GENERAL CONDITION OF INDIA IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
The empire conquered south of the Sutlej by the Afghan predecessors
of the Mughal had no claim to be regarded as the empire of Hindustan.
It was rather the empire of Delhi, that is, of the provinces called
up to the year 1857 the North-western Provinces, including that part
of the Bengal Presidency which we know as Western Behar, and some
districts in the Central Provinces and Rajputana. It included,
likewise, the Punjab. For a moment, indeed, the princes of the House
of Tughlak could claim supremacy over Bengal and almost the whole of
Southern India, but the first invasion from the north gave the
opportunity which the Hindu princes of the south seized to shake off
the uncongenial yoke, and it had not been re-imposed. The important
kingdom of Orissa, extending from the mouth of the Ganges to that of
the Godavari, had always maintained its independence. Western India,
too, had for some time ceased to acknowledge the sway of the foreign
invader, and its several states had become kingdoms.
{73} Thus, at the accession of Akbar, the westernmost portion of
India, the kingdom of Gujarat, ruled over by a Muhammadan prince of
Afghan blood, was independent. It had been overrun, indeed, by
Humayun, but on his flight from India it had re-asserted itself, and
had not since been molested. Indeed it had carried on a not
unsuccessful war with its nearest neighbour, Malwa. That state,
embracing the greater part of what we know as Central India, was thus
independent at the accession of Akbar. So likewise was Khandesh: so
also were the states of Rajputana. These latter deserve a more
detailed notice.
The exploits of the great Sanga Rana have been incidentally referred
to in the first chapter. The defeat of that prince by Babar had
greatly affected the power of Mewar, and when Sher Shah drove Humayun
from India its chiefs had been compelled eventually to acknowledge
the overlordship of the conqueror. But, during the disturbances which
followed the death of Sher Shah, they had recovered their
independence, and at the accession of Akbar they still held their
high place among the states of Rajputana. Of the other states it may
briefly be stated that the rulers of Jaipur had paid homage to the
Mughal in the time of Babar. The then Raja, Baharma, had assisted
that prince with his forces, and had received from Humayun, prior to
his defeat by Sher Shah, a high imperial title as ruler of Ambar. The
son of Baharma, Bhagwan Das, occupied the throne when Akbar won {74}
Panipat. Jodhpur, in those days, occupied a far higher position than
did Jaipur. Its Raja, Maldeo Singh, had given to the great Sher Shah
more trouble in the field than had any of his opponents. He had,
however, refused an asylum to Humayun when Humayun was a fugitive. He
was alive, independent, and the most powerful of all the princes of
Rajputana when Akbar ascended the throne of Delhi. Jaisalmer,
Bikaner, and the states on the borders of the desert were also
independent. So likewise were the minor states of Rajputana; so also
was Sind; so also Multan. Mewat and Baghelkhand owned no foreign
master; but Gwalior, Orchha, Chanderi, Narwar, and Pannao suffered
from their vicinity to Agra, and were more or less tributary,
according to the leisure accruing to the conqueror to assert his
authority.
But even in the provinces which owned the rule of the Muhammadan
conqueror there was no cohesion. The king, sultan, or emperor, as he
was variously called, was simply the lord of the nobles to whom the
several provinces had been assigned. In his own court he ruled
absolutely. He commanded the army in the field. But with the internal
administration of the provinces he did not interfere. Each of these
provinces was really, though not nominally, independent under its own
viceroy.
According to all concurrent testimony the condition of the Hindu
population, who constituted seven-eighths of the entire population of
the provinces subject to Muhammadan rule, was one of contentment.
They {75} were allowed the free exercise of their religion, though
they were liable to the _jizyia_ or capitation tax, imposed by
Muhammadans on subject races of other faiths. But in all the
departments of the Government the Hindu element was very strong. In
most provinces the higher classes of this faith maintained a
hereditary jurisdiction subordinate to the governor; and in time of
war they supplied their quota of troops for service in the field.
Each province had thus a local army, ready to be placed at the
disposal of the governor whenever he should deem it necessary. But,
besides, and unconnected with this local army, he had almost always
in the province a certain number of imperial troops, that is, of
troops paid by the Sultan, and the command of which was vested in an
officer nominated by the Sultan. This officer was, to a great extent,
independent of the local governor, being directly responsible to the
sovereign.
Theoretically, the administration of justice was perfect, for it was
dispensed according to the Muhammadan principle that the state was
dependent on the law. That law was administered by the Kazis or
judges in conformity with a code which was the result of accumulated
decisions based on the Kuran, but modified by the customs of the
country. The Kazi decided all matters of a civil character; all
questions, in fact, which did not affect the safety of the state. But
criminal cases were reserved to the jurisdiction of a body of men
whose mode of procedure {76} was practically undefined, and who,
nominated and supported by the Crown, sometimes trenched on the
authority of the Kazi. The general contentment of the people would
seem, however, to authorise the conclusion that, on the whole, the
administration of justice was performed in a satisfactory manner.
Time had welded together the interests of the families of the earlier
Muhammadan immigrant and those of the Hindu inhabitant, and they both
looked alike to the law to afford them such protection as was
possible. In spite of the many wars, the general condition of the
country was undoubtedly, if the native records may be trusted, very
flourishing.
