ARSON AND ESPIONAGE
It will be necessary to return to the subject of bribery when we
come to the marketing business of the Trust. We will now pass to a
few examples of the resort to open violence for the attainment of
the Trust’s ends. The Tidewater Pipe Line was started by Lombard,
Ayres & Co., New York refiners, and others, on the publication of the
Rutter circular; and Mr. Rockefeller offered at first to buy them
out--pipes, refineries, and all--but refused finally to give the price
of $15,000,000 they asked. The Standard’s next move was the purchase of
a certain minority of the shares in the Tidewater Company. On January
17, 1883, the Standard stockholders held a hugger-mugger meeting at
the Tidewater office in Titusville, without notifying the stockholders
generally, voted the turning over of the control to Standard Oil
interests, and took possession of the office in the name of that
Company. The president of the Tidewater, however, who had been absent
in New York, met this attempt by another equally determined. He carried
the office by surprise, barricaded it, and kept forcible possession
till a suit could be brought to declare the meeting void, which
was legally accomplished. Previously to this all sorts of material
obstacles had been put in the way of the Tidewater pipe getting to the
sea; the railroads constantly opposed the Company’s obtaining a right
of way, and mysterious individuals--obviously representing Standard
interests--constantly cropped up along the proposed route, acquiring
exclusive rights over strips of land running at right angles to the
proposed right of way, some of these tiny ribbons of land being forty
miles long. Finally, the Tidewater Pipe Line became a Standard Oil
tentacle.
In the case of the United States Pipe Line--organised by the
independent oil producers and not to be confused with the United Pipe
Lines, which were always a Rockefeller organisation--it has been
clearly shown that the Standard Oil Company’s representatives have
resorted to similar means of obstruction. Physical force was used on
several occasions, a notable instance being that of the crossing of the
Delaware River at Hancock under the Erie Railroad bridge in 1893. Erie
interests as such were in no wise affected by the crossing, and the
president of the Erie road, after a conference with Mr. Emery, manager
of the United States Pipe Line, had informed him that there would be
no objection to going under the bridge, and even sent his own engineer
to Hancock to make arrangements for the exact location of the pipe.
When the connection from both sides of the river was about to be made,
however, the railroad company ran up two engines and “wrecking cars,”
with about seventy-five men, and placed inflammable material over the
ends of the pipe lines, so that on any attempt to connect they would
be so heated that connection would become impossible. The spot was
beleaguered by the hostile forces of the railroad and the pipe line
company for three months, when the latter abandoned the route and set
its pipes seventy miles back to a place called Athens, Pa. The case for
the United States Government in the Missouri prosecution says:--
The obstruction came in part directly from the agents of the Standard
Oil Company and partly from the railroads, but there is every reason
to believe that the railroads were acting in the interests of the
Standard Oil Company, as their own interests would scarcely be
injured by the pipe line, and as they had (so far as the evidence
shows) never opposed the construction of pipe lines by the Standard
Oil Company.
I select another case from the year 1895, when the United States
Pipe Line was getting in through the State of New Jersey to New York
harbour. The account of it may be best given in the words of the United
States Attorney-General’s brief in the Missouri case:--
When the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad was reached at
Washington, N.J., serious opposition was again encountered. The
pipe line company bought the fee simple title to land at a point
where there was a culvert in the railroad and placed a pipe through
this culvert, and put a force of men in charge. The next day two
locomotives, a wrecker, and 150 men attempted by force to eject
the employees of the pipe line from their position and to tear up
the pipes. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and finally an agreement
was reached by which the matter was taken into Court. Mr. Emery
testifies that some of the same men who opposed the passage of the
pipe under the tracks of the Erie Railroad at Hancock, N.Y., some two
years before, were also among the representatives of the Delaware,
Lackawanna, and Western Railroad in the trouble at Washington, N.J.
After a delay of six months the lower Court decided in favour of the
right of the pipe line to cross the tracks.
