“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing

of all these ships, with the exception of the _Ajax_ and

_Agamemnon_, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history

and intentions of the designs.

“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work

involved in those designs remains, although my official connection

with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years

ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply

embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist

for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of

the Admiralty.

“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the

most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration

of one feature only in their fighting efficiency, _viz._, the

extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the

water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which

I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other

qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the

French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English

ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length

at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed

so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in

all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very

few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’

“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are

stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed

simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly

greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are

altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the

belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at

least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any

other navy.

“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid

destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir

Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable

risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks

are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the

armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there

is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction

of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances

which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a

very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions

for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of

the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships

is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while

the _mitraille_, which is driven back into a ship when armor is

penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile

can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is

intended to protect.

“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce

certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary

to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief

and untechnical as possible.

“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped

under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the

English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do

battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered

the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second

question may be considered to include the first; but it will be

convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have

been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres

in the comparison between existing ships.

“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent

designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed,

armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a

decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further,

it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the

armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce

the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by

one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are

concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution

of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary

armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed

at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in

former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from

being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power

as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased,

especially when firing with depression.

“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the

broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down

to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by.

The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically

dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a

citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern

battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising

from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet

above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends

from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked

at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof

to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of the _Admiral_

class the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total

length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty

feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate

the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications

from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of

the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The

protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the

central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is

no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck,

situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the

bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed

coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc.,

the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into

a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of

longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to

these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams

with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the

armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective

deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding

substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely

subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown

into communication with one another by means of very extensive

injuries to the partitions.

“In all the modern French ships, as well as in the _Admiral_ class,

a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above

the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the

stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light

erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the

barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a

small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided

ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and

habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less

considerable number of light guns can be fought concurrently

with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The

radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and the

_Admiral_ class, independently of other considerations than the

armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of

the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side

armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision

and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing

the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may

find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and

seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship

has to fight a vessel of the _Admiral_ class, the latter has

obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the

sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends

of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the

ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion,

the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region

might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the

lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships

and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the

ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way,

with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance

of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English

ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships

will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow

and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the

passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion

of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor,

even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness.

In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an

error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt

armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical

extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any

discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view,

or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the

wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle

ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from

rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one

who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the

light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than

the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area

exposed at the unarmored ends of the _Admiral_ class, between the

level of the belt-deck and the water-line.

“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown

him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French

belted ships (of which the _Amiral Duperré_ is an example), if the

light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously

riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate

sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of

the _Admiral_ class in the English navy, if similarly treated,

would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to

be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that

there has never been any assertion that the _Admiral_ class would

be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the

armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above.

On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it

was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power

to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of

inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect

they were in identically the same position as all other armored

ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries

placed high above water.

“What has been said respecting the _Admiral_ class is this: If the

unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown

open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the

stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations

from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored

portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of

the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large

inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the

unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were

careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures

above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable

amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing

to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and

stability.

“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks;

the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and

openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short,

every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments,

and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the

outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate

the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.

“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the

French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal

precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying

above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the

French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships.

Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating

our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in

a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical

disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware

that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and

maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor.

To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am

content to say that, as between the French ships and the _Admiral_

class, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action

are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the

shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.

“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly

involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the

first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the

extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight

and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has

recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other

respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons

in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the

ends. In the _Collingwood_ herself quite as large a proportionate

increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt

from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might,

of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor

involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result

may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war

should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far

as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in the

_Admiral_ class this matter was very carefully investigated before

the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the

trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the

protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by

means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by

coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.

“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which

the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole

of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in

draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss

in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers

were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious

disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or

speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and

near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the

vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme

case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to

eighteen inches, a ship of the _Admiral_ class would go into action

with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so

protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that

deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating

at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or

alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced

if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would

the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.

“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends

with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of

the belt armor in the _Admiral_ class about fourteen to eighteen

inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the

French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be

measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected

buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship

lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then

the _Admiral_ class would not compare favorably with the fully

belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not

the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of

gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either

the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the

vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.

“As between the _Admiral_ class and the central-citadel ships

of the _Inflexible_ type there is a difference in this respect

which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel

ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel

still remains several feet above water; whereas, in the _Admiral_

class, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near

the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that,

notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water,

the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety

against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than the

_Admiral_ class. In both classes the armored portions require the

assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount

of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when

damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is

true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.

“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be

considered.

“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged

by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in

the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven

at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities,

and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support

of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of

experiments made with the _Inflexible’s_ model about eight years

ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must

therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed

after a careful personal observation of these model experiments.

First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence

of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the

still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers

arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides

above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the

belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along

that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would

result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and

partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in

the _Admiral_ class for the very purpose of limiting the flow of

entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the

speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is

evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it

prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep

the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and

the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.

“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my

opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail

in the calculations and designs for the _Admiral_ class, that the

disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective

decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing

in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the

protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim,

speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against

extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further,

that in these particulars the _Admiral_ class are capable of

meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the

French navy.

“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between

the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor

have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and

will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the

different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There

is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables

the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised.

As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is

developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be

readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships

have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working

simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum

total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of

what is wisest and best for the particular conditions which the

ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has

the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of

producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he

will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains

on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the

doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair

measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English

ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because

they are of smaller displacement.

“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself

chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it

would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the

artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing

the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery

officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the

subject, I would venture to say a few words.

“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason

for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether

it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a

considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the

unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in

the condemnation of the _Admiral_ class. If the _Collingwood_,

or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target

in a sea-way for the _Amiral Duperré_ or one of her consorts,

this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that the

_Collingwood_ would herself be delivering heavy blows in return for

those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily

be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the

introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on

the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So

far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board

meeting which decided to approve the building of the _Collingwood_

the possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some

length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system

and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which

has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may

be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of

modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the

shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty

be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements

for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in

use at the ends of the _Admiral_ class. More especially is this

true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much

larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder

are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be

practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and

the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire

from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack

against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships,

especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and

large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.

“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not

profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great

differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten

that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced

in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from

the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the

armor in the _Admiral_ class is satisfactory. This has been done

after the attention of the Board and the public has been most

strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the

rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the

under-water decks of the _Admiral_ class. It would be folly to

suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations

would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved

to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility

of making experiments which should determine the points at issue,

I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily

arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual

fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which

have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular

structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of

the kind could be arranged.

“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of

armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too

great a length to permit of any attempt at a full discussion. It

will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of

naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed,

even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in

view of the present means of offence and defence.

“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor,

but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways

by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward

Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of

a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of

the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong

protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc.,

should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel.

At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design

of the grand Italian vessels of the _Italia_ class. In them the

hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular

hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim,

taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under

water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which

Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against

gun-fire.

“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect

the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from

those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the

protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the

cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of

the ship lying below it.

“Between these two types of ships come the _Admiral_ class of the

English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose

resemblances and differences have been described above.

“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the

development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected

cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable,

seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on

decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments,

involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which

are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms

of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence.

In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated

controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly

to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled

by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of

our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with

greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting

the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided

except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done

by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago

was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted,

I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition

of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will

require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question,

‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’

“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject,

is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the

disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the

principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of

inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and

cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is

no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and

cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but

it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory,

especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as

from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that

even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof

against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks.

It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be

faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region

of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I

have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better

fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of

protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor,

and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially

constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to

the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over

a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary

condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability

of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable

that in future the great distinction between battle-ships and

protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull

protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick

armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.

“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a

momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the

relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It

cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.

“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and

impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be

assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire

to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a

sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

“W. H. WHITE.

“ELSWICK WORKS, _March 26th_.”

The following reply by Sir Edward Reed appeared in the _Times_ of

April 8, 1885, the omitted portions being personal allusions which

have very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no

interest to a professional reader outside of England:

“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is

compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which

I have brought against these six ships, _viz._, that they have been

so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that

their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient

to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a

good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored

parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and

afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an

important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of

the _Admiral_ type are, and are admitted to be, so built that their

‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if

inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed

by their armor-belts.’

* * * * *

“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are

or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow

myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from

the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the

efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have

been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief

from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments,

coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork

is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear

no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from

my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any

references to these devices, and for a very simple reason, _viz._,

all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no

sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common

to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are

unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships

stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than

it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an

armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon

the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few

line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the

present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend

upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright

and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships

intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a

few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If,

for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the

compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side

remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured

side of the ship would help to capsize her.

“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks,

and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion

of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of

a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think,

what we please, so far as our sense and judgment will allow us;

but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails

utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to

keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell

that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He

refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions

and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for

the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he

tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues

in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’

at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’

But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what

he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build

a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and

close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a

few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect

particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe

distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is

wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in

carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally

different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our

national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent

such an object from ever becoming ours.

“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late

colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare

were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance

shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or

less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the

line-of-battle ship _Collingwood_ to be supposed to steam straight

up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is

to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow,

and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment

between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?

“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so

as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their

commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will,

to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir,

it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign

officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in

their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one

occasion the _Collingwood_ herself was imposed upon them as a model

to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better

ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’

said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under

my feet?’

* * * * *

“Mr. White coolly tells us that the _Collingwood_, with five

hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight

feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck

stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface,

and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water

would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured

bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a

very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard

such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her

Majesty’s ships.

“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the

above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury

by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that

such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. The

_Huascar_ was not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated

her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet

after the _Cochrane_ and _Blanco Encaloda_ had defeated her she

presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction

which shell-fire produces. An officer of the _Cochrane_, who was

the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me

written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the

destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, of

_débris_ and dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser

shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or

nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst

on board, doing awful destruction.’

“Speaking of the injury which the _Cochrane_ received from a single

shell of the _Huascar_, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works

at commander’s cabin, breaking fore and aft bulkhead of cabins,

breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood,

passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room,

struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of

embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went

overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and

terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished

with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in

its flight.’

“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is

obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those

very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments,

coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme

surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets

seem so ready to place their main dependence.

* * * * *

“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of

the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision

as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell,

subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety

in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be

prepared for fighting at close quarters.

“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in

Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor

of the _Admiral_ class is somehow associated with the placing

of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate

positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement

of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may

happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel

or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs

of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost

equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless

concentrated in a single battery.

“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt

my advice to protect the _Admiral_ class in certain unarmored

parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would

practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than

existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my

suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection

of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld

from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some

degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist

capsizing forces?

“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception

to my claiming for the _Inflexible_ type of ship, on account of

their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability

in battle than the _Admiral_ type possesses, because, he says, ‘in

both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the

unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall

effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’

The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the

principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in

the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must

in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or

less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then

on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all

left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is

no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater

ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help

hold her up?

* * * * *

“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the

relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various

conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to

three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things

being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our

ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot

wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite

possible that the French constructors may have given their ships

less initial stability than ours; from such information as I

possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the

armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her,

are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they

will retain until their armor is pierced; whereas our ships may

have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their

armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than

half the height of those of the French ships above water.

* * * * *

“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at

Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their

armor-belts at the bow, and the _Amiral Duperré_ was always quoted

in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper

from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at

the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships

in this respect, as the following figures will show:

+------------------+--------------+--------------+

| | Thickness | Thickness |

| NAME OF SHIP. | of Armor | of Armor |

| | Amidship. | at Bows. |

+------------------+--------------+--------------+

| | Centimetres. | Centimetres. |

| Amiral Baudin | 55 | 40 |

| Formidable | 55 | 40 |

| Hoche | 45 | 40 |

| Magenta | 45 | 40 |

| Marceau | 45 | 40 |

| Caiman | 50 | 35 |

| Fulminant | 33 | 25 |

| Furieuse | 50 | 32 |

| Indomptable | 50 | 37 |

| Requin | 50 | 40 |

| Terrible | 50 | 37 |

+------------------+--------------+--------------+

“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing the _Amiral Duperré_ with the

_Amiral Baudin_, _Dévastation_, _Formidable_, and _Foudroyant_,

which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities

are observable: The _Duperré_ is about three feet narrower than

the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less

metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to

her breadth than the other ships.’

“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth

all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty

office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not

unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no

business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their

stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of

fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours,

has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing

the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But

their falling into one error is no justification for our falling

into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every

ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the

experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed

with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so

far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or

rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a

secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged

inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger

of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire

armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water

when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then

has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow

into holes ten by four feet?

“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture

to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored

ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to

be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far

as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when

the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to

facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the

sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is

placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such

holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The

officer of the _Cochrane_, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state

that shot-plugs are out of the question after or at such a fight.

