ignominious and galling servitude. The legions of our enemies thicken on
our plains; desolation and death mark their bloody career; whilst the
mangled corpses of our countrymen seem to cry out to us as a voice from
heaven: "Will you permit our posterity to groan under the galling chains
of our murderers? Has our blood been expended in vain? Is the only
reward which our constancy, till death, has obtained for our country,
that it should be sunk into a deeper and more ignominious vassalage?"
Recollect who are the men that demand your submission; to whose decrees
you are invited to pay obedience! Men who, unmindful of their relation
to you as brethren, of your long implicit submission to their laws; of
the sacrifice which you and your forefathers made of your natural
advantages for commerce to their avarice,--formed a deliberate plan to
wrest from you the small pittance of property which they had permitted
you to acquire. Remember that the men who wish to rule over you are they
who, in pursuit of this plan of despotism, annulled the sacred contracts
which had been made with your ancestors; conveyed into your cities a
mercenary soldiery to compel you to submission by insult and murder--who
called your patience, cowardice; your piety, hypocrisy.
Countrymen! the men who now invite you to surrender your rights into
their hands are the men who have let loose the merciless savages to riot
in the blood of their brethren--who have dared to establish popery
triumphant in our land--who have taught treachery to your slaves, and
courted them to assassinate your wives and children.
These are the men to whom we are exhorted to sacrifice the blessings
which Providence holds out to us--the happiness, the dignity of
uncontrolled freedom and independence.
Let not your generous indignation be directed against any among us who
may advise so absurd and madd'ning a measure. Their number is but few
and daily decreased; and the spirit which can render them patient of
slavery, will render them contemptible enemies.
Our Union is now complete; our Constitution composed, established, and
approved. You are now the guardians of your own liberties. We may justly
address you, as the _Decemviri_ did the Romans, and say: "Nothing that
we propose, can pass into a law without your consent. Be yourselves, O
Americans, the authors of those laws on which your happiness depends."
You have now, in the field, armies sufficient to repel the whole force
of your enemies, and their base and mercenary auxiliaries. The hearts of
your soldiers beat high with the spirit of freedom--they are animated
with the justice of their cause, and while they grasp their swords, can
look up to Heaven for assistance. Your adversaries are composed of
wretches who laugh at the rights of humanity, who turn religion into
derision, and would, for higher wages, direct their swords against their
leaders or their country. Go on, then, in your generous enterprise, with
gratitude to Heaven for past success, and confidence of it in the
future. For my own part, I ask no greater blessing than to share with
you the common danger and common glory. If I have a wish dearer to my
soul, than that my ashes may be mingled with those of a Warren and a
Montgomery, it is--that these American States may never cease to be free
and independent!
ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
OF NEW YORK. (BORN 1757, DIED 1804.)
ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
--CONVENTION OF NEW YORK,
JUNE 24, 1788.
I am persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn shall be indulged, in
addressing the committee. We all, in equal sincerity, profess to be
anxious for the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and
solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the
United States, and I presume that I shall not be disbelieved, when I
declare, that it is an object of all others, the nearest and most dear
to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose become
the most important study which can interest mankind. It is our duty to
examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best
and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from nature, from reason,
from examples, the best principles of policy, and to pursue and apply
them in the formation of our government. We should contemplate and
compare the systems, which, in this examination, come under our view;
distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each,
and discarding the former, incorporate the latter, as far as
circumstances will admit, into our Constitution. If we pursue a
different course and neglect this duty, we shall probably disappoint the
expectations of our country and of the world.
In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the
usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more natural, than that the public
mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist
these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of
all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became
predominant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this passion
alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than
to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable
one, and deserved our utmost attention. But, sir, there is another
object equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little
capable of regarding: I mean a principle of strength and stability in
the organization of our government, and vigor in its operations. This
purpose can never be accomplished but by the establishment of some
select body, formed peculiarly upon this principle. There are few
positions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic,
some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate
passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is
evident, that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so formed as
to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities
and that mutability which it is designed to remedy. It is therefore
necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its authority
during a considerable period, and that it should have such an
independence in the exercise of its powers, as will divest it as much as
possible of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be the centre
of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and
to reduce every irregular propensity to system. Without this
establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never have
an efficient government.
It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every
country desire sincerely its prosperity; but it is equally
unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability
necessary for systematic government. To deny that they are frequently
led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a
flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of
administration especially, which involves our political relations with
foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths
are not often held up in public assemblies: but they cannot be unknown
to any who hear me. From these principles it follows, that there ought
to be two distinct bodies in our government: one, which shall be
immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and
possess all the popular features; another, formed upon the principle,
and for the purposes, before explained. Such considerations as these
induced the convention who formed your State constitution, to institute
a Senate upon the present plan. The history of ancient and modern
republics had taught them, that many of the evils which these republics
had suffered, arose from the want of a certain balance and mutual
control indispensable to a wise administration; they were convinced that
popular assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden
impulses, and the intrigues of ambitious men; and that some firm barrier
against these operations was necessary; they, therefore, instituted your
Senate, and the benefits we have experienced have fully justified their
conceptions.
Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the interests of the several
States, and those of the United States in contrast; this is not a fair
view of the subject; they must necessarily be involved in each other.
What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing
passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence of
these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public
good; and against this influence we ought to provide. The local
interests of a State ought in every case to give way to the interests of
the Union; for when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the
former becomes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on
the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one.
When you assemble from your several counties in the Legislature, were
every member to be guided only by the apparent interests of his county,
government would be impracticable. There must be a perpetual
accommodation and sacrifice of local advantages to general expediency;
but the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by
this important principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the
Senate should be so formed, as to be unbiased by false conceptions of
the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their
several States.
Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions of danger to the
State governments; they seem to suppose that the moment you put men into
a national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all
their affection for their fellow-citizens. But can we imagine that the
Senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to
sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents? The State
governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the
general system. As long, therefore, as Congress has a full conviction of
this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as
firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This conviction can never
leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues
to be read, and its principle known, the States must, by every rational
man, be considered as essential, component parts of The Union; and
therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is wholly
inadmissible.
The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of
State governments, which will ever give them an important superiority
over the general government. If we compare the nature of their different
powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall
find the advantage entirely on the side of the States. This
consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended
to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout the States may be
two thousand. Their personal influence will, therefore, be
proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in
Congress. The State establishments of civil and military officers of
every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible
correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such
an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the
predilection and support of the people. Whenever, therefore, Congress
shall meditate any infringement of the State constitutions, the great
body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic
representatives. Can the general government withstand such an united
opposition? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their
privileges? Will they suffer their Legislatures to be reduced to a
shadow and a name? The idea is shocking to common-sense.
From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be
mentioned, results a complicated, irresistible check, which must ever
support the existence and importance of the State governments. The
danger, if any exists, flows from an opposite source. The probable evil
is, that the general government will be too dependent on the State
Legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious
to their humors; that the States, with every power in their hands, will
make encroachments on the national authority, till the Union is weakened
and dissolved.
Every member must have been struck with an observation of a gentleman
from Albany. Do what you will, says he, local prejudices and opinions
will go into the government.
What! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these
prejudices? Shall we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it. It
is undeniable that there must be a control somewhere. Either the general
interest is to control the particular interests, or the contrary. If the
former, then certainly the government ought to be so framed, as to
render the power of control efficient to all intents and purposes; if
the latter, a striking absurdity follows; the controlling powers must be
as numerous as the varying interests, and the operations of the
government must therefore cease; for the moment you accommodate these
different interests, which is the only way to set the government in
motion, you establish a controlling power. Thus, whatever constitutional
provisions are made to the contrary, every government will be at last
driven to the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal
interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their reasoning, to distinguish
between the real, genuine good of a State, and the opinions and
prejudices which may prevail respecting it; the latter may be opposed to
the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrificed; the former is
so involved in it, that it never can be sacrificed.
There are certain social principles in human nature from which we may
draw the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of
individuals and of communities. We love our families more than our
neighbors; we love our neighbors more than our countrymen in general.
The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they
depart from the centre, and become languid in proportion to the
expansion of the circle on which they act. On these principles, the
attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the
State governments; they will be a mutual protection and support. Another
source of influence, which has already been pointed out, is the various
official connections in the States. Gentlemen endeavor to evade the
force of this by saying that these offices will be insignificant. This
is by no means true. The State officers will ever be important, because
they are necessary and useful. Their powers are such as are extremely
interesting to the people; such as affect their property, their liberty,
and life. What is more important than the administration of justice and
the execution of the civil and criminal laws? Can the State governments
become insignificant while they have the power of raising money
independently and without control? If they are really useful; if they
are calculated to promote the essential interests of the people; they
must have their confidence and support. The States can never lose their
powers till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties.
These must go together; they must support each other, or meet one common
fate. On the gentleman's principle, we may safely trust the State
governments, though we have no means of resisting them; but we cannot
confide in the national government, though we have an effectual
constitutional guard against every encroachment. This is the essence of
their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond conception.
With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I shall
certainly admit that the Constitution ought to be so formed as not to
prevent the States from providing for their own existence; and I
maintain that it is so formed; and that their power of providing for
themselves is sufficiently established. This is conceded by one
gentleman, and in the next breath the concession is retracted. He says
Congress has but one exclusive right in taxation--that of duties on
imports; certainly, then, their other powers are only concurrent. But to
take off the force of this obvious conclusion, he immediately says that
the laws of the United States are supreme; and that where there is one
supreme there cannot be a concurrent authority; and further, that where
the laws of the Union are supreme, those of the States must be
subordinate; because there cannot be two supremes. This is curious
sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together is false. They
are inconsistent only when they are aimed at each other or at one
indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme, as to all
their proper, constitutional objects; the laws of the States are supreme
in the same way. These supreme laws may act on different objects without
clashing; or they may operate on different parts of the same common
object with perfect harmony. Suppose both governments should lay a tax
of a penny on a certain article; has not each an independent and
uncontrollable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim,
there cannot be two supremes, is simply this--two powers cannot be
supreme over each other. This meaning is entirely perverted by the
gentlemen. But, it is said, disputes between collectors are to be
referred to the federal courts. This is again wandering in the field of
conjecture. But suppose the fact is certain; is it not to be presumed
that they will express the true meaning of the Constitution and the
laws? Will they not be bound to consider the concurrent jurisdiction; to
declare that both the taxes shall have equal operation; that both the
powers, in that respect, are sovereign and co-extensive? If they
transgress their duty, we are to hope that they will be punished. Sir,
we can reason from probabilities alone. When we leave common-sense, and
give ourselves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty, no security
in our reasonings.
I imagine I have stated to the committee abundant reasons to prove the
entire safety of the State governments and of the people. I would go
into a more minute consideration of the nature of the concurrent
jurisdiction, and the operation of the laws in relation to revenue; but
at present I feel too much indisposed to proceed. I shall, with leave of
the committee, improve another opportunity of expressing to them more
fully my ideas on this point. I wish the committee to remember that the
Constitution under examination is framed upon truly republican
principles; and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for the
common protection and the general welfare of the United States, it must
be utterly repugnant to this Constitution to subvert the State
governments or oppress the people.
JAMES MADISON,
OF VIRGINIA. (BORN 1751, DIED 1836.)
ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION--CONVENTION OF
VIRGINIA,
JUNE 6, 1788.
MR. CHAIRMAN: