"The Bolsheviks," Kautsky mediates, "acquired the force necessary for
the seizure of political power through the fact that, amongst the
political parties in Russia, they were the most energetic in their
demands for peace--peace at any price, a separate peace--without
interesting themselves as to the influence this would have on the
general international situation, as to whether this would assist the
victory and world domination of the German military monarchy, under
the protection of which they remained for a long time, just like
Indian or Irish rebels or Italian anarchists." (Page 53.)
Of the reasons for our victory, Kautsky knows only the one that we
stood for peace. He does not explain the Soviet Government has
continued to exist now that it has again mobilized a most important
proportion of the soldiers of the imperial army, in order for two
years successfully to combat its political enemies.
The watchword of peace undoubtedly played an enormous part in our
struggle; but precisely because it was directed against the
_imperialist_ war. The idea of peace was supported most strongly
of all, not by the tired soldiers, but by the foremost workers, for
whom it had the import, not for a rest, but of a pitiless struggle
against the exploiters. It was those same workers who, under the
watchword of peace, later laid down their lives on the Soviet fronts.
The affirmation that we demanded peace without reckoning on the effect
it would have on the international situation is a belated echo of
Cadet and Menshevik slanders. The comparison of us with the
Germanophile nationalists of India and Ireland seeks its justification
in the fact that German imperialism did actually _attempt_ to
make use of us as it did the Indians and the Irish. But the
chauvinists of France spared no efforts to make use of Liebknecht and
Luxemburg--even of Kautsky and Bernstein--in their own interests. The
whole question is, did we allow ourselves to be utilized? Did we, by
our conduct, give the European workers even the shadow of a ground to
place us in the same category as German imperialism? It is sufficient
to remember the course of the Brest negotiations, their breakdown, and
the German advance of February, 1918, to reveal all the cynicism of
Kautsky's accusation. In reality, there was no peace for a single day
between ourselves and German imperialism. On the Ukrainian and
Caucasian fronts, we, in the measure of our then extremely feeble
energies, continued to wage war without openly calling it such. We
were too weak to organize war along the whole Russo-German front. We
maintained persistently the fiction of peace, utilizing the fact that
the chief German forces were drawn away to the west. If German
imperialism did prove sufficiently powerful, in 1917-18, to impose
upon us the Brest Peace, after all our efforts to tear that noose from
our necks, one of the principal reasons was the disgraceful behavior
of the German Social-Democratic Party, of which Kautsky remained an
integral and essential part. The Brest Peace was pre-determined on
August 4, 1914. At that moment, Kautsky not only did not declare war
against German militarism, as he later demanded from the Soviet
Government, which was in 1918 still powerless from a military point of
view; Kautsky actually proposed voting for the War Credits, "under
certain conditions"; and generally behaved in such a way that for
months it was impossible to discover whether he stood for the War or
against it. And this political coward, who at the decisive moment gave
up the principal positions of Socialism, dares to accuse us of having
found ourselves obliged, at a certain moment, to retreat--not in
principle, but materially. And why? Because we were betrayed by the
German Social-Democracy, corrupted by Kautskianism--_i.e._, by
political prostitution disguised by theories.
We did concern ourselves with the international situation! In reality,
we had a much more profound criterion by which to judge the
international situation; and it did not deceive us. Already before the
February Revolution the Russian Army no longer existed as a fighting
force. Its final collapse was pre-determined. If the February
Revolution had not taken place, Tsarism would have come to an
agreement with the German monarchy. But the February Revolution which
prevented that finally destroyed the army built on a monarchist basis,
precisely because it was a revolution. A month sooner or later the
army was bound to fall to pieces. The military policy of Kerensky was
the policy of an ostrich. He closed his eyes to the decomposition of
the army, talked sounding phrases, and uttered verbal threats against
German imperialism.
In such conditions, we had only one way out: to take our stand on the
platform of peace, as the inevitable conclusion from the military
powerlessness of the revolution, and to transform that watchword into
the weapon of revolutionary influence on all the peoples of Europe.
