OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I.
116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings,
displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a
Deity, and refute the fallacies of _Atheists_; and yet the most
religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded
as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these
contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the
world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with
regard to the existence of these monsters.
The _Sceptic_ is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the
indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is
certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or
conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any
subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural
question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push
these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species of scepticism, _antecedent_ to all study and
philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a
sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It
recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and
principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they,
we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some
original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.
But neither is there any such original principle, which has a
prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if
there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those
very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The
Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any
human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and
no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction
upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when
more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a
necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper
impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those
prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To
begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and
sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately
all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow
and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we
can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and
certainty in our determinations.
117. There is another species of scepticism, _consequent_ to science and
enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute
fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach
any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation,
about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought
into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of
common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound
principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these
paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in
some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally
excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which
they may be founded.
I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics
in all ages, against the evidence of _sense_; such as those which are
derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on
numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the
various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the
double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other
appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only
sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be
depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by
considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of
the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them,
within their sphere, the proper _criteria_ of truth and falsehood. There
are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of
so easy a solution.
118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or
prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any
reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an
external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist,
though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even
the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this
belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful
instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by
the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any
suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other.
This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed
to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external
to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it:
our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform
and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who
perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by
the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be
present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are
only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being
able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the
object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther
from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no
alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present
to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who
reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we
say, _this house_ and _that tree_, are nothing but perceptions in the
mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which
remain uniform and independent.
119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or
depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system
with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds
herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system,
and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer
plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led
us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even
erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a
chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of
argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind
must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though
resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from
the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible
and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?
It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not
from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And
nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should
so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a
substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be
produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question
be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like
nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind
has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot
possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The
supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in
reasoning.
120. To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to
prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected
circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our
senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he
can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once
called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we
may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.
121. This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more
philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to
introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and
enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may
they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to
believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external
object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more
rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of
something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and
more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason,
which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove,
that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.
122. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the
most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it
requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and
reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is
universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities
of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely
secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions
of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they
represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it
must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of
extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that
denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired
from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities,
perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same
conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent
on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can
save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those
primary qualities are attained by _Abstraction_, an opinion, which, if
we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even
absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot
possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, which is
neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of
human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general,
which is neither _Isosceles_ nor _Scalenum_, nor has any particular
length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity
of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and
general ideas.[31]
[31] This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most
of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best
lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among
the ancient or modern philosopher, Bayle not excepted. He
professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with
great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as
well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all
his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality,
merely sceptical, appears from this, _that they admit of no
answer and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to
cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion,
which is the result of scepticism.
123. Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or
to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an
opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if
referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same
time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial
enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion
as contrary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that
all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave
matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary,
you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown,
inexplicable _something_, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so
imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend
against it.
PART II.
124. It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy
_reason_ by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of
all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections,
both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of
fact and existence.
The chief objection against all _abstract_ reasonings is derived from
the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a
careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass
through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief
object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of
absurdity and contradiction. No priestly _dogmas_, invented on purpose
to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common
sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of
extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all
geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation.
A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing
quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on _in infinitum_; this
is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any
pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and
most natural principles of human reason.[32] But what renders the matter
more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are
supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is
it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the
consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all
the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and
yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of
contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any
rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle
_in infinitum_, this angle of contact becomes still less, even _in
infinitum_, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their
tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its
tangent, and so on, _in infinitum_? The demonstration of these
principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three
angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter
opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and
absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and
suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a
diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a
full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders
upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and
confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance
concerning any one object.
[32] Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points,
we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts
of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by
the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present
to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and
consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely
less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears
more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them
composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite
number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are
still supposed infinitely divisible.
125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences
seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time
than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in
succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a
contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not
corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be
able to admit of it.
Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to
that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and
contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances,
contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is
absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any
proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more
sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism
itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of
geometry or the science of quantity.[33]
[33] It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities
and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such
thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that
all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to
a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular
ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea,
present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we
immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white
animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is
also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and
sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination,
are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed
in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be
admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of
quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but
particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and
imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible.
It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without
prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers
of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and
contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems
the readiest solution of these difficulties.
