So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see

when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions

they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates,

and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a

usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was

the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil

war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty.

Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question

is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of

Thessalia determined against the truth: _Aliqua sunt injuste facienda_,

_ut multa juste fieri possint_. But the reply is good: _Auctorem

præsentis justitiæ habes_, _sponsorem futuræ non habes_. Men must pursue

things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine

Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the

exemplar and description of good.

XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it

remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without

which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or

statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and

motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: _Necesse

est scilicet de virtute dicere_, _et quid sit_, _et ex quibus gignatur_.

_Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse_, _acquirendæ autem ejus

modos et vias ignorare_. _Non enum de virtute tantum_, _qua specie sit_,

_quærendum est_, _sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat_: _utrumque enum

volumeus_, _et rem ipsam nosse_, _et ejus compotes fieri_: _hoc autem ex

voto non succedet_, _nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo_. In such full

words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith

Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied

himself to philosophy, _Non ita disputandi causa_, _sed ita vivendi_.

And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any

consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca

excellently saith, _De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat_, _de summa

nemo_), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with

that aphorism of Hippocrates, _Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non

sentiunt_, _iis mens ægrotat_. They need medicine, not only to assuage

the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the cure of

men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral

philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble

handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of the handmaid look

perpetually towards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left

to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so

ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of

divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many

sound and profitable directions.

(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but

find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the

rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and

action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men

(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their

books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more

particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit

ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible,

and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have

written. We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof,

that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we

ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the

one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of

application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of

the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the

constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the

culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:

points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one,

and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these

things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:—

“Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”

and so likewise,

“Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.”

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and

neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which

draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth

adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating

or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the

exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto

which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take

measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound

and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and

tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to

those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and

causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;

wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to

describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.

For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are

proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle

handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it

not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to

intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide

themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in

few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as

well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to

that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time;

others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of

pursuit:—

“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly

also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be

considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation

(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s

self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and

cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered. “That there

is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more

serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to

take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to

take distaste at the good of another?” which is that properly which we

call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I

cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the

several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in

morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and

suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of

astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to

the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,

lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts,

lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of

these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures

of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man

shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive,

dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, _huomo di prima impressione_,

_huomo di ultima impressione_, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this

kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry.

For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no

precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both

history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these

observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but

no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of

them for use of life.

(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed

upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and

sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and

not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as

sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy,

privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune,

rising _per saltum_, _per gradus_, and the like. And, therefore, we see

that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, _benignitas

hujis ut adolescentuli est_. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of

discipline was to be used to the Cretans, _increpa eos dure_, upon the

disposition of their country, _Cretensus semper mendaces_, _malæ bestiæ_,

_ventres_. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire

contradictories: _Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates_, _ut vehementes sunt_,

_sic mobiles_, _sæpeque ipsæ sibi advers_. Tacitus observeth how rarely

raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: _solus Vespasianus

mutatus in melius_. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and

sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men _qui magnam felicitatem

concoquere non possunt_. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a

measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune;

_Divitiæ si affluant_, _nolite cor apponere_. These observations and the

like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in

his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they

were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do

essentially appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and

moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of

complexions and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to

follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to

all patients.

(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the

affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to

know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases;

and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of

the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the

diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the

perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the ancient

politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea,

and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm

and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would

be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in

working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the

nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as

winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I

find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers

volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the

principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are

considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved

by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the

quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. For it is

not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this

inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light

can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to

the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better

travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I

can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it

was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a

subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample

descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular

writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of

anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance,

and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors

of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how

affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and

how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose

themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify:

how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and

encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst

the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I

say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another;

even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which

otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation

is erected that excellent use of _præmium_ and _pæna_, whereby civil

states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope,

for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of

states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so

it is in the government within.

(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and

have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite,

and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom,

exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company,

friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these

as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind

suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and

described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate

of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we

will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it

were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and

habit to speak of.

(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of

those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom;

using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it

will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not

learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in

things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now

stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth

a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily

on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and

that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of

enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter

sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth,

than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion,

that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to

have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many

precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of

ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.

(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either

too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you

discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and

so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can

hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other

side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.

(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several

times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst

disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may

work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the

more easy and pleasant.

(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which

is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by

nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a

wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.

