this aspect of the discussion is to be found in a little volume recently
published in Paris under the title _Le Monde des Aveugles_. The author,
M. Pierre Villey, is himself blind. In the interests of Science he has
cast aside the delicacy and reserve which have generally prevented the
blind from analysing or at least from discussing the import of their
experiences. He is also fortunately possessed of a philosophic and
highly cultivated intellect, and has not failed to make himself
acquainted with the general course of metaphysical speculation.
The present writer has been in correspondence with M. Villey, whose
conclusions remarkably confirm the view for which this essay contends,
and he finds that M. Villey recognises the truth of that view.
Individual quotations would only detract from the cumulative effect of
his argument, but we may refer in particular to the interesting
discussion as to the relations between the space concepts of the blind
and those of the vident. The blind can be taught, and are taught,
geometry, and can discuss and understand spatial and geometrical
problems. The sensible furniture by which the spatial conceptions of the
blind are denoted obviously cannot be visual, and are no doubt largely
tactual, whilst on the other hand the vident utilise the visual data to
the almost total exclusion of any other. There must therefore be some
common measure by means of which a community is established between the
spatial conceptions of the blind and those of the vident. M. Villey
concludes and clearly shows that the common medium is to be found in the
fact that our spatial conceptions are fundamentally based upon and are
expressive of the discoveries of our exertional activity. Touch, in
short, is an ambiguous term and includes both passive sensations and
those forms of Activity which we describe when we use the term "feel" as
a transitive verb. Just as we distinguish between seeing and looking or
between hearing and listening, so should we distinguish between touch
passive and touch active or palpation.
* * * * *
The view of Science which we have endeavoured to explain has received a
notable confirmation from the establishment during the latter part of
the nineteenth century of the scientific doctrine of Energy.[69:1]
The culmination of the scientific fabric of which Galileo and Newton
laid the foundations was reached when it was demonstrated that the whole
physical universe must be regarded as composed of Energy, either kinetic
and actually undergoing transmutation from one form to another, or
potential and quiescent yet containing within itself the quantifiable
capacity of transformation. The objective correlatives of the different
classes of sensible experiences are found to be different forms which
this Energy assumes--the kinetic energy of a mass in motion, the radiant
energy of Light, the energy of Heat, the potential energy of chemical
separation, etc.--all these have now at length been shown to be forms of
one real thing capable under appropriate conditions of being transmuted
into each other and of which not only the inter-transmutability but the
equivalent values can be calculated and have been found by experiment to
be fixed and definite. Thus the mechanical equivalent of heat is a fixed
and definite quantity. The Energy of a body in motion can be measured
and stated in terms of mass and velocity.
The profound conception of Aristotle, under which Nature was regarded as
a potent Energy containing within itself the capacity of generating the
phenomenal World, has again been revived and realised--but with great
additions. The theory in the hands of Science is now not only confirmed
by incessant experiment, but the relation which it affirms between
reality and phenomenon has been _quantified_.
Moreover, the actual operations under which the potential generates the
actual have, so to say, been laid bare to view; and lastly, the
inter-transmutability of all forms of Energy and its real unity have
been established.
The doctrine has therefore received a confirmation of which Aristotle
did not dream, and its explanation has at the same time received an
illumination which his vague if profound adumbration could never afford.
With this added support the true conception of human knowledge has
received new strength. The theory is still, nevertheless, not to be
grasped without a resolute effort of reflection. It involves an
inversion of our everyday conceptions more radical than that which was
demanded by the Copernican theory of astronomy, and we know that that
theory--offered to and rejected by mankind before the beginning of the
Christian era--had to wait through sixteen or seventeen hundred years
before it secured an acceptance, at first grudging and even now not
always adequate.
* * * * *
The ordinary metaphysical student has hitherto rather resented the idea
that in order to a true solution of the problem of Knowledge he must
acquaint himself with the fundamental conceptions of physics. Yet so it
is. It may perhaps be hoped that when the first strangeness of the new
position has disappeared the conditions may be accepted with greater
readiness. At any rate, a correct apprehension of our fundamental
conceptions of the world of our external experience is indispensable. No
theory can wholly dispense with such conceptions. It is therefore
essential that, however elementary, they should be clear and not
contradictory. Philosophy has always vaguely realised and exacted as
much. The need is now imperative.
Some years ago, in an essay on Schopenhauer, the author, Mr. Saunders,
remarked, "How the matter of which my arm is composed and that state of
consciousness which I call my Will [imagine anyone calling Will a state
of consciousness!] are conjoined is a mystery beyond the reach of
Science, and the man who can solve it is the man for whom the world is
waiting."
Well, if that be so, then the world need not wait any longer. The
required explanation is offered to metaphysics by the scientific work of
the physicians who built up and consolidated the modern doctrine of
Energy. It is true that most of them have continued to postulate the
reality of material bodies. For their purpose there was no real
difficulty in doing so. What they required was a datum of configuration,
a phenomenal basis upon which their calculations could proceed and in
terms of which, as a point of origin, their statement of transmutations
was made. The persistence of material bodies is a condition precedent to
the phenomenal manifestations in which our Experience arises. Organic
existence in every form and the world in which it arises presuppose the
actuality of these. But dynamically they are merely the phenomenal
result of certain permanent forces constantly in operation. To beings,
if there be such, inhabiting the Ether there is little doubt but that a
gravitation system like that of the sun and its planets must present a
corporate rigidity and identity somewhat similar to that which cohering
masses present to our intelligence. But, in terms of reality, Energy,
potential and kinetic, containing within itself the potency which
generates the actual and sustains the constant transmutation in which
phenomena arise is the sole and only postulate.
The rise of meta-geometrical methods and other branches of scientific
speculation have led in recent years to a considerable amount of very
interesting inquiry into the nature of our fundamental geometrical
conceptions. Strange to say, a large body of respectable mathematicians
have been found to favour the extraordinary view that our mathematical
conceptions are derived from Sensation. We do not propose here to
discuss at length this idea. It is merely another form of the old
sensationalist view of Knowledge, but we suggest that the conditions of
the problem will readily appear in their true light and real nature
whenever such inquirers realise the fact that our exertional activity is
the source of our cognitions of the external, and that therefore our
pure exertional activity is the source of the basal concepts of
geometry.
Here lies the root of the distinction between pure and empirical
science. The propositions of geometry, being derived from our own pure
activity, are of the former class; the inductive conclusions of physical
experimental science, being gathered by observation and measurement
from sensible data, are empirical and approximate. A geometrical
proposition--such, for example, as the assertion that the three angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles--is not merely approximate.
It has no dependence on measurement. It is absolutely true. It is
ascertained deductively, and therefore measurement is not involved, and
is never employed. Its truth is not ascertained by measurement. It is
not verified by measurement. It in no degree depends upon the sensible
figure. It is equally true for every human being whatever be the degree
of accuracy of the figure by the aid of which he studies it, or indeed
whether he studies it by figure or otherwise, as must necessarily be the
case with the born blind.
There may be many different forms of energetic transmutation which may
determine many other forms of space besides that form of tridimensional
space in which our Activity is involved. For such, a different geometry
may and will be applicable; but for the tridimensional conditions of
_our activity_ the proposition is necessary and absolute. No measurement
of any stellar parallax, however minute and whatever the result might
be, could have any bearing on its truth. Geometry is the science of the
pure forms of our motor activity amidst corporeal bodies.
A useful illustration of our argument is to be drawn from a
consideration of the question of phonetic spelling. Occasionally we find
persons urging that all spelling should be an exact reproduction of
sound. Indeed, an improved alphabet has been designed to enable the idea
to be carried out with greater accuracy.
Now it is quite true that it is by their sound that we recognise or
denote our words. Hence our alphabet was originally phonetic in
principle, and indeed still is so, although the correspondence is
imperfect. As the use of visible signs develops spelling seems to fall
into certain fixed frames and to deviate more and more from pure
phonetic simplicity. But why is this so? It is because the sounds are
merely the symbols or indicators of the different forms of vocal
articulation (vocal acts), and it is really as the symbols and
indicators of these actions that they possess any meaning and acquire
such permanence and identity as they have. The phonetic system,
therefore, becomes in use subordinated to the expression of the acts by
which are produced these radical vocables which constitute the
essentials of rational Discourse.
In all this the process of the expression of words in spelling is a
microcosmic counterpart of the process of cognition as we have tried to
explain it.
It is noteworthy that the same thing necessarily happens in the case of
any new system of spelling.
The most prominent advocates of phonetic spelling have been also the
authors of a system of phonetic shorthand.
Like the written and printed alphabet of Europe, the alphabet of
Phonography was made phonetic. Indeed it started off as a more nearly
perfect phonetic system than the ordinary European alphabet. But as its
use advances its employment undergoes the same change. The phonetic
symbols are abbreviated by grammalogues and contractions, and this
proceeds in accordance with a principle unconsciously recognised but
which really depends on the same inherent necessity to preserve in a
consistent form the expression of the radical vocables of Speech.