They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or

oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside

parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the

holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes.

There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes

and long, but they are of no use whatever.’

“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said

enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question

of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates

a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful

devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation

by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you,

our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as

he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two

they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal

for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are

about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be

grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish

these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty

matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.

“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of

the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He

admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those

experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make, _viz._,

experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but

unarmored parts of ships.

* * * * *

“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the

abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by

unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity

that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence.

On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might

be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo

alike, ships which could dispose of the _Admiral_ class of ships

more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest

antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to

produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that

armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose

business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas

and lock them up in their own ports.”

The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained

sixteen members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those

members, Admiral George Elliot, R.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder,

R.N., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not

sign the report, and accordingly they submitted a very able minority

report embodying their views.

The first of the “general principles” laid down in their report is as

follows:

“That it is of the last importance that the modifications in

existing types of men-of-war which the committee have been invited

to suggest should be calculated not merely to effectually meet the

necessities of naval warfare now and in the immediate future, but

in full view of the probable necessities of naval warfare in the

more remote future.”

It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant officers to

observe in some designs of the present day a confirmation of their

forecast in many particulars.

The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present

controversy, by Admiral Elliot, appeared in the _Times_ (London) of

April 24, 1885, and contain the pith of his oft-quoted arguments:

“My first impression on reading these letters in the _Times_ is one

of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts

has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of

side-armor _versus_ cellular-deck armor, but that their attention

has been directed to this feature of design only as connected with

a particular type of ship, namely, the _Collingwood_, which vessel

is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to

buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr.

White’s defence of the unarmored ends of the _Collingwood_ is so

far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development

of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an

exponent of the real merits of this system.

* * * * *

“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two

distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to

the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in

the design of the _Collingwood_, and in this scientific view of the

case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point

out that the cellular-deck principle _per se_ does not involve any

such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight

of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight

will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the

unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his

sharpest weapon of attack.

* * * * *

“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the

protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to

the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss

Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the

question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than

twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the

sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to

the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does

not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection,

and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than

ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of

much greater displacement than the _Collingwood_ class. I feel

justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis,

because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved

armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of

ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced

the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck

water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this

thin armor-belt.

“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection,

namely, an all-round belt _versus_ a raft body, must not only be

ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel,

and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by

such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being

those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties

of the combatants.

“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view

of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great

tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of

protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view

with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by

the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which

it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’

and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice

and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval

battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one

side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is

called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission

is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing

reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate

known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and

in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe

that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that

in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the

water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on

their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity

hereafter.

“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes

as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided

character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition

of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is

almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he

has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all

that will stand between the life and death of a ship—that is

to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and

boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by

the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited.

Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell

explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because

one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by

economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern

to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance

as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a

belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing

a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt.

This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of

safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to

close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram

encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise

to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits

and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics

the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far

between.

“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a

raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can

be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of

cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they

are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid

contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general

rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or

extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin

of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun

fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would,

I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing

through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard

after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without

dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great

extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being

to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of

fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available

between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially

applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician

will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and

defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in

this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous

advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended

as high as the upper deck.

“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention

than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another

disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that

question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I

shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that,

as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside

armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards

defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that

of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this

respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.

“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the

size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that

the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even

in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong

inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of

such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers

purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with

light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting

power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the

answer to the question, Where are the guns?”

The following reply appeared in the _Times_ (London) of May 1, 1885:

“SIR.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and

candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy

that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.

“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and

the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with the

_Collingwood_ or _Admiral_ type of ship, but I regret that he has

treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied

them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is

not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will

presently appear.

“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck

question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and

unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated

upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit

to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to

make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should

find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of

giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats

the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from

his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting

capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an

opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck,

I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a

cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually

formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular

steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water

the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its

load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of

thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe

materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous

fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It

needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of

thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the

dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not

sufficiently provide.

“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my

opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he

has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound

one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a

moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I

believe the _Dreadnought_, though of old design, would still fight

a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear

only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or

very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are

armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat.

Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions

imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive

ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling

us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional

conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would

be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more

costly than the _Inflexible_, with enough side-armor more than a

yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the

same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the

vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of

their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all

fire, are among the most vulnerable.

