Reumont, with the Manchester Regiment on the right of the K.O.Y.L.I. It
was common talk among the men of the 5th Division that the French were
coming up in support, and that, therefore, there must be no giving way.
The French in question were--and only could be--Gen. Sordet's cavalry,
who, at the time, were plodding away in rear on their forty mile trek
to the left flank of our army, and who could never under any
circumstances have been of help to the 5th Division on the right of the
Le Cateau battle-front. However, that was the rumour and they held on.
Some of the K.O.S.B. in the first line trenches saw some men on their
flank retiring, and, thinking it was a general order, followed suit.
Col. Stephenson personally re-conducted them back to their trenches. He
was himself almost immediately afterwards knocked out by a shell; but
the force of example had its effect, and there was no more retiring
till the general order to that effect was unmistakable. This was about
three o'clock. The final retirement of those battalions which had held
on till the enemy was on the top of them was very difficult, and very
costly in casualties, as they were mowed down by shrapnel and
machine-gun fire the moment they left their trenches. It was during
this retirement that Corpl. Holmes, of the K.O.Y.L.I, won his Victoria
Cross by picking up a wounded comrade and carrying him over a mile
under heavy fire. Another Victoria Cross in the same battalion was won
that day by Major Yate under very dramatic circumstances. His company
had been in the second line of trenches during the bombardment, and had
suffered terribly from the enemy's shell-fire directed at one of our
batteries just behind. When the German infantry came swarming up in the
afternoon, there were only nineteen sound men left in the company.
These nineteen kept up their fire to the last moment and then left the
trench and charged, headed by Major Yate. There could be but one
result. Major Yate fell mortally wounded, and his gallant band of
Yorkshiremen ceased to exist. It was the Thermopylae of B Company, 2nd
K.O.Y.L.I. This battalion lost twenty officers and six hundred men
during the battle, and was probably the heaviest sufferer in the 5th
Division. It stuck it till the last moment and the enemy got round its
right flank.
The 3rd Division line, further west, was also forced about three
o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy in great numbers broke through
towards Troisvilles, to the right of the 9th Brigade, causing the whole
division to retire. The actual order to retire in this case was passed
down by word of mouth from right to left by galloping Staff officers,
who--in the pandemonium that was reigning--were unable to get in touch
with all the units of each battalion. As a result the retirement was
necessarily irregular, and--as in the case of the 5th Division--the
battalions that "stuck it" longest found themselves isolated and in
time surrounded. This was the case with the 1st Gordon Highlanders, in
the 8th Brigade, to whom the order to retire either never penetrated,
or to whom it was too distasteful to be acted upon with promptitude.
The exact circumstances of the annihilation of this historic battalion
will never be known till the war is over, but the nett result was that
it lost 80 per cent. of its strength in killed, wounded and missing.
The same fate overtook one company of the 2nd R. Scots in the same
brigade. This company was practically wiped out and the battalion as a
whole had some 400 casualties in killed and wounded. The whole
division, in fact, suffered very severely in carrying out the
retirement, the ground to the rear being very open and exposed, and the
enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire incessant. The village of Audencourt
had been heavily shelled all day and was a mass of blazing ruins,
effectually barring any retirement by the high road, and forcing the
retreating troops to take to the open country. Once, however, behind
the railway, the retreat became more organized, and a series of small
rear-guard fights were put up from behind the shelter of the
embankment.
The 23rd Brigade R.F.A., under Col. Butler, put in some most efficient
work at this period, and materially assisted the retirement of the 8th
Brigade. With remarkable coolness the gunners, entirely undisturbed by
the general confusion reigning, continued to drop beautifully-timed
shells among the advancing German infantry. The work of the artillery,
in fact, all along the line was magnificent, and deeds of individual
heroism were innumerable. The 37th Battery, for instance, kept up its
shrapnel-fire on the advancing lines of Germans till these were within
300 yards of its position. Then Captain Reynolds, with some volunteer
drivers, galloped up with two teams, and hitched them on to the two
guns which had not been knocked out. Incredible as it may appear, in
view of the hail of bullets directed at them, one of these guns was got
safely away. The other was not. Captain Reynolds and Drivers Luke and
Brain were given the Victoria Cross for this exploit. Sergt. Browne, of
the same battery, got the D.C.M. The 80th Battery was another that
distinguished itself by exceptional gallantry at Ligny during the
retreat, and three of its N.C.O.'s won the D.C.M. Near the same place
the 135th Battery also covered itself with glory. In fact, it is not
too much to say that the situation on the afternoon of August 26th was
very largely saved by the splendid heroism of our Field Artillery; and
for the exploits of this branch of the service alone the battle of Le
Cateau must always stand out as a bright spot in the annals of British
arms.