In 1879 the owners of the Vacuum Oil Works, of Rochester, N.Y., Messrs.
H. B. and C. M. Everest, father and son, made over a three-fourths
interest in their concern, which manufactured a patent lubricating
oil, to the Standard Oil Company, the Everests remaining managers on a
salary, and also being co-directors along with Messrs. H. H. Rogers,
J. D. Archbold, and Ambrose McGregor, of the Standard Oil Trust, of
which the Vacuum Oil Company was now run as a subsidiary. The following
year three of the employees, Wilson, Matthews, and Miller, having got
some money together, thought that they would like to start refining on
their own account, and did so, setting up the Buffalo Lubricating Oil
Company in the town of Buffalo. C. M. Everest warned them he would do
all in his power to injure their concern. He tried especially, by an
offer of $20,000, to get Miller, who was the most practical refiner
of the three, to break his contract with his two new partners, and on
June 7, 1881, H. B. Everest took Miller to the office of his lawyer,
Mr. Geo. Truesdale, in order to come to an arrangement with him. Mr.
Truesdale afterwards testified as follows in regard to this interview
(Proceedings in Relation to Trusts, House of Representatives, 1888,
Report No. 3,112, p. 864):--
I told him (Miller) that I did not know the exact terms of his
contract, but if he had entered into a contract and violated it
I presumed there would be a liability for damages as well as a
liability for the debts of the Buffalo party. Mr. Miller and Everest
both talked on the subject, and Mr. Everest says, “I think there are
other ways for Miller to get out of it.” I told him I saw no way
except either to back out or to sell out; no other honourable way.
Mr. Everest says, substantially, I think, in these words: “Suppose
he should arrange the machinery so it would bust up, or smash up,
what would the consequences be?”--something to that effect. “Well,”
I says, “in my opinion, if it is negligently, carelessly done, not
purposely done, he would be only civilly liable for damages caused
by his negligence; but if it was wilfully done, there would be a
further criminal liability for malicious injury to the property of
the parties--the company.” Mr. Everest said he thought there wouldn’t
be anything only civil liability, and said that would--he referred
to the fact that I had been police justice, had some experience in
criminal law--and he said that he would like to have me look up the
law carefully on that point, and that they would see me again.
Shortly afterwards Miller blew up a still in the Buffalo works twice
over by overheating, but did no further damage beyond spoiling the
175 barrels of oil contained in the still. He absconded, was kept
in idleness, or semi-idleness, by the Vacuum Company at a salary of
$1,500 a year, and the latter company proceeded to harass the Buffalo
Lubricating Oil Company out of existence by taking one vexatious
action after another against it on the ground of infringement of
patents. These were all decided in favour of the Buffalo Company by
the Courts except in one case, for a purely technical infringement
it was condemned to pay 6 cents (3d.) damages. Finally, the Buffalo
Company turned on its adversary and took an action against the Vacuum
Oil Company directors, H. H. Rogers, J. D. Archbold, A. McGregor, and
the two Everests for criminal conspiracy, instituting at the same time
civil suits for damages. The trial, at which Mr. J. D. Rockefeller
and all the forces of the Standard Oil were mustered, aided by the
most eminent counsel in the States, came off at Buffalo on May 2,
1886, and Messrs. Rogers, Archbold, and McGregor escaped owing to
the judge withdrawing the case from the jury, because, although they
were directors of the Vacuum Oil Company, it could not be proved that
they had advised Miller to cause an explosion. The two Everests were
condemned. By various means the Standard contrived to stay execution of
the sentence until May, 1888, two years later; the statute provided a
penalty of one year’s imprisonment or $250 fine, or both. Great efforts
were made to obtain a mitigation of the sentence. A petition signed
by forty “leading citizens” of Rochester was handed in to the judge,
praying him, on account of the “untarnished fidelity and integrity”
of the convicted men, to make the penalty as light as the Court was
authorised by law to fix. In the result the two Everests were each
fined $250 for the criminal offence, and the Vacuum Oil Company settled
the civil suits for $85,000 (£17,000). This is the case on which the
late Mr. Henry D. Lloyd (whose work, “Wealth against Commonwealth,”
was the first to expose the Standard’s misdeeds), based the caustic
comment: “The Standard Oil Trust is evangelical at one end and
explosive at the other.”
It was remarked in a previous chapter that the unfair advantages
conceded to Mr. Rockefeller by the conspiring railroads afford a
sufficient answer to the Standard Oil Trust’s contention that the
secret of its success lies in its superior business ability. But there
is no need to deny a high level of business ability to Mr. Rockefeller
and his associates. The Standard Oil people have always enjoyed this
legitimate advantage of knowing exactly what they intend doing.
Granting, however, that the Standard people are the keenest of business
men, it is equally certain that they have pushed their keenness to the
point where it has become mere unscrupulous cunning and chicanery. This
is conspicuously shown in the history of the Trust in its character of
salesmen.
Every local agent for the sale of Standard oil is required to furnish
reports to the statistical department of the Standard Oil Trust at
26, Broadway, New York, of all the transactions entered into by every
dealer in his district. His business, in short, is to know everybody
else’s business and to report it. This is done by filling up printed
forms showing in parallel columns against every retailer’s name in the
district, be he shopkeeper or pedlar, the description and brand of
goods he buys and sells, how the goods have been transported, their
price, and the name and address of the wholesale dealer who supplied
them. The agent is stimulated in every way by reproof and reward to
obtain the most intimate and apparently trifling details bearing upon
the above points, and, as is well known in the United States, is
generally converted by the system into a mere spy, who will not stick
at bribery or any other dirty trick so long as he can give his chiefs
the desired information. The United States Government agents found
that the Standard’s “statistical department” was presided over by a
man named Christian Dredger--a name which, allied to the occupation,
certainly reminds one of “the man with the muck-rake.” The knowledge
that a local grocer or pedlar is buying elsewhere than from the
Standard is no sooner received by mail or telegraph at the statistical
department than a Standard agent is told off to swoop down upon the
“irregular trader,” and either by threats of underselling and ruining
his business in case he persists to offer the “independent” oil, or
by promising him a secret rebate on published prices, secures his
submission. If the agent can persuade the retailer to countermand his
order from the independent, so much the better.
These accusations are proved beyond question by extant collections of
hundreds of letters and numerous telegrams received by independent
retailers, and by a superabundance of sworn testimony from all parts
of the States. Just to show how the thing works, here is a typical
letter received by a retailer who has been caught ordering oil from an
independent, and has been “persuaded” to countermand the order:--
DES MOINES, IOWA,
_January 14, 1891_.
John Fowler, Hampton, Iowa.
DEAR SIR,--Our Marshallstown manager, Mr. Ruth, has explained the
circumstances regarding the purchase and subsequent countermand of
a car of oil from our competitors. He desires to have us express
to you our promise that we will stand all expense, provided there
should be any trouble growing out of the countermand of this car. We
cheerfully promise to do this; we have the best legal advice which
can be obtained in Iowa bearing on the points in this case. An order
can be countermanded either before or after the goods have been
shipped, and, in fact, can be countermanded even if the goods have
already arrived and are at the depôt [_anglice_, railway station].
A firm is absolutely obliged to accept a countermand. The fact that
the order has been signed does not make any difference. We want you
to absolutely refuse under any circumstances to accept the car of
oil. We are standing back of you in this matter, and will protect you
in every way, and would kindly ask you to keep this letter strictly
confidential.
Yours truly,
E. P. PRATT.
Another typical example of Standard methods is revealed in the
following letter addressed to the Independent Oil Company, of
Mansfield, Ohio, by one of its customers:--
TIFFIN, OHIO,
_January 24, 1898_.