“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am

quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in

its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly

carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even

in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are

elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action,

but which are _not_ unavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George

Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and

that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.

“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion

be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than

hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long

time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.

* * * * *

“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and

contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have

made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which

contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability

and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must

not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me

to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me

in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and

in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our

principal and most costly ships at least shall be so constructed

as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in

battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant

crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find

me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity

offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot

that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or

raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which

possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”

The same number of the _Times_ contains a reply to Mr. Reed’s letter

of April 8, 1885, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of

certain charges of no interest to us, but containing the following

paragraphs:

“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a

description of the damage done to the _Huascar_ in her action with

the two Chilian iron-clads.

“This description seems to me one of the best possible

illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘the

_mitraille_ which is driven back into a ship when armor is

penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can

be.’ Had the _Huascar_ not had weak armor, but light sides only,

the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of

a shell which entered the unarmored stern of the _Cochrane_ shows

how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through

thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many

such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly

admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what

shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single

case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the

thin side-plating of the _Superb_. The case was quite exceptional,

whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with

the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover,

in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural

arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the

shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored

structures in the _Admiral_ class are likely to be destroyed in

such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor,

on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage

shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have

before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on

the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be

readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that

armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be

a real defence.

* * * * *

“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are

only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole

responsibility for professional work, the governing features in

the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are

officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it

is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to

intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither

their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.

* * * * *

“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am

content to seek information from the best authorities in both

branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I

have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are

not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of

gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed

attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as

if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging,

getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’

“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will

indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which

Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have

the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister

of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the

Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful

publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have

no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single

ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities

think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the

most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”

APPENDIX III.

RANGE OF GUNS.

_From Report of U. S. Fortification Board._

GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY NINE TO TEN MILES.

+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+

| NATION. | Ship. | Maximum | Draught. | Guns. | Calibre.|

| | | Armor. | | | |

+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+

| | | Inches. | Feet. In. | Number. | Inches. |

| England | Inflexible | 24 | 25 4 | 4 | 16 |

| France | Friedland | 7⅞ | 29 4 | 2 | 10.6 |

| ” | Redoubtable | 14 | 24 10 | 4 | 10.6 |

| ” | Duguesclin } | | | | |

| ” | Bayard } | 9⅞ | 24 10 | 4 | 9.5 |

| ” | Turenne } | | | | |

| ” | Vauban } | | | | |

| ” | Fulminant } | 13 | 21 4 | 2 | 10.6 |

| ” | Tonnerre } | | | | |

| Italy | Duilio | 21.7 | 28 | 4 | 17 |

| ” | Dandolo | 21.7 | 28 9 | 4 | 17 |

| Germany | Sachsen } | | | | |

| ” | Baiern } | 17.25 | 19 8 | 4 | 10.2 |

| ” | Würtemberg } | | | | |

| ” | Baden } | | | | |

| ” | Wespe } | | | | |

| ” | Viper } | | | | |

| ” | Biene } | | | | |

| ” | Mücke } | 8 | 10 2 | 1 | 12 |

| ” | Scorpion } | | | | |

| ” | Basilisk } | | | | |

| ” | Cameleon } | | | | |

| ” | Crocodil } | | | | |

| Brazil | Riachuelo | 11 | 20 | 4 | 9 |

+---------+----------------+---------+-----------+---------+---------+

Besides a large number on unarmored vessels and on armored vessels

not yet completed.

GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD.

+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+

| NATION. | Ship. |Maximum|Draught. | Guns. |Calibre.|

| | |Armor. | | | |

+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+

| | |Inches.|Feet. In.|Number.|Inches. |

| England | Conqueror | 12 | 24 0 | 2 | 12 |

| ” | Colossus | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |

| ” | Edinburgh | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |

| France | Amiral Duperré | 21.6 | 26 9 | 4 | 13.4 |

| ” | Dévastation | 15 | 24 11 | { 2 | 10.6 |

| | and Foudroyant | | | { 4 | 13.4 |

| ” | Terrible | 19 | 24 7 | 2 | 16.5 |

| ” | Tonnant | 17¾ | 16 9 | 2 | 13.4 |

| ” | Vengeur | 13¾ | 16 9 | 2 | 13.4 |

| Italy | Italia | 18.9 | 30 3 | 4 | 17 |

| Germany | Salamander } | | | | |

| ” | Natter } | 8 | 10 2 | 1 | 12 |

| ” | Hummel } | | | | |

| China | Ting Yuen } | 14 | 20 | 4 | 12 |

| ” | Chen Yuen } | | | | |

+---------+---------------------+-------+---------+-------+--------+

GUNS RANGING POSSIBLY TEN MILES OR UPWARD SHORTLY TO BE AFLOAT.

