along on foot to inspect the trenches, disregarding warnings as to the
great danger he was running. He proceeded on foot down the Richebourg
Road, which was swept by shell-fire, in company with Captain Strutt,
commanding the R. Scots, and was almost immediately killed by a shell,
Captain Strutt being at the same time rendered unconscious. The
General's A.D.C., Captain Thorp, ran forward and knelt by Sir Hubert's
body, trying to screen it from the shells which were now falling
thickly on the road. Captain Strutt shortly afterwards recovered
consciousness, but was almost immediately severely wounded by another
shell, and the command of the R. Scots devolved on Lieut. Cazenove.
This battalion had now lost 15 officers and over 500 men in the last
three days' operations, but its casualties were to a certain extent
repaired by the timely arrival of a draft of 180 men and several
officers from home.
While the 3rd Division was thus pushing slowly ahead in the face of
great natural difficulties, the 5th Division was being heavily engaged
in the neighbourhood of Givenchy. Little forward progress was either
asked for or expected from this division, the canal south of Givenchy
having been, from the first, the selected pivot of the proposed
wheeling movement. It was also a matter of common knowledge that the
Germans were in far greater strength here than they were further north,
the original idea of the wheeling movement having been, in fact,
entirely based on the knowledge of the gradually diminishing strength
of the German forces as they stretched northwards.
The first regiment to take a conspicuous part in the terrific fighting
which for three weeks raged round Givenchy was the Dorsets. This was
on the 13th, _i.e._, on the same day on which the 8th Brigade made its
advance to Croix Barbee and Pont de Hem.
It was a miserable day, foggy and wet. The Dorsets were on the extreme
right of our army, in a line of trenches on the low ground between
Givenchy and the canal. The attack was pressed with great vigour by the
enemy, and the 1st Bedfords, on the left of the Dorsets, were driven
out of the village of Givenchy. The left flank of the Dorsets was now
exposed to enfilading fire from the ridge on which Givenchy stands, and
their position was distinctly precarious. Some of the left-hand
trenches were all but surrounded, the enemy having pressed forward into
the gap at Givenchy, and from thence bearing down on the flank of the
Dorsets. That regiment, however, held on with the utmost tenacity and
successfully defended its position against repeated and most determined
attacks; but the position was distinctly critical, and it was felt to
be essential that orders of some sort should be received from Brigade
Head Quarters. The telephonic communication had unfortunately been cut
and there was no means of getting a message through except by hand,
which, in the circumstances, seemed an all but impossible undertaking.
A private of the name of Coombs, however, volunteered to try, and on
the outward voyage actually got through untouched, but on returning
with the necessary orders he was shot clean through the chest, but
continued running for another 200 yards till he had delivered his
message.
The orders received were that the Dorsets were to hold on, and this
they continued to do, and with such good results that about 10 a.m. a
long line of Germans was seen advancing with hands up and a white flag.
The Dorsets left their trenches to accept this surrender and were
instantly raked from end to end by concealed machine-guns from beyond
the canal. These machine-guns had evidently been trained on the
Dorsets' position in anticipation of that which actually happened,
proving beyond any question that the whole thing was one carefully
thought-out piece of treachery. The Dorsets being got fairly in line,
and fully exposed to the concentrated fire of several machine-guns,
literally fell in hundreds. Major Roper was killed and Col. Bols was
shot through the back and actually taken prisoner, but in the
subsequent confusion he managed to crawl away and rejoin what was left
of his battalion. The most unsatisfactory part of the whole affair was,
that if the French Territorials on the south side of the canal,
_i.e._, on the right of the Dorsets, had been where they ought to
have been, that which happened never could have happened; but instead
of being up in line, for some unexplained reason they were a quarter of
a mile behind.
The loss, however, was limited--as a loss--to the treacherous massacre
of several hundred gallant men, and the capture of two of the
supporting guns. The Gunners, as usual, behaved with the utmost
gallantry, but they too came under the same enfilading fire as the
Dorsets and every man of the detachment except Captain Boscawen fell
either killed or wounded. Two of the guns were captured, but, with
this, the material advantage gained by the enemy began and ended, for
the 1st Cheshires were brought up from reserve and, with their
co-operation, the morning's line was re-occupied. The Cheshires,
however, themselves suffered considerably, among their casualties being
their C.O., Col. Vandeleur, who was killed while leading the attack.[3]
[3] Col. Vandeleur, while leading the Cheshires at Givenchy,
was _not_ killed as originally reported, but was wounded,
fell into the hands of the Germans and finally escaped to
England.
