DR. WYNPERSSE.

Footnote 168:

“In the consideration of this subject, which every Christian must deem

most highly deserving the closet examination, our attention should be

directed to two different classes of objectors: those who deny the

necessity of any mediation whatever; and those who question the

particular nature of that mediation, which has been appointed. Whilst

the deist on the one hand ridicules the very notion of a Mediator: and

the philosophizing Christian on the other, fashions it to his own

hypothesis; we are called on to vindicate the word of truth from the

injurious attacks of both; and carefully to secure it, not only

against the open assaults of its avowed enemies, but against the more

dangerous misrepresentations of its false or mistaken friends.

The objections which are peculiar to the former, are upon this

subject, of the same description with those which they advance against

every other part of revelation; bearing with equal force against the

system of natural religion, which they support, as against the

doctrines of revealed religion, which they oppose. And indeed, this

single circumstance, if weighed with candour and reflection; that is,

if the deist were truly the philosopher he pretends to be; might

suffice to convince him of his error. For the closeness of the analogy

between the works of nature, and the word of the gospel, being found

to be such, that every blow which is aimed at the one, rebounds with

undiminished force against the other: the conviction of their common

origin must be the inference of unbiassed understanding.

Thus, when in the outset of his argument, the deist tells us, that as

obedience must be the object of God’s approbation, and disobedience

the ground of his displeasure, it must follow by natural consequence,

that when men have transgressed the divine commands, repentance and

amendment of life will place them in the same situation as if they had

never offended:—he does not recollect, that actual experience of the

course of nature directly contradicts the assertion; and that, in the

common occurrences of life, the man who by intemperance and

voluptuousness, has injured his character, his fortune, and his

health, does not find himself instantly restored to the full enjoyment

of these blessings on repenting of his past misconduct, and

determining on future amendment. Now, if the attributes of the Deity

demand, that the punishment should not outlive the crime, on what

ground shall we justify this temporal dispensation? The difference in

_degree_, cannot affect the question in the least. It matters not,

whether the punishment be of long or short duration; whether in this

world, or in the next. If the justice or the goodness of God, require

that punishment should not be inflicted when repentance has taken

place; it must be a violation of those attributes to permit any

punishment whatever, the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will

it avail to say, that the evils of _this life_ attendant upon vice,

are the effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way

of natural consequence. Is not that established constitution itself,

the effect of the divine decree? And are not its several operations as

much the appointment of its Almighty framer, as if they had

individually flowed from his immediate direction? But besides, what

reason have we to suppose that God’s treatment of us in a future

state, will not be of the same nature as we find it in this; according

to established rules, and in the way of natural consequence? Many

circumstances might be urged on the contrary, to evince the likelihood

that it will. But this is not necessary to our present purpose. It is

sufficient, that the deist cannot _prove_ that it will _not_. Our

experience of the present state of things evinces, that indemnity is

not the consequence of repentance here: can he adduce a

counter-experience to show, that it will hereafter? The justice and

goodness of God are not then _necessarily_ concerned, in virtue of the

sinner’s repentance, to remove all evil consequences upon sin in the

next life, or else the arrangement of events in this, has not been

regulated by the dictates of justice and goodness. If the deist admits

the latter, what becomes of his natural religion?

Now let us inquire, whether the conclusions of abstract reasoning will

coincide with the deductions of experience. If obedience be at all

times our duty, in what way can present repentance release us from the

punishment of former transgressions? Can repentance annihilate what is

past? Or can we do more by present obedience, than acquit ourselves of

present obligation? Or, does the contrition we experience, added to

the positive duties we discharge, constitute a surplusage of merit,

which may be transferred to the reduction of our former demerit? And

is the justification of the philosopher, who is too enlightened to be

a Christian, to be built, after all, upon the absurdities of

supererogation? ‘We may as well affirm,’ says a learned Divine, ‘that

our former obedience atones for our present sins, as that our present

obedience makes amends for antecedent transgressions.’ And it is

surely with a peculiar ill grace, that this sufficiency of repentance

is urged by those, who deny the _possible_ efficacy of Christ’s

mediation; since the ground on which they deny the latter, equally

serves for the rejection of the former: the _necessary connexion_

between the merits of one being, and the acquittal of another, not

being less conceivable, than that which is conceived to subsist

between obedience at one time, and the forgiveness of disobedience at

another.

Since then, upon the whole, experience (as far as it extends) goes to

prove the natural inefficacy of repentance to remove the effects of

past transgressions; and the abstract reason of the thing, can furnish

no link, whereby to connect present obedience with forgiveness of

former sins: it follows, that however the contemplation of God’s

infinite goodness and love, might excite some faint hope, that mercy

would be extended to the sincerely penitent; the animating _certainty_

of this momentous truth, without which the religious sense can have no

place, can be derived from the express communication of the Deity

alone.

But it is yet urged by those, who would measure the proceedings of

divine wisdom by the standard of their own reason; that, admitting the

necessity of a Revelation on this subject, it had been sufficient for

the Deity to have made known to man his benevolent intention; and that

the circuitous apparatus of the scheme of redemption must have been

superfluous, for the purpose of rescuing the world from the terrors

and dominion of sin; when this might have been effected in a way

infinitely more simple and intelligible, and better calculated to

excite our gratitude and love, merely by proclaiming to mankind a free

pardon, and perfect indemnity, on condition of repentance and

amendment.

To the disputer, who would thus prescribe to God the mode by which he

may best conduct his creatures to happiness, we might as before reply,

by the application of his own argument to the course of ordinary

events: and we might demand of him to inform us, wherefore the Deity

should have left the sustenance of life, depending on the tedious

process of human labour and contrivance, in rearing from a small seed,

and conducting to the perfection fitting it for the use of man, the

necessary article of nourishment; when the end might have been at once

accomplished by its instantaneous production. And will he contend that

bread has not been ordained for the support of man; because that,

instead of the present circuitous mode of its production, it might

have been rained down from heaven, like the manna in the wilderness?

On grounds such as these, the philosopher (as he wishes to be called)

may be safely allowed to object to the notion of forgiveness by a

Mediator.

With respect to every such objection as this, it may be well, once for

all, to make this general observation. We find, from the whole course

of nature, that God governs the world, not by independent acts, but by

connected system. The instruments which he employs in the ordinary

works of his Providence, are not physically necessary to his

operations. He might have acted without them, if he pleased. ‘He

might, for instance, have created all men, without the intervention of

parents: but where then had been the beneficial connexion between

parents and children; and the numerous advantages resulting to human

society from such connexion?’ The difficulty lies here: the _uses_

arising from the _connexions_ of God’s acts may be various; and such

are the _pregnancies_ of his works, that a _single act_ may answer a

prodigious variety of purposes. Of the several purposes we are, for

the most part, ignorant: and from this ignorance are derived most of

our weak objections against the ways of his Providence; whilst we

foolishly presume, that, like human agents, he has but one end in

view.

This observation we shall find of material use in our examination of

the remaining arguments adduced by the deist on the present subject.

And there is none to which it more forcibly applies than to that by

which he endeavours to prove the notion of a Mediator to be

inconsistent with the _divine immutability_. It is either, he affirms,

agreeable to the will of God to grant salvation on repentance, and

then he _will_ grant it without a Mediator: or it is not agreeable to

his will, and then a Mediator can be of no avail, unless we admit the

mutability of the divine decrees.

But the objector is not, perhaps, aware how far this reasoning will

extend. Let us try it in the case of prayer. All such things as are

agreeable to the will of God must be accomplished, whether we pray or

not; and therefore our prayers are useless, unless they be supposed to

have a power of altering his will. And indeed, with equal

conclusiveness it might be proved that repentance itself must be

unnecessary. For if it be fit that our sins should be forgiven, God

will forgive us without repentance: and if it be unfit, repentance can

be of no avail.

