[Frontispiece: Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven]
DEDUCTIONS FROM
THE WORLD WAR
BY
BARON VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL STAFF
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1918
COPYRIGHT, 1918
BY
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK
COPYRIGHT
BY
CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press, New York
_INTRODUCTORY NOTE_
_Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, the author of this book, is the most
distinguished soldier-writer of Prussia. In other words, since none
will dispute Prussia her militarism, he is the most distinguished
living writer on militarism in theory and practice._
_Freytag comes of a Baltic family. He was born in Russia, the son of
a Russian diplomatist, and he served in the Russian Army before, at
the age of twenty-one, he joined a Prussian Guard Regiment. Before
the war he was an influential member of the General Staff in Berlin,
and had made a reputation by his writings on the history and science
of war. On the outbreak of war he became the German representative
on the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The military weakness of
Austria has in recent years been a commonplace in Berlin, and Freytag
duly tells us how the "brave troops" of the Dual Monarchy "had to
suffer for the sins and omissions of which the Parliaments had been
guilty." When Count Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff,
was superseded by Falkenhayn, after the failure of the original
German offensive in the West, Freytag became Quartermaster-General in
the field, and Moltke became Deputy Chief of the General Staff--that
is to say, head of such parts of the General Staff Organization as
remain in Berlin, while the main business of the General Staff is
conducted from "Great Headquarters" in the field._
_At the beginning of August, 1916, Falkenhayn was superseded in his
turn by Hindenburg, after the German failure at Verdun. Freytag's
post of Quartermaster-General was merged in the larger post which was
now created for Ludendorff, and, Moltke having died in June, Freytag
was appointed in September, 1916, to the post, which he still holds,
of Deputy Chief of the General Staff._
_Shortly before his appointment, Freytag's position as chief writer
to the Prussian Army was put beyond dispute by his decoration with
the Order Pour le Mérite (Peace Class). The Order Pour le Mérite
(Military Class) was founded by Frederick the Great, and has now been
conferred upon innumerable Prussian officers. Freytag is apparently
the only officer who has received during the present war the Order
Pour le Mérite (Peace Class), which was founded by Frederick William
IV in 1842, and is conferred for distinction in "Science and Arts."_
_"DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WORLD WAR" was written for German consumption.
As soon as a few German newspaper reviews called attention to its
contents, and especially to the chapters "The Army in the Future" and
"Still Ready for War" with their candid explanation of the way in
which Germany proposes, this war finished, to prepare for the next,
all comment was restricted or suppressed. Circulation of the book in
Germany was promoted, but its export was prohibited, and very few
copies have found their way across the frontier._
_This book is interesting as an attempt to lay the foundations of
"history"; it is comparable with the "popular edition" of Moltke's
"History of the Franco-German War of 1870," upon which a whole
generation of Germany was brought up, while the real history of the
war was being written in France--for posterity. The book is very
instructive as a denunciation of international ideals and as a
warning of the plans which are being made in Berlin for the cold and
reasoned application of the lessons of the war and the development of
a still more scientific military system, a still more perfect
war-machine, than existed in 1914. Again, we have here, on the best
possible authority, the warning that Germany--with all her avowed
indignation at the idea of an economic "war after the war"--is
determined not only to rebuild her military system, but to build it
this time upon an indestructible economic foundation. But above all
Freytag's book is a revelation because he says what Germany thinks.
"War has its basis in human nature," he writes, "and as long as human
nature remains unaltered, war will continue to exist, as it has
existed already for thousands of years." That view is universal in
Germany, and to the German people Freytag's deductions will seem to
be only logic and common sense. In reality, Freytag the soldier says
nothing a whit stronger in praise of militarism than is said in his
apt quotations from Prince Bülow the civilian. Militarism is not a
Prussian invention; militarism is Prussia herself. And so long as
Prussia rules Germany, all talk that seeks to distinguish "war
parties" from "peace parties," "militarists" from "statesmen" is
misleading._
_J.E.M._
_December, 1917._
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD
It may seem presumptuous to draw conclusions from the World War while
it is still in progress. And yet it is imperative that we should be
clear in regard to a number of questions which have presented
themselves as a result of the War. We must look for their solution
in the State and the Army. The War must admonish us to submit our
whole national life and our military organisation to an examination
in the light of the experiences which we have gained. Such an
examination cannot and should not be much longer postponed.
Without clear views and an adequate understanding of the major
sequences of the War, not only as regards operations and tactics, but
also as regards world-politics and world-economics, without carefully
balancing the new experience that it has brought us against all that
it has confirmed and that has to be maintained, we shall not be in a
position to draw accurate deductions for the future. Towards this
the writer hopes to contribute by means of the following arguments.