+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+

| NATION. | Ship. | Maximum| Draught.| Guns. | Calibre.|

| | | Armor. | | | |

+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+

| | | Inches.| Feet. In.| Number. | Inches. |

| England | Collingwood | 18 | 26 3 | 4 | 12 |

| ” | Rodney | 18 | 25 3 | 4 | 13.5 |

| ” | Benbow | 18 | 27 | 2 | 17 |

| ” | Camperdown | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |

| ” | Howe | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |

| ” | Anson | 18 | 27 3 | 4 | 13.5 |

| ” | Hero | 12 | 24 | 2 | 12 |

| ” | Renown | 18 | 27 3 | 2 | 16.25 |

| ” | Sanspareil | 18 | 27 3 | 2 | 16.25 |

| France | Amiral Baudin | 21⅝ | 26 | 3 | 16.5 |

| ” | Formidable | 21⅝ | 26 | 3 | 16.5 |

| ” | Furieux | 19⅝ | 21 7 | 2 | 13.4 |

| ” | Indomptable } | | | | |

| ” | Caïman } | 19⅝ | 24 7 | 2 | 16.5 |

| ” | Requin } | | | | |

| ” | Marceau } | | | | |

| ” | Hoche } | 17¾ | 27 3 | { 2 | 13.4 |

| ” | Magenta } | | | { 2 | 10.6 |

| ” | Neptune | 17¾ | 27 3 | 3 | 13.5 |

| Italy | Lepanto | 18.9 | 29 6 | 4 | 17 |

| ” | Ruggiero di Lauria | 17.7 | 25 11 | 4 | 17 |

| ” | Andrea Doria | 17.7 | 29 6 | 4 | 17 |

| ” | F. Morosini | 17.7 | 25 11 | 4 | 17 |

| Russia | Catherine II. | 24 | 27 | 4 | 12 |

| ” | Tchesme | 24 | 25 | 4 | 12 |

| ” | Sinope | 24 | 25 | 4 | 12 |

| Denmark | Tordenskiold | 8 | 15 | 1 | 13.8 |

+---------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+---------+

THE END.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This is not strictly true of quite all the ships named, but it

probably will be true erelong, as none of them has more than a light

auxiliary rig, and that will probably be abandoned.

[2] See Note, page 27.

[3] “The British Navy.”

[4] From “Engineering.”

[5] Some persons regarded the existence of these four small

port-holes as converting the tower into a nest for projectiles,

although a single enemy could not possibly have attacked more than

two of these ports at once, situated as they were. What would such

persons think of the batteries of the _Nelson_, _Northampton_, and

_Shannon_, each open for more than one hundred feet in length, on

each side of the ship, in so far as armor is concerned?

[6] The _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, for example.

[7] See Notes, page 58.

[8] “The British Navy,” vol. i., p. 438.

[9] _Ibid._, p. 427. The writer trusts he may be excused from again

quoting these very important sentences from the work of the former

Secretary to the Admiralty, notwithstanding that he recently had

occasion to quote them elsewhere.

[10] The reasons for placing this ship in the list of armored ships,

against the writer’s own judgment, have been stated previously. (See

Notes for new ships.)

[11] Harbor-defence vessel.

[12] Three turret-vessels, nearly resembling the _Gorgon_, which

belong to the Indian and colonial governments, are not included

in this list, nor are several unimportant small vessels, _viz._,

_Scorpion_, _Wyvern_, _Viper_, _Waterwitch_, and _Vixen_. The very

few remaining thinly armored wood-built ships are also excluded.

[13] Ships for local defence of ports.

[14] Cruisers for distant service.

[15] The thicknesses of decks given are those of the horizontal, or

nearly horizontal, parts of the deck. Where the decks slope down at

the sides the thickness is sometimes increased a little, as will have

been seen in the section of the _Mersey_. (See Notes for new ships.)

[16] See Notes, page 60.

[17] The editor of these Notes wishes to acknowledge his very great

indebtedness to the Office of United States Naval Intelligence

for the data relating to foreign navies, notably to Lieutenant R.

