Serrano had one political success to rejoice over which occurred with no

intervention on his own part. On the 30th of June Don Carlos had caused

the Prussian ex-captain Albert Schmidt, who was at Concha’s headquarters

as correspondent for German papers and had fallen into the hands of

the Carlists, to be shot, although he was a non-combatant. This act in

defiance of the rights of war, and the barbaric way in which the war was

conducted as a whole, led Prince Bismarck to take diplomatic measures

against Carlism, which was to a great extent financially supported by the

legitimists in France, the feudals in Austria, and by the Jesuits in the

Vatican. He thus made it possible for the remaining powers to recognise

Serrano’s government officially and exerted an indirect pressure on

the French government, which was rendering the Carlists all sorts of

assistance on the French frontier, with the object of holding it more

closely to its obligations.

All the powers except Russia decided to recognise the Spanish government

and sent ambassadors to Madrid. The German ambassador was received with

special marks of attention on September 12th. Two German warships were

despatched to the bay of Biscay to protect the interests of the Germans

living along the coast, and to prevent the smuggling in of materials of

war. But Serrano’s small military success against the Carlists brought

about a new turn in affairs at the end of the year 1874.

THE BOURBON ALFONSO XII ELECTED (1875 A.D.)

[Illustration: DON CARLOS DE BOURBON]

[Sidenote: [1875-1883 A.D.]]

General Martínez Campos, who, like most of the officers, was an adherent

of the overturned Bourbon dynasty, on December 29th, at Murviedro,

proclaimed the son of the ex-queen Isabella as King Alfonso XII of Spain.

The army generally declared in favour of Alfonso, Sagasta’s ministry

resigned, Serrano laid down the chief command and the presidency, a

ministerial regency was formed on the 31st under Cánovas del Castillo,

which informed Isabella, then living at Paris, of the elevation of her

son to the throne. The latter left Paris on January 6th, 1875, landed

in Barcelona, arrived at Madrid the 14th, and although he was not yet

eighteen, took over the reins of government.

The inexperienced king was in a difficult position. The state treasury

was almost empty; the war with the Carlists consumed enormous sums and

brought few results; the close relations of the king to his godfather

Pope Pius demanded especial considerations; the papal nuncio required the

most extensive concessions in return for his supporting the king; he

wanted to bring back the old intolerance and priesthood, and if possible

to return to the Inquisition; the ex-queen Isabella, who had lost all

title to respect, impatiently awaited her return to Madrid. In every

direction, nothing could be seen but dangerous reefs which confronted the

government.[e]

That Cánovas del Castillo should undertake the leadership of the new

government was quite as much a matter of course as that the first and

most imperative duty of the government should be to overthrow the Carlist

rebellion. At first, it was put down in Catalonia and Aragon where its

chief seat, Seo de Urgel, fell on August 26th, 1875. Thereupon all

forces were directed towards the north against the Basque territories,

the old citadel of Carlism. The closely besieged Pamplona was relieved

on November 24th, and, when Quesada advanced with one hundred thousand

men, Estella also fell on February 19th, 1876. On February 28th, the

king himself entered Pamplona; on the same day Don Carlos retreated over

the border to France. The victors conducted themselves humanely on the

whole, although ten thousand persons were exiled, as many more lost their

property, and a limitation of the old _fueros_ of the Basque lands was

planned. It was not until 1878, however, that Martínez Campos succeeded

in quelling the rebellion in Cuba after important economical concessions,

when the rights of a Spanish province were granted to the Cubans. [For

fuller details see the history of Spanish America in a later volume.]

In the meanwhile on May 24th the newly elected cortes, which the king

had opened on February 15th, 1876, had adopted the new constitution

(proclaimed June 30th). This provided for a senate and house of

representatives controlled by general and direct election, established

freedom of the press, of religion, and of unions, but abolished trial

by jury, civil marriage, and freedom of teaching, in order to win over

the radicals and the clergy. Rome at first protested against the freedom

of religion but gave up this point, as the Protestants were actually so

limited and oppressed in the exercise of their rights that all the firm

fervour of belief of men like Pastor Fliedner in Madrid was needed to

endure it all and actually to establish an evangelical church in the

Spanish capital where now Luther’s hymn of victory, “A firm foundation is

our God,” resounds also in Spanish (“_Castillo fier es nuestro Dios!_”).

The republican attempts on the king’s life on October 25th, 1878, and

December 30th, 1879, were only after-effects of the long period of

unrest; on the whole the pacification of the country made unmistakable

progress. The government exercised the utmost watchfulness against

Carlist plots and even effected a papal prohibition against Spanish

bishops. The opposition of Catalan manufacturers to the commercial

treaty with France was summarily suppressed by the proclamation of a

state of siege; a republican revolt on the part of the soldiers in

Badajoz on August 5th, 1883, was energetically put down and severely

punished by the king, who, wholly on his own responsibility, attempted

to put a stop to the old mischief of having officers take part in

political party intrigues and boldly ordered the dismissal of a large

number of unsubmissive and irresponsible elements. The social democratic

associations of the _mano nero_ (the black hand) seemed very dangerous

for a time. These were favoured by the severe economical decay of the

last years, and grew rapidly until, divided into about three thousand

groups and controlled by a central organisation at Xeres, they covered

the south like a net. Since they distinguished themselves by deeds of

violence of all kinds, the government at last took decisive measures,

overpowered their ringleaders and caused seven of them to be executed.

ALFONSO XII AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS

[Illustration: ALFONSO XII]

[Sidenote: [1879-1886 A.D.]]

Several years passed thus before the king could venture to enter into

any personal relations with the most powerful foreign rulers. Not until

September, 1883, did he proceed to Austria and Germany, accompanied by

several of his ministers, when on the occasion of the grand manœuvres

at Frankfort on the Main, Emperor William gave him the honorary command

of the 15th regiment of Ulans. Alfonso XII visited this regiment in its

quarters at Strasburg, on his return journey to France and for this

reason on his entry into Paris, on September 29th, the chauvinistic mob

hailed him as the _roi-ulan_ and insulted the laws of hospitality with

hoots and howls. The king in knightly fashion repaid their treatment by

giving 10,000 francs for the poor of Paris. Emperor William, in order

to show his warm sympathy for the king, sent the crown-prince to Spain.

The latter set sail with a German fleet and landed in Valencia November

22nd after a stormy passage. Although the Spaniards were at first cool

and reserved, after a few weeks spent in Madrid and the most important

cities of the south, the prince completely won them over by his imposing

and kindly personality and by the regard shown to the king in such

demonstrative fashion contributed his share towards firmly establishing

the Spanish throne. The friendly relations thus introduced did not

indeed hinder the outbreak of popular hatred against Germany in 1885 in

connection with the dispute over the Carolines; only the statesmanlike

firmness of the king and the moderation of Germany hindered serious

troubles and assured the continuance of the Bourbon throne which had only

just been re-established.

But the days of the young monarch were already numbered, November 25th,

1885, he died of consumption in the Pardo palace. He left two daughters

by his second marriage with the archduchess Maria Christina of Austria

(November 29th, 1879), Mercedes and Maria Theresa; not until several

months after his death, on May 17th, 1886, was the heir to the throne,

Alfonso XIII, born. He was proclaimed king on the same day, under the

regency of his mother. The latter recalled to the mind of the Spanish

that other queen of German blood, Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick, the

wife of Charles VI.[p]

THE REGENCY OF MARIA CHRISTINA (1886-1902 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1886-1897 A.D.]]

The widow of Alfonso XII quietly assumed that there was no debate as to

her right to be regent of Spain, which found itself facing an addition

to its astonishingly long list of minorities. And the new minor was not

yet born. The situation was serious. The latest policy of the cabinet

had not been popular in its reaction from liberalism, and even Cánovas

del Castillo advised the queen-regent to begin her administration by

concessions. He recommended his ancient rival Sagasta, who was called to

the Pardo, and by the pact since called after the place, agreed to use

his influence to uphold the regency while frankly stating his intention

to make gradual reforms in the direction of restoring the constitutional

liberties of 1868.

In Paris Ruiz Zorilla was agitating for a revolution and restoration

of the republic, while the Carlists were trying to stir Don Carlos to

leave his retreat in Venice and invade Spain. The pope, however, felt

that the interests of the church would be better subserved by peace,

especially as he found Maria Christina an ardent and generous Catholic,

who encouraged the Jesuits to unsurpassed power over education. But

Sagasta’s influence kept the country from any entanglements in European

alliances, re-established trial by jury, which Alfonso XII had abolished,

and universal suffrage which Alfonso had vetoed; enlarged the liberties

of speech and press, and modified the tariff beneficially. A few military

conspiracies were frustrated and mildly punished. A strong aid to Sagasta

was Emilio Castelar, who saw the gradual return of his republican ideals.

[Illustration: MARIA CHRISTINA]

But by 1890, Maria Christina, who was even more dictatorial than her late

husband, asked his resignation and called in Cánovas, whose conservative

and high-tariff policy brought a marked diminution of foreign trade.

Cánovas’ chief trouble came from his own party. After two and a half

years, he resigned and again advised the calling of Sagasta, who sent

an expedition of twenty-five thousand soldiers under Campos to Morocco

and forced the sultan to pay an indemnity of £800,000 for attacks on the

Spanish outposts at Melilla in Morocco. He was not so happy with the

Cuban question.

Cuba had long been rather the victim and prey of the mother-country

than a colony, and the efforts for relief by the few friends in Spain

had received practically no attention. The growth of the sentiment of

revolt, the failure of the milder policies of men like Martínez Campos,

and the equal fiasco of the mediævally relentless policy of General

Weyler, who won the name of “butcher,” are detailed in the later volume

devoted to Spanish America. It must suffice here to say that Cánovas was

assassinated by an anarchist, August 9th, 1897, while pressing a bill

for more liberal home rule in Cuba. He was succeeded by the former war

minister General Azcarraga.

Meanwhile the people of the United States had been so deeply stirred by

the decades of torture inflicted on their island neighbours in Cuba that

General Weyler was recalled through pressure brought to bear by American

diplomacy. The conservative cabinet gave way to Sagasta, Marshal Blanco

replaced Weyler and tried a gentler policy. But the ruination of Cuba

could not be checked by any mild and negative treatment. The people of

the United States had been wrought to a pitch of horror by the tales

of the starvation of Cuban men, women, and children by the thousand,

and when the United States cruiser _Maine_, while visiting the port

of Havana, was blown up with great loss of life, it needed only the

declaration of a commission of inquiry that she had been sunk by a

submarine mine, to bring the United States to demand the evacuation of

Cuba by Spain. There was no implication that the destruction of the

_Maine_ had official sanction, but it was given as a final proof of the

intolerable state of affairs in Cuba.

[Sidenote: [1897-1898 A.D.]]

The demand was naturally more than Spanish pride would bear and the

American minister was given his passports. The European powers refused

to intervene, though the press was almost unanimously for Spain, except

in England. It was notorious that Spanish resources were hopelessly

inadequate to a protracted war with the infinite riches of the United

States, but the American navy was small and according to European experts

decidedly inferior in discipline, morale, and efficiency to the Spanish

navy. This theory was exploded by the swift and utter destruction of

two Spanish fleets, that of Admiral Montojo by Admiral Dewey in Manila

Bay, May 1st, 1898, and that of Admiral Cervera by the fleet under

Admiral Sampson in Santiago de Cuba, July 3rd. Land-forces in Cuba, the

Philippines, and Porto Rico won those islands with comparatively little

struggle, as is described in the second volume of our history of the

United States.

[Illustration: ANTONIO CÁNOVAS DEL CASTILLO]

Late in July, Spanish pride saw nothing left but surrender of practically

all her colonies. A treaty of peace was signed at Paris, December 12th,

1898, after a protocol had put an end to hostilities for some months. The

Caroline Islands which remained to Spain in the Pacific, and over which

there had almost been a war with Germany in 1885, were sold to Germany in

1899 for £800,000; and in 1900 the United States bought two small islands

that had been overlooked in the earlier treaty, paying $100,000 (£20,000)

for them.

Spain came out of the war in a sad financial state. Besides the practical

annihilation of her navy and the great loss of her army’s prestige, her

national debt of £259,116,500 had been increased by £60,000,000 for war

expenses (borrowed at very high interest); and the United States had

forced her to assume the Cuban and Philippine debts of £46,210,000. The

mountain of debt that confronted her was thus £365,326,500; or more than

$1,826,600,000.

The liberals, who had been compelled to take the government at the

outbreak of war, had faced inevitable defeat, but there were so

many details of maladministration, of neglect and ignorance in war

preparations that the blame of the disaster fell on them as if they

had been its origin. Sagasta gave way to the conservative Silvela. He

feared to support the radical measures which Villaverde, the minister of

finance, felt necessary for the reduction of expense and the increase

of revenue, and which provoked violent and organised resistance from

tax-payers. Villaverde in consequence was sacrificed, though he had

attacked his problem with sanity and courage. The resistance of the

National Tax-payers’ Union did not cease, however, and Silvela was driven

to rigorous measures of repression.

[Sidenote: [1898-1902 A.D.]]

In spite of the severe up-hill struggle that is before Spain, it is

everywhere believed that the loss of her colonies is the greatest

blessing that could have befallen her. So great a drain were they upon

the industries, the morals, and the population of the home-country, and

so corrupt had their administration become that their removal resembled

the amputation of a limb given over to gangrene. Already signs of

healthier conditions are numerous, and, as industry, like charity, should

begin at home, the outlook of the new attention to the great natural

resources of the peninsula is most alluring.

Not the least sign of promise is the growing popular feeling against

the vampire of priestcraft. Early in her history Spain developed the

most advanced and organised liberties of all European governments. Then

she came under the sway of the church, and it became for centuries her

boast that she was the most faithful and meekest of disciples. At the

same time she became and continued the most ignorant, the most depraved

and superstitious, the most blood-thirsty, of all European nations. Her

loyal subjects were proud of their chains; haughty in the obstinate

ignorance of her Jesuitical schools and the fiery intolerance of their

rulers and people. Her non-orthodox were broken on the rack, tormented

and burned at the stake after suffering all the diabolic ingenuities

of the Inquisition. Her provinces, as the Netherlands, were kept in

ceaseless and odious war. Her colonies were steeped for centuries in

oppressions resulting in the absolute obliteration of whole races, and

the lasting savagery of others. And these horrors were, practically

without exception, done in the name of the church and with its official

approval. It is clear to the outside world that Spain must shake loose

the affectation of religion from the education of the masses, from the

intrigues of the court, and from the politics and everyday life of the

people, before this brave and brilliant race can take its place in line

with the rest of Europe on the march of civilisation and the betterment

of mankind.

In 1902, the regency of Maria Christina came to an end: her son was

declared of age and crowned as Alfonso XIII.[a]

FOOTNOTES

[124] [Hume[c] vividly describes this royal progress: “Through the stark

and ruined country he went; the emaciated and famished inhabitants,

hardly one of whom but had some dear one killed in the war, filled to

overflowing with love and hope of better times under the sway of their

new king. They had suffered so much for him; he was young and had

suffered too, they said, in his exile: surely he would be good to them,

make bread cheap, and heal their bleeding wounds. Most of the towns on

the way had changed the name of their great square from Plaza Mayor to

‘Plaza de la Constitucion’; and the marble slabs bearing the latter

inscription were now torn down and splintered, and the thoughtless mob,

little knowing or caring what it all meant, shouted themselves hoarse

with cries of ‘Death to liberty and the Constitution!’ and ‘Long live

Ferdinand.’”[c] The amazing cry of “Hurrah for chains!” was also heard.]

[125] The name Persians was given to the _servile_ deputies who had

signed the memorial in which the period from 1608 to 1814 was compared to

the old Persian saturnalia of crime which accompanied a change of rulers.

[126] [Spanish kings had been ruled by favourites before; but Lerma

and Olivares, even Valenzuela and Godoy, were men of education and

breeding, whilst the secret advisers of Ferdinand were, many of them,

coarse, ignorant buffoons. Meeting at night with noisy mirth they settled

over the heads of the ministers questions of national policy, and even

made and unmade ministers in mere caprice. Ministers were appointed

or dismissed arbitrarily by Ferdinand for the most puerile reasons,

and were sent into prison or exile at the idle fancy of the king. The

members of the _camarilla_ were treated in the same way, being one day

in high favour and the next in jail. There were over thirty ministers

in the six years from 1814 to 1820, an average of two months’ duration

for each. The most prominent member of the _camarilla_ was a low buffoon

called “Chamorro,” who had been a water-carrier, another, Ugarte, was

a second-hand broker; Tattischeff, the Russian minister, was also a

member.[c]]

[127] The blood-thirsty Elio tortured to death a woman who had just given

birth to a child.

[128] That is, “Swallow it,” meaning the constitution, a popular street

song of Cadiz, which may be compared with the “_Ça ira!_” of the French

Revolution.

[129] [He was dragged through the streets in a basket drawn at the tail

of an ass; he was then hanged and quartered as if he were a felon.]

[130] [The minister Calomarde was one of the most violent of the

absolutists. Born in 1773 he had worked his way upward gradually till in

1823 be entered the cabinet. For ten years he was the most influential of

the ministers and deserves much of the discredit due to all who managed

the realm. It is unnecessary to dispute over the exact share of each.

There was odium enough for all. In 1833 Calomarde sided with Don Carlos

and was banished, dying in Toulouse in 1842.]

[131] [Burgos[h] thus sums up Don Carlos: “The heart of this prince

was as incapable of elevated sentiments as his head was of political

combinations. His profound ignorance made him regard the enthusiasm

displayed by the passionate and disheartened crowds as general and

unanimous, and the delight of the populace he regarded as a sign of

approbation of the system of intolerance with which he was credited.

In the unarrested march of his force to Madrid in 1837 the delighted

pretendant saw the hand of providence raising him to the throne of his

ancestors, and his apathy prevented his taking the means which his

fatalism moreover considered unnecessary. His courtiers, puffed up

with passing advantages, thought that by dint of them and the stolid

impassivity of their sovereign they could give the rein to their

resentments.”]

[132] [In 1852 a priest named Merino stabbed her, but her life was saved

by the whalebone of her corsets. The priest was garrotted, his body

burned.]

[133] [“Young, valiant, having bled for the country whose dominions his

father had extended, crowned with glory, beloved by his fellow citizens,

educated in the liberal spirit and holding an enviable position, he

neither coveted the throne of Spain, his aspirations being ever modest,

nor refused any sacrifice to win success for the nation which had won his

sympathy from the first. The liberals could not deny that Amadeo belonged

to a family which represented the liberal spirit, more than any other

in Europe, and which had seconded the aspirations of lovers of liberty.

The fact of the duke of Aosta’s being educated in the latter school, was

a guarantee not to one party, but to all liberals; and if he obtained

the votes of the constituents, sacrificing his most dear affections to

the love of the country, there should be but one rule for all liberal

monarchists--king and liberty. This rule had inspired great men in

England to found the monarchy of 1688 and this is what Spanish patriotism

advised.”--PIRALA.[l]]

[134] [At the head of the Madrid garrison, the captain-general of the

capital turned the members of the cortes into the streets, dismissed

the government, including the war minister, and dissolved parliament.

He then profoundly surprised his fellow countrymen by declining to use

his dictatorship as a stepping-stone to power. For the first time in

Spain, the victorious leader of a _pronunciamiento_ invited the leaders

of all parties to form a government to restore and maintain peace.

Castelar naturally declined. Cánovas del Castillo, the chief agent of the

Alfonsist propaganda, held aloof, because he saw that events were playing

into his hands. Marshal Serrano, with Sagasta and Martos, consented

to form a nameless provisional government, which attempted for eleven

months to reorganise Spain, first crushing the republican risings in the

south, and then vigorously attacking the Carlists in northern and central

Spain.[k]]

BRIEF REFERENCE-LIST OF AUTHORITIES BY CHAPTERS

[The letter [a] is reserved for Editorial Matter.]

CHAPTER I. LAND AND PEOPLE AND EARLY HISTORY

[b] M. M. BUSK, _The History of Spain and Portugal_.

[c] HEINRICH SCHURTZ on “Die Pyrenäische Halbinsel,” in Helmolt’s

_Weltgeschichte_.

[d] MARTIN A. S. HUME, _The Spanish People: their Origin, Growth, and

Influence_.

[e] POLYBIUS, _General History_.

[f] TITUS LIVIUS, _History of Rome_.

[g] S. A. DUNHAM, _History of Spain and Portugal_.

[h] PLINY, _Historia Naturalis_.

[i] IDATIUS, _Chronicum_.

[j] ULRICK R. BURKE, _A History of Spain_.

[k] M. CASIRI, _Bibliotheca arabico-hispana Escurialensis_.

[l] EDWARD GIBBON, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_.

[m] J. A. CONDÉ, _Historia de la Dominacion de los Arabes en España_.

[n] GREGORY OF TOURS, _Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum_.

[o] PROCOPIUS, _De Bello Gothorum_.

[p] ST. ISIDORUS HISPALENSIS, _Historia Gothorum, Vandalorum, et

Suevorum_.

[q] JUAN DE MARIANA, _Historia general de España_.

[r] JUAN F. DE MASDEU, _Historia crítica de España_.

[s] BARONIUS, _Annales Ecclesiastici_.

[t] CHARLES DE S. MONTESQUIEU, _Esprit des Lois_.

[u] AMBROSIO DE MORALES, _Crónica general de España_.

[v] SEBASTIANUS SALMANTICENSIS, _Chronicon_.

[w] ANONYMOUS, _Chronica Albeldensis_.

[x] ST. JULIAN, _Historia Regis Wambæ_.

[y] JORDANES, _De Origine Gothorum_.

[z] ISIDORUS PACENSIS, _Epit._

[aa] JUAN DE FERRERAS, _Historia de España_.

[bb] AMADOR DE LOS RÍOS, _Los Judíos en España_.

[cc] FLÓREZ Y LAFUENTE, _España Sagrada_.

[dd] CARDINAL LORENGANA, _Collectio Sanctorum Patrum Ecclesiæ Toledanæ_.

[ee] WULSA, _Chronica Regum Wisigothorum_.

[ff] ANONYMOUS, _Continuation of Joannis Biclarensis_.

[gg] CHARLES PAQUIS, _Histoire d’Espagne et de Portugal_.

[hh] ANONYMOUS, _Chronicon Moissacense_.

[ii] MONACHUS SILENSIS, _Chronicon_.

[jj] LUCAS TUDENSIS, _Chronicon_.

[kk] RODERICUS XIMENES TOLETANUS, _Rerum in Hispania Gestarum_.

[ll] JOSEPH ASCHBACH, _Geschichte der Westgoten_.

[mm] FELIX DAHN, _Die Könige der Germanen_.

[nn] ANONYMOUS, _Crónica del Rey D. Rodrigo_.

CHAPTER II. THE TIME OF MOSLEM DOMINATION

[b] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

[c] RODERICUS XIMENES TOLETANUS, _op. cit._

[d] ISIDORUS PACENSIS, _op. cit._

[e] ANONYMOUS, _Chronica Elbeldensis_.

[f] SEBASTIANUS SALMANTICENSIS, _op. cit._

[g] U. R. BURKE, _op. cit._

[h] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[i] J. DE MARIANA, _op. cit._

[j] “El-Lagi” (in _Casiris Fragmenta Historiarum_).

[k] ALFONSO X, _Crónica de España_.

[l] J. F. DE MASDEU, _op. cit._

[m] ORTIZ, _Compendio general de la historia de España_.

[n] SAMPIRUS ASTORICENSIS, _Episcopus_.

[o] GEORG WEBER, _Weltgeschichte_.

[p] ANONYMOUS, _Annales Complutenses_.

[q] ANONYMOUS, _Annales Toledanos_.

[r] HENRY E. WATTS, _Spain_.

[s] CHARLES ROMEY, _Histoire de l’Espagne_.

[t] J. M. MAS-LATRIE, _Trésor de chronologie, d’histoire, et de

géographie_.

[u] PRUDENCIO DE SANDOVAL, _Historia de los Reyes Castilla y Leon_.

[v] J. DE FERRERAS, _op. cit._

[w] P. RISCO, _Edition of Gesta Roderici Campidocti_.

[x] ROBERT SOUTHEY, _Translation of the Chronicle of the Cid_.

[y] VICTOR A. HUBER, _Geschichte des Cid_.

[z] R. DOZY, _Recherches sur la littérature et l’histoire d’Espagne,

pendant le Moyen Age_.

[aa] IBN BASSAM, _History of Literature_.

[bb] ALEXANDER BAUMGARTNER, “Der Cid in der Geschichte,” in _Stimmen aus

Maria-Laach_.

