up their abode
under my roof, if Milton will cross my threshold to sing to me of
Paradise, and Shakespeare to open to me the worlds of imagination
and the workings of the human heart, and Franklin to enrich me with
his practical wisdom, I shall not pine for want of intellectual
companionship, and I may become a cultivated man though excluded
from what is called the best society in the place where I live.”
665. HORACE MANN (1796-1859).--Horace Mann is not a philosopher who
discusses education, but a politician who reformed and developed
the education of his country. Secretary of the Massachusetts Board
of Education, he opened schools, founded libraries, and pronounced
a great number of discourses, the best known of which is _The
Necessity of Education in a Republican Government_.
“When, then,” he often said, “will men give their thought to
infancy? We watch the seed which we confide to the earth, but we do
not concern ourselves with the human soul till the sun of youth has
set. Were it in my power, I would scatter books over all the earth
as men sow wheat on the plowed fields.”
Speaking to Americans, to working people, and to tradesmen, he made
apparent the positive advantages of instruction:--
“If to-morrow some one were to tell you that a coal mine had been
discovered which would pay ten per cent, you would all rush to
it; and yet there are men whom you let grovel in ignorance when
you might realize from forty to fifty per cent on them. You are
ever giving your thought to capital and to machines; but the first
machine is man, and the first capital, man, and you neglect him.”
But he also interested himself in the moral effects of education,
especially in a democratic society, where each citizen is a
sovereign:--
“The education which has already been given a people makes it
necessary to give them more. By instructing them, new powers have
been awakened in them, and this intellectual and moral energy
must be regulated. In this case we have not to do with mechanical
forces, which, once put in action, accomplish their purpose and
then stop. No; these are spiritual forces endowed with a principle
of life and of progress which nothing can quench.”
666. CONCLUSION.--The labors of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Bain, the
works of Channing and Mann, and others still, will contribute, we
hope, to prepare the definite solutions demanded by our times in
the matter of education. These solutions are important for the
security and the greatness of our country. More than ever it is
necessary that education become something else than an affair of
inspiration, abandoned to caprice and hazard, but that it be a
work of reflection. It is said that the future is uncertain, that
events are leading French society no one knows where, and that
our destinies are at the mercy of the most unforeseen storms. We
do not believe this, since it is within our power that it shall
be otherwise. There is a means, in fact, of assuring the future
of peoples, and this is to give them an intellectual and moral
education which purifies the soul and strengthens character. Do
not let us look for regeneration and progress from a sudden and
miraculous transformation; do not let us demand them even of the
immediate efficiency of such or such a political institution.
Everything here below is accomplished according to the laws of a
slow progression, by trifling and successive modifications. Just as
for the child there is no abridgment which allows us to suppress
the slow steps of the insensible growth which each year brings
forward, so for nations there is no other process than the action,
slow but sure, of a wise and vigorous education, for causing them
to pass from vice to virtue, from abasement to grandeur.
The partisans of evolution sometimes seem to announce to us the
near apparition of a race superior to our own, called to supplant
us, as we shall have supplanted the inferior races. One day or
another we shall be liable, it seems, to meet “at the angle of a
rock” the successor of the human race. We count but little on such
promises, and the coming of this hypothetical race of men, suddenly
evoked by a wave of the magic wand of natural selection, leaves us
very incredulous.
Happily, we know another means, a much surer process, for causing
to appear, not a strange race, until now unknown, but generations
of more worth than our own, which are superior to it in physical
force, as in qualities of mind or virtues of character. This means
is to establish, through reflection and reason, an education
better adapted to our destination; an education broader and more
complete, at once more severe and more liberal, since it will at
the same time exact more toil and permit more scope; in which the
child will learn to count more on himself; in which his indolence
will no longer be encouraged by accustoming him inopportunely to
invoke supernatural aid; in which instruction will no longer be
a formulary recited as lip-service, but an inner and profound
acquisition of the soul, in which the fear of the conscience
will be substituted for the other rules of conduct, and in which
thought and free reflection will no longer be distrusted; finally,
an education more scientific and more rational, because it will
neglect nothing which can develop a human soul and bring it into
likeness with its ideal. Now that education to which the future
belongs, notwithstanding the obstacles which the spirit of the past
will still stir up against it,--that education is not possible,
its laws cannot be established, its methods cannot be practised,
except on one condition; this is, that the psychology of the child
be written, and well written, and that reflection draw from this
psychology all the consequences which it permits.
