CHAPTER VI

THE SEAMEN AT GALLIPOLI

At the outbreak of war, Germany was represented in the Mediterranean by

two vessels, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, more likely, perhaps, to

become historical than any two that she will ever build. Both were

modern vessels, the _Goeben_, a first-class battle-cruiser, carrying

ten 11-inch guns and capable of 28 knots, and the _Breslau_, a light

cruiser of about the same speed and with twelve 4.1-inch guns. Outside

the Adriatic, these were the only hostile men-of-war with which the

Allies in the Mediterranean had to reckon; and, though full allowance

must be made for the responsibilities entailed in preventing a sortie

of the Austrian Navy, in convoying troops from Algeria to France, and

in avoiding the least infringement of neutral waters, the escape of the

_Goeben_ and _Breslau_ must still be regarded as a disaster to our arms.

On August 4th, before the declaration of war between Germany and Great

Britain, but after France and Germany had already begun hostilities,

the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ had shelled Phillippeville and Bona, two

Algerian ports belonging to France, and had returned to Messina in

Sicily on August 5th. Here they obtained coal from vessels in the

harbour, {101} the Italian authorities refusing, under the laws of

neutrality, to allow them facilities for coaling ashore, and, by the

same rule, they had to leave territorial waters within twenty-four

hours. Their movements and whereabouts had, of course, been known

throughout to Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in command of the British

Mediterranean Fleet; and now, being free to attack them, he was

awaiting their departure, together with a subsidiary squadron under

Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge. The German admiral and his officers

had no illusions as to the destiny that awaited them when they put to

sea; made their wills; and steamed out of harbour on the evening of

August 6th. Their design, it was believed, was to rush the Straits of

Otranto and join up with the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic. The

paramount importance of not affording Italy the least pretext of

complaint seems to have weighed heavily on the British admirals. The

_Goeben_ and _Breslau_, heading apparently for the Straits, suddenly

changed course for the southeast; and, though the light cruiser

_Gloucester_, which had kept in touch with them, immediately notified

this and went gallantly in pursuit, the superior power and speed of the

two German cruisers enabled them to fight her off and make good their

escape.

They passed through the Dardanelles on August 10th, and, three days

later, were said to have been bought by the Turkish Government, by

whose officers and crews they were in future to be manned. Sir

Berkeley Milne was recalled for an inquiry, the senior French officer,

Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, taking his place as Commander of the

combined British and {102} French forces, on August 30th; and, on

September 20th, Rear-Admiral Troubridge also returned home. At his own

request, he was court-martialled on November 5th, Admirals Sir Hedworth

Meux and Sir George Callaghan conducting the inquiry, and, on November

12th, it was announced that he had been acquitted of all blame. Sir

Berkeley Milne was also exonerated as the result of an Admiralty

investigation.

So ended an episode in which, from the strictly naval standpoint, and

though our leaders in the Mediterranean were held free from blame, it

must be admitted that the honours rested with the German admiral and

the perspicacity of his advisers in Berlin. Whether or no the arrival

at Constantinople of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ was the determining

factor in the Turkish Government's policy; how, if they had been sunk

by us, that Government might have acted; and the effect on the

situation that they had created of a prompter and more drastic action

on our own part--these matters can never probably be accurately

determined. On the other hand, it is clear that, both in material and

moral effect, their presence was an enormous asset to German diplomacy;

and that, indirectly at any rate, our campaign in Gallipoli, with all

its consequences, derived from them. On September 27th, Turkey closed

the Dardanelles; on October 31st, she declared war; and, three days

later, on instructions from the Admiralty, but without reference to the

War Council, certain units of the Mediterranean Fleet shelled the outer

forts of the Dardanelles. In the light of after events, this was {103}

undoubtedly an error, but it was undertaken at the time with the

purpose of ascertaining the effective range of the protecting Turkish

guns.

Now to obtain a fair picture of the operations at Gallipoli that were

afterward undertaken--operations in the first place wholly naval, but

finally predominantly military--it is necessary to return for a moment

to London and to study the general background against which they must

be viewed. Here, after all, were the two or three brains upon which,

as a whole, our strategy depended; and it is interesting to note how

the mechanism through which they acted had become moulded and modified

by the stress of war. For it must be remembered that, after those

admirable dispositions, long considered and provided for by the

Committee of Imperial Defence, had been undertaken--after not only the

navy and army, but every affected department had gone, as it were, to

its war-stations--an era followed that is best to be described as the

era of improvisation.

No such war had been fought upon the earth's surface, and each

succeeding day opened a new prospect. With every branch of both

services discovering strange and imperative needs; with no section of

our national life that was failing to experience some fresh

dislocation--it was little wonder that, in the various higher

executives, changes and experiments in change should have been found

necessary. Many, perhaps most of these, were proved to be inadequate,

and replaced by others as the war went on. Others were doomed from the

first and should never have been embarked upon. It had been so

arranged, for {104} example, at the War Office, that most of the

General Staff officers should take commands in the field; and, when

Lord Kitchener became Secretary for War, the General Staff practically

ceased to exist.

Accustomed to self-reliance, to centralization even in the minutest

details, Lord Kitchener assumed powers so various and important, as it

was impossible for any one man to wield; and, to some extent, though

not to such an extreme, a similar process had set in at the Admiralty.

Instead of the Board of Admiralty, consisting of the First Lord, the

four Sea Lords, the two Civil Lords, the Parliamentary and Permanent

Secretaries, there had come into being a War Staff Group, including the

First Lord and the First Sea Lordd (but none of the other Sea Lords),

the Chief of Staff, the Permanent Secretary, a Naval Secretary, and Sir

Arthur Wilson--the latter, "Tug" Wilson, as he was called, although

retired, being regarded as one of our greatest naval strategists. That

was the composition in November, 1914, of the real directorate of the

navy, Lord Fisher, who succeeded Prince Louis of Battenburg, on October

30th, being First Sea Lord.

As in the War Office and Admiralty, a similar kind of change had become

observable in the Cabinet. Theoretically the direction of the war

rested, of course, in the hands of this body, assisted in their

deliberations by the Committee of Imperial Defense. Practically both

the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defense fell more and more

into abeyance, the conduct of the war passing into the hands of a new

and smaller body, known as the War Council. {105} This consisted of

the Prime Minister, then Mr. Asquith, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,

Mr. Lloyd George, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary

of State for India, the Marquis of Crewe, the Secretary for War, Lord

Kitchener, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill.

Of these, however, the main responsibility rested upon Mr. Asquith, Mr.

Churchill, and Lord Kitchener. This was in practice the triumvirate

then conducting the war, as far as the British Empire was concerned,

and each of the three was a man of strong and outstanding personality.

In Mr. Asquith the country was being served by a statesman of very

typical English qualities, imperturbable, perhaps a little slow-moving,

magnanimous, shrewd, and of great intellectual capacity. In Mr.

Churchill the Admiralty had at its head a man of brilliant and

impulsive mentality, complete physical and moral fearlessness, and a

somewhat headstrong initiative. In Lord Kitchener there had come to

the War Office the foremost soldier of the Empire, the man who had been

recalled by an irresistible popular appeal from the governorship of

Egypt, in whose name the new armies, voluntarily recruited from every

social rank, had outrun equipment, ammunition, even places to be lodged

in--a man who already, in his sixty-fourth year, had become an almost

legendary figure, the liberator of the Sudan, Roberts' successor in

South Africa, the administrator of India and Egypt, omnivorous of work,

relentless, silent, and the public's beau-ideal of personal efficiency.

But, while of these three, it was little wonder that, {106} politics

apart, Lord Kitchener predominated, another figure, scarcely less

powerful, and hardly second as a national idol, stood, as it were, at

the elbow of this inner triumvirate in the person of Lord Fisher. The

maker of the modern navy, and, in an even more vital sphere, as

authoritative an influence as Lord Kitchener, at the age of seventy he

had returned to the Admiralty with an almost equal popular approval.

He had not, however, as had Lord Kitchener, an actual place in the War

Council; and he was not, of course, present at many of its meetings.