The Germans did not pursue the 3rd Division beyond the line of the
villages above named. In the case of the 5th Division there was no
pursuit at all, in the strict sense of the term. That is to say, there
were no rear-guard actions. The division made its way through Reumont,
to the continuation of the straight Roman road by which it had reached
Le Cateau, and down this road it continued its retreat unmolested. Rain
began to fall heavily and numbers of the men, heedless alike of rain or
of pursuing Germans, dropped like logs by the roadside and slept.
The extrication of the Le Cateau army from a position which, on paper,
was all but hopeless, was undoubtedly a very fine piece of generalship
on the part of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. The C. in C. in his despatch
wrote: "I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of
the army under my command, on the morning of August 26th, could never
have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation."
THE RETREAT FROM LE CATEAU
Le Cateau may without shame be accepted as a defeat. There was at no
time, even in anticipation, the possibility of victory. It was an
affair on altogether different lines to that of Mons. At Mons the
British Army had been set a definite task, which it had cheerfully
faced, and which it had carried through with credit to itself and with
much advantage to its ally. Its ultimate retirement had only been in
conformity with the movements of that ally. Everything worked according
to book.
But Le Cateau was quite another affair. Here we find half the British
force temporarily cut off from the other half by _force majeure_,
and turning at bay on a pursuer whom it could no longer escape. There
was never any question of victory. The disparity in numbers and in
armament left no room for illusions on that score. Searching deep below
the surface, we might perhaps find that the main factor in deciding
that Briton and German should cross swords at Le Cateau was the
primitive impulse--always strong in the Anglo-Saxon breed--to face an
ugly crisis and die fighting. In the event the British force faced the
foe, and fought, but it did not die--as an army; a result due to
consummate generalship on the part of the Army Corps Commander, aided
by a strange laxity, or over-caution, as the case may be, on the part
of the enemy.
Why the Germans did not pursue with more vigour will never be known
till the history of this period comes to be written from the German
side. The failure to pursue after Mons is intelligible. While the 2nd
A.C. was defending the group of manufacturing towns north of the
Valenciennes road, the 1st A.C. on the right was thrown forward in
echelon, and formed a standing menace to the left flank of the
advancing enemy. A too eager pursuit, in advance of the general line,
might well have resulted in the isolation and capture of the German
right.
At Le Cateau, however, there was no such risk. Here the German attack
had been mainly concentrated against the 5th Division, evidently with
the idea of turning the British right flank, and forcing in a wedge
between the 1st and 2nd Army Corps. This was in effect done, and all
that remained was for the Germans to push their advantage home in order
to separate, at any rate, a large percentage of the 2nd A.C. from the
main body on its left. This could have been effected without any fear
of a flank attack from the 1st A.C, that corps being at the time far
too scattered and distant to make any concerted move; and in any case
being hopelessly cut off by the Sambre.
Why this programme was not carried through to its consummation can only
be guessed at. It may be that the enemy had only imperfect information
as to the movements of the 1st A.C.; or it may be that they were
deterred by the knowledge that General d'Amade was hurrying up on their
right flank from the direction of Arras with the 61st and 62nd Reserve
Divisions; or it may be again that the advancing troops had been too
roughly handled by the British at bay to allow of pursuit. This last
hypothesis is not only the most flattering to British self-esteem, but
it is also eminently possible. In any case the fact remains that they
did not pursue. Sir Horace, on the other hand, had no idea of letting
this supineness on the part of the enemy influence his own policy.