126. The sceptical objections to _moral_ evidence, or to the reasonings
concerning matter of fact, are either _popular_ or _philosophical_. The
popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human
understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained
in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in
sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the
perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and
sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to
insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in
common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and
cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of
argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be
insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of
_Pyrrhonism_ or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and
employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may
flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if
not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and
by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and
sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our
nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in
the same condition as other mortals.
127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere,
and display those _philosophical_ objections, which arise from more
profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph;
while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact,
which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely
from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of
this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently
_conjoined_ together; that we have no argument to convince us, that
objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will
likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that
nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of
our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like
other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic
insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his
own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all
assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater
length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected
to result from them.
128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to _excessive_
scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it
remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic,
_What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious
researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer.
A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of
astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant
and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays
principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on
conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his
philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had,
that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he
must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life
must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.
All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a
total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end
to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very
little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And
though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary
amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most
trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and
leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the
philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned
themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his
dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to
confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no
other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must
act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of
these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised
against them.
PART III.
129. There is, indeed, a more _mitigated_ scepticism or _academical_
philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in
part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or _excessive_ scepticism, when
its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common
sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to
be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see
objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising
argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to
which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their
understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They
are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them
is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves
far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy
of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of
the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect
state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a
reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve,
and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice
against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of
the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are
commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the
learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and
obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by
showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over
their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal
perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In
general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which,
in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a
just reasoner.
130. Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism which may be of advantage
to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts
and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are
best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The
_imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is
remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most
distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which
custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct _Judgement_ observes a
contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines
itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice
and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of
poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring
us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than
to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt,
and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural
instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to
philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect,
that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation,
philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life,
methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond
common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those
faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate
operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe,
after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can
we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may
form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature,
from, and to eternity?
This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect,
so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into
the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their
objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the
proper subjects of science and enquiry.
131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of
demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend
this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere
sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number
are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and
nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a
variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their
different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and
different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost
scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection,
pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in
these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of
words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That _the square of the
hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides_, cannot be
known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of
reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, _that
where there is no property, there can be no injustice_, it is only
necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation
of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect
definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical
reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except
the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be
pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.
132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and
existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever
_is_ may _not be_. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction.
The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and
distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not
to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that
which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences,
properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there
confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the
half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly
conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never
existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable,
and implies no contradiction.
The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments
from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely
on experience. If we reason _a priori_, anything may appear able to
produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know,
extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their
orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of
cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object
from that of another[34]. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning,
which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of
all human action and behaviour.
[34] That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, _Ex nihilo,
nihil fit_, by which the creation of matter was excluded,
ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the
will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we
know _a priori_, the will of any other being might create it,
or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination
can assign.
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All
deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in
history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.
The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural
philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and
effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the
immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning
particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in
_reason_, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most
solid foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as
of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more
properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to
fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of
mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning
and enquiry.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc
must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, _Does it contain any abstract
reasoning concerning quantity or number?_ No. _Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No.
Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion.
INDEX
Abstraction
not source of ideas of primary qualities, 122.
Academic
philosophy, 34.
Action
and philosophy, 1, 4, 34, 128;
Addition
4.
Analogy
a species of, the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact,
82;
Animals
the reason of, 83-85;
learn from experience and draw inferences, 83;
which can only be founded on custom, 84;
cause of difference between men and animals, 84 n.
Antiquity
62.
Appearances
to senses must be corrected by reason, 117.
A priori
25, 36 n, 89 n, 132, 132 n.
Aristotle
4.
Association
of ideas, three principles of, 18-19, 41-44 (v. _Cause_ C).
Atheism
116.
Bacon
99.
Belief
(v. _Cause_ C, 39-45);
and chance, 46.
Berkeley
really a sceptic, 122 n.
Bigotry
102.
Body
and soul, mystery of union of, 52;
volition and movements of, 52.
Real existence of (v. _Scepticism_, B, 118-123).
Cause
first (v. _God_, _Necessity_, 78-81; _Providence_,
102-115, 132 n).
a principle of association of ideas, 19, 43;
sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence,
22.
A. _Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason_,
23-33.
Reasonings _a priori_ give no knowledge of cause and effect,
23 f.;
impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally
different, 25;
natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes, but only
to reduce causes to a few general causes, e.g. gravity, 26;
geometry applies laws obtained by experience, 27.
Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the
understanding, 28;
yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known
qualities of things and their secret powers, to that which
we assumed in the past. On what is this inference based? 29;
demonstrative reasoning has no place here, and all experimental
reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past,
and so cannot prove it without being circular, 30, 32;
if reasoning were the basis of this belief, there would be no need
for the multiplication of instances or of long experience,
31;
yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even
in beasts and children, so that they cannot be founded on
abstruse reasoning, 33;
to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of
equal weight and authority with reason, 34.
B. _Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the
appearance of another_, 35-38.
Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to
objects, 35;
we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide
of human life, 36;
but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses
or memory, 37;
the customary conjunction between such an object and some other
object produces an operation of the soul which is as
unavoidable as love, 38;
animals also infer one event from another by custom, 82-84;
and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species
of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to
ourselves, 85.
C. _Belief_, 39-45.
Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by
some feeling annexed to it, 39;
belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively,
forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be
attained by the imagination alone, 40;
it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance,
41;
contiguity, 42;
causation, 43;
by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature
and our ideas, 44;
this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so
entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, 45.
_Probability_, 46-7.
Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable
contrivance of Nature, 46 (cf. 87-8);
probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret
counteracting cause, 47 (cf. 67);
it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a
mere negative word, 74.
D. _Power_, 49-57.
Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by
analysis or explained by production of the impression from
which they are copied, 49;
from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect:
we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see
sequence, 50.
Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an
idea of reflection? 51;
it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of
production in nature, 50 n;
nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, 52;
nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n);
nor from influence of will over mind, 53;
many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a
volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only
occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5;
thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56;
this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and
is no explanation, 57;
vis inertiae, 57 n.
In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are
conjoined and never connected, 58;
the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar
instances, and the only difference between such a number and
a single instance is that the former produces a habit of
expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61.
This customary transition is the impression from which we form the
idea of necessary connexion.
E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v.
_Providence_).
In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in
the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason
backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8;
we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human
acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2;
when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any
species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115.
F. _Definitions of Cause_, 60 (cf. 74 n).
Ceremonies
41.
Chance
ignorance of causes, 46;
has no existence, 74 (v. _Cause_ B).
Cicero
4.
Circle
in reasoning, 30.
Clarke
37 n.
Colour
peculiarity of ideas of, 16.
Contiguity
19, 42.
Contradiction
the test of demonstration, 132.
Contrariety
19 n.
Contrary
of matter of fact always possible, 21, 132.
Creation
132 n.
Criticism
132.
Cudworth
57 n, 158 n.
Custom
when strongest conceals itself, 24;
an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, 36, 127;
and belief, 39-45;
gives rise to inferences of animals, 84.
Definition
only applicable to complex ideas, 49;
need of, 131;
of cause, 60.
Demonstrative
opp. intuitive, 20;
reasoning, 30;
confined to quantity and number, 131;
impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can
involve a contradiction, 132.
Descartes
57 n.;
his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is
incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no
advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt,
116;
his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. _Scepticism_,
116-132).
Design
argument from, 105 f. (v. _Providence_).
Divisibility
of mathematical and physical points, 124.
Doubt
Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. _Scepticism_ A).
Epictetus
34.
Epicurean
philosophy, defence of, 102-15;
denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v.
_Providence_).
Euclid
truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20.
Evidence
moral and natural, 70;
value of human, 82-9 (v. _Miracles_).
Evil
doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies
existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81.
Existence
external and perception, 118-9 (v. _Scepticism_, B, 116-32).
Ex nihilo nihil
132 n.
Experience
(v. _Cause_ A, 23-33);
opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and
superficial, 36 n.
Infallible, may be regarded as proof, 87 (v. _Miracles_);
all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond
the usual course of experience, 113.
Extension
50;
a supposed primary quality, 122.
Faith
101, 132.
Fiction
and fact (v. _Cause_ C), 39 f.
Future
inference to, from past, 29 (v. _Cause_ A).
General
ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a
general term, 125 n.
Geography
mental, 8.
Geometry
propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not
on existence of objects, 20;
gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered
by experience, 27.
God
idea of, 14;
no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own
faculties, 57;
theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being
only occasions of his volition, 54-57;
by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is
the cause of evil, 78-81.
Veracity of, appealed to, 120.
And creation of matter, 132 n.
v. _Providence_, 102-115; _Scepticism_, 116-132.
Golden
age, 107.
Gravity
26.
