CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF THE BIGHT

In his speech of August 3d in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey

told his listeners that we had incurred no obligations to help France

either by land or sea. In view not less, however, of the increasing

difficulties of our diplomatic relations with Germany than of the

spontaneous friendship that had been growing between ourselves and our

French neighbours, the question of coöperation with the latter, in

certain eventualities, had inevitably arisen and been discussed. It

had also been pointed out that unless some conversations were to take

place between the naval and military experts of both countries--unless

some definite lines were laid down as to the methods by which each

country was to help the other--such coöperation, even if desired, would

almost certainly be fruitless. At the same time, in a letter written

on November 22, 1912, to the French ambassador, Sir Edward Grey had

made it clear that these discussions between their respective experts

did not commit either Government to a specified course of action "in a

contingency which has not yet arisen and may never arise."

When the contingency arose, however, the plans were there; and the

mobilization and transport to {25} France of our Expeditionary Force

will remain on record as one of the most efficient military operations

ever undertaken by any country. Second only to the rapidity and

completeness with which the navy took command of the sea, were the

speed and secrecy with which those first divisions were conveyed across

the Channel. That in mere numbers they seem in retrospect to have been

almost ridiculously inadequate is merely a measure of the colossal

proportions that the war on land afterward assumed. Small as that army

was, however, it was the largest force that we had ever sent oversea as

a single undertaking; and it must be borne in mind that, in all

probability, it was the most highly trained then in existence, and that

its presence in France had both moral and material effects of almost

incalculable importance.

Nobody who lived, or was staying, near any of our great southern

railway lines during those early days of August will ever forget the

emotions roused by that endless series of troop trains, passing with

such precision day and night; and of the feelings produced in France by

this visible pledge of our friendship there was instant and abundant

evidence. Between August 9th and August 23d five Divisions of Infantry

and two Cavalry Divisions were safely landed in France; and when it is

remembered what a single division consists of some idea may be obtained

of what that accomplishment meant.

Apart from the Headquarters' Staff with a _personnel_ of 82, requiring

54 horses, 2 wagons, and 5 motor-cars, it embraced three Infantry

Brigades, Headquarters' divisional artillery, three brigades of {26}

Field Artillery, one Howitzer Brigade, one heavy battery, a divisional

ammunition column, the Headquarters' division of engineers, two Field

companies, one Signal company, one Cavalry squadron, one Divisional

train, and three Field ambulances--comprising a total _personnel_ of

over 18,000 men, 5,500 horses, 870 wagons, 9 motor-cars, and 280

cycles, the number of guns, including machine guns, amounting to 100;

and with a base establishment for each division of 1,750 men and 10

horses.

Such was the task performed by the transport officers, every kind of

vessel being assembled for the purpose, from the cross-channel packet

boat accommodating not more than three hundred at a time to the giant

Atlantic liner carrying as many thousands. Chiefly from _Southampton_,

but also from Dover, Folkestone, Newhaven, Avonmouth, and many other

ports, that constant stream of men, horses, provisions, and equipment

poured ceaselessly for nearly a fortnight, screened by

destroyer-escorts, and with aeroplanes and seaplanes keeping watch over

them from the sky. Without a single casualty as the result of enemy

action, they were mustered and marched into line of the French left

flank; and that this great achievement should have been possible within

so short a period from the declaration of war is perhaps the completest

tribute that could be paid to the consummate skill of our naval

dispositions.

Scarcely realized by those splendid battalions, whistling "Tipperary"

on the way to Mons, and even now, perhaps, hardly appreciated by the

bulk of their countrymen at home, it was the navy and the navy {27}

alone that made that glorious epic possible. With their eyes on Europe

and the impending clash of the armies; hearing in imagination, under

the unsuspected force of the heavy German artillery, the crumpling up

of those iron-clad cupolas of the Brialmont forts at Liège--few would

have thought twice, perhaps, even if they had known what they were

doing, of those tiny submarines _E6_ and _E8_ creeping, the first of

their kind, into the Bight of Heligoland. Yet but for them and their

gallant crews and officers, Lieutenant-Commanders Talbot and Goodhart;

but for the presiding destroyers, _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_ and the

submarines of the Eighth Flotilla--the passage of the Expeditionary

Force might well have been impossible and the first battle of the Marne

fought with another issue.