The error in all these conclusions is the same, it consists in

mistaking a conditional for an absolute decree; and in supposing God

to ordain an end unalterably, without any concern as to the

intermediate steps, whereby that end is to be accomplished. Whereas

the _manner_ is sometimes as necessary as the _act_ proposed: so that

if not done in that particular way, it would not have been done at

all. Of this observation, abundant illustration may be derived, as

well from natural as from revealed religion. ‘Thus we know from

natural religion, that it is agreeable to the will of God, that the

distresses of mankind should be relieved: and yet we see the

destitute, from a wise constitution of Providence, left to the

precarious benevolence of their fellow-men; and if not relieved by

_them_, they are not relieved _at all_. In like manner, in Revelation,

in the case of Naaman the Syrian, we find that God was willing he

should be healed of his leprosy; but yet he was not willing that it

should be done, except in _one particular manner_. Abana and Pharpar

were as famous as any of the rivers of Israel. Could he not wash in

them, and be clean? Certainly he might, if the design of God had been

no more than to heal him. Or it might have been done without any

washing at all. But the healing was not the only design of God, nor

the most important. The _manner_ of the cure was of more consequence

in the moral design of God, than the _cure_ itself: the effect being

produced, for the sake of manifesting to the whole kingdom of Syria,

the great power of the God of Israel, by which the cure was

performed.’ And in like manner, though God willed that the penitent

sinner should receive forgiveness; we may see good reason why,

agreeably to his usual proceeding, he might will it to be granted in

one particular manner only, through the intervention of a Mediator.

Although in the present stage of the subject, in which we are

concerned with the objections of the DEIST, the argument should be

confined to the deductions of natural reason; yet I have added this

instance from Revelation, because, strange to say, some who assume the

name of Christians, and profess not altogether to discard the written

word of Revelation, adept the very principle which we have just

examined. For what are the doctrines of that description of

Christians, in the sister kingdom,[169] who glory in having brought

down the high things of God to the level of man’s understanding? That

Christ was a person sent into the world to promulgate the will of God:

to communicate new lights on the subject of religious duties: by his

life to set an example of perfect obedience: by his death to manifest

his sincerity: and by his resurrection to convince us of the great

truth which he had been commissioned to teach, our rising again to

future life. This, say they, is the sum and substance of Christianity.

It furnishes a purer morality, and a more operative enforcement: its

morality more pure, as built on juster notions of the divine nature:

and its enforcement more operative, as founded on a _certainty_ of a

state of retribution. And is then Christianity nothing but a new and

more formal promulgation of the religion of nature? Is the death of

Christ but an attestation of his truth? And are we, after all, left to

our own merit for acceptance: and obliged to trust for our salvation

to the perfection of our obedience? Then indeed, has the great Author

of our religion in vain submitted to the agonies of the cross; if

after having given to mankind a law, which leaves them less excusable

in their transgressions, he has left them to be judged by the rigour

of that law, and to stand or fall by their own personal deserts.

It is said, indeed, that as by this new dispensation, the certainty of

pardon on repentance has been made known, mankind has been informed of

all that is essential in the doctrine of mediation. But granting that

no more was intended to be conveyed, than the sufficiency of

repentance; yet it remains to be considered _in what way_ that

repentance was likely to be brought about. Was the bare declaration

that God would forgive the repentant sinner, sufficient to ensure his

amendment? Or was it not rather calculated to render him easy under

guilt, from the facility of reconciliation? What was there to alarm,

to rouse the sinner from the apathy of habitual transgression? What

was there to make that impression which the nature of God’s moral

government demands? Shall we say that the grateful sense of divine

mercy would be sufficient; and that the generous feelings of our

nature, awakened by the supreme goodness, would have secured our

obedience? that is, shall we say, that the love of virtue and of right

would have maintained man in his allegiance? And have we not then had

abundant experience of what man can do, when left to his own

exertions, to be cured of such vain and idle fancies? What is the

history of man, from the creation to the time of Christ, but a

continued trial of his natural strength? And what has been the _moral_

of that history, but that man is strong, only as he feels himself

weak? strong, only as he feels that his nature is corrupt, and from a

consciousness of that corruption, is led to place his whole reliance

upon God? What is the description which the apostle of the Gentiles

has left us, of the state of the world, at the coming of our

Saviour?—_being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication,

wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate,

deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful,

proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents,

without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection,

implacable, unmerciful—who, knowing the judgment of God, that they

which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same,

but have pleasure in them that do them_.

Here were the fruits of that natural goodness of the human heart,

which is the favorite theme and fundamental principle with that class

of Christians, with whom we are at present concerned. And have we not

then had full experiment of our natural powers? And shall we yet have

the madness to fly back to our own sufficiency, and our own merits,

and to turn away from that gracious support, which is offered to us

through the mediation of Christ? No: lost as men were, at the time

Christ appeared, to all sense of true religion: lost as they must be

to it, at all times, when left to a proud confidence in their own

sufficiency: nothing short of a strong and salutary terror could

awaken them to virtue. Without some striking expression of God’s

abhorrence of sin, which might work powerfully on the imagination and

the heart, what could prove a sufficient counteraction to the violent

impulse of natural passions? what, to the entailed depravation, which

the history of man, no less than the voice of Revelation, pronounces

to have infected the whole human race? Besides, without a full and

adequate sense of guilt, the very notion of forgiveness, as it relates

to us, is unintelligible. We can have no idea of forgiveness, unless

conscious of something to be forgiven. Ignorant of our forgiveness, we

remain ignorant of that goodness which confers it. And thus, without

some proof of God’s hatred for sin, we remain unacquainted with the

greatness of his love.

The simple promulgation then, of forgiveness on repentance, could not

answer the purpose. Merely to _know_ the condition, could avail

nothing. An _inducement_ of sufficient force to ensure its

_fulfilment_ was essential. The system of sufficiency had been fully

tried, to satisfy mankind of its folly. It was now time to introduce a

new system, the system of _humility_. And for this purpose, what

expedient could have been devised more suitable than that which has

been adopted?—the sacrifice of the Son of God for the sins of men:

proclaiming to the world, by the greatness of the ransom, the

immensity of the guilt: and thence, at the same time evincing, in the

most fearful manner, God’s utter abhorrence of sin, in requiring such

expiation; and the infinity of his love, in appointing it.

To this expedient for man’s salvation, though it be the clear and

express language of Scripture, I have as yet sought no support from

the authority of Scripture itself. Having hitherto had to contend with

the deist, who denies all Revelation; and the pretended Christian, who

rationalizing away its substance, finds it a mere moral system, and

can discover in it no trace of a Redeemer: to urge the declarations of

Scripture, as to the particular nature of redemption, would be to no

purpose. Its authority disclaimed by the one, and evaded by the other,

each becomes unassailable on any ground, but that which he has chosen

for himself, the ground of general reason.

But, we come now to consider the objections of a class of Christians

who, as they profess to derive their arguments from the language and

meaning of Scripture, will enable us to try the subject of our

discussion by the only true standard, the word of Revelation. And

indeed, it were most sincerely to be wished, that the doctrines of

Scripture were at all times collected purely from the Scripture

itself: and that preconceived notions and arbitrary theories were not

first to be formed, and then the Scripture pressed into the service of

each fanciful, dogma. If God has vouchsafed a Revelation, has he not

thereby imposed a duty of submitting our understandings to its perfect

wisdom? Shall weak, shortsighted man presume to say, ‘If I find the

discoveries of Revelation correspond to my notions of what is right

and fit, I will admit them: but if they do not, I am sure they cannot

be the genuine sense of Scripture: and I am sure of it, on this

principle, that the wisdom of God cannot disagree with itself?’ That

is, to express it truly, that the wisdom of God cannot but agree with

what this judge of the actions of the Almighty deems it wise for him

to do. The language of Scripture must then, by every possible

refinement, be made to surrender its fair and natural meaning, to this

predetermination of its necessary import. But the word of revelation

being thus pared down to the puny dimensions of human reason, how

differs the Christian from the deist? The only difference is this:

that whilst the one denies that God hath given us a Revelation; the

other, compelled by evidence to receive it, endeavours to render it of

no effect. But in both there is the same self-sufficiency, the same

pride of understanding that would erect itself on the ground of human

reason, and that disdains to accept the divine favour on any

conditions but its own. In both, in short, the very characteristic of

a Christian spirit is wanting—HUMILITY. For in what consists the

entire of Christianity, but in this; that feeling an utter incapacity

to work out our own salvation, we submit our whole-selves, our hearts,

and our understandings, to the divine disposal; and relying on God’s

gracious assistance, ensured to our honest endeavours to obtain it,

through the Mediation of Christ Jesus, we look up to him, and to him

alone, for safety? Nay, what is the very _notion_ of religion, but

this humble reliance upon God? Take this away, and we become a race of

independent beings, claiming as a debt the reward of our good works; a

sort of contracting party with the Almighty, contributing nought to

his glory, but anxious to maintain our own independence, and our own

rights. And is it not to subdue this rebellious spirit, which is

necessarily at war with virtue and with God, that Christianity has

been introduced? Does not every page of revelation, peremptorily

pronounce this; and yet shall we exercise this spirit, even upon

Christianity itself? Assuredly if we do; if, on the contrary, our

pride of understanding, and self-sufficiency of reason, are not made

to prostrate themselves before the awfully mysterious truths of

revelation; if we do not bring down the rebellious spirit of our

nature, to confess that the _wisdom of man_ is but _foolishness with

God_; we may bear the name of Christians, but we want the essence of

Christianity.

These observations, though they apply in their full extent, only to

those who reduce Christianity to a system purely rational; yet are, in

a certain degree applicable to the description of Christians, whose

notion of redemption we now come to consider. For what but a

preconceived theory, to which Scripture had been compelled to yield

its obvious and genuine signification, could ever have led to the

opinion, that in the death of Christ there was _no expiation for sin_;

that the word _sacrifice_ has been used by the writers of the New

Testament merely in a figurative sense; and that the whole doctrine of

the redemption amounts but to this, ‘that God, willing to pardon

repentant sinners, and at the same time willing to do it, only in that

way, which would best promote the cause of virtue, appointed that

Jesus Christ should come into the world; and that _he_, having taught

the pure doctrines of the gospel; having passed a life of exemplary

virtue; having endured many sufferings, and finally death itself, to

prove his truth, and perfect his obedience; and having risen again, to

manifest the certainty of a future state; has not only, by his example

proposed to mankind a pattern for imitation; but has, by the merits of

his obedience, obtained, through his intercession, as a reward, a

kingdom or government over the world, whereby he is enabled to bestow

pardon and final happiness, upon all who will accept them on the terms

of sincere repentance.’ That is, in other words, we receive salvation

through a Mediator: the mediation conducted through intercession: and

that intercession successful in recompense of the meritorious

obedience of our Redeemer.

Here, indeed, we find the notion of redemption admitted: but in

setting up, for this purpose, the doctrine of _pure intercession_, in

opposition to that of _atonement_, we shall perhaps discover, when

properly examined, some small tincture of that mode of reasoning,

which, as we have seen, has led the modern Socinian to contend against

the idea of redemption at large; and the deist, against that of

revelation itself.

For the present, let us confine our attention to the _objections_

which the patrons of this new system bring against the principle of

atonement, as set forth in the doctrines of that church to which we

more immediately belong. As for those which are founded in views of

general reason, a little reflection will convince us, that there is

not any, which can be alleged against the latter, that may not be

urged with equal force, against the former: not a single difficulty

with which it is attempted to encumber the one, that does not equally

embarrass the other. This having been evinced, we shall then see how

little reason there was for relinquishing the plain and natural

meaning of scripture; and for opening the door to a latitude of

interpretation, in which, it is but too much the fashion to indulge at

the present day, and which if persevered in, must render the word of

God a nullity.

The first, and most important of the objections we have now to

consider, is that which represents the doctrine of atonement, as

founded on the _divine implacability_—inasmuch as it supposes, that to

appease the rigid justice of God, it was requisite that punishment

should be inflicted; and that consequently the sinner _could_ not by

any means have been released, had not Christ suffered in his stead.

Were this a faithful statement of the doctrine of atonement, there had

indeed been just ground for the objection. But that this is not the

fair representation of candid truth, let the objector feel, by the

application of the same mode of reasoning, to the system which he

upholds. If it was necessary to the forgiveness of man, that Christ

should suffer; and through the merits of his obedience, and as the

fruit of his intercession, obtain the power of granting that

forgiveness; does it not follow, that had not Christ thus suffered and

interceded, we could not have been forgiven? And has _he_ not then, as

it were, taken us out of the hands of a severe and strict judge; and

is it not to him alone that we owe our pardon? Here the argument is

exactly parallel, and the objection of implacability equally applies.

Now what is the answer? ‘That although it is through the merits and

intercession of Christ that we are forgiven; yet these were not the

_procuring cause_, but the _means_, by which God originally disposed

to forgive, thought it right to bestow his pardon.’ Let then the word

_intercession_ be changed for _sacrifice_, and see whether the answer

be not equally conclusive.

The sacrifice of Christ was never deemed by any who did not wish to

calumniate the doctrine of atonement, to have _made_ God placable, but

merely viewed as the _means_ appointed by divine wisdom, by which to

bestow forgiveness. And agreeably to this, do we not find this

sacrifice every where spoken of, as ordained by God himself?—_God so

loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever

believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life_—and

_herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent

his Son to be the propitiation for our sins_—and again we are told,

that _we are redeemed with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb

without blemish, and without spot—-who verily was foreordained before

the foundation of the world_—and again, that Christ is _the Lamb slain

from the foundation of the world_. Since then, the notion of the

efficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, contained in the doctrine of

atonement, stands precisely on the same foundation with that of pure

intercession—merely as the _means_ whereby God has thought fit to

grant his favour and gracious aid to repentant sinners, and to fulfil

that merciful intention, which he had at all times entertained towards

his fallen creatures: and since by the same sort of representation,

the charge of implacability in the Divine Being, is as applicable to

the one scheme as to the other; that is, since it is a calumny most

foully cast upon both: we may estimate with what candour this has been

made by those who hold the one doctrine the fundamental ground of

their objections against the other. For, on the ground of the

expression of God’s unbounded love to his creatures every where

through Scripture, and of his several declarations that he forgave

them _freely_, it is, that they principally contend, that the notion

of expiation by the sacrifice of Christ cannot be the genuine doctrine

of the New Testament.

But still it is demanded, ‘in what way can the death of Christ,

considered as a sacrifice of expiation, be conceived to operate to the

remission of sins, unless by the appeasing a Being, who otherwise

would not have forgiven us?’—To this the answer of the Christian is,

‘I know not, nor does it concern me to know _in what manner_ the

sacrifice of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins; it is

enough, that this is declared by God to be the medium through which my

salvation is effected. I pretend not to dive into the counsels of the

Almighty. I submit to his wisdom: and I will not reject his grace,

because his mode of vouchsafing it is not within my comprehension.’

But now let us try the doctrine of pure intercession by this same

objection. It has been asked, how can the sufferings of one Being be

conceived to have any connexion with the forgiveness of another. Let

us likewise inquire, how the meritorious obedience of one Being, can

be conceived to have any connexion with the pardon of the

transgressions of another: or whether the prayers of a righteous Being

in behalf of a wicked person, can be imagined to have more weight in

obtaining forgiveness for the transgressor, than the same

supplication, seconded by the offering up of life itself, to procure

that forgiveness? The fact is, the want of discoverable connexion has

nothing to do with either. Neither the sacrifice nor the intercession

has, as far as we can comprehend, any _efficacy_ whatever. All that we

know, or can know of the one or of the other is, that it has been

appointed as the means, by which God has determined to act with

respect to man. So that to object to the one, because the mode of

operation is unknown, is not only giving up the other, but the very

notion of a Mediator; and if followed on, cannot fail to lead to pure

deism, and perhaps may not stop even there.