The troops were kept moving. On the afternoon of the 26th, the 5th
Division managed to get back as far as Estrees, and the 3rd Division to
Vermand and Hargicourt, each arriving at its destination about dark.
The weather was very bad, and the majority of the men were crowded into
farm-barns, but many dropped by the roadside where they were and slept,
heedless of the pouring rain.
On the far side of the river the 4th and 6th Brigades, whom we last saw
at Landrecies and Maroilles, got to Etreux and Hannappes respectively
about 2 p.m., and bivouacked by the roadside; but the 5th Brigade,
moving by way of Taisnieres and Prisclies, could get no further than
Barzy, and was therefore still far behind the line of the 2nd A.C.
retreat, and, in fact, of its own division. The 2nd Brigade got to Oisy
without mishap. The 1st Brigade was not so fortunate, the Munster
Fusiliers being overtaken at Bergues and captured _en masse_ with
the exception of some 150 who escaped with the aid of the 15th Hussars.
Two guns of the 118th Battery, which were with them were captured at
the same time. A mile or two further south, on the high ground just
beyond Etreux, the brigade was again attacked, the Black Watch, who
were then doing rear-guard, coming under a severe artillery fire. This
was most effectively replied to by the 117th Battery under Major
Packard and the pursuit was checked. The battery in withdrawing was
charged by a squadron of German cavalry, but the charge died away under
the fire of the Black Watch.
The story of the rescue of the Munsters by the 15th Hussars is one of
which the latter regiment may well be proud. Two troops only of the
15th Hussars were engaged, and yet the number of honours that fell to
them is remarkable. Mr. Nicholson got the Cross of the Legion of
Honour, Sergt. Papworth got the Victoria Cross, and Sergt. Blishen,
Corpl. Shepherd and Corpl. Aspinall the D.C.M.
The story of this affair is as follows: It was reported to the General
commanding that the Munster Fusiliers were in trouble, and the 15th
Hussars, who were acting as divisional cavalry, were sent back to help.
The country in the neighbourhood of Bergues is a difficult one, being
traversed by numerous narrow byways cutting in all directions, and the
15th Hussars, not knowing just where the Munster Fusiliers were,
separated into troops and beat the country northwards. Just south of
Bergues, where the road from that place meets the main road to La
Capelle, Mr. Nicholson's troop found 150 of the Munster Fusiliers in
great difficulties, with some Germans in pursuit not 200 yards distant.
He at once dismounted the troop and, sending the horses off for shelter
to a farmyard behind, lined the hedges on the side of the main road and
opened fire on the Germans. These retired to a farm some 200 yards up
the road, from which they presently brought a machine-gun to bear on
the hedges, and under cover of this they shortly afterwards emerged,
driving a herd of cattle before them down the road. The Hussars,
however, shot down both cattle and Germans and sent the survivors
scuttling back once more into the farm.
In the meanwhile the Hon. E. Hardinge's troop, having heard the
firing, arrived on the scene from another direction and--also
dismounting--crept up to a position from which they could command
the farmyard, and opened fire on the Germans massed inside, doing
tremendous execution at first, as it was a complete surprise. The
Germans, however, quickly recovered themselves and returned the fire
with machine-guns. Almost at the first discharge Mr. Hardinge fell
mortally wounded, and Sergt. Papworth took over command of the troop.
Bodies of the enemy were now seen advancing on all sides, and it was
obvious that, if the little British force was to escape being
surrounded, it was time to move. There is always a disposition on such
occasions for very tired men to throw up the sponge and surrender. In
the present instance, however, any such inclination was summarily
checked by the energy and determination of Mr. Nicholson and Sergt.
Papworth, who, taking prompt charge of the situation, brought the whole
party--Munsters and all--safely out of the difficulty. They had to put
in twenty-eight miles of steady marching before they finally caught up
with their division.
On the 27th the retreat was resumed, the troops starting as usual in
the small hours of the morning. The 1st Division, in place of following
the route taken by the 2nd Division, crossed the Sambre and went
through Wassigny to Hauteville; the 2nd Division went to Mont d'Origny,
and the 3rd and 5th Divisions joined up at Ham, the former, which had
been greatly harassed and delayed throughout by hostile cavalry and
horse artillery, arriving some hours after the other. On arrival at its
destination the whole division dropped by the side of the road and
slept.
Next morning the whole 2nd A.C. followed the one road from Ham to
Noyon, the 5th Division, which was still some hours ahead of the 3rd,
passing on through Noyon to Pommeraye, where it billeted.
On the other side of the river the two divisions of the 1st A.C. also
joined up and went through La Fere to the group of villages to the
south of that place, where they billeted, the 1st Brigade at St.
Gobain, the 2nd at Fresancourt, the 4th at Berlancourt, the 5th at
Servais and the 6th at Deuillet and Amigny.
The monotony of retreat was in some part relieved by several rear-guard
brushes during the day between the 3rd and 5th C.B. on the one hand and
some Prussian Uhlans of the Guard on the other, in one and all of which
the honours rested very emphatically with the British cavalry.
The 29th August, 1914, will probably be imprinted for ever in the minds
of those who took part in the famous Mons retreat, for on this day the
troops rested. For eight days they had now been marching practically
without ceasing and the feet of many were literally stripped of skin;
they had dug trenches innumerable and had fought various engagements,
great and small, for the most part in the blazing heat of an
exceptionally hot August, and with a minimum of sleep and food. But on
the 29th they rested.
The whole Expeditionary Force was now once more in touch, and, with its
arrival at the La Fere line, the acute pressure of the retreat may be
said to have been at an end. The various divisions were re-organized;
mixed up brigades were once more sorted out; stragglers and
"temporarily attached" restored to their lost battalions, and the whole
force put into ship-shape working order. Gen. Sordet, who had rendered
incalculable service with his cavalry on our left flank, was now
relieved by the 6th French Army, which came into position on our left
in the neighbourhood of Roye, while the 5th French Army continued our
line towards the east. The British Army, in fact, refreshed by its rest
on the 29th, was now in perfect trim to turn and fight at any moment.
But this was not to be for awhile yet. Gen. Joffre's scheme called for
a still further retirement.
At 1 p.m. on the 29th the French Generalissimo visited the C. in C. at
his Head Quarters at Compiegne and explained to him the outline of his
plan. Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and Gen. Allenby were
also present. As a result of this conference, the bridges over the Oise
were blown up (an operation which again cost us some good lives from
among the R.E.), and the British force retired another twenty miles to
a line north of the Aisne, between Soissons and Compiegne.
The 2nd A.C. set out on this march about 3 p.m.; the 1st A.C. followed
some twelve hours later, marching in one column through the Foret de
St. Gobain, after which it divided up, the 1st Division going to
L'Allemande and the 2nd Division to Passy.
On the morning of the 31st the march was once more resumed, the 2nd
Division leaving at 6.30 a.m. and marching via Pernaut and Cutry to
Soucy, which was reached at 4.30 p.m., while the 1st Division retired
to Missy-a-Bois.
The 3rd A.C. took a wrong turn near Vellerie this day and for a time
lost themselves, but in the end joined up with the new line, which
reached--broadly speaking--from Crepy to Villers-Cotterets.
VILLERS-COTTERETS
At the latter place we were again forced into a rear-guard action. At
nine o'clock the 4th (Guards') Brigade, which was acting rear-guard,
was overtaken at Soucy, where--in accordance with orders--it had faced
about while the 2nd Division was having a two hours' halt for rest and
dinner. It was no case of surprise, the brigade being thoroughly
prepared and, indeed, expecting to have to hold the enemy in check.
Dispositions were therefore made accordingly. The 2nd Grenadiers and
3rd Coldstream held the ground from Montgobert to Soucy, with the
Coldstream lining the long grass ride that runs through the woods at
Haramont. They were supported by two batteries of the 41st Brigade
R.F.A. The 2nd Coldstream and Irish Guards were posted in rear of the
first line along the northern edge of the Foret de Villers-Cotterets,
at the base of the ridge known as the Rond de la Reine.