[667. COMMENT ON MR. SPENCER’S EDUCATION.--Monsieur Compayré
might have emphasized his cautions. Read with caution, and with
a purpose to weigh the truth, Mr. Spencer’s _Education_ is
inspiring and wholesome; but it may be doubted whether there
has been written, since the _Émile_, a book on education which
is so well fitted to deceive an unwary reader by its rhetoric
and philosophic plausibility. The air of breadth and candor
with which the writer sets out is eminently prepossessing, and
the reader is almost obliged to assume that he is being led to
foregone conclusions. The first chapter, in particular, is a
piece of literary art, in which there is such a deft handling
of sentiment and pathos as to unfit the susceptible reader for
exercising his own critical judgment.
In this place I can only indicate in the briefest manner what
seem to be the fundamental errors contained in the book:--
1. Mr. Spencer does not distinguish between the _immediate_ and
the _mediate_ practical value of knowledges. We may admit with
him that science is of inestimable value to the human race; but
it does not follow by any means that every person must be versed
in science. As we need not own everything that is essential to
our comfort, so we need not have as a personal possession all the
knowledge that we need for guidance.
2. It is a very low conception of education that would limit its
function to adapting a man merely to that state in life into
which he chances to be born. The Bushman, the Red Indian, and
the accountant, are unfortunate illustrations of the province of
education. Often the highest function of education is to lift a
man out of his ancestral state.
3. That the value of a subject for guidance is the same as its
value for discipline, is true under only one assumption,--that
the Bushman is always to remain a Bushman, and the Red Indian
always a Red Indian, as by the new philosophy of course they
should. Practical teachers very well know that, as a rule, the
studies that are the most valuable for practical use are the
least valuable for discipline. Mr. Spencer quotes no better proof
of his assumption than “the beautiful economy of Nature.”
4. Mr. Spencer’s proposed education is sordid in its
utilitarianism. He is preoccupied with man as an instrument
rather than with a human being aspiring towards the highest type
of his kind. A liberal education should be preoccupied first with
the training of the man, then with the training of the instrument.
5. Mr. Spencer’s restatement of Condillac’s and Comte’s doctrine,
that individual education should be a repetition of civilization
_in petto_, is at best but a specious generalization. The
doctrine cannot be applied to practice, in any considerable
degree, if we would, and should not be, if we could, for it
ignores one essential factor in progress,--inheritance.
6. The part assigned to “Nature” in the work of education is so
overstrained as to be unnatural and absurd. Physical science has
long since discarded this myth of Nature personified. It is only
in educational science that this fiction is still employed to eke
out an argument.
7. The doctrine of consequences which underlies Mr. Spencer’s
system of moral education is applicable to but a limited number
of cases, or, if applied with thoroughness, is inhuman. Not even
all the fit would survive if they were not shielded from the
consequences of their acts by human sympathy and oversight.]
FOOTNOTES:
[277] J. P. Richter, better known under the name Jean Paul
(1763-1825), the author of a spirited and scholarly book, _Levana,
or the Doctrine of Education_, 1803.
[278] See _The Elements of Psychology, on the Principles of Beneke_
(London, 1871).
[279] The first French translation appeared in 1878.
[280] In this, as in several other instances, Monsieur Compayré
gives a summary of the author’s thought rather than an exact
quotation. (P.)
[281] As, historically, ornament precedes dress, on Mr. Spencer’s
main principle, it need not be till late in life that women dress
sensibly. Or ought not the genesis of dress in the individual to
follow the same order as the genesis of dress in the race? (P.)
[282] _Introduction to Social Science_, p. 390.
[283] So far as experience can testify, this is a pure assumption.
The most trifling injuries are often the most painful, and the most
serious the most painless. (P.)
