Transcribed from the [1873] Austin and Co. edition by David Price.
CHRISTIANITY
IN RELATION TO
FREETHOUGHT, SCEPTICISM, AND
FAITH:
THREE DISCOURSES
BY THE BISHOP OF PETERBOROUGH.
WITH
SPECIAL REPLIES
BY MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
LONDON:
AUSTIN & CO., 17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.
* * * * *
PRICE ONE SHILLING.
ADVERTISEMENT.
IT will be seen by the following Circular and Correspondence how the
Discourses of the Bishop of Peterborough and Mr. Bradlaugh’s Replies
thereto were brought about. The Dean’s Circular speaks of four
Discourses to be delivered by the Bishop, but in fact only the three here
reported were given. This volume, therefore, contains the whole of both
sides of the question, so far as the discussion has hitherto proceeded in
Norwich. The speeches were all taken down by a competent shorthand
reporter, specially engaged for the _National Reformer_.
The reader will clearly see by the Correspondence that the Christians
refused the proposal of the Secularists that the two parties should
co-operate in publishing together and circulating as widely as possible
the Discourses and Replies. Mr. Bradlaugh has therefore taken upon
himself the responsibility of their joint publication. The extraordinary
reasons given by the Dean (in the last paragraph of his letter of Feb.
15th) for refusing the perfectly fair offer of Mr. Cooper, will not pass
unnoted. His claim to certainty _may_ differ from the claim to
infallibility made on behalf of the Pope and the Romish Church, and the
principle on which he condemns the dissemination of Sceptical works as
treason to human welfare, _may_ differ from that which in Rome has led to
the establishment of the _Index Expurgatorius_; but we confess that in
neither case can we see the difference, and we challenge the Dean to show
that there really is any.
We are confident that Freethinkers generally will appreciate the
disinterested zeal of Mr. R. A. Cooper in making all arrangements
necessary to ensure that the Bishop’s Discourses should be fitly answered
on the spot and without delay.
THE PUBLISHERS.
_April_, 1871.
CIRCULAR OF THE DEAN OF NORWICH.
SIR,—I am about to ask your kind help in an enterprise undertaken for the
religious welfare of our fellow-citizens, to the success of which your
co-operation may very materially contribute. It has been thought that in
large cities, where sceptical views are often so much disseminated, and
spread so widely among all classes, good might be done, under God’s
blessing, by an annual series of discourses from some competent preacher,
directed against modern forms of infidelity, and afterwards published and
circulated at so low a price as should put them within the reach of all.
It is chiefly with the view of holding such discourses there, that the
Dean and Chapter have recently caused the Nave of the Cathedral Church to
be lighted and furnished with chairs, _all of which_ (except, a very few
reserved for persons engaged in the service, or connected with the
Cathedral) _will be perfectly free_. With the view of giving the
preachers a larger discretion as to time, and of making the whole service
shorter, it is proposed to use before the sermon the Litany only with one
or two hymns. I may add that the whole scheme has the thorough sanction
and concurrence of the Lord Bishop of the Diocese, who has been consulted
on every part of it.
_The Lord Bishop of Peterborough has kindly undertaken to give the first
series of discourses on Tuesday_, _the_ 21_st_, _Tuesday_, _the_ 28_th_,
_Wednesday_, _the_ 29_th_, _and Thursday_, _the_ 30_th_ _of March_, _the
service each evening commencing at_ 8 _p.m._
If you approve of our scheme (and pray observe that _the discourses_,
_having for their object the vindication and establishment of the
Christian faith_, _will in all probability hardly notice the points on
which Christians of various Communions differ_), will you kindly help us,
first, by making known among your workpeople or parishioners the days and
hours of the services, with the name of the preacher, and encouraging
them to attend; secondly, by circulating among them the discourses, when
published, of which I shall be greatly pleased to send you as large a
number as you think you can dispose of? On this last point I shall be
obliged by a communication from you.
The subject of the first series of discourses will be “Free Thought.”