(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and

with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not

first in the intention, but _tanquam aliud agendo_, because of the

natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other

axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which

being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed

by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth

that which is lame and counterfeit.

(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and

operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great

caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers

in great indignation call poesy _vinum dæmonum_, because it increaseth

temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of

Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, “That young men are no

fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the

boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and

experience”? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and

discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto

virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and

popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be

scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life,

because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled

years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true

also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy,

till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest

their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no

true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the

verse describes it, _Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur_; and

again, _Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit_, _hic diadema_: which the

poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but

books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth

Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been

more odious than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference,

but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most

excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there

not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities

themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise,

arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, _In Marco Catone hæc

bona quæ videmus divina et egregia_, _ipsius scitote esse propria_; _quæ

nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura_, _sed a magistro_? Many

other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and

effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so,

likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of

company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in

the doctrine of morality.

(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more

accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that

the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at

other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this

practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to

obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been

practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or

exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because

they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil

hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of

that which is past, and an inception or account _de novo_ for the time to

come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all

good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.

(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all

other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble

and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate;

which is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and

virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his

compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set

before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute,

constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself

into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature;

whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a

carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as

if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude

stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when

nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all

the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man

practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like

but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what

virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend

unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself

thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express

himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words

are these: _Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam_, _quæ supra

humanitatem est_, _heroicam sive divinam virtutem_; and a little after,

_Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est_, _swic neque Dei_: _sed hic

quidem status altius quiddam virtute est_, _ille aluid quiddam a vitio_.

And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus

attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men

needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue

as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an

imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen

and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind,

which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting

upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of

perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.

And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a

false imitation of divine love, _Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad humanam

vitam_—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist

or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules

and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that

facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so

certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work

him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality

can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay, further,

as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise

the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or

excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same

instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though

they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity

admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power,

the angels transgressed and fell; _Ascendam_, _et ero similis altissimo_:

by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell;

_Eritis sicut Dii_, _scientes bonum et malum_: but by aspiring to a

similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever

transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are

called: _Diligite inimicos vestros_, _benefacite eis qui oderunt vos_,

_et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos_, _ut sitis filii

Patris vestri qui in cœlis est_, _qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos

et malos_, _et pluit super justos et injustos_. So in the first platform

of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, _Optimus

Maximus_: and the sacred Scriptures thus, _Miscericordia ejus super omnia

opera ejus_.

(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the

culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the

arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to

collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by

others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But

as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians)

that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink

wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of

sleep—

“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur

Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:

Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,

Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in

knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more

vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser

dreams.

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,

which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and

spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation

or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For

as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and

pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral

knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without

perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile

for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind,

seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many

have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from

perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have

an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of

honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and

reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business;

and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure,

we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to

stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it,

than in the strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all

others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.

Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like sheep,

for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for

in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would

follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than

policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of

internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external

goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft

to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in

the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, _Sed adhuc

poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum_. Again,

states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of

frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so

governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but

the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These

respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary

actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government.

For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be

three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever—wisdom of the

behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but

much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an

influence also into business and government. The poet saith, _Nec vultu

destrue verba tuo_: a man may destroy the force of his words with his

countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his

brother affability and easy access; _Nil interest habere ostium apertum_,

_vultum clausum_: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and

to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus,

before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending,

did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his

countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of

such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage

appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well

expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: _Ne aut arrogans

videar_, _aut obnoxius_; _quorum alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti_,

_alterum suæ_: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity,

without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if

behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass

into affectation, and then _Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam

transferre_—to act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that

extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And

therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by

saying, _Amici fures temporis_: so certainly the intending of the

discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as

are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and

seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do

seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything

becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by _puntos_ and

compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an

over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is

time and season. For as Solomon saith, _Qui respicit ad ventos_, _non

seminat_; _et qui respicit ad nubes_, _non metet_: a man must make his

opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as

a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it

ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to

be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any

deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for

exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly

handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto

collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the

professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note

or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there

is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three

wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of

behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an

inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government,

they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that

happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is

most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered

advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.

For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned

men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without

learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should

be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less

infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some

part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in

the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that

it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general

wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at

certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use

their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them,

and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing

of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every

other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of

counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal

insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon

particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of

causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth

to his brother, _De petitione consulatus_ (being the only book of

business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a

particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of

many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a

perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may

see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed

by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as

the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we

see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,

positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay

a while, offering to consideration some number of examples.

(6) _Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam_,

_ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi_. Here is commended the

provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it

was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’

papers unperused.

_Vir sapiens_, _si cum stulto contenderit_, _sive irascatur_, _sive

rideat_, _non inveniet requiem_. Here is described the great

disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than

himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to

jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways

quit himself well of it.

_Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum_, _postea sentiet eum

contumacem_. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in

his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.

_Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo_? _coram regibus stabit_, _nec erit

inter ignobiles_. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to

honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love

not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and

diligent.

_Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole_, _cum adolescente secundo

qui consurgit pro eo_. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla

first, and after him by Tiberius. _Plures adorant solem orientem quam

occidentem vel meridianum_.

_Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te_, _locum tuum ne

demiseris_; _quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima_. Here caution

is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the

unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of

means to make them better.

_Erat civitas parva_, _et pauci in ea viri_: _venit contra eam rex

magnus_, _et vallavit eam_, _instruxitque munitones per gyrum_, _et

perfecta est obsidio_; _inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens_, _et

liberavit eam per sapientiam suam_; _et nullus deinceps recordatus est

huminis illius pauperis_. Here the corruption of states is set forth,

that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.

_Millis responsio frangit iram_. Here is noted that silence or rough

answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

_Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum_. Here is lively represented how

laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the

last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar

or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

_Melior est finis orationis quam principium_. Here is taxed the vanity

of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than

upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

_Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem_, _non bene facit_; _iste et pro

buccella panis deseret veritatem_. Here is noted, that a judge were

better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge

offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

_Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi_, _in quo

paratur fames_. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous

extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry

horseleech.

_Fons turbatus pede_, _et vena corrupta_, _est justus cadens coram

impio_. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the

face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many

particular injuries passed over by connivance.

_Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre_, _et dicit hoc non esse

peccatum_, _particeps est homicidii_. Here is noted that, whereas men in

wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they

might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate

their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

_Noli esse amicus homini iracundo_, _nec ambulato cum homine furioso_.

Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do

principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse

us to many factions and quarrels.

_Qui conturbat domum suam_, _possidebit ventum_. Here is noted, that in

domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting

of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their

expectation, and it turneth to wind.

_Filius sapiens lætificat patrem_: _filius vero stultus mæstitia est

matri suæ_. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the

good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill

proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

_Qui celat delictum_, _quærit amicitiam_; _sed qui altero sermone

repetit_, _separat fæderatos_. Here caution is given, that reconcilement

is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past,

than by apologies and excuses.

_In omni opere bono erit abundantia_; _ubi autem verba sunt plurima_,

_ibi frequenter egestas_. Here is noted, that words and discourse

aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.

_Primus in sua causa justus_: _sed venit altera pars_, _et inquiret in

eum_. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth

much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed,

except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

_Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia_, _et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora

ventris_. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which

seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which

hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

_Qui erudit derisorem_, _ipse sibi injuriam facit_; _et qui arguit

impium_, _sibi maculam generat_. Here caution is given how we tender

reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem

it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

_Da sapienti occasionem_, _et addetur ei sapientia_. Here is

distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal

and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is

quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.

_Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium_, _sic corda hominum

manifesta sunt prudentibus_. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to

a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are

represented; from which representation proceedeth that application,

“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.”

(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of

Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a

desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as

deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with

brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the

sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is

allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some

writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as

instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I

would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to

be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out

any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it

and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they

were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times

abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And

therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this

variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel

chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories

or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of

particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much

greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example,

than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point

of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example

is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with

all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon

made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the

examples alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and

without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse

which they are brought in to make good.

(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of

times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel

handleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of

business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there

is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is

discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of

Cicero _ad Atticum_, and others. For letters have a great and more

particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives.

Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil

knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much

from that whereof we have spoken as _sapere_ and _sibi sapere_, the one

moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For

there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a

man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many

are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like

ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the

garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: _Nam pol

sapiens_ (saith the comical poet) _fingit fortunam sibi_; and it grew to

an adage, _Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ_; and Livy attributed it to Cato

the first, _In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat_, _ut quocunque

loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur_.

(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed,

hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in

Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the state

in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the

manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And in this

fortune had no part.” And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in

anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is too high and too

arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_,

_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another

prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and

that which the poet expresseth,

“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,

Nunc adsint!”

For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,

therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their

successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so

Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of

the ship, _Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus_.

(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortunæ suæ_:

_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like,

being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to

insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward

declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question

imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as

they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar (who was

rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died

he desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were

conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.

This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is

practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And,

therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by

axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some

heads or passages of it.

(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to

teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every

man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the

difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is

as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral.

But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and

in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an

opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please

herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the

hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.

In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that

nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the

globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being

and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and

doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of

fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can

be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do

abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless

fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.

(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary

towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus

did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and

recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is,

to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their

natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps

and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses

and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their

friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers,

competitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora

noras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this

not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,

and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and

the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in

itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:

for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are

one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These

informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the

minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of

observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground

a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,

_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens

exhauriet illud_. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under

precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the

obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the

ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and

distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to

words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to

set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said,

_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and

not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and

gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, “the gate

of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of

Gallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_. So again, noting the

differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in

the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech

of Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut

penitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed

intentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his

character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,

he saith, “That in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;” but

then again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_. So that there is no

such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance

(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these

fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and

formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily

and hardly.

(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted

without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus

sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the

Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is

better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small

favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to

industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordiæ_. So

again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular

which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and

unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus

advanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus præfecturas

et tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he

did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.

(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of

flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with

the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a

stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his

dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of

which Tacitus saith, _Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_:

_correptamque Græco versu admonuit_, _ideo lædi quia non regnaret_. And,

therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men

to confess their secrets:—

“Vino torus et ira.”

And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so

settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes

upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open

themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,

according to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_:

“Tell a lie and find a truth.”

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:

men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their

virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from

their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,

with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions

conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more

masked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their

natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by

their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly

and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,

returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion

being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished

that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very

wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.

And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to

suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian

proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:—

“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,

C’è ne manco che non credi.”

“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men

do account upon.”

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their

natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top

of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto

they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of

the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that

maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform

ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also

of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is

principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself

outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,

_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the

other’s neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in

three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with

those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and

specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of

persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least

which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The

second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in

most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech

inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to

a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and

inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful

and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and

action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a

philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_,

_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say

to himself, _Et hoc volo_, _ac etiam aliquid addiscere_. I have stayed

the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is

a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all

things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of

themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for

nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many

matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but

only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which

may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more

dexterity.

(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take

good information touching their own person, and well to understand

themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a

glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine

glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world,

or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.

(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and

virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with

the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and

examination to frame the considerations following.

(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with

the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit,

then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if

differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be

more close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never

seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years;

whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth,

_alia Tiberio morum via_.

(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and

courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and,

if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as we see was

done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal

profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and

inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether

they were worse for a prince or for a priest.

(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to

have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there

is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as Cæsar Julius

did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the

excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and

saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom

the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil

and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial

greatness.

(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed

according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar,

all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not

solemn, or of reputation.

(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples,

in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their

natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth

Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, _Sylla

potuit_, _ego non potero_? Wherein he was much abused, the natures and

proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world;

the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn,

and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many

other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s self, there

followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s self; wherein we see

nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For

there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues,

fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man’s

weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the

other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by

exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus,

who was the greatest politique of his time, _Omnium quæ dixerat

feceratque arte quadam ostentator_, which requireth indeed some art, lest

it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to

the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than

in policy; for as it is said, _Audacter calumniare_, _semper aliquid

hæret_; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, _Audacter

te vendita_, _semper aluquid hæret_. For it will stick with the more

ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile

at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth

countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and

government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at

times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military

persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and

careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being

too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as

gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’

injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a

few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height

of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their

moderation.

(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not

perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not

disvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three

manners—by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men think he is

rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that

which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and

by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation,

applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let

him hear what is truly said: _Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris_,

_si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat_.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the

valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners—by

caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do

ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which

they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will

thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and

proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves

to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from

a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of the one it is

well said,

“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,”

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the

virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a

coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some

probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble

his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities

which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but

industries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the

surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man

cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who

endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down

the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other,

which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he

is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,

to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those

things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets,

that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say,

“That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and

presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which

they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in

this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must

take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury,

by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some

sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage,

with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of

necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it

ever succeedeth with good felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to

frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing

hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: _Idem manebat_, _neque idem

decebat_—men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to

Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he

had _versatile ingenium_. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn

wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more

dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious

and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is

almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe

that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it

in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus

would have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the

nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it

is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not

discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the

occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country

fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then

they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it

is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring

about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other

remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave

for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at

first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or

cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most

prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our

mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with

that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well

expressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the

occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit

or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions

that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not

occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please

the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:

which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with

the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which

Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut

exercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ_;

_ut quæipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi

cogantur_. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of

sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly

and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own

plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very

imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in

the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of

secrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French

calleth _sourdes menées_, when men set things in work without opening

themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many

times _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum

illaqueant_. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a

natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been

reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a

kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they

stood his friends or enemies.” So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul,

made no scruple to profess “that he had rather be first in a village than

second at Rome.” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what

Cicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of Cæsar) _non recusat_, _sed

quodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_. So we

may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his

very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in

his harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi

liceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he

would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected

in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, “Is it possible?”

or, “Did you ever hear the like?” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he

did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous:

whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and

dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_,

wherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his

design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute

anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for

necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and

he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that

point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could

make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain

in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by

colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and

unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus

made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in

regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to

Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti

simulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of

dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly

politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our

minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and

are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not

superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of

some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they

can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison,

preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and

effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular

fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in

many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some

measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which

are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must

needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato

the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to

no great purpose, _Hæc omnia magno studio agebat_. So in most things men

are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best,

when it should be the fittest.

(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune,

as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the

amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the impediments of the

mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune

will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down

wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because

of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions.

But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that

other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the

true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant,

populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of

Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him,

that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his

gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that

are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds,

wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In

the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides

and currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are

seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of

reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any

of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased

by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in

matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of

the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend

their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come

on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to

instance; not observing the good precept, _Quod nunc instat agamus_.

(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters

which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding

in a man’s ears, _Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus_: and that

is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions

of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not

commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their

ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait

occasions, and to devise plots.

(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth

nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his

business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally

intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the

motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he

cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a

second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he

purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot

make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat

in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it,

yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact

an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand

amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is

more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth

so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more

proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than

for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be

perfect in that rule, _Hæc oportet facere_, _et illa non imittere_.

(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s self

peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever

to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom

in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash

was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit,

because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other

answered, “True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?”

(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias,

construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and

moderation, _Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus_.

For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far

into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and

humorous envies or emulations.

(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I

would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought

things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of,

but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made than a

beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I

mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but

only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will

think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I

know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good

fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping

themselves from gross errors.

(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator,

doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a

prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those

subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of

the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that

it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic

for his own fortune.

(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we

have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called _Bonæ

Artes_. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that

principle of Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but

the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but

the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his principles, “That he

presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear;

and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in

straits,” which the Italians call _seminar spine_, to sow thorns: or that

other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, _Cadant

amici_, _dummodo inimici intercidant_, as the triumvirs, which sold every

one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies:

or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble

states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their

fortunes, _Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium_, _id non

aqua sed ruina restinguam_: or that other principle of Lysander, “That

children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:” and the

like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are

more in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from

the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be

more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the

shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not

much about.

(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain

themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of

ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their

eyes not only that general map of the world, “That all things are vanity

and vexation of spirit,” but many other more particular cards and

directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, and

the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded

and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith

excellently:

“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis

Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum

Dii _moresque_ dabunt vestri.”

And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the

Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom

of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, “He hath

conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing.” And although

men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this

incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute

which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our

substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to

small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual

grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, _Atque

affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ_. And if any man flatter himself

that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as

was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That

either they should never have been born, or else they should never have

died,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their

greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these

compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be

purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards

their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is

elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V., in his instructions to the

king his son, “That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that

if she he too much wooed she is the farther off.” But this last is but a

remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon

that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy,

wherein they join close, namely that same _Primum quærite_. For divinity

saith, _Primum quærite regnum Dei_, _et ista omnia adjicientur vobis_:

and philosophy saith, _Primum quærite bona animi_; _cætera aut aderunt_,

_aut non oberunt_. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of

the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,

“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;”

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a

taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired

in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things

are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not

fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

“Totamque infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.”

Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God

over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much

irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul in moving the

body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be

reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows

whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next

unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth detest

the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant

of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses

of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things

ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and

revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the

government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady

body, is in the view of God as crystal: _Et in conspectu sedis tanquam

mare vitreum simile crystallo_. So unto princes and states, and

specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions

of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and

combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard

of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,

and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part

clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king

that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it

decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the

certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being

silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by

speech, desired it might be certified for his part, “That there was one

that knew how to hold his peace.”

(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is

laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those

which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as

lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make

imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as

the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the

lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is

received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker

is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain

fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams;

and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through

which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and

governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same

fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a

platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into

consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the

causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what

means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the

impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws

touching private right of _meum_ and _tuum_ have into the public state,

and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and

delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with preambles or

without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and

what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume, or too

full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when

upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses

and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be

pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity

and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be

mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how

the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and

governed; and many other points touching the administration and (as I may

term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I

purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in

aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for

deficient.

(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much of their

dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the

civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law was _nonhos

quæsitum munus in usus_; it was not made for the countries which it

governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter

of action with matter of general learning.

XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil

knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and

with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some

pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth

to me (_si nunquam fallit imago_), as far as a man can judge of his own

work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while

they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear,

but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been

content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that

have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of

these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit

in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits

of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of

ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of

all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath

disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the

leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in

civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their

popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their

monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to

peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of

religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the

perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which as a phœnix may call whole

volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time,

which is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to

this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of

the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength

and their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of

invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition

of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and

employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to

things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man

shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall

make that ancient and patient request, _Verbera_, _sed audi_: let men

reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful

(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of

men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off.

Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so

blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of

all men’s labours and peregrinations.

XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the

will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a

reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a

reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is

agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to the

author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and

discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for

righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein

was an image of natural reason.

(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to

believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind

suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as

it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the

worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then

faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.

(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we

call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not

upon the light of nature: for it is written, _Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei_;

but it is not written, _Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei_: but of that it is

said, _Ad legem et testimonium_: _si non fecerint secundum verbum istud_,

&c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the

great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but

likewise those which concern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your

enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father,

that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.” To this it

ought to be applauded, _Nec vox hominem sonat_: it is a voice beyond the

light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a

libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if

they were opposite and malignant to nature: _Et quod natura remittit_,

_invida jura negant_. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s

messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of

the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that

they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and

veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed

that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the

light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have,

by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and

vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of

nature is used in two several senses: the one, that which springeth from

reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and

earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an

inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle

of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is

participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the

moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the

duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is

not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.

(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the

latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing

that the apostle calleth religion “our reasonable service of God;”

insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of

reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and

magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most

specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to

be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this

point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have

embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no

constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and

the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument

altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of

imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with

difference.

(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in

the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;

the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction

thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by

way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth

indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth

to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort as

may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine

upon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our

understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the

latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and

respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles

and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of

reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences

from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In

nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by

induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those

principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which

draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not

in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller

nature, namely, wherein there are not only _posita_ but _placita_; for in

such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in

games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the

game are positive, but how? merely _ad placitum_, and not examinable by

reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to

win the game is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many

grounds and maxims which are _placita juris_, positive upon authority,

and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most

just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that

affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary

reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the

_placets_ of God.

(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to

my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and

use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which

for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of

true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that

which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and

contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort falling

into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible

than it pleaseth God to reveal them, _Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit

senex_? The other sort into the error of the disciples, which were

scandalised at a show of contradiction, _Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis_?

_Modicum et non videbitis me_; _et iterum_, _modicum_, _et videbitis me_,

&c.

(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and

blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in

my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of

curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of

controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open

men’s eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which

is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon

weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men

would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles,

would be carried thus, _ego_, _non dominus_; and again, _secundum

consilium meum_, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and

oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, _non ego_,

_sed dominus_; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and

denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have

not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that “The causeless curse shall

not come.”

(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed,

and the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter we

will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now

last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three

branches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the

information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the

limits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth

particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is

inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof I

have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong

two considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what

perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and

the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to

the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief.

(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient,

that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only,

ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to

much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to

abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of

many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian

fight, he did not say, “Why strive you?” but drew his sword and slew the

Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, “You are

brethren, why strive you?” If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it

must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it

be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive you?” We see of

the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, “He that is

not with us is against us;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that

is not against us is with us.” So we see the coat of our Saviour was

entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself;

but the garment of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided.

We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,

but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it

is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those

points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the

Church of God.

(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and

sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the

water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts:

methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which

excelleth so much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same

kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it

is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived

for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels

immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem

to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt.

This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical

divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a

cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived

from thence.

(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted

strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to

find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in

all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to

dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the

obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large

commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast

than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we

see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings

of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or

collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the

civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian

compiled the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that

which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity,

and more base in substance.

(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact

methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and

sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial, like

unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more

subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several

parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede

from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the more

you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do

incur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures

by inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your

positions.

(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be

sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect.

For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and

uniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded

with this: _O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei_! _quam

incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus_, _et non investigabiles viæ ejus_.

So again the apostle saith, _Ex parte scimus_: and to have the form of a

total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies

by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude that the true

use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions

preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to

handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences

prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.

(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large,

there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather

curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much

must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and

not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, which

by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor.

For the Inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to

know; which are—the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of

the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future

succession of all ages. For as to the first it is said, “He that

presseth into the light shall be oppressed of the glory.” And again, “No

man shall see My face and live.” To the second, “When He prepared the

heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the deep.” To

the third, “Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to Him of

man, for He knew well what was in man.” And to the last, “From the

beginning are known to the Lord all His works.”

(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and

expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds

of sobriety—the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to

the former, man is not to prevent his time: _Videmus nunc per speculum in

ænigmate_, _tunc autem facie ad faciem_; wherein nevertheless there

seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this

glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. But to press too far

into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of

man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into

it—aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the

nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; medicine is that which is

partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is

that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any

part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at

all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a

dissolution of the mind and understanding.

(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time

by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find

the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalising and

traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is

no such enmity between God’s Word and His works; neither do they give

honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For to

seek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said, “Heaven and

earth shall pass, but My word shall not pass,” is to seek temporary

things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek

the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek

the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place

was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place

of all where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope

or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in

the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s

capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule,

_Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas_. For it were a strange

conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration

sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of

a basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that

therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof

positively to be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations,

the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical,

which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and

cabalists, are to be confined with a _a noli akryn sapere_, _sed time_.

(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching

the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth make a just

and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the

Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which

hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the

questions which were propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to

the state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not

being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing

man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered their words, but their

thoughts. Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being

written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a

foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the

Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted

only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and

respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were

uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or

after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have

in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in

clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the

Church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were,

the main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the

allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not

that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in

allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the

Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a

profane book.

(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report

no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In perusing

books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and many of

commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an

art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon

the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances. But that form of

writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and

precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of

Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not

chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing

abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which

will remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded,

and I may speak it with an _absit invidia verbo_, and nowise in

derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and

the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts

of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this

your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space of these forty years and

more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications

thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work

in divinity which had been written since the Apostles’ times.

(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief

and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also

judged and directed by the former—the one being as the internal soul of

religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And, therefore,

the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole

religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no certainty

of belief or confession: as a man may well think, considering the chief

doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was because the

heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into

part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of

heart, so they might have external honour and rites.

(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of

divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth the

doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works

of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of

Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or

respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the

creation and that of the redemption; and both these works, as in total

they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer

to the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to

the Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the

continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that

of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the

whole act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the

Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by

the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we

consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the

reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.

(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which

discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition

thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and

according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and

commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided

according to the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the

three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more

special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose

attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose

attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to

the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and

libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth

liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the

degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or

act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to

cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not

exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both

these doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of the

heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation,

Christian resolution, and the like.

(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts

between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the

word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the

visible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and

under the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions:

but now the adoration being _in spiritu et veritate_, there remaineth

only _vituli labiorum_; although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and

retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.

(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimony

of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the offices and

jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church directing the

whole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the

other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.

(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of

truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from

religion, besides the privative, which is atheism and the branches

thereof, are three—heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we

serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false

gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false

gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth

excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And

yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are

all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for

so he saith, _Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare_, _et quasi scelus

idololatriæ nolle acquiescere_.

(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no

deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth

vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent have men been

either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.

* * * * *

Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as

truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of

those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well

converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded

from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of

proceeding in _melius_, and not _in aliud_; a mind of amendment and

proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true

and constant to the argument I handle if I were not willing to go beyond

others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again:

which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions

naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s

judgments by confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am

in good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second

reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I

am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which

certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add

authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well

invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on

the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and

challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due _tanquam

adeps sacrificii_, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine

Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.