DEAR SIRS,--I am sorry to say that a Standard Oil man from your city
followed that oil car and oil to my place, and told me that he would
not let me make a dollar on that oil, and was dogging me around for
two days to buy that oil, and made all kinds of threats, and talked
to my people of the house while I was out, and persuaded me to sell,
and I was in a stew what I should do, but I yielded, and I have been
very sorry for it since. I thought I would hate to see the bottom
knocked out of the prices, but that is why I did it--the only reason.
The oil was all right. I now see the mistake, and that is of getting
a carload. Two carloads coming in here inside of a week is more than
the other company will stand....
Yours truly,
H. A. EIRICK.
Chess, Carley & Co., the Standard marketing agents at Louisville,
Kentucky, are big offenders in this respect. The late Mr. George Rice,
of Marietta, Ohio, a well-known independent, offered a grocer named
Armstrong, in Clarksville, Tennessee, his oil at a lower price than
Chess, Carley & Co. would sell to him at. Armstrong mentioned the offer
to the latter, and “was scared almost out of his boots,” wrote Rice’s
agent.
Carley told him, continues the agent, “he would break him up if he
bought oil of any one else; that the Standard Company had authorised
him to spend $10,000 to break up any concern that bought oil from any
one else; that he (Carley) would put all his drummers in the field to
hunt up Armstrong’s customers, and sell his customers groceries at 5
per cent. below Armstrong’s prices, and turn all Armstrong’s trade
over to Moore, Bremaker & Co., and settle with Moore, Bremaker & Co.
for their losses in helping to break Armstrong up, every thirty days.”
The Waters-Pierce Oil Company, the Standard’s Texas and Mexico branch,
are equally bad, and their methods are denounced by their customers in
similar language to that already quoted. The retailers speak of their
threats, their “cutting to kill”; they complain that the Standard
agents “nose” about their premises, ask impudent questions, and
generally make trade disgusting and humiliating.
The system naturally results in bribing employees, not only of the
railroads, but of the independents themselves in order to gain
information. The bribes seem to have been generally small in amount,
but to have yielded wonderful results. For instance, in 1893, a negro
boy who was induced by the Atlantic Refining Company of Philadelphia
(Standard Oil subsidiary), to supply regular details of the business
of the Lewis Emery Oil Company, his employers, was only paid $90 (£18)
for supplying information as to the firm’s daily shipments for about
six months and also for smuggling his company’s price-book to the
Standard managers to be copied out! Most of the old legends about a man
“selling his soul to the devil” make Mephistopheles do something very
substantial as his part of the bargain. But the Standard Oil Trust is
capable of giving his Satanic Majesty many wrinkles in “labour-saving”
methods, and breaks down the moral sense of the rising generation
on much more economic principles. E. M. Wilhoit, Standard agent at
Topeka, Kansas, from 1891 to 1898, testified in the Missouri trial that
his agency was allowed $8 (£1 12s. 6d.) a month for paying railroad
employees for information of competitive shipments, Mr. E. P. Pratt,
the manager of the Kansas City branch of the Consolidated Tank Line
Company, forwarding this $8 from Kansas City by his personal cheque.
Mr. G. W. Mayer, who succeeded Pratt, reduced this amount to $6 (25s.)
a month. The cheques came in blank envelopes without any letter, and
the instructions as to what should be done with the money were given
verbally. The clerks of five different railways were called upon once
a week for this information, which was generally written on a small
slip of paper and handed to the drayman who took oil to the railroad.
I select this case almost at random as a typical one from an ocean of
similar evidence. From the tempter’s point of view it certainly seems a
very cheap line of damnation.
THE “BOGUS INDEPENDENTS”
“The very rich are just like all the rest of us; and if they get
pleasure from the possession of money it comes from their ability to
do things which give satisfaction to some one besides themselves.”
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER _in_ “_Random Reminiscences_.”