This was the position at home, then, when, at a gathering of the War

Council, held on November 25th, it was suggested by Mr. Churchill that

the best way to defend Egypt was to attack some part of Turkey's

Asiatic coast, and that an occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula would

give us the control of the Dardanelles and put Constantinople at our

mercy--the idea in Mr. Churchill's mind being evidently that of a

combined naval and military movement on a big scale. That some such

attack on the Turkish lines of communication might eventually become

desirable Lord Kitchener agreed. He did not consider, however, that

the time had arrived for it; and when, a few days later, Mr. Churchill

suggested to the War Office the advisability of collecting enough

transport for 40,000 men--such transport to be assembled in Egypt--Lord

Kitchener again replied that he did not think this was yet necessary,

and that he would give the Admiralty full notice. The precaution was

taken, however, in spite of this, to send horse-boats to Egypt whenever

convenient, in view of the possible {107} occasion of some such

expedition as had already now become adumbrated.

Meanwhile the navy was playing its part in various operations already

necessitated by the war with Turkey. Thus, on November 2nd, the

_Minerva_, a sixteen-year-old protected cruiser, had shelled the forts

and barracks of Akaba in the Red Sea; and, on November 8th, the town of

Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, had been bombarded to cover the

landing of troops from India, whence they captured Basra on November

21st. Simultaneously, of course, between Russia and Turkey, the

struggle for the mastery of the Black Sea had been progressing. On

November 10th, the Russians had sunk four Turkish transports; and, on

November 18th, the _Goeben_, had been materially damaged in an

engagement off Sebastopol. Two days later, the Turkish _Hamidieh_ had

bombarded Tuapse. On December 10th, the _Goeben_ having been repaired,

with the _Berk-i-Satvet_, shelled Batum; and, on December 12th, the

_Hamidieh_ was damaged by a mine in the Bosphorus. The first notable

Turkish loss, however, was in the torpedoing of the battleship

_Messudiyeh_ in the Dardanelles, on December 13th, by the British

submarine _B11_, under circumstances that will be referred to later.

On December 17th, the Russian cruiser _Askold_ sank a couple of Turkish

steamers off Beyrout, and, on December 26th, the _Goeben_ was again

damaged, this time, like the _Hamidieh_, by a mine in the Bosphorus.

Later, having been once more repaired, she was again to figure in

desultory raiding actions on Black Sea ports; but, by the end of the

year, it may be said that {108} the Russian Navy was practically in

unchallenged command of the Black Sea.

Russia's position in the land campaign against Turkey was not, however,

quite so satisfactory, and it was on January 2nd that there was

received in London a telegram from Sir George Buchanan, our ambassador

in Petrograd, destined to have a profound effect upon our Near East

policy. In this it was stated that the Russian armies were being

rather severely pressed in the Caucasus, and that the Russian

Government hoped it might be found possible for a demonstration to be

made against Turkey elsewhere. On this same day, Lord Kitchener wrote

to Mr. Churchill that he did not think we could do anything that would

seriously help the Russians in the Caucasus; that we had no troops to

land anywhere; that the only place where a demonstration might check

the sending eastward of Turkey's reinforcements was the Dardanelles;

but that we should not be ready for anything big for some months. A

telegram was, however, sent to Russia the next day that some

demonstration would be made, although it was unlikely, it was feared,

that it would have any great effect in withdrawing enemy troops from

the Caucasus. To an ally in a strait that was the only reply possible.

But to the British Government it meant this--that by January 3d it had

definitely pledged itself to make a demonstration against the Turks,

and that the Dardanelles had again been mentioned as a possible arena

of attack.

Let us consider for a moment, from the geographical standpoint, the

sort of problem that was {109} presented. A little under fifty miles

in length, the channel of the Dardanelles--the Hellespont of the

ancients--united the Sea of Marmora on the east with the Ægean Sea and

Mediterranean on the west. Its general course was from northeast to

southwest, but, at the point known as the Narrows, about fourteen miles

from the Ægean entrance, there was a kink in it, lying north and south,

a little over four miles long. In no part of its course between the

Ægean Sea and the town of Gallipoli, where it began to broaden, was it

more than 7,000 yards wide, and at the Narrows it was little more than

three-quarters of a mile across. Its depth in mid-channel varied from

25 to 55 fathoms, and down it set a current from the Sea of Marmora of

an average speed of 1-½ knots, frequently increasing, and especially in

the Narrows, after a northerly wind, to as much as 5 knots. In

addition to this, cross-currents were continually met with, owing to

the shallow bays on each side of the channel.

The boundaries of this channel were, on the north side, the Peninsula

of Gallipoli which separated it from the Gulf of Saros, and, on the

southern, the coast of Asia Minor, upon the westernmost portion of

which had stood the old town of Troy. The Peninsula of Gallipoli was a

narrow tongue of land, not more than three miles wide where it sprouted

from the mainland, swelling to twelve just above the Narrows, but only

five miles across at the Narrows themselves. It was almost wholly arid

or brush-covered, with a central and irregular spine of hills, rising,

in the plateau of Kilid Bahr and the heights {110} of Krithia and Achi

Baba, to 970, 700, and 600 feet respectively, and, except for a few

small beaches and descending stream-beds, facing both north and south

in low, precipitous cliffs.

The southern or Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles were somewhat lower

and more broken, the hills inland rising to 3,000 feet, many of them

being plentifully wooded. Of these the most famous was Kag Dagh, the

Mount Ida of the Gods, whence, in the Homeric poems, they had looked

down upon the twenty years' siege of Troy. Every yard of these shores,

indeed, as of the waters between them, was instinct with real or

legendary history. Across the Dardanelles, Leander had swum to Hero.

Over the Narrows, Xerxes had built his bridge of boats. By the same

road, a hundred and fifty years later, Alexander of Macedon had marched

to the conquest of Asia; and it had been across the Narrows, in the

middle of the fourteenth century, that the Turks from Asia had swarmed

into Europe. Constantinople and all but a few miles around it had soon

been encircled by their advance, and had been finally occupied by

Sultan Mohamed II about a hundred years afterward.

That had been in 1453, and, nine years later, recognizing the vital

importance of the Dardanelles, Mohamed II had built the first two forts

of the many that were afterward designed to protect them. These were

the Old Castles, the Castles of Europe and Asia, on either side of the

Narrows; and it had not been till two hundred years later that the two

New Castles had been built lower down, at the Ægean {111} entrance.

From that time onward, till 1864, the fortifications of the Dardanelles

may be said to have remained mediæval; but, upon the advice of Great

Britain, then Turkey's protector, new works had been undertaken, and,

after the Peace of San Stefano in 1878, there had been a further

strengthening of both coasts, the later fortifications having been

German and the artillery provided by Krupps.

Since that date, the Dardanelles had never been forced against armed

resistance, and only once before, in modern times, when the British

admiral Duckworth in 1807 had made a plucky but not very long-lived

demonstration before Constantinople--having had to retire, not without

damage, owing to the precarious nature of his communications.

Such was the geographical aspect of the problem that the Admiralty was

called upon to consider; and the fortifications protecting the Straits

were arranged somewhat as follows. Commanding the entrance, on the

European side, were forts at Cape Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr with two

others on the Asiatic side, Fort Orkanieh and Kum Kale. These

contained, between them, ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch, and two

6-inch guns. A few miles higher up, about four below the Narrows, and

just south of Point Kephez on the Asiatic coast, was Fort Dardanos,

mounting five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets, at a height of about

350 feet. Opposite this, on the European side, was Fort Soghandere.

The mouth of the Narrows themselves was very strongly guarded both at

Chanak in Asia and Kilid Bahr on the Peninsula; and a fleet approaching

the Narrows {112} would find itself confronted--apart from an unknown

number of field-guns and howitzers--with ten 14-inch, eighteen

10.2-inch, eight 9.2-inch, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns, as well as

twenty-one 8.3-inch howitzers. When it is remembered that, in

addition, there were the channel minefields and land torpedo-stations

to be reckoned with, and an area of manoeuvre less than four miles at

the widest, it will be seen that the prospect, on paper at any rate,

was a sufficiently formidable one from every standpoint. Could it

reasonably be faced by the navy alone? Was an accompanying army

absolutely essential? And, if so, of what numbers must the latter

consist to ensure success?

These were the questions that now inevitably arose; and if, from a

technical standpoint, the first could be answered satisfactorily, there

would be many obvious advantages in the purely naval attack. If the

navy, that was to say, could force itself unaided into the Sea of

Marmora and shell Constantinople, troops that would be very valuable

elsewhere need not be diverted to a new theatre of war; a great deal of

tonnage would be saved at a time when the pressure on our mercantile

marine was everywhere immense, while, if it were unsuccessful, such an

attack could be abandoned, it was thought, without much damage to our

prestige.