That is, instead of, together with Kerensky, peacefully awaiting the
final military catastrophe--which might bury the revolution in its
ruins--we proposed to take possession of the watchword of peace and to
lead after it the proletariat of Europe--and first and foremost the
workers of Austro-Germany. It was in the light of this view that we
carried on our peace negotiations with the Central Empires, and it was
in the light of this that we drew up our Notes to the governments of
the Entente. We drew out the negotiations as long as we could, in
order to give the European working masses the possibility of realizing
the meaning of the Soviet Government and its policy. The January
strike of 1918 in Germany and Austria showed that our efforts had not
been in vain. That strike was the first serious premonition of the
German Revolution. The German Imperialists understood then that it was
just we who represented for them a deadly danger. This is very
strikingly shown in Ludendorff's book. True, they could not risk any
longer coming out against us in an open crusade. But wherever they
could fight against us secretly deceiving the German workers with the
help of the German Social-Democracy, they did so; in the Ukraine, on
the Don, in the Caucasus. In Central Russia, in Moscow, Count Mirbach
from the very first day of his arrival stood as the centre of
counter-revolutionary plots against the Soviet Government--just as
Comrade Yoffe in Berlin was in the closest possible touch with the
revolution. The Extreme Left group of the German revolutionary
movement, the party of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, all the
time went hand in hand with us. The German revolution at once took on
the form of Soviets, and the German proletariat, in spite of the Brest
Peace, did not for a moment entertain any doubts as to whether we were
with Liebknecht or Ludendorff. In his evidence before the Reichstag
Commission in November, 1919, Ludendorff explained how "the High
Command demanded the creation of an institution with the object of
disclosing the connection of revolutionary tendencies in Germany with
Russia. Yoffe arrived in Berlin, and in various towns there were set
up Russian consulates. This had the most painful consequences in the
army and navy." Kautsky, however, has the audacity to write that "if
matters did come to a German revolution, truly it is not the
Bolsheviks who are responsible for it." (Page 162.)
Even if we had had the possibility in 1917-18, by means of
revolutionary abstention, of supporting the old Imperial Army instead
of hastening its destruction, we should have merely been assisting the
Entente, and would have covered up by our aid its brigands' peace with
Germany, Austria, and all the countries of the world generally. With
such a policy we should at the decisive moment have proved absolutely
disarmed in the face of the Entente--still more disarmed than Germany
is to-day. Whereas, thanks to the November Revolution and the Brest
Peace we are to-day the only country which opposes the Entente rifle
in hand. By our international policy, we not only did not assist the
Hohenzollern to assume a position of world domination; on the
contrary, by our November Revolution we did more than anyone else to
prepare his overthrow. At the same time, we gained a military
breathing-space, in the course of which we created a large and strong
army, the first army of the proletariat in history, with which to-day
not all the unleashed hounds of the Entente can cope.
The most critical moment in our international situation arose in the
autumn of 1918, after the destruction of the German armies. In the
place of two mighty camps, more or less neutralizing each other, there
stood before us the victorious Entente, at the summit of its world
power, and there lay broken Germany, whose Junker blackguards would
have considered it a happiness and an honor to spring at the throat of
the Russian proletariat for a bone from the kitchen of Clemenceau. We
proposed peace to the Entente, and were again ready--for we were
obliged--to sign the most painful conditions. But Clemenceau, in whose
imperialist rapacity there have remained in their full force all the
characteristics of lower-middle-class thick-headedness, refused the
Junkers their bone, and at the same time decided at all costs to
decorate the Invalides with the scalps of the leaders of the Soviet
Republic. By this policy Clemenceau did us not a small service. We
defended ourselves successfully, and held out.
What, then, was the guiding principle of our external policy, once the
first months of existence of the Soviet Government had made clear the
considerable vitality as yet of the capitalist governments of Europe?
Just that which Kautsky accepts to-day uncomprehendingly as an
accidental result--_to hold out_!