I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
E. MEYRICK GOULBURN, D.D.
Dean of Norwich.
The Deanery, Norwich, February 7th, 1871.
CORRESPONDENCE.
Norwich, Feb. 13th, 1871.
REV. SIR,—I received with extreme pleasure your circular letter of 7th
inst., relating to, and defining the objects of the Discourses intended
to be delivered next month in the Cathedral, by the Bishop of
Peterborough, and I am induced to reply to it by the conviction that
great good may result from “the scheme,” if you can be induced to modify
it in some particulars.
The circular states that the Discourses are to be “directed against
modern forms of infidelity,” and have for their object the “vindication
and establishment of the Christian faith,” but I assume your ultimate
object is the vindication and establishment of truth—no matter what the
truth may be. If my assumption be correct, I heartily sympathise with
your object, and as a Sceptic or Infidel, will co-operate with my
Christian brethren if permitted.
May I call your attention to a practical difficulty in the way of the
scheme, which I fear you have not sufficiently considered? In the
present state of opinion, or rather in the absence of real opinion, on
these subjects, Sceptics or Infidels cannot always insure the attention
of Christian hearers, or of persons indifferent to the subject of their
discourses, but these and not the confirmed Infidels, are the persons the
zealous Sceptic most desires to reach. I imagine your difficulty is the
same. You want to get at the mighty mass who know and care nothing about
these questions, and also at the Infidel whose opinions you deem so
mischievous. The fact is, the great mass and the Infidel are not likely
to attend unless their attention be in some manner especially drawn to
the Discourses, but you will probably have a large congregation of
believing Christians, whose faith may be confirmed, but yet who do not
hold opinions you wish to change.
I beg to suggest a mode by which I think the difficulty may be removed,
and an interest created that will be useful to the cause of truth—to
Christian truth, if Christianity be true—but to truth, whether
Christianity be true or false.
I intend to invite to Norwich some person who shall be well known as a
representative exponent “of modern forms of Infidelity,” and request him
to deliver a course of lectures at about the same time, and on the same
subject as that chosen by the Bishop of Peterborough, and if you think it
would be useful to give the public the opportunity of reading as well as
hearing the discourses, both expositions of the subject might be
published together, and more extensively circulated and read, in
consequence of the greater interest that would be thus created.
I have always scrupulously abstained from doing anything to influence the
politics or religion of persons in my employment, but in accordance with
your wish, I will take care to inform them all of the Discourses, and
also acquaint them with the high reputation which the Bishop of
Peterborough enjoys as a preacher.
I should be willing to subscribe for 200 copies of the joint publication,
which will enable me to present one to every man and boy in my
employment, who is willing to accept it, and the remainder I shall be
happy to distribute according to the suggestion of the circular.
I am, Rev. Sir, your obedient servant,
ROBERT A. COOPER.
The Very Rev. E. M. Goulburn,
Dean of Norwich.
* * * * *
The Deanery, Norwich, Feb. 15th, 1871.
SIR,—I beg to acknowledge your letter of the 13th inst., and to thank you
for the readiness you express to circulate among persons in your
employment, the announcement of the Bishop of Peterborough’s Sermons.
I regret that I cannot meet this kindness on your part by assisting in
any way in the circulation of tracts by a representative exponent “of
modern forms of infidelity,” and I will explain in few words the reason
why I must decline the joint publication suggested by your letter.
Professing yourself (as you do) a “Sceptic,” by which I conceive is meant
(according to the derivation of the word) one who has doubts as to
religious truth, and, therefore, is engaged in an inquiry, having for its
object the resolution of those doubts and the arrival at a conclusion; it
is (under your view of the subject) perfectly consistent and reasonable
that you should do all in your power to get both sides of the religious
question ably and fairly expounded, in order to give yourself and others
an opportunity of forming a right conclusion.
But my conclusion on the momentous question has long since been made up.