Within three hours of the first outbreak of the war, _E6_ and _E8_

stole out on their perilous errands; and it was upon the information

brought back by them from those mined and fortified waters that the

later dispositions were made. From August 7th onward, until the

Expeditionary Force had been safely landed, the submarines kept their

watch. In the lee of islands, at the mouths of channels, in hourly

danger of detection and death, day and night, without relief, those

cautious periscopes maintained their vigil. Farther to the south,

guarding the approaches to the Channel, between the North Goodwins and

the Ruytingen, were the two destroyers _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_, with

the main covering submarine flotilla; while to the northeast of these,

the _Amethyst_ and _Fearless_, each with a flotilla of destroyers, took

{28} turns about on patrol duty during the passage of the army.

Nor must it be forgotten, so swift was the subsequent progress both in

the range and effectiveness of submarine activity, that this was, at

that time, a branch of the service scarcely tried and of unknown

possibilities. The submarines used were of a type soon so outclassed

as to become almost obsolete, the easiest of prey to net and torpedo,

and working at a distance from their bases then unprecedented.

Nevertheless, after the Expeditionary Force had been safely transported

to France, they were, in the words of Commodore, afterward

Vice-Admiral, Roger Keyes, "incessantly employed on the enemy's coast

in the Heligoland Bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much valuable

information regarding the composition and movement of his patrols.

They have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his anchorages, and,

while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and well-executed

anti-submarine tactics; hunted for hours at a time by torpedo craft,

and attacked by gunfire and torpedoes."

That was written on October 17, 1914, when the action, now about to be

described, had already made the Bight of Heligoland a familiar term to

most people, but without conveying, perhaps, to more than a very few

all that it meant from a strategical standpoint. Between three and

four hundred miles from the nearest of our naval bases, and from some

of the chief of them more than six hundred miles distant, it was in

this small area that there was concentrated practically the whole of

Germany's naval forces, the {29} Kiel Canal connecting it with the

Baltic, rendering these available in either sea.

Nor would it be easy to imagine, from the point of view of defense,

either a bay of littoral with greater natural advantages. Bounded on

the east by the low-lying shores of Schleswig-Holstein, with their

fringe of protecting islands, and on the south by the deeply indented

coast-line between the Dutch frontier and the mouth of the Kiel Canal,

each of the four great estuaries, from west to east, of the Ems, the

Jade, the Weser, and the Elbe, had been subdivided by sandbanks into a

meshwork of channels than which nothing could have been easier to make

impregnable. These were further guarded by the continuation of the

scimitar curve of the Frisian Islands, beginning opposite Helder in

Holland with the Dutch island of Texel, becoming German in the island

of Borkum just beyond the Memmert Sands, opposite the mouth of the Ems,

and continued, as a natural screen, in the successive islands of Juist,

Nordeney, Baltrum, Langeoog, Spiekeroog, and Wangeroog as far as the

entrance of Jade Bay, covering the approach to Wilhelmshaven.

Situated on the western lip of this channel, and connected by locks

with the Ems and Jade Canal, this was one of the largest of Germany's

naval bases and a town of about 35,000 inhabitants. In the next

estuary, that of the Weser, and on the eastern coast of it, lay

Bremerhaven, another naval base and important dockyard; and, on the

same stretch of coast, at the point of the tongue of land between the

Weser and the Elbe, lay Cuxhaven, yet a third and {30} immensely

powerful naval port. This, with the attendant batteries of Döse, was

flanked at sea by the Roter and Knecht sandbanks and the little island

of Sharhorn, and was only about forty miles distant from Heligoland,

lying in the centre of the Bight and commanding the hole.

Probably, from an offensive standpoint, of less value, under modern

conditions, than was generally supposed, the possession of Heligoland,

as a fortified outpost, was, if only psychologically, one of Germany's

greatest assets. Of rocky formation and rising, at its highest point,

to about 200 feet, it was not only a useful observation post but a

fortress of the utmost strength. With wide views extending to the

mouth of the Elbe and the coast of the neighbouring estuaries, it also

protected a roadstead capable of sheltering and concealing a fleet of

considerable strength; and, in addition, it possessed a wireless

station of the greatest strategical importance.

From an early period, indeed, the peculiar advantages of the island had

been obvious to many observers. In the seventeenth century, it had

been used as a convenient station by the traders in contraband between

France and Hamburg, and, for the same purposes, toward the end of the

eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, by British

smugglers. During the Danish blockade of the German ports in the

Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848, its advantages had become so manifest

to the then British Governor that he made a special report about it to

the Colonial Office. "Possessing pilots of all the surrounding coasts

and rivers and with its {31} roadstead sufficient for a steam fleet,"

it would in an emergency, he had pointed out, "amply repay the small

cost of its retention in time of peace." Other considerations had

supervened, however, and, in 1890, after having been in British

possession for more than eighty years, Heligoland had been ceded to

Germany, to become, in due course, the keystone of her naval defenses.