It is important to note, in considering the administration upon which
we are now entering, that neither Babar nor Humayun had changed, to
any material extent, the system of their Afghan predecessors in
India. Babar, indeed, had been accustomed to a system even more
autocratic. Whether in Ferghana, in Samarkand, or in Kabul, he had
not only been the supreme lord in the capital, but also the feudal
lord of the governors of provinces appointed by himself. Those
governors, those chiefs of districts or of jaghirs, did indeed
exercise an authority almost absolute within their respective
domains. But they were always removable at the pleasure of the
sovereign, and it became an object with them to administer on a plan
which would secure substantial justice, or to maintain at the court
agents who should watch over their interests with the ruling prince.
{77} Similarly the army was composed of the personal retainers of the
sovereign, swollen by the personal retainers of his chiefs and
vassals and by the native tribes of the provinces occupied.
With Babar, too, as with his son, the form of government had been a
pure despotism. Free institutions were unknown. The laws passed by
one sovereign might be annulled by his successor. The personal
element, in fact, predominated everywhere. The only possible check on
the will of the sovereign lay in successful rebellion. But if the
sovereign were capable, successful rebellion was almost an
impossibility. If he were just as well as capable, he discerned that
the enforcement of justice constituted his surest safeguard against
any rebellion.
Babar, then, had found in the provinces of India which he had
conquered a system prevailing not at all dissimilar in principle to
that to which he had been accustomed in the more northern regions.
Had he been disposed to change it, he had not the time. Nor had his
successor either the time or the inclination. The system he had
pondered over just prior to his death shows no radical advance in
principle on that which had existed in Hindustan. He would have
parcelled out the empire into six great divisions, of which Delhi,
Agra, Kanauj, Jaunpur, Mandu, and Lahore should be the centres or
capitals. Each of these would have been likewise great military
commands, under a trusted general, whose army-corps should be so
strong as to render him independent of {78} outside aid: whilst the
Emperor should give unity to the whole by visiting each division in
turn with an army of twelve thousand horse, inspecting the local
forces and examining the general condition of the province. The
project was full of defects. It would have been a bad mode of
administration even had the sovereign been always more capable than
his generals. It could not have lasted a year had he been less so.
The sudden death of Humayun came to interfere with, to prevent the
execution of, this plan. Then followed the military events
culminating in the triumph of Panipat. That battle placed the young
Akbar in a position his grandfather Babar had occupied exactly thirty
years before. Then, it had given Babar the opportunity, of which he
availed himself, to conquer North-western India, Behar, and part of
Central India. A similar opportunity was given by the second battle
of Panipat to Akbar. On that field he had conquered the only enemy
capable of coping with him seriously. As far as conquest then was
concerned, his task was easy. But to make that conquest enduring, to
consolidate the different provinces and the diverse nationalities, to
devise and introduce a system so centralising as to make the
influence of the Emperor permeate through every town and every
province, and yet not sufficiently centralising to kill local
traditions, local customs, local habits of thought,--that was a task
his grandfather had never attempted; which, to his father, would have
seemed an impossibility, even if it had occurred or {79} had been
presented to him. Yet, in their schemes, the absence of such a
programme had left the empire conquered on the morrow of the Panipat
of 1526, an empire without root in the soil, dependent absolutely on
continued military success; liable to be overthrown by the first
strong gust; not one whit more stable than the empires of the
Ghaznivides, the Ghors, the Khiljis, the Tughlaks, the Saiyids, the
Lodis, which had preceded it. That it was not more stable was proved
by the ease with which the empire founded by Babar succumbed, in the
succeeding reign, to the attacks of Sher Shah. It may be admitted
that if Babar had been immortal he might possibly have beaten back
Sher Shah. But that admission serves to prove my argument. Babar was
a very able general. So likewise was Sher Khan. Humayun was flighty,
versatile, and unpractical; as a general of but small account. It is
possible that the Sher Khan who triumphed over Humayun might have
been beaten by Babar. But that only proves that the system introduced
by Babar was the system to which he had been accustomed all his
life--the system which had alternately lost and won for him Ferghana
and Samarkand; which had given him Kabul, and, a few years later,
India; the system of the rule of the strongest. Nowhere, neither in
Ferghana, nor in Samarkand, nor in Kabul, nor in the Punjab, nor in
India, had it shot down any roots. It was in fact impossible it could
do so, for it possessed no germinating power.
{80} And now, at the close of 1556, the empire won and lost and won
again was in the hands of a boy, reared in the school of adversity
and trial, one month over fourteen years.[1] Panipat had given him
India. Young as he was, he had seen much of affairs. He had been
constantly consulted by his father: he had undergone a practical
military education under Bairam, the first commander of the day: he
had governed the Punjab for over six months. But it was as an
administrator as well as a conqueror that he was now about to be
tried. In that respect neither the example of his father, nor the
precepts of Bairam, could influence him for good. So far as can be
known, he had already displayed the germs of a judgment prompt to
meet difficulties, a disposition inclined to mercy. He had refused to
slay Hemu. But other qualities were required for the task now opening
before him. Let us examine by the light of subsequent transactions
what were his qualifications for the task.
[Footnote 1: Akbar was born the 15th October, 1542. The second battle
of Panipat was fought the 5th November, 1556.]
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