Thus we have seen, to what the general objections against the doctrine

of atonement amount. The charges of _divine implacability_, and of

_inefficacious means_, we have found to bear with as little force

against this, as against the doctrine which is attempted to be

substituted in its room.

We come now to the objections which are drawn from the immediate

language of scripture, in those passages in which the nature of our

redemption is described. And first, it is asserted, that it is no

where said in scripture, that God is reconciled _to us_ by Christ’s

death, but that we are every where said to be reconciled _to God_. Now

in this objection, which clearly lays the whole stress upon _our

obedience_, we discover the secret spring of this entire system, which

is set up in opposition to the scheme of atonement: we see that

reluctance to part with the proud feeling of merit, with which the

principle of redemption by the sacrifice of Christ is openly at war:

and consequently we see the essential difference there is between the

two doctrines at present under consideration; and the necessity there

exists for separating them by the clearest marks of distinction. But

to return to the objection that has been made, it very fortunately

happens, that we have the meaning of the words in their scripture use,

defined by no less an authority than that of our Saviour himself—_If

thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy

brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the

altar, and go thy way—first be reconciled to thy brother, and then

come and offer thy gift_. Now, from this plain instance, in which the

person _offending_ is expressly described, as the party to _be

reconciled to_ him who had been _offended_, by agreeing to his terms

of accommodation, and thereby making his peace with him; it manifestly

appears, in what sense this expression is to be understood in the

language of the New Testament. The very words then produced for the

purpose of showing that there was no displeasure on the part of God,

which it was necessary by some means to avert, prove the direct

contrary: and our _being reconciled to God_, evidently does not mean,

our giving up our sins, and thereby laying aside _our_ enmity to God,

(in which sense the objection supposes it to be taken) but the turning

away _his_ displeasure, whereby we are enabled to regain his favour.

And indeed it were strange, had it not meant this. What! are we to

suppose the God of the Christian, like the deity of the Epicurean, to

look on with indifference upon the actions of this life, and not to be

offended at the sinner? The displeasure of God, it is to be

remembered, is not like man’s displeasure, a resentment or passion,

but a judicial disapprobation: which if we abstract from our notion of

God, we must cease to view him as the moral governor of the world. And

it is from the want of this distinction, which is so highly necessary;

and the consequent fear of degrading the Deity, by attributing to him

what might appear to be the weakness of passion; that they, who trust

to reason more than to scripture, have been withheld from admitting

any principle that implied displeasure on the part of God. Had they

attended but a little to the plain language of scripture, they might

have rectified their mistake. They would there have found the wrath of

God against the disobedient, spoken of in almost every page. They

would have found also a case which is exactly in point to the main

argument before us; in which there is described, not only the wrath of

God, but the turning away of his displeasure by the mode of sacrifice.

The case is that of the three friends of Job,—in which God expressly

says, that his _wrath is kindled against the friends of Job, because

they had not spoken of him the thing that was right_; and at the same

time directs them to offer up a sacrifice, as the way of averting his

anger.

But then it is urged, that God is every where spoken of as a being of

infinite love. True; and the whole difficulty arises from building on

partial texts. When men perpetually talk of God’s justice, as being

necessarily modified by his goodness, they seem to forget that it is

no less the language of scripture, and of reason, that his goodness

should be modified by his justice. Our error on this subject proceeds

from our own narrow views, which compel us to consider the attributes

of the Supreme Being, as so many distinct qualities, when we should

conceive of them as inseparably blended together; and his _whole

nature_ as _one great impulse_ to what _is best_.

As to God’s displeasure against sinners, there can be then upon the

whole no reasonable ground of doubt. And against the doctrine of

atonement, no difficulty can arise from the scripture phrase of men

being _reconciled to God_: since, as we have seen, that directly

implies the turning away the displeasure of God, so as to be again

restored to his favour and protection.

But, though all this must be admitted by those who will not shut their

eyes against reason and scripture; yet still it is contended, that the

death of Christ cannot be considered as a _propitiatory sacrifice_.

Now, when we find him described as _the Lamb of God which taketh away

the sins of the world_; when we are told, that _Christ hath given

himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God_; and that he

_needed not, like the high-priests under the law, to offer up

sacrifice daily, first for his own sins, and then for the people’s;

for that this he did once, when he offered up himself_; when he is

expressly asserted to be the _propitiation for our sins_; and God is

said to have _loved us_, and to have _sent his Son to be the

propitiation for our sins_; when Isaiah describes _his soul as made an

offering for sin_; when it is said that _God spared not his own Son,

but delivered him up for us all_; and that _by him we have received

the atonement_; when these, and many other such passages are to be

found; when every expression referring to the death of Christ,

evidently indicates the notion of a sacrifice of atonement and

propitiation; when this sacrifice is particularly represented, as of

the nature of a _sin-offering_; which was a species of sacrifice

‘prescribed to be offered upon the commission of an offence, after

which the offending person was considered as if he had never sinned;’

it may well appear surprising on what ground it can be questioned,

that the death of Christ is pronounced in scripture to have been a

sacrifice of atonement and expiation for the sins of men.

It is asserted, that the several passages which seem to speak this

language, contain nothing more than _figurative allusions_: that all

that is intended is, that Christ laid down his life _for_, that is,

_on account of_ mankind: and that there being circumstances of

resemblance between this event and the sacrifices of the law, terms

were borrowed from the latter, to express the former in a manner more

lively and impressive. And as a proof that the application of these

terms is but figurative, it is contended, 1st. That the death of

Christ did not correspond _literally_ and exactly, to the ceremonies

of the Mosaic sacrifice: 2dly. That being in different places compared

to different kinds of sacrifices, to _all_ of which it could not

possibly correspond, it cannot be considered as exactly of the nature

of _any_: and lastly, that there was no such thing as a sacrifice of

_propitiation_ or _expiation of sin_ under the Mosaic dispensation at

all; this notion having been entirely of Heathen origin.

As to the two first arguments, they deserve but little consideration.

The want of an exact similitude to the precise form of the Mosaic

sacrifice, is but a slender objection. It might as well be said, that

because Christ was not of the species of animal, which had usually

been offered up; or because he was not slain in the same manner; or

because he was not offered by the high-priest, there could have been

no sacrifice. But this is manifest trifling. If the formal notion of a

sacrifice for sin, that is, a life offered up in expiation be adhered

to, nothing more can be required to constitute it a sacrifice, except

by those who mean to cavil, not to discover truth.

Again, as to the second argument, which from the comparison of

Christ’s death, to the _different_ kinds of sacrifices, would infer

that it was not of the nature of _any_, it may be replied, that it

will more reasonably follow, that it was of the nature of _all_.

Resembling that of the _Passover_, inasmuch as by it we were delivered

from an evil yet greater than that of Egyptian bondage; partaking the

nature of the _sin offering_, as being accepted in expiation of

transgression; and similar to the institution of the _scape-goat_, as

bearing the accumulated sins of all: may we not reasonably suppose

that this one great sacrifice contained the full import and completion

of the whole sacrificial system? And that so far from being spoken of

in figure, as bearing some resemblance to the sacrifices of the law,

_they_ were on the contrary, as the apostle expressly tells us, but

figures, or faint and partial representations of this stupendous

sacrifice which had been ordained from the beginning? And besides, it

is to be remarked in general, with respect to the figurative

application of the sacrificial terms to the death of Christ; that the

striking resemblance between that and the sacrifices of the law, which

is assigned as the reason of such application, would have produced

just the contrary effect upon the sacred writers; since they must have

been aware that the constant use of such expressions, aided by the

strength of the resemblance, must have laid a foundation for error, in

that which constitutes the main doctrine of the Christian faith. Being

addressed to a people whose religion was entirely sacrificial, in what

but the obvious and literal sense, could the sacrificial

representation of the death of Christ have been understood?

