ANSW. The covenant being made with Adam, as a public person, not for
himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him
by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that
first transgression.
Having shewn, in the foregoing answer how our first parents sinned and
fell, we are now led to consider, how their fall affected all their
posterity, whom they represented; and accordingly it is said, that the
covenant was made with Adam, as a federal head, not for himself only,
but all his posterity; so that they sinned in, and fell with him. But,
before we enter more particularly on this subject, it may not be
improper to enquire, whether this character, of being the head of the
covenant, respects only Adam, or both our first parents? I am sensible
there are many who think this covenant was made with Adam, as the head
of his posterity, exclusive of Eve; so that, as he did not represent her
therein, but his seed, she was not, together with him, the
representative of mankind; therefore, though the covenant was made with
her, and she was equally obliged to perform the conditions thereof, yet
she was only to stand or fall for herself, her concern herein being only
personal; and therefore it follows, from hence, that when she fell,
being _first in the transgression_, all mankind could not be said to sin
and fall in her, as they did in Adam; therefore, if she alone had
sinned, she would have perished alone.
And if it be objected hereunto, that she could not then be the mother of
innocent children, for _who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?_
The reply, which is usually given to this, which is only matter of
conjecture, is, that God would have created some other woman, who should
have been the mother of a sinless posterity.[56]
The reason why these conclude that the covenant was made only with Adam,
is because we never read expressly, in scripture, of its being made with
Eve in behalf of her posterity; and particularly it is said, in Gen. ii.
16, 17. that _the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree in
the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good
and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof,
thou shalt surely die_. And it is observed, that this law was given to
him before the woman was created; for it said, in the following words,
_It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an help meet
for him_. And, in other scriptures, which treat of this matter, we read
of the man’s being the head of the covenant, but not his wife: thus the
apostle, in 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47. compares him, whom he styles, _the first
man, Adam_, as the head of this covenant, with Christ, whom he calls,
_The second man_, as the head of the covenant of grace; and elsewhere he
says, _As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive_, ver.
22. and again _By one man sin entered into the world_, &c. Rom. v. 12.
and _By one man’s disobedience, many were made sinners_, ver. 19. It is
not said by the disobedience of our first parents, but of one of them,
to wit, Adam; therefore, from hence, they conclude, that he only was the
head of this covenant, and herein the representative of mankind.
But, though I would not be too peremptory in determining this matter,
yet, I think, it may be replied to what has been said in defence
thereof; that though it is true, it is said, in the scripture, but now
mentioned, that God forbade the man to eat of the tree of knowledge of
good and evil, before the woman was created, yet she expressly says,
that the prohibition respected them both[57], when she tells the
serpent, _We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the
fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall
not eat thereof, lest ye die_, Gen. iii. 2, 3. Besides, we read, that
Eve had dominion over the creatures, as well as Adam, Gen. i. 26-28. it
is true, it is said, that _God created man_, &c. but by the word _man_,
both our first parents are intended; for it immediately follows, _and he
blessed them_, therefore the woman was not excluded; so that we may
apply the apostle’s words, (though used with another view) _The man is
not without the woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord_, 1
Cor. xi. 11. to this particular dispensation of providence. And there
seems to be the same reason for one’s being constituted the federal head
of their posterity, as the other, since they were both designed to be
the common parents thereof; the tenor of the covenant seems to be the
same with respect to them both, and the tree of life was a seal and
pledge of blessings, to be conveyed by both.
But to proceed to consider the subject-matter of this answer,
I. We shall prove, that Adam was a public person, the head of the
covenant with whom it was made for himself, and all his posterity. When
we speak of him as the head of our posterity, we do not only mean their
common parent, for, had there been no other idea contained therein, I
cannot see how they could be said to fall in him; for it doth not seem
agreeable to the justice of God to punish children for their parents’
sins, unless they make them their own, at least, not with such a
punishment that carries in it a separation from his presence, and a
liableness to the condemning sentence of the law.
