The next two days were days of comparative calm--the lull before the
desperate storm which was preparing to break upon the British force.
On the morning of the 27th, the 6th Brigade, on the left of our line,
which had so successfully pushed forward its position on the 24th,
made a still further advance, the 1st K.R.R. on this occasion being
the left-hand battalion, with the 1st S. Staffords on its right. The
1st Berks and the King's Regiment were in support. The movement was
again a complete success, the brigade advancing as far as the
Paschendael--Becelaere road and occupying the crest of the ridge along
which this road runs. Here the K.R.R. came under a very heavy
shell-fire, and Prince Maurice of Battenberg and Captain Wells were
killed, Captain Willis, Captain Llewellyn and 2nd Lieuts. Hone and
Sweeting being wounded at the same time. The ground gained was,
however, successfully held for the time being. The effect of this
advance was to give a slightly concave formation to the eastern face
of the Ypres salient, the two extremities now projecting beyond the
centre trenches in the Polygon wood. This curious formation, however,
was very temporary, both of the horns so formed having shortly to
withdraw. The withdrawal of the southern horn was begun on the night
of the 26th, during the events already narrated. We may now consider
the subsequent events which led to its complete disappearance.
In the very small hours of the same morning on which the 6th Brigade
advanced--before daylight, in fact--the 1st Scots Guards marched down
the Menin road to resume its place in the 1st Brigade. At Gheluvelt the
battalion deployed to the north of the road, and at once came under the
blind shell-fire which ceased not night or day in this particular area.
Captain Hamilton and Captain Balfour were killed, and Lieuts. Wickham
and Roberts wounded. The battalion, however, worked its way up to its
position on the left of the 1st Coldstream, and there awaited events.
How dramatic those events were destined to prove was little suspected
at the time.
A few hours later the 20th Brigade, returning from its one night's rest
in the outskirts of Ypres, followed them down the same road, and filed
into the shelter-trenches south of the road. Here they stayed till 5
p.m. on the 28th, when they continued their march down the high road
through Gheluvelt, and took over the trenches just west and south of
the Kruiseik cross-roads.
Here for the moment we may leave them in order to take a glance at the
general situation.
The day which followed, that is to say October 29th, was the first of
the five days during which the Kaiser was present in person with his
troops opposite Ypres. He had arrived with the avowed intention of
stimulating the army to one supreme, irresistible effort which would
carry all before it, and open the coveted road to Calais to the mass of
troops now concentrated at Roulers and Menin.
The occasion was signalized on the morning of the 29th by a grand
assault along and on each side of the Menin road. This broad highroad
was the most direct and obvious route to Ypres, and the Germans--as
their way is--went straight for the shortest cut. There was no secret
about the enterprise; it was, in fact, known among all ranks of the
British Army, and even published in some of the general orders of the
evening before, that the XXVII. German Reserve Corps would attack
Kruiseik and Zandvoorde at 5.30 a.m. on the 29th.
In the light of this general knowledge, subsequent events are not
wholly easy to understand. The attack came at the very hour which had
been announced, and--as far as Kruiseik was concerned--at the very
spot. Zandvoorde, as a matter of fact, was not implicated, and so can
be left out of the discussion.
At Kruiseik our line of defence was just in rear of the cross-roads,
about a quarter of a mile nearer Ypres than it had been on the 26th.
The six regiments in the front line which came in the path of the
attack were the 1st Grenadiers, 2nd Gordons and 2nd Scots Fusiliers
south of the road, and the Black Watch, 1st Coldstream and 1st Scots
Guards to the north of it. In reserve were the 2nd Scots Guards and the
Border Regiment, the latter being in Gheluvelt, the former to the south
of it.
At 5.30 then, with true military punctuality, the Germans made their
advance under cover of a thick fog, and, as subsequent events proved,
succeeded in getting past and behind our first line without opposition.
It is said that they marched in column of fours straight down the main
Menin road, which, for some reason only known to staff officers, does
not appear to have been in the charge of any of the first line troops.
However that may be, the fact remains that the Germans did get past,
without a shot being fired from either side, and established their
machine-guns in the houses along the roadside in rear; with the result
that the regiments next the road suddenly found themselves, without any
warning, assailed by a murderous machine-gun fire from both rear and
flank. To add to the unpleasantness of the situation, they were at the
same time vigorously shelled by our own artillery. Under this combined
attack the 1st Grenadiers next the road on the south side suffered very
severely. Colonel Earle was wounded almost at the first discharge, and
Major Stucley, who then took over command, was killed within a short
interval. Owing to the thickness of the fog it was a matter of great
difficulty to locate the enemy with any degree of accuracy, or to
return a fire which appeared to come from the direction of our own
reserves. Captain Rasch, who was now in command, accordingly decided to
withdraw the battalion into the woods to the south, leaving the enemy
to continue their fusilade at the empty trenches. With them went the
left flank company of the Gordons, under Captain Burnett. "C" Company
of the Gordons, which was on the right of Captain Burnett's company,
was comparatively clear of the fire from the rear, and did not withdraw
with the others. The subsequent exploits of this company were most
remarkable, and will be described later on.
The fog now suddenly lifted, the sun came through, and the situation
became comparatively clear to both sides. The Germans ceased their
fusilade from behind at the empty trenches, and began to press
southwards from the road, and westward from the direction of Menin, in
great numbers. To meet this new movement, the 1st Grenadiers and
Captain Burnett's company of the Gordons formed up and charged, driving
the enemy back to the road in considerable disorder. In the moment of
victory, however, they were heavily enfiladed from the trenches
recently occupied by Captain Burnett's company, and numbers fell. They
were again forced to withdraw to the south, the enemy following close
on their heels. Once more the Grenadiers and Gordons reformed, and once
more they drove the enemy back to the road, only to be themselves again
driven back by weight of numbers. It was at this moment that Lieut.
Brooke, of the Gordon Highlanders, who had been sent from the right
flank with a message, arrived on the scene and--seeing the overwhelming
superiority in numbers of the enemy--hurriedly collected a handful of
men from the rear (servants, cooks, orderlies, etc.), and led them
forward in a gallant attempt to do something towards equalizing
numbers. He and nearly all his men were killed, but he was subsequently
awarded the Victoria Cross for his action.
In the meanwhile the Grenadiers were fighting to a finish. Refusing to
be beaten or to give way, they fought up to the moment when the order
arrived for them to retire to Gheluvelt. This was about 10 a.m. By that
time 500 out of the 650 men who had gone into action had fallen, and
out of the sixteen officers only four were left. No. 4 Company--the
heroes of the successful charge on the 24th--alone lost 200 men, or, in
other words, were wiped out.
Of the officers, Major Stucley, Captain Rennie, Lord R. Wellesley, the
Hon. W. Forester and the Hon. A. Douglas-Pennant were killed, in
addition to which Col. Earle, the Hon. C. Ponsonby, Lieuts. Lambert,
Kenyon-Slaney and Powell were wounded. Lieut. Butt, the medical officer
attached, was killed while dressing Col. Earle's wounds. The casualties
of the Gordons were between two and three hundred.
While this had been going on south of the road, an almost identical
state of things prevailed on the north side where were stationed the
Black Watch and 1st Coldstream. These two battalions similarly found
themselves, without any warning, mowed down in the fog by machine-gun
fire from their rear and right flank. Gradually they too were forced
back, fighting every yard of the way, but powerless to stem the masses
of the enemy opposed to them. Both these battalions were practically
annihilated. The 1st Coldstream battalion, in fact, may be said to
have ceased to exist, for the time being, after this day. The remnant
was shortly afterwards absorbed into the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. That
remnant consisted of 180 rank and file; _no officers_ and no senior
N.C.O.
The right flank company of the 1st Scots Guards shared the fate of the
two battalions on its right. It became isolated, was surrounded by
masses of the enemy, and ceased to exist.
At 11 a.m. the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, who had been on the right of the
Gordons, and just outside of the pressure of the first attack, had in
their turn to fall back, Col. Uniacke with two companies of the Gordons
going forward again to aid them in their retirement.
About noon things were looking pretty serious; the Germans were
pressing on towards Gheluvelt in great numbers, both on the main road
itself and to the north and south of it, and it seemed doubtful whether
their impetus could be checked.
At this critical moment, a succession of incidents, small in
themselves, but powerful as a combination, brought about a marked
change in the fortunes of the day. It has already been mentioned that
"C" Company of the Gordons, under Captain R. S. Gordon, had remained
throughout the morning in its original trenches, the order to retire
not having reached it. Curiously enough, another small detachment to
its right was in a very similar position. This detachment consisted of
a platoon of the 2nd Queen's, and about a hundred men of other units,
under the command of Major Bottomley of the Queen's. The party had been
sent forward to reinforce the 20th Brigade, and, at the time of the
retirement, was in some dug-outs in a very advanced position on the
high ground near Kruiseik. As in the case of "C" Company of the
Gordons, the order to retire did not reach them, and they were left.
Here then were two distinct and quite independent detachments,
completely isolated, and cut off by a good half mile from the rest of
the brigade. It seemed as though their destruction was a foregone
conclusion. In the event, however, not only were they not destroyed,
but they were able, from their unsuspected positions, to work very
considerable havoc in the ranks of the enemy. It so happened that Major
Bottomley's party contained an unusual number of marksmen, including
Lieut. Wilson of the 2nd Queen's. These--quite regardless of their own
perilous position, or of the fire which they were sure to draw upon
themselves by their action--now laid themselves out to take advantage
of their advanced position to pick off the Germans to right and left.
The very audacity of the proceeding proved their saving, the enemy
finding it very hard to properly locate a fire which seemed to come
from their very midst. There was, however, some retaliation, and Lieut.
Wilson was eventually shot through the head and killed.
It cannot well be claimed that sniping such as this--however
effective--had any appreciable influence on the tide of battle, but
this claim can be justly made in the case of "C" Company of the 2nd
Gordons. This company's presence was equally unsuspected by the enemy,
and, soon after midday, a German battalion proceeded to mass in close
column within 300 yards of its position. Such a target was of course
unmissable, and within five minutes the German battalion was
annihilated, 850 dead and wounded being afterwards found on the spot
where it had concentrated.
It is satisfactory to be able to record that both these gallant
detachments successfully withdrew. Captain Gordon remained in his
position till dusk, when, by exercising great care, he succeeded in
rejoining his battalion. Major Bottomley actually remained in his
position till the night of the following day, _i.e._, the 30th,
when he succeeded in safely extricating his party from their perilous
position--a truly astonishing performance in view of the fact that the
Germans were not only round him, but were in actual occupation of the
trenches to right and left.
While this was taking place south of the road, the 1st Scots Guards,
north of the road, were gradually bringing about a change in the aspect
of the fight. It will be remembered that the two battalions between
them and the road, viz., the Black Watch and 1st Coldstream, had been
engulfed and overwhelmed in the German advance, a fate which had also
overtaken Captain de la Pasture's company of the 1st Scots Guards,
which was on the right of that battalion. In this crisis--for it was
undoubtedly an extremely critical moment--Captain Stephen, with a quick
grasp of the situation, brought up the reserve company of the Scots
Guards, together with some stragglers from the 1st Coldstream who had
escaped the carnage on the right. Facing his command half right, he
proceeded to pour volley after volley into the flank of the Germans
pressing forward between him and the road. Some of the Germans turned
to face this new attack, but the Guardsmen, fighting with superb
courage, held them off throughout the afternoon. During this memorable
performance on the part of Captain Stephen's company, the company
commander himself and Sir G. Ogilvy were killed, and the Hon. G.
Macdonald and Sir V. Mackenzie wounded. The 1st Scots Guards had now
lost 10 officers and 370 men since they had marched down the Menin road
two days before.[9] The battalion received great praise in high
quarters for the part it had played at this critical moment in the
fortunes of the day, and there can be little doubt that the tremendous
losses they had inflicted on the enemy had appreciably checked the
German advance.
[9] Up to the end of January, 1915, the total casualties in the
two battalions Scots Guards amounted to 2,888 of all ranks.
Captain Gordon's attack had taken the enemy on the left flank, and
Captain Stephen's on the right flank. They were yet to meet a still
more severe check from in front. In partial reserve on the hill on
which Gheluvelt stands, were detachments of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders,
2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Queen's, S. Wales Borderers and the Border
Regiment. It was about midday when the Germans, having forced their way
as described through the regiments next the Menin road, began pushing
forward towards Gheluvelt, the main body marching in column of fours
along the road from Gheluvelt itself, where the main road passes
through the village, the head of the advancing column was out of sight,
owing to a bend in the road at the foot of the hill. Captain Watson,
however, who was in charge of the machine-gun section of the Border
Regiment, managed to get a couple of maxims through a ploughed field
into some turnips on the north slope of the hill. From here there was a
clear view of the road stretching away to Kruiseik, with the head of
the German column about 1,200 yards distant. On to this column both
machine-guns were now trained. The position was ideal for working
execution on the enemy, but it was in no way entrenched, and fully
exposed to the enemy's fire. The head of the enemy's column was soon
knocked to pieces, and, on the other hand, one of the Border Regiment
machine-guns was knocked out, but the other kept going till all the
ammunition was expended. In the meanwhile the German infantry advancing
south of the road had become visible to the several detachments
afore-mentioned, of whom Major Craufurd of the Gordons had assumed
temporary command, and these now opened a galling fire on the advancing
ranks, which they succeeded in throwing into considerable confusion.
This moment proved the turning-point in the day's battle. The frontal
fire from the Border Regiment's machine-guns and the above-named
detachments, coupled with the enfilading fire from the 1st Scots Guards
to the north of the road, brought the advancing force to a standstill,
which--when the reserves from Gheluvelt were advanced--quickly
developed into a retreat. The Germans fell back to Kruiseik, which they
occupied, and which from this date on remained in their hands. The 3rd
Brigade was brought forward to occupy the place of the Black Watch and
1st Coldstream north of the road, the 1st Scots Guards and the Camerons
retaining their original morning position.
This battle of the Kruiseik cross-roads had cost us very dear, some of
the finest battalions in the British Army being practically
annihilated, but there can be no question but that the losses of the
attacking forces were incomparably greater. It must be borne in mind
that the British forces which actually took part in this fight numbered
at the outside 5,000, while the attacking force consisted of an entire
Army Corps, that is to say, approximately, 24,000 infantry.
It may be interesting at this point, at the risk of forestalling
matters a little, to explain the gradual process of retirement by which
our line was straightened, and the bulge eliminated from our defensive
position. It is less easy to explain why the process was so gradual. We
may take our furthest advance east to have been on the 19th. On that
date the 22nd Brigade pushed forward as far as the Roulers-Menin
railway. There, however, they encountered very strong opposition, and
withdrew to Zonnebeke--a distance of six miles--on the same day. The
20th Brigade, however, did not take part in this retirement, and
entrenched themselves at the point to which they had advanced, east of
Kruiseik.
On the 24th the 6th Brigade made a second advance south of the
Zonnebeke road; and on the following day the Guards' Brigade fought its
way up into line on the right of the 6th Brigade, while the 5th and 1st
Brigades filled the gap between the Guards' Brigade and the 20th
Brigade at Kruiseik. These several advances resulted in a line of
defence which jutted out from Zonnebeke to Reutel, and then--after
passing east of Kruiseik and Zandvoorde--fell back quite suddenly, and
in an all but straight line, to Klein Zillebeke. Klein Zillebeke, and
Zonnebeke, then, were the starting-points to north and south of the
bulge, and it is significant that these two points have never been
lost; nor has our ultimate middle-of-November line, which ran along the
high ridge connecting these two places, ever been forced. But till this
obvious line of defence was reached, we lost ground on each occasion
that the enemy attacked in force.
On the 26th we were driven back from east of Kruiseik to a position
west of Kruiseik; on the 29th we lost Kruiseik and were driven back to
Gheluvelt; on the 30th we lost Zandvoorde; and on the 31st we lost
Gheluvelt, and were driven back to a new position nearer Veldhoek. On
November 2nd we were driven from this position, and our line was
retired another 300 yards towards Hooge. Here it remained till November
11th, when the Prussian Guard captured this position, but was unable to
drive us from the Veldhoek ridge. This ridge has, from that date to the
present moment, proved the _ne plus ultra_ of German advance, and
it is fairly safe to predict that it will so remain to the end, unless
voluntarily relinquished for sanitary or strategic reasons. This in
itself is a cause for congratulation and even triumph, but not so is
the thought of the many good men who laid down their lives between
Kruiseik and Veldhoek in the defence of the indefensible.
In reckoning up these successive retirements from the point of view of
military failure or success, or from the, perhaps, more interesting
point of view of the relative fighting merits of those who retired and
those who advanced, it is well to realize, from the start, the
tremendous disparity in numbers and freshness of the opposing forces.
The British commanders had, throughout this defence of Ypres, to ring
the changes, as between reserve and firing line, with battalions, and
sometimes even with companies. The German commanders could afford to do
it with Army Corps.
Day after day, the same British battalions, jaded, depleted of
officers, and gradually dwindling into mere skeletons, were called upon
to withstand the attacks of fresh and fresh troops. It was not merely
that the Germans had the superiority in numbers on each occasion when
they attacked. This, of course, must always be the privilege of the
attacking side; but they had also the unspeakable advantage of being
able at any time to direct a stream of fresh troops against any given
part of our thin, weary, battered line. Thus on October 29th the XXVII.
Reserve Corps attacked Kruiseik; on the 30th the XV. Army Corps
attacked Zandvoorde; on October 31st and November 1st we had the XIII.,
XXIV., and II. Bavarian Corps attacking the line from the Menin road to
Messines, to which on November 2nd must be added the XXVI. Army Corps.
By this time, however, the 16th French Army had come up, and did
something towards equalizing matters.
But again on November 11th, fifteen fresh battalions of the Prussian
Guard were brought up, and all that Sir Douglas Haig had to put in
their path were the remnants of the same unconquerable battalions that
had now been fighting, without intermission, for close on three months.
ZANDVOORDE
Following the loss of Kruiseik on the 29th came the loss of Zandvoorde
on the 30th. The particular section in the line of defence known as the
Zandvoorde trenches had from first to last been a death-trap, and had
proved particularly expensive to the 3rd Cavalry Division, whose
special privilege it had been to defend them. They curved round the
south-east side of the village, following the contours of the ridge,
and, being the most prominent feature in the entire Ypres salient, were
particularly susceptible to shell-fire from all quarters, except the
north. Their chief attraction, from the purely military point of view,
lay in the fact that they were on the crest of a ridge some 120 feet
high, which here juts out into the plain, and which faces the ridge of
about the same height a mile and a quarter away, on which Kruiseik
stands. Their weakness lay in the fact that they were practically
surrounded by the enemy, and were even open to attack from the
direction of Hollebeke, which lay due west of their southern extension.
In these circumstances their loss on the 30th was not wholly a matter
for regret.
At the moment of the final attack, the 7th C.B. (Household Cavalry) had
already been in these trenches for three days and nights, under a
ceaseless shell-fire from south and east, and occasionally even from
west. In the case of the machine-gun section of the Blues, under Lord
Worsley, that period was doubled, the detachment having been in the
advance trenches for six days and nights unrelieved.
There is reason to believe that the supreme attack on Zandvoorde
had originally been planned for the 29th, so as to take place
simultaneously with that on Kruiseik, but a delay in the arrival of the
XV. German Army Corps resulted in its postponement till the following
day. The expected reinforcements arrived during the night of the 29th
and--all being now according to arrangement--the attack took place at
daybreak on the following morning.