We come now to the third and principal objection, which is built upon

the assertion, that no sacrifices of _atonement_ (in the sense in

which we apply this term to the death of Christ) had existence under

the Mosaic law: such as were called by that name having had an

entirely different import. Now that certain offerings under this

denomination, related to _things_, and were employed for the purpose

of purification, so as to render them fit instruments of the

ceremonial worship, must undoubtedly be admitted. That others were

again appointed to relieve _persons_ from _ceremonial_ incapacities,

so as to restore them to the privilege of joining in the services of

the temple, is equally true. But that there were others of a nature

strictly propitiatory, and ordained to avert the displeasure of God

from the transgressor, not only of the ceremonial, but, in some cases,

even of the _moral_ law, will appear manifest upon a very slight

examination. Thus we find it decreed, that _if a soul sin and commit a

trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which

was delivered to him to keep—or have found that which was lost, and

lieth concerning it, and_ SWEARETH FALSELY, _then, because he hath

sinned in this, he shall not only make restitution to his

neighbour—but he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord, a

ram without blemish out of the flock; and the priest shall make an_

ATONEMENT _for him before the Lord, and it shall be_ FORGIVEN HIM. And

again in a case of criminal connexion with a bond-maid who was

betrothed, the offender is ordered to _bring his trespass-offering,

and the priest is to make_ ATONEMENT _for him with the

trespass-offering, for the sin which he hath done; and the sin which

he hath done shall be_ FORGIVEN _him_. And in the case of all offences

which fell not under the description of _presumptuous_, it is manifest

from the slightest inspection of the book of Leviticus, that the

atonement prescribed, was appointed as the means whereby God might be

_propitiated_, or _reconciled to the offender_.

Again, as to the _vicarious_ import of the Mosaic sacrifice; or, in

other words, its expressing an acknowledgment of what the sinner had

deserved; this not only seems directly set forth in the account of the

first offering in Leviticus, where it is said of the person who

brought a free-will offering, _he shall lay his hand upon the head of

the burnt-offering, and it shall be_ ACCEPTED FOR _him to make

atonement for him_: but the ceremony of the scape-goat on the day of

expiation, appears to place this matter beyond doubt. On this head,

however, as not being _necessary_ to my argument, I shall not at

present enlarge.

That expiatory sacrifice (in the strict and proper sense of the word)

was a part of the Mosaic institution, there remains then, I trust, no

sufficient reason to deny. That it existed in like manner amongst the

Arabians, in the time of Job, we have already seen. And that its

universal prevalence in the Heathen world, though corrupted and

disfigured by idolatrous practices, was the result of an original

divine appointment, every candid inquirer will find little reason to

doubt. But be this as it may, it must be admitted, that _propitiatory

sacrifices_ not only existed through the whole Gentile world, but had

place under the law of Moses. The argument then, which from the

non-existence of such sacrifices amongst the Jews, would deny the term

when applied to the death of Christ, to indicate such sacrifice,

necessarily falls to the ground.

But, in fact, they who deny the sacrifice of Christ to be a real and

proper sacrifice for sin, must, if they are consistent, deny that _any

such_ sacrifice ever did exist, by divine appointment. For on what

principle do they deny the former, but this?—that the sufferings and

death of Christ, for the sins and salvation of men, can make no change

in God: cannot render him more ready to forgive, more benevolent than

he is in his own nature; and consequently can have no power to avert

from the offender the punishment of his transgression. Now, on the

same principle, _every_ sacrifice for the expiation of sin, must be

impossible. And this explains the true cause why these persons will

not admit the language of the New Testament, clear and express as it

is, to signify a real and proper sacrifice for sin: and why they feel

it necessary to explain away the equally clear and express description

of that species of sacrifice in the old. Setting out with a

preconceived erroneous notion of its nature, and one which involves a

manifest contradiction; they hold themselves justified in rejecting

every acceptation of scripture which supports it. But, had they more

accurately examined the true import of the term in scripture use, they

would have perceived no such contradiction, nor would they have found

themselves compelled to refine away by strained and unnatural

interpretations, the clear and obvious meaning of the sacred text.

They would have seen, that a sacrifice for sin, in scripture language,

implies solely this, ‘a sacrifice wisely and graciously _appointed_ by

God, the moral governor of the world, to expiate the _guilt_ of sin in

such a manner as to avert the _punishment_ of it from the offender.’

To ask _why_ God should have appointed this particular mode, or in

_what way_ it can avert the punishment of sin, is to take us back to

the general point at issue with the deist, which has been already

discussed. With the Christian, who admits redemption under _any_

modification, such matters cannot be subjects of inquiry.

But even to our imperfect apprehension, some circumstances of natural

connexion and fitness may be pointed out. The whole may be considered

as a sensible and striking representation of a punishment, which the

sinner was conscious he deserved from God’s justice: and then, on the

part of God, it becomes a public declaration of his _holy displeasure_

against sin, and of his _merciful compassion_ for the sinner; and on

the part of the offender, when offered by or for him, it implies a

sincere _confession of guilt_, and a hearty desire of obtaining

_pardon_: and upon the _due_ performance of this service, the sinner

is pardoned, and escapes the penalty of his transgression.

This we shall find agreeable to the nature of a _sacrifice for sin_,

as laid down in the Old Testament. Now is there any thing in this

degrading to the honour of God; or in the smallest degree inconsistent

with the dictates of natural reason? And in this view, what is there

in the death of Christ, as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind, that

may not in a certain degree, be embraced by our natural notions? For

according to the explanation just given, is it not a declaration to

the whole world, of the greatness of their sins; and of the

proportionate mercy and compassion of God, who had ordained this

method, whereby, in a manner consistent with his attributes, his

fallen creatures might be again taken into his favour, on their making

themselves parties in this great sacrifice: that is, on their

complying with those conditions, which, on the received notion of

sacrifice, would render them parties in this; namely, an adequate

conviction of guilt, a proportionate sense of God’s love, and a firm

determination, with an humble faith in the sufficiency of this

sacrifice, to endeavour after a life of amendment and obedience? Thus

much falls within the reach of our comprehension on this mysterious

subject. Whether in the expanded range of God’s moral government, some

other end may not be held in view, in the death of his only begotten

Son, it is not for us to enquire; nor does it in any degree concern

us: what God _has_ been pleased to reveal, it is alone our duty to

believe.

One remarkable circumstance indeed there is, in which the sacrifice of

Christ differs from all those sacrifices which were offered under the

law. Our blessed Lord was not only the _Subject_ of the offering, but

the _Priest_ who offered it. Therefore he has become not only a

sacrifice, but an intercessor; his intercession being founded upon

this voluntary act of benevolence, by which _he offered himself

without spot to God_. We are not only then in virtue of the

_sacrifice_, forgiven; but in virtue of the _intercession_ admitted to

favour and grace. And thus the scripture notion of the sacrifice of

Christ, includes every advantage, which the advocates for the pure

intercession, seek from their scheme of redemption. But it also

contains others, which they necessarily lose by the rejection of that

notion. It contains the great advantage of impressing mankind with a

_due_ sense of their guilt, by compelling a comparison with the

immensity of the sacrifice made to redeem them from its effects. It

contains that, in short, which is the soul and substance of all

Christian virtue—HUMILITY. And the fact is plainly this, that in every

attempt to get rid of the scripture doctrine of atonement, we find

feelings of a description opposite to this evangelic quality, more or

less to prevail: we find a fondness for the opinion of man’s own

sufficiency, and an unwillingness to submit with devout and implicit

reverence, to the sacred word of revelation.

In the mode of inquiry which has been usually adopted on this subject,

one prevailing error deserves to be noticed. The nature of sacrifice,

as generally practised and understood, antecedent to the time of

Christ, has been first examined; and from that, as a ground of

explanation, the notion of Christ’s sacrifice has been derived:

whereas, in fact by _this_, all former sacrifices are to be

interpreted; and in reference to _it_ only, can they be understood.