Therefore Adam must be considered as constituted their head, in a
federal way, by an act of God’s sovereign will, and so must be regarded
as their representative, as well as their common parent; which, if it
can be proved, then they may be said to fall with him. For the
understanding hereof, we must conclude him to have been the head of the
world, even as Christ is the Head of his elect; so that, in the same
sense as Christ’s righteousness becomes their’s to wit, by imputation,
Adam’s obedience, had he stood, would have been imputed to all his
posterity, as his sin is, now he is fallen. This is a doctrine founded
on pure revelation: and therefore we must have recourse to scripture, to
evince the truth thereof. Accordingly,
1. There are several scriptures in which this doctrine is contained; as
that in Rom. v. 14. where the apostle speaks concerning our fall in
Adam, whom he calls, the _figure_[58] _of him that was to come_. Now, in
what was Adam a type of Christ? Not as he was a man, consisting of soul
and body; for, in that respect, all that lived before Christ, might as
justly be called types of him. Whenever we read of any person, or
things, being a type in scripture, there are some peculiar circumstances
by which they may be distinguished from all other persons, or things
that are not types. Now Adam was distinguished from all other persons,
more especially as he was the federal head of all his posterity; and
that he was so, appears from what the apostle not only occasionally
mentions, but largely insists on, and shews in what respect this was
true; and he particularly observes, that as one conveyed death the other
was the head, or Prince of Life. These respective things indeed, were
directly opposite, therefore the analogy, or resemblance, consisted only
in the manner of conveying them; so that as death did not become due to
us, in the first instance of our liableness to it, for our own actual
sin, but the sin of Adam; that right we have to eternal life, by
justification, is not the result of our own obedience, but Christ’s:
This is plainly the apostle’s method of reasoning. Now, if Christ was,
in this respect a federal Head and Representative of his people, then
Adam, who is in this, or in nothing, his type, or figure, must be the
Head of a covenant, in which his posterity were included.
There is another scripture, by which this may be proved in 1 Cor. xv.
45-59. where the apostle speaks of the _first and second Adam_; by the
latter he means Christ. Now, why should he be called the second man, who
lived so many ages after Adam, if he did not design to speak of him, as
typified by him, or bearing some resemblance of him? And, in other
expressions, he seems to imply as much, and shews how we derive death
from Adam, of whom he had been speaking, in the foregoing verses.
Accordingly, he says, _The first man was of the earth, earthy: and, as
is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and we have borne the
image of the earthy_; so that if Adam was the root and occasion of all
the miseries we endure in this world, arising from his violation of the
covenant he was under, it plainly proves, that he was therein the head
and representative of all his posterity.
For the farther proof of this, we may take occasion to consider the
apostle’s method of reasoning, in the scripture but now referred to, _By
one man sin entered into the world_, that is, by the first man, _in whom
all have sinned_, Rom. v. 12. so I would choose to render it rather than
as it is in our translation, since this seems to be the most natural
sense of the word[59]; and it proves Adam, in whom all sinned, to be
their head and representative, and also agrees best with the apostle’s
general design, or argument, insisted on, and farther illustrated in the
following verses.
Again, the apostle speaks of those penal evils consequent on Adam’s
sins, which could not have befallen us, had he not been our federal
head and representative; Thus, in ver. 18. _By the offence of one,
judgment came upon all men to condemnation_[60]. It may be observed,
that the apostle, in this text, uses a word, which we translate
_condemnation_[61]; which cannot, with any manner of consistency, be
taken in any other than a forensick sense; and therefore he argues,
from thence, that we are liable to condemnation, by the offence of
Adam; which certainly proves the imputation of his offence to us, and
consequently he is considered therein as our federal head.
2. This farther appears, in that all mankind are exposed to many
miseries, and to death, which are of a penal nature; therefore they must
be considered, as the consequence of sin. Now they cannot be the
consequence of actual sin, in those, who are miserable and die, as soon
as they are born, who have not _sinned after the similitude of Adam’s
transgression_; therefore this must be the result of his sin, which it
could not be, had he not been the federal head of all his posterity.[62]
_Object._ It is objected to this, that God might, out of his mere
sovereignty, ordain that his creatures should be exposed to some degree
of misery; and, if this misery be not considered, as the punishment of
sin, in infants, then it does not prove the imputation of Adam’s sin to
them; and even their death, considered only as a separation of soul and
body, may not contain in it a proper idea of punishment, (which consists
in the stroke of justice, demanding satisfaction for sin) if it be only
reckoned an expedient, or a necessary means for their attaining eternal
life. Therefore it doth not follow, that, because we are liable to
death, before we have done good or evil, it must necessarily be a
punishment due to that sin, which was committed by Adam.