Such then was the Bight of Heligoland, commanded at its centre by the

rocky island itself; flanked on each side by the sentinel islands of

the Frisian and Schleswig coasts; and with its tributary river-mouths

each an intricate meshwork of shallow and treacherous sandbanks.

Subject to fogs, and responding to its prevalent winds with short steep

seas of peculiar violence, it had been mined and protected since the

outbreak of war with every means that ingenuity could suggest. As for

the island itself, from which all women and civilians, with the

exception of five nurses, had been removed, new guns had been mounted

there, houses pulled down, and trees felled to assist the gunners; and

it is only when this is remembered that some idea becomes possible of

all that was involved in those first patrols, and in the affair of

outposts, as one officer has described it, afterward to be known as the

Battle of the Bight.

This was brought about as the result of the detailed information

afforded by our scouting submarines, who had obtained an accurate

knowledge of the procedure of the enemy's day and night patrols, and

had reported that they could always collect a large force of destroyers

round them whenever they showed {32} themselves in the Bight. From

this it became evident that a force, approaching at dawn from the

direction of Horn Reef, would have every prospect of being able to cut

off the enemy's returning night patrols; and an operation was

accordingly decided upon, of which the following were the broad

outlines. On the morning of August 28, 1914, the day appointed for the

action, some submarines, with a couple of destroyers in attendance,

were to penetrate into the Bight and expose themselves to the enemy,

and were then to lure them, if possible, into contact with other forces

that would be waiting. In close proximity, therefore, to the

submarines it was arranged for two light cruisers, the _Arethusa_ and

_Fearless_, to rendezvous with two flotillas of destroyers, while,

behind these, were to lie ambushed out at sea the Light Cruiser and

Battle-Cruiser Squadrons. The general design, with full details as to

the meeting-places, was communicated to each of the responsible

commanders and, in absolute secrecy, from their various bases, the

forces to be engaged put to sea.

Of these the first were the submarines under Commodore Roger Keyes, who

accompanied them on board the destroyer _Lurcher_, with the _Firedrake_

in attendance--those stout little vessels that had already made

themselves familiar, during the passage of the armies, with the

proposed scene of action. Setting out at midnight on August 26th, they

escorted the eight submarines chosen for this hazardous duty, _D2_,

_D8_, _E4_, _E5_, _E6_, _E7_, _E8_, and _E9_; and, while these were

kept in the background throughout the next day, the _Lurcher_ and

_Firedrake_ acted as their {33} scouts. To the perils in store for

them, in the way of detection, the fine weather and calm sea naturally

added; but, at nightfall of August 27th, each submarine crept to its

appointed station in close proximity to the German coast.

Meanwhile, at five in the morning of the same day, the _Arethusa_,

under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had set out in her turn, with two flotillas

of destroyers, meeting the _Fearless_ at sea during the afternoon; and,

farther north, at the same early hour, Vice-Admiral Beatty, in the

_Lion_, had departed with the First Battle-Cruiser and First Light

Cruiser Squadrons to be at hand in case of necessity. By the evening

of August 27th, therefore, all were in their places; the submarines

were feeling their way into the heart of the Bight; and the excitement

of all engaged, during those hushed hours of darkness, can be readily

imagined and perhaps envied. The night passed uneventfully, however,

and, upon the flotillas and squadrons at sea, the day broke clear and

sunny, but with a good deal of mist--in some places almost amounting to

fog--veiling the entrance of the Bight and the neighbourhood of

Heligoland.

The time was now come for the first open movement to be made; and,

while the _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_ began to search the waters, through

which the battle-cruisers were to come, for possible hostile

submarines, three of our own, _E6_, _E7_, and _E8_, designedly exposing

themselves, proceeded toward Heligoland. Finding the sea clear,

Commodore Keyes with the _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_ then followed up the

three submarines; and there we may leave {34} them for the moment,

turning our attention to the forces assembled in their rear under

Commodore Tyrwhitt.

These consisted, as we have seen, of the Light Cruiser _Arethusa_,

flying Commodore Tyrwhitt's broad pennant, the Light Cruiser

_Fearless_, under Captain W. F. Blunt, and most of the destroyers of

the First and Third Flotillas, and, at daybreak, they, too, began to

push their way into the misty Bight. Nor had they long to wait for the

enemy. Though the visibility was poor, seldom at first extending to

more than three miles, and though the fighting in consequence afterward

became confused, the general strategical plan soon proved itself to

have been sound. Issuing apparently from berths between the Frisian

Islands and the coast-line, a patrol of German destroyers, setting out

toward Heligoland, suddenly discovered our forces on the east, or

Bight, side of them. Previous to this, at about ten minutes to seven,

a solitary German destroyer had already been sighted and chased, but

now, for forty minutes, from twenty minutes past seven, a general

action ensued--the _Arethusa_ and Third Flotilla engaging the German

destroyers, and steering northwest to cut them off from Heligoland.

So far the presence of the _Arethusa_, whose armament has already been

described, had given us the advantage in this particular attack; but,

just before eight o'clock, two German cruisers loomed out of the mist,

one with four funnels and one with two. Whether these had come from

Heligoland or had followed up the destroyer-patrol was not apparent,

but {35} they immediately joined action, and, for a quarter of an hour,

the little _Arethusa_ found herself being bombarded by both of them as

well as by various destroyers.

Firing with every gun, the _Arethusa_, then only forty-eight hours out

of the builders' hands, was already in as tight a corner as she could

have asked for and beginning to suffer pretty heavily.

Twice she was hit below the water-line, but saved by the skill and

promptitude of her engineers; shrapnel shells were bursting over her

deck, and men were already dropping as the result of them; Lieutenant

Westmacott was killed at Commodore Tyrwhitt's side; the foremost port

gun was shot out of action, the gunlayer being blown out of his seat;

gun after gun was wrecked and the torpedo tubes disabled, till only one

6-inch gun remained effective; and a bursting shell, exploding some

ammunition, started a furious fire on the _Arethusa's_ deck.

Fortunately, at a quarter past eight, Captain Blunt in the

_Fearless_--of which a destroyer officer afterward wrote that "to see

the old _Fearless_ charging round the field of fight, seeking fresh

foes, was most inspiriting"--and appeared on the scene, and attracted

to herself the guns of the four-funnelled German cruiser. Thus

relieved a little, for ten minutes longer, the _Arethusa_ fought the

other on a converging course, till a splendidly directed shot wrecked

the German's forebridge, and she broke off toward Heligoland, which was

just in sight.

Heavily as the _Arethusa_ had suffered, the little destroyer _Laurel_,

who, with one of her consorts, had {36} first sighted the oncoming

cruisers, had been punished, as was only to be expected, with even

greater severity. For some little time engaging single-handed a German

light cruiser and two destroyers, on every calculation of the chances

of war, she should have been sunk a dozen times over. Struck first in

the boiler-room, the after funnel was blown in, and the main steam-pipe

damaged, four men being killed, but the remainder sticking to their

posts with the utmost coolness and heroism. Next she was struck

forward, three more men being killed and a gun being put out of action;

and a few moments later her captain, Commander F. Rose, was wounded in

the leg, but continued to direct the action. Soon afterward he was

again hit, dropping on the bridge with the other leg wounded, but

remained where he was, after a period of unconsciousness, until six

o'clock in the evening.

Meanwhile the _Laurel_ herself, while responding as best she could to

the superior gunfire of the cruiser, was vigorously attacking the two

destroyers, one of whom she succeeded in sinking and, when Commander

Rose was no longer able to take charge, his "Number One," Lieutenant C.

R. Peploe, continued the action, bringing his destroyer out, in the

words of Commodore Tyrwhitt, "in an able and gallant manner under most

trying conditions." Few on board, indeed, would have given much for

her chances of ever coming out at all; and, when a final shell struck

her near the centre gun, causing a violent explosion and setting her on

fire, the likelihood of the _Laurel_ making port must have seemed

remote to the last degree. Thanks in a great measure, however, {37} to

the gallantry and promptitude of Alfred Britten, Stoker Petty Officer,

who put out the fire, in spite of the close neighbourhood of several

lyddite shells, no further damage resulted; while the mass of fumes, in

which the disabled _Laurel_ now lay heavily wreathed, served in some

degree as a screen against further attack from the cruiser.

It was now nearly nine o'clock; fighting had died down; and, when

Commodore Tyrwhitt called his flotillas together, it was found that the

First Flotilla had also been in action and sunk _V187_, the German

commodore's destroyer. Unfortunately two boats' crews from the

destroyers _Goshawk_ and _Defender_, lowered to pick up survivors from

the sunk destroyer, had had to be left behind owing to an attack by a

German cruiser during this work of mercy--a self-revealing act on the

part of the second navy in the world. Apart from this, though many of

our vessels, especially the _Laurel_ and _Arethusa_, had been heavily

battered, all the flotillas were intact; while, unknown to Commodore

Tyrwhitt and his command, even the abandoned boats' crews were being

rescued. For, peeping through her periscope, Submarine _E4_ had

witnessed the whole occurrence--the sinking of _V187_, the subsequent

work of rescue, and the approach of the hostile cruiser. Under her

resourceful captain, Commander E. W. Leir, she had at once proceeded to

attack the enemy; and, though she had not managed to torpedo her, she

had driven her from the scene of action, returning, at the greatest

risk, to the two boats. Coming to the surface, she had taken on board

the whole of the abandoned British crews, as {38} well as a German

officer and two men. Being unable to embark the rest--eighteen wounded

Germans--she had left them with a German officer and six unwounded men,

provided them with water, biscuits, and a compass, and allowed them to

navigate their way back to Heligoland.

While this unique action was in progress, and while the _Arethusa_ was

busy repairing her guns and replenishing her ammunition, let us return

again to the _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_, whom we had last seen heading

for Heligoland in the wake of the decoy submarines. These also had

been successful in getting into touch with the enemy forces, and, at

ten o'clock, the _Arethusa_, with most of her guns now in working order

again, received a message from them that they were being chased by

light cruisers, and at once proceeded to their assistance.

Having joined up with them, and being now close to Heligoland,

Commodore Tyrwhitt thought it wiser to retreat a little to the

westward, but, a few minutes later, sighted a four-funnelled German

cruiser, which opened a very heavy fire upon the British force about

eleven o'clock. The position being somewhat critical, Commodore

Tyrwhitt ordered the _Fearless_ to attack and the First Flotilla to

launch torpedoes; but, though they did so with immense spirit, the

cruiser evaded the onslaught and vanished in the mist. Ten minutes

later she appeared again from another direction, to be attacked both by

the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_, the former especially escaping

destruction from her only by the slenderest of margins. Salvo after

salvo of shells plunged into the water, some of {39} them barely thirty

feet short of the _Arethusa_, while two torpedoes were also launched at

her, but fortunately also fell short, leaving her unharmed.

Meanwhile both Commodore Tyrwhitt and Commodore Keyes had been

communicating by wireless with Admiral Beatty, who, just after eleven,

having evaded three submarines, ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to

the support of the light forces. While this was hurrying to their

assistance, however, the _Arethusa's_ 6-inch guns had proved too

accurate for the German cruiser, who had broken off action,

disappearing into the mist again in the direction of the Island. How

badly she was damaged could only be guessed, but, four minutes later,

yet another cruiser was sighted, the three-funnelled _Mainz_, which was

immediately attacked both by the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_. The

blood of everybody was up now as never before, and, for twenty-five

minutes, the assault was so fiercely pressed that, at the end of that

time, the _Mainz_, in spite of her powerful resistance, was seen to be

on fire and sinking by the head. Her engines had stopped, and it was

just at this moment that the Light Cruiser Squadron appeared on the

scene, reducing her, in a very few minutes, to a condition that, as

Commodore Tyrwhitt put it, must have been indescribable.

How bad it was let a single quotation from a cruiser officer's diary

suffice to indicate. Watching the deck of the _Mainz_ through his

powerful glasses, he was at first completely puzzled by two things--the

absence of corpses and the enormous profusion of deck-sponges soaked in

blood. It was not for some time {40} that he began to realize that the

one accounted for the other. "Enough said," he wrote, "a six-inch

projectile does not kill a man nor even dismember him; it simply

scatters him."

It was now a quarter past twelve, and, by this time, Admiral Beatty was

himself on the spot. From the reports received by him from the various

squadron and flotilla commanders, and the obvious presence now of many

enemy ships, he had come to the conclusion that, in an action where

speed was essential--the main German bases being so close at hand--the

lighter forces might not be able to deal with the situation

sufficiently rapidly. Bearing in mind the possibilities of a concerted

submarine attack, and the conceivable sortie in force of a German

battle squadron, he decided that his speed would probably baffle the

first, and that the latter, if he were prompt enough, could not arrive

in time; while, for anything less in the way of enemy attack, he had

ample forces at his disposal.