From an error so fundamental, it is not wonderful that the greatest

perplexities should have arisen concerning the nature of sacrifice in

general; and that they should ultimately fall with cumulative

confusion on the nature of that particular sacrifice, to the

investigation of which fanciful and mistaken theories had been assumed

as guides. Thus, whilst some have presumptuously attributed the early

and universal practice of sacrifice, to an irrational and

superstitious fear of an imagined sanguinary divinity; and have been

led in defiance of the express language of revelation, to reject and

ridicule the notion of sacrifice, as originating only in the grossness

of superstition: others, not equally destitute of reverence for the

sacred word, and consequently not treating this solemn rite with equal

disrespect, have yet ascribed its origin to human invention; and have

thereby been compelled to account for the divine institution of the

Jewish sacrifices as a mere accommodation to prevailing practice; and

consequently to admit, even the sacrifice of Christ itself to have

grown out of, and been adapted to, this creature of human

excogitation.

Of this latter class, the theories, as might be expected, are various.

In one, sacrifices are represented in the light of _gifts_, intended

to sooth and appease the Supreme Being, in like manner as they are

found to conciliate the favour of men: in another, they are considered

as _federal rites_, a kind of eating and drinking with God, as it were

at his table, and thereby implying the being restored to a state of

friendship with him, by repentance and confession of sins: in a third,

they are described as but _symbolical actions_, or a more expressive

language, denoting the gratitude of the offerer, in such as are

eucharistical; and in those that are expiatory, the acknowledgment of,

and contrition for sin strongly expressed by the death of the animal,

representing _that_ death which the offerer confessed to be his own

desert.

To these different hypotheses, which in the order of their

enumeration, claim respectively the names of _Spencer_, _Sykes_, and

_Warburton_, it may _generally_ be replied, that the _fact_ of Abel’s

sacrifice seems inconsistent with them all: with the first, inasmuch

as it must have been antecedent to those distinctions of property, on

which alone experience of the effects of gifts upon men could have

been founded: with the second, inasmuch as it took place several ages

prior to that period, at which both the words of scripture, and the

opinions of the wisest commentators have fixed the permission of

animal food to man: with the third, inasmuch as the language, which

scripture expressly states to have been derived to our first parents

from divine instruction, cannot be supposed so defective in those

terms that related to the worship of God, as to have rendered it

necessary for Abel to call in the aid of actions, to express the

sentiment of gratitude or sorrow; and still less likely is it that he

would have resorted to that _species_ of action, which in the eye of

reason, must have appeared displeasing to God, the slaughter of an

unoffending animal.

To urge these topics of objection in their full force, against the

several theories I have mentioned, would lead to a discussion far

exceeding the due limits of a discourse from this place. I therefore

dismiss them for the present. Nor shall I, in refutation of the

_general_ idea of the human invention of sacrifice, enlarge upon the

_universality_ of the practice; the _sameness_ of the notion of its

efficacy, pervading nations and ages the most remote; and the

_unreasonableness_ of supposing any natural connexion between the

slaying of an animal, and the receiving pardon for the violation of

God’s laws,—all of which appear decisive against that idea. But, as

both the general idea and the particular theories which have

endeavoured to reconcile to it the nature and origin of sacrifice,

have been caused by a departure from the true and only source of

knowledge; let us return to that sacred fountain, and whilst we

endeavour to establish the genuine scripture notion of sacrifice, at

the same time provide the best refutation of every other.

It requires but little acquaintance with scripture to know that the

lesson which it every where inculcates, is, that man by disobedience

had fallen under the displeasure of his Maker; that to be reconciled

to his favour, and restored to the means of acceptable obedience, a

Redeemer was appointed, and that this Redeemer laid down his life to

procure for repentant sinners forgiveness and acceptance. This

surrender of life has been called by the sacred writers a sacrifice;

and the end attained by it, expiation or atonement. With such as have

been desirous to reduce Christianity to a mere moral system, it has

been a favourite object to represent this sacrifice as entirely

figurative founded only in allusion and similitude to the sacrifices

of the law; whereas, that this is spoken of by the sacred writers, as

a real and proper sacrifice, to which those under the law bore respect

but as types or shadows, is evident from various passages of holy

writ, but more particularly from the epistle to the Hebrews; in which

it is expressly said, that _the law having a shadow of good things to

come, can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year

continually, make the comers thereunto perfect;—but this man, after he

had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right

hand of God_. And again, when the writer of this epistle speaks of the

high-priest entering into the holy of holies with the blood of the

sacrifice, he asserts, that _this was a figure for the time then

present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices, that could

not make him that did the service perfect; but Christ being come, an

high priest of good things to come; not by the blood of goats and

calves, but by his own blood, he entered once into the holy place,

having obtained eternal redemption for us; for_, he adds, _if the

blood of bulls and of goats sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh,

how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal

Spirit, offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience

from dead works to serve the living God?_ It must be unnecessary to

detail more of the numerous passages which go to prove that the

sacrifice of Christ was a true and effective sacrifice, whilst those

of the law were but faint representations, and inadequate copies,

intended for _its_ introduction.

Now, if the sacrifices of the _Law_ appear to have been but

preparations for this one great sacrifice, we are naturally led to

consider whether the same may not be asserted of sacrifice from the

beginning: and whether we are not warranted by scripture, in

pronouncing the entire rite to have been ordained by God, as a type of

that ONE SACRIFICE, in which all others were to have their

consummation.

That the institution was of divine ordinance, may, in the first

instance, be reasonably inferred from the strong and sensible

attestation of the divine acceptance of sacrifice in the case of Abel,

again in that of Noah, afterwards in that of Abraham, and also from

the systematic establishment of it by the same divine authority, in

the dispensation of Moses. And whether we consider the book of Job as

the production of Moses; or of that pious worshipper of the true God,

among the descendants of Abraham, whose name it bears; or of some

other person who lived a short time after, and composed it from the

materials left by Job himself: the representation there made of God,

as _prescribing_ sacrifices to the friends of Job, in every

supposition exhibits a strong authority, and of high antiquity, upon

this question.

These few facts, which I have stated, unaided by any comment, and

abstracting altogether from the arguments which embarrass the contrary

hypothesis, and to which I have already alluded, might perhaps be

sufficient to satisfy an inquiring and candid mind, that sacrifice

must have had its origin in DIVINE INSTITUTION. But if in addition,

this rite, as practised in the earliest ages, shall be found connected

with the sacrifice of Christ, confessedly of divine appointment:

little doubt can reasonably remain on this head. Let us then examine

more particularly the circumstance of the first sacrifice offered up

by Abel.

It is clear from the words of scripture, that both Cain and Abel made

oblations to the Lord. It is clear also, notwithstanding the well

known fanciful interpretation of an eminent commentator, that Abel’s

was an animal sacrifice. It is no less clear, that Abel’s was

accepted, whilst that of Cain was rejected. Now what could have

occasioned the distinction? The acknowledgment of the Supreme Being

and of his universal dominion, was no less strong in the offering of

the fruits of the earth by Cain, than in that of the firstlings of the

flock by Abel: the intrinsic efficacy of the gift must have been the

same in each, each giving of the best that he possessed; the

expression of gratitude, equally significant and forcible in both. How

then is the difference to be explained? If we look to the writer to

the Hebrews, he informs us, that the ground on which Abel’s oblation

was preferred to that of Cain, was, that Abel offered his in _faith_;

and the criterion of this faith also appears to have been, in the

opinion of this writer, the _animal_ sacrifice. The words are

remarkable—_By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice

than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God

testifying of his gifts_. The words here translated, _a more excellent

sacrifice_, are in an early version rendered _a much more sacrifice_,

which phrase, though uncouth in form, adequately conveys the original.

The meaning then is, that by faith Abel offered that which was much

more of the true nature of sacrifice than what had been offered by

Cain. Abel consequently was directed by faith, and this faith was

manifested in the nature of his offering. What then are we to

infer?—Without some revelation granted, some assurance held out as the

object of faith, Abel could not have exercised this virtue: and

without some peculiar mode of sacrifice enjoined, he could not have

exemplified his faith by an appropriate offering. The offering made,

we have already seen, was that of an animal. Let us consider whether

this could have a connexion with any divine assurance communicated at

that early day.

