CHAPTER IV

THE BIRTH OF THE TRUST

The arrangements which have now been described were the foundation

on which the Standard Oil Trust was built. Some time in the summer

of 1874, when he had become sure that the so-called “equalisation”

scheme would be worked in his favour by the railroads and leading

pipe lines simultaneously, Mr. Rockefeller conferred at Saratoga

with two of his old friends of the South Improvement Company--W. G.

Warden, of Philadelphia, and Charles Lockhart, of Pittsburg--both big

refiners, and agreed with them to form an oil refiners’ Trust, which

was to work with absolute secrecy, and gradually acquire control of

all the refineries in America. The instrument by which this large

order was to be put through was, of course, the secret rebate and

the new “equalisation,” or, less euphemistically, discrimination.

Secrecy was to be maintained by each firm as it came in carrying on

business ostensibly as before under its old style and title, staff,

and management, but its actual business was to be directed solely by

the central board of the Trust, presided over by Mr. Rockefeller,

which would control all operations of buying, transport, and selling.

The refineries had to become the absolute property, however, of the

Standard Oil Company, their late proprietors taking stock of that

Company in exchange. We know this from an account of the Saratoga

meeting given at a later period by Charles Lockhart, of Pittsburg, to

Miss Ida M. Tarbell.

In March, 1875, something leaked out as to the constitution of the

Trust, which was then spoken of as the Central Association. It

gradually roped in most of the refining firms in America, the process

being effected by one sensational collapse after another under the

influence of the discrimination and the rebate. An exception was the

huge refinery of Charles Pratt and Co., of New York, of which the

famous H. H. Rogers was one of the most considerable assets. This firm

sold itself more or less voluntarily to the Standard Oil for stock at

265. The absorption of the “Creek” refineries, _i.e._, those in the

Oil Regions, was conducted by the scarcely less famous J. D. Archbold,

who appeared in Titusville as the representative of a Standard Oil

offshoot, since known to fame as the Acme Oil Company. Between 1875

and 1879 Mr. Archbold won his spurs in the Standard by buying out,

dismantling, or shutting down nearly every refinery on the “Creek.” The

history of this collapse makes pitiful reading, and I need not enter

into it beyond giving a specimen or two extracted from contemporary

records.

In 1888 Mr. A. H. Tack, a partner of the Citizens’ Oil Refining Company

of Pittsburg, after explaining on oath before the House Committee on

Manufactures how his splendidly organised business gradually became

non-paying under the Standard Oil influence, added:--

In 1874 I went to see Rockefeller if we could make arrangements with

him by which we could run a portion of our works. It was a very brief

interview. He said there was no hope for us all. He remarked this--I

cannot give the exact quotation--“There is no hope for us,” and

probably he said, “There is no hope for any of us”; but he says, “The

weakest must go first.” And we went!

The case of Scofield, Shurmer and Teagle, a Cleveland refinery, is

evidence of the demoralisation of the times. At first the firm showed

fight, and in 1876 brought a suit against the Lake Shore and Michigan

Southern and the New York Central and Hudson River railroads for

“unlawful and unjust discrimination, partialities, and preferences made

and practised ... in favour of the Standard Oil Company, enabling the

said Standard Oil Company to obtain, to a great extent, the monopoly

of the oil and naphtha trade of Cleveland.” But Mr. Rockefeller

persuaded them to drop their suit and obtain bigger profits than

they were making by becoming his fellow-conspirators. They signed a

contract, consequently, with him for ten years, the firm putting in a

plant worth $73,000 and its entire time, and Mr. Rockefeller putting

in $10,000--and his railway discriminations! The firm was guaranteed

$35,000 a year net profit--about 50 per cent. on capital; profits over

$35,000 went to Mr. Rockefeller up to $70,000--about 100 per cent.; any

further profits were to be divided.