Habit
(v. _Custom_, _Cause_ B).
History
use of, 65.
Human
nature, inconstancy a constant character of, 68.
Ideas
A. _Origin of_, 11-17.
Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, 11-12;
the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or
inward sentiment, 13 (cf. 53);
all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent
feelings, 14;
deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in
corresponding idea, 15-16;
suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from
which it is derived, 17 (cf. 49);
idea of reflection, 51;
general ideas, 135 n;
innate ideas, 19 n;
power of will over ideas, 53.
B. _Association of_, 18-19.
Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and
regularity, 18;
only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity,
and Cause or Effect, 19;
contrariety, 19 n;
production of belief by these principles, 41-43.
C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, 44;
relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, 20;
such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 20,
131;
no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or
number, 131.
Imagination
11, 39;
and belief, 40.
Impressions
all our more lively perceptions, 12;
the test of ideas, 17, 49.
Incest
peculiar turpitude of explained, 12.
Inconceivability
of the negative, 132 (cf. 20).
Inertia
57 n.
Inference
and similarity, 30, 115 (v. _Cause_).
Infinite
divisibility, 124 f.
Instances
multiplication of not required by reason, 31.
Instinct
more trustworthy than reasoning, 45;
the basis of all experimental reasoning, 85;
the basis of realism, 118, 121.
Intuitive
opp. mediate reasoning, 2.
La Bruyere
4.
Liberty
(v. _Necessity_, 62-97).
Definition of hypothetical liberty, 73.
Necessary to morality, 77.
Locke
4, 40 n, 50 n, 57 n.
His loose use of 'ideas,' 19 n;
betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the
School-men, 19 n;
distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 122.
Malebranche
4, 57 n..
Man
a reasonable and active being, 4.
Marriage
rules of, based on and vary with utility, 118.
Mathematics
ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral
and metaphysical sciences, 48;
their difficulty, 48.
Mathematical and physical points, 124 n.
Matter
necessity of, 64;
creation of, 132 n (v. _Scepticism_ A).
Matter-of-fact
contrary of, always possible, 21;
arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, 22.
Metaphysics
not a science, 5-6;
how inferior and superior to mathematics, 48.
Mind
mental geography, 8;
secret springs and principles of, 9;
can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward
sentiment, 13;
power of will over, 53.
Miracles.
86-101.
Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed
is unusual or extraordinary, 89;
difference between extraordinary and miraculous, 89 n;
if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one
proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a
miracle is as complete as possible;
an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience,
that is a proof, against it, 90;
definition of miracle, 90 n;
hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its
falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it
establishes, 91;
as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, 92;
the passion for the wonderful in human nature, 93;
prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their
diminution with civilization, 94;
the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the
almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, 95;
value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a
prophet or apostle, 97;
no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much
less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be
opposed by another perfect proof, 98;
so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion, 99;
a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion
on reason, not on faith, 100;
the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which
will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give
him a determination to believe what is most contrary to
custom and experience, 101.
Moral
evil (q.v.) 80.
Moral science
30;
inferior to mathematics, 48;
sceptical objections to, 126-7.
Moral evidence easily combined with natural, 70.
Motion
50.
Nature
design in, 105 f. (v. _Providence_),
and the course of our ideas, 44.
State of, a philosophical fiction, 151, 151 n.
Necessary
connexion (v. _Cause_).
Necessity
two definitions of, 75.
A. _and Liberty_, 62-81;
the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always
been of the same opinion on this subject, 63;
our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed
uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are
allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, 64;
history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, 65,
which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66;
irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary
causes, 67;
the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds
and weather, 68;
we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction
of motives and actions, 69;
history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of
combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a
common origin, 70;
the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a
lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere
conjunction, 71;
we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of
brute matter, 72;
the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of
liberty and a false experiment, 72 n;
though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has
always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it
that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of
acting or not acting according to the determinations of our
will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a
prisoner, 73;
liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is
the same as chance, 74.
B. _Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality_, this
doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so
is at least innocent, 75;
rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and
connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied,
a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76;
liberty also essential to morality, 77.
Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of
causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil
in actions, 78;
Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but
ineffectual in practice, 79;
no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural
sentiments to blame certain actions, 80;
how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of
moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal,
81.
Negative
inconceivability of, 132.
Newton
57 n.
Nisus
52 n, 60 n.
Number
the object of demonstration, 131.
Occasional causes
theory of, 55.