[cc] MODESTO LAFUENTE, _Historia general de España_.

CHAPTER III. CASTILE, TO DEATH OF PEDRO THE CRUEL

[b] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[c] F. S. CASADO, _Historia de España_.

[d] U. R. BURKE, _op. cit._

[e] ALFONSO X, _Crónica_, _op. cit._

[f] G. WEBER, _op. cit._

[g] J. DE MARIANA, _Historia de Rebus Hispaniæ_.

[h] LÓPEZ DE AYALA, _Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla_.

[i] JOHN FROISSART, _Chronicles of England, France, and Spain_.

[j] D. JUAN C. GARCIA, _Pedro I_, _Enrique II_, _Juan I_, _Enrique III_.

[k] MARQUIS DE MONDEJAR, _Vida de Alfonso X_.

[l] ALFONSO NUÑES DE CASTRO, _Corónica Góthica, Castillana y Austriaca_.

[m] PROSPER MÉRIMÉE, _Histoire de Don Pedre I_.

[n] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

CHAPTER IV. ARAGON, TO THE UNION WITH CASTILE

[b] G. WEBER, _op. cit._

[c] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[d] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

[e] GERÓNIMO ZURITA, _Anales de la corona de Aragon_.

[f] J. DE FERRERAS, _op. cit._

CHAPTER V. TRASTAMARA, TO ISABELLA

[b] L. DE AYALA, _op. cit._

[c] G. WEBER, _op. cit._

[d] J. FROISSART, _op. cit._

[e] D. A. DE LEMOS, _Historia geral de Portugal_.

[f] ANONYMOUS, _Chronicon Conimbricense_.

[g] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[h] U. R. BURKE, _op. cit._

[i] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

[j] PEREZ DE GUZMAN, _Crónica del serenissimo Principe Don Juan II_.

[k] ANONYMOUS, _Crónica del Condestable Don Alonso de Luna_.

[l] WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, _History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella

the Catholic_.

CHAPTER VI. FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

[b] GONZALO DE OVIEDO Y VALDÉS, _Las Quincuagenas_.

[c] HERNANDO DEL PULGAR, _Reyes Católicos_.

[d] PETER MARTYR, _Opus Epistolarum_.

[e] LORENZO G. DE CARBAJAL, Ms.

[f] U. R. BURKE, _op. cit._

[g] W. H. PRESCOTT, _op. cit._

[h] ANDRÉS BERNÁLDEZ, _Reyes Católicos_.

[i] PEDRO DE ABARCA, _Los Reyes de Aragon_.

[j] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[k] J. DE FERRERAS, _op. cit._

[l] JUAN A. LLORENTE, _Historia crítica de la Inquisicion de España_.

[m] J. DE MARIANA, _op. cit._

[n] HEINRICH GRAETZ, _Geschichte der Juden_.

[o] J. A. CONDÉ, _op. cit._

[q] BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, _Historia general de las Indias_.

[r] LUCIO MARINEO, _Cosas Memorables_.

[s] GUSTAV BERGENROTH, _Letters, Despatches and State Papers_

(supplementary volumes).

[t] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

CHAPTER VII. THE REGENCY OF FERDINAND

[b] W. H. PRESCOTT, _op. cit._

[c] WILLIAM ROBERTSON, _History of the Reign of Charles V_.

[d] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[e] M. A. S. HUME, _op. cit._

[f] L. G. DE CARBAJAL, _Anales del Rey Don Fernando el Catolicó_.

[g] G. ZURITA, _op. cit._

[h] J. DE MARIANI, _op. cit._

[i] PRUDENCIO DE SANDOVAL, _Historia del Emperador Carlos V_.

[j] DIEGO DE CLEMENCIN, in _Mem. de la Real Accademie de Historia, VI_.

[k] U. R. BURKE, _op. cit._

[l] P. MARTYR, _op. cit._

[m] L. MARINEO, _op. cit._

[n] PAOLO GIOVIO, _Historia sui temporis_.

[o] ANTONIO VARILLAS, _Politique de Ferdinand_.

[p] NICCOLO MACCHIAVELLI, _Lettere diverse_ and _Il Principe_.

[q] A. GÓMEZ, _De Rebus Gestis Francisci Ximenii_.

[r] LAS CASAS, _op. cit._

[s] G. DE OVIEDO Y VALDÉS, _op. cit._

[t] M. A. S. HUME, _Spain: its Greatness and Decay_.

[u] G. BERGENROTH, _op. cit._

[v] RODRIGUEZ VILLA, _Vida de Juana la loca_.

[w] L. P. GACHARD, in _Bulletin de l’Académie Royale de la Belgique_.

[x] VICENTE DE LA FUENTE, _Juana la loca vindicada de la nota de herejia_.

[y] CHARLES DE MOÜY, an article “Jeanne la Folle” in the _Revue des deux

Mondes_.

[z] MICHEL BAUDIER, _Vie de Ximenes_.

[aa] HERMANN BAUMGARTEN, _Geschichte Karls V._

CHAPTER VIII. THE EMPEROR CHARLES V

[b] P. MARTYR, _op. cit._

[c] W. ROBERTSON, _op. cit._

[d] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[e] ROSSEEUW ST. HILAIRE, _Histoire d’Espagne_.

[f] P. DE SANDOVAL, _op. cit._

[g] JOSÉ DE SIGUENZA, _Historia de la Orden de San Gerónimo_.

[h] WILLIAM STIRLING-MAXWELL, _The Cloister-Life of Charles V_.

[i] BAKHUYZEN VAN DEN BRINK, _Analyse d’un manuscrit contemporain sur la

retraite de Charles Quint_.

[j] FRANÇOIS A. M. MIGNET, _Antonio Perez et Philippe II_.

[k] AMÉDÉE PICHOT, _Chronique de Charles Quint_.

[l] LOUIS P. GACHARD, _Retraite et mort de Charles Quint_.

[m] JOHN L. MOTLEY, _The Rise of the Dutch Republic_.

[n] M. DE MARLIANI, _Histoire politique de l’Espagne moderne_.

[o] STRADA, _De Bello Belgico ab Excessu Carli V_.

CHAPTER IX. PHILIP II

[b] MICHELE SURIANO, “Relazione” (in L. P. Gachard’s _Relations des

Ambassadeurs Vénitiens sur Charles V et Philippe II_).

[c] CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA, _Filipe Segundo_.

[d] L. P. GACHARD, _Rapport à le ministre de l’Interieur_ prefixed to the

_Correspondence de Philippe II_.

[e] BADOVARO, Ms. (see Suiano, _supra_).

[f] J. L. MOTLEY, _op. cit._

[g] MANDELL CREIGHTON, article on “Philip II” in the _Encyclopædia

Britannica_.

[h] ROBERT WATSON, _The History of the Reign of Philip II_.

[i] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[j] M. A. S. HUME, _The Spanish People_.

[k] M. A. S. HUME, _Spain: its Greatness and Decay_.

[l] WILLIAM OF ORANGE, _Apologie_.

[m] BERMUDEZ DE CASTRO, _Antonio Perez_.

[n] M. M. BUSK, _op. cit._

[o] W. H. PRESCOTT, _History of the Reign of Philip II_.

CHAPTER X. LAST OF THE SPANISH HABSBURGS

[b] M. LAFUENTE, _op. cit._

[c] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[d] M. CATHERINE D’AULNOY, _Mémoires de la cour d’Espagne_.

[e] VINCENT VOITURE, _Voyage d’Espagne_.

[f] G. T. RAYNAL, _Histoire des Indes_.

[g] JOHANN C. FR. VON SCHILLER, _Geschichte des dreissig jährigen

Krieges_.

[h] WILLIAM COXE, _Memoirs of the Kings of Spain_.

[i] ZANETORNATO, _Relazione del Governo della corte de Spagna_.

[j] M. A. S. HUME, _Spain: its Greatness and Decay_.

[k] JOHN DUNLOP, _Memoirs of Spain during the Reign of Philip IV and

Charles II_.

[l] HENRI MARTIN, _Histoire de France_.

CHAPTER XI. REVIVAL UNDER THE FIRST BOURBONS

[b] SAN FELIPE (or ST. PHILIPPE), _Commentarios_.

[c] W. COXE, _op. cit._

[d] M. A. S. HUME, _The Spanish People_.

[e] MARÉCHAL DE BEZWICK, _Mémoires_.

[f] LORD MAHON, _War of Succession in Spain_.

[g] JEAN B. R. DE TESSÉ, _Mémoires_.

[h] M. A. S. HUME, _Spain: its Greatness and Decay_.

[i] GIULIO ALBERONI, _Storia_.

[j] LORD MAHON, _History of England_.

[k] M. LAFUENTE, _op. cit._

[l] S. A. DUNHAM, _op. cit._

[m] WILLIAM CONNOR SYDNEY, _England and the English in the Eighteenth

Century_.

[n] M. M. BUSK, _op. cit._

CHAPTER XII. SPAIN AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

[b] M. M. BUSK, _op. cit._

[c] ROSSEEUW ST. HILAIRE, _op. cit._

[d] M. LAFUENTE, _op. cit._

[e] MANUEL DE GODOY, _Mémoires_.

[f] H. REYNALD, _Histoire d’Espagne depuis la mort de Charles III_.

[g] PEDRO CEVALLOS, _Exposition de faits et des trames_, etc.

[h] CONDÉ JOSÉ M. DE TOREÑO, _Historia del levantamiento, guerra y

revolution de Españao_.

[i] WILLIAM F. P. NAPIER, _History of the War in the Peninsula and in the

South of France_.

CHAPTER XIII. THE PENINSULAR WAR

[b] W. F. P. NAPIER, _op. cit._

[c] M. M. BUSK, _op. cit._

[d] H. M. STEPHENS, article on “Sir John Moore” in the _Encyclopædia

Britannica_.

[e] M. LAFUENTE, _op. cit._

[f] CONDÉ J. M. DE TOREÑO, _op. cit._

[g] M. A. S. HUME, _Modern Spain_.

CHAPTER XIV. THE BOURBON RESTORATION

[b] GUSTAVE HUBBARD, _Histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne_.

[c] M. A. S. HUME, _Modern Spain_.

[d] DOCHEZ, continuation of Charles Paquis’ _Histoire de l’Espagne_.

[e] WILHELM MÜLLER, _Politische Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_.

[f] FRANÇOIS A. DE CHÂTEAUBRIAND, _Congrès de Vérone_.

[g] H. M. STEPHENS, _op. cit._

[h] J. DE BURGOS, _Anales del Reinado de Doña Isabel_.

[i] MARQUES DE MIRAFLORES, _Continuation de los Memorias del Reinado de

Isabel II_.

[j] ANTONIO DE PIRALA, _Historia contemporánea_.

[k] A. E. HOUGHTON, article on “Spain,” in the New Volumes of the

_Encyclopædia Britannica_.

[l] A. DE PIRALA, _El Rey en Madrid y en provincias_.

[m] EMILIO CASTELAR, speech of November 3rd, 1870.

[n] VICTOR CHERBULIEZ, _L’Espagne Politique_.

[o] JOSEPH DE GRABINSKI, _Amédée de Savoie, duc d’Aoste, roi d’Espagne_.

[p] OTTO KAEMMEL, _Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_ (in Spamer’s

_Weltgeschichte_).

[q] M. M. BUSK, _History of Spain and Portugal_.

BOOK II

THE HISTORY OF PORTUGAL FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT

CHAPTER I. EARLY HISTORY TO JOÃO I

LAND AND PEOPLE

[Sidenote: [TO 1383 A.D.]]

The reasons for which Portugal is neglected are precisely those which in

some eyes make her truly lovable. For a half-century art has done almost

nothing for the natural river highways; and the Douro, the Guadiana, and

the Tagus flow through this kingdom like the wandering rivulets of great

English parks. The large towns of the interior, Coimbra, Santarem, Evora,

and Miranda, look like pretty kiosks rising about flowering thickets;

peaceful retreats, solitudes animated with a life that jogs quietly along

and does not go with leaps and bounds as in France, where a satisfied

humanity stands still, instead of rushing into the unknown risks of the

future.

The cities of the coast, Lisbon, Oporto, appear more like dwelling-places

conveniently placed the better to enjoy the sunlight and the ocean

breezes than wide-awake communities guarding their mercantile interests

in the commercial exchange of the products of the Old World with the

riches of the New.

[Sidenote: [TO 1147 A.D.]]