On the 15th, as though in fury at the loss of their gallant General,
the 3rd Division, now under the command of General Mackenzie, fought
with a dash and determination which were irresistible. Their advance
was continually checked by the country dykes, but, in spite of these
hampering obstacles, the Germans were everywhere driven back with heavy
loss. The 4th Middlesex and the 2nd R. Scots again did particularly
good work, and, further north, in the 9th Brigade, the R. Fusiliers and
the Northumberland Fusiliers gained high praise from the A.C. Commander
for the vigour and activity with which they pushed forward in the face
of strong opposition.
Conneau's cavalry, filling the eight-mile gap between the two Army
Corps, also made good progress, as did the 3rd A.C., on the left. In
the case of the latter Army Corps the 6th Division succeeded in
reaching Sailly without encountering serious opposition, while the 4th
Division got as far as Nieppe. The 2nd A.C., in its attempt to wheel,
had so far advanced its left flank three miles in the last four days at
a cost of 90 officers and 2,000 men. It had, however, inflicted very
heavy losses on the enemy.
On the 16th the 3rd Division continued the wheeling movement with
little opposition till it reached the village of Aubers, which was
found to be strongly held, and where it was brought up short.
So much for the present as regards the general movement forward of the
four divisions of infantry working south of Le Gheir. The attempt to
drive the enemy back was destined to prove abortive, but this was not
generally recognized by October 17th, and the idea was still to push
our troops forward. This general desire to advance soon communicated
itself to the 15th Brigade, on the extreme right of the British line at
Givenchy, which had so far been looked upon as the pivot on which the
left was to sweep round, and on the morning of the 17th the brigade was
ordered to push ahead. During the night of the 16th the 1st Devons had
taken over the trenches just north of the canal in which the Dorsets
had suffered such terrible casualties three days earlier. The 1st
Bedfords were on their left, and on their right, of course, were the
French Territorials south of the canal.
At 5 a.m. on the morning of the 17th a great bombardment was
concentrated upon Givenchy, and the Germans were soon shelled out of
that place, which had been in their possession since the 13th. A
general advance was thereupon ordered.
As a precaution against the calamity which had overtaken the Dorsets,
the Devons put one company on the south side of the canal. This company
was in touch with the French Territorials--so long as these latter kept
up in line, which, as it proved, was not for long. The advance was made
under considerable difficulties, as the country afforded no natural
cover, and the enemy was found to be in far greater force than had been
anticipated. However, in spite of a most continued and stubborn
resistance, the Devons, in obedience to orders, succeeded in advancing
their position 1,000 yards, and held on there till dusk, waiting for
the French Territorials on their right and the regiment on their left
to come up into line. These, however, failed to arrive, and it soon
became clear that for the Devons to remain isolated at the point to
which they penetrated could only result in the capture of the entire
battalion. Their retirement, however, in the circumstances, was a
matter of extreme difficulty, the country being quite flat and entirely
destitute of cover. The enemy were favoured by an exceptionally clear
field for their fire, and all their attention was naturally focussed on
the one battalion which had dared to push so far ahead. The men were
sheltering as best they could in ditches and behind haystacks, of which
there was fortunately a fair sprinkling. When the order came to retire
some crept away under shelter of the hedges; others had not even this
cover, and had to take their chance in the open.
One detachment of some forty men were sheltering behind a large
haystack in the open. They were quickly located, and shrapnel and
machine-gun fire was concentrated on the haystack, which soon began to
dwindle under the hail of missiles. Lieut. Worrall, who was one of the
party, thereupon set fire to the haystack, and told the men to make a
bolt for it singly, under cover of the smoke. This they successfully
did, and with few further casualties--all but Sergt. Harris and another
man, who were wounded and could not move. The haystack was now
beginning to blaze fiercely and it was clear the men could not be left.
Lieut. Worrall picked up Sergt. Harris and carried him 400 yards across
the open to the shelter of the canal bank, where he left him. Then he
went back for the other man.
In the meanwhile the line further north was still making a certain
progress. At Lorgies a party of the K.O.S.B. Cyclists, under Corpl.
Wheeler, rode right into the enemy outposts. They promptly dismounted,
and, opening fire, held the enemy for half an hour till the brigade
(the 13th) arrived on the scene and captured the place. Still further
north again Gen. Shaw and his 9th Brigade was as usual fairly active.
About 4 p.m. the R. Scots Fusiliers and the Northumberland Fusiliers
attacked and carried the village of Aubers with the bayonet, completely
routing the occupying troops; and a little later the R. Fusiliers and
Lincolns performed the same office by the village of Herlies.
Aubers stands on the crest of the ridge which faces Neuve Chapelle.