The enemy commenced by shelling the front line, and shelling it with
such accuracy that Gen. Scott-Ker ordered the Grenadiers and 3rd
Coldstream to fall back through the 2nd line and take up a position in
rear. This was done, but subsequently these two battalions were
brought up into line with the Irish Guards along the northern edge of
the wood, whilst the 2nd Coldstream were sent back to take up a
covering position in rear of the wood, along the railway east and west
of Villers-Cotterets Halte. Such was the position without much change
up to midday, when the enemy's attack began to slacken and shortly
afterwards they appeared to have had enough of it and drew off. The
4th Brigade thereupon resumed its march as far as Thury, which was
reached about 10.30 p.m. Their casualties in this action amounted to
over 300. The Irish Guards had Col. the Hon. G. Morris and Lieut.
Tisdall killed; Major Crichton and Lord Castlerosse wounded. In the
Grenadiers the Hon. J. Manners and Lieut. McDougall were killed, and
in the Coldstream, Lieut. G. Lambton was killed and Captain Burton and
Captain Tritton wounded. The Brigadier-Gen. Scott-Ker was himself
badly wounded in the thigh, and the command of the brigade was taken
over by Col. Corry.
NERY
The same morning witnessed a very heroic little action at Nery. During
the preceding night the 1st C.B. had billeted in this little village,
together with L Battery R.H.A., which was attached to the brigade. The
village lies low in a broken and hilly country. To the south and east
of it the ground rises suddenly and very steeply, forming a long ridge
which juts out into the plain from the north. Along these heights
Lieut. Tailby, of the 11th Hussars, was patrolling in the early
morning, and in a very thick fog, when he suddenly bumped right into a
column of German cavalry. He had hardly time to gallop back and warn
the brigade before shot and shell began to fly thickly into the
village. The German force, as it afterwards turned out, consisted of
no less than six cavalry regiments, with two batteries of six guns
each attached; and there is reason to believe that they were just as
surprised at the encounter as was the 1st C.B. However that may be,
the advantage in position, as well as in numbers, was greatly on the
side of the Germans, who, from the heights they were on, completely
dominated the ground below. Even the sun favoured them, for when that
broke through about five o'clock, it was at the backs of the enemy and
full in the faces of the defenders.
The lifting of the fog soon cleared up any doubts in the minds of all
concerned as to how matters stood. On the heights above, with the sun
behind them, were the six German regiments, dismounted, with their
twelve guns. Down below in an open orchard on the western side of the
village were the Bays and L Battery R.H.A. They were still in the
position in which they had bivouacked the night previous. Beyond them
were the 5th Dragoon Guards. The 11th Hussars were on the south-east
side of the village nearest the enemy, but more or less hidden from
view and protected from the enemy's fire by the lie of the land.
Then began one of those rare episodes which will live for ever in
history and romance.
The position of L Battery had not been chosen with a view to action.
Except for the fog, it would never have been caught there; but having
been caught there it accepted the situation. Owing to the broken nature
of the ground, only three of its guns could be brought to bear on the
enemy's position, but these three were quickly at work. The Bays, who
were the regiment chiefly in the line of fire, got their horses into
safety and then joined in with rifle and machine-gun fire, taking what
shelter they could; but this did not amount to much, and the sun was in
their eyes. None of these disadvantages made themselves felt in the
case of the 11th Hussars, who, from their sheltered position, were able
to bring a most effective machine-gun fire to bear on the flank of the
Germans. Their doings, however, we may pass by. The focus-point of
German attention was the little Horse Artillery Battery down in the
apple-orchard. This now became the target for a perfect tornado of shot
and shell, and at a range of only 400 yards. Two of the three guns were
quickly knocked out, and the fire of batteries, rifles and maxims
became concentrated on the one that remained.
Men and officers combined to serve this one gun. Captain Bradbury, in
command, had one leg taken off by a shell, but he propped himself up,
and continued to direct the fire till he fell dead. Lieut. Campbell
died beside him, as did also Brig.-Major Cawley, who came up with
orders from Head Quarters. Lieut. Gifford and Lieut. Mundy both fell
wounded, and Sergt.-Major Dorrell took over command. With the support
of Sergt. Nelson, Gunner Darbyshire and Driver Osborne he cheerfully
continued this absurd and unequal duel.