"On March 19," Kautsky informs us, "in the Central Committee of the
National Guard, some demanded a march on Versailles, others an appeal
to the electors, and a third party the adoption first of all of
revolutionary measures; as if every one of these steps," he proceeds
very learnedly to inform us, "were not equally necessary, and as if
one excluded the other." (Page 72.) Further on, Kautsky, in connection
with these disputes in the Commune, presents us with various warmed-up
platitudes as to the mutual relations of reform and revolution. In
reality, the following was the situation. If it were decided to march
on Versailles, and to do this without losing an hour it was necessary
immediately to reorganize the National Guard, to place at its head the
best fighting elements of the Paris proletariat, and thereby
temporarily to weaken Paris from the revolutionary point of view. But
to organize elections in Paris, while at the same time sending out of
its walls the flower of the working class, would have been senseless
from the point of view of the revolutionary party. Theoretically, a
march on Versailles and elections to the Commune, of course, did not
exclude each other in the slightest degree, but in practice they did
exclude each other: for the success of the elections, it was necessary
to postpone the attack; for the attack to succeed, the elections must
be put off. Finally, leading the proletariat out to the field and
thereby temporarily weakening Paris, it was essential to obtain some
guarantee against the possibility of counter-revolutionary attempts in
the capital; for Thiers would not have hesitated at any measures to
raise a white revolt in the rear of the Communards. It was essential
to establish a more military--_i.e._, a more stringent regime in
the capital. "They had to fight," writes Lavrov, "against many
internal foes with whom Paris was full, who only yesterday had been
rioting around the Exchange and the Vendome Square, who had their
representatives in the administration and in the National Guard, who
possessed their press, and their meetings, who almost openly
maintained contact with the Versaillese, and who became more
determined and more audacious at every piece of carelessness, at every
check of the Commune." (Page 87.)
It was necessary, side by side with this, to carry out revolutionary
measures of a financial and generally of an economic character: first
and foremost, for the equipment of the revolutionary army. All these
most necessary measures of revolutionary dictatorship could with
difficulty be reconciled with an extensive electoral campaign. But
Kautsky has not the least idea of what a revolution is in practice. He
thinks that theoretically to reconcile is the same as practically to
accomplish.
The Central Committee appointed March 22 as the day of elections for
the Commune; but, not sure of itself, frightened at its own
illegality, striving to act in unison with more "legal" institutions,
entered into ridiculous and endless negotiations with a quite helpless
assembly of mayors and deputies of Paris, showing its readiness to
divide power with them if only an agreement could be arrived at.
Meanwhile precious time was slipping by.
Marx, on whom Kautsky, through old habit, tries to rely, did not under
any circumstances propose that, at one and the same time, the Commune
should be elected and the workers should be led out into the field for
the war. In his letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote, on April 12, 1871,
that the Central Committee of the National Guard had too soon given up
its power in favor of the Commune. Kautsky, in his own words, "does
not understand" this opinion of Marx. It is quite simple. Marx at any
rate understood that the problem was not one of chasing legality, but
of inflicting a fatal blow upon the enemy. "If the Central Committee
had consisted of real revolutionaries," says Lavrov, and rightly, "it
ought to have acted differently. It would have been quite unforgivable
for it to have given the enemy ten days' respite before the election
and assembly of the Commune, while the leaders of the proletariat
refused to carry out their duty and did not recognize that they had
the right immediately to _lead_ the proletariat. As it was, the
feeble immaturity of the popular parties created a Committee which
considered those ten days of inaction incumbent upon it." (Page 78.)
The yearning of the Central Committee to hand over power as soon as
possible to a "legal" Government was dictated, not so much by the
superstitions of former democracy, of which, by the way, there was no
lack, as by fear of responsibility. Under the plea that it was a
temporary institution, the Central Committee avoided the taking of the
most necessary and absolutely pressing measures, in spite of the fact
that all the material apparatus of power was centred in its hands. But
the Commune itself did not take over political power in full from the
Central Committee, and the latter continued to interfere in all
business quite unceremoniously. This created a dual Government, which
was extremely dangerous, particularly under military conditions.
On May 3 the Central Committee sent deputies to the Commune demanding
that the Ministry for War should be placed under its control. Again
there arose, as Lissagaray writes, the question as to whether "the
Central Committee should be dissolved, or arrested, or entrusted with
the administration of the Ministry for War."
Here was a question, not of the principles of democracy, but of the
absence, in the case of both parties, of a clear programme of action,
and of the readiness, both of the irresponsible revolutionary
organizations in the shape of the Central Committee and of the
"democratic" organization of the Commune, to shift the responsibility
on to the other's shoulders, while at the same time not entirely
renouncing power.
These were political relations which it might seem no one could call
worthy of imitation.
"But the Central Committee," Kautsky consoles himself, "never
attempted to infringe the principle in virtue of which the supreme
power must belong to the delegates elected by universal suffrage." In
this respect the "Paris Commune was the direct antithesis of the
Soviet Republic." (Page 74.) There was no unity of government, there
was no revolutionary decision, there existed a division of power, and,
as a result, there came swift and terrible destruction. But to
counter-balance this--is it not comforting?--there was no infringement
of the "principle" of democracy.