They are addressed equally to the Army and the nation.
CONTENTS
CHAP.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD
I. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CENTRAL POWERS
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL AND MASSED WARFARE
III. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNICAL SCIENCE
IV. LEADERSHIP
V. THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE
VI. STILL READY FOR WAR
DEDUCTIONS FROM THE
WORLD WAR
I
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION
OF THE CENTRAL POWERS
The grouping of the Powers at the beginning and still more during the
course of the World War has been extremely unfavourable to the
Central Powers. We must go back to the desperate struggle of
Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War to find anything
comparable to it. Napoleon, too, found himself at length pitted
against all Europe, but the comparative strength of the opposed
forces at the beginning of the autumn campaign of 1813 was by no
means unfavourable to him. The Allies at that time possessed only an
insignificant superiority of numbers. Moreover, our enemies have not
had to endure what Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen in 1909 justly
deduced from the history of previous coalition wars:
"Even when all objections have been disposed of, every difficulty
overcome, even when resolution is ripened, and a powerful advance
from all sides is about to be set on foot, yet in the breast of every
individual the anxious question will still arise: Will the others
come? Will our distant Allies take their stand at the right time?"[1]
Not only did all the Allies take their stand, but, in addition, they
were reinforced by our former allies, Italy and Roumania, while
America showed herself more and more clearly a secret ally of the
Entente Powers, rendering the most valuable services by furnishing
them with all manner of requisites of war and pecuniary loans, long
before she openly took up her stand against us in February, 1917, by
severing diplomatic relations and in April by declaring a state of
war. However valuable to Germany and Austria-Hungary has been the
alliance of Turkey and later of Bulgaria, an equilibrium of forces
could not, of course, be effected by means of these States. England
has been successful in keeping the Entente together, and has utilised
the fact that the destruction of the Central Powers proved to be far
more difficult than had been anticipated in order to strengthen the
bond between herself and her Allies. They had involved themselves in
a common undertaking, which had not prospered according to
expectations. Now there was no alternative but to carry it through,
for to give it up would be equivalent to a confession of utter
failure and defeat. The ties which bound the Continental Allies to
England were constantly reinforced by the promise held out of
territorial acquisitions, as well as by monetary aids. In this
connection England's favourable position in world-politics and
world-economics stood her in noticeably good stead. The more the
prospect vanished of inflicting on us a military defeat with the aid
of the blockade, the more England strengthened her endeavour to
secure that we should at any rate find ourselves after the War in an
unfavourable economic position, both geographically and in respect of
commercial treaties. England gave expression to her desire for war
and victory by creating a strong land-army, finally adopting the
system of universal service. In so doing she broke with her
traditional custom of waging Continental wars to all intents and
purposes by means of the armies of her Allies.
In the wars against Louis XIV England had already raised herself to
the position of a great Colonial Power and had won for herself
supremacy on the sea. As a result of the Seven Years' War, she
became a World-Power. It was not, however, until the American War of
Independence that she entered upon a period of world-policy and
world-economics. It has justly been said:[2]
"World-trade there had long been, but not world-policy. Not even
England possessed the latter, in spite of her world-embracing
settlements and dominions. In fact there existed only European
policy. World-policy could only come into being when in the other
continents, as well as in our own, independent and permanent centres,
capable of asserting themselves against the European Great Powers,
had shaped for themselves a State existence. This happened in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the case of America, and in
the twentieth century in the case of Japan."
In the European Continental wars up to 1870-71, when we were still
predominantly an agrarian State, questions of world-policy and
world-economics had played a comparatively subordinate role. It has
been the development of our trade, combined with the increase of our
population, which, in the course of this World War, has thrown into
special prominence the significance of these questions in relation to
our Fatherland. The import of raw materials, foodstuffs, and
manufactured articles, the export of the products of our industries,
had become essential conditions of our economic life. In regard to
these questions the outbreak of the World War found us insufficiently
prepared. Such measures as we had taken were shown to be inadequate.
Hence in our conduct of the War we were faced with a difficult
problem, which had not arisen in the case of previous wars on the
European mainland. We found ourselves not only at such a
disadvantage in regard to the general political situation as we had
not hitherto experienced, and, as a consequence of this, faced with
an overwhelming superiority of numbers, but also we had to grapple
with an economic situation as difficult as could possibly be
imagined. This is not the place to examine how far, in view of the
all too rapid growth of her trade, world-policy and world-economics
may have been premature in the case of Germany, inasmuch as our
continental position was still by no means sufficiently assured.