We realized too clearly that the very fact of the existence of the
Soviet Government is an event of the greatest revolutionary
importance; and this realization dictated to us our concessions and
our temporary retirements--not in principle but in practical
conclusions from a sober estimate of our own forces. We retreated like
an army which gives up to the enemy a town, and even a fortress, in
order, having retreated, to concentrate its forces not only for
defence but for an advance. We retreated like strikers amongst whom
to-day energies and resources have been exhausted, but who, clenching
their teeth, are preparing for a new struggle. If we were not filled
with an unconquerable belief in the world significance of the Soviet
dictatorship, we should not have accepted the most painful sacrifices
at Brest-Litovsk. If our faith had proved to be contradicted by the
actual course of events, the Brest Peace would have gone down to
history as the futile capitulation of a doomed regime. That is how the
situation was judged _then_, not only by the Kuehlmanns, but also
by the Kautskies of all countries. But we proved right in our
estimate, as of our weakness then, so of our strength in the future.
The existence of the Ebert Republic, with its universal suffrage, its
parliamentary swindling, its "freedom" of the Press, and its murder of
labor leaders, is merely a necessary link in the historical chain of
slavery and scoundrelism. The existence of the Soviet Government is a
fact of immeasurable revolutionary significance. It was necessary to
retain it, utilizing the conflict of the capitalist nations, the as
yet unfinished imperialist war, the self-confident effrontery of the
Hohenzollern bands, the thick-wittedness of the world-bourgeoisie as
far as the fundamental questions of the revolution were concerned, the
antagonism of America and Europe, the complication of relations within
the Entente. We had to lead our yet unfinished Soviet ship over the
stormy waves, amid rocks and reefs, completing its building and
armament en route.
Kautsky has the audacity to repeat the accusation that we did not, at
the beginning of 1918, hurl ourselves unarmed against our mighty foe.
Had we done this we would have been crushed.[8] The first great
attempt of the proletariat to seize power would have suffered defeat.
The revolutionary wing of the European proletariat would have been
dealt the severest possible blow. The Entente would have made peace
with the Hohenzollern over the corpse of the Russian Revolution, and
the world capitalist reaction would have received a respite for a
number of years. When Kautsky says that, concluding the Brest Peace,
we did not think of its influence on the fate of the German
Revolution, he is uttering a disgraceful slander. We considered the
question from all sides, and our _sole criterion_ was the interests of
the international revolution.
[8] The Vienna Arbeiterzeitung opposes, as is fitting, the
wise Russian Communists to the foolish Austrians. "Did not
Trotsky," the paper writes, "with a clear view and
understanding of possibilities, sign the Brest-Litovsk peace
of violence, notwithstanding that it served for the
consolidation of German imperialism? The Brest Peace was
just as harsh and shameful as is the Versailles Peace. But
does this mean that Trotsky had to be rash enough to
continue the war against Germany? Would not the fate of the
Russian Revolution long ago have been sealed? Trotsky bowed
before the unalterable necessity of signing the shameful
treaty in anticipation of the German revolution." The honor
of having foreseen all the consequences of the Brest Peace
belongs to Lenin. But this, of course, alters nothing in the
argument of the organ of the Viennese Kautskians.
We came to the conclusion that those interests demanded that the only
Soviet Government in the world should be preserved. And we proved
right. Whereas Kautsky awaited our fall, if not with impatience, at
least with certainty; and on this expected fall built up his whole
international policy.
The minutes of the session of the Coalition Government of November 19,
1918, published by the Bauer Ministry, run:--"First, a continuation of
the discussion as to the relations of Germany and the Soviet Republic.
Haase advises a policy of procrastination. Kautsky agrees with Haase:
_decision must be postponed_. _The Soviet Government will not last
long. It will inevitably fall in the course of a few weeks_...."
In this way, at the time when the situation of the Soviet Government
was really extremely difficult--for the destruction of German
militarism had given the Entente, it seemed, the full possibility of
finishing with us "in the course of a few weeks"--at that moment
Kautsky not only does not hasten to our aid, and even does not merely
wash his hands of the whole affair; he participates in active
treachery against revolutionary Russia. To aid Scheidemann in his role
of _watch-dog_ of the bourgeoisie, instead of the "programme" role
assigned to him of its "_grave-digger_," Kautsky himself hastens
to become the grave-digger of the Soviet Government. But the Soviet
Government is alive. It will outlive all its grave-diggers.
8