If the Portuguese had been as skilful speculators as they were intrepid

sailors and distinguished warriors, Henry the Navigator, who set the

example of maritime conquest, Dias, Vasco da Gama, Cabral, Albuquerque,

valiant captains identified with all the glories of the Aviz dynasty,

would have imitated the speculative prudence of the Dutch, their rivals.

And if, when the illustrious house of Braganza opened the era of national

liberties, the people had had in their heads less of poetic imagination

and more power of reason; if, courageous and adventurous as they were,

they had shown themselves more positive, the French, at first, and then

the English, would never have invaded their treasury, exploited their

soil, and paralysed their industries. Truly a childlike nation, satisfied

with little, pursuing the ideal, economical without avarice, pure in

morals, sober, generous, hospitable, the Portuguese have bred heroes

in place of diplomats, poets in place of capitalists: they knew how

bravely to defend their country against the Romans, the Arabs, and the

Spaniards, and still more recently against the army of Napoleon. They

have kept themselves a free nation, independent and original, possessing

a language, a literature, distinct manners and customs, and governed

politically by one of the most liberal constitutions of Europe.

To make Portugal complete, Brazil and the colonies were necessary to

this country whose language is spoken on the European continent by only

five millions of men; and again the narrow domain which so restricts

the use of this tongue creates an obstacle to the popularity of the

works to which language gives birth, just as its poverty impedes the

development of the fine arts. Jealousy and indifference, the double

affliction of southern nations, have curbed the artistic and literary

aspirations of the Portuguese. What man of genius would resolve on a

career of self-denial only to be calumniated and persecuted as was

Prince Henry, to achieve a miserable end like Admiral Pacheo, or like

Camoens; or to languish forgotten, like the painter Glama, reduced to

making tavern signs; like the sculptor Machado de Castro and the founder

Costa, creators of an equestrian statue of José I, worthy of ranking

with the greatest art works of the eighteenth century? Encouragement and

recompense are the safeguards of emulation, and emulation, utilising the

moral resources of a people, permits them the use of its advantages to

rise to the level of other nations.

Except for a few coins, the Phœnicians, the Phocæans, and the

Carthaginians have left almost no trace in Portugal of their occupation

or their passing; but the touch of Rome clings better than in Spain.

Cæsar’s Pax Julia sleeps thirty feet beneath the city of Beja and needs

only the simple power of will to be awakened, with its population of

statues, its inscriptions, and its frescoes; Liberalitas Julia, the

Ebora of Ptolemy, planted like Beja upon high ground in the province

of Alemtejo, has a double character, that of a Grecian town with its

temple of Diana and that of a Roman city with its great aqueduct, immense

works, wrought under the hand of Quintus Sertorius, who made himself

master eighty years before the Christian era. The aristocracy of Pax

Julia and Liberalitas Julia was accustomed to spend its summers in the

little municipality of Alcacer, where there was a famous bath under

the protection of a local divinity, the nymph Salacia. Braganza, the

Juliobriga; Lisbon, the Felicitas Julia of the Augustan era, had equally

received their political baptism from the conqueror of Gaul; while

ancient Lusitania, become a Julian or Cæsarian country, easily adapted

the popular customs and organisations of the Roman government to its

Carthaginian institutions.

Vespasian and Trajan made an important town of Chaves; Viseu is the

Vesontium of the consul D. Brutus; Lamego, the Urbs Lamacœnorum of

Trajan. Setubal occupies a terrace opposite the ancient Roman colony

of Cetobriga. At Braga, Ponte de Lima, Salvaterra, we find traces of

amphitheatres, aqueducts, baths, and temples; so that well-directed

excavations would evoke the manes of that sovereign people which,

governing the universe, kept watchful station on the coast of Hispania to

keep an eye on Numidia.

[Sidenote: [TO 1170 A.D.]]

From the seventh century to the capture of Lisbon in 1147 Moorish

architecture had its compromising effect on the elegant majesty of the

great lines and arches of the Saracens’ predecessors; the baths of

Cintra, the wall and seventy-seven towers of Lisbon, the fortifications

and palaces of Evora, and many mosques since transformed into churches,

signified, towards the close of the twelfth century, the degree of

Islam’s foothold on Portuguese soil--an unsteady tenure, without

consistence, without depth, bearing witness to the rapidity of conquest

as well as to the fear of ephemeral possession. Little by little, in

place of the mosques, arose churches, veritable apostolic citadels,

headquarters for the war against the infidel. Formless and rude at first,

they developed as the Christian armies won back the land; but when the

native peoples effected their definite triumph they were obliged to call

in foreign artists, more skilful than themselves in the interpretation of

the architectural vernacular.

The Portuguese knew how to fight bravely and to sing their triumphs, but

they did not know how to build; and for this reason the monastery of

Alcobaça, founded in fulfilment of a vow by Alfonso I, king of Portugal,

in 1170, is an Anglo-Saxon church, built by workmen from England. A new

architectural epoch dates from the fifteenth century, and its character

has been best perpetuated in the abbey of Batalha. Of its kind, this is

one of the most beautiful edifices in existence; and assuredly it is

the most majestic and the most pure in form that Portugal possesses. It

was built in the reign of João I (1385-1433) who brought from England a

celebrated sculptor named Stephenson. Many German, English, and Norman

artists summoned by the monarch came to aid him. João himself and his

queen Philippa, granddaughter of Edward III of England, supervised the

work. And that nothing might be lacking to the poetic magnificence and

graceful details of the building, another queen, the pious Leonora, and

two monarchs--João II, the poet king, and after him, Emmanuel--followed

the continuance of the work with intelligent interest. Nothing in the

whole peninsula rivals in magnificence the façade of the monastery, nor

in boldness of design its chapter hall.[b]

THE ORIGIN OF PORTUGAL

[Sidenote: [712-1109 A.D.]]

It has been stated that geographically the kingdom of Portugal is an

integral part of the Iberian peninsula; the only reason why it has

retained its independence, while the other mediæval states of that

peninsula have merged into the kingdom of Spain, is to be found in its

history. When Philip II of Spain annexed Portugal it was a century too

late for it to coalesce with Spain. It had then produced Vasco da Gama

and Alfonso de Albuquerque, and its language had been developed from a

Romance dialect into a literary language by Camoens and Sá de Miranda.

Conscious of its national history, it broke away again from Spain in

1640, and under the close alliance of England maintained its separate

and national existence during the eighteenth century. A union with

Spain might have been possible, however, during the first half of the

present century had not a generation of historians and poets arisen

who, by recalling the great days of the Portuguese monarchy, have made

it impossible for Portugal ever again to lose the consciousness of her

national existence.

The history of Portugal really begins with the gift of the fief of

the Terra Portucalensis or the county of Porto Cale to Count Henry of

Burgundy in 1094; for any attempt to identify the kingdom of Portugal

and the Portuguese people with Lusitania and the Lusitanians is utterly

without foundation. With the rest of the Iberian peninsula, Portugal was

colonised by the Phœnicians and conquered by the Carthaginians; and the

Roman province of Lusitania, whether according to the division of Iberia

into three provinces under Augustus or into five under Hadrian, in no

way coincided with the historical limits of the kingdom of Portugal. In

common with the rest of the peninsula, it was overrun by the Vandals,

Alans, and Visigoths, and eventually conquered by the Arabs in the eighth

century. It was not until the fifteenth century that an attempt was

made by Garcia de Menezes to identify Lusitania with Portugal. Under the

influence of the Renaissance, Bernardo de Brito insisted on the identity,

and claimed Viriathus as a Portuguese hero. Other writers of the same

epoch delighted in calling Portugal by the classical name of “Lusitania,”

and Camoens, by the very title of his great epic, _Os Lusiadas_, has

immortalised the appellation.

For two centuries Portugal remained subject to the Omayyad caliphs, and

under their wise rule the old Roman _coloniæ_ and _municipia_, such as

Lisbon, Lamego, Viseu, and Oporto, maintained their Roman self-government

and increased in wealth and importance. Towards the close of the tenth

century, as the Omayyad caliphate grew weaker, the Christian princes

of Visigothic descent who dwelt in the mountains of the Asturias began

to grow more audacious in their attacks on the declining power, and

in 997 Bermudo II, king of Galicia, won back the first portion of

modern Portugal from the Mohammedans by seizing Oporto and occupying

the province now known as Entre-Minho-e-Douro. In the beginning of the

eleventh century the Omayyad caliphate finally broke up, and independent

emirs established themselves in every large city, against whom the

Christian princes waged incessant and successful war.[c]

In 1027 Alfonso V of Leon fell before Viseu, the siege of which was in

consequence abandoned; but in 1057, both it and Lamego were recovered

by his son-in-law, Ferdinand I; and the following year Coimbra shared

the same fate. In 1093, Santarem, Lisbon, and Cintra were reduced by

Alfonso VI, the famous conqueror of Toledo, whose arms were generally

so successful against the misbelievers.[135] As these conquests were

continually exposed to the irruptions of the Almoravids, in 1095 that

monarch conferred the government of Portugal from the Minho to the Tagus,

and the right of conquering as far as the Guadiana, on Henry of Besançon

or Burgundy, who in 1072 had married his illegitimate daughter Theresa,

and to whose arms he had been so much indebted for many of his recent

successes.[136]

[Sidenote: [1095-1139 A.D.]]

The nature of the authority conferred on the new count has been a matter

of much controversy between the Castilian and Portuguese writers.

While the latter maintain that the concession of Alfonso was full and

entire,--a surrender of all feudal claims over the country, which the

count was to govern in full sovereignty,--the former no less zealously

contend that the government was to be held as a fief, hereditary indeed,

but no less dependent on the crown of Leon. In the absence of documentary

evidence, probability only can guide us. It is unreasonable to suppose

either that the king was willing, or, if willing, that his nobles would

allow him to dismember at once and forever so fair a territory from

his crown, and that too in favour of a stranger and an illegitimate

daughter--for illegitimate she was, notwithstanding the allegations to

the contrary by some Portuguese writers, who seldom regard truth if

unpalatable to their national vanity. That Portugal was conferred as

a dependent fief is also confirmed by the disputes between its early

sovereigns and those of Leon--the former striving to maintain their

avowed independence, the latter to reduce them to their reputed original

vassalage. Alfonso died in 1109.

The administration of Henry was vigorous, and his military conduct

glorious. His triumphs over the Mohammedans were frequent, whether

achieved in concert with his father-in-law, Alfonso, or by his own

unaided arm. Nor were his efforts to crush rebellion, whether of his

local Christian governors or of his Mohammedan vassals, less successful.

One of his last acts was to assist his natural sovereign, Urraca,

daughter of Alfonso, against her husband the king of Aragon. He died in

1112, leaving many ecclesiastic structures enriched by his liberality.

Braga, Oporto, Coimbra, Lamego, and Viseu were the places most indebted

to his piety. Unfortunately for his memory, many of the great deeds

recorded of him by his partial people rest on authority too disputable to

be received. Probably some of them have been confounded with those of his

more famous son.

During the minority of Alfonso [or Affonso], the son of Henry, who, at

his father’s death, was only in his second year, the administration of

the kingdom was assumed by the widowed Theresa. The character of this

princess is represented as little superior to that of her sister Urraca:

the same violence, the same unbridled passions, and the same unnatural

jealousy of her son appear, though in a degree undoubtedly less criminal,

to have distinguished her conduct. Yet on that sister and her nephew, the

successor of Urraca, she sometimes made war, in the hope of profiting by

the dissensions of the period; on every occasion she was repulsed, and

was forced to sue for peace. Her intimacy with Dom Ferdinand Peres, whom

she is supposed to have secretly married, and through whom all favours

were to be solicited, roused the jealousy of the courtiers. By their

persuasion Alfonso, whom she had rigorously endeavoured to exclude from

all participation in public affairs, undertook to wrest the sovereignty

from her hands. He had little difficulty in collecting troops; for no

sooner did he erect the standard of resistance, than the discontented

nobles flocked round it. His preparations reached the ears of his mother,

who wrathfully armed to defend her authority. The two armies met near

the fortress of Guimarães, where the princess was utterly routed, and

forced to seek refuge in the castle of Leganoso. There she was speedily

invested, and compelled to surrender the reins of government into the

hands of her son, while her favourite or husband fled into Galicia. She

survived her fall about two years.[137]

The new count was destined to prove a more formidable enemy to the

Mohammedans than even his able father. During the first years of his

administration, he was at variance with his cousin, Alfonso VII or VIII,

whose Galician territories he invaded, and with whose enemy, the king of

Navarre, he entered into alliance.[h]

When Alfonso Henriques was no longer checked by the enmity of his

Christian neighbours, he prosecuted his enterprises against the Moors

with such vigour that he soon extended his sway nearly to the Tagus;

and, by the terror of his progress, obliged Ali to send from Africa a

powerful army, to support the walis, next threatened against him. A

battle ensued, esteemed the most memorable in Portuguese annals, but

which has been so disfigured by national vanity or ignorance that the

facts relating to it are not easily ascertainable. The numbers of the

Mohammedans are rated at three hundred thousand, and even at six hundred

thousand men; and this host is said to have been commanded by five

kings. Since the establishment of the Almoravid domination, there were

no Moorish kings left in Spain; but the name was erroneously given to

the walis who led the troops of their respective provinces. What does

seem certain respecting the battle in question is that the Mussulman

forces were incomparably superior to the Portuguese; that, dreading an

invasion, which, even if ultimately foiled, must still bring inevitable

ruin upon his territories, the count boldly crossed the Tagus, and

advanced to the plain of Ourique [or Orik], where he entrenched himself

strongly, and awaited the attack; that the Moors repeatedly assaulted

his fortifications and were as often repulsed, until at last, from

weariness and mortification, they fell into some disorder; and that

Alfonso Henriques, seizing the critical moment, burst out upon them from

behind his lines, and completed their discomfiture. Upon the field of

victory the army were said to have hailed their count king of Portugal;

and this glorious day, the 25th of July, 1139, is considered the epoch

of the foundation of the monarchy. The five walis of Badajoz, Beja,

Elvas, Evora, and Lisbon were found amongst the dead, and honoured with

the royal title. The conqueror assumed, as the arms of Portugal, their

five shields, arranged in what he called a cross, though the figure they

present more resembles that of a cinque upon dice; and accordingly the

Portuguese arms are termed _As Quinas_, the Cinques.

[Sidenote: [1139-1147 A.D.]]

Alfonso’s military election was said to have been subsequently confirmed

by the cortes of Lamego, with a solemnity well deserving attention, as

perhaps the only instance on record of a formal compact between prince

and people, at the original establishment of a monarchy.[i] But it is

now denied that such a cortes ever sat, the story being of much later

date. The true kingship of Alfonso Henriques dates from 1143 when, at the

intervention of a papal legate, Alfonso VII recognised him as king and

vassal of the pope.[a]

Having established his own independence of foreign authority, the new

king proceeded to the emancipation of his clergy from their subjection

to the archbishop of Toledo, whose primacy extended over the whole

peninsula. This was the subject of long negotiations with the papal see;

but Alfonso Henriques at length obtained from Pope Alexander III a bull

dissolving the connection with Toledo, and constituting the archbishop of

Braga primate of Portugal.

Alfonso Henriques’ last conquest from the Moors was the city of Lisbon,

which he took by the help of a fleet of French, English, and German

crusaders, who put into the Tagus in their way to the Holy Land. He

easily persuaded these champions of Christianity that it would be no

violation of their vow to suspend their voyage for a while, in order to

fight the Mohammedans in Portugal; and some of them, chiefly English, he

is said to have induced permanently to settle in his new acquisitions.[i]

[Sidenote: [1147-1169 A.D.]]

In 1147, we find the Portuguese intent on regaining Santarem. As the

fortifications were strong, and the defenders numerous, he caused a small

but resolute band to scale the walls by night: scarcely had twenty-five

reached the summit of the wall, when the Moorish inhabitants took the

alarm, and flew to arms. In vain one of the gates was opened by the

Christians, and the rest of the assailants rushed in. The struggle

which ensued, amidst the darkness of night, the clash of weapons, the

groans of dying warriors, the shrieks of women and infants who were

indiscriminately butchered, constituted a scene which none but a demon

would have delighted to witness, which none but a demon would have

commanded.[138] In an hour this important fortress, one of the great

bulwarks of Christian Lusitania, was in possession of the victor. His

success, and the embarrassment of the Mohammedan princes of Spain, both

on account of the rising power of the Almohads in Africa, and of the

hostilities of the kings of Leon and Castile, emboldened him to attempt

the recovery of Lisbon. That city was invested; but the valour of the

defenders and the strength of the walls would doubtless have compelled

him to raise the siege, had not a succour arrived which no man could

have expected. This was a fleet of crusaders, chiefly of English, under

the command of William Longsword, who was hastening to the Holy Land.

The Portuguese king had little difficulty in persuading them that the

cross had no greater enemies than the Mohammedans of Spain, and that

the recovery of Lisbon would be no less acceptable to heaven than that

of the Syrian towns: the hope of plunder did the rest; the crusaders

disembarked, and joined in the assaults which were daily made on the

place. After a gallant defence of five months, the besieged showing no

disposition to surrender, the Christians appointed October 25th for a

general assault on the city. It was carried by storm; a prodigious number

of the Moors were put to the sword; the crusaders were too much enriched

to dream of continuing their voyage; so that, with the exception of a few

who received lands in Portugal, the rest returned to their own country.

But the Mohammedans had still possession of one-half of Portugal, and

of several strong fortresses. Having reduced Cintra, Alfonso passed the

Tagus, and seized on several fortified places in Estremadura, and even

in Alemtejo. It was not, however, until 1158 that he seriously attempted

the reduction of Alcacer-do-Sal, which fell, after a vigorous resistance

of two months. In 1165 Cezimbra and Palmella were invested: the former

place was speedily taken; while, before the latter, he had to encounter a

strong force sent to relieve it by the Moorish governor of Badajoz.[139]

The misbelievers were defeated, and many places made to surrender.

The martial character of the Portuguese king, as well as the almost

uninterrupted success of his arms, inclined him to perpetual war--whether

with Moors or Christians appears to have given him little concern. In

1167 he seized on Limia, a territory of Galicia, which he claimed on the

ground of its having formed part of his mother’s dowry. The following

year he advanced against Badajoz, the Moorish governor of which was a

vassal of the king of Leon. Ferdinand II hastened to its relief; but

before his arrival the Portuguese standard floated on the towers. The

forces of Ferdinand were greatly superior in number, and the Portuguese

king prepared to issue from the gates--whether, as the national writers

assert, to contend for his new conquest on the open field, or, as

the Castilians say, to escape from the incensed monarch of Leon, is

uncertain. What is indubitable is that, as he was passing through the

gate with precipitation, his thigh came into contact with the wall or

bars, and was shattered. He was taken prisoner by the Leonese, and

conducted to their king, who treated him with courtesy, and consented to

his liberation on the condition of his surrendering the places which he

had usurped in Galicia. From this accident, however, he never recovered

so as to be able to mount a horse; but it had a much worse effect than

his own personal decrepitude: it encouraged the restless Mohammedans to

resume their incursions into his territories.

[Sidenote: [1169-1185 A.D.]]

Though these incursions were repressed by the valour of his son, Dom

Sancho, who, not content with defending Portugal, penetrated into the

Moorish territory, to the very outskirts of Seville, his people could not

fail to suffer from the ravages of the misbelievers. This irruption, too,

had its ill effect; it so much incensed Yusuf ben Yakub, the emperor of

the Almohads, that he despatched a considerable force into the kingdom.

The discomfiture of this army under the wall of Abrantes, and the

exploits of the celebrated Dom Fuas Roupinho, one of Sancho’s captains,

preserved the country indeed from the yoke of the stranger, but not from

the devastation; Alemtejo, above all, suffered in this vindictive warfare.

Alfonso Henriques died December 6th, 1185. His memory is held by the

Portuguese in the highest veneration; and hints are not obscurely given

that he merited canonisation. He, who had been favoured by a celestial

vision at Ourique, whose holy intentions had been so miraculously

communicated to St. Bernard, and after death whose mantle, preserved

with religious reverence, could cure the diseased, was surely worthy of

ecclesiastical deification. That, in after times, when João I gained

Ceuta, he appeared in white armour in the choir of Santa Cruz at Coimbra,

and informed the holy brotherhood that he and his son Dom Sancho were

proceeding to Ceuta to assist their vassals, no true Portuguese ever

yet disbelieved: hence the peculiar office which the monks of that

magnificent house solemnised in his honour. To a less Catholic reader,

“this always adorable king” (_sempre o rei adoravel_) may, from his

indiscriminate slaughter of the innocent and guilty, and from his amours,

appear to have been imbued with the imperfections of our nature.[h]

HERCULANO’S ESTIMATE OF THE FIRST PORTUGUESE KING

[Sidenote: [1128-1185 A.D.]]

Alfonso I was not generally over-scrupulous in sacrificing his knightly

generosity and even his political faith to public convenience. The

methods which he nearly always adopted to secure the independence

and extend the limits of Portugal do more honour to his strength and

dexterity than to his delicacy on points of honour. If, however, the

severe and impartial historian must perceive blemishes in the character

of Alfonso I as a man, justice must, in his favour, throw into the scale

the difficulties which beset him in bequeathing to the next generation

a well-cemented political existence, and a nationality, as we may say,

sufficiently compact to withstand the storms which shook the peninsula.

He had to attend to the internal organisation of society and externally

to secure it an advantageous position in relation to the various nations

of Spain, Christian and Mussulman.

Founder of a new dynasty in the midst of a society equally new, what more

natural than that Alfonso I should conceive it necessary gradually to

accustom his subjects as well as foreigners to look upon his son Sancho

as king before death came to make, as it were, solution of continuity

between father and son, and therefore in the monarchy? In Leon and

Castile heredity had superseded election to the throne in point of

fact; but the Visigothic right of election still existed as a written

law, and was still presupposed by the formula of coronation even in the

thirteenth century. There were no particular institutions in Portugal to

fix the succession, nor any security that the Leonese-Castilian dynasty

would offer a long line of kings succeeding each other from father to

son. Neither daring nor ambition were lacking in those days; and the

death of the first king of the Portuguese might give rise to serious

disturbance, either in the country itself or from without, especially

as Ferdinand II had already shown in his conduct towards the young king

of Castile that his generosity could not always resist an opportunity

of adding another crown to that which he already possessed. These and

similar considerations probably moved Alfonso I to associate his son with

him in the government, not by any formal act of which we have record, but

by giving him a free hand in the government of the state, especially in

matters of warfare.

[Illustration: AN EARLY PORTUGUESE KING]

Following the phases of this long reign, and judging impartially the

actions of the man placed by providence at the head of the nation, to

guide it in the first years of its existence, it is recognised that

the idea of fixing the Portuguese independence outweighed all other

considerations in his mind, sometimes perhaps to the prejudice of some

which should have been respected. It is this idea which in reality links

together many acts of Alfonso Henriques which, taken separately, would

give men a right to accuse him of little faith and immoderate ambition.

Besides the revolt against Doña Theresa which is to be attributed rather

to the nobles than to an inexperienced youth, the breaking of the truce

with the emperor in 1137, the cruelties practised upon the Saracens,

and finally his conduct towards the king of Leon, his son-in-law, whose

noble and generous character cannot fail to cast a reflection upon

that of Alfonso I, are actions which, taken separately, are worthy of

condemnation, at least until records reveal some circumstances still

unknown to us, which may absolve them. But, if we consider them in

connection with the idea to which the king of Portugal had devoted

himself, and which was so to speak incarnate in him, who will not find

excuses for such actions, especially if we consider the barbarous epoch,

the difficult situation of the country, and the real weakness of a

society separated from another which struggled to bring it to reunion?

The great need to which Alfonso I was bound to attend was to give

homogeneity and internal and external strength to the nation which was

being formed. For this purpose he was forced at the same time to seek

the favour of the church, the first element of strength in those days;

to favour the nobles, the chief nerve of the army, and finally to impart

the utmost degree of vigour to the municipal spirit without which, in our

opinion, popular spirit and keen love of country never have existed and

never will exist.

Besides this labour of internal organisation, he had to extend the limits

of the territory which he inherited, too narrow for the establishment

of an independent state. The fear of his name among the Mussulmans and

Christians and the daring of his troops were means to accomplish it.

Naturally warlike, two successive generations learned in his school the

hard business of war and succeeded in bequeathing to those to come the

glorious traditions of strength and patriotic love which the nation

guarded religiously for several centuries. However, before Alfonso I

could trust the independence of the country to the chances of war, it

was necessary to shield it while a frail plant, by political dexterity.