Herlies, on the other hand, lies at the foot of a long, gradual slope
of open, cultivated land. The village was defended on the west side by
a semi-circular line of trenches, protected by barbed wire
entanglements. The defenders had also a Horse Artillery Battery and--as
usual--a great number of machine-guns posted here and there in any
suitable buildings. The two attacking battalions, on the other hand,
were supported by a R.F.A. battery and a section of howitzers. These
did admirable preliminary work, and at dusk the two regiments--Lincolns
on right, R. Fusiliers on left--charged the trenches, carried them
hot-handed and pursued the Germans into the village. Here further
pursuit was unfortunately checked by the too great activity of our own
artillery, but the position won was occupied and held for six days. The
Lincolns, who were the chief sufferers, lost seventy-five men and two
officers during this attack.
Further north, Conneau's cavalry added their share to the day's work by
capturing Fromelles, so that there was an appreciable advance all
round, which would have been greater still had not the 7th Brigade,
which was on the right of the 3rd Division, failed to take the village
of Illies.
The position then at night on the 17th was that the pivot point
remained on the canal, south of Givenchy. From that point the line of
the 2nd A.C. curved round behind La Bassee and through Violaines, after
which it zig-zagged towards the north-east in an irregular salient, the
3rd A.C. being thrown back on its left.
Such was still the state of things on the morning of the 18th, when the
Germans--having been reinforced during the night by the XIII. Division
of the VII. Corps--made counter-attacks all along the line of the 2nd
A.C. All these were repulsed with loss to the enemy, but our own line
made no advance, the stumbling-block being still Illies, which
continued to defy capture by the 7th Brigade.
At dusk the undefeated 9th Brigade stormed and took the trenches one
mile north-east of Illies, but as they were unsupported on either
flank, they had to abandon the position and fall back. The 1st R. Scots
Fusiliers did particularly good work on this occasion, and suffered
correspondingly, Captain Burt and Lieuts. Cozens-Brooke, the Hon. J.
Doyle, and Fergusson-Barton being killed, and six other officers
wounded. In the meanwhile Conneau had advanced from Fromelles and
attacked Fournes, but this attack failed.
Meanwhile, in the Armentieres district, the 3rd A.C. was making great
efforts to play up to its allotted part in the wheel to the south, the
4th Division being north of Armentieres, the 6th Division south of it.
The centre of interest was still to the south of Armentieres, the
concentration of German troops north of that town being still only in
process of development. For the moment, then, we can neglect affairs
further north, and follow the attempted wheeling movement of the troops
south of Armentieres to its furthest point east.
On the afternoon of the 18th the 16th Brigade captured Radinghem, the
two battalions chiefly concerned being the 2nd Lancs. and Yorks. and
the 1st Buffs. These two battalions, who were on the right of the 6th
Division, gallantly stormed and carried the village and then--in the
impetuosity of success and enterprise--followed on beyond after the
retreating Germans. Here, in pushing forward through an impenetrable
wood, they suddenly found themselves swept from all sides by concealed
machine-guns, which literally rained bullets on them. The casualties
here were very high, the Lancs. and Yorks. alone losing 11 officers and
400 men. Col. Cobbold and Major Bailey, however, who displayed the
greatest coolness and courage throughout, succeeded in withdrawing the
remains of the battalion in good order and getting it back to
Radinghem.
The two battalions, in spite of their heavy losses, retained possession
of this village throughout the night, though--had the Germans
counter-attacked in force--things might have gone badly with them, as
they were two miles ahead of the rest of the division.
FROM ATTACK TO DEFENCE
It was now generally recognized that the wheeling movement originally
contemplated was an impossibility. Between Armentieres and Givenchy the
3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions, and Conneau's cavalry, which was acting
with them, had opposed to them the II., IV., VII. and IX. German
Cavalry Divisions, several battalions of Jaegers, the XIII. Division of
the VII. A.C., a brigade of the III. A.C., and the whole of the XIV.
A.C., which had recently moved north from in front of the 21st French
Army. They were therefore sufficiently outnumbered, even at this
period, to put any idea of further advance quite out of the question.
It now became merely a matter of holding on to that which they had
got--if possible.
The 2nd A.C. front, owing to the irregularity of the advance, was of a
zig-zag character, and on the night of the 19th Sir Horace ordered a
slight retirement so as to straighten out the line. It was quickly
evidenced that this step was not taken a moment too soon, for on the
following day the Germans, confident in the sufficiency of their
numbers, attacked all along the line, and succeeded in re-capturing Le
Pilly, and with it the whole of the R. Irish Regiment. This was
something of a disaster, but luckily the attack was not equally
successful elsewhere. The 1st Cheshires, though attacked with great
vigour, held their ground unshaken throughout this day and the next,
and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Two platoons of the R.
Fusiliers, who were sent up to establish communication between Herlies
and the R. Irish Regiment at Le Pilly, were caught in flank, owing to
the capture of the latter place, and suffered severely, Captain Carey,
in command, being killed.
The 9th Brigade, which had throughout these operations been on the left
of the 3rd Division, was now temporarily transferred to the 3rd A.C.,
whose line, reaching as it did from Radinghem to Le Gheir, was
considered by the C. in C. to be too thin for safety. The removal of
this brigade had the effect of widening the gap between the 2nd and 3rd
A.C.'s by a further four or five miles, and the responsibilities of
Conneau's cavalry were correspondingly increased, the left of the 2nd
A.C. now stopping short at Riez, which was held by the 1st Gordons. The
weakening of the 2nd A.C. by the borrowing of one of its brigades and
the capture of one of its battalions was made up to it in some measure
by the arrival of the Lahore Division of Indians, under General Watkis,
which took up a position in rear of it at Neuve Chapelle.
With the additional assistance which had been lent him, Gen. Pulteney
was everywhere successful in holding his ground. At one moment in the
day the enemy succeeded in getting possession of Le Gheir, but as the
loss of this place would have laid bare the flank of the cavalry at St.
Yves, Gen. Hunter-Weston decided that it must be retaken at any cost,
and the work was entrusted to the K.O. Regiment and the Lancs.
Fusiliers. These two battalions, finely handled by Col. Butler, of the
Lancs. Fusiliers, proved themselves quite equal to the call made upon
them, and not only re-captured the lost trenches, but took 200
prisoners and released 40 of our own men who had been captured.
THE BIRTH OF THE YPRES SALIENT
It is necessary now to turn for the moment to the scene further north,
where a mild interest was beginning to be displayed in England in the
war-clouds which were gathering round the picturesque and historical
Flemish town of Ypres. It will be remembered that, on the 14th, Sir
Henry Rawlinson, with the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division,
had reached Ypres from Dixmude. On their first arrival, the 3rd Cavalry
Division had been sent south of Ypres, the 6th C.B. going to Wytschate
and the 7th C.B. to Kemmel; but as the Cavalry Corps under General
Allenby gradually drew up from the direction of Bethune, the 6th and
7th C.B. (3rd Cavalry Division) were withdrawn to the north side of
Ypres, where they worked the ground between Zonnebeke and the Foret
d'Houlthust, filling, in fact--as well as might be--the gap between the
French Cavalry to the north and the left of the 7th Division. This
latter division, since its arrival, had pushed forward with little or
no opposition to a convex position some six miles east of Ypres, which
embraced the villages of Zonnebeke, Kruiseik and Zandvoorde. South of
Zandvoorde there was a considerable hiatus, Allenby's Cavalry Corps,
which had unexpectedly found itself opposed by the XIX. Saxon Corps and
three divisions of German Cavalry, having not yet got into proper touch
with the right of the 7th Division. This, however, in view of the fact
that the 7th Division was on the outside of the wheeling movement, and
had therefore the bigger sweep to make, was a matter of little moment,
and one which would have speedily righted itself at a later stage, had
the original plan been successfully carried through. A matter of more
moment at the time was that the 22nd Brigade, on the left of the 7th
Division at Zonnebeke, was considerably in arrear of the 20th Brigade
at Kruiseik, whereas the converse should have been the case.
Accordingly, in the early morning of the 19th, the 22nd Brigade was
ordered to advance from Zonnebeke in the direction of the straight road
connecting Roulers and Menin, so as to bring the left shoulder of the
7th Division well forward. When this had been done, the 20th and 21st
Brigade were to join in the general advance.
[Illustration: Ypres and its surroundings.]
The main idea on the extreme left of our line, at the moment, was to
seize the bridge over the River Lys at Menin, and so impede the further
advance of the German reinforcements which were being steadily railed
up from the direction of Lille. In the event it turned out that the
manoeuvre was impracticable owing to the insufficiency in numbers of
the British force operating east of Ypres. This force, it will be
understood, consisted, at the time, of the 7th Division alone,
supported by two cavalry brigades on its left flank, whereas the
Germans had by the 19th concentrated on the spot a force of five or six
times this magnitude. However, in the intention lies the explanation of
the subsequent Ypres salient. The original idea was strategically
sound, but it was frustrated owing to the difficulty and consequent
delay in concentration which accompanied the transfer of the British
force from the Aisne to its new field of operation in Flanders. It was
a race as to which army could concentrate with the greatest rapidity,
and the Germans--having by far the easier task and by far the shorter
road to travel--got in first.
At 5 a.m., then, on the 19th, the 22nd Brigade set out from Zonnebeke
on its forward movement, the 2nd Queen's on the left, the 1st R. Welsh
Fusiliers in the centre, and the 2nd Warwicks on the right, the 1st S.
Staffords being in reserve.