Finally, in the hands of the expert stenographer the system of phonetic
shorthand (though he still uses the sound as the guide and indicator of
his actions) is as far removed from a pure phonetic representation as
the ordinary method of spelling. Indeed, unless some such suprasensible
and unifying principle were available, phonetic spelling would speedily
perish in an infinity of degenerate variations.
We adduce this illustration as one which very well confirms our main
argument. We have no desire to discuss on its merits the general
question of Spelling Reform, which of course is quite apart from the
attempt to establish a scheme of spelling on a purely phonetic basis. A
more rational system of spelling is nevertheless an object worthy of all
consideration.
* * * * *
Intellectualism and sensationalism have both broken down. The world of
speculation is anxiously looking for a new clue. Witness the pathetic
eagerness with which it clutches at every floating straw. The
innumerable "isms" by which it seeks ever and anon to keep itself afloat
are most of them but the sometimes unrecognisable wreckage of the old
systems drifting about under very inappropriate names. Such terms as
Realism and Idealism are freely used (generally prefixing the adjective
"new") by writers in philosophic periodicals in a sense which might make
Plato, Aquinas, or Kant turn in their graves.
We see their votaries encumbered with the trappings of a futile
erudition of the insignificant or clinging pathetically to the insecure
relics of teleological doctrine, or, still less virile, seeking support
in a return to the unscientific tales of supernatural spiritualism. Such
efforts are vain.
Only by facing the facts with all their consequences, whatever these
may be and whatever they may involve for the proudest aspirations of
mankind--only thus can truth be attained. And lest any should say that
we preach an unrelieved pessimism, let us remind such that Knowledge is
not after all the source of Life, that another category and a different
principle--that, namely, which we indicate under the term
Love-divine--must have generated the potent current of Life, and that no
one should close the door against the hopes of the human Intelligence
until he has discovered what are the limits imposed upon what Perfect
Love can do.
The question still remains whether mankind will be equal to the effort
required to assimilate the essential truth. They very nearly failed to
assimilate the Copernican cosmogony. For sixteen hundred years after it
was first offered to mankind the race preferred to grope in the darkness
and confinement of a false conception.
If they succeed in accomplishing the reception of the new truth,
unheard-of progress may be looked for. If they fail, civilisation must
disappear and humanity decline. There is no middle course. As Bacon
remarked, in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only to God and
angels to be lookers-on.
We know how stubbornly the Ptolemaic cosmogony still clings to our
conceptions, how largely it still dominates--or till recently did
dominate--the religious cosmography of the most civilised peoples.
In Philosophy our leading teachers seem as yet to have a very feeble
appreciation of the new conditions. They turn greedily to the eloquent
pages of _L'Evolution creatrice_, but however earnestly they search they
cannot find there any definite solution of the difficulties of the
age-old problem. They wander wearily through the mazes of psychological
detail or wage almost childish logomachies over the interpretation of
each other's essays. Philosophical magazines are filled with articles
which reflect this state of the philosophic mind. Philosophical
congresses meet and argue and go home; Gifford lecturers prelect; yet so
far as can be seen there is little sign that the key has been grasped.
The great fact remains obscured amidst a mass of words.
The elucidation of the problem of Knowledge demands certain improvements
in our philosophic terminology. Language as a rule is a very unerring
philosopher, and words shaped and polished by long usage generally
express, more truly than those who use them realise, the essential
reality of things. Yet these long-enduring errors of the ages which we
have been discussing here have left their impress too on the terminology
of Metaphysics.
Thought and Action are in common speech contrasted, and the distinction
expresses an essential truth. But when we seek to say further that both
of these are Activities, we are stating another truth in terms which are
hardly consistent with the previously contrasted distinction. It might
be better if Action and Active could be applied generally to both and if
the term _exertion_ could be substituted for Action in describing the
forms of activity which we denominate _motor_. To that suggestion,
however, there are also serious objections. The words derived from _ago_
have historically a special application to the exertional and dynamic.
We leave the question to our readers as one of which it is of
considerable importance to find a satisfactory solution.
In the foregoing pages our object has been to illustrate the erroneous
conceptions by which the theory of human cognition has been obscured and
to explain briefly what we conceive to be the true solution. The
argument in support of the doctrine here explained has been more fully
presented by the present writer in an essay entitled _The Dynamic
Foundation of Knowledge_, to which the reader who desires to study the
question further must now be referred.
FOOTNOTES:
[60:1] +Kosmon tonde ton auton akanton oute tis theon oute anthropon
epoiese, all' en aiei kai esti kai estai pyr aeizoon haptomenon metra
kai aposbennymenon metra.+ Quoted by Clement of Alexandria, etc. (_The
First Philosophers of Greece_, by A. Fairbanks, p. 28.)
[61:1] "La subdivision do la matiere en corps isoles est relative a
notre perception" (_Evolution creatrice_, p. 13).
[69:1] For a clear brief summary of the theory the reader may be
referred to a little work by Sir William Ramsay, F.R.S., entitled
_Elements and Electrons_, pp. 8-15.
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF ENERGY[81:1]
The problem of Metaphysics--the nature of Reality--still presses for a
solution. Agnosticism is but a cautious idealism--a timid phenomenalism.
That philosophy, however named, which proclaims that the experience of
life is nothing more than a vain show, a pantomime of sensations
distinguished only from ideas by their greater intensity and
distinctness, is not only a confession of failure. It is a denial of
fact.
To know the nature of the Absolute as such, to present the Absolute to
finite minds as it must be presented, if that be possible, to the
Absolute itself, must ever remain impossible to man. But it is equally
true that to attempt such a task has never been the urgent mission of
Philosophy. The distinction between the Ideal and the Real, between the
conceptual and the perceptual, is quite certainly and incessantly
recognised. Agnosticism can neither deny the fact successfully, nor
solve the speculative difficulties which its recognition raises up. The
Real and the Ideal, essentially distinct yet mockingly similar, for ever
blend and intermingle in the composite experience of life. Truly to
discriminate and unravel these,--validly to separate the Ideal element
which impregnates that Reality which we are for ever compelled to
postulate and recognise, still remains the great problem of
Philosophy--humbler perhaps and more practical, but not less profound
than any vain attempt to discover to finite conception the Absolute as
it is in itself. Therefore it is that the efforts of negative and
agnostic criticism to dispense with the recognition of Reality as a
necessary postulate of our activity are foredoomed to failure. They
leave us not a solitude which we might pretend to be peace, but a
seething sea of troubles urgently demanding a new attempt to reveal the
unity which must underlie the infinite diversity of experience.
Such, indeed, seems to us the present position of Metaphysics; and, what
is more important, it appears to react with increasing force upon the
theories and investigations of Science.
The problem of Reality is thus at present not without a special and
increasing interest for the students of Physical Science. Until lately
they have been taught and have always maintained that Matter is the
direct object of sense-perception. No doubt it is long since Philosophy
has urged that our conceptions of the external world are a mentally
constructed system. But this doctrine has made but little impression
upon the students of Natural Science. The objective origin of our
sensations and the apparently objective reality also of the intelligible
qualities and operative laws of the external world are too strongly
impressed upon their minds. Idealism and Transcendentalism have carried
no conviction to them. Still, the difficulties of common sense have
continued to grow. Recent developments of scientific theory have
increased the urgency of the problem, but they seem to us also to
suggest a solution the beneficial results of which affect the whole of
Metaphysics.
We refer to the doctrine of Energy, which occupies now as great a place
in the physical sciences as the doctrine of Evolution does in the
zoological sciences.
Natural philosophers have for some time taught that there are two Real
Things in the physical universe--Matter and Energy. It seems a very
striking theory. Has it received the attention it deserves from the
student of Metaphysics? We are convinced that it has not: and the reason
he most frequently gives for this neglect is that, being a purely
scientific doctrine, it does not come within his sphere. Science, we are
told, deals with the phenomenal world internally considered; Philosophy
with the relations of the phenomenal world to Reality, and with the
nature of the transcendental elements in our Knowledge.
This may be generally true. Nevertheless, Philosophy and Science have
surely concepts in common. They both refer to the same thing when they
speak of Space; we presume also when they speak of Matter. Indeed,
Philosophy analyses the conceptions involved not only in scientific
reasoning, but in the most common and ordinary mental processes. It
analyses them with special reference to the relations between the
Phenomenal and the Real--a question which, though it always lies latent,
does not in ordinary circumstances arise in urgent form. It is therefore
evident that the fundamental conceptions of Science _do_ fall within the
purview of Philosophy.
The study of Physics _can_ be carried on practically as a study of
phenomena--of Heat, Colours, Sounds, Forces, etc., all of which are
kinds of phenomena--without the expression of any dogmatic and
formulated opinion as to their relation with Reality. Physics can speak
of mass and weight and avoid all reference to Matter; but there always
is, in scientific reasoning, an implicit reference to Reality, and it
facilitates, therefore, the expression of scientific reasoning, when the
account of a physical process is stated with reference to a supposed
reality, such as Matter. And in making such reference Science _is_
thinking of the thing-in-itself. It _is_ a reference beyond phenomena.