_Answ. 1._ I will not deny but that God might dispense some lesser
degrees of natural evil, to a sinless creature, out of his mere
sovereignty; neither will I contend with any, who shall say, that he
might, without any dishonour to his perfections, send on him an evil,
sensibly great, provided it were not only consistent with his love, but
attended with those manifestations and displays thereof, which would
more than compensate for it, and, at the same time, not have any
tendency to prevent the answering the end of his being; yet I may be
bold to say, that, from the nature of the thing, God cannot inflict the
least degree of punishment on a creature, who is, in all respects
guiltless. If therefore these lesser evils are penal, they are the
consequence of Adam’s sin.
2. As for death, that must be considered as a penal evil; for, as such,
it was first denounced, as a part of the curse, consequent on Adam’s
sin; and the apostle says, _The wages of sin is death_, Rom. vi. 23. and
elsewhere he speaks of all men, as _dying in Adam_, 1 Cor. xv. 22. and
therefore his sin is imputed to all mankind; and consequently he was
their federal head and representative in the covenant that he was under.
II. They, whose federal head and representative Adam was, are such as
descended from him by ordinary generation. The design of this limitation
is to signify, that our Saviour is excepted, and consequently that he
did not sin or fall in him, inasmuch as he was born of a virgin;
therefore, though he had the same human nature with all Adam’s
posterity, yet he did not derive it from him, in the same way as they
do; and a similitude of nature, or his being a true and proper Man, does
not render him a descendant from Adam, in the same way as we are. The
formation of his human nature was the effect of miraculous,
supernatural, creating power; therefore he was no more liable to Adam’s
sin, as being a Man, than a world of men would be, should God create
them out of nothing, or out of the dust of the ground, by a mediate
creation, which would be no more miraculous, or supernatural, than it
was to form the human nature of Christ in the womb of a virgin. Now, as
persons, so formed, would not be concerned in Adam’s sin, or fall,
whatever similitude there might be of nature; even so our Saviour was
not concerned therein.[63]
Moreover, that we might understand that he was not included in this
federal transaction with Adam, the apostle opposes him, as the _second
Man_, the federal Head of his elect, or spiritual seed, to Adam, the
_first man_, and head of his natural seed, in that scripture before
referred to, ver. 45. And, as an argument, that his extraordinary and
miraculous conception exempted him from any concern in Adam’s sin and
fall; the angel, that gave the first intimation hereof, when he tells
the blessed virgin, his mother, that _the Holy Ghost should come upon
her, that the power of the highest should over-shadow her_, he says,
_Therefore that Holy Thing, that shall be born of thee, shall be called,
the Son of God_; thereby implies, that, in his first formation, he was
holy, and consequently had no concern in the guilt of Adam’s sin,
because of the manner of his formation, or conception; and this is
certainly a better way to account for his being sinless, than to
pretend, as the Papists do, that his mother was sinless; which will do
no service to their cause, unless they could ascend in a line to our
first parents, and so prove, that all our Saviour’s progenitors were
immaculate, as well as the virgin; which is more than they pretend to
do.
III. It is farther observed, in this answer, that mankind sinned in and
fell with Adam in his _first transgression_, and therefore they had no
concern in those sins, which he committed afterwards. This appears from
hence, that Adam, as soon as he sinned, lost the honour and prerogative,
that was conferred upon him, of being the federal head of his posterity,
though he was their natural head, or common father; for the covenant
being broken, all the evils, that we were liable to, arising from
thence, were devolved upon us, and none of the blessings, contained
therein, could be conveyed to us that way, since it was impossible for
him, after his fall, to perform sinless obedience, which was the
condition of the life promised therein. This doth not arise so much from
the nature of the covenant, as from the change that there was in man,
with whom it was made. The law, or covenant, would have given life, if
man could have yielded perfect obedience; but since his fall rendered
that impossible, though the obligation thereof, as a law, distinct from
a covenant, and the curse, arising from the sanction thereof, remains
still in force against fallen man; yet, as a covenant, in which life was
promised, it was, from that time, abrogated; and therefore the apostle
speaks of it, as being _weak through the flesh_, Rom. viii. 3. that is,
by reason of Adam’s transgression, and consequently he ceased, from that
time, to be the federal head, or means of conveying life to his
posterity; therefore those sins that he committed afterwards, were no
more imputed to them, to inhance their condemnation, than his
repentance, or good works, were imputed for their justification.