It is obvious that the promise made to our first parents, conveyed an

intimation of some future deliverer, who should overcome the tempter

that had drawn man from his innocence, and remove those evils which

had been occasioned by the fall. This assurance, without which, or

some other ground of hope, it seems difficult to conceive how the

principle of religion could have had place among men, became to our

first parents the grand object of faith. To perpetuate this

fundamental article of religious belief among the descendants of Adam,

some striking memorial of the fall of man, and of the promised

deliverance, would naturally be appointed. And if we admit that the

scheme of redemption by the death of the only begotten Son of God, was

determined from the beginning; that is, if we admit that when God had

ordained the deliverance of man, he had ordained the means: if we

admit that Christ was _the Lamb slain from the foundation of the

world_; what memorial could be devised more apposite than that of

animal sacrifice?—exemplifying, by the slaying of the victim, the

death which had been denounced against man’s disobedience:—thus

exhibiting the awful lesson of that death which was the wages of sin,

and at the same time representing that death which was actually to be

undergone by the Redeemer of mankind:—and hereby connecting in one

view, the two great cardinal events in the history of man, the FALL,

and the RECOVERY: the death denounced against sin, and the death

appointed for that Holy One who was to lay down his life to deliver

man from the consequences of sin. The institution of animal sacrifice

seems then to have been peculiarly significant, as containing all the

elements of religious knowledge: and the adoption of this rite, with

sincere and pious feelings, would at the same time imply an humble

sense of the unworthiness of the offerer; a confession that death

which was inflicted on the victim, was the desert of those sins which

had arisen from man’s transgression; and a full reliance upon the

promises of deliverance, joined to an acquiescence in the means

appointed for its accomplishment.

If this view of the matter be just, there is nothing improbable even

in the supposition that that part of the signification of the rite

which related to the sacrifice of Christ, might have been in some

degree made known from the beginning. But not to contend for this,

(scripture having furnished no express foundation for the assumption,)

room for the exercise of faith is equally preserved, on the idea that

animal sacrifice was enjoined in the general as the religious sign of

faith in the promise of redemption, without any intimation of the way

in which it became a sign. Agreeably to these principles, we shall

find but little difficulty in determining on what ground it was that

Abel’s offering was accepted, whilst that of Cain was rejected. Abel,

in firm reliance on the promise of God, and in obedience to his

command, offered that sacrifice which had been enjoined as the

religious expression of his faith; whilst Cain, disregarding the

gracious assurances that had been vouchsafed, or at least disdaining

to adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting his belief, possibly as

not appearing to _his reason_ to possess any efficacy or natural

fitness, thought he had sufficiently acquitted himself of his duty in

acknowledging the general superintendance of God, and expressing his

gratitude to the Supreme Benefactor, by presenting some of those good

things which he thereby confessed to have been derived from his

bounty. In short, Cain, the first-born of the fall, exhibits the first

fruits of his parents’ disobedience, in the arrogance and

self-sufficiency of reason, rejecting the aids of revelation, because

they fell not within _its_ apprehension of right. He takes the first

place in the annals of deism, and displays, in his proud rejection of

the ordinance of sacrifice, the same spirit, which, in later days, has

actuated his _enlightened_ followers, in rejecting the sacrifice of

Christ.

This view of the subject receives strength, from the terms of

expostulation in which God addresses Cain, on his expressing

resentment at the rejection of _his_ offering, and the acceptance of

Abel’s. The words in the present version are, _if thou doest well,

shalt thou not be accepted?—and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at

the door_—which words, as they stand connected in the context, supply

no very satisfactory meaning, and have long served to exercise the

ingenuity of commentators to but little purpose. But if the word,

which is here translated SIN, be rendered, as we find it in a great

variety of passages in the Old Testament, a SIN OFFERING, the reading

of the passage then becomes, _if thou doest well, shalt thou not be

accepted? and if thou doest not well, a sin offering lieth even at the

door_. The connexion is thus rendered evident. God rebukes Cain for

not conforming to that species of sacrifice which had been offered by

Abel. He refers to it as a matter of known injunction; and hereby

points out the ground of distinction in his treatment of him, and his

brother: and thus, in direct terms, enforces the observance of animal

sacrifice.

As that part of my general position, which pronounces sacrifice to

have been of _divine institution_, receives support from the passage

just recited; so to that part of it which maintains that this rite

bore an aspect to the _sacrifice of Christ_, additional evidence may

be derived from the language of the writer to the Hebrews, inasmuch as

he places the blood of Abel’s sacrifice in direct comparison with the

blood of Christ, which he styles pre-eminently _the blood of

sprinkling_: and represents both as _speaking good things_, in

different degrees. What then is the result of the foregoing

reflections?—The sacrifice of Abel was an animal sacrifice. This

sacrifice was accepted. The ground of this acceptance was the faith in

which it was offered. Scripture assigns no other object of this faith

but the promise of a Redeemer: and of this faith, the offering of an

animal in sacrifice, appears to have been the legitimate, and

consequently the instituted, expression. The institution of animal

sacrifice then, was coeval with the fall, and had a reference to the

sacrifice of our redemption. But as it had also an immediate and most

apposite application to that important event in the condition of man,

which, as being the occasion of, was essentially connected with the

work of redemption, _that_ likewise we have reason to think was

included in its signification. And thus, upon the whole, SACRIFICE

appears to have been ordained _as a standing memorial of the death

introduced by sin, and of that death which was to be suffered by the

Redeemer_.

We accordingly find this institution of animal sacrifice continue

until the giving of the law. No other offering than that of an animal

being recorded in scripture down to this period, except in the case of

Cain, and that we have seen was rejected. The sacrifices of Noah and

of Abraham are stated to have been burnt-offerings. Of the same kind

also were the sin-offerings presented by Job, he being said to have

offered burnt-offerings according to the number of his sons, lest some

of them _might have sinned in their hearts_. But when we come to the

promulgation of the law, we find the connexion between animal

sacrifice and atonement, or reconciliation with God, clearly and

distinctly announced. It is here declared that sacrifices for sin

should, on conforming to certain prescribed modes of oblation, be

accepted as the means of deliverance from the penal consequences of

transgression. And with respect to the _peculiar_ efficacy of animal

sacrifice, we find this remarkable declaration,—_the life of the flesh

is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make

atonement for the soul_: in reference to which words, the sacred

writer formally pronounces, that _without shedding of blood there is

no remission_. Now in what conceivable light can we view this

institution, but in relation to that great sacrifice which _was_ to

make atonement for sins: to that _blood of sprinkling_, which was to

_speak better things than that of Abel_, or that of the law. The _law_

itself is said to have had respect solely unto him. To what else can

the principal institution of the law refer?—an institution too, which

unless _so_ referred appears utterly unmeaning. The offering up an

animal cannot be imagined to have had any intrinsic efficacy in

procuring pardon for the transgression of the offerer. The blood of

bulls and of goats could have possessed no virtue, whereby to cleanse

him from his offences. Still less intelligible is the application of

the blood of the victim to the purifying of the parts of the

tabernacle, and the apparatus of the ceremonial worship. All this can

clearly have had no other than an _instituted_ meaning; and can be

understood only as in reference to some blood-shedding, which in an

eminent degree possessed the power of purifying from pollution. In

short, admit the sacrifice of Christ to be held in view in the

institutions of the law, and every part is plain and intelligible;

reject that notion, and every theory devised by the ingenuity of man,

to explain the nature of the ceremonial worship, becomes trifling and

inconsistent.