Here Ranke's words are applicable: "Who can control circumstances,
calculate future events, govern the surging of the elements?"[3]
Even the power of prevision attributed to great men is after all very
limited. Friedjung[4] remarks justly that the real necessity of
events and of all which we assert to have taken place in accordance
with the laws of history only becomes apparent when the history of
the world is considered in large epochs; that, for the rest, history
is an ingenious tissue of necessity and chance, and that to estimate
future events is consequently hardly possible even for the most
clear-sighted contemporary observers. Hence diplomats have often
been unjustly accused of furnishing an incorrect report in regard to
a foreign country, concerning which they were supposed to possess an
exact knowledge. Even the most perfect knowledge of a country does
not endow its possessor with the capacity to foresee coming events,
although, of course, the gift of exact observation exists in
different degrees in different individuals. It might well be
imagined that, in this age of extreme publicity, it should be easy
enough to form a trustworthy estimate of a foreign country and its
armed power. The Press and the proceedings of Parliament furnish a
host of details from which to build up a complete picture, but
whether this picture will prove accurate in case of war is a matter
of doubt, for many unforeseen accidents, notably those resulting from
the power of personality, are in such matters peculiarly likely to
affect the issue. Thus the abundance of news which we have at our
disposal at the present day may easily serve only to obscure and
distract.
The consequences of the blockade to which the Central Powers were
subjected made themselves felt at once. Although we have succeeded
by our own might in developing and carrying on our economic life
during the War, none the less the advantages of our economic position
in the world have made themselves felt all the time. They alone
explain the fact that new opportunities of resistance constantly
revealed themselves to our opponents, because the sea was open to
them, and that victories which formerly would have been absolutely
decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, still brought us no
nearer to peace. Thus was Russia able to recover from the severe
defeats of the summer of 1915 and to attack once more in the
following year with newly-equipped armies.
Though the American Admiral Mahan, in his famous book, _The Influence
of Sea-Power on History_, summed up the result of the Seven Years'
War as follows: On the sea, immense success and material gain for
England, on land, enormous sacrifice of men, with the sole result
that the _status quo_ was maintained; though he asserts, moreover,
that the British fleet contributed most towards the overthrow of
Napoleon by cutting him off from the most important of all sources
for replenishing supplies, namely, the sea, the question of sea-power
was not really of decisive importance in those times. Pitt, in his
speech in Parliament against the Peace of Paris of 1763, already
emphasised the fact that North America had been conquered for England
in Germany. Napoleon was defeated on land. The Continental States
of that time, pre-eminently France, were still agrarian States, and
far better able than now to suffice for their own needs for a long
time. In our days of world-policy and world-economics, the views of
the famous naval writer are far more in accordance with actuality.
The fact that we have resorted to submarine warfare as a means of
self-defence is in itself a proof of it. The unsparing application
of this new weapon will hasten materially the end of this mighty
economic conflict, by means of the economic difficulties which it
will create for our opponents and for neutrals. The World War
affords incontrovertible proof that Germany must for all time to come
maintain her claim to sea-power. We need not at present discuss by
what means this aim is to be achieved.
As the result of our geographical situation, it will always remain
our task to form a just estimate of the opposing demands of
world-economics and national economics in the narrower sense, and of
oversea and continental politics. Even in land-warfare, economic
considerations have played a very considerable part. The occupation
by our troops of Belgium and of the coal and industrial district of
Northern France, as well as of Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland,
procured us important economic advantages and involved a
corresponding loss to our enemies. The main object of the Serbian
campaign was to establish a land communication with Turkey, whose
obstinate defence of the Dardanelles had rendered us signal service,
since it barred the exit from and entry to the harbours of the Black
Sea against Russia. At the same time, the operations against Serbia
procured us the valuable alliance of Bulgaria. Not only did we
acquire by this means an accession of strength against the numerical
superiority of our enemies, but also the possibility of trade
intercourse with the Balkan States. A year later, the unwelcome
hostility of Roumania and her overthrow procured us further economic
advantages and secured our position in regard to the whole of the
Balkans. Now, as always, it is the sword which decides in war; it is
victory on the battle-field that gives the decision, but its effect
is far more dependent than it used to be on world-economic factors.
These factors are to be traced through the whole of this War.
To be sure, modern times had already witnessed one great economic
war. The American Civil War of the sixties of last century arose out
of the economic antagonism between the trading and industrial States
of the North and the cotton-growing States of the South of the Union.
In the latter, cultivation by the aid of slaves formed the basis of
the industry, and to this extent the slave question was a factor in
the dispute. It was not, however, until later that the demand for
the abolition of slavery found wide expression in the North and was
utilised as a welcome means of stirring up feeling against the South.
The real points at issue were that the Northern States wanted high
protective duties, while the Southern States wanted to facilitate
export, and that the Northern States had a special interest in
utilising the customs revenues for investments which should above all
be of advantage to their trade, but which were a matter of
indifference to the South. The American War of Secession, like
everything else American at that time, attracted little attention
with us. Germany was still only a geographical conception; there
could be no question of a world-policy for its component States.
Moreover, our own wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, claimed all our
attention. Yet, different as were the cause, the development, and
the other conditions of the American Civil War compared with the
present World War, the economic factors which in each case found
expression have engendered more than one similar phenomenon. The
Northern States endeavoured at the outset, by the aid of their
imposing fleet, to cut off the Southern States, which had no
battle-fleet worth mentioning, from their sea-borne supplies, and,
also, on land, from the Mississippi and the corn-growing States of
the South-West, and thus paralyse them economically. The valour of
the Southern troops, who were far inferior numerically, as well as of
their generals, and, above all, the distinguished leadership of Lee,
for four years rendered impossible the accomplishment of this
so-called "Anaconda plan," until the Southern States finally
succumbed to the blockade.
Things never quite repeat themselves in history. But we may learn
from history. Not in order to be more prudent another time, but in
order to be wise for all time, as Jacob Burckhardt says. In this
sense, the American Civil War might have furnished us many a hint
which was left disregarded. But we must confess, as Professor
Bernhard Harms said in a lecture, that in August, 1914, we found
ourselves confronted with the problem of conducting a war governed by
world-economic considerations without immediately comprehending it.
To be sure, our opponents too only gradually perceived the true
situation. The operations which they had begun extracted only little
by little the full advantage of the world-economic situation, which
was favourable to them and unfavourable to us; they did so only when
they met with an unexpected force of resistance in the Central
Powers. But in any case, in our military conduct of the War, we drew
the necessary conclusions from the world-situation, and were at pains
to turn it to account by means of a far-reaching organisation.
In every domain only the War itself could be the great teacher in
regard to these hitherto unknown effects of world-economics upon its
range. It was generally taken for granted that a long war was in
these days hardly practicable. For England it was "a commercial war
with a view to her own enrichment and the annihilation of her chief
rival."[5] Nevertheless, even England did not at the outset reckon
for a war of such long duration. Only when it became apparent that
the forcible annihilation of her "chief rival" by the aid of her
Allies was not to be accomplished did England find herself compelled
to make considerable additions to her fighting forces, and finally to
adopt the system of universal service. Lord Kitchener was prompt in
grasping the situation, and, by erecting a strong army, put the
country in a position to sustain a long war.
Even Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen, for all his farsightedness,
though he insisted that the frontal attack would produce no decisive
result, but that the campaign would drag itself out, declared in the
article already referred to:
"Such wars are, however, impossible at a time when the existence of
the nation is based upon the unbroken continuance of trade and
industry, and the machinery which has been brought to a standstill
must be set in motion again by a speedy decision. A strategy of
exhaustion becomes impossible, when the maintenance of it demands
milliards from millions."
This frontal wearing down of forces in entrenched warfare has none
the less taken place on most sections of the fronts; but we have
reaped positive results only from the war of movement. The
present-day world has, contrary to expectation, proved itself capable
of enduring a long war, though at the cost of such destruction as
humanity has never before experienced. The expenditure of milliards
would to be sure have been avoided, if we had succeeded, as Count
Schlieffen in the same argument goes on to suggest, in conducting the
attack on a large scale against the front and both flanks of the
enemy, and in developing it to a sweeping victory. We did, in fact,
achieve several local victories of this nature, but we did not
achieve such a victory at the Marne with our whole western army at
the beginning of the War. It is fruitless to picture to oneself how,
if the case had been otherwise, events might have developed in
detail, but we may confidently assert that a complete German victory
at the Marne in September, 1914, would have given quite another
character to the whole War, and would certainly have shortened it
very considerably. From this may be seen the full significance of a
decisive military success, even in a war so influenced by
world-economics as the present.
[1] _Deutsche Revue_, January, 1909.
[2] Alexander v. Peetz. Introduction to _Weltpolitische
Neubildungen_, by Paul Dehn.
[3] _Ursprung des Siebenjährigen Krieges_.
[4] _Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland_, Introduction to
Vol. II.
[5] Dr. Georg Solmssen. _England und Wir!_ Lecture delivered at
Cologne, November 13, 1916.