I am as firmly convinced that Christianity is God’s own message to the
world, the truth and the only truth, the way, and the only way, of
happiness and peace, as that the sun is now shining in the heavens. I
cannot, therefore, help regarding any attempt to throw doubt or discredit
on Christianity as a treason against the highest well-being of my
fellow-creatures. And you will see, therefore, that (under my view) I
could not properly join in disseminating publications, which, at the very
least, will insinuate a doubt as to that revealed religion which I hold
to be the only means of raising and saving our fallen race.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,
E. MEYRICK GOULBURN.
Mr. Robert A. Cooper.
* * * * *
Norwich, Feb. 25th, 1871.
REV. SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 15th inst.
(which came to hand on the 22nd), and to regret that you can engage in
the circulation of only one side of the important question you propose to
expound. And I regret it for these reasons, because by so restricting
your action, you, while attacking, prevent the fair expression of that
form of thought which you seek to destroy, and allow those who hold such
opinions to shelter themselves, if need be, under the assumption that
your exposition of the case is not theirs. And, also, because your
expression of the unqualified certainty of your own conviction of the
truth of Christianity (obtained, doubtless, from a consideration of all
sides of the subject), is open to the objection that you fear to trust
the impartial examination of the evidence of that truth to the minds of
others, and implies a latent, though unconscious, doubt of the certainty
of the proof of that truth of which you speak so positively.
I cannot accept your description of my position as a “Sceptic or
Infidel,” but let that pass.
I am still disposed to subscribe for 200 copies of the Bishop’s sermons,
and if you desire me to distribute more, I have no doubt I can dispose of
a considerable number.
I am, Rev. Sir, your obedient servant,
ROBERT A. COOPER.
The Very Rev. E. M. Goulburn,
Dean of Norwich.
* * * * *
The Deanery, Norwich, Feb. 25th, 1871.
SIR,—In reply to your letter of to-day, in which you say, “I cannot
accept your description of my position as a ‘Sceptic or Infidel,’” I
hasten to assure you that I should never have presumed to describe your
position as such, had I not imagined I had your own authority for doing
so. The words of your letter of the 13th inst., from which I drew this
inference, are:—
“If my assumption be correct, I heartily sympathise with your object,
and as a Sceptic or Infidel, will co-operate with my Christian
brethren if permitted.”
I am thankful and rejoiced to find that my inference was an incorrect
one; but I trust you will acknowledge that there was some ground in the
wording of the sentence for my making it.
I shall be happy to request your _acceptance_ of 200 copies of the
Bishop’s Discourses, and am much obliged to you for your offer of
circulating them.
Yours very faithfully,
E. M. GOULBURN.
Mr. Robert A. Cooper.
* * * * *
Norwich, March 1st, 1871.
REV. SIR,—I am sorry that in the sentence you refer to, I did not express
my meaning with sufficient clearness to be understood; though I am unable
to see that it will bear the construction you put upon it.
In the circular letter, you speak of the prevalence, in large cities, of
“sceptical views,” and also of “modern forms of infidelity,” evidently
using the words “sceptical” and “infidelity” in their popular and
ordinary, and not in their strict, grammatical sense.
I say evidently, because the phrases “sceptical views,” and “modern
infidelity” appear to be intended as equivalent, and I therefore assume
that you use them in their popular sense, because if I am to suppose you
use the word “sceptical” in its strict etymological meaning, I must also
that you do the word “infidelity,” and I am reluctant to think that you
would, in speaking of the opinions of people who you must know are as
sincere and honest as yourself, deliberately and intentionally do that.
By “sceptical views” and “modern forms of infidelity,” I understood you
to mean both doubt and disbelief of the truth of religion in general, and
Christianity in particular, and I therefore accepted in substance your
own phraseology in the popular sense in which you appeared to use it, and
I speak of myself as a “Sceptic or Infidel,” meaning thereby that I am
not merely a doubter, but a disbeliever—a disbeliever not of “religious
truth,” but the truth of any religion. It is so common for religious
people to speak of disbelievers in general as “sceptics” or “infidels,”
without regard to the derivation or strict meaning of the words, that I
think it would have been pedantic to appear to have understood them in
any other than their common, and I deem not very correct, meaning.