IV. Having considered the first transgression of Adam, as imputed to all
those who descended from him by ordinary generation, we shall proceed to
consider, how this doctrine is opposed, by those who are in the contrary
way of thinking.
_Object. 1._ It is objected, that what is done by one man cannot be
imputed to another; for this is contrary to the divine perfections, to
the law of nature, and the express words of scripture. It is true, that
which is done by us, in our own persons, may be imputed to us, whether
it be good or evil. Thus it is said, that Phinehas’s _zeal in executing
judgment, by which means the plague was stayed, was counted to him for
righteousness_, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. so was Abraham’s _faith_, Rom. iv. 9,
23. Accordingly God approved of these their respective good actions, as
what denominated them righteous persons, and placed them to their
account, as bestowing on them some rewards accordingly; so, on the other
hand, a man’s own sin may be imputed to him, and he may be dealt with as
an offender: But to impute the sin committed by one person to another,
is to suppose that he has committed that sin which was really committed
by another; in which case, the Judge of all the earth would not do
right.
_Answ._ When we speak of persons being punished for a crime committed by
another, as being imputed to them, we understand the word _imputation_
in a forensick sense, and therefore we do not suppose that here is a
wrong judgment passed on persons or things, as though the crime were
reckoned to have been committed by them; accordingly we do not say, that
we committed that sin, which was more immediately committed by Adam. In
him it was an actual sin; it is ours, as imputed to us, or as we are
punished for it, according to the demerit of the offence, and the tenor
of the covenant, in which we were included.
Moreover, it is not contrary to the law of nature, or nations, for the
iniquity of some public persons to be punished in many others, so that
whole cities and nations have suffered on their account; and as for
scripture-instances hereof, we often read of whole families and nations,
suffering for the crimes of those, who had been public persons, and
exemplary in sinning. Thus Achan coveted the wedge of gold, and, for
this, he suffered not alone; but his _sons and daughters were stoned,
and burned with fire_, together with himself, Joshua vii. 24, 25. though
we do not expressly read, that they were confederates with him in the
crime. And as for the Amalekites, who, without provocation, came out
against Israel in the wilderness, God threatens them, that he would have
_war with them for this, from generation to generation_, Exod. xvii. 16.
and in pursuance of this threatening, God, imputing the crime of their
forefathers to their posterity, some hundreds of years after, ordered
_Saul to go and utterly destroy them, by slaying both man and woman,
infant and suckling_, 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3. And the sin of Jeroboam was
punished in his posterity, according to the threatening denounced, 1
Kings xiv. 10, 11. as was also the sin of Ahab, 1 Kings xxi. 21, 22. And
the church acknowledges, that it was a righteous dispensation of
providence for God to bring upon Judah those miseries, which immediately
preceded, and followed their being carried captive, when they say, _Our
fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne their iniquity_,
Lam. v. 7. and our Saviour speaks to the same purpose, when he tells the
Jews, _That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the
earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, unto the blood of Zacharias,
son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar_, Matth.
xxiii. 35. These instances, and others of the like nature, prove that it
is no unheard of thing, for one man to suffer for a crime committed by
another[64].
But I am sensible the principal thing intended in the objection, when
this is supposed to be contrary to scripture, is, that it contradicts
the sense of what the prophet says, when he tells the people, that _they
should not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, The
fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on
edge_; for _the soul that sinneth shall die_, Ezek. xviii. 2-4. the
meaning of which scripture is, that if they were humble and penitent,
and did not commit those crimes that their fathers had done, they should
not be punished for them, which was a special act of favour, that God
would grant them on this supposition; and it is as much as to say, that
he would not impute their father’s sins to them, or suffer them to be
carried captive, merely because their fathers had deserved this
desolating judgment. But this does not, in all respects, agree with the
instance before us; for we are considering Adam as the federal head of
his posterity, and so their fathers were not to be considered in this,
and such like scriptures. Moreover, the objectors will hardly deny, that
natural death, and the many evils of this life, are a punishment, in
some respects, for the sin of our first parents. Therefore the question
is not, whether some degree of punishment may ensue hereupon? but,
whether the greatest degree of the punishment of sin in hell, can be
said to be the consequence hereof? But this we shall be led more
particularly to consider, under a following answer[65].