It was quite clear, of course, that, unless the Straits could be

secured behind it, the Fleet would not remain there for very long.

But, from evidence at the Government's disposal, it was believed that

its arrival would have immediate and far-reaching results--that a

revolution in Constantinople against {113} the pro-German Young Turk

Party would almost certainly ensue; and that Bulgaria, then neutral and

undecided, might definitely ally herself with the Entente Powers.

Further, the opening of the Dardanelles would at once facilitate the

admission into Russia of much-needed munitions, and would release, for

the benefit of the world at large, considerable supplies of cereals.

Moreover, there was another factor that forbade the question being

summarily dismissed as technically impossible. For, while it was true

that hitherto the bulk of naval opinion had been adverse to the use of

ships in a duel with forts, and while the results of purely naval

action against such defenses as those, for example, as Port Arthur, had

not been encouraging, it was realized that in the present war--as

regarded the land, at any rate--the value of fortresses had fallen very

considerably. Hammered by modern artillery, the world had seen such

strongholds as those of Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, crumbling to pieces

in a few hours, and theories were once more in the melting-pot. Since

the outbreak of war, too, there had been added to the navy, in the

15-inch guns of the _Queen Elizabeth_, the most powerful marine

artillery that the world had yet seen. Could the navy then tackle the

problem alone?

With all this in his mind, on January 3d, the day that we had pledged

ourselves to do our best, Mr. Churchill telegraphed to Vice-Admiral

Carden, then our senior officer in the Mediterranean, asking him if he

thought it practicable to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships

alone, assuming that only our {114} older battleships would be

employed, with a suitable escort of mine-sweepers and bumpers, and

suggesting that the importance of a successful result would justify

severe loss. Two days later, Vice-Admiral Carden replied that he did

not think the Dardanelles could be rushed, but that they might be

forced by extended operations with a large number of ships. On January

6th, Mr. Churchill invited Admiral Carden to forward detailed

particulars as to the force required, the manner of its employment, and

the results to be expected from it. Five days afterward, Admiral

Carden replied that five operations were possible, namely, the

destruction of the defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles; action

inside the Straits so as to clear the defenses up to and including

Point Kephez Battery; the destruction of the defenses of the Narrows;

the sweeping of a clear channel through the minefields and advance

through the Narrows, followed by a reduction of the forts farther up,

and an entrance into the Sea of Marmora. What Admiral Carden

suggested, in fact, was a methodical invasion with a systematic

demolition of the fortifications--an operation estimated to require at

least a month for its performance.

This was Admiral Carden's plan, and it was of course discussed by the

Admiralty War Group, though never officially by the Board of Admiralty;

and it is interesting to discover the general attitude of its naval

members toward the scheme. Of these by far the most influential was

Lord Fisher, who seems from the first instinctively to have distrusted

it, to have been occupied with preparing for other {115} operations

elsewhere, and to have left it, so long as it seemed to him likely to

remain subsidiary and additional to these, in the admittedly capable

hands of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson--not a regular member of the War

Group, but frequently consulted--and the then Chief of the Staff,

Admiral Henry Oliver. Sir Arthur Wilson seems on the whole to have

taken up much the same attitude as that of Lord Fisher. Admiral Oliver

believed in its possibilities, though these would largely depend, of

course, upon factors, whose importance could only be determined by

experiment. At the same time, he would apparently have preferred to

wait until the army could coöperate on a big scale. Commodore

Bartolomé, while agreeing in the preferability of a combined naval and

military operation, believed that, at a push, in a purely naval attack,

about half the forces could get through, though what they would do then

was a matter upon which he felt himself in the dark. None of these

sailors believed, since it could always be broken off, that the

proposed naval attack could lead to disaster. All assumed the

necessity, as seen by the War Council, from a political point of view,

of immediate action; and all assumed it to be the case, on the

authority of Lord Kitchener, that no troops were at the moment

available.

Thus we come to the 13th of January, the very critical date when, at a

meeting of the War Council, Mr. Churchill, with additional details,

submitted Admiral Carden's plans. The outer forts having been

destroyed, as could be done, it was believed, without the bombarding

ships coming into range of their guns, {116} the inner would be

attacked both from the Straits and by indirect fire across the

Gallipoli Peninsula. Three modern vessels and about a dozen old

battleships would, it was thought, suffice for the operation; and these

could be spared without sensibly depleting our naval strength

elsewhere. Further, the _Queen Elizabeth_, now ready for her trials

and about to carry these out at Gibraltar, could instead fledge her

virgin guns upon the forts of the Dardanelles.

Such was the proposition laid before the War Council, and it was quite

clear, of course, to every member of it that, with a minimum of effort,

it opened a vista of very dazzling political possibilities. It was

also obvious that Mr. Churchill himself believed whole-heartedly that

the attempt should be made. What was the attitude of his colleagues on

this most important occasion? Now, while in the end it was Mr. Asquith

who would have to be responsible for any decision, it was undoubtedly

Lord Kitchener, in such a matter as this, whose opinion would carry the

greatest weight; but Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were also

present, though not as executive members. Lord Kitchener, after

consideration, pronounced himself in favour of the plan, pointing out

that, if it were to prove unsuccessful, the attack could be

discontinued. Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson remained silent, and

their silence was accepted as giving technical consent. Nor would it

have been true to have interpreted it otherwise, although the minds of

both of them were occupied with other plans. It was therefore decided

to instruct the Admiralty to prepare for a naval {117} expedition in

February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with

Constantinople as its objective--a decision that was unhappily

variously understood by the different members of the Council, the

majority being under the impression that all they had done was to

sanction the tentative preliminaries of a promising line of action.

Mr. Churchill, however, thought otherwise, and, with his characteristic

energy and enterprise, now threw himself vigorously into a scheme that

more and more fully absorbed his imagination. He put himself into

touch with the French Minister of Marine, who visited London and

approved of the plans, and, with the consent of his Government,

promised the coöperation of French naval forces in the Mediterranean.

The precise sphere in which each navy was to act was determined with

great care, and it was understood that Admiral Carden was to be in

command of both forces.

Meanwhile, however, from a condition of not very enthusiastic consent,

Lord Fisher was slowly adopting an attitude of more or less active

disapproval. Already he foresaw that the proposed adventure would

almost inevitably assume dimensions that would seriously endanger the

larger scheme, upon which he and Admiral Wilson were hard at work. He

accordingly wrote direct to Mr. Asquith on January 28th, submitting a

memorandum that did not actually condemn the suggested bombardment on

its own merits, but made it clear to the Premier that Lord Fisher was

not in such accord with it as he had assumed.

{118}

Hearing of this letter, Mr. Churchill also wrote to Mr. Asquith, and,

as a result of this, on January 28th, before the next meeting of the

War Council, Mr. Asquith invited both of them to his private room for

half an hour. The drama of Gallipoli, with its throne-shaking prize

time after time on the brink of capture, with its pitiless slaughters,

its amazing achievements, its epic presentment of human courage--the

drama of Gallipoli was still in the future; but, in that half-hour, the

stage was committed to it; and there can have been few discussions,

during the course of the war, more pregnant with the issues of life and

death.

It would be tempting to linger for a moment over the historic picture

of the three men in that little room--the old Admiral, pivot of so many

controversies, but admittedly the greatest living seaman; the young

statesman, who had already in his crowded life played so many parts,

soldier, journalist, Cabinet Minister, and who had now been a brilliant

First Lord for more than three years; and the silver-haired,

ruddy-cheeked Yorkshireman, to whom this was but one of a thousand

issues, for which, as for his country's entrance into the war, he must

take the ultimate responsibility. In that half-hour, his was chiefly

to listen while the two unfolded their separate schemes. Upon the

attitude of his mind toward them at the subsequent War Council, its

final decision would mainly depend. He entered it, inclining of the

two toward Mr. Churchill's, on the ground of its general political

advantages; and indeed the preparations for carrying out the latter

were already far advanced.

{119}

This became clear when, at the Council Table, Mr. Churchill explained

what had been done. The Grand Duke Nicholas, then Commander-in-Chief

of the Russian Armies, had welcomed the idea with enthusiasm; the

French Admiralty had promised coöperation; the admiral on the spot

believed that it would succeed; the attack could be stopped if

unsuccessful; and the necessary ships were already on the way.

Further, the French were confident that the Austrian submarines could

not get as far as the Dardanelles, while the Turks, as far as was

known, had no submarines at all. Little loss was expected during the

bombardment of the entrance, though some might result during the

sweeping up of mines; the real difficulty would be the attack on the

Narrows, of which Mr. Churchill submitted the plan.