II
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONAL AND
MASSED WARFARE
In the course of the present World War the soul of a war waged by
means of great national armies has revealed itself as something
special, something hitherto inexperienced. Its origin may be traced
back to the time of the French Revolution. The _levée en masse_ of
the French Republic is, to be sure, to a great extent legendary. It
furnished hardly a quarter of the anticipated man-power.
Clausewitz[1] remarks justly:
"If the whole War of the Revolution passed over without all this
making itself felt in its full force and becoming quite evident; if
the generals of the Revolution did not persistently press on to the
final extreme, and did not overthrow the monarchies in Europe; if the
German armies now and again had the opportunity of resisting with
success and checking for a time the torrent of victory--the cause lay
in reality in that technical incompleteness with which the French had
to contend, which showed itself first among the common soldiers, then
in the generals, lastly, at the time of the Directory, in the
Government itself. After all this was perfected by the hand of
Buonaparte, this military power, based on the strength of the whole
nation, marched over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely
and certainly that wherever it encountered only the old-fashioned
armies, the result was not doubtful for a moment."
Yet Napoleon waged his victorious wars with a prætorian army. Only
at the period of his decline did he utilise the national strength to
a fuller extent. After the overthrow of his army in Russia, he made
what were for those days enormous levies in France, amounting in all
to 1,237,000 men. Even at the time when his power was increasing, it
was not so much the strength of the armies which he placed in the
field that decided the issue as the fact that the other States were
not at that time in a position to make good their losses by a
continual requisitioning of the national strength.
The French people did not by any means flock enthusiastically to the
Imperial flag. After the repulse of the invasion of 1792, their
warlike ardour had been more and more extinguished. In the case of
the increased levies of the last year of the First Empire, it was
necessary to resort to violent measures in order to carry out the
conscription. Hence, though the Napoleonic army was supported upon
the national strength, it was never a national army in the true sense
of the term.
On the other hand, the designation "national army" exactly applies to
the Prussian army of the War of Liberation. The population of the
diminished and impoverished Prussian State at that time numbered less
than five millions, and of this number the Prussian army included in
August, 1813, not less than 271,000 men. Moreover, the recourse to
the provinces for the organisation of the _Landwehr_ gave the army a
special character. By the retention of universal military service
even after the war, the Prussian army was differentiated from the
armies of other States. In Prussia alone, after the great campaigns
of the beginning of the nineteenth century, did a genuine fusion take
place between nation and army. But even in 1870-71 the strain upon
our national strength for the purposes of war was nothing like as
great as in the present World War. We entered upon the
Franco-Prussian War with the advantage on our side, and therefore it
appeared to many unnecessary to requisition the national strength
more extensively than had been done hitherto.
Only reluctantly did Roon accede to Moltke's demand on December 8,
1870, for further supplies of troops, which were rendered necessary
by the growing extension of the theatre of war and by the mass-levies
of the Republic in the second period of the war; and yet how modest
appears this demand compared with the conditions of the present day.
It amounted only to the calling up of fifty-seven Landwehr battalions
which were employed at home for guarding prisoners or for coast
defence, and the transfer to Alsace-Lorraine of a number of reserve
battalions. This proposal, emanating from the Chief of the General
Staff, was to be sure the result of the increasing difficulties which
the national war in France was causing, but although even at that
time nation was contending against nation on French soil, yet the
armies of the Republic consisted only of masses of men hurriedly
scrambled together, who were again and again routed by the onset of
the German troops, which, though far inferior in numbers, were vastly
superior in fighting efficiency. Thus even the 950,000 men whom
France still had under arms at the conclusion of the war could not
alter the fate of the country.
"Gambetta believed," writes Arthur Chuquet,[2] "that the legendary
marvels of 1792 and 1793 could be repeated. He overlooked the fact
that it was the cowardice and lack of discipline of the volunteer
forces of the First Republic which were mainly responsible for the
defeat of the revolutionary armies, and that the Republic at that
time was saved, not by the heroism of its troops, but by dissension
within the coalition."
The campaign against the army of the Second Empire had demonstrated
the superiority of our own army based upon the principle of universal
military service. The campaign against the Republic revealed the
hopelessness of the resistance of a completely improvised militia to
disciplined troops. Nevertheless, no really new points of view in
the realm of war psychology were revealed in this instance. Quite
otherwise was it in the case of the American Civil War. Here the
Southern States were very soon compelled to resort to universal
military service, and the Northern States to raise larger and larger
volunteer levies, with a longer term of service. Like every other
civil war, this was steeped in the hatred of both parties. In the
Southern States the reaction of the national character upon military
efficiency was revealed very clearly. They continued their
resistance to the utmost limit. But Europe, up to the outbreak of
the World War, had not witnessed any such phenomena in war. It was
the adoption of universal military service by all the Great Powers,
as a result of the German victories of 1870-71, which first
introduced a new element into the conduct of war. This inevitably
made itself all the more perceptible when the increased facilities of
communication of modern times rendered the nations more closely
coherent within their own borders and more accessible to the
suggestive influence of the Press for good as well as for ill. That
men have always been susceptible to suggestion is demonstrated by the
spread of religious fanaticism, but the present age has increased
this susceptibility still further. Even distinguished minds are
subject to mass-suggestion, as is shown in the case of numerous
distinguished scholars and artists among our enemies. Neither
judgment nor good taste availed to prevent them from joining in the
general orgies of hatred directed against everything German.
Among the factors which have contributed in recent times to increase
this susceptibility of the masses must be counted the political
elections, which have everywhere stirred up passions and prejudiced
sound judgment. They alone explain many events which have taken
place in America. In the several States there are over twenty
offices which have to be filled annually by means of public
elections. And in these it is not the personal opinion of the voter
that counts, but the party politicians and their whips. It is the
ingenuity and unscrupulousness of the latter, as well as their
expenditure of large sums of money, that decide the issue. It is, in
fact, in the great democratic republics that we find the worst form
of moral servitude. The widely-diffused but superficial education of
the masses renders them peculiarly open to suggestion. The sense of
unity of whole nations has been considerably enhanced by the fact
that in present-day warfare the entire population is involved either
directly or indirectly. The countries as a whole are implicated
economically.
In 1914 for the first time France opposed to our national army an
army organised upon the basis of universal military service; an army,
moreover, in which hatred against everything German had been kindled
by the assiduous fostering through decades of the agitation for a war
of _revanche_. The overwhelming impression of our initial successes,
which had by no means been anticipated when Germany was attacked on
all sides, inflamed these passions still further. The Swiss writer
Stegemann, in his history of this War,[3] suggests that it may have
been suspected in foreign countries that the preparedness of
Germany's army and navy, which had been achieved during long years by
infinite labour and feverish activity, was merely apparent and was
associated with a degeneration of nervous force.
"To this suspicion the campaigns of this War have furnished a heroic
answer. When the order of mobilisation was published, all trace of
nervousness vanished. Even from a distance one could perceive the
power and energy of a military organisation which was suddenly called
from its tranquil development to perform the most exalted
achievements. This gave nourishment to the theory that Germany had
intentionally provoked the War. The thoroughness in execution which
was really due to the character and constitution of the nation was
misconstrued as the deliberate provocation of war."
As a result of the thoughtless adoption of _franc-tireur_ methods of
warfare in Belgium, with the support and approval of the authorities,
the War acquired from the outset still more of the character of a
struggle of nation against nation. The principle that war is
directed only against the armed strength of the enemy-State and not
against its population could not under these circumstances be upheld
by our troops. They found themselves compelled to resort to severe
measures of retaliation. Thus the War acquired a character of
brutality which is otherwise very alien to the nature of our
well-conducted German soldiers.
The self-assurance of the French army, which had already begun to
waver, was restored after the Battle of the Marne. Subsequently the
French authorities left no stone unturned in order, with the aid of a
corrupt and lying Press, to sustain the confidence of the nation in
an ultimate victory. The continued augmentation of the allied
English army, the alleged inexhaustible reserves of Russia (in spite
of all the defeats which she had suffered), the entry into the War of
Italy, and, later, of Roumania as Allies, the munitions furnished by
America, and finally her open partnership against us--all this had to
be utilised again and again to strengthen the tissue of lies which
France wove round herself more and more closely, so closely that the
French finally lost all sense of truth. Thus the French army is
inspired, even if not consciously so in all its members, with the
feeling that it is not only a question of freeing the native soil
from a hated invader, but also of a struggle for the future
world-position of France. The characteristics of the French soldier
have always been a product rather of his race than of any military
training. They explain the devotion and the contempt of death with
which whole divisions have hurled themselves forward again and again
in dense masses in hopeless attempts to break through.
The French national character exhibits striking contradictions. High
and noble qualities exist side by side with base impulses. The
French soldier exhibits heroic courage side by side with the
instincts of a "_Nettoyeur_," and, in the treatment of our prisoners,
his conduct has been worthy of an apache. The French officers have
completely lost that chivalrous sentiment which as late as 1870 found
expression in the words of an old Frenchman: "The person of a
prisoner is sacred." The French, both white and black, and their
women no less, have not scrupled to jeer at and ill-treat our
prisoners in the most flagrant manner, and the Government of the
Republic has in general furnished an example of unworthy treatment of
prisoners. The naturally amiable and, under ordinary circumstances,
good-natured Frenchman easily degenerates, as a result of his
excitable temperament, into the very opposite. The history of the
wars of religion and of the Revolution affords evidence of the fact.
The human beast is always roused in him with surprising suddenness.
His characteristic light-heartedness engenders in him a
disinclination to think things out to a conclusion. This renders him
very susceptible to influence, and prevents him from seeing through
the tissue of lies presented to him in the newspapers. While the
Frenchman had always displayed military aptitude, his training in
time of peace upon the basis of universal military service had only
still further developed his good military qualities, and he has never
exhibited those failings which formerly and often erroneously have
been attributed to French armies, such as lack of endurance in
difficult situations, the inability to endure defeats, susceptibility
to panic. The effect of universal military service has manifestly
been to discipline the whole nation, and to furnish an appropriate
vessel for its always very strongly developed sense of unity. Those
who judged the French nation by the customary standard of former days
have been astonished at their conduct in this War.
As England has developed into a Land Power only in the course of this
War, it has been only by degrees that warlike enthusiasm has infected
the masses of her people. England, great as have been her feats of
organisation, has never been able to make up for the advantage with
which France entered the War owing to her possession of universal
military service. Since she took her time, and the nature of
entrenched warfare made it possible, England was able, however, to
furnish her numerous new formations with a training which was lacking
in the armies of Gambetta. Nevertheless, the new English divisions
could not attain either the coherence of the old troops of the
expeditionary army first dispatched to France or the fighting value
of the French troops. The English reached a high degree of technical
efficiency, but their fighting tactics remained defective. Also, for
all that tough courage peculiar to the Englishman, they lacked that
spirit which can be engendered only by the consciousness of a lofty
national purpose such as that for which the French were fighting. In
place of her voluntary army England gradually built up for herself on
French soil a national army; but, voluntary army or national army, it
served only the ends of English politics and the economic war against
Germany. If the purpose of the War played only a minor part in the
case of the voluntary army, it played a very considerable part in the
case of the national army. If this purpose was not presented clearly
and comprehensively to the understanding of every individual, the
maximum amount of effort could not be expected from this army. In
stirring up and working upon the feelings of the masses, England in
fact showed no more scruples than France. Though the Englishman is
less excitable by temperament, he is all the more obstinate in
clinging to a notion which has once taken root in his mind. This
stirring up of hatred has in his case, too, engendered distressing
excesses as regards the treatment of German prisoners. In certain
cases, even if not as a general rule, the English have shown
themselves not behind the French in brutality.
Thus we had to wage war against enemies who were under the influence
of a mass-psychosis. This has engendered phenomena such as Europe
had not witnessed since the time of the wars of religion. Deeds of
horror and senseless rage of destruction, such as are described for
us in _Simplicissimus_ have again made themselves manifest. The
notion that humanity as a whole had advanced spiritually was proved
to be an error. The vast distance between civilisation and _Kultur_
was clearly revealed.
After the Thirty Years' War an effort was made to alleviate, by
careful training of the men, the horrors of war due to the outrages
of the military rabble. Thus it was asserted in praise of Prince
Eugène of Savoy that in the neighbourhood of his camp the peasant
could till his field unmolested. Instead of war being made to feed
itself, a complicated system of supplies was adopted. The result was
that the war strategy of the weak voluntary armies of that time
became fixed more and more into a conventional mould, from which
Frederick the Great was the first to emancipate it, so far as the
limited means available at that time rendered this possible.
Subsequently, under Napoleon, war developed more and more into "true
war," to use Fichte's expression. This transformation, however,
could be fully effected only by means of universal military service.
Universal military service holds sway over our age and for
generations will not vanish. To it Prussia-Germany owes her
advancement, and it was inevitable that, when all the Great Powers
adopted it, the violence of war should again be augmented. We must
not let the bright side of universal service blind us to its dark
side. Henceforth the passion of war infected whole nations, and this
passion was constantly inflamed anew by contact with that of the
enemy. Therewith many of those barriers were overthrown by means of
which the professional soldiery, preserving the chivalrous customs of
the Middle Ages, had sought to check the excesses of war. Also the
barriers which International Law had sought to oppose to the
encroachments of war collapsed in the face of this new violence.
At the same time factors were introduced into the World War which
could not fail to react upon the strategical and tactical conditions
and which it will be impossible to disregard in the future. They
call for a new standard in measuring the efficiency of armies. Thus
the efficiency of the German troops far surpasses that which might
have been expected according to the standard of earlier times. Even
in regard to the operations at the Loire at the turn of the year
1870-71, the late Field-Marshal Freiherr von der Goltz wrote in his
Reminiscences[4]:
"With the exception of a few stout hearts, everyone was sick of even
the most successful battles. The fire of war still burnt, but with a
dim and flickering light. The craving to enjoy at length the
longed-for term of tranquillity was very widespread."
In these words is reflected the effect of an exhausting triumphal
progress which the second army had pushed into the heart of the enemy
country. Here, in fact, the thought might well intrude: Have we not
now had victory enough? And yet at that time less than five months
of war had elapsed, and the course of the war had been
extraordinarily successful. The troops had not undergone anything
like such tremendous experiences as they have had in the present
World War. In this War the consciousness that our national existence
is at stake has raised us above ourselves.
All of us, leaders as well as men, have human weaknesses, and
assuredly not all German soldiers are heroes by nature. But it is
precisely in this--in the fact that the weak are carried along with
the strong--that the educative force of this struggle for the
existence of Germany is revealed. The weak could not do otherwise
than strive to be heroes. Reverses, such as were occasionally
inevitable in this long and tremendous War, have doubtless had a
temporarily depressing effect upon the troops, and after efforts and
a consumption of nervous force such as have never been experienced in
any previous wars, the craving for rest has sometimes made itself
felt. But even in the third year of the War, the fire of war did not
merely flicker with a dim light, but was constantly rekindled to
fresh flame. In Transylvania and Roumania and in Eastern Galicia in
1917 the troops displayed an ardour equal to that of the first days
of the War. The magic of victory enabled them to defy all the
difficulties of the ground and all the inclemencies of the weather.
They would not, of course, have been a national army, linked to the
homeland by a thousand ties, if they had felt no desire for the
conclusion of a long war, a war demanding ever fresh sacrifices, and
if a calmer feeling had not taken the place of the enthusiasm of the
first months. But it was just such a feeling that was necessary for
the accomplishment of such gigantic achievements in the West and in
the East. What was wanted was not enthusiasm, but the living heroic
sense of duty on the German soldier. Moreover, there exists in our
army a cool contempt for danger, such as elsewhere has only been
exhibited in picked professional armies, and yet ours has remained a
national army in the best sense of the word.
Clausewitz declares[5]:
"If we look at a wild warlike race, then we find a warlike spirit in
individuals much more common than in a civilised people; for in the
former almost every warrior possesses it, whilst in the civilised,
whole masses are only carried away by it from necessity, never by
inclination."
None the less, the inculcated sense of duty, the conscious will of
the whole people, when, as in the case of this War, it is a question
of safeguarding our most treasured possessions, and when the purpose
of the War is clearly manifest, has brought forth even loftier
achievements than mere warlike impulse, or, as in the case of the
Japanese, the sense of the blessedness of extinction.
In fact, we cannot sufficiently express our joyful recognition of the
high sense of duty and the power of resistance which our troops have
everywhere displayed in the face of overwhelmingly superior forces,
while at the same time we ought not to refuse our respect even for
our enemies, above all the French. For they too were prepared and
resolved every one to die for his country. On both sides was
revealed a nervous force, a capacity of resistance to inclement
conditions, with which no one had credited the civilised humanity of
the present day, more especially in the face of the increased
effectiveness of present-day weapons. Before the War it was looked
upon as an understood thing that the efficiency of the older classes
of recruits was only limited. Field-Marshal Count Schlieffen, who
taught us how to manipulate a massed army, and who, because he was
convinced of the great importance of numbers in war, was unwilling to
abandon the employment of the older drafts in the front line: none
the less declared, "Landwehr and Landsturm, territorial army and
territorial army reserves, can only to a very limited extent be
reckoned as part of the nation in arms."
If the World War has not confirmed this prediction, it is due to the
fact that such imponderable things defy any attempt to assess them.
Hence it is not to be wondered at that we encountered surprises in
these matters. The improved hygiene and treatment of wounds of the
present day have contributed greatly to maintaining the efficiency of
the national armies. In the case of Germany, above all, medical art
and science have achieved wonders. They have succeeded in preserving
our army from those epidemics which have been the scourge of previous
armies and in restoring to it almost 90 per cent. of its wounded.
Only by their aid has it been possible to maintain continuously the
full strength of our troops and to carry on the war for so long.
The Russians have afforded us less cause for surprise than the rest
of our enemies. True they brought up their masses earlier than had
been anticipated, but these, as was to be expected, proved themselves
very unwieldy, so that the superior mobility of our troops helped to
restore the balance. Their unshaken resistance to the Russian mass
attacks did the rest.