The enormous dimensions of the profits contemplated in this case--and

no doubt afterwards reaped--would presumably have excited suspicion

very quickly among Scofield, Shurmer and Teagle’s acquaintances who

had seen them in their struggling days had not Mr. Rockefeller been an

adept in joining secrecy to fraud as the basis of his operations. To

quote Miss Tarbell (i. p. 66):--

According to the testimony of one of the firm given a few years later

on the witness-stand in Cleveland the contract was signed at night

at Mr. Rockefeller’s house on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland, where he

told the gentlemen that they must not even tell their wives about the

new arrangement, that if they made money they must conceal it--they

were not to drive fast horses, “put on style,” or do anything to

let people suspect there were unusual profits in oil refining. That

would invite competition. They were told that all accounts were to be

kept secret. Fictitious names were to be used in corresponding, and

a special box at the post-office was employed for these fictitious

characters. In fact, smugglers and housebreakers never surrounded

their operations with more mystery.

“Smuggling,” “housebreaking,” “burglary” are all terms that have been

used to designate Mr. Rockefeller’s methods, though much has been made

of his mild demeanour and gentle persuasiveness in dealing with his

rivals. To my mind his persuasiveness is on a par with that of the bold

highwayman sung of in the “Pickwick Papers”:--

But Dick put a couple of balls in his nob

And perwailed on him to stop.

The Standard Oil Trust has been repeatedly and publicly charged in

America with using in the pursuits of its ends or the defence of its

interests such weapons as perjury, bribery, open violence, and arson.

They concern, of course, individual members of the combination rather

than the whole combination, and we begin with that part of the case

which concerns Mr. J. D. Rockefeller personally.

In 1888 the mystery surrounding the ramifications of the Standard ring

caused the Senate of New York State to order an “Investigation Relative

to Trusts,” and before the Commission entrusted with this investigation

Mr. Rockefeller appeared and was questioned as to the _initium

malorum_--the South Improvement Company. I quote from the official

report of this investigation:--

_Q._ There was such a company?

_A._ I have heard of such a company.

_Q._ Were you not in it?

_A._ I was not.

As pointed out in my former articles, Mr. J. D. Rockefeller was a

director with 180 shares in the concern, and the fact is now absolutely

beyond dispute. The statement above was made on February 28th, and on

April 30th following Mr. Rockefeller appeared before a Committee of the

House of Representatives at Washington, and the following colloquy took

place:--

_Q._ I want the names particularly of gentlemen who either now or

in the past have been interested with you gentlemen who were in the

South Improvement Company?

_A._ I think they were O. T. Waring, W. P. Logan, John Logan, W.

G. Warden, O. H. Payne, H. M. Flagler, William Rockefeller, J. A.

Bostwick, and--_myself_.

A direct contradiction of his own words within the space of two months!

Again, questioned as to railway rates by the New York Senate Committee,

Mr. Rockefeller was asked if there had been any arrangements by which

the Trust or the companies controlled by it got transportation at any

cheaper rates than were allowed to the general public, and his answer

was:--

No, we have had no better rates than our neighbours. But, if I may

be allowed, we have found repeated instances where other parties had

secured lower rates than we had.

The Committee, however, was not satisfied, and returned to the charge

later on in the day, and Mr. Rockefeller, after much wriggling and

evasion, practically admitted the contrary:--

_Q._ Has not some company or companies embraced within this Trust

enjoyed from railroads more favourable freight rates than those rates

accorded to refineries not in the Trust?

_A._ I do not recall anything of that kind.

_Q._ You have heard of such things?

_A._ I have heard much in the papers about it.

_Q._ Was there not such an allegation as that in the litigation

or controversy recently disposed of by the Interstate Commerce

Commission, Mr. Rice’s suit; was not there a charge in Mr. Rice’s

petition that companies embraced within your Trust enjoyed from

railroad companies more favourable freight rates?

_A._ I think Mr. Rice made such a claim. Yes, sir.

_Q._ Did not the Commission find the claim true?

_A._ I think the return of the Commission is a matter of record. I

could not give it.

_Q._ You don’t know it; you haven’t seen that they did so find?

_A._ It is a matter of record.

_Q._ Haven’t you read that the Interstate Commerce Commission did

find that charge to be true?

_A._ No, sir; I don’t think I could say that. I read that they made a

decision, but I am really unable to say what that decision was.

_Q._ You did not feel interested enough in the litigation to see what

the decision was?

_A._ I felt an interest in the litigation. I don’t mean to say I did

not feel an interest in it.

_Q._ Do you mean to say that you don’t know what the decision was?

_A._ I don’t say that. I know that the Interstate Commerce Commission

had made a decision. The decision is quite a comprehensive one, but

it is questionable whether it could be said that that decision in all

its features results as I understand you to claim.

_Q._ You don’t so understand it? Will you say, as a matter of fact,

that it is not so?

_A._ I stated in my testimony this morning that I had known of

instances where companies altogether outside of the Trust had enjoyed

more favourable freights than companies in this Trust, and I am not

able to state that there may not have been arrangements for freight

on the part of companies within this Trust as favourable as, or more

favourable than, other freight arrangements; but, in reply to that,

nothing peculiar in respect to the companies in this association. I

suppose they make the best freight arrangements they can.

A commission, known, from the name of its chairman, as the Hepburn

Commission, was appointed by Congress in 1879 to investigate the New

York railroads, and a number of Standard Oil officials, notably Messrs.

H. H. Rogers, J. D. Archbold, Jabez A. Bostwick, and W. T. Sheide,

were summoned before it. Though not so sweeping in their denials as

Mr. Rockefeller, all of them avoided the truth. Their testimony, in

fact, was so evasive that the Hepburn Commission, in making its report,

characterised the Company as “a mysterious organisation whose business

and transactions are of such a character that its members decline

giving a history or description of it lest this testimony be used to

convict them of a crime.” The reason that the witnesses themselves

gave for their evasion was--as might be expected--a different one from

that assigned by the Commission. They stated that the investigations

were an interference with their rights as private citizens, and that

the Government had no business to inquire into their methods. This

is a very interesting plea, for it throws a light on the general

spirit of insubordination to all law and order consistently evinced by

the Standard Oil Trust throughout its whole career whenever law and

order were found to be in opposition to its progress. This constant

opposition to the public authority, whether manifested by open contempt

of Court when under examination, or by secret bribery to avert or

compass legislation, or by secret acts known to be contrary to law, has

been such as to merit for the Standard Oil conspirators the appellation

of the anarchists of commercial life. Opposition to the law, denial of

the law, refusal to be subject to the law, and attempted corruption of

the officers of the law, indelibly marks their business policy.

Direct lying, however, was employed on occasion when Standard witnesses

were under the necessity of answering questions categorically. Henry

M. Flagler, for instance, swore in 1880 in the Court of Common Pleas

(Standard Oil Company _v._ W. C. Scofield _et al._) that the Standard

Oil Company neither owned, operated, nor controlled refineries

elsewhere than at Cleveland, Ohio, and Bayonne, N.J., whereas before

the Investigation Relative to Trusts, New York Senate, 1888, he

testified that in 1874 the Standard Oil Company _purchased_ the

refineries of Lockhart, Frew & Co., of Pittsburg; Warden, Frew & Co.,

of Philadelphia; and Chas. Pratt & Co., of New York. Mr. Rockefeller

also swore falsely in the Scofield case in 1880, in the same sense

as Mr. Henry M. Flagler. The purchase and consequent control of

the Pittsburg, Philadelphia, and New York refineries mentioned was

absolutely secret at the time, and seemingly not likely to be found out.

BRIBERY: THE ARCHBOLD LETTERS

“Solid as a prison, towering as a steeple, its cold and forbidding

façade seems to rebuke the heedless levity of the passing crowd,

and frown on the frivolity of the stray sunbeams which in the late

afternoon play around its impassive cornices. The building is No. 26,

Broadway, New York City, home of the Standard Oil.”

T. W. LAWSON _in_ “_Frenzied Finance_.”

The great oil octopus · 第 4 / 15 章