Lord Fisher then said that he had understood that the question would

not be raised to-day; but Mr. Asquith held that, in view of the steps

that had been taken, it could not be left any longer in abeyance. Lord

Kitchener considered the attack on the Dardanelles to be one of the

utmost importance, and equivalent, if successful, to a victorious

campaign fought by the new armies then training; and both Mr. Balfour

and Sir Edward Grey dwelt on its political effect upon the Balkans.

There then followed a dramatic incident. Lord Fisher, pushing his

chair back, rose from the table as though about to leave the room.

Lord Kitchener at once followed him, and asked him what he meant to do.

He said that he would not return to the Council Table and meant to

resign his position as First Sea Lord. For a few {120} minutes the two

men, each outstandingly first in his own profession, stood talking by

the window, Lord Kitchener urging Lord Fisher to come back to the

table. He was the only dissentient, as Lord Kitchener pointed out,

everybody else being in favour of the plan; and, after a little fresh

argument, Lord Fisher returned and resumed his place among the others.

Mr. Churchill had, however, noticed the incident and, after lunch, had

a private talk with Lord Fisher, strongly urging him to undertake the

operation, and obtaining his definite, if reluctant, consent to do so.

At the afternoon meeting of the War Council, Mr. Churchill then

announced that the Admiralty was willing to proceed, and, from that

time onward, he never looked back. The matter, in his own words, had

passed into the domain of action. By January 28th, therefore, the

country was finally committed to a purely naval attack on the

Dardanelles with Constantinople as its ultimate objective.

This was the decision, but almost immediately--almost insensibly in

fact--the scope of the operations began to widen. From the outset it

had been clear that the silencing of the forts would demand a certain

number of landing-parties, although it was believed that these need

only be small, consisting principally of Marines. Lord Kitchener

himself was then of the opinion that, once the ships had completed

their passage, the garrison of the Peninsula would evacuate it, and it

would cease to have any military importance. He was also quite

definite in his statement that there were no more British troops

available for {121} the purpose, an opinion which Mr. Churchill did not

share, though he was, of course, overborne by Lord Kitchener's

authority. Nevertheless the idea of military coöperation grew, as it

were, unofficially in the minds of those responsible. Sir Henry

Jackson, in a memorandum to be adopted or not, according to Admiral

Carden's discretion--pointed out that the naval bombardment was not

recommended as a sound operation, unless a strong military force was

ready to assist, or at least to follow it up.

Meanwhile the Turkish attack upon Egypt had been defeated; certain of

our plans in France and Flanders had been altered; and, on February

16th, at an informal meeting of Ministers, a very important decision

was arrived at. This was to send the 29th Division, hitherto destined

for service on the Western Front, to Lemnos, an island about sixty

miles from the Gallipoli Peninsula--the Division sailing, it was hoped,

within ten days. At the same time arrangements were to be made for a

further force to be sent if necessary from Egypt; horse-boats were to

accompany the 29th Division; arrangements were to be made to assemble a

large number of lighters and tugs in the Levant; and the Admiralty was

also to build special transports and lighters, suitable for the

conveying and landing of 50,000 men where these might be wanted. The

military effort was already in embryo, therefore, before the purely

naval attack had been begun; and, with all this in mind, we can now

transfer our attention to the actual scene of conflict.

It was on February 19, 1915, that Admiral Carden decided to open the

bombardment of the entrance {122} forts, namely those of Cape Helles

and Sedd-el-Bahr on the northern and European side, and Kum Kale and

Orkanieh on the southern or Asiatic. Admiral Carden himself, then

fifty-eight, had had a varied and adventurous career; had taken part in

the Egyptian campaign of 1882; receiving the medal and the Khedive's

Bronze Star; had been present, two years later, at the Eastern Sudan

campaign; and, as a commander in 1897, had been with the punitive

expedition that followed the Benin massacres. He had reached flag-rank

in 1908, and had been Rear-Admiral to the Atlantic Fleet for a year,

being the Admiral Superintendent of Malta Dockyard at the outbreak of

war.

Under his command, besides a flotilla of destroyers and the seaplane

ship _Ark Royal_, were three old English battleships--the _Vengeance_,

that had already been employed on the Belgian coast; the _Cornwallis_,

that had been at the Nore, in the Third Fleet, christened the "Forlorn

Hope"; and the _Triumph_, formerly the Chilian _Libertad_, that had

been acting as Depot Ship at Hong Kong. With these were the

_Agememnon_, a more modern battleship, though about to have been passed

into the Second Fleet; and the _Inflexible_, which we have last heard

of helping to sink the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ near the Antarctic

Circle. In addition there were under his command the _Suffren_,

_Gaulois_, and _Bouvet_, three old French battleships that, the summer

before, had not even been in Commission. All these vessels, however,

with the exception of the _Triumph_, carried 12-inch guns and therefore

outranged the forts; and, between {123} them, they mounted a secondary

armament of fourteen 7.5-inch, ten 9.2-inch, ten 6.4-inch, twenty-four

6-inch, eighteen 5.5-inch, and sixteen 4-inch guns.

Beginning at eight in the morning, a long-distance shelling was

continued till a quarter to three in the afternoon, when the

_Vengeance_, _Cornwallis_, and _Triumph_, with the three French

battleships--less valuable vessels that could justifiably be

risked--drew in to shore and opened fire with their secondary armament

of smaller guns. It then became clear that, in spite of the previous

five hours' bombardment, the forts had not been silenced, for they

immediately opened fire. They effected no damage, however. By

nightfall, those on the European side had apparently been put out of

action, but one of the Asiatic forts was still replying when the light

failed and operations ceased.

Bad weather followed, and it was not till February 25th that the attack

could be seriously taken up again, the Fleet having been strengthened

in the interval, notably by the _Queen Elizabeth_ with her 15-inch

guns. Together with the _Irresistible_, the _Agamemnon_, and the

French battleship _Gaulois_, she began a long-range bombardment early

in the morning, and this was followed as before by an attack at close

quarters--the _Vengeance_, _Cornwallis_, and _Suffren_ again taking

their part in this, with the _Charlemagne_ and, later in the day, the

_Triumph_ and _Albion_. Even so it was not until evening that the last

gun was silenced, and the trawlers, under cover of the fleet, were able

to begin clearing away the mines.

Nor could the results of these two days' {124} bombardments have been

said to hold great promise for the future. So little damage had been

done by the first day's firing that the batteries were all active again

by the second; and, at the end of this, when the demolition-parties

landed, they found seventy per cent. of the guns still in serviceable

condition. Few more dangerous duties, under such circumstances, can be

imagined than those undertaken by these little detachments; and, both

in the courage with which they were faced and the coolness with which

they were completed, the records of the navy and the Royal Marines were

more than fully sustained. Particularly prominent was the act of

Lieutenant-Commander E. G. Robinson, who on February 26th went alone,

under heavy fire, into a hostile gun-position, that might well have

been occupied, destroyed a 4-inch gun single-handed, and then returned

to his landing-party for a further charge to destroy a second gun that

he had found there. Owing to the fact that their white uniforms

rendered them so conspicuous as targets, Lieutenant-Commander Robinson

refused to allow his comrades to accompany him on either occasion. For

this act he was very justly awarded the Victoria Cross.

Meanwhile at home, the lack of unanimity, of whole-hearted enthusiasm

in the necessary team-work, and, more than this, of a detailed

conception of what was actually intended were beginning to bear their

fruits. Thus it had been decided, in the first place--and this had

greatly influenced both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson--that, if the

naval attack were to become unpromising, it would be {125} broken off

and its losses cut. That had also been Lord Kitchener's view, but, on

February 24th, he stated, at a meeting of the War Council, that if the

Fleet could not get through without help, the army would have to come

to its aid. By Mr. Churchill that had evidently long been accepted,

and preparations, as we have seen, were well under way. Transports had

been collected for the despatch of the 29th Division, and it was hoped

that it would begin to sail on the 22nd. Two days before, however,

Lord Kitchener had decided, for reasons doubtless important, but

without consulting his colleagues, that this Division could not be

spared, and he had countermanded the transports.

Against this reversal of policy at a critical moment Mr. Churchill made

the strongest protest, and said that he must disclaim all

responsibility if disaster occurred in Turkey owing to the

insufficiency of troops. Lord Kitchener for his part asserted that the

forces in Egypt, on the spot, and on the way there were at present

quite adequate, and that the 29th Division was not then essential to

success--a view that the War Council supported, the 29th Division being

detained in England.