Parallelism
between thought and course of nature, 44-5.
Perception
and external objects, 119 f. (v. _Scepticism_, _Impression_,
_Idea_).
Philosophy
moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5;
gratifies innocent curiosity, 6;
metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human
understanding, 6.
True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113);
a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8;
may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general
principles, 9.
Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or
metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger
portions of it, 26;
academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of
truth, and so has few partisans, 34;
though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature
steps in and asserts her rights, 34;
moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in
shortness of arguments, 48.
Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62.
Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a
doctrine, 75.
Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and
security of government, 104 (cf. 114).
All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world,
which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never
carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113.
Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom
and toleration, 102.
Points
physical, indivisible, 124 n.
Power
50 f, 60 n. (v. _Cause_ D).
Probability
46 f. (v. _Cause_, B).
Probable
arguments, 38, 46 n.
Production
50 n.
Promises
not the foundation of justice, 257.
Proof
46 n, 86-101 (v. _Miracles_, _Demonstrative_).
Providence
102-115 (v. _God_).
The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design
in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is
necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from
such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not
been observed, 105;
so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than
appears in nature, 106;
so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by
assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of
general laws, 107;
to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes
to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, 108.
From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its
perfect exercise in a future world, 109;
we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of
events, 110;
in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the
imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and
also know other instances of his art, 111-112;
but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do
not know any class of beings to which he belongs, 113;
and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not
belong to a known species of things, 115.
Punishment
requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, 76 (v. _Necessity_).
Pyrrhonism
126.
Qualities
primary and secondary, 122.
Quantity
and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them
being entirely similar, 131.
Real
presence, 86.
Reality
and thought, 44.
Realism
of the vulgar, 118.
Reason
(a) opp. intuition, 29;
opp. experience, 28, 36 n.
(b) Corrects sympathy and senses, 117.
No match for nature, 34.
Fallacious, compared with instinct, 45.
Of men and animals, 84 n.
(c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, 124;
objections to abstract reasoning, 124 f. (v. _Scepticism_).
(d) _Reasoning_.
Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, 30, 46 n, 132;
moral, divided into general and particular, 132;
produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, 46 n.
Probable (v. _Cause_, 28-32).
Relations
of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought,
independently of the existence of any object, 20.
Religion
a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. _Miracles, Providence_).
Resemblance
19, 41 (v. _Similarity_).
Resistance
and idea of power, 53 n.
Scepticism
A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal
doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more
moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30);
extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124.
No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything
at all, 116;
admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126,
128).
B. _As to the Senses_, 117-123.
The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be
corrected by Reason, 117;
more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external
objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing
but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other
existences, 118;
even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to
natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells
nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119;
the appeal to the _veracity of God_ is useless, 120;
and scepticism is here triumphant, 121.
_The distinction between primary and secondary qualities_ is useless,
for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122;
and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by
abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n;
if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there
is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth
arguing about, 123.
C. _As to Reason_, 124-130.
Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124;
objection to _abstract reasoning_ because it asserts infinite
divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense,
124,
and infinite divisibility of time, 125;
yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism
becomes sceptical about itself, 125.
Popular objections to _moral reasoning_ about matter of fact, based
on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and
disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126;
philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and
that inference is based on custom, 127;
excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by
the most trivial event in life, 128.
Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective
and as producing caution and modesty, 129;
and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130;
all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and
number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry
and illusion, 132.
D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_).
Sciences
132 (v. _Reason_, (d); _Scepticism_, C).
Secret
powers, 39;
counteracting causes, 47, 67.
Senses
outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of
thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117.
Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. _Scepticism_, B).
Similarity
basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115).
Solidity
50;
a supposed primary quality, 122.
Soul
and body, 52.
Space
and time, 124 f.
Species
an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference
to its cause, 115 (cf. 113).
Stoics
34, 79.
Superstition
6 (v. _Providence_).
Theology
science of, 132 (v. _God_, _Providence_).
Tillotson
argument against real presence, 86.
Time
and space, 124 f.
Truth
8, 17 (v. _Scepticism_).
Understanding
limits of human, 7;
operations of, to be classified, 8;
opp. experience, 28;
weakness of, 126 (v. _Reason_, _Scepticism_).
Voluntariness
as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130.
Whole
theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79, 80.
Will
compounds materials given by senses, 13;
influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of
power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will,
only of sequence of motions on will, 52;
so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53.
Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57.
Freedom of (v. _Necessity_).