In some cases this gave rise to actions which considered summarily would

be condemned by severe morality. But view the picture in the proper

light, and the stains which before cast a shadow upon the noble and

haughty figure of the first Portuguese king will almost disappear, and

the sympathy which the Portuguese nation has in all ages shown for the

memory of the son of Count Henry will again appear estimable, for it has

its roots in a sentiment rarely found among nations--gratitude to those

to whom they are most indebted. This national affection went so far as to

attribute to Alfonso Henriques the halo of the saints, and urge that Rome

should bestow upon the fierce conqueror that crown which belongs to the

martyr’s resignation. But if a creed of peace and humility forbade Rome

to grant that crown, another religion likewise venerable, the religion

of patriotism, teaches us that when we pass the pale, worm-eaten portal

of the church of Santa Cruz we are about to pay homage to the ashes of

that man but for whom the Portuguese nation, and perhaps even the name of

Portugal, would not be in existence to-day.

REIGNS OF SANCHO I AND ALFONSO II

[Sidenote: [1185-1211 A.D.]]

The historical value of the twenty-six years’ reign of the son of Alfonso

I is perhaps no less than that of his own long term of government; but

the character of the two epochs differ as much as did the gifts and

characters of the two princes who presided over the political life of

each. Less able as a captain than his father, and without that superior

invention and daring which incited the founder of the monarchy to great

enterprises, Sancho I was far from winning equal renown as a conqueror,

but wasted the best years of his manhood in wars for the most part

useless and obscure.

Upon this point the two epochs admit of no comparison. Before the sword

of Alfonso, Saracen and Christian drew back dismayed, citadels and

castles opened their gates; the limits of the country were extended,

and the foundations of the existence of Portugal, cemented by torrents

of blood, were permanently laid in the west of Spain. After a conquest

Sancho always lost again, and for years carried on a sterile strife with

Leon; and if he recovered a part of the north and west of Alemtejo it

was because the Almohads, whose power was already on the decline, had

not sufficient forces to maintain the almost useless dominion of those

inhospitable deserts, and so abandoned them, while the Christians,

especially the military orders, gradually reclaimed them and built

castles and preceptories.

But if we turn our eyes from the frontiers and look upon the interior

of the country, the name of the second monarch appears no less glorious

than that of the first, and we see his reign as a complement of the

preceding reign. Fertilised by the ashes of the martyrs of the Gospel

and the _Koran_, turned and furrowed by the steel of combatants and the

whirl of battles, the land of Portugal received from the hands of Sancho

the seeds of greatness and royal strength in the councils which were

everywhere established; in the farms and villages which were founded

in the districts least subject to invasion and incursions; and in the

frontier castles which were crowned with bastions and provided with

military stores. In those days the courage which faces death was but a

trivial virtue. Without the grand idea which dominated all his conquests,

without the political skill and extraordinary military talent with which

he made up for the lack of strength and resources of the monarchy which

he founded, Alfonso I, in spite of his courage and energy, would rank no

higher than a fortunate knight.

Upon this point his son was not fortune’s favourite. However, he

revenged himself nobly, labouring to earn the title of the Povoador, or

city-builder, which he indeed deserved. History, so subject to the vulgar

error of rating the barren laurel crown above the fruitful olive branch,

has treated the last years of Sancho’s reign with scorn because therein

he endeavoured to substitute cities for deserts, cultivated fields for

waste lands, and life for death. He pursued this end with energy, and

his highest praise lies in the collection of documents which prove

his activity and which are perhaps but a small portion of those once

existing. This monarch sincerely followed the system which the internal

state of the nation demanded, and enabled his successors to be, if not

more valiant, at least more fortunate soldiers.

Such is the justice due to Sancho as king. As a man his moral character

was not relatively bad, it was vulgar; that is, he had the defects common

to princes and barons of the times; he was ignorant and credulous--for

science, according to the opinion of the age, was only fit for the

mean-spirited--irascible, and violent, because moderation is not learned

upon the battle-field, where his father educated him. Besides this he

seems to have been inclined to gallantry and the pleasures of the chase.

Certain facts of his life also cast upon him the suspicion of cupidity,

and of having gathered large sums into his treasury by means grievous

to his nation. Sancho himself asserts that the defenders of the state

often lacked necessaries, and yet he left in his will nearly _a million

maravedis_, almost all in gold coin, that is, more than _three million

cruzados_ of the actual currency--truly an incredible sum, if we consider

the rarity of precious metals at that time. Such riches presuppose

frequent rapine or a too violent system of taxation. Indeed it is proved

by a law of Alfonso II that the king as well as his barons obtained

the greatest necessaries of life at an incomparably inferior price, a

monstrous imposition which may give us some idea of the other exactions

of the treasury.

But the point in which the reign of Sancho has perhaps the highest

significance lies in the beginning of that varied and complex fact which

for three centuries constituted the principal feature of our Middle Ages.

We speak of the alliance of the king and councils against the privileged

classes, the clergy and the nobility. The first phases of the struggle

are not only the beginning but the epitome, or rather the symbol of the

whole. The burgesses of Oporto, attacking their bishop and lord with

the officers of the crown, confiscating his property, expelling him

covered with ignominy, and braving the anger of the powerful family of

Martinho Rodrigues, are a type of the resistance and ill will exhibited

by the municipality and the king towards the two high classes of the

state, until the monarchy gained a final and decisive victory. Sancho,

abandoning the citizens of Oporto, transferring, so to speak, his inert

strength of a dying man to the opposite camp, and even associating

himself with the clergy to assist in subduing the burgesses, gave a

deplorable example to his successors and stirred up the popular spirit

to future strife. In spite of this, history cannot condemn him, for

everything seems to indicate that the last months of his life were one

protracted agony; and if even in our own times, when religious feeling

has grown dim and weak, souls calling themselves strongly tempered

waver at the approach of death, and bow not only to the terrors of

religion but often even to the superstitious beliefs of infancy which

then importunately revive--how can we fail to excuse an ignorant

and credulous man, born in an inexorable age, for sacrificing both

political convenience and loyalty to the voice of a frequently legitimate

remorse?[j]

[Sidenote: [1211-1245 A.D.]]

Alfonso II “the Fat” had no sooner ascended the throne than he showed a

disposition to evade the execution of his father’s will. Not only did he

refuse to allow his brothers the money which had been bequeathed them,

but he insisted on the restitution of the fortresses which belonged to

his two sisters, the saints Theresa and Sancha; and on their refusal

to surrender them, he seized them by force. The infantas complained to

the pope and the king of Leon: the former ordered his legate to see

justice done to them; the latter, who still bore an affection towards his

divorced wife Theresa, interfered more effectually by way of arms. The

Leonese entered Portugal by way of Badajoz, reduced several fortresses,

and spread devastations around them. In the sequel, Alfonso of Portugal,

at the command of the pope and doubtless through fear of the Leonese,

consented to treat with his sisters.

The transactions of Alfonso with the Mohammedans were not so remarkable

as those of his predecessors--a circumstance that must be attributed not

to his want of military spirit but to his excessive corpulency, which

rendered the fatigues of the field intolerable. Though he sent a handful

of troops to aid in the triumphs of Las Navas de Tolosa, he did not take

the field in person against the enemies of his faith, until 1217 when the

arrival in his ports of another crusading armament, which promised to

co-operate in his designs, roused him to the reduction of Alcacer-do-Sal,

a place that still remained in the power of the misbelievers. It held out

till the end of September. The Mohammedans who had remained in Alemtejo,

and were pressing the siege of several fortresses, were compelled to

retire.

During the last three years of his reign, Alfonso had new disputes

with the church. He appears to have borne little respect for the

ecclesiastical immunities, some of which were, indeed, inconsistent with

the interests of the community. Alfonso insisted on churchmen heading

their own vassals in the wars he undertook, and such as refused were

compelled to go. For such violence there was no excuse; but in subjecting

the ecclesiastical possessions to the same contributions as were levied

on the property of the laymen, and churchmen themselves to the secular

tribunals, he attempted a salutary innovation on the established system

of the clerical exemptions. The archbishop of Braga, like the English

Becket of the preceding century, remonstrated with the king; and when

remonstrances were ineffectual, hurled at the head of his abettors the

thunders of the church. In return he was deprived of his revenues, and

compelled to consult his present safety by flight. He complained to the

pope: Honorius III ordered three Castilian bishops to insist on ample

reparation, to excommunicate the king, and impose an interdict on the

nation. The afflicted people now endeavoured to effect a reconciliation

between the king and the archbishop: the former promised to make

satisfaction, and in future to respect the privileges of the church; he

was accordingly absolved, and the interdict removed, but before he could

fulfil his share of the compact he was surprised by death (1223).

Sancho II, having reluctantly promised to respect the immunities of the

church, prepared to extend the boundary of his dominions at the expense

of the Mohammedans. He recovered the important town of Elvas, which had

been regained by the Moors: next Jarumeñha and Serpa yielded to his arms.

He now carried the war into Algarve. He appears to have left the enemy no

fortified places in Alemtejo; the frontier fortresses of that province,

thus rescued from the infidels, he intrusted to the defence of the order

of Santiago, who triumphed in several partial engagements. The frontier

places continued for some years to change masters, according as either of

the hostile powers prevailed.

In his domestic administration, Dom Sancho was doomed to be far

less fortunate. From his infancy he appears to have been of a weak

constitution, and of a still weaker mind; but if he was weak, we have no

proof that he was vicious, though great disasters afflicted his kingdom,

and the historians of his country have stigmatised his memory. His

hostility to the immunities of the clergy appears to have been the first

and chief cause of his unpopularity.[h]

SANCHO II CALLED CAPELLO, “THE HOODED”

The account of the state of the kingdom which served as a foundation

for the acts which afterwards emanated from the Roman curia affirmed

that the king in spite of his former promises showed on the one hand

pertinacity in the perpetration of violence, and on the other the most

inexcusable tolerance towards criminals, and neither amended himself

nor restrained his subjects; that robbers, highwaymen, incendiaries,

sacrilegists, and murderers swarmed everywhere, robbing and killing

clergy and laity without distinction, and living secure of impunity. That

through this contagious example of the impotence of the laws, barons and

knights, nobles and plebeians made general practice of those acts which

the church by the most severe comminations had endeavoured to restrain.

That certain patrons of parishes and monasteries, and others falsely

giving themselves out as such, accompanied by illegitimate children,

wasted the property of the said parishes and monasteries without pity,

reducing them to such misery that the very ministers of worship could not

maintain themselves; so that in some there was even no one to perform the

indispensable services, and in others the cloisters, refectories, and

other offices were converted into stables and brothels for the lowest of

men, and it might almost be said that divine worship had ceased there

and the property of these holy places was given over to dilapidation

and plunder. That at the same time Sancho allowed the castles, towns,

and revenues of the crown to be destroyed and squandered, and suffered

the increase of assassinations without any distinction whatever of the

class, age, or sex of the victims; as well as robbery, incest, the rape

of nuns and secular women, grievous oppression of labourers, priests,

and merchants, with the purpose of extorting money from them; violation

of temples and cemeteries, incendiarism, and breaches of truce. That

Sancho was aware of all this and yet tolerated it, and through neglect of

punishment facilitated the perpetration of further crimes; that finally,

by abandoning the defence of the frontiers, he, the king of Portugal,

allowed the Saracens to occupy the lands and lordships of the Christians.

“We,” added the prelates, “have used our utmost endeavours to move the

prince to devote himself with due ardour to the repression of such

evils; but he closes his ears to our admonitions, which have so far been

entirely vain.”

If the reader will reflect upon this last invective of the clergy against

Sancho, he will recognise with what good reason we attribute to the long

wars of this reign an immense influence upon the strife with the clergy,

and see in these repeated enterprises against the infidel an idea, or

maybe a political instinct, of the monarchy which drew strength from

them for the eternal duel with the priesthood. As far as documents throw

light upon the last conquests in Algarve, the accusation that Sancho in

a cowardly manner abandoned the defence of the frontier and allowed

the Mussulman arms to encroach upon the territory of the kingdom was a

calumny.

[Sidenote: [1237-1245 A.D.]]