Granting then the case of the Mosaic sacrifice and that of Abel’s to

be the same; neither of them in itself efficacious; both instituted by

God; and both instituted in reference to that true and efficient

sacrifice, which was one day to be offered: the rite, as practised

before the time of Christ, may justly be considered as a SACRAMENTAL

MEMORIAL, _showing forth the Lord’s death until he came_; and when

accompanied with a due faith in the promises made to the early

believers, may reasonable be judged to have been equally acceptable

with that sacramental memorial, which has been enjoined by our Lord

himself to his followers, for the _showing forth his death until his

coming again_. And it deserves to be noticed that this very analogy

seems to be intimated by our Lord, in the language used by him at the

institution of that solemn Christian rite. For in speaking of his own

blood, he calls it, in direct reference to the blood wherewith Moses

established and sanctified the first covenant, _the blood of the_ NEW

_covenant, which was shed for the remission of sins_: thus plainly

marking out the similitude in the nature and objects of the two

covenants, at the moment that he was prescribing the great sacramental

commemoration of his own sacrifice.

From this view of the subject, the history of scripture sacrifice

becomes consistent throughout. The sacrifice of Abel, and the

patriarchal sacrifices down to the giving of the law, record and

exemplify those momentous events in the history of man,—the death

incurred by sin, and that inflicted on our Redeemer. When length of

time, and mistaken notions of religion leading to idolatry and every

perversion of the religious principle, had so far clouded and obscured

this expressive act, of primeval worship, that it had ceased to be

considered by the nations of the world in that _reference_ in which

its true value consisted: when the mere rite remained, without any

remembrance of the promises, and consequently unaccompanied by that

faith in their fulfilment, which was to render it an acceptable

service: when the nations, deifying every passion of the human heart,

and erecting altars to every vice, poured forth the blood of the

victim, but to deprecate the wrath, or satiate the vengeance of each

offended deity: when with the recollection of the true God, all

knowledge of the true worship was effaced from the minds of men: and

when joined to the _absurdity_ of the sacrificial rites, their

_cruelty_, devoting to the malignity of innumerable sanguinary gods

endless multitudes of human victims, demanded the divine interference;

then we see a people peculiarly selected, to whom, by express

revelation, the knowledge of the one God is restored, and the species

of worship ordained by him from the beginning, particularly enjoined.

The principal part of the Jewish service, we accordingly find to

consist of sacrifice; to which the virtue of expiation and atonement

is expressly annexed: and in the manner of it, the particulars appear

so minutely set forth, that when the _object_ of the whole law should

be brought to light, no doubt could remain as to its intended

application. The Jewish sacrifices therefore seem to have been

designed, as those from the beginning had been, to prefigure that

_one_, which was to make atonement for all mankind. And as _in_ this

all were to receive their consummation, so _with_ this they all

conclude: and the institution closes with the completion of its

object. But, as the gross perversions, which had pervaded the Gentile

world, had reached likewise to the chosen people; and as the

temptations to idolatry, which surrounded them on all sides, were so

powerful as perpetually to endanger their adherence to the God of

their fathers, we find the ceremonial service adapted to their carnal

habits. And since the law itself, with its accompanying sanctions,

seems to have been principally temporal; so the worship it enjoins is

found to have been for the most part, rather a public and solemn

declaration of allegiance to the true God in opposition to the Gentile

idolatries, than a pure and spiritual obedience in moral and religious

matters, which was reserved for that more perfect system, appointed to

succeed in due time, when the state of mankind would permit.

That the sacrifices of the law should therefore have chiefly operated

to the cleansing from external impurities, and to the rendering

persons or things fit to approach God in the exercises of the

ceremonial worship; whilst at the same time they were designed to

prefigure the sacrifice of Christ, which was purely spiritual, and

possessed the transcendant virtue of atoning for all moral pollution,

involves in it no inconsistency whatever, since in this the true

proportion of the entire dispensations is preserved. And to this

point, it is particularly necessary that our attention should be

directed, in the examination of the present subject; as upon the

_apparent disproportion_ in the objects and effects of sacrifice in

the Mosaic and Christian schemes, the principal objections against

their intended correspondence have been founded.

The sacrifices of the law then being preparatory to that of Christ;

_the law itself being but a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ_; the

sacred writers in the _New Testament_, naturally adopt the sacrificial

terms of the ceremonial service, and by their reference to the use of

them as employed under the law, clearly point out the sense in which

they are to be understood in their application under the gospel. In

examining, then, the meaning of such terms, when they occur in the

_New_ Testament, we are clearly directed to the explanation that is

circumstantially given of them in the _Old_. Thus, when we find the

virtue of atonement attributed to the sacrifice of Christ, in like

manner as it had been to those under the law; by attending to the

representation so minutely given of it in the latter, we are enabled

to comprehend its true import in the former.

Of the several sacrifices under the law, that one which seems most

exactly to illustrate the sacrifice of Christ, and which is expressly

compared with it by the writer to the Hebrews, is that which was

offered for the whole assembly on the solemn anniversary of expiation.

The circumstances of this ceremony, whereby atonement was to be made

for the sins of the whole Jewish people, seem so strikingly

significant, that they deserve a particular detail. On the day

appointed for this general expiation, the priest is commanded to offer

a bullock and a goat as sin-offerings, the one for himself, and the

other for the people: and having sprinkled the blood of these in due

form before the mercy-seat, to lead forth a second goat, denominated

the scape-goat; and after laying both his hands upon the head of the

scape-goat, and confessing over him all the iniquities of the people,

to _put them upon the head_ of the goat, and to send the animal, thus

bearing the sins of the people, away into the wilderness: in this

manner expressing by an action, which cannot be misunderstood, that

the atonement, which it is directly affirmed was to be effected by the

sacrifice of the sin-offering, consisted in removing from the people

their iniquities by this symbolical translation to the animal. For it

is to be remarked, that the ceremony of the scape-goat is not a

_distinct_ one: it is a continuation of the process, and is evidently

the concluding part and symbolical consummation of the sin-offering.

So that the transfer of the iniquities of the people upon the head of

the scape-goat, and the bearing them away to the wilderness,

manifestly imply that the atonement effected by the sacrifice of the

sin-offering, consisted in the transfer and consequent removal of

those iniquities. What then are we taught to infer from this

ceremony?—That as the atonement under the law, or expiation of the

legal transgressions, was represented as a translation of those

transgressions, in the act of sacrifice in which the animal was slain,

and the people thereby cleansed from their legal impurities, and

released from the penalties which had been incurred; so the great

atonement for the sins of mankind was to be effected by the sacrifice

of Christ, undergoing for the restoration of men to the favour of God,

that death which had been denounced against sin; and which he suffered

in like manner as if the sins of men had been _actually_ transferred

to him, as those of the congregation had been _symbolically_

transferred to the sin-offering of the people.

That this is the true meaning of the atonement effected by Christ’s

sacrifice, receives the fullest confirmation from every part of both

the Old and the New Testament: and that thus far the death of Christ

is vicarious, cannot be denied without a total desregard of the sacred

writings.

It has indeed been asserted, by those who oppose the doctrine of

atonement as thus explained, that nothing _vicarious_ appears in the

Mosaic sacrifices. With what justice this assertion has been made, may

be judged from the instance of the sin-offering that has been adduced.

The transfer to the animal of the iniquities of the people, (which

must necessarily mean the transfer of their penal effects, or the

subjecting the animal to suffer on account of those iniquities)—this

accompanied with the death of the victim; and the consequence of the

whole being the removal of the punishment of those iniquities from the

offerers, and the ablution of all legal offensiveness in the sight of

God:—thus much of the nature of vicarious, the language of the Old

Testament justifies us in attaching to the notion of atonement. Less

than this we are clearly not at liberty to attach to it. And what the

law thus sets forth as its express meaning, directly determines that

which we must attribute to the great atonement of which the Mosaic

ceremony was but a type: always remembering carefully to distinguish

between the figure and the substance; duly adjusting their relative

value and extent; estimating the efficacy of the one as real,

intrinsic, and universal; whilst that of the other is to be viewed as

limited, derived, and emblematic.

It must be confessed, that to the principles on which the doctrine of

the Christian atonement has been explained in this, representation of

it, several objections, in addition to those already noticed, have

been advanced. These, however, cannot now be examined in this place.

The most important have been discussed; and as for such as remain, I

trust that to a candid mind, the general view of the subject which has

been given, will prove sufficient for their refutation.”