_Object. 2._ It is farther objected, that it is not agreeable to the
divine perfections, for God to appoint Adam to be the head and
representative of all his posterity; so that they must stand, or fall,
with respect to their spiritual and eternal concerns in him, inasmuch as
this was not done by their own choice and consent, which they were not
capable of giving, since they were not existent. The case say they, is
the same, as though a king should appoint a representative body of men,
and give them a power to enact laws, whereby his subjects should be
dispossessed of their estates and properties, which no one can suppose
to be just; whereas if they had chosen them themselves, they would have
no reason to complain of any injustice that was done them, inasmuch as
the laws, made by their representatives, are, in effect, their own laws.
Therefore, to apply this to the case before us, had all mankind chose
Adam to be their representative, or consented to stand or fall in him,
there would have been no reason to complain of the dispensation of God’s
providence, relating hereunto: but, inasmuch as it was otherwise, it
does not seem agreeable to the justice of God, to constitute him the
head and representative of all his posterity: so that, by his fall, they
should be involved in ruin, and eternal perdition.
_Answ._ There are various methods taken to answer this objection.
1. Some say little more to it than this: That if Adam had retained his
integrity, we should have accepted of, and rejoiced in that life, which
he would have procured by his standing; there would then have been no
complaint, or finding fault, with the divine dispensation, as though it
had been unjust; therefore, since he fell, and brought death into the
world, it is reasonable that we should submit, and acknowledge, that all
the ways of God are equal. But, though we must all allow that submission
to the will of God, in whatever he does, is the creatures duty, yet I
cannot think this a sufficient answer to the objection, and therefore
would not lay much stress upon it, but proceed to consider what may be
farther said in answer to it.
2. Others say, that, since Adam was the common father, and consequently
the most honourable of mankind, (our Saviour only excepted, whom he did
not represent) therefore it was fit that he should have this honour
conferred upon him; so that, had all his posterity been existent, and
the choice of a representative been wholly referred to them, the law of
nature would have directed to, and pointed out the man, who ought, in
this respect, to have the preference to all others. This answer bids
fairer, I confess to remove the difficulty than the other, especially if
it be added, that God might have given Adam some advantages of nature,
above the rest of mankind, besides that relative one, arising from his
being their common father; and therefore, that it would have been their
interest, as well as their duty, to have chosen him, as being best
qualified to perform the work that was devolved upon him.
3. But, since this will not wholly remove the difficulty, it is farther
alleged, that God chose him, and therefore we ought to acquiesce in his
choice; and, indeed, had all mankind been then existent, supposing them
to be in a state of perfect holiness (and we must not suppose the
contrary) then they would have acknowledged the equity of this divine
dispensation, otherwise they would have actually sinned, and fallen, in
rejecting and complaining of the will of God. But this will not satisfy
those who advance the contrary scheme of doctrine, and deny the
imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, who still complain of it, as
a very severe dispensation, and conclude, that the sovereignty of God is
pleaded for against his other perfections; therefore something farther
must be added, in answer to the objection.
We freely allow, that it is not equitable (to use the similitude taken
from human forms of government) for a king to appoint a representative,
who shall have a power committed to him, to take away the properties, or
estates of his subjects: but this does not, in many respects, agree with
the matter under our present consideration: nevertheless, if we were to
suppose, that these subjects had nothing which they could call their
own, separate from the will of the prince, and their properties and
estates were not only defended, but given by him, and that upon this
tenure, that he reserved to himself a right to dispossess them of them
at his pleasure; in this case, he might, without any injustice done
them, appoint a representative, by whose conduct they might be
forfeited, or retained; and this agrees with our present argument.
Accordingly let it be considered, that there were some things which Adam
was possessed of in his state of innocency, and others which he was
given to expect, had he stood, which he had no natural right to,
separate from the divine will; therefore it follows, from hence, that
God might, without doing his posterity any injustice, repose this in the
hands of a mutable creature, so that it should be retained or lost for
them, according as he stood or fell. And this will appear less
exceptionable, when we consider the nature of that guilt, which all
mankind were brought under, by Adam’s sin, and the loss of original
righteousness, as the consequence of his fall; which they, who maintain
the other side of the question, generally represent, in such a way, as
though we supposed that there were no difference between it, and the
guilt contracted, together with the punishment ensuing on actual sins,
how great soever they are. But this will be more particularly considered
under a following answer,[66] in which we shall endeavour to take a just
estimate of the difference between the guilt of Adam’s sin, imputed to
us, and that of actual sins committed by us.