But the heads of the clergy did not hesitate to adopt such means, for it

was necessary to destroy the reputation of a conqueror of the enemies of

the cross which the king of Portugal must still have enjoyed in the Roman

curia, where the solemn testimonies of praise lavished upon him more

than once by Gregory IX could not be yet forgotten. It was necessary to

snatch the crown from the soldier’s helm and place it on a dishonoured

brow, that they might afterwards roll it in the dust before the priestly

sandal. But up to a certain point Sancho offered a pretext for such

calumny by the fatal repose of the preceding years, and perhaps some

obscure event, the loss of some unimportant tower or grange of Ayamonte

in the east or Tavira in the west, a loss exaggerated by ecclesiastical

malice, gave the absurd assertion some appearance of truth.

The description of the state of Portugal, drawn up by the Roman curia,

although exaggerated, was based on facts proved by various documents

and memoirs of that time, and above all by the inquisitions of the

following reign. But these very inquisitions prove that the members of

the secular clergy and monastic orders were not innocent of the public

evils, especially as regards robbery and the diminution of the patrimony

of the crown. They complained of the contempt in which canonical censure

was held, but the fault was theirs. The spiritual sword was blunted

by excessive use; excommunication, interdict, denial of burial in

consecrated ground accompanied all the pretensions of the ministers of

the altar, even those which the rudest of men could plainly perceive

to be dictated by shameful cupidity. It is not surprising, therefore,

that the nobles as well as the burgesses and peasants laughed at the

chastisement which the clergy themselves taught them to despise. It was

this contrast which throughout all Europe wounded the most enlightened

men and gradually undermined the foundations and political influence

of the church. The representation of the prelates was therefore doubly

disloyal, attributing to the king alone the evils of which they were no

less guilty, and describing the crimes and excesses of the laity towards

the clergy, but forgetting to mention the abuse of divine things and the

cupidity and lawlessness of the clergy.

The truth is, however, that this new phase of the interminable conflict

between the clergy and the civil power did not arise from the cause

assigned, but from the conjunction of circumstances which gave the

bishops the means of gaining a decisive victory over the crown. The idea

of deposing a king through the initiative of the church was old, and was

considered so feasible that in grave cases the popes did not hesitate

to allude to it clearly in their comminations and threats. In Portugal

especially, as a kingdom in a manner dependent upon the papal throne,

such a course must have seemed even easier, as the king was without moral

or material means of defence.[j]

SANCHO DEPOSED, ALFONSO III SUCCEEDS (1245 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1245-1253 A.D.]]

Censures were passed on the monarch for his persecution of the dean

of Lisbon. His subsequent repentance disarmed the pontiff; and,

notwithstanding the complaints of the people that the laws were silent,

and brute force only triumphed, he would doubtless have ended his reign

in peace, had he not resumed or permitted the spoliation of the church.

At length, both clergy and people united their murmurs; they perceived

that the king was too feeble to repress the daily feuds of his barons,

who broke out into open war and committed the greatest excesses. They

applied to Innocent IV, who, in concert with the fathers of the council,

issued a decree by which, though the royal title was left to Sancho, the

administration was declared to be vested in the infante Alfonso, brother

of the king.

No sooner did Alfonso hear of the extraordinary proceedings of the

pope and council, than he prepared to vindicate the title which it had

conferred upon him. He was then at Boulogne-sur-Mer, the lordship of

which belonged to him in the right of his wife Matilda. Having sworn

before the papal commissioners to administer Portugal with justice, and

leaving the government of Boulogne in the hands of his countess, he

embarked at that port, and safely landed at Lisbon. At first the king

intended to oppose the infante; but seeing how generally the deputies

owned him,--how all classes, nobles and citizens, prelates and peasants,

joined his brother,--he retreated into Spain, to solicit the support of

his cousin, Ferdinand III. As that saintly monarch was too busy in the

Andalusian wars to assist the fugitive king in person, he recommended

the interests of his guest to his son Alfonso. The Castilian infante

showed no want of zeal in behalf of his relative. He collected a

considerable army, and invaded Portugal. Arriving before Leiria without

much opposition, he was preparing to storm that fortress, when he was

visited by a deputation from the archbishop of Braga, which conjured him,

as a true son of the church, not to incur excommunication by opposing the

execution of the pontifical bulls. The Castilian infante listened, and

obeyed: he led back his army; and the deposed monarch, now bereft of all

hope, retired to Toledo, where, early in 1248, he ended his days. So long

as the latter lived, some of the fortified places in Portugal refused

to acknowledge the regent; but on his death without issue--there is no

evidence that he was ever married--his brother was peaceably acknowledged

as his successor.

[Sidenote: [1253-1279 A.D.]]

Alfonso III, on arriving at a height which, a few years before, his

ambition could scarcely have reached, was not without apprehensions that

the Castilian king or infante might trouble him in his usurpation, and

assembled the three estates of his realm to deliberate on the means of

defence. Fortunately for his ambition, both father and son were absorbed

by their Andalusian conquests. To secure, if possible, the good will of

the former, he sent a considerable aid to the Christian camp, which was

readily received by the hero. In the meantime he himself resolved to

profit by the reverses of the misbelievers, and finish the conquest of

Algarve. At the head of a sufficient force, he accordingly penetrated

into that province, and speedily recovered the places which the

Mohammedans had again surprised. In a subsequent expedition, his ardour

or avarice led him to encroach on the possessions of Alfonso el Sabio,

Ferdinand’s successor. The Castilian army marched against the Portuguese,

who were compelled to retreat. The Castilian king did not stop here.

On the pretext that Algarve, as chiefly conquered by his subjects,

the knights of Santiago, belonged to him, he invaded that province,

and quickly reduced its chief fortresses. The Portuguese was glad to

sue for an accommodation; and it was at length agreed that he should

marry Doña Beatrice de Guzman, a natural daughter of the Castilian, and

with her receive the sovereignty of Algarve. As the province had been

conquered by the subjects of both crowns, equity would have indicated

its division by the two monarchs; but as such a division would probably

have led to future wars, the present arrangement might be a politic one.

The Castilian appears to have reserved to himself the sovereignty of

Algarve, his feudatory being required both to pay tribute and to furnish

a certain number of forces whenever he should be at war. The cession,

with whatever conditions it was accompanied, was disagreeable to the

Castilians, who thought that their monarch had sacrificed the interests

of the state in favour of his daughter. The marriage was solemnised in

the following year (in 1254), and a few years afterwards Portugal was

declared forever free from homage to the Castilian kings.

From the facility with which this matrimonial connection was formed,

it would be inferred that the Portuguese was become a widower. But

the countess Matilda still lived, and was anxious to return to her

lord. Her only defects were her barrenness and her age--two which,

though no canonist would recognise, were sufficient in the mind of so

unscrupulous a prince as Alfonso. She sailed for Portugal. He refused

to see her; and when at length she forced her way into his presence, he

heard, unmoved, her entreaties, her expostulations, and threats. The

queen (for such history must call her) retired to Boulogne, and laid

her complaints before the pope and her liege superior, St. Louis. After

a patient examination of the case, Alexander IV expedited a bull, by

which he declared Matilda the lawful wife of Alfonso, and annulled the

recent marriage with Doña Beatrice. The king persevered in his lust,

as he had already done in his usurpation, even when excommunicated by

the pope; and he and his household were interdicted from the offices

of the church. A second time is she said to have visited Portugal, but

with as little success. She had married him when poor--when almost an

exile from his native court--and had thereby raised him to power and

riches: and her unshaken attachment--unshaken even by his sickening

ingratitude--proves that though the empire of the passions had ceased,

she possessed an uncommon share of woman’s best feeling. Her last act,

by which she bequeathed a considerable sum to this faithless deserter,

was characteristic enough of her ruling misfortune. On her death, in

1262, his prelates obtained from the pope a bull to render legitimate the

present marriage.[h]

POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF ALFONSO’S REIGN

Alfonso determined to bridle the power of the bishops, in spite of his

oath at Paris. Perceiving that this could only be done with the help of

the mass of the people, he summoned a cortes at Leiria in 1254, to which

representatives of the cities were elected and sat with the nobles and

higher clergy. With the help of the cortes--one of great importance in

the constitutional history of Portugal--he dared the interdict laid upon

the kingdom for having married again (the daughter of Alfonso el Sabio)

whilst his first wife (Matilda, countess of Boulogne) was alive. Finally,

however, on the petition of the archbishops and bishops of Portugal,

Pope Urban IV legalised the disputed marriage in 1262 and legitimated

his eldest son, Dom Diniz, while in 1263, Alfonso X made over to him the

full sovereignty of Algarve. On the other hand, the people made use of

their power, and in a full cortes at Coimbra in 1261 the representatives

of the cities boldly denounced Alfonso’s tampering with the coinage,

and compelled recognition of the fact that taxes were not levied by the

inherent right of the king but the free consent of the people. After

a prosperous and successful reign Nemesis came upon Alfonso in the

rebellion of his eldest son Diniz[140] in 1277, which continued until

1279, in which year the king died.

The period of war and of territorial extension in the peninsula was now

over, and the period of civilisation was to dawn. Territorially and

constitutionally Portugal was now an established kingdom; it remained for

it to become civilised and thoroughly homogeneous before the great heroic

period of exploration and Asiatic conquest should begin.

DOM DINIZ

[Sidenote: [1279-1325 A.D.]]

No better man for such work than the new king, Dom Diniz, could have

been found; he was himself a poet and loved letters; he was a great

administrator and loved justice; above all he saw the need of agriculture

and the arts of peace to take the place of incessant wars, and nobly

earned the title of the _Ré Lavrador_, or Diniz the Labourer. From all

these points of view his reign is of vast importance in the history

of Portugal, though, like all reigns of peaceful progress, it is not

signalised by many striking events. It began with a civil war between

Diniz and his brother Alfonso, who disputed his legitimacy, which ended

in a compromise; and in 1281 Diniz married Isabella, daughter of Pedro

III of Aragon, who for her pure and unselfish life was canonised in

the sixteenth century. His reign is marked by only one war with Sancho

IV and his successor, Ferdinand IV, of Castile and Leon, which was

terminated in 1297 by a treaty of alliance, according to the terms of

which Ferdinand IV married Constanza, daughter of Diniz, while Alfonso,

the heir to the throne of Portugal, married Beatrice of Castile, sister

of Ferdinand. At the end of this reign war broke out between the king and

the heir-apparent, and a pitched battle was only prevented in 1323 by St.

Isabella riding between the armies and making a peace between her husband

and her son, which lasted until the death of the great peace-monarch, the

_Ré Lavrador_, in 1325.[c]

Treachery and abuse of power were so frequent that, notwithstanding

various diplomatic disloyalties, Diniz was considered one of the most

loyal and just princes and lords of the two kingdoms. For this reason the

two great kingdoms of Aragon and Castile appointed him arbitrator in the

most serious disputes, and submitted to his judgment. Although the genius

of war did not weave martial crowns for him, as conqueror in battles--for

during his time no great honours fell to the Portuguese arms--yet he was

ever at the head of the national armies in all the campaigns; knowing

that his most powerful allies had been destroyed and others had betrayed

him, he had the skilful audacity to penetrate forty leagues into the

interior of Castile, and availing himself of the opportunity afforded

by his opponents’ weakness, he increased the Portuguese dominion by two

castles and eleven important towns, as though he were the most successful

of warriors. The civil dissensions which disturbed his reign both arose

from the same causes and circumstances, mediæval feudalism, assisted by

Castilian elements. Taking for leaders first the brother and then the

son of Diniz, the rebels combatted royal power in the kingdom, which,

supported by the people, daily increased feudal privileges and forces.

The husband of Isabella was as rapid and successful in his measures

against his brother as he was undecided and weak in repressing his

son. In the first instance his courage was heightened by the just

ambition of safe-guarding his throne; whereas, in the second instance,

it was weakened by paternal affection and respect of legitimacy in the

succession of the crown.

However, the principal glory of Diniz was not won with his sword. Of

his epoch a perfect king, penetrated by his country’s needs, he notably

increased the territory of Alfonso Henriques, but above all he raised to

an amazing height the edifice of internal organisation, the foundations

of which had been laid by Sancho I. His disloyalties with respect to the

neighbouring kingdoms, his rare moments of repressive cruelty, the errors

into which he may have fallen as a politician, the many faults into which

he was in truth led by an ardent and sensual character--Diniz redeemed

them all by the general and profound reform he effected with regard to

Portuguese society.

He raised the population of the country, as none of his predecessors

had done, by the means we have spoken of; he brought agriculture to a

pitch of prosperity which we now marvel at; he created the internal

industry and commerce, promoted municipal organisation, favouring labour,

encouraging markets, and raising the spirit of the people; he safeguarded

navigation by establishing vast societies of mutual aid between

merchants, and definitely established a navy, with which he defended

the coasts and the Portuguese merchant ships against pirates, and

equipped his subjects for the discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth

centuries, which brought universal and eternal fame upon Portugal. He

built nearly fifty fortresses, reorganised the popular militia, and

nationalising the military orders with praiseworthy abnegation, he widely

prepared the defence of the country, and bequeathed to Dom João I the

possibility of opposing a formidable invasion by Castile and establishing

once for all, with immortal glory, the independence of the country.

He was a zealous administrator, wise and economic, so that with the

national resources he left the public treasury wealthy. Of a tolerant

spirit, prudent and just in the application of the laws, no prince of his

own times surpassed him in these qualities, then most rare. With gentle

measures, affectionately and frequently protecting individual rights, he

was one of the most determined opponents of the excessive privileges of

the nobility and the church. Having received civil power, bound beneath

the yoke of the Portuguese clergy, in their turn fettered to the Roman

tiara, Diniz not only raised this power, but even succeeded in giving

life to the national episcopacy.

The establishment of the councils begun by previous governments largely

progressed, and the cortes, continuing to summon the deputies of the

people, was a new and powerful aid towards the destruction of mediæval,

ecclesiastical, and military feudalism in Portugal. With the laws

respecting mortmain decreed and executed with civic firmness and superior

wisdom, the clergy were deprived of territorial power and the sovereign

right of administering justice; civil actions were brought before secular

tribunes, which by a usurpation of jurisdiction had up to that time been

brought before ecclesiastical tribunals.

The nobles were prohibited from raising new seigniorial castles, and

many of the old were levelled; they were deprived of their traditional

rights of deciding mutual disputes with the sword, of making knights, of

exempting themselves from the royal tax, turning into fiefs and boroughs

the lands they had seized without just cause, and even those with which

they had established merely personal relations, and finally by giving

judgment in causes in which the nobles claimed for themselves exclusive

knowledge, the feudal nobility was totally destroyed, as was the temporal

power of the church. Up to then the beneficial influence of the times

sufficed to totally undermine the old oligarchic institutions of the

Middle Ages, which were an overwhelming oppression of the people, and

absorbed the forces of the state.

[Sidenote: [1300-1340 A.D.]]

Finally Diniz, who was the greatest poet of the first four centuries of

Portugal, founded to his honour the Estudaria de Santo Eloy in Lisbon,

and also the university, causing general enthusiasm; and by spreading the

love of letters and study in the country, laid the foundations of secular

and public instruction and opened to the Portuguese people the gates of

science, and consequently those of civilisation and liberty.

After the work of Alfonso Henriques, that of Diniz is the most important

which Portuguese history records to us: the first was the founder of

the military nation; the second, that of the cultured people. The union

of those two works gave to Portugal centuries later the possibility of

realising, in the long evolution of mankind, her glorious mission of

enlarging the known world.[k]

Alfonso IV, surnamed the Brave, had scarcely grasped the reins of

sovereignty, when he exhibited, in a manner little becoming royalty,

his vindictive feelings towards his illegitimate brother, Alfonso

Henriques, who, to escape his wrath, had just fled into Castile. Having

collected some troops, and been joined by a prince of Castile, he entered

Portugal, laid waste the frontiers, and put to the sword every living

being that fell in his way. The king now took the field in person, and

laid waste the neighbouring territories of Castile. These harassing

though indecisive hostilities might have continued for years, had not

St. Isabella left her retreat in the convent of St. Clair, which she had

founded, and prevailed on her son to permit the return of the exile.

Another defect of the new king gave great offence to the people--his

neglect of public business, and his addiction to the chase. The first

twelve years of Alfonso’s reign were distracted by hostilities with

his namesake of Castile, the husband of his daughter. Though these

hostilities were chiefly owing to the perversity of the infante Don

Juan Manuel, it cannot be denied that the Portuguese king had abundant

reason for dissatisfaction with his son-in-law. The usage experienced by

the Castilian queen at the hands of her husband; her mortification at

seeing a mistress, Leonora de Guzman, not only preferred to herself, but

the sole depository of the royal favour; the studied insults to which

she was daily exposed both from her husband and his minion, at length

exhausted her patience, and drew forth some complaints to her father. The

influence, too, which Don Juan Manuel obtained in the Portuguese court

through the marriage of his repudiated daughter Constanza with Pedro, son

and heir of the Portuguese king, was uniformly exerted to embroil the two

crowns. Alfonso of Portugal at length sent a herald at arms to defy his

son-in-law, on the ground both of the unjust treatment of the queen, whom

her husband was suspected of seeking to repudiate, and of the continued

detention of Constanza. His next step was to enter Castile and ravage the

country as far as the vicinity of Seville.

The war was now as destructive as it was indecisive and even inglorious:

it was one of mutual ravage, of shameless rapine, and unblushing cruelty.

Instead of meeting each other on a fair field, they seemed intent on

nothing but laying waste each other’s territory, and collecting as much

booty as they could carry away: sometimes, however, the contest was

decided on the deep, but with little success to either party. At length,

through the efforts of the pope, the two princes agreed to a truce, and

to the opening of negotiations for peace. But one of the conditions

was the removal of Leonora de Guzman--a condition which Alfonso of

Castile, who was entirely governed by that lady, was in no disposition

to execute, but the preparations of the Mohammedans, which he knew were

chiefly directed against himself, and the loud complaints of his own

subjects, forced him to promise at least that it should be conceded.

To the departure of Constanza, the restitution of some insignificant

fortresses which had been reduced, and even to the return of his queen,

the Castilian felt no repugnance; but though he consented for Leonora

to leave the court, he recalled her immediately after the conclusion of

peace. To his queen, however, he no longer exhibited a marked neglect:

on the contrary, he treated her with all the outward respect due to her

character and station; and the good understanding was confirmed by her

admirable moderation.

In the wars which the Castilian had to sustain against the Mohammedans,

the Portuguese--so nobly did he forget his wrongs when the interests of

Christendom were at stake--was no inefficient ally. He was present at the

great battle on the banks of the Salado, in which the barbaric power was

so signally humbled. This aid he continued readily to supply, until the

death of Alfonso of Castile, by the plague, before Gibraltar, in 1350.

THE ROMANCE OF IÑES DE CASTRO

[Sidenote: [1340-1357 A.D.]]

The tragedies represented in Castile by Pedro the Cruel, successor of

Alfonso XI, were fully equalled by one in Portugal. Soon after his

marriage with Constanza, Pedro, the infante of Portugal, had become

passionately smitten with one of her attendants, Doña Iñes de Castro, a

lady of surpassing beauty, and frail as beautiful. That he made love to

her, and that his criminal suit was favourably received, is indubitable,

both from the deep grief which preyed on the spirits of Constanza, and

from the anxiety of the king, lest this new favourite should be the

cause of the same disturbance in Portugal, as Leonora de Guzman had

occasioned in Castile. To prevent the possibility of a marriage between

the two lovers, Alfonso caused Iñes to hold over the baptismal font a

child of Pedro’s--in other words, to contract a near spiritual affinity.

But the man whom the sacred bond of wedlock could not restrain was

not likely to be deterred from his purpose by an imaginary bar. After

Constanza’s death in childbed, 1345, he privately married the seductive

favourite. How soon after the death of the first wife this second union

was contracted, whether immediately, or after Iñes had borne him three

children, has been matter of much dispute. It appears that the marriage

was celebrated on the 1st day of January, 1354, when Iñes must have

borne him four children, of which three survived. It also appears that

a papal dispensation was obtained for it, and that it took place at

Braganza, in presence of a Portuguese prelate and his own chamberlain.

However secret this step, it was suspected by some courtiers, who, partly

through envy at the rising favour of the Castros, and partly through

dread of the consequences which might ensue, endeavoured to prevail on

the king to interfere in behalf of young Ferdinand, the son of Pedro

and Constanza, and the lawful heir to the monarchy. From the boundless

influence possessed over the mind of Pedro by Doña Iñes, it was feared

that the true heir would be set aside from the succession in favour of

her offspring. In the end, they wrung from him a reluctant consent to her

death. The king, hearing that his son had departed on a hunting excursion

for a few days, hastily left Monte-mor, and proceeded to the convent of

St. Clair, at Coimbra, where Iñes then was. On learning his approach, she

at once apprehended his object. Her only resource was an appeal to his

pity. Taking her three children by the hand, she issued from the convent

to meet him, prostrated herself at his feet, and in the most pathetic

terms begged for mercy. Her beauty, her youth, her deep emotion, and

the sight of her offspring--his own grandchildren--so affected him that,

after a struggle between policy and nature, the latter triumphed, and

he retired. No sooner, however, was he in private with his confidants,

than they censured his compassion, though natural in itself, as ruinous

in its consequences to his family and kingdom, and obtaining his consent

hastened to the convent. The unfortunate, guilty Iñes fell beneath their

daggers. The fate of this lady has called forth the deepest commiseration

of novelists and poets, and has given rise to some vigorous effusions of

the tragic muse.

When Pedro returned from the chase, and found his wife so barbarously

murdered, his grief was surpassed, if possible, by his thirst for

revenge. He leagued himself with the kindred of Iñes; and though he

could not fall on the murderers, who were protected by the king, he laid

waste the provinces of Entre-Douro-e-Minho, and Tras-os-Montes, where

their possessions chiefly lay. King Alfonso was in consternation at the

unexpected fury of his son. In the end he proposed, as the price of

reconciliation, that the obnoxious nobles should be banished, and his

son admitted to the chief share of the administration. Pedro accepted

it, laid down his arms, and proceeded to court where he was received

with an affection truly paternal, and where he engaged, though with a

fixed resolution of breaking the engagement, never to seek revenge on the

assassins of Doña Iñes.

Alfonso did not long survive this forced reconciliation with his son.

His death, which happened at the beginning of 1357, is said to have

been hastened by remorse for the tragical deed of which he had been

the occasion. That he exhibited great repentance is certain; but his

character was unamiable. He had been a disobedient son, an unjust

brother, and a harsh father. The rebellion of his son was but fit

retribution for his own conduct to the royal Diniz. His justice too often

degenerated into blind vengeance. During his reign (in 1348) Portugal

was afflicted with the plague, which spread throughout most of Europe,

but which raged with more violence in that kingdom than anywhere else.

Whole towns are said to have been left desolate, and some priests to have

abandoned their flocks to the care of the monks.[h]

If we consider Alfonso IV--not isolated, nor in the light of our

present-day views and social conditions as a son or as a father (even in

this character we can bring forward the virtuous and exemplary spouse),

but principally as leader and as king, in the moment when he assumed

and exercised his power--we must confess, in face of the numerous

documents relating to his external policy and his enormous legislation,

that he is one of the most important figures, and that his government

was one of the most advantageous, the most brilliant, and the most able

of the intelligent and energetic governments which presided over the

national formation of Portugal. In the character of this king there is

a certain harmonious stamp of austerity which gives him a decided and

characteristic originality in the midst of the free customs, and, we

may say, of the traditional moral license of the kings of his time. Dom

Diniz, the father of King Alfonso IV, in spite of the perfect devotion of

his wife, was the easy prey of adulterous loves, and far from disguising

them, flagrantly and heedlessly published them by the generosity of his

gifts, calling to himself his bastard children and lavishing favours upon

them, and confessing even by public documents the rewards conferred on

his mistresses.

As to Dom Pedro, the Romeo of Iñes de Castro, we know that he was not

so absorbed by this fatal passion but that the nation’s history owes

to him the bastard progenitor of the second dynasty. In this instance

Dom Alfonso presents a totally distinct character from that of his son;

an exemplary husband, he made every effort to raise by royal authority

the moral tone in the relation between the sexes, and to check the

dissolute customs of the times. He made severe laws against those who

availed themselves of such usages and customs up to that time in vogue,

which seduced by endearments, or other means, various virgins and widows

leading honest lives to make use of them for their evil purposes; he

denounced “any man or woman guilty of panderage, and keeping in their

houses for this purpose virgins, married women, religious, or widows.”

At the exact moment that he was publishing some of his most severe laws

upon this matter his son gave cause of scandal by his real or apparent

cohabitation with Doña Iñes de Castro. Finally he left the kingdom to his

successor in perfect internal and external peace, and it would be cruel

injustice to deny that under his government the work of the political

consolidation of Portuguese society made important progress.[k]

PEDRO THE SEVERE

[Sidenote: [1357-1361 A.D.]]