P. Rodgers, Chief Intelligence Officer, and to Lieutenants W. H.

Beehler, J. C. Colwell, and W. I. Chambers, Assistants. The notes

upon the United States Navy are to a great degree reprints of his

own contributions to the editorial and news columns of the New York

_Herald_.

[18] “Recent Naval Progress,” June, 1887.

[19] Lieutenant Colwell, U.S.N., in “Recent Naval Progress,” 1887.

[20] Lieutenant Chambers, U.S.N.

[21] “Our War Ships,” Cusack-Smith.

[22] It is called a belt in _Lloyd’s Universal Register_, but the

term is very likely to mislead.—E. J. R.

[23] It will be instructive to repeat here, before leaving this

question of partially armored ships, a comparison resembling that

which I employed in a paper read at the Royal United Service

Institution, in which are set down in one column the displacements of

certain British and French ships, eleven of each, built and building,

possessing maximum armor on the water-line of at least fifteen

inches. As all the French ships given have complete or all but

complete armor-belts, it is proper to reckon their whole displacement

tonnages as armored tonnage. But in the case of all the British ships

which carry such thick armor they are deprived of armor altogether

except amidships, and it is therefore misleading, and even absurd,

to reckon their whole displacement tonnages as armored tonnage. For

this reason I am obliged to give two tonnages for them, _viz._, the

armored and the unarmored, as I do below:

+-------------------------++----------------------------------------+

| FRENCH SHIPS. || BRITISH SHIPS. |

+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+

| |Armored.|| Unarmored.|Armored.| Total. |

+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+

| | Tons. || | Tons. | Tons. | Tons. |

| Amiral Baudin | 11,141 || Inflexible | 5,210 | 6,670 | 11,880 |

| Amiral Duperré | 10,486 || Ajax | 4,160 | 4,350 | 8,510 |

| Dévastation | 9,639 || Agamemnon | 4,160 | 4,350 | 8,510 |

| Formidable | 11,441 || Colossus | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |

| Courbet | 9,639 || Edinburgh | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |

| Hoche | 9,864 || Collingwood | 4,580 | 4,570 | 9,150 |

| Magenta | 9,864 || Rodney | 4,800 | 4,900 | 9,700 |

| Marceau | 9,864 || Home | 4,800 | 4,900 | 9,700 |

| Neptune | 9,864 || Camperdown | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |

| Caïman | 7,239 || Benbow | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |

| Indomptable | 7,184 || Anson | 4,900 | 5,100 | 10,000 |

+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+

| Total |106,225 || Total | 51,570 | 54,180 |105,750 |

+----------------+--------++-------------+--------+--------+--------+

I have not thought it necessary to alter these figures in repeating

this comparison, as they are sufficiently near the truth for the only

purpose for which I employ them, which is that of exhibiting the fact

that whereas the above eleven British iron-clads (so called) figure

in the official tables of the British government as constituting an

armored tonnage of 105,750 tons, nearly equal to that of the eleven

French ships, they really represent but little more than half that

amount of armored tonnage.—E. J. R.

[24] For the reason before stated, the _Brennus_ and _Charles Martel_

are omitted from this table.

[25] These powers and speeds are taken from _Lloyd’s Universal

Register_.

[26] Some returns say four of 28 tons, and four of 24 tons, all being

of 27 centimetres calibre. I have adopted these in Table A.

[27] See Notes, page 263.

[28] Lieutenant Chambers, U. S. Navy.

[29] Lieutenant Colwell, U. S. Navy.

[30] Lieutenant Shroeder, U. S. Navy.

[31] I adopt this figure from Lord Brassey, who adopts it from Mr.

King, but I am inclined to regard it as too small by about five feet,

for I observe that in giving the length as 107 feet they give the

breadth as 58 feet, whereas they give the breadth of the ship as 64¾

feet. I also observe that they both speak of an “armored citadel or

compartment 107 feet in length,” and the word “compartment” seems to

point to _inside_ dimensions, and although it seems odd to use these

in such a case, it is probable that that has been done. But as there

is considerable curvature in the transverse bulkheads, and as the

greatest inside length has presumably been given, it may still be

practically correct to regard the mean length of the battery as 107

feet. I regret that I have not the means at hand of making certain of

the precise length.—E. J. R.

[32] See Notes, page 136.

[33] _Lloyd’s Universal Register_ falls into a still more notable

error in respect to the speed of these vessels, for it assigns to the

best of them a speed of only seven and one-half knots, and to some

only five knots, whereas they are very much faster, as will presently

be shown in the text. But the mistake, grave as it is, seems to me

to have resulted only from a printer’s error, for the removal of a

vertical “lead” one column to the left would add ten knots to the

speeds of all these vessels, and make them correct.—E. J. R.