[284] See the _Esprit de discipline dans l’éducation_, a memoir of
Gréard, published in the _Revue Pédagogique_, 1883, No. 11.
[285] By the “analytical problem” of education, Mr. Bain means the
determining of the education value of subjects. See _Education as
a Science_, Chapter V. (P.)
[286] We might dwell on Mr. Bain’s observations relative to
punishments. Here is what Gréard says of them: “Mr. Bain, with
infinite good sense and disciplinary tact, is much less concerned
with applying the rule than with the conditions according to which
it should be applied. On this point he enters into details full of
scruples. He does not hesitate to call to his aid the knowledge of
the masters of penal jurisprudence, and his recommendations, added
to those of Bentham, comprise not less than thirty articles.”
[287] There should be added to these the works of Swiss, Italian,
and French educators, particularly of Siciliani, and the original
and eminently suggestive studies of Bernard Perez.
APPENDIX.
A.
SUGGESTIONS TO TEACHERS OF THE HISTORY OF PEDAGOGY.
The two aims to be kept in view in the teaching of this subject
are _culture_ and _guidance_. The purpose should be to extend the
intellectual horizon of the teacher, or, to use Plato’s phrase, to
make him “the spectator of all time and all existence”; and, in the
second place, to furnish the teacher with a clew which will safely
conduct him through the mazes of systems, methods, and doctrines.
There is no other profession that has derived so little profit
from capitalized experiences; and there is no profession in which
culture and breadth are more necessary.
For securing the ends here proposed, it is recommended that a plan
somewhat like the following be pursued in the use of this volume:--
1. If there are three recitations a week, assign one chapter
for each of the first two recitations, _to be carefully and
thoughtfully read_, and require each pupil to select one special
topic to present and discuss when he is called upon in the
recitation; and for the _third_ recitation in each week, require
each pupil to select a topic from any part of the book which has
thus far been studied. The purpose of this plan is to bring before
the class, in sharp outline, the salient points of the subject;
and, at the same time, to create a sense of the organic unity of
the theme as a comprehensive whole. When there are more than three
recitations a week, only a part of a chapter need be assigned for
an advance lesson.
2. When the first survey of the subject has been made in the way
just suggested, a _review_ may be conducted as follows:--
(1.) _Biographical._ Following a chronological order, divide the
whole treatise into as many sections as there are recitations to be
devoted to this purpose, and require each pupil to make a careful
study of some educator, as Socrates, Montaigne, or Pestalozzi, and
to present this theme when called upon in recitation. When there
is opportunity, encourage pupils to amplify their themes with
information derived from other sources.
(2.) _Topical._ Require each pupil to select some doctrine, system,
or method, and to show, in a systematic way, its origin, progress,
and termination. In this review, encourage the critical spirit, and
make the recitation to consist, in part, of a free discussion of
principles and doctrines. The value of this subject for _guidance_
will appear in this part of the study.
(3.) _By Chapters._ Require each pupil to prepare a summary of some
chapter in the book, emphasizing the more important truths that
are taught in it, and showing the tendency or drift of educational
thought. The _culture_ value of the subject will appear in this
part of the study. By this mode of treatment, the subject can be
compassed, with good results, in twenty weeks.
3. Where no more than twelve or fourteen weeks can be given to this
subject, it is recommended that the following chapters be selected:
I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., X., XII., XIII., XVIII., XIX.,
XX., XXI., XXII.
For use in _Teachers’ Meetings_ held by superintendents, the
following chapters are suggested: II., III., V., VI., VII., X.,
XIII., XVIII., XX., XXII.
For use in _Teachers’ Reading Circles_, either of the above
selections will serve a good purpose.
B.
A SELECT LIST OF WORKS SUPPLEMENTARY TO “COMPAYRÉ’S HISTORY OF
PEDAGOGY.”
1. The Cyclopædia of Education. New York.
2. Buisson. Dictionnaire de Pédagogie. Parts 1-156. Paris.
3. Lindner. Handbuch der Erziehungskunde. Wien and Leipzig.
4. K. Schmidt. Die Geschichte der Pädagogik. Cöthen.
5. G. Compayré. Histoire Critique des Doctrines de l’Éducation
en France. Paris.
6. Barnard. German Teachers and Educational Reformers.
7. Barnard. French Teachers, Schools, and Pedagogy.
8. Barnard. English Teachers, Educators, and Promoters of
Education.
9. Barnard. American Teachers, Educators, and Benefactors of
Education.
10. Barnard. Pestalozzi and Swiss Pedagogy.
11. Biber. Pestalozzi and his Plan of Education. London.
12. Donaldson. Lectures on the History of Education. Edinburgh.
13. Krüsi. Pestalozzi: his Life, Work, and Influence. Cincinnati.
14. Lorenz. Life of Alcuin. London.
15. Mrs. Mann. Life of Horace Mann. Boston.
16. Meiklejohn. Dr. Andrew Bell. London.
17. Morley, J. Rousseau. London.
18. Mullinger. The Schools of Charles the Great. London.
19. Quick. Essays on Educational Reformers. Cincinnati.
20. Shuttleworth. Four Periods of Public Education. London.
21. Arnold. Higher Schools and Universities of Germany.
London.
22. Hart. German Universities. New York.
23. De Guimps. Histoire de Pestalozzi. Lausanne.
24. De Guimps. La Philosophie et la Pratique de l’Éducation.
Paris.
25. Meunier. Lutte du Principe Clérical et du Principe Laïque
dans l’Enseignement. Paris.
26. Gaufrés. Claude Baduel et la Réforme des Études au XVI^e
Siècle. Paris.
27. Bentham. Chrestomathia. London.
28. Drane. Christian Schools and Scholars. London.
29. Ascham. The Scholemaster. Notes by Mayor. London.
30. Locke. Thoughts concerning Education. Notes by Quick.
Cambridge.
31. Laurie. John Amos Comenius. Boston.
32. Lancelot. Narrative of a Tour to La Grande Chartreuse.
London.
33. Schimmelpenninck. Narrative of the Demolition of Port Royal.
London.
34. Hamilton, Elizabeth. Letters on the Elementary Principles
of Education. London.
35. Spencer. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. N. Y.
36. Rousseau, Émile. Extracts. Boston.
37. Blackie. Four Phases of Morals. N. Y.
38. Aristotle. The Politics and Economics. London.
39. Craik. The State in its Relation to Education. London.
40. Cousin. Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia.
41. Gill. Systems of Education. Boston.
42. Souquet. Les Ecrivains Pédagogues du XVI^e Siècle. Paris.
43. Mann. Lectures on Education. Boston.
44. Quintilian. Institutes of Oratory. London.
45. Plato. The Republic and the Laws. London.
46. Xenophon. The Memorabilia of Socrates. N. Y.
47. Plutarch. Morals. Boston.
48. MacAlister. Montaigne on Education. Boston.
49. Pestalozzi. Leonard and Gertrude. Boston.
50. Necker de Saussure. Éducation Progressive. Paris.
51. Cochin. Pestalozzi: sa Vie, ses Œuvres, ses Méthodes.
Paris.
52. Compayré. Cours de Pédagogie. Paris.
53. Milton. Tractate on Education. Cambridge.
54. Fénelon. Fables. Paris.
55. Fénelon. The Education of a Daughter. Dublin.
56. Martin. Les Doctrines Pédagogiques des Grecs. Paris.
57. Jacotot. Enseignement Universel. Paris.
58. Adams. The Free School System of the United States.
London.
59. Conrad. The German Universities for the last Fifty Years.
Glasgow.
60. Capes. University Life in Ancient Athens. N. Y.
61. Mahaffy. Old Greek Education.
62. Chassiotis. L’Instruction Publique chez les Grecs. Paris.
63. Spiers. School System of the Talmud. London.
64. Simon. L’Éducation et l’Instruction des Enfants chez les
Anciens Juifs. Paris.
65. Edgeworth. Practical Education. N. Y.
NOTE.--For other supplementary works, and for a more complete
description of the books in the above list, consult the
Bibliography of G. Stanley Hall (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.).
INDEX.
Abelard, 75.
Academy, 22; French, 219, 301, 386.
Achilles, 46.
Activity, 57, 72, 92, 93, 171, 191, 207, 461, 476;
categories of, 542;
the divine, 454;
industrial, 544.
Adalberic, 68.
Adaptation, 27, 31, 79, 90, 92, 158, 200, 294, 323, 329, 354, 461,
530, 553.
_Adèle_ and _Théodore_, of Madame de Genlis, 480.
Age, for public instruction, 11, 14, 15, 19, 31, 32, 34, 38, 49, 50,
55, 287, 323, 347, 348.
Agricola, Rudolph, 87.
Agriculture, 420.
Ahriman, 14.
Aix-la-Chapelle, Council of, 73.
Alcuin, 72.
Alexander, 11, 36, 294.
_Alexander_, 118.
Alfred the Great, 73.
_All is in All_, 527.
Amusements, 33, 94, 96, 98, 118, 119, 146, 161, 248, 294, 306, 348,
458, 460.
Amyot, 53, 54.
Analysis, 22, 23, 32, 42, 96, 188, 284, 314, 558.
Anselm, Saint, 76, 77, 119.
Antiquity, education in, 1-16, 18, 37, 320.
Arabic, 102.
Arabs, 77.
Arbogast, 393, 394.
Argovia, 418, 438.
Argument, 19, 52, 74, 80, 145.
Aristophanes, 20, 87.
Aristotle, 10, 11, 22, 42, 46, 52, 59, 66, 74, 321;
plan of education, 36-41;
of music, 20, 39.
Arithmetic, 76, 80, 98, 114, 129, 205, 268, 269, 441;
moral, 471.
Arnauld, 154;
_General Grammar_, 155.
Art, 30, 31, 60, 116, 179, 309, 310, 327, 546;
of education, 22, 39, 60, 85, 91, 122, 310, 476;
industrial, 331, 351, 384, 528, 545;
of creating thought, 23, 91, 156, 157, 315, 316, 471.
Artisans, 15, 28, 40, 98, 118, 134, 135, 209, 300, 565.
Arts, Faculty of, 233, 234, 321, 341, 512;
the Seven Liberal, 75, 119.
Asceticism, 4, 63, 65, 66, 160, 161, 259, 260.
Assembly, Constituent, 371, 372, 390, 395;
Legislative, 371, 373, 390;
National, 369, 391.
Assistant, 10, 131, 267, 327, 424.
Astronomy, 6, 11, 32, 71, 74, 76, 98, 129, 157, 205.
Athens, education at, 17, 40, 43.
_Atlantic Monthly_, 310.
d’Aubigné, 53.
Augustine, Saint, 47, 64, 68, 71, 219, 225.
Augustus, 46, 47.
Aurelius, Marcus, 53, 58.
Austria, 465.
Authority, 15, 74, 81, 110, 122, 136, 172, 191, 264, 309, 518, 528,
532;
basis of, 13, 32, 74, 149, 161.
Auxerre, 342.
Avignon, 139, 263.
Bacon, 32, 123, 124, 133, 136, 192, 211.
Bain, 124, 194, 538, 556-563;
errors of, 559-563.
Barraud, 434.
Barrère, 397.
Barrière, 485.
Basedow, 414.
Basil, Saint, 64.
Bausset, Cardinal de, 178.
Bauzen, 537.
Beauty, 30, 31, 84, 98, 546.
Beauvilliers, 165, 166.
Beckx, 142, 145.
Belief, 74, 143, 191, 304, 381.
Bell, Andrew, 6, 513-517.
_Belles-lettres_, 113, 150, 152, 236, 321, 322, 324, 404.
Benedict, Saint, 69.
Benedictines, 68, 76, 279.
Bentham, _Chrestomathia_, 100, 519, 562.
Berlin, 451, 464.
Bernardin de Saint Pierre, 394.
Bersot, 149, 534.
Bert, Paul, 395.
Berthollet, 405.
Burgdorf, 419, 426, 433, 456, 457.
Bérulle, 150.
Bias, 32.
Bible, 7, 65, 81, 86, 99, 113, 120, 248, 304, 324, 342, 420.
Billom, College of, 141.
Bills, Educational, 390-411, 509-512, 519-525.
Birr, 438.
Blackie, _Four Phases of Morals_, 21.
Blankenburg, 457, 463.
Boarding-schools, 282, 327, 397, 433, 485.
Body, 28, 29, 33, 38, 65, 94, 196-199, 292-315;
exercises for, 18, 19, 28, 94, 135, 289-292.
Bœotia, 53.
Bohemia, 125.
Boileau, 182, 219, 243.
Bonneval, 283.
_Book for Mothers_, Pestalozzi’s, 431.
Books, 70, 86, 105, 132, 240, 298, 369, 393, 528;
use of, 106, 107, 218, 298, 352, 429, 441, 516, 564.
Bossuet, 141, 182-185, 243.
Boufflers, Marquis de, 148.
Bouquier, 379, 391, 400;
Law of, 400, 401.
Bourgogne, 366;
Duke of, 166, 177-182.
Boys, education of, 6, 8, 34, 48, 54, 94, 114, 284-302, 398.
Boze, de, 243.
Brahmins, 4, 5.
Bréal, Michel, 113, 343, 534.
Bretagne, 344.
Brethren of Saint Charles, 255.
Brethren of the Christian Schools, 112, 138, 147, 253-277, 353, 365,
513, 515.
Brinon, Madame de, 228.
Browning, 54.
Brugg, 418, 438.
Buddha, 4.
Buisson, _Dictionnaire de Pédagogie_, 13, 130, 369.
“Bureau of Correspondence,” 358.
Burnier, 163.
Burnouf, _Histoire du Bouddhisme_, 5.
Buss, 428.
Cabanis, 369.
Cabet, 527.
Cabinet, school, 385.
_Cabinet of du Mas_, 239.
Cadet, 246.
Cæsar, 51, 106.
Cæsar de Bus, 139.
Cajet, Dom Joseph, 280.
Calvin, 113.
Cambridge, University of, 77.
Campan, Madame, 485-487.
Campe, 415.
Campus Martius, 44.
Carnot, 501, 521, 524.
Carré, 153.
Carthage, 105.
Caste, 2, 14, 15, 16, 28, 33, 42, 143, 256, 564.
Casuistry, 65, 67, 343.
Catechism, 44, 81, 113, 272, 321, 338, 364.
Catherine II., of Russia, 320.
Catholicism, 139, 253-277.
Cavern, Plato’s, 32.
Centralization, 358, 361, 386, 395, 396, 512;
opposed, 372.
Central Schools, 407.
Ceremonies, 12, 30, 36, 146, 199, 287, 393.
Chaillot, 504.
Chaldee, 95.
Chance, 328, 329.
Channing, 59, 476, 563-565.
Character, 490, 497.
Charicles, 25.
Charity, 37, 61, 281;
condemned, 29, 153.
Charlemagne, 71-73, 106.
Charles the Bold, 68, 73.
Charron, _Wisdom_, 110.
Chastanier, 263.
Chateaubriand, 245, 511.
Chevalier de la Tour-Landry, 79.
Child, 38, 39, 46, 79, 169, 195, 196;
age for study, 11, 39, 49, 287;
development of, 31, 38, 50, 195, 455, 456, 498;
education of, 46, 48, 80, 86, 103, 107, 122, 129, 153, 169, 237,
240, 284-304, 318, 420, 442, 501-504, 520-525;
etiquette, 88, 89, 199, 270;
inclination of, 3, 33, 79, 159, 169, 207, 257, 291, 333, 334, 346,
454, 460, 492, 547, 549;
indulgence of, 50, 172, 173, 206, 551;
moral protection of, 39, 49, 50, 78, 88, 173, 248, 470-475;
punishment of, 6, 7, 12, 33, 76, 77, 78, 102, 271-276, 551;
the property of the State, 27, 397, 398.
Chinese, 11-13;
civil service of, 16.
_Chriæ_, 51.
Christian Doctrine, The Order of the, 139.
Christianity, 8, 61, 116, 174, 228, 248, 304.