While now determined that the affair should not be broken off, Lord

Kitchener still believed that the navy would need but little military

help, and, on February 24th, he wired to Sir John Maxwell, then

commanding the forces in Egypt, and General Birdwood, who was to

command the Australian and New Zealand contingent on the Peninsula,

that it was not intended to land parties on Gallipoli, except {126}

under cover of the naval guns, to help in the total demolition of the

forts, when the ships should get to close quarters.

Two days later, Sir John Maxwell replied that, in the opinion of a

French officer, formerly military attaché at Constantinople, a military

expedition was essential to the opening of the passage for the Allied

Fleets; that a landing would be extremely hazardous; and that the

Peninsula was very strongly organized for defence. Nevertheless Lord

Kitchener retained his opinion and telegraphed the same evening to

General Birdwood, that as far as could be seen, till the passage was

actually secured, he would be limited to such minor operations as the

final destruction of the batteries, though it was possible that he

might have to organize expeditions to deal with inland concealed

howitzers such as the ships could not destroy.

General Birdwood had not then sailed for the Dardanelles, and, at a

meeting of the War Council on March 3d, Lord Kitchener announced that

it might after all be possible to send the 29th Division, but that he

proposed to leave the matter open till March 10th, when he hoped to

have heard from General Birdwood. By this time, the entrance had been

cleared, and for several days the ships had been operating in the

Straits themselves, bombarding Forts Dardanos and Sogandhere,

protecting the mine-sweepers, and landing Marines--the latter suffering

a reverse at Kum Kale with about fifty casualties.

This was on March 4th, and the next day General {127} Birdwood, who had

arrived earlier than was expected, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that

he was very doubtful whether the navy could force the passage unaided;

that the previous attacks had been comparatively easy, since the ships

could stand off and shoot from anywhere; but that in the Straits they

were being bothered by unknown fire. Twenty-four hours afterward, he

sent another telegram maintaining the same point of view. On March

6th, a preliminary bombardment of the forts of the Narrows took place,

the _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Agamemnon_ firing over the Peninsula from

the Gulf of Saros, themselves being hit but not seriously damaged by

concealed Turkish batteries on the Peninsula, yet without obtaining, as

was afterward discovered, any appreciable results. The attack was

renewed the next day, and it was believed that Fort Chanak had been

silenced, several of our vessels having been hit but none of them

placed out of action. In these operations, the _Ocean_, _Majestic_,

_Albion_, _Prince George_, _Lord Nelson_, and _Vengeance_ also

participated, together with the French _Suffren_, _Bouvet_,

_Charlemagne_, and _Gaulois_. So we come to March 10th, on which date

Lord Kitchener finally released the 29th Division, the transports

sailing on March 16th, three weeks later than had been intended, and

three days after Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been given command of the

Expeditionary Army, left England. The time was now approaching when,

if it were to be made at all, the navy must attempt its decisive

thrust; and telegrams concerning this were already being exchanged

between Mr. Churchill and Admiral {128} Carden. On March 11th, Mr.

Churchill wired to the effect that, while Admiral Carden's skill and

patience in avoiding casualties had been highly appreciated at the

Admiralty, the results to be gained by success were deemed to be

sufficiently important to justify a necessary loss in men and ships.

The whole operation might be decided, and consequences of a decisive

character be produced by the turning of the corner at Chanak. It was

recognized that the Admiral would have to press hard, at a certain

point of the action, to obtain such a decision; and it was desired to

know whether, in his opinion, the suitable occasion had now arrived.

To this Admiral Carden replied two days later that he considered this

stage to have been reached, and that, in order to ensure his

communications immediately he entered the Sea of Marmora, military

operations on a large scale should at once be commenced. On March

15th, Mr. Churchill replied that Sir Ian Hamilton would arrive on the

16th, and that Admiral Carden should consult with him as to the

concerted steps to be taken. On March 16th, however, Admiral Carden,

for reasons of health, had to resign his command, and, on the next day,

Vice-Admiral Sir John Michael de Robeck was appointed by telegram to

succeed him.

In this telegram, Mr. Churchill presumed that, in Admiral de Robeck's

judgment, the proposed operations were practicable, but asked him not

to hesitate to say so if he held a contrary opinion. Replying the same

day, Admiral de Robeck made it clear that the suggested plan of

campaign received his full {129} concurrence; that the success of the

undertaking would depend on his ability to clear the minefields before

forcing the Narrows; and that to do this successfully the forts must be

silenced while the mine-sweeping was in progress. He further stated

that he had had an entirely satisfactory interview with Sir Ian

Hamilton, General d'Amade, and Admiral Wemyss--afterward to become

First Sea Lord.

On March 18th, therefore, under excellent weather conditions, the

decisive attempt was begun, with an advance fringe of destroyers and

trawlers to clear a channel for the bombarding squadrons. Work upon

the minefields, indeed, had already been in progress since February

25th, in which these trawler mine-sweepers, under Commander W. Mellor,

had persisted with unfailing gallantry. With the current always, and

the wind frequently, opposed to them; with every minefield accurately

ranged, and hotly contested by the enemy's guns, they had suffered the

severest casualties both in men and material without for a moment

desisting from their task. And, manned, as they were, largely by

reservists and men hitherto unaccustomed to war, they had exhibited

qualities of heroism and seamanship not even excelled by the destroyer

patrols.

That is saying a good deal, since these latter, throughout the winter

and under the worst circumstances, had maintained a standard of

cheerful efficiency as high as any that the navy had ever reached.

Long before the naval expedition had been decided upon and throughout

the critical discussions in London, they had sentinelled the Ægean, the

{130} Syrian coast, and the mouth of the Dardanelles. With their decks

never dry, with their galley-fires out, with all on board drenched to

the skin, they had ridden out storm after storm in these notoriously

treacherous seas. Servants of everybody, succourers of the wounded,

and general suppliers of the landing-parties, none--not even the

submarines presently to be considered--were to play a nobler part in

the Gallipoli story.

It was at about a quarter to eleven in the morning that the great

bombardment began, the _Queen Elizabeth_, _Inflexible_, _Agamemnon_,

and _Lord Nelson_, stationed near the entrance, opening fire at about

ten and a half miles range. These four battleships took for their

targets the forts at Kilid Bahr and Chanak; while the _Triumph_ and

_Prince George_, at closer range, engaged the forts at Soghandere,

Kephez, and Dardanos. This action was continued for an hour and a

half, when a French squadron, magnificently handled, advanced up the

Straits as far as Point Kephez, and, at close range, engaged the forts

of the Narrows.

All the ships were hit, but, manoeuvring in circles, none was

materially injured, the _Suffren_, _Gaulois_, _Charlemagne_, and

_Bouvet_ being the vessels employed. After an hour and a half of this

inshore firing, the forts ceased to reply; and, at about the same time,

the French vessels were relieved--the _Vengeance_, _Irresistible_,

_Albion_, _Majestic_, _Swiftsure_, and _Ocean_ taking their places.

These vessels began their attack at half-past two, advancing in line

and meeting a hot fire; and it was just as the French vessels were

passing out that the first disaster of the day occurred in the {131}

sinking of the _Bouvet_ by a floating mine. This was in an area

previously swept clear, and it opened up a new and difficult problem,

namely that of mines, loosed higher up the Straits, and drifting down

with the current. Sinking in three minutes, practically the whole of

the crew of the _Bouvet_ was lost.

It was now becoming clear that the old axiom as to the inferiority of

ships to forts still held the field; and to the observers on land it

was even more obvious than to those who were directing the gunfire

afloat. In the rear of one battery, for instance, within a space not

more than three hundred feet deep, there fell no less than eighty-six

shells, the battery itself remaining undamaged, while none of the

6-inch guns of the much-hammered Fort Dardanos suffered any injury from

our fire. The assault was continued, however, till dark, with the

utmost vigour, in spite of the growing list of casualties, both the

_Irresistible_ and _Ocean_ being sunk by drifting mines, and the

_Gaulois_ and _Inflexible_ seriously crippled by gunfire.

Struck soon after four, it was not until ten minutes to six that the

_Irresistible_ went down in deep water, most of her crew being saved,

thanks, in a great measure, to the seamanship of Captain C. P. Metcalfe

of the destroyer _Wear_, and Midshipman Hugh Dixon of one of _Queen

Elizabeth's_ picket-boats, who laid themselves alongside under a very

heavy fire. A quarter of an hour after the _Irresistible_ sank, the

_Ocean_ was struck, but most of her crew were also rescued. The damage

to the _Inflexible_ was sufficiently serious to make it very uncertain

that she would reach port; her forward control position being {132}

badly smashed up, her shell room and magazine injured by a mine; and

many of her compartments rendered untenable by poisonous fumes. That

she happily did so was chiefly due to the valour and discipline of all

on board, and perhaps particularly to the steadfastness of her engineer

officers and engine-room staff. Working in semi-darkness, in stifling

heat, and in momentary peril of death by drowning, the strain imposed

upon them, and from which they emerged so well, was of the severest

order.

So ended the great attempt of the unaided navy, never, as it turned

out, to be repeated, although the first intention of all responsible,

both at home and on the spot, was to renew it. Thus, Admiral de

Robeck, wiring an account of it, stated that the squadron was ready

again for immediate action, although it would be necessary to

reconsider the plan of attack and to find a solution of the

drifting-mine problem. Both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, on the

morning of the 19th, as well as Mr. Churchill himself, shared this

view; and Lord Fisher at once ordered two more battleships to reinforce

Admiral de Robeck, the _Queen_ and the _Implacable_ being already on

their way. With equal promptitude, the French Government had ordered

the _Henri IV_ to replace the _Bouvet_. This was also the attitude of

the War Council, who, on February 19th, wired to Admiral de Robeck,

instructing him formally, if he thought fit, to continue the operations

against the Dardanelles.

On the other hand, Sir Ian Hamilton, telegraphing to Lord Kitchener,

had expressed his opinion that, {133} from what he had seen, the

Dardanelles were less likely to be forced by battleships alone than at

one time had seemed probable, and that the military operations to

ensure success would not be of the secondary nature hitherto suggested.

To this Lord Kitchener replied that the Dardanelles must be forced, and

that, if large military operations were necessary, they must be

undertaken. Meanwhile Admiral de Robeck was beginning to agree with

Sir Ian Hamilton, and on March 23d wired to the Admiralty that the mine

menace was greater than had been suspected; that time would be required

to deal with it satisfactorily, but that the Fleet would be ready as

soon as the army; and that a decisive operation about the middle of

April seemed to offer better prospects than immediate action.

These views were the result of a conference, earlier in the day,

between Admiral de Robeck, Sir Ian Hamilton, and General Birdwood, but

both to Mr. Churchill and Lord Kitchener--and not without reason--this

postponement seemed far too long. The latter at once telegraphed to

Sir Ian Hamilton, pointing this out to him, and asking him how soon he

could act on shore--a difficult question to answer in view of the facts

that, only ten days before, Sir Ian had been in England; that he had

been assisted by no previous staff preparation; that he had been given

no preliminary scheme of action; that no arrangements had been made

about water-supply; that the 29th Division had not yet even sailed; and

that, when he had left, it had been under the assumption that the navy

itself would force the Straits.

{134}

On March 26th, however, this last idea was finally abandoned as the

result of a further telegram from Admiral de Robeck, in which he stated

definitely that, in his opinion, and after consultation with General

Hamilton, a combined operation was essential to secure the objects of

the campaign. To Mr. Churchill, who still believed that the navy, with

local military help, might win its way through, this decision was a

great disappointment; and he was unwilling to accept it. He was

anxious to order Admiral de Robeck to renew the naval attack according

to his previous intention. But neither Lord Fisher, Sir Arthur Wilson,

nor Sir Henry Jackson agreed to this. While the men on the spot were

willing, they had been ready to back them up. Now that these had

changed their minds, they refused to press them. Before such a weight

of opinion Mr. Churchill could but bow, although Mr. Asquith and Mr.

Balfour were inclined to agree with him.

Nor were there lacking experts, who held the same view, both at the

Admiralty and the Dardanelles. On the military side also, General

Birdwood was for an immediate action with the then available forces;

and, in view of later knowledge, this, with a further naval effort,

might very possibly have achieved the desired end. For it was not

until April 25th that Sir Ian Hamilton was ready to land his whole

military force; and, in that month, the Peninsula of Gallipoli was

transformed into a well-nigh impregnable arsenal.

With the purely military side of the following campaign this is not the

place fully to deal; but {135} something of the ordeal that was now in

preparation not only for the soldiers but for the sailors can be

gathered from the memoranda, since become public, of German officers

who were concerned in it, and who were fully aware, of course, of the

military concentration on the islands of Lemnos, Tenedos, and Imbros.

Thus, a week after the naval attack had failed, General Liman von

Sanders took command of the Peninsula; began to build roads in post

haste, bodies of Greek and Armenian workmen being brought up for the

purpose; constructed barbed-wire defences at every possible

landing-place, some of these being submerged in the shallow waters;

built machine-gun emplacements amongst the surrounding cliffs, and

imported heavy guns of all calibres--according to Enver Pasha, 200

Skoda guns were, in these four weeks, rushed down to the Peninsula.

Meanwhile, owing to the defective loading of the British transports,

these all had to be sent back again to Alexandria, the nearest place

where there were facilities for a rapid re-arrangement of the troops

and material. While this was in process, the general plan of attack

was being considered by the naval and military staffs, but could not be

worked out in detail till April 10th, when the Army Headquarters

returned from Egypt--Commodore Keyes, already familiar to us, acting as

Chief of Staff to Admiral de Robeck.

Collected in the harbour of Mudros, there was now a veritable Armada of

every kind of naval and mercantile craft--from Atlantic liners to Hull

trawlers and from obsolete battleships to the latest marine {136}

inventions. Between these and the shore plied smaller motor-boats and

pinnaces on innumerable errands, and, by the end of the third week in

April, all had been organized for the proposed landing. In view of the

long delay, the magnitude of the operations, and the neighbourhood of

the assembling-places to their objectives, it had been wholly

impossible, of course, to conceal from the enemy the nature and scope

of the impending attack. Nothing but sheer artillery fire, rapidity of

execution, and human heroism could be depended upon; and, at only one

of the landings--that at Gaba Tepe on the north of the Peninsula--was a

surprise to be hoped for.

Simultaneously with this landing, it was proposed to throw forces

ashore at five other beaches scattered round the head of the Peninsula.

Of these, following the coast westward from Gaba Tepe--about a dozen

miles from the tip of the Peninsula--the next was Y beach, some ten

miles away. South of this was X beach, three miles farther along and

just north of Cape Tekeh; next came W beach round the corner, between

Cape Tekeh and Cape Helles; then V beach, facing south, between Cape

Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr; and finally S beach, round the corner again,

in Morto Bay, just inside the entrance.

It had also been arranged, as a diversion, that there should be a

landing of French forces at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore. Each

expedition was self-contained, the navy taking charge of the landing

and supplying the beach-masters to superintend the arrangements; the

covering forces were conveyed in {137} battleships, from which they

were to be landed in boats towed by naval pinnaces, the main body of

the troops being afterward brought, up, when the landing-places had

been secured, in allotted liners. In view of all the circumstances, it

was an attempt without precedent, and as perilous an operation as could

well be conceived. Nevertheless it was entered upon with the highest

anticipations by every rank concerned. Let us consider the landings in

the foregoing order, beginning with that at Gaba Tepe in what was

afterward to be known as Anzac Cove.

In charge of this was Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby, who had under his

command the following five battleships, the _Queen_, _London_, and

_Prince of Wales_, each carrying some 500 troops; and the _Triumph_ and

_Majestic_, which were to cover the landing with gunfire. With them

were the cruisers _Bacchante_ and eight destroyers, some of the latter

also carrying troops, the seaplane ship _Ark Royal_, a balloon ship,

and fifteen trawlers. All through the morning of the 24th, the

transports had been getting into position, and the exodus from the

harbour began in the afternoon, the skies being clear and the sea calm.

Presently the various squadrons passed ahead of the transports, and

these, with their attendant troop-ships, separated for their appointed

stations--the cheers from the shore dying behind them as they moved out

to the open sea.

Each had its rendezvous off the Peninsula coast, that of Admiral

Thursby's squadron being about five miles distant from it; and this was

reached in the first hour of Sunday morning under a bright but {138}

setting half-moon. Since the fall of dusk the night before, the

squadron had been steaming with lights out, and the crowded troops had

been doing their best to snatch a little sleep before they would be

called upon. The boats and steam pinnaces had already been slung out,

and now the signal was given for them to be lowered--each boat, in

charge of a midshipman, and each pinnace towing three boats.

Twelve in all of these little processions were silently marshalled

under the sides of the battleships, the moon having sunk now, and shore

and sea living in the darkness before dawn. Battleships and pinnaces,

with the boats streaming out behind them, then drew very slowly into

shore, the battleships, cleared for action, stopping about a mile and a

half out. There was to be no preliminary bombardment, since it was

hoped--though none too confidently--to surprise the enemy; and, from

this point, therefore, the pinnaces with the landing-parties crept

toward the shore in absolute stillness. They had almost reached it,

racing against the dawn, when the destroyers, with their additional

troops, slid between the battleships; and it was then that a sudden

alarm light--just before five o'clock--showed the Turks to have

discovered their presence. Three minutes later, the boats being then

in shallow water, a murderous rifle and machine-gun fire broke upon the

beach, nothing being visible but the flashes from the guns above an

entrenchment almost on the shore itself.

It was a critical moment, many men being hit at once, but the rest,

tumbling out of the boats, dashed {139} ashore, made for the enemy in

true Australian style, and, within less than ten minutes, had taken the

trench. Afterward it was discovered that the landing had taken place a

little to the east of the chosen spot; and the troops, having rushed

the beach, found themselves in consequence faced by a steep and

shrub-covered line of cliffs. But there was more cover here, although

the enemy was firing down on them from the second line of trenches

half-way up; and, having paused for a moment to take breath, shed their

packs, and charge their magazines, they went for the cliffs and carried

them, and, an hour later, had established a definite line along the

ridge.

Meanwhile the rest of the covering troops had been landed, the whole

being ashore within half an hour; and already the wounded were being

evacuated, the two services going on together. It was now growing

light, and, though the battleships came into action, the casualties on

the beach grew more numerous. The trenches had been cleared, but, in

the thick brushwood, the enemy marksmen found an ideal cover; and, as

the day broadened, a couple of batteries, admirably concealed, opened

fire. For many hours the battleships failed to locate them, and, all

that time, under a hail of shrapnel, beach-masters, midshipmen, and

seamen had to carry out their duties. For the actual troops it was

less of an ordeal, since they could bolt across to the cover of the

cliffs, but for the navy, marshalling the boats and moving them to and

fro, there was no such respite. Owing to the heavy fire, too, both

from {140} the howitzers inland and warships in the Narrows on the

other side, the loaded transports had to stand farther from the shore,

thus at once increasing and delaying the work. Without a moment's

pause, however, it went forward, men, stores, and munitions being

punctually landed; General Birdwood and his staff went ashore in the

afternoon; and, before evening, roads were actually being built inland.

All through the next day, the great movement went on, in spite of

fierce counter-attacks by the reinforced Turks; and, by the nightfall

of April 26th, the position at Gaba Tepe was secure.

Though five in number, the remaining landing-places were grouped within

six miles round the point of the Peninsula; and the naval forces

responsible for them were under the command of Rear-Admiral Rosslyn E.

Wemyss. They consisted of the seven battleships, _Lord Nelson_,

_Prince George_, _Cornwallis_, _Implacable_, _Swiftsure_, _Albion_, and

_Vengeance_; of the four cruisers, _Euryalus_, _Talbot_, _Minerva_, and

_Dublin_; of six sweepers and fourteen trawlers. Allotted to Y beach

as the first covering troops were the King's Own Scottish Borderers,

and they sailed from Mudros in the cruisers _Amethyst_ and _Sapphire_.

It had not been possible to effect a surprise here; and consequently,

as the boats approached the beach, it was under a protective screen of

fire from the battleship _Goliath_. So effective was this, and so

promptly were the covering troops thrown ashore that they reached the

top of the high surrounding cliffs practically without opposition.

Following a second detachment of the Borderers {141} came the Plymouth

Battalion of the Royal Naval Division, the troops establishing

themselves on the top of the cliffs, and trying to join hands with

those landing at X beach. Unfortunately, between them there were

strong hostile forces. They themselves were heavily and ceaselessly

attacked; and, after twenty-four hours' fighting, it was decided to

withdraw them--or rather what was left of them--under the fire of the

battleships, the _Amethyst_ and _Sapphire_, _Goliath_, _Talbot_, and

_Dublin_ undertaking their re-embarkation, ably supervised by

Lieutenant-Commander Adrian St. V. Keyes. Thus, by the evening of the

26th, while Gaba Tepe had been secured, beach Y had had to be abandoned.

The action at beach X, however, just north of Cape Tekeh, had met with

better results. Here the troops detailed to make the first landing had

been two companies and a machine-gun section of the Second Battalion of

the Royal Fusiliers, and they had been embarked in the battleship

_Implacable_. The beach before them was a narrow one, about two

hundred yards long, but the cliffs beyond it were not high, and their

ultimate objective was a hill that lay to the rear of the

landing-places, round the corner, at W and V. Covered by the

_Implacable_, who came close inshore, the troops landed with scarcely

any casualties; and, though they did not succeed, owing to a very

fierce counter-attack, in obtaining complete possession of the desired

hill, they had, by the evening, with the aid of their supports,

entrenched themselves for half a mile round their landing-place,

besides having already joined hands, earlier in the day, {142} with the

Lancashire Fusiliers who had advanced from Beach W.

This lay between Cape Tekeh and Cape Helles at the extreme end of the

Peninsula, and was some three hundred and fifty yards long and from

fifteen to forty yards deep. Flanked on each side by precipitous

cliffs, the land in front rose less steeply, climbing in a series of

low sand-hills to the ridge that lay beyond. It had been an obvious

landing-place, however, and had, in consequence, been fortified with

the utmost care. Not only had the water in front of it been mined but

also the shore itself. Submerged entanglements covered the approach to

it, and a jungle of barbed wire protected the sea's edge. The

surrounding cliffs were heavily trenched and honeycombed with nests of

machine-guns. The ridge itself, even should it be gained, was

commanded on both sides by higher ground still.

To take this position, than which nothing could well have been

stronger, fell to the First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who

had been conveyed to their rendezvous by the _Euryalus_ and

_Implacable_, from which they had embarked, at four o'clock in the

morning, into the small boats. An hour later, and while these were

approaching the shore--there had been eight picket-boats, each towing

four cutters--the _Euryalus_ followed them up and poured a heavy fire

into the trenches. Farther out at sea, other units of the squadron

supported the bombardment with guns of all calibres, but without doing

much damage to the well-designed trenches and scarcely any to the beach

entanglements.

{143}

Hung up by the wire or staked under water, an easy mark for rifle and

machine-gun, men fell so thickly that, for a few minutes, it seemed as

if indeed their task were a hopeless one. But they were not to be

denied; hacking at the wire, as one man fell, another succeeded him;

while, upon the extreme left, where it was just possible to effect a

landing upon some rocks a detachment climbed ashore, and, with great

skill, put out of action some enfilading maxims. Thus supported, their

comrades made a little headway; and, once having gained a footing,

never stopped. By ten o'clock, three of the enemy's trenches had been

taken; and, by half-past eleven, they were in touch with the X

landing-party. The actual beach was now secured, although the general

position was still hazardous, and remained so until the next afternoon,

when the landing at beach V had been consolidated. Throughout the

whole time, in a widening semi-circle, a fierce infantry action was in

progress; but, though the shore was under fire, thanks to the

expedition and coolness of the beach-masters, Captain Townsend and

Commander Collard, and the courage of all concerned, the remaining

troops were safely landed.

Terrible as were the conditions, however, at beach X, those at beach V

were even more so; and it was here that the self-sacrifice demanded of

navy and army alike reached its sublimest level. We have said that no

stronger defensive position than that of beach W could well be

imagined; but that of beach V presented a problem that, in certain

respects, was even more difficult. Of about the same size and much the

{144} same formation, it was more strongly flanked on either side--by

sheer cliffs on the west and by the village and Fort of Sedd-el-Bahr on

the east; while brooding above it, in the centre, as above the

amphitheatre of a circus, stood the battered ruins of the old barracks,

a perfect cover for sharpshooters and maxims.

Here, as at beach W, there were dense wire barricades, and the high

ground between had been similarly fortified. Nor was it possible here,

as it had been for the Lancashire Fusiliers, to land even the smallest

detachment on the flanks. A frontal assault was the only possible one,

and accordingly special measures had been taken. As in all the other

cases, the first landing-parties were to be towed ashore in small open

boats, but the remainder of the covering troops, about 2,000 strong,

was to be landed from a larger vessel designed for the purpose. This

was the converted collier, the _River Clyde_, in charge of Commander

Edward Unwin, and large doorways had been cut in her sides to enable

the contained troops to pour out rapidly. As soon as the first boats

had made good their landing, the _River Clyde_ was to be run ashore,

and a string of lighters pushed out from her side to form a bridge for

the emerging soldiers. Mounted in her bows, and protected by sandbags,

were several machine-guns to cover the operation.

The troops to whom had been assigned this, the most dangerous of all

the day's undertakings, were the Dublin Fusiliers, of whom three

companies were to land from the open boats, the remainder coming ashore

from the _River Clyde_ with the Munsters, {145} Hampshires, and other

forces. Here also, as the collier and boats drew in, the battleships

in the rear maintained a tremendous bombardment, but here, too, the

effect on the defences was so slight as to be negligible. Till the

boats actually touched shore, the Turks reserved their fire and then

opened simultaneously with devastating results. In several of the

boats there was not a single man who escaped either death or

disablement. One of the boats disappeared altogether; another

contained only two survivors. Of the few who scrambled ashore alive,

some were killed on the wire, others fell on the sands half-way up the

beach; and but a small handful managed to reach a little ridge, some

four feet high, under which they took shelter.

For the boats to return again was impossible; that any were beached at

all was almost a miracle; and nothing has ever excelled the heroic

determination of those responsible for navigating them. With dead and

wounded men lying about them, themselves with but a moment or two to

live, they plied their oars or gave their orders under that withering

storm of lead and shrapnel. Such was Able Seaman Levi Jacobs of the

_Lord Nelson_, who, after the whole of his comrades had been killed or

wounded, took in his boat unaided and, when last seen, was standing up

alone, trying to pole the cutter into shore.

Even more costly was the first attempt to land the troops from the

_River Clyde_, though it justified its existence as a harbour of refuge

and was the eventual means of carrying the beach. Commander Unwin had

succeeded in grounding her almost {146} simultaneously with the boats,

and the lighters were run out through a tornado of fire, but failed

unfortunately to reach the shore. This was chiefly due to the strong

current and the almost instant slaughter of those at work on them.

Time was the essence of the contract, however; every second counted;

and already the first of the Munsters were pouring out of the ship.

While willing hands fought with the lighters, they leapt, swam, and

waded to the shore, some being drowned by the weight of their

equipment, others shot to pieces by the enemy, and again but a handful

reached the precarious cover of the same little parapet that was

sheltering their comrades. Then the lighters were fastened up again;

other troops began to rush them; and once more the pier broke down, the

shoremost lighter swinging round with the current and shutting off the

troops that stood behind it.

Now was the enemy's opportunity, and he made the most of it; the

officers on the lighters shouted to their men to lie down, but, even

so, half had already fallen, and many more were shot where they lay.

It was in these circumstances that Commander Unwin himself set the most

magnificent example of conduct. Leaving the _River Clyde_, he made for

the lighters, and, standing waist-deep in the bullet-lashed water, he

worked indefatigably to repair the bridge and secure the lighter

against the thrust of the current. With him was Midshipman G. L.

Drewry, who, after being wounded in the head, twice attempted to swim

from lighter to lighter with a line. Failing to do so owing to

exhaustion, Midshipman {147} W. St. A. Malleson then took up the task,

succeeded, and, when the line broke again, made two further, but this

time unsuccessful, efforts to repair it. No less gallant were A. B.

Williams and Seaman G. M'K. Samson, the latter working on a Lighter the

whole day, until he was dangerously wounded, and the former, until he

was killed, holding on to a line in the water, under the heaviest fire,

for over an hour. Commander Unwin himself, almost frozen, had to

return to the _Clyde_, where he was wrapped up in blankets, leaving the

ship a second time to work at the lighters till he was injured in three

places, and a third time, after he had been dressed, to save some

wounded men lying at the water's edge.

It had become clear by this time, however, that on the present lines,

at any rate, the disembarkation could not proceed. Of the thousand men

who had left the collier, half were dead or wounded, but fortunately

the remainder were comparatively safe. Meanwhile the machine-gunners

in her bow, as well as the ships at sea, kept up an incessant

fusillade, both to protect the survivors under the sandbank, and to

prevent a counter-attack by the enemy. Earlier in the day, the

_Albion_, seeing the _River Clyde's_ predicament, had called for

volunteers to go to her help, and a pinnace and launch had been manned

to assist in completing the bridge of boats. Owing to the murderous

fire, however, it had been impossible to get into position; and it was

not till dark that the work was finally completed, when the rest of the

troops were at last able, though not without many casualties, to go

ashore.

{148}

It was now essential to occupy the village, or rather the ruins, of

Sedd-el-Bahr on the right; and, all through the night, fierce but

unsuccessful efforts were made to this end by the tired troops. On the

morning of the 26th, however, thanks to the heavy fire of the _Albion_

inshore and other vessels farther out, a determined onslaught,

heroically organized by Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams,

gained possession of it; and, by half-past one, the old Castle and its

surrounding heights had been secured.

Two subsidiary landings had also taken place, one at what was known as

the Camber, a little to the east of V beach, and near the village of

Sedd-el-Bahr. Here a half company of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers had

been landed to make an attack on the village, but, owing to the

narrowness of the approach, they were able to make no advance, and had

to withdraw after heavy losses. Finally, at S beach in Morto Bay,

covered by the _Cornwallis_ and _Lord Nelson_, the 2nd South Wales

Borderers and a detachment of the 2nd London Field Company of the Royal

Engineers about 750 men in all--were successfully landed, largely due

to the ability of Lieutenant-Commander Ralph B. Janvrin, who was in

charge of the trawlers that brought them ashore. They suffered but few

casualties, consolidated themselves in their assigned positions, and

held these till April 27th, when they were joined by the general

advance. Equally successful, in respect of its transport arrangements,

was the French diversion at Kum Kale, the whole force being landed

during the 25th. On the 26th, however, after they had beaten off many

counter-attacks, {149} and taken over 400 Turkish prisoners, it became

clear that they could only advance at a heavy cost and after fresh

reinforcements; and it was decided to reëmbark them, this being

effected without serious opposition.

So was obtained that footing upon Gallipoli, never, alas, to ripen into

a complete conquest, but yet an achievement without parallel in the

naval and military records of the world. Of the second great landing

at Suvla Bay, four miles north of Anzac Cove, on August 7th, all that

can be said here is that, before breakfast-time, two divisions were

firmly established, and that once again, in Sir Ian Hamilton's words,

the navy played father and mother to the army. Let a few brief facts,

therefore, complete the picture of all that the seamen stood for at

Gallipoli.

Between its base at Alexandria, 600 miles distant, and its front-line

trenches, the army had but two harbours--Kephalos Bay on the Island of

Imbros, about fifteen miles from the Peninsula, and the Bay of Mudros

on Lemnos some four times as distant. When the expedition started, in

neither of these harbours were there any conveniences whatsoever.

Wharves and breakwaters, piers and storehouses, all were totally

lacking. On the Peninsula itself, as we have seen, each of the

landing-places was an open beach. Each was exposed, throughout the

whole occupation, to registered and observed artillery fire. At two of

the most important of them--Suvla and Anzac--only lighters and tugs

could be used for disembarkation; two trans-shipments were thus always

necessitated; and nothing could be landed except {150} by night. All

were peculiarly exposed to the weather, as were also the harbours on

Imbros and Lemnos; and, in addition to this, after the month of May,

there was the ever-present menace of hostile submarines.

Nevertheless the army was well maintained in food, equipment, and

munitions; it received its full supply of winter clothing at the

beginning of December; the sick and wounded were punctually removed;

and letters and mails were regularly delivered. So also in the final

act, in the amazing evacuation, so swiftly and bloodlessly carried out,

the navy received to its arms again and silently transferred the last

man of those war-worn legions.

Of the statesmen and strategists responsible for the general campaign,

judgments may well differ, though they should be lenient--every issue

being so vitally involved with issues as large all the world over. But

of the hewers of wood and drawers of water, of the human instruments of

their policy, there can be no doubt in any man's mind, however

unfamiliar with the tasks allotted to them. Not even the gods on Mount

Ida ever looked down upon finer men.

{151}