[34] See Notes, page 139.

[35] According to the _Universal Register_; but only two of nine

tons (besides smaller ones) according to Admiralty Return to

Parliament.—E. J. R.

[36] The _Grosser Kurfürst_ was run into off Folkestone by the _König

Wilhelm_, and foundered.—E. J. R.

[37] See Notes, page 145.

[38] _Lloyd’s Universal Register_ appears to me to be in error

concerning the speed of this and the next vessel. The _Carnet_ gives

their speed as fourteen knots, and the Admiralty Return puts it at

fifteen knots, which I believe to be the expected speed.—E. J. R.

[39] See Notes, page 145.

[40] See Notes, page 144.

[41] See Notes, page 144.

[42] Curiously enough, neither Lord Brassey, nor Mr. King (United

States Navy), nor Captain Von Kronenfels seems to have been aware

of the origin of this little ship’s design, for it is mentioned

by none of them, although all of them have been most ready to

do me, in common with others, full justice in such matters. Mr.

King, for example, speaking of a ship previously mentioned, says,

“The most powerful ship belonging to the Turkish navy is the

_Mesoodiyeh_, designed by Sir E. J. Reed, C.B., M.P., built by the

Thames Shipbuilding Company, delivered to the Sultan in 1876, and

now the flag-ship of the fleet.” He would doubtless have as readily

acknowledged the authorship of the _Feth-i-Bulend’s_ design, had he

been aware of it. As I was the Chief Constructor of the British Navy

when I designed for the Sultan of Turkey this ship and the _Fatikh_

(now the German _König Wilhelm_), I think it right to state that I

did so not only with the sanction but by the orders of the Admiralty,

and in pursuance of what was then the declared policy of England,

viz., that of giving Turkey the benefit of our good offices in

efforts to produce a powerful fleet. Beyond a complimentary present

of a jewelled snuffbox or two, I received no remuneration for my

services to Turkey, and sought none, and desired none.—E. J. R.

[43] See Notes, page 141.

[44] See Notes, page 142.

[45] “The Present Position of European Politics.”

[46] $43,425,000.

[47] Dilke.

[48] Lieut. Colwell, U.S.N., in “Recent Naval Progress.”

[49] See Notes for later ships.

[50] See Notes, page 227.

[51] See Notes, page 185.

[52] See Notes, p. 257.

[53] Complete.

[54] Building at South Boston and West Point.

[55] It is probable that the battery of the battle-ship will be two

6-inch, two 10-inch, and two 12-inch guns.

[56] Probably.

[57] From _Army and Navy Gazette_, February 27, 1886.

[58] Lieutenant Colwell, United States Navy.

[59] Naval Intelligence, General Information Series No. 5.

[60] “Recent Naval Progress.”

[61] From the General Information Series No. V., U. S. Naval

Intelligence Office.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnotes [13] and [14] have multiple anchors on page 47.

Footnote [25] has multiple anchors on page 76.

Footnotes [53], [54] and [56] have multiple anchors on page 228.

The illustrations on pages 90, 254 and 257 were vertical and have

been rotated to the horizontal.

Some illustrations have been moved several pages to be closer to

the related text.

The table on page 184 of the original book was very wide, and has

been split into 3 parts. The tables on pages 76, 84, 109, 146 and

221 have been split into 2 parts.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been

corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within

the text and consultation of external sources.

Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,

when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,

and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Pg 49: ‘projecting sponsoons’ replaced by ‘projecting sponsons’.

Pg 57: ‘1-inch Nordenfelt’ replaced by ‘1-inch Nordenfeldt’.

Pg 76: ‘Furiex’ (in table) replaced by ‘Furieux’.

Pg 89: ‘nearly 600 tons’ replaced by ‘nearly 6000 tons’.

Pg 98: ‘slow burning power’ replaced by ‘slow burning powder’.

Pg 118: ‘Dmitry Donskoi’ (in table) replaced by ‘Dmitri Donsköi’.

Pg 118: ‘Admiral Kornilof’ replaced by ‘Admiral Korniloff’.

Pg 140: ‘_Rinda_’ replaced by ‘_Rynda_’.

Pg 180: ‘floating ing batteries’ replaced by ‘floating batteries’.

Pg 243: ‘Whitehead torpedes’ replaced by ‘Whitehead torpedoes’.