Footnote 56:
If Adam represented Eve (his rib) in the covenant, she did not fall
till he fell.
Footnote 57:
_The compilers of the LXX. seem to have understood the words in this
sense, when then render the text in_ Gen. ii. 17. η δ αν ημερα φαγητε
απ αυτου θαγατω απο θανεισθε.
Footnote 58:
Τυπος, _the Type_.
Footnote 59:
Εφ᾽ ω.
Footnote 60:
_The words are_, ως δι ενος παραπτωματος, εις παντας ανθρωπους εις
κατακριμα. _The word Judgment, though not in the original, is very
justly supplied in our translation, from verse 16. or else, as the
learned Grotius observes, the word εγενετο might have been supplied;
and so the meaning is_, Res processit in condemnationem. _And J.
Capellus gives a very good sense of the text, when he compares Adam as
the head, who brought death into the world, with Christ by whom life
is obtained. His words are these_: Quemadmodum omnes homines, qui
condemnantur, reatum suum contraxerant, ab una unius hominis offensa;
sic & quotquot vivificantur, absolutionem suam obtinuerunt ab una
unius hominis obedientia.
Footnote 61:
_The word_ κατακριμα _is used in scripture, in a forensic sense, in
those places of the New Testament, where it is found: Thus ver. 16. of
this chapter, and chap. viii. 1. And accordingly it signifies a
judgment unto condemnation; as also do those words, the sense whereof
has an affinity to it, in Rom. viii. 34._ τις ο κατακρινων; _and also_
ακατακριτος, _as in Acts xvi. 37. and_ chap. xxii. 25. _So that,
according to the construction of the word, though_ κριμα _signifies_
judicium _in general_, κατακριμα signifies judicium adversus aliquem,
_or_ condemnatio.
Footnote 62:
That mankind are born and live in sin, maybe collected from various
sources of argument; by matter of fact, none are found free from, who
are capable of actual guilt, by the evils and death which a just God
would not otherwise inflict; by the ideas of the ancients who speak of
a degeneration from a golden, to an iron age, by the general practice
of offering sacrifice, which is an acknowment of guilt, by the
testimony of the heathens, that evil example has a preponderating
influence over good, by the historical account of the fall of man in
the scriptures, by their numerous testimonies that none are righteous
before God or can be justified by their obedience to his laws, by the
confessions of the saints, by the necessity of repentance in all, by
the propriety of prayer for the pardon of sin, by Christ’s example of
daily prayer which contains such a petition, by the necessity of faith
that we may please God, by man’s unwillingness to be reconciled to
God, and rejection of all the spiritual good things offered, and
contempt of divine threatnings; and above all other proofs, by the
coming and suffering of Christ.
Footnote 63:
The covenant of grace was from eternity, and implied his innocence.
Footnote 64:
_This is not only agreeable to many instances contained in scripture,
but it has been acknowledged to be just by the very heathen, as
agreeable to the law of nature and nations. Thus one says: Sometimes a
whole city is punished for the wickedness of one man: Thus Hesiod,_
πολλακι και ξυμπασα πολις κακου ανδρος επαυρει; _and Horace says,_
Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi: _And one observes, that it
was the custom of several cities of Greece, to inflict the same
punishment on the children of tyrants, as their fathers had done on
others:_ In Græcis civitatibus liberi tyrannorum suppressis illis,
eodem supplicio afficiuntur. _Vid. Cicer. Epist. ad Brut. XV. & Q.
Curt. Lib. VI. speaks of a law observed among the Macedonians; in
which, traiterous conspiracies against the life of the prince were
punished, not only in the traitors themselves, but in their near
relations,_ Qui regi infidiati essent, illi cum cognatis & propinquis
suis morte afficerentur.
Footnote 65:
_See Quest._ xxvii.
Footnote 66:
_See Quest._ xxvii.
Quest. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI.