of daylight, when the Medical Staff went forth to do their melancholy
duty. All were armed with lanterns, which, shining like pale glow-worms,
made the dense gloom around more impenetrable still. Yet, groping and
shivering through the black horror of the night, they patiently pursued
their ghastly task with zeal that was truly magnificent. Dead, dying,
wounded, were dotted all over the veldt. There, bearded old Boers, boys,
Britons in their prime, were indiscriminately counted, collected,
tended, the Field Hospital men and Indian stretcher-bearers working
incessantly and ungrudgingly till dawn. Gruesome and heart-rending were
the sights and scenes around the camp-fires when such wounded as could
crawl dragged themselves towards their comrades. Pitiable the faces of
the survivors as news came in of gallant hearts that had ceased to beat.
A pathetic incident was witnessed in the grey gloom of the small hours.
One of the bearers chanced on an ancient hoary-headed Boer, who was
lying behind a rock supporting himself on his elbows. The bearer
approached warily, as many of the enemy were known to have turned on
those who went to their succour. This man, however, was too weak from
loss of blood to attempt to raise his rifle. Between his dying gasps he
begged a favour--would some one find his son, a boy of thirteen, who had
been fighting by his side when he fell. The request was obeyed. The
little lad, stone-dead, was discovered. He was placed in the failing
arms of his father. The unhappy old fellow clasped the clay-cold form,
and hugged it despairingly to himself, and then, merciful Providence
pitied him in his misery--his stricken spirit went out to join his son.
An officer who was wounded, and who spent the night in the terrible
scene, thus described his own awful experiences: "I lay where I fell for
about three-quarters of an hour, when a doctor came and put a
field-dressing on my wound, gave me some brandy, put my helmet under my
head as a pillow, covered me with a Boer blanket which he had taken from
a dead man, and then went to look after some other poor beggar. I shall
never forget the horrors of that night as long as I live. In addition to
the agony which my wound gave me, I had two sharp stones running into my
back; I was soaked to the skin and bitterly cold, but had an awful
thirst; the torrents of rain never stopped. On one side of me was a
Gordon Highlander in raving delirium, and on the other a Boer who had
his leg shattered by a shell, and who gave vent to the most
heart-rending cries and groans. War is a funny game, and no one can
realise what its grim horrors are till they see it in all its barbarous
reality. I lay out in the rain the whole of the night, and at daybreak
was put into a doolie by a doctor, and some natives carried me down to
the station. The ground was awfully rough, and they dropped me twice; I
fainted both times. I was sent down to Ladysmith in the hospital train;
from the station I was conveyed to the chapel (officers' hospital) in a
bullock-cart, the jolting of which made me faint again. I was the last
officer taken in. I was then put to bed, and my wound was dressed just
seventeen hours after I was hit. They then gave me some beef-tea, which
was the first food I had had for twenty-seven hours."
The amazing spirit of chivalry that animated all classes, general
officers, medical officers, chaplains, and even stretcher-bearers, in
this campaign has been the subject of much comment. It was thought that
modernity had rendered effete some of the sons of Great Britain, and the
war, if it should have done no other good, has served to prove that
times may have changed, but not the tough and dauntless character of the
men who have made the Empire what it is.
The following, from a Congregational minister of Durban, who had
volunteered to go to the front as honorary chaplain to the Natal Mounted
Rifles, in which corps many of his congregation enrolled, is of immense
interest. It gives us an insight into the inner core of valour--the
valour of those who, unarmed, share the dangers without the
intoxications of the fight. It runs:--
"The Lancers, who were mistaken by the Boers in the growing
darkness for a body of their own men, fell upon them and turned
a rout into a wild flight. Commander Schiel was very furious at
losing the battle, and said he would like to kill every man,
woman, and child in Natal. In this he was the exception to the
rule, for the captives whom we liberated said the Boers had
treated them with great kindness. After the battle Dr.
Bonnybrook and I spent the night on the field of battle, and
also followed the retreating Boers for a distance of six or
seven miles, searching for and tending the wounded and dying.
In the early hours of the morning we came to a Boer
field-hospital, and shouting out, 'Doctor and Predicant,' we
entered and rested, and slept there awhile. By daybreak we were
out again. About six miles from camp Dr. Bonnybrook rode up to
twenty-five mounted and armed Boers, and told them they were
his prisoners. Ordering two to take the weapons of their
comrades, he marched them into camp prisoners. For an unarmed
man to accomplish alone, this was an exceedingly brave thing to
do. After the battle one of the captured held up his gun and
said, 'Look through this. I have not fired a shot. I am a
Britisher. They forced me to come.'"
Among other heroes of Elandslaagte was Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the
Gordon Highlanders. This young officer, one of the "Dargai boys," helped
the charge in an endeavour to embarrass the Boer flank. Supported by a
party of Gordons, so runs the narrative, Meiklejohn waved his sword and
cried out to his party hastily gathered round him. But the Boer ranks
were alert, and poured in a deadly fire on the gallant band. Lieutenant
Meiklejohn received three bullets through his upper right arm, one
through the right forearm, a finger blown away, a bullet through the
left thigh, two bullets through the helmet, a "snick" in the neck, while
his sword and scabbard were literally shot to pieces. He has by now lost
his right arm, but, happily, being left-handed, it is hoped he may
remain in the profession he is so well calculated to adorn.
A private soldier in the 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders recounted an
extraordinary personal experience. He said:--
"We, the Devons, Imperial Light Horse, and others, had a fight
at Elandslaagte with the Boers, and I never enjoyed myself so
much before. You first have to get christened to fire, and then
you think nothing of the shells bursting about you, and the
bullets which go whistling past like bees. We went forward by
fifty-yard rushes, and at every rush you could hear a groan,
and down would go one of our comrades, either killed or
wounded, poor chap. When we were miles from the enemy they
opened fire on us with shell, and as we were going along in
mass, one of the shells burst on the left of the company, and
one of our men of my section--Bobby Hall--got shot dead with a
piece of the shell going straight through his head. That was
what made more than one wish to turn and run. But what would
Britain do if her soldiers ran from the enemy? At last we got
to where we could get a shot at the Boers with our rifles, and
you may bet we gave them more than one, as perhaps the papers
have told you. I got through the rifle-fire down to the bayonet
charge on the hillside, when I felt a sting in the left arm,
and looking down, found I was shot in the wrist. In changing my
position I got shot in the centre of the forehead. The bullet
did not go straight through. It glanced off my nose-bone, and
came out above my right temple.... On looking round, I was just
in time to see the blood squirt from the first wound. I shifted
my position in quick time, for I did not want another from the
same rifle. I lay still after doing this for a while, when the
thought came to me to get my wrist bandaged and try to shoot
again. On changing my position I got a bullet right in the
'napper.' I was out of action then, for all was dark. I heard
the officer I was going to get the bandages from say, 'Poor
chap! he's gone.' But no, I am still kicking."
THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE
Owing to the Boers having posted their 15-centimetre gun on the Impati
for the purpose of shelling the camp and town, the troops and
inhabitants removed to a position some three miles south of Dundee
village. The movement was fraught with many discomforts. Rain fell in
torrents, making the roads a mass of slush and enveloping everything in
a thick mist, while provisions, which had been hastily gathered
together, were scarce. On the following day, Sunday, an attempt was made
to return to camp, but the Boer firing continued so active that the
project had to be abandoned. Thereupon, on Sunday night the whole
column, having first loaded four days' supplies from their old camp and
set there lighted candles sufficient to cause such an illumination as
would suggest to the Boers an idea of occupation, quietly stole away. No
one exactly knew their destination. At nine of the clock the Army
Service Corps waggons moved to the camp, were loaded, and by midnight
commenced rumbling along in the damp obscurity. The advance column,
after passing through Dundee, where it was joined by transport and
rearguard, proceeded along the Helpmakaar road on the way to
Ladysmith.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. PENN SYMONS, K.C.B.
Photo by R. Stanley & Co., London.]
On Monday afternoon the first halt was called, but the rest was of short
duration, for at ten the column was again plodding along through the
miry roads in hourly dread lest the whole scheme should be spoilt, and
the Boers suddenly arrest the course of the two-mile-long column.
And they had indeed good reason for alarm. They were forced to plod
through a narrow pass in the Biggarsberg range of mountains, so narrow
indeed that a hundred Boers might have effectually barred their way.
Here, through this perilous black cylinder of the hills, they marched at
dead of night. It took them between the hours of half-past eleven till
three, stumbling and squelching in the mire, and knowing that should the
enemy appear, should they but shoot one of the oxen of the leading
waggon of the convoy, and thus block the cramped defile, all chance of
getting safely through to Ladysmith would be at an end. This was by no
means a happy reflection to fill men's minds in the dripping, almost
palpable, darkness of the night, and the resolute spirit of the gallant
fellows who unmurmuringly stowed away all personal wretchedness and
stuck manfully to their grim duty is for ever to be marvelled at and
admired. Fortunately the Dutchmen, "slim" as they were, had not counted
on the possibility of this march being executed at all, still less of
its being executed in pitch darkness. They were caught napping, and the
party, who had left kit, provisions (except for the four days), and
everything behind them, who were now drenched to the skin in the only
clothes they possessed, at last reached Sunday River in safety.
Here they eagerly awaited an escort of the 5th Lancers, which had been
detached by Sir George White from Ladysmith to meet them. These, to the
great joy of the worn-out travellers, appeared on Wednesday afternoon.
On that evening the column again started off for a last long wearisome
tramp, the men, who had not been out of their clothes for a week, being
now ready to drop from sleeplessness and exhaustion. But valiantly they
held on. Not a word, not a grumble. All had confidence in General Yule
and his officers, who shared with the men every hardship and every
fatigue; each realised his individual duty to make the very best of a
very bad job, and pluckily kept heart till the last moment. Torrents of
rain fell, making the night into one vast immensity of slough and pool,
but the stumbling, straining left, right, left, right, of the retreating
men continued ceaselessly through the weary hours. On Thursday morning,
the 26th, to their intense relief, they found themselves at last in the
long-looked-for camp at Ladysmith.
The excitement of arrival was almost too much for the exhausted,
fainting troops, but the cheers that went up from a thousand throats
brought light to their sleep-starved eyes and warmth to their chilled
frames. There was rest at last--rest and safety, food and warm covering,
though of a more practical than artistic kind. The Devons--who had just
come grandly through the fight at Elandslaagte and looted the Boer camp
of innumerable saleable odds and ends--out of their newly-gained wealth
"stood treat." In the joy of their hearts each of the men subscribed
sixpence, and the gallant Dublin Fusiliers, the heroes of Glencoe, who,
all unwashed and unshorn, now looked like chimney-sweeps rather than the
warriors they were, were invited to a fine "square meal." It is
difficult to imagine the condition of those battered braves after their
week of hardship, fighting, and privation, and sticklers for etiquette
would have been shocked at the manners and customs enforced by warlike
conditions. One who dined with the Dundee column gave the following
graphic description of the luxurious repast:--
"To begin with, there was no sort of furniture either in the messroom or
the anteroom. If you wanted to sit down, you did so on the floor. We
each got hold of a large tin mug, and dipped it into a large tin
saucepan of soup and drank it, spoons not existing. A large lump of salt
was passed round, and every one broke off a piece with his fingers. Next
you clawed hold of a piece of bread and a chunk of tongue, and gnawed
first one and then the other--knives and forks there were none. This
finished the dinner. Add to this two or three tallow-candles stuck on a
cocoa tin, and the fact that none of the officers had shaved, or had had
their clothes off for a week, and had walked some forty-five miles
through rivers and mud, and you will have some idea of how the officers'
mess of one of the smartest of Her Majesty's foot regiments do for
themselves in time of war. Not a murmur or complaint was to be heard."
Their state must certainly have been pitiable, for it will be remembered
that on the retirement from Dundee rations for four days only were
loaded, and provisions for two months, besides all officers' and men's
kit and hospital equipment, were left behind.
And, sad to say, so also were the wounded. It was necessary for their
future well-being to desert them. The men who had so gloriously led to
victory now found themselves stranded and in a strange position--the
vanquishers at the mercy of the vanquished! Most melancholy of all must
have been the plight of those unhappy sufferers when they first learnt
that their comrades were marching farther and farther away, and that
they, in all their helplessness, must be left lonely--unloved, and
perhaps untended--in charge of the enemy. One dares not think of the
agonies of those sad souls--the nation's invalids--bereft of kindly
words and kindred smiles; one cannot linger without a sense of
emasculating weakness on the sad side-picture of battle that, in its
dumb wretchedness, seems so much more paralysing than the active horror
of facing shot and shell in company with glorious comrades in arms. Let
us hope there was some one to whisper to them, to persuade them that all
was for the best; that the safety of their sick selves and their sound
mates depended on this retreat, this wondrous retreat which, when the
tale of the war in its entirety shall be told, will shine like a
dazzling light among records whose brilliancy in the history of British
achievements cannot be excelled. Perhaps, too, they had faith to inspire
them with the certainty that all that they had suffered in that dark
hour for their country and for the weal of their fellows, would be
remembered to their glory in the good times to come.
While the retreat was going forward Glencoe's gallant hero was breathing
his last. After hopelessly lingering for three days, General Sir W. Penn
Symons passed away. He expired in the hands of the enemy at Dundee
hospital on Monday the 23rd of October. The next day he was quietly
buried with profound signs of mourning.
SIR W. PENN SYMONS--GLENCOE
By the death of Major-General Sir William Penn Symons, the British army
lost a brilliant and distinguished soldier, and a man of great valour
and courage. He came of a Cornish family, the founder of which was a
Norman knight who came over with William the Conqueror. The eldest son
of the late William Symons, Recorder of Saltash, he was born in 1843,
and in 1863 joined the South Wales Borderers--the old 24th Regiment. He
became lieutenant in 1866, captain in 1878, major in 1881,
lieutenant-colonel in 1886, and colonel in 1887.
His first experience of active service was in 1877, when the Borderers
took the field against the Galekas. In the Zulu War of 1879 he served
with distinction, but was not present at the battle of Isandlwana, being
away from his regiment on special duty. In 1885 he served as
Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General, organising and
commanding the Mounted Infantry in the Burmese Expedition. Being
honourably mentioned in dispatches for his services with the Chin Field
Force, he received a brevet-colonelcy. In 1889-90 he was given a brigade
in the Chin-Lusha Expedition, was again mentioned in despatches, made a
C.B., and received the thanks of the Government of India. He commanded a
brigade of the Waziristan Field Force in 1894-95 with like distinction,
but he will best be remembered in connection with the campaign on the
North-West Frontier of India in 1897-98, after which he was made a
K.C.B. In 1898 he gave up his appointment in India and took command of
the British troops in Natal.
He was one of the best shots in the army, his military hobby in fact
being musketry, though he was also a great authority on the subject of
mounted infantry. He was a keen sportsman, an excellent linguist. He was
highly respected by all who knew him. As an evidence of how he was
regarded by his brother officers, one may quote from the telegram which
was sent from Sir G. White to the War Office on the morrow of the battle
of Glencoe. The communication said: "The important success is due to his
great courage, fine generalship, and gallant example, and the confidence
he gave to the troops under him."
Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill's remarks about him, in a letter to the
_Morning Post_, show how fully he was appreciated for his social as well
as for his military qualities.
"So Sir Penn Symons is killed! Well, no one would have laid down his
life more gladly in such a cause. Twenty years ago the merest chance
saved him from the massacre at Isandhlwana, and Death promoted him in an
afternoon from subaltern to senior captain. Thenceforward his rise was
rapid. He commanded the First Division of the Tirah Expeditionary Force
among the mountains with prudent skill. His brigades had no misfortunes;
his rearguards came safely into camp. In the spring of 1898, when the
army lay around Fort Jumrood, looking forward to a fresh campaign, I
used often to meet him. Every one talked of Symons, of his energy, of
his jokes, of his enthusiasm. It was Symons who had built a racecourse
on the stony plain; who had organised the Jumrood Spring Meeting; who
won the principal event himself, to the delight of the private soldiers,
with whom he was intensely popular; who, moreover, was to be first and
foremost if the war with the tribes broke out again; and who was
entrusted with much of the negotiations with their _jirgas_. Dinner with
Symons in the mud tower of Jumrood Fort was an experience. The memory of
many tales of sport and war remains. At the end the General would drink
the old Peninsular toasts: 'Our Men,' 'Our Women,' 'Our Religions,' 'Our
Swords,' 'Ourselves,' 'Sweethearts and Wives,' and 'Absent Friends'--one
for every night in the week. The night I dined it was 'Our Men.' May the
State in her necessities find others like him!"
THE BATTLE OF REITFONTEIN
On the morning of the 23rd, thirty men of the 18th Hussars rode into
camp at Ladysmith, after having had some exciting adventures. The facts
were these. On the arrival at Glencoe camp of the news of the Boer
defeat at Elandslaagte, General Yule had detached a force to cut off the
flying Boers. Unfortunately, the Hussars who were sent out for this
purpose were themselves cut off, but at last, with the enemy at their
heels, succeeded in fighting their way down a dangerous pass, and
eventually effecting their escape. This, too, without the loss of a man!
To return to the great retreat. While General Yule was falling back to
effect a junction with General White, the latter officer conceived a
brilliant plan to ensure the safety of the returning force. He was aware
that Yule's column was marching _via_ the Helpmakaar road, Beith, and
the Waschbank and Sunday River Valleys, and therefore, to cover the
movement, he sent out a strong force to the west of the road. The force
consisted of the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd Field Batteries, 1st Devons, 1st
Liverpools, 1st Gloucesters, 2nd King's Royal Rifles (just arrived from
Maritzburg), 19th Hussars, 5th Lancers, Natal Carabiniers, Border
Mounted Rifles, and Imperial Light Horse.
The enemy was already strongly posted on the kopjes a mile and a half
west of the railway and two miles south-east of Modder Spruit station,
in all, some seven miles from Ladysmith. It was necessary, therefore, to
keep him well occupied, and divert his attention from the Dundee column.
On both sides firing soon commenced, but our guns were promptly
silenced. Then the British took up a position three-quarters of a mile
west of the railway, and for some twenty minutes kept up a heavy
artillery fire supplemented by sharp volleys from the infantry. Before
long the kopjes were cleared and the object of the British attack
accomplished. The main body of the Boers retired in the direction of
Besters, a point to the south of Ladysmith, where, in the circumstances,
it was more advisable for them to be. In this battle a great deal of
sharpshooting, especially at officers, took place on the part of the
foe, who also resorted to their old tactics of discharging their guns
and running away, again discharging them and again running--a trick they
had been mightily fond of in their dealings with the Zulus, and which
was calculated to tire out the fleetest antagonists. Colonel Wilford of
the 1st Gloucester Regiment was mortally wounded. Sir George White had a
narrow escape, as the Boers turned their artillery on the Staff, and
their first shell came screaming within fifteen yards of the General.
Captain Douglas, 42nd Battery, had also a marvellous escape, his horse
having been wounded and his haversack ripped open by a splinter. In this
smart engagement, as Sir George White in his official statement
declared, "Our side confined its efforts to occupying the enemy and
hitting him hard enough to prevent his taking action against General
Yule's column." The manoeuvre, as we know, was eminently successful,
but was not executed without cost to those who assisted in it. The
following was the official list of the officers killed and wounded:--
1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment.--Killed:
Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel Edmund Percival Wilford. 42nd
Battery Field Artillery.--Wounded: Lieutenant S. W. Douglas,
shell-graze of abdomen, slight. 53rd Battery Field
Artillery.--Major Anthony J. Abdy, shell-graze of right knee,
slight; Lieutenant Arthur Montague Perreau, bullet wound, right
leg, severe; Lieutenant George Herbert Stobart (from 34th
Battery), bullet wound, finger, slight. 19th Hussars.--2nd
Lieutenant A. Holford, bullet wound, slight. 1st Battalion
Gloucestershire Regiment.--Lieutenant Carlos Joseph Hickie,
slightly.
The Boers, triumphant, entered Dundee about the same time as General
Yule and his worn-out troops were being enthusiastically greeted in
Ladysmith. They attacked the Dundee Town Guard, putting it to flight,
and turned many civilians out of their houses. Later, they mounted two
big guns at Intintanyone, some 4500 yards from the Ladysmith camp, and
their energies pointed to further activities.
LADYSMITH
Here it may be as well to review the geographical position of this now
famous place. Ladysmith, as a position for purposes of defence, is very
badly situated. It lies in the cup of the hills, and stony eminences
command it almost in a circle. Towards the north is Pepworth's Ridge, a
flat-headed hill fringed at the base with mimosa bushes. North-east is
Lombard's Kop, which is flanked by a family of smaller kopjes. South of
this hill and east of Ladysmith is a table-headed hill called Umbulwana.
South of this eminence runs the railway through the smaller stations of
Nelthorpe and Pieters towards Colenso. To the west of Pepworth's Ridge
is Surprise Hill, and other irregular hills which rise from four to five
hundred feet on all sides. The place is watered by the Klip River, which
enters the valley between the hills on the west, twists gracefully in
front of the town, and turns away among the eastern hills before making
its way to the south. The position, commanded as it was on every hand,
was not an enviable one, but the glorious fellows who had fought in two
brilliant engagements were in no wise disconcerted.
[Illustration: OFFICER OF THE NINTH LANCERS.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]
Yet all were on the alert, for the Boers had now closed in round the
town, and an engagement was hourly expected. A little desultory fighting
took place, but when the British troops advanced, those of the Orange
Free State at once retired towards the border. The town, however, was
somewhat harassed for want of water, owing to the Boers having cut off
the main pipes. The inconvenience was merely temporary, as the Klip
River, which runs through the main position, was fairly pure, and
there were wells which could be made serviceable. A captive balloon was
inflated by the Royal Engineers, and was used for the purpose of making
observations, much to the annoyance of the Dutchmen, who had securely
perched themselves at points of vantage on the surrounding hills. They
were at this time on the north and east, having laagered south-east of
Modder Spruit and Vlaak Plaats, some seven miles from Ladysmith, and
were preparing to arrange a closely-linked chain of earthworks that
should effectually surround the garrison. An exchange of shots now and
then, however, was all that took place for a while between the
contending parties, though both sides were evidently gathering
themselves together for some definite move. The situation was thus
described by a captive in Ladysmith:--
"Saturday and Sunday have passed without any demonstration being made by
the enemy. The camp has again assumed its condition of readiness and
watchfulness. On Saturday afternoon it was rumoured that General
Joubert, with the commando encamped at Sunday River, was experiencing
difficulty in transporting the 40-pounders across the spruit, which was
swollen after the heavy rains. Small parties of Boers are constantly on
the alert, and are harassing the British outposts.
"Scarcely a day passes without the outlying pickets being fired upon.
The latest reports say that the enemy are gathered in considerable force
on Dewdrop Farm.
"Great excitement has been caused in the Artillery camp by the capture
of a supposed spy, who was caught in the act of tampering with the guns.
The man had eluded the vigilance of the sentry, and had opened the
breech of one of the 15-pounders when he was noticed. He was promptly
arrested. When asked what he was doing, he said he was a lieutenant in
the 18th Battery. Questioned further, he contradicted himself, and said
that it was quite by accident that he opened the breech. He admitted
that he belonged to Johannesburg. He was marched off in custody of the
guard. The sequel of the story has not been made public.
"No camp followers are allowed, and all here have been ordered to leave.
The enemy are now undoubtedly closing round Ladysmith. A large commando
is reported to be on the Helpmakaar road, and a large camp has been
formed between the Harrismith Railway Bridge and Potgieter's Farm. The
camp on Dewdrop Farm extends for four miles. The enemy have an
exceptional number of waggons. The Boer patrols are very venturesome;
they have approached within three and a half miles of the town, and one
party actually removed carcasses ready dressed for consumption from
within the slaughtering lines."
The prospect was far from cheering, particularly as Sir George White was
well aware that his field-guns were ineffective against the powerful
guns of position which the enemy were handling with unpleasant
dexterity. At this critical period the united forces of Ladysmith and
Glencoe only amounted to some 10,000 men, more than half of whom were
infantry. The General, however, put the best face he could on the
matter, telegraphed home for big guns--and waited!
General Joubert now expressed his opinions on the causes of the war. His
ideas, published in the German journals, were of interest as showing the
sentiments of the opposite camp:--
"It was evident to our Government after the Jameson raid, that
Great Britain would be forced in time by various sordid
elements into a war of extermination with the Boers. It was
equally clear that this danger could only be averted by
armaments on a most extensive scale. We were conscious that the
impending war of annihilation would incur the sharpest
condemnation on the part of the other European Powers, but
history had taught us that not one of these Powers would be
roused to intervene in our favour. In these circumstances we
had to rely on our own strength.
"By indefatigable zeal and heavy sacrifices to augment our
forces, and yet to secrete them from the observation of the
British--these were the objects of our noblest exertion. Well,
we succeeded, and hoodwinked the British. Spies were permitted
to obtain glimpses of our obsolete artillery, but until the war
was on the point of breaking out they had no suspicion of the
formidable extent of our stores of modern material.
"We counted on the unreliability of the British announcements
concerning their own preparedness, and attended as little to
their cries of 'To Pretoria!' as did the Germans in 1870 to the
Parisian boasters who shouted 'A Berlin!' Without completely
denuding her colonies of troops, Great Britain cannot possibly
despatch more than about 85,000 men to South Africa. Of this
imposing force, only half will be available for the chief
battles. It may be possible for Great Britain to effect the
landing in various places of these troops by the middle of
December. I estimate, however, that the losses in prisoners,
killed, sick, and wounded will amount in the meantime to some
10,000. There will thus remain 75,000 men.
"Even should we fail to prevent the junction of the British
troops under Sir Redvers Buller and be compelled to retreat,
the British army would become from natural causes so
debilitated that it would represent a force for operative
purposes not exceeding 35,000. The remainder would have to be
employed in protecting lines of communication extending some
700 miles.
"Our lines of depots, on the contrary, are in home territory.
They are constructed at regular distances in three directions,
and barely 500 men are necessary to cover them.
Excellently-organised communications have been established
between them, and if any one of them be seriously threatened,
the stores--if rescue be impossible--will be destroyed.
"Moreover, defensive warfare--to which we need not think,
however, of resorting for a long time to come--is fraught with
far greater advantages to us than offensive operations. With a
change of _terrain_ there will be a change of tactics. In Natal
and the south we have to deal with unfamiliar conditions. On
the high plains of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State we
shall be at home, and the British will meet opposition from us
and from Nature at every step of the way, and at all times be
prepared for action on two or three fronts. In this way will be
developed a guerilla warfare of a most inconceivably bloody
character, such as the British will be unable to endure for
more than a few months."
General Joubert then protested that the Boers were fighting merely for
the freedom of their own "narrower" Fatherland, and not with a view to
the destruction of British preponderancy in South Africa. He
acknowledged the bravery of the British soldiers, but imagined that
hardships and deprivations would so demoralise them that they would be
unable to hold out against an enemy superior in numbers.
"In these circumstances," he continued, "do not accuse me of
boasting when I frankly say that victory will be ours. Every
one of us is filled with the same conviction and unshakeable
faith in God, that He will remain as true to us in this as in
former wars, and that He will not allow the blood shed and to
be shed in this struggle, that will probably last yet a year,
to extinguish us and our children."
THE BATTLE OF LOMBARD'S KOP
Towards the end of October Sir George White decided that something must
be done to protect his line of communication with the south. The Boers
were spreading out in crescent form and drawing gradually nearer to the
town. On the north were troops commanded by General Joubert. On the west
was a Free State commando, and on the east was General Lucas Meyer, who
owed us a grudge after the events of Talana Hill. Reinforced by troops
from General Erasmus, he now desired to press towards the railway with a
view to seizing it at some point south of the town. It was necessary at
all costs to put a stop to this scheme. Colonel Ian Hamilton with an
Infantry Brigade was therefore despatched on the 27th to Lombard's Kop,
a hill some five miles east of Ladysmith. There he bivouacked for the
night, with a view to clearing the enemy out at the point of the bayonet
on the morrow. He never brought his plan into execution, however, for
Sir George White, having been informed of the size of Meyer's force,
ordered him to fall back on the town. On Sunday the 29th it was
discovered that the Boers were intrenched in lines that extended over
twenty miles, while "Long Tom," their six-inch gun, was perched on
Pepworth Hill, its big ominous muzzle being situated some 7500 yards to
the north of Ladysmith. In addition to this formidable weapon,
field-guns with a range of some 8000 yards were posted about in
well-concealed positions. For the protection of our line of
communication it was necessary that the enemy, though three times as
strong as the British force, should be dispersed, and that night, at
half-past ten o'clock, Colonel Hamilton again set out with three
battalions, the Devons, the Gordons, the Manchesters, and a Brigade
Division of Artillery. The night was dark but clear, and the troops
marched along the Newcastle Road to Limit Hill, a strong kopje some
three miles north of Ladysmith, and half-way between that town and
Pepworth Hill. There they bivouacked for the night. While this party was
moving as described, a small force under Colonel Carleton, composed of
four and a half companies of the Gloucestershire Regiment and six
companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and No. 10 Mountain Battery, was
moving towards Nicholson's Nek with a view of seizing it. But of Colonel
Carleton's column anon.
[Illustration: MAP OF LADYSMITH AND SURROUNDING HEIGHTS]
On Colonel Ian Hamilton's right flank, towards Lombard's Kop, was
Colonel Grimwood, with the 1st and 2nd King's Royal Rifles, the
Liverpools, Leicesters, and Dublin Fusiliers, three Field-Batteries, and
the Natal Volunteer Artillery. On the extreme right, when day broke, was
General French with a Cavalry Brigade and some volunteers. The idea was,
that while Colonel Grimwood was shelling the Boer position to the north
of Lombard's Kop, General French should prevent any attempt to turn his
right; the enemy's artillery silenced, Colonel Grimwood was to drive him
along the ridge running to Pepworth, and, under cover of the British
guns, press the Boers towards their centre. Meanwhile our centre, under
Colonel Hamilton, was to attack a hill where the enemy was in force,
rout him and join in the general scheme, while Colonel Carleton
protected the centre from a flank movement. Unfortunately "the best laid
schemes o' mice and men gang aft agley," and General White's admirable
scheme failed, as we shall learn. An artillery duel began operations,
and this continued for two long hours, while the warm spring morning
developed, and the Boers, who had been warned of our plans and had
changed their position during the night, were laughing in their sleeves
at the capital surprise they had prepared. They had drawn off their men
from the point that was to have been the objective of our centre, and
extending and reinforcing their left, were calmly waiting our attack.
The artillery duel continued till seven o'clock, our batteries with
great difficulty searching out the enemy's position. Colonel Grimwood,
with two battalions of the King's Royal Rifles, held the kopjes and
ridges in front of Farquhar's Farm, while mounted infantry and troopers
of the 18th Hussars, supported by the Liverpools and Leicesters, were
posted on the hills on the right. Behind them came the artillery, who
directed their fire at the hill above the farm, where the enemy was
supposed to be intrenched.
[Illustration: BEFORE LADYSMITH--HORSE ARTILLERY GALLOPING TO TAKE UP A
NEW POSITION.
Drawn by R. Caton Woodville.]
The Boers, who in great hordes had streamed from the hills like a
mountain torrent and concealed themselves in the surrounding ridges, now
made all Colonel Grimwood's plans impossible. He seemed, indeed, in
danger of being annihilated by sheer force of superior numbers, when
troops from the centre were pushed forward to his support. A smart
engagement ensued, the Boers making energetic efforts to penetrate the
line between the Infantry and Artillery, while the 53rd Battery changed
front to meet the attack and the 5th Lancers struggled to form up on the
left of the rifle regiments. But the enemy's automatic quick-firing gun
vomited forth its death-dealing steel with such persistence that the
cavalry was forced to retire at a gallop. The gunners again came to the
rescue, and six field-batteries, spread over in a semicircular front of
three-quarters of a mile, sent their shrapnel over the heads of the
infantry to crash on the ridges occupied by the Boers.
At this critical moment, when the turmoil of warfare was at its
hottest, and when our gallant troops were struggling unsuccessfully to
hold their own against an overwhelming number of the enemy, a message
came from Sir George White to retire. Some sort of a panic had taken
place in the town, owing partly to the fact that the Boers were
threatening it from another quarter, partly to the persistent shelling
of "Long Tom," which, as some one described, was like a voluble virago,
determined to have the last word! All efforts to silence the horrible
weapon had failed, and for some three or four hours it had sent its
eighty-four-pound shells shrieking into the town. There was no resource
but to fall back, which was done to the appalling detonations of the
Boer guns all going at once, while "Long Tom," like some prominent
solo-singer, dominated the whole clamouring orchestra. To silence him
and to cover the retreat, a Lieutenant of the _Powerful_, in charge of a
gun drawn by a team of oxen, went out on the road between Limit Hill and
Ladysmith. Before the gun could be got in position, however, "Long Tom"
had spotted it--barked at it--overturned it, and killed several of the
oxen. But his triumph was short-lived. Another rival performer had come
on the scene, namely, the twelve-and-a-half-pounder of the Naval
Brigade. It came, saw, and conquered, knocking out "Long Tom" at the
fourth shot!
[Illustration: TYPES OF ARMS--THE CREUSOT QUICK-FIRING FIELD GUN, OR
"LONG TOM"]
The whole action of the Naval Brigade reads like a fairy story.
Ladysmith on the point of exhaustion, with all its troops engaged and no
big guns wherewith to meet the terrific assaults of the six-inch cannon
on Pepworth Hill, was almost in despair. At the eleventh hour up came
the Naval Brigade under Captain the Hon. Hedworth Lambton of H.M.S.
_Powerful_ with 280 Bluejackets, two 4.7 guns, and four
twelve-and-a-half-pounders. Then the affair was done. It was just one,
two, three, and away--for the fourth splendidly-directed shot saved the
situation.
In this engagement great feats of daring were accomplished, feats which
have now become so general that we have almost ceased to gasp in wonder
at the heroism of the "mere man" of the nineteenth century. When the
regiments were forced to retire from the death-laden region of Lombard's
Kop, Major Abdy of the 53rd Battery R.A., dashing across the plain under
a storm of shells from a quick-firing gun, brought his battery between
the enemy and the straggling mass of retreating soldiers. Horse and man
rolled over, but the fire of the 53rd never slackened till the imminence
of danger was past. The correspondent of the _Standard_, who was
present, said: "When the moment came for the battery to fall back, the
limber of one of the guns had been smashed and five horses in one team
had been killed. Captain Thwaites sent back for another team and waggon
limber, and brought back the disabled gun under a concentrated fire from
the enemy, who were not more than four hundred yards distant. Lieutenant
Higgins, of the same battery, also distinguished himself for gallantry.
One of the guns was overturned in a donga. In the face of a close and
heavy fire the Lieutenant succeeded in righting the gun and bringing it
into a place of safety."
The following is a list of killed and wounded among the officers who
were engaged on Lombard's Kop:--
13th Field Battery, R.A.--Major John Dawkins, wounded,
slightly. 42nd Field Battery.--Lieutenant James Taylor
M'Dougall, killed. 69th Field Battery.--Lieutenant Harold
Belcher, bullet wound, forearm, severely. 1st Battalion King's
Royal Rifles.--Major W. T. Myers (7th Battalion), Lieutenant H.
S. Marsden, and Lieutenant T. L. Forster, killed; Lieutenant H.
C. Johnson, bullet wound in shoulder, severely. 2nd Battalion
King's Royal Rifles.--Major H. Buchanan Riddell, bullet wound,
abdomen, severe. 1st Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment.--Captain Willcock, bullet wound, shoulder and wrist;
Captain Bertram Fyffe, bullet wound, forearm and chest, severe;
Captain Frederick Staynes, bullet wound, forearm, severe. Royal
Army Medical Corps.--Major Edward G. Gray, killed. Natal
Mounted Rifles.--Lieutenant W. Chapman, killed.
THE DISASTER OF NICHOLSON'S NEK
The circumstances which attended the movements of Colonel Carleton's
column are even now somewhat fraught with mystery. He carried out the
night march unmolested until within two miles of Nicholson's Nek. Then
some boulders, loosened evidently for the purpose, rolled down the hill,
and a sudden crackling roll of musketry stampeded the infantry
ammunition mules. The alarm became infectious, with the result that the
battery mules also broke loose from their leaders, practically carrying
with them the whole of the gun equipment. The greater part of the
regimental small-arm ammunition reserve was similarly lost. In
consequence of this misfortune, Colonel Carleton's small force, after a
plucky fight and heavy loss, had to capitulate. The real truth about the
affair may never be known, but for the lamentable result Sir George
White in an official dispatch, with heroic courage--greater perhaps than
any required by warriors in the field--took upon himself the entire
blame. The General knew well that the failure of his programme in the
engagement of Lombard's Kop had inevitably brought about the disaster to
the isolated force.
The list of officers taken prisoners by Boers was as follows:--
Staff.--Major W. Adye. 1st Battalion Royal Irish
Fusiliers.--Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton; Majors F. H.
Munn and C. S. Kincaid; Captains Burrows, Rice, wounded, and
Silver, severely wounded; Lieutenants A. E. S. Heard, C. E.
Southey, W. G. B. Phibbs, A. H. C. MacGregor, H. B. Holmes, A.
L. J. M. Kelly, W. D. Dooner, wounded; Second Lieutenants R. J.
Kentish, C. E. Kinahan, R. W. R. Jeudwine; Chaplain Father
Matthews. 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment.--Majors S.
Humphrey, H. Capel Cure, and W. R. P. Wallace; Captains S.
Duncan and R. Conner, both slightly wounded; Lieutenants A.
Bryant, F. C. Nisbet, J. O'D. Ingram, R. M. M. Davy, C. S.
Knox, W. A. M. Temple, A. H. Radice, F. A. Breul, W. L. B.
Hill, P. H. Short; Second Lieutenants H. H. Smith, W. S.
Mackenzie, R. L. Beasley, Lieutenant and Quartermaster R. J.
Gray. Royal Artillery Mountain Battery.--Major G. E. Bryant;
Lieutenants Wheeler, G. R. H. Nugent, W. H. Moore, Webb
(attached): Newspaper Correspondent, J. Hyde.
Some details of their misfortune were given by the prisoners in
Pretoria, and they serve to throw more light on the subject.
Colonel Carleton, as we know, was sent towards Nicholson's Nek to hold
it and prevent the Free Staters from coming to the assistance of the
other Boers. Having lost his reserve ammunition and the water of all the
battery through the stampede of the mules, he set to work to construct a
defensive position. But stones were scarce and the defences were
slender, and by the light of dawn his position was revealed. At this
time a long-range fire was opened from three hills to south and west,
dropping from 1500 yards into the position, and taking it both in flank
and in rear. From his observations Colonel Carleton discovered that
General White's scheme had failed--that it was being abandoned. In
consequence of this failure the whole Boer force was enabled to swarm
from all directions towards the isolated column. Firing fierce and
incessant, exhausted the already worn-out Irish Fusiliers, while the
advanced companies of the Gloucesters were severely mauled by the
Martini bullets of the enemy. The hill was now completely surrounded,
the ammunition expended; still Colonel Carleton had no idea of giving
in. The bayonet was left, and by the bayonet he meant to stand or fall.
Suddenly a wounded officer ordered the white flag to be raised. It was
then hoisted, but uncertainty prevailed as to the authority for the
exhibition of the flag, and some of our men still continued to fire.
However, the mischief was done, and the surrender was merely a matter of
moments.
The most vivid account of the disaster, from an outsider's point of
view, was given by the _Times_ special correspondent at Ladysmith. He
wrote:--
"This column, consisting of six companies of the Royal Irish
Fusiliers, four and a half companies of the Gloucestershire
Regiment, and No. 10 Mountain Battery, left camp on Sunday
night at 10.30, with the object of occupying a position from
which it would be able to operate upon the right of the Boer
position on Pepworth Hill. The column was guided by Major Adye,
of the Field Intelligence, and a staff of the headquarters
guides. Their destination was Nicholson's Nek, a position
which, when reconnoitred from this side, appeared to possess
the necessary tactical advantages for a detached force.
Nicholson's Nek lies about four miles up Bell's Spruit, a donga
due north of Ladysmith. The men blundered along in the
darkness, the Irish Fusiliers leading, the battery in the
centre, the rear being brought up by the Gloucestershire
Regiment. There seems no doubt upon one point, and that is, the
enemy were aware of this part of the movement from the
beginning. Probably they were aware of the whole of the plans
for Monday, for in Ladysmith it was impossible to say who was a
Boer agent and who not. However that may be, it is certain that
the enemy were on the flanks of the column all night, one of
the survivors positively stating that he constantly heard the
snapping of breeches, and once the peculiar noise which a rifle
makes at night when it is dropped.
"Two hours before daybreak, while the column was in enclosed
country, either a shot was fired or a boulder rolled into the
battery in column of route. The mules stampeded, and easily
broke away from their half-asleep drivers. They came back upon
the Gloucestershire Regiment, the advance party of whom fired
into the mass, believing in the darkness that it was an attack.
This added to the chaos; the ranks were broken by the frenzied
animals, and they dashed through the ranks of the rearguard,
carrying the first and second reserve ammunition animals with
them. It became a hopeless panic; the animals, wild with the
shouting and the turmoil, tore down the nullah into the
darkness, and the last that was heard of them was the sound of
ammunition-boxes and panniers as they were splintered against
the boulders. The hubbub of those few minutes was sufficient to
have alarmed the enemy. By a strenuous effort the officers
succeeded in getting the men again under control, and when
daylight came they seized the first position which presented
itself, and which was about two miles short of the original
goal. They were forced to take advantage of the first kopje, as
Boer scouts were all round them, and the day was ushered in
with desultory firing. It was a sorry position which they had
chosen, and the men were in a sorrier plight. All their reserve
ammunition was gone, and though they had saved pieces of the
screw-guns, they were not able with these pieces to patch up a
single mounting.
"The position itself was a flat kopje commanded on the south by
a self-contained ridge. To the east was another kopje, which
commanded the top of the position at about 500 yards. On the
west were two similar spurs, also commanding the position at
short ranges. The summit of the kopje was a plateau, all the
sides being gradual slopes except the eastern, which was
almost sheer, this latter being the side from which access had
been gained. From below it appeared a defensible position, but
when once the top was reached it was evident that it was
commanded from all sides. The men busied themselves attempting
to build breastworks. The Gloucestershire companies, with their
Maxim gun, were given the northern face to hold, two companies
being detached on to a self-contained ridge of the position
which lay on the south side. The Irish Fusiliers had the
precipitous flank to defend.
"From earliest daybreak Boer scouts were reconnoitring, and
about eight o'clock mounted Boers could be seen galloping in
small groups to the cover at the reverse of the hill on the
west. Later two strong parties of mounted men took position on
the far side of the two hills commanding the kopje from the
west. About nine o'clock these two parties had crowned the
hills and opened a heavy fire at short ranges right down upon
the plateau. Our men made a plucky attempt to return this fire,
but it was impossible; they were under a cross-fire from two
directions, flank and rear. The two companies of Gloucesters
holding the self-contained ridge were driven from their
shelter, and as they crossed the open on the lower plateau were
terribly mauled, the men falling in groups. The Boers on the
west had not yet declared themselves, but about 200 marksmen
climbed to the position which the two companies of the
Gloucesters had just vacated. These men absolutely raked the
plateau, and it was then that the men were ordered to take
cover on the steep reverse of the kopje. As soon as the enemy
realised this move, the men on the western hill teemed on to
the summit and opened upon our men as they lay on the slope.
They were absolutely hemmed in, and what had commenced as a
skirmish seemed about to become a butchery. The grim order was
passed round--'Faugh-a-Ballaghs, fix your bayonets and die like
men!' There was the clatter of steel, the moment of suspense,
and then the 'Cease fire' sounded. Again and again it sounded,
but the Irish Fusiliers were loth to accept the call, and
continued firing for many minutes. Then it was unconditional
surrender and the men laid down their arms."
[Illustration: GENERAL JOUBERT.
Photo by Elliott & Fry, London.]
An officer of the Gloucestershire Regiment described the affair thus:--
"HOSPITAL, WYNBERG, 9/11/1899.
"We were ordered out with six companies of Royal Irish
Fusiliers and No. 10 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to make
a night march through the Boer lines and hold a hill behind
their right flank till the rest of the troops took us off,
which they expected to do about 11 A.M. As it turned out, they
were not able to do this, but they did keep the Boer guns
employed, luckily for us. We started off at 8.30 P.M., and got
to the foot of our hill about 2 A.M. The Royal Irish Fusiliers
were in front, then the battery and S.A.A. mules, and last
ourselves. The Royal Irish Fusiliers had got part way up the
hill--a very steep one--when three mounted Boers galloped down
amid clouds of dust, rolling stones, &c. They started off the
battery and S.A.A. mules, the Boers firing as they passed. The
mules cut right through the regiment, and all was chaos for a
time.
"It was pitch dark, and the noise of the mules and the loads
and the stores falling about was enough to put any one off.
Several men were hurt, some got in next day, some are
missing.--Part of Stayner's, Fyffe's, and my company were cut
off from the rest altogether, and when we got them in some sort
of order, we had quite lost the rest of the column. The orders
were to push on, no matter what happened, and every one left to
look out for himself. After some time trying to find the
path, we came across a straggler, who told us which way the
regiment had gone, and eventually we found them on the top of a
hill. We were ordered, as soon as we got on the hill, to put up
sangars, which we worked at by the light of a very small moon
till daylight. Then the Boers began on us all round, not very
many, till about half-past eight. From then till 2.30 the fire
was hot, and hottest at 2.30, when our ammunition being almost
down and the fire devilish from all sides, we had to give in.
"I got a grazing shot on my left hand and a bullet in my right
forearm early (about 8.30 A.M., and two more grazers--right
thigh and left elbow)--later, finally, a bullet from behind
through the right shoulder about a quarter of an hour before
the end. I don't know who gave the order to 'Cease fire.' The
firing could not have gone on five minutes more on our side for
want of ammunition, and the Boer fire was tremendous from all
round. It was like 'magazine independent' at the end of
field-firing. The astonishing thing is so few were hit. If we
had had our guns and ammunition, I think we could have held on
until night and then got off, but there were 1200 of them, they
said, to our 800, not counting gunners, and you could not till
the very end see a dozen of them. The way they take cover is
simply wonderful. All the prisoners were marched off at once
and sent by rail to Pretoria. It was a terribly hot day, and no
shade or water except what the Boers gave us. They were very
good about water, giving us all they had, and fetching more
from the bottom of the hill, one and a half mile away."
An officer of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, writing from Staatsmodel
Schule, Pretoria, said:--
"We were all taken prisoners, together with the Gloucester
Regiment and a Battery of Mounted Artillery, which accounts for
us being in Pretoria so soon. As we were going up the hill in
the dark, a small party of Boers dashed through our ammunition
mules, causing them to stampede. By this move we lost all our
mules, 200 in all, and with them all our ammunition and
artillery.... You don't know what it means shooting a Boer; he
is behind a rock, and all you can ever see is his rifle
sticking out. For the last hour of the fight I had a rifle and
ammunition which I took from a dead man, and blazed away for
all I was worth. Then we fixed bayonets and prepared for a
rush, when the 'Cease fire' sounded. Our senior Captain has
told me that my name has been mentioned to our Colonel, who was
commanding the force, as having caused a lot of men to rally.
We were all then taken prisoners, except two officers killed
and eight wounded, and marched to the Boer laager, and sent off
that night to a station twenty miles distant in waggons. While
we were in their laager they treated us extremely well, and
gave us food and tobacco. All you read about the Boers in
England is absolutely untrue. They are most kind to the wounded
and prisoners, looking after them as well as their own wounded,
and anything they've got they will give you if you ask them,
even if they deprive themselves. We came up to Pretoria in
first-class sleeping-carriages, and the way they treated us was
most considerate, feeding us and giving us coffee every time we
stopped. The day we arrived we took up quarters on the
racecourse, but we have been moved into a fine brick building
with baths, electric light, &c. They provide us with
everything, from clothes down to tooth-brushes. They also feed
us, and we are constantly getting presents of vegetables and
cigars from private people. In fact, we can have everything we
like except our liberty; for some reason or other they won't at
present give us parole, and we are surrounded by sentries.
There are close upon fifty officers in this building, and they
have got any amount of wounded ones in different places. They
say they won't exchange the officers at any price."
As this letter had evidently to pass through the hands of the prison
censor, we may take the eulogies of the Boers for what they were worth!
However, it is but just to own that there are Boers and Boers. For
instance, it is a fact that Captain Gerard Rice, who was wounded in the
ankle and unable to move, offered a Boer half-a-sovereign to carry him
off the field. The man refused the money, but performed the action with
great kindness.
Father L. Matthews, chaplain of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who was
captured at Nicholson's Nek on October 31 and subsequently released,
gave the following version of the disaster:--
"We were sent out to occupy the position with the object of
preventing the two Boer forces from joining. We started at 8.30
on Sunday night, marched ten miles, and got to the hill at 1
A.M. The first mishap was that the mountain battery stampeded
and scattered the whole lot of mules. We formed up again and
gained the top of the hill. The guns were gone, but not all the
ammunition. I do not know what stampeded the mules. They
knocked me down. It was pitch dark.
"We had one hour's sleep. Firing began just after daylight. It
was slack for some time, but the Boers crept round. Then the
firing became furious. Our men made a breastwork of stones.
"After 12 o'clock there was a general cry of 'Cease fire' in
that direction. Our fellows would not stop firing. Major Adye
came up and confirmed the order to cease fire. Then the bugle
sounded 'Cease fire.' In our sangar there was a rumour that the
white flag was raised by a young officer who thought his batch
of ten men were the sole survivors.
"We were 900 alive, having started perhaps 1000. I think that
many of the battery men escaped. Our men and officers were
furious at surrendering. The Boers did not seem to be in great
numbers on the spot, but I heard that the main body had
galloped off.
"The men had to give up their arms. The officers were sent to
Commandant Steenekamp. The officers then ordered the men to
fall in. The officers were taken away from the men and sent to
General Joubert. On the same day the officers went in
mule-waggons and slept at some store _en route_, and next day
took the train at Waschbank for Pretoria. The officers are very
well treated, and so, I have heard, are the men. There has been
no unpleasantness in Pretoria. The officers are in the Model
School, and are allowed to walk as they please in the grounds.
"I think that the surrender was a great blunder, and was caused
by a misunderstanding. Major Adye was much put out. The white
flag was not hoisted by the Irish Fusiliers."
Father Matthews puts the case mildly. Some of the officers of the Irish
Fusiliers were so exasperated at the exhibition of the white flag, that
they set to work and smashed their swords rather than give them up.
The final figures of the losses sustained at Nicholson's Nek were as
follows: The total of missing of the Gloucesters and Royal Irish
Fusiliers was 843. Thirty-two of the Gloucesters, 10 of the Fusiliers,
and 10 of the Mountain Battery were found dead on the field, while 150
wounded were brought into camp at Ladysmith. Between 70 and 100 of the
men escaped and got back to camp.
THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH
It was now found necessary to issue a proclamation giving all strangers
the option of leaving the town at twenty-four hours' notice. In spite of
this notice, however, many civilians remained. Meanwhile, shells
continued to drop uproariously, if harmlessly, into the town, while the
balloon corps worked steadily in their task of locating the hostile
guns. The enemy objected to that original form of spy, and aimed at him
many a shot, but, fortunately, without effect. The Naval Brigade, always
animated, active, and efficient, completed the mounting of the
long-range guns which were to add to the safety of the place and the
discomfiture of its besiegers. On the whole, the position was becoming
somewhat serious, particularly for those whose nerves were unaccustomed
to the uproar of diurnal thunderstorms. Lord Wolseley has somewhere said
that "the effect of artillery fire is more moral than actual; it kills
but very few, but its appalling noise, the way it tears down trees,
knocks houses into small pieces, and mutilates the human frame when it
does hit, strikes terror into all but the stoutest hearts." It may be
imagined that the early days of this experience must have been somewhat
embarrassing, though later on, so attuned became the nerves, even of
women, that they engaged in shopping in the midst of bombardment, quite
unmoved.
On 2nd November at 2.30 P.M. the telegraphic communication with
Ladysmith was interrupted, but it was undecided whether the Boers had
got sufficiently far south to promote the interruption or whether the
wires had been cut by Dutch sympathisers or small scouting parties of
the enemy. The Boers applied for an armistice with a view to burying
their dead, their real object most probably being, as in many previous
cases of a similar nature, to obtain time for refitting their heavy
guns. This request was refused, but they were permitted to bury their
slain under a flag of truce. Meanwhile, General Joubert's force received
large reinforcements of Free State burghers under the command of Lucas
Meyer, and additional commandoes from the Middleburgh and Leydenburg
districts under Schalkburger were expected.
After this the siege of Ladysmith began in real earnest. "Long Tom,"
though temporarily incapacitated, soon resumed his volubility, and was
assisted by another of his calibre nicknamed "Slim Piet." Curiously
enough, the first house hit during the siege was a commodious
bungalow-shaped residence with large verandah belonging to Mr. Carter,
the author of the now well-known "Narrative of the Boer War." The owner
fortunately had left before the bombardment, and the premises were then
occupied by nurses.
[Illustration: TYPES OF ARMS--12-POUNDER NAVAL GUN ON IMPROVISED
CARRIAGE]
[Illustration: TYPES OF ARMS--4.7-INCH NAVAL GUN ON IMPROVISED MOUNTING]
Lieut. Frederick Egerton, of the _Powerful_, who was wounded by a shell
in the left knee and right foot, was promoted to the rank of Commander
in Her Majesty's fleet for special services with the forces in South
Africa. But his promotion came too late. He expired after some hours of
suffering.[4]
The Boers by now had established batteries on Grobler's Kloof,
a commanding eminence from whence they could attack both Ladysmith on
the north and Colenso on the south. Women and children vacated the
place, and the trains coming in and out had to run the gantlet of the
Boer fire, both Nordenfeldt quick-firing guns and Mauser rifles being
brought to bear on the refugees. The Boers, however, continued to salute
the town without much effect, while the naval gunners replied with
telling emphasis. They succeeded in dismounting the Boers' 40-pounder
which had been so comfortably posted on Pepworth's Hill.
The carriages and platforms on which the naval guns were mounted at
Ladysmith, and which proved so important a feature in promoting the
defence of the place, were specially designed by Captain Percy Scott of
the cruiser _Terrible_. In regard to this officer's resourcefulness the
_Times_ expressed an opinion that is worthy of remembrance:--
"Captain Percy Scott, of the _Terrible_, came to the rescue, adding one
more to the numerous instances in which this country has owed to
individual resource and initiative its escape from the disasters invited
by the incompetence of the War Office. There is no need to inquire just
now into the balance of political and military considerations which
determined the policy of making a stand at Ladysmith. It is enough that
that policy was definitely adopted in ample time to allow of providing
Ladysmith with the long-range guns which its position renders peculiarly
necessary, dominated as it is by hills on three sides. Why were such
guns not provided? Why was it left to fortunate accident to furnish the
garrison at the very last moment with the means of defence? The
conclusions of German military science, as will have been noted by all
who read the interesting account of German manoeuvres which we
published yesterday, are all in favour of saving the lives of the
infantry by a very free use of artillery at long ranges. The country
around Ladysmith seems to be one that calls loudly for even a more
lavish artillery equipment than might normally suffice. Yet, in spite of
science and of common-sense, the Ladysmith garrison, occupying a
predetermined position open to artillery fire from all sides, was left
absolutely destitute of long-range guns, and none too well provided with
field-artillery. But that Captain Scott proved himself able, just in
time, to improvise out of the rough materials at hand an effective
gun-carriage, there would have been nothing to prevent the Boers from
using their big guns at half the distance they have actually had to
keep."
At this time British troops were withdrawn from Colenso and moved
farther south, and Boer armies continued to close round Ladysmith.
Isimbulwana Hill, lying east of Ladysmith, was taken possession of, and
a force advancing from Dewdrop, on the west of the town, moved south
towards Colenso, and there on high ground posted its guns. Yet, in spite
of this, the town showed itself to be "all alive and kicking." Though
cut off from the telegraph, it sent out pigeon-posts; though engirdled
by Boers, it made sorties of the most animated description, and
literally laughed at the hint of surrender. On the 2nd, Colonel
Brocklehurst made an attack on the enemy's laagers with a force of
cavalry, mounted infantry, and mounted volunteers, surprising the
Dutchmen and driving them back with comparatively small loss, and on the
following day fighting lasted for some hours between the British
cavalry, supported by field-artillery, Imperial Light Horse, and Natal
Mounted Volunteers, and the Republicans. Many shells were pitched into
the town, and an artillery duel rampaged with such relentless vigour
that the general sensation to those who remained enclosed in the town
was as though a thunderstorm with earthquake was passing over the place.
Nothing worse happened, and the enemy for a while were driven back to
their camp and some thirty or more prisoners were taken. Major Charles
Kincaid, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, with nine wounded prisoners, was
exchanged by the Boers for eight of their countrymen in similar plight.
Others of them were not fit to travel. The enemy continued active,
replacing disabled guns with new ones and dragging fresh powerful
weapons to bear on the situation. On the 4th of November they announced
their annexation of Upper Tugela, and a counter-proclamation of the
nature already quoted was issued by the Governor.
A large commando of the enemy commenced the bombardment of Colenso, and
the troops forming the garrison of that place fell back on Estcourt,
where was stationed a force of considerable strength. By "considerable
strength" it must be understood that the force was sufficiently strong
for purposes of defence, though not for purposes of offence. As a matter
of fact, the force in Natal was not, and has not since been,
sufficiently strong for attack of a foe in such powerfully intrenched
positions. From beginning to end our military commanders on that side of
the theatre of war were sorely handicapped by the tardy recognition by
the Home Government of the gravity of the situation. But here it is now
desirable that something should be said of the early history of the
towns of Mafeking and Kimberley, which, like Ladysmith, were by this
time almost completely isolated, rails and telegraph wires having been
cut around both places respectively.
[Illustration: LADYSMITH, NATAL.
Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Colonel Sherston, D.S.O., of the Rifle Brigade, in which he held the
rank of Major, was a son of the late Captain Sherston, of Evercreech
House, Somerset, and a nephew of Lord Roberts. He entered the army on
February 12, 1876, and on the Afghan War breaking out two years later was
appointed aide-de-camp to his uncle, then Sir Frederick Roberts. He was
present in the engagement at Charasiah on October 6, 1879, and the
subsequent pursuit of the enemy, his services being mentioned in
despatches. A similar distinction fell to his lot in connection with the
operations around Cabul in 1879, including the investment of Sherpore. He
accompanied Lord Roberts in the famous march to Candahar, and was present
at the battle at that place, when he was again mentioned in despatches.
His services during the operations were rewarded with the medal with three
clasps and the bronze decoration. In 1881 he took part in the Mahsood
Wuzeeree Expedition, and on August 20, 1884, he received his company. He
served with the Burmese Expedition in 1886-87 as D.A.A. and Q.G. on the
Headquarters Staff, and was again mentioned in despatches and received the
Distinguished Service Order and the medal with clasp. On October 15, 1898,
A.A.G. in Bengal.
[2] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Henry Gunning, of the 1st King's Royal
Rifles, was the eldest son of Sir George William Gunning, fifth Baronet,
of Little Horton House, Northampton, the Chairman of the Conservative
Party in Mid-Northamptonshire, by his marriage with Isabella Mary Frances
Charlotte, daughter of the late Colonel William Chester-Master, of the
Abbey, Cirencester, and was born on July 17, 1852. Educated at Eton, he
entered the army as a sub-lieutenant on March 26, 1873, and was gazetted
to the 60th Foot (now the King's Royal Rifle Corps) as a lieutenant on
September 9, 1874. He served in the Zulu War of 1879 with the third
battalion of his regiment, and was present at the action of Gingindhlovu
and the relief of Ekowe, afterwards serving as adjutant of the battalion
throughout the operations of "Clarke's Column," for which he wore the
medal with clasp. He was gazetted captain in August 1883, was an adjutant
of the Auxiliary Forces (the 5th Militia Battalion of the King's Royal
Rifles) from March 1886 to March 1891, having obtained the rank of major
on June 25, 1890. In 1891-92 he took part in the war in Burma, being
engaged in the operations in the Chin Hills in command of the Baungshe
column, for which he wore a second medal with clasp. His commission as
lieutenant-colonel bore date April 16, 1898. Colonel Gunning, who was in
the Commission of the Peace for the county of Northants, married in 1880
Fanny Julia, daughter of the late Mr. Clinton George Dawkins, formerly Her
Majesty's Consul-General at Venice.
[3] Colonel John James Scott Chisholme, who was killed at Elandslaagte,
belonged to the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, and who was detached on special
service in South Africa, came of an old Scottish family, the Chisholmes of
Stirches, Roxburghshire, his family seat being situate at the latter
place. He was the only son of the late Mr. John Scott Chisholme (who
assumed the name of Scott in 1852 under the will of his uncle, Mr. James
Scott of Whitehaugh), by his marriage with Margaret, eldest daughter and
co-heir of the late Mr. Robert Walker of Mumrells, Stirlingshire, and was
born in 1851. He entered the army in January 1872, his first services
being with the 9th Lancers, and reached the rank of captain in March 1878.
From that year till 1880 he served with the 9th Lancers in the Afghan War,
was present at the capture of Ali Musjid, took part in the affair of Siah
Sung, where he was severely wounded, and in the operations around Cabul in
December 1879, when he was again wounded, and obtained mention in
despatches, being rewarded with the brevet of major (May 2, 1881), and the
medal with two clasps. He reached the substantive rank of major in
December 1884, and from that year till 1889 was a major of the 9th
Lancers, when he was transferred to the 5th Lancers. He was Military
Secretary to Lord Connemara when Governor of Madras from 1888 to 1891. He
reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel in August 1894, and that of colonel
on August 12, 1898.
[4] Commander Egerton was a nephew of the Duke of Devonshire and of the
first Earl of Ellesmere. He was the son of the late Admiral the Hon.
Francis Egerton, M.P. for East Derbyshire, 1868-86. Commander Egerton, who
was in his thirty-first year, entered the navy seventeen years ago. He
became a lieutenant in 1891, and in 1897 he was appointed gunnery officer
in the cruiser _Powerful_, having specially qualified in gunnery. He
possessed honorary certificates from the Royal Naval College, but he had
had no previous experience of war service.