Working up his engines, therefore, to full speed, he overtook the light

cruisers just as they were finishing the _Mainz_, and, a quarter of an

hour afterward, sighted the _Arethusa_ fighting a rearguard action with

a cruiser of the _Kolberg_ class--recognized as the _Köln_. Following

the general plan, he at once steered to cut the latter off from

Heligoland, and, seven minutes later, opened fire, chasing her at full

speed out to sea. While pursuing the _Köln_, another German cruiser,

apparently the _Ariadne_, was seen right ahead, steering at high speed

and at right angles to the _Lion_, who was herself now travelling at 28

knots. In spite of {41} this, and that, before losing her in the mist,

the _Lion_ had only time for a couple of salvoes, she was set on fire,

reduced to a sinking condition, and was soon afterward lost, as the

Germans themselves admitted. This was just before one; mines had been

reported eastward; it was essential that the squadrons should not be

too far dispersed; and therefore Admiral Beatty, desisting from

pursuit, ordered a withdrawal, and returned to the _Köln_. She was

sighted at 1:25, with her ensign still flying; the _Lion_ opened fire

upon her from two turrets; a couple of salvoes sufficed to sink her;

and, within ten minutes, she had disappeared. By this time, the

_Arethusa_, the _Fearless_, and the advanced destroyer flotillas had

been in action almost continuously for more than six hours; the

_Arethusa's_ speed, owing to her injuries, was slowly diminishing knot

by knot; upon the bridge of the little _Laurel_, Commander Frank Rose,

with both his legs crippled, still kept his post; three German cruisers

and two destroyers, including the commodore in command, were known to

have been sunk; and, behind the mists in the Bight, nothing was more

likely than that overwhelming reinforcements were hurrying to the spot.

Under these circumstances, Admiral Beatty decided to withdraw his

forces, covering their retirement with his powerful battle-cruisers;

and it was while doing so that Captain Reginald Hall of the _Queen

Mary_ executed one of the smartest manoeuvres of the day. Watching

from his bridge, and travelling at the time something approaching

thirty knots an hour, he saw an enemy torpedo, ten knots faster, that,

in a matter of moments, {42} would strike him amidships. The

destruction of the _Queen Mary_, had the submarine achieved it, would

have more than outbalanced all the German losses, but, by very sharply

turning full helm, the impact was just avoided in time--the

battle-cruiser and torpedo, till the latter sunk, actually travelling

side by side.

This was the last sign of hostile reaction to one of the most brilliant

little raids in our naval history; and, for the closing picture, we

must turn to Admiral Christian, who, with yet another squadron, had

been waiting out at sea. To him and Rear-Admiral Campbell had been

allotted the task of intercepting any vessels that might have escaped

in this direction; and, at about half-past four, some of Admiral

Campbell's cruisers met Commodore Keyes in the returning _Lurcher_.

Limping along in company with him were the destroyers _Laurel_ and

Liberty, and on board her were 220 of the crew of the _Mainz_,

Commodore Keyes having laid himself alongside the burning cruiser with

the greatest chivalry and skill.

The _Laurel_ was by this time quite unable to proceed farther under her

own steam, and she was accordingly taken in tow by the cruiser

_Amethyst_, the _Bacchante_ and _Cressy_ relieving the _Lurcher_ of her

prisoners, and sailing with them to the Nore. Meanwhile, the

_Arethusa_, after her fiery ordeals, was in hardly better case than the

_Laurel_, and, at seven o'clock, after struggling along homeward at

about six knots an hour, found herself unable to proceed farther, and

signalled for assistance. Two and a half hours later it was then pitch

dark--and with no lights, of course, permissible, the _Hogue_ took her

in tow, the {43} necessary arrangements being carried out with the aid

of a couple of hand lanterns.

So the day ended without the loss to ourselves of a single vessel of

any description; and when, many hours afterward, the news having

preceded her, the _Arethusa_ returned to harbour, scarred and

lopsided--with her eleven dead and seventeen wounded officers and

men--it was little wonder that every ship's syren of all that were

assembled there blew her a welcome, and that every seaman who could

scramble on deck cheered and cheered her again till he was hoarse.

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The Heroic Record of the British Navy: A Short History of the Naval War, 1914-1918 · 第 2 / 12 章