You were, therefore, perfectly entitled to say you had my authority for
describing me as a “Sceptic:” what I demurred to was your description of
my position as a “Sceptic” as I had adopted the term in the sense in
which you seem to use it in your circular, but not in the sense of your
letter. I think the misconception would have been avoided had you used
the whole instead of the half of my expression—viz., “Sceptic or
Infidel,” instead of “Sceptic” only; as your description, if correct, of
the position of a “Sceptic” will clearly not apply to a “Sceptic or
Infidel.”
And here I will endeavour to state “my conclusion on the momentous
question.” I am quite convinced that the history of Jesus Christ, as
recorded in the New Testament, is a fable entirely unworthy of credence,
and that the Christian and all other systems of religion are but
mischievous delusions, but the nature of the evidence by which I arrive
at these conclusions, is so different from that which convinces me that
the sun is shining in the heavens (space?) that I could not use that form
of words as correctly expressing the strength of my convictions.
I regret it is necessary to occupy your time with so long an explanation.
Although I could not agree with what you said, I did not wish to trouble
you further on that point, and thought it would be sufficient to indicate
a dissent without going into detail. Brevity was a failure, and I
apologise.
I am, Rev. Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT A. COOPER.
The Very Rev. E. M. Goulburn,
Dean of Norwich.
CHRISTIANITY
IN RELATION TO
FREETHOUGHT, SCEPTICISM, AND FAITH.
CHRISTIANITY AND FREETHOUGHT.
[_First Discourse of the Bishop of Peterborough_, _delivered in Norwich
Cathedral_, _March_ 28_th_, 1871.]
ON Tuesday evening, March 28th, the Right Rev. Dr. Magee, Lord Bishop of
Peterborough, preached the first of a series of Sermons on Christianity
and Freethought, before a large congregation in the nave of the
Cathedral. According to the Dean’s previous arrangements, the nave was
occupied by men, and the south aisle by ladies. The nave was brilliantly
lighted, and the Lord Bishop of Norwich and the full chapter took part in
the service.
After prayers were intoned and a hymn sung, the Right Rev. Prelate
selected his text from the Gospel according to St. John, viii. 33: “How
sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?” His Lordship said:
The scene that is described in this chapter makes, I think, a fitting
introduction to the series of sermons of which I am here to-night to
preach the first. These sermons are meant to be pleadings for
Christ. Their object is to win back to him those who may have left
him, to cause those who have not left him to cling to him more
strongly; to win back disciples to Christ, and to confirm disciples
in their discipleship. That is what I and those who are to follow me
here have in view. For this reason I ask you to-night to study this
story in the life of Christ, because it is one in which we see how
Christ himself, long ago, first won and then lost disciples.
The scene commences with a large accession of disciples to Christ.
We read, that as he spoke these words many believed on him, and the
scene ends with many of those very believers taking up stones to cast
at him. First they believed on him, shortly after they seek to take
his life; and after this is over, we read how his own disciples came
to him again, and said to him, “Master, tell us.” Now, brethren, we
Christians believe that in this scene was a prophecy of the whole
history of Christ’s life upon earth in his Church; the story of those
who come and those who go, of those who believe in him at first, and
of those who cease to believe in him, and also the inner history of
those that never forsake him. We believe that when the noisy strife
of things has passed away, and the execrations of those that hated
him have ceased to ring upon the ear, there still will be heard the
voice of the Church, saying “Master, tell us,” that which others will
not, or cannot listen to; “Master, to whom shall we go? thou hast the
words of eternal life.” But it is not on those who thus stay with
Christ that I ask you to fix your attention. I ask you to-night to
contemplate with me, not those who remain with him, but those who
leave him. I ask you to understand a little of that mental history
that is here shown us, telling us how they passed from belief to
doubt, and from doubt to rejection of Christ.
It will be profitable to us, I think, both to those who believe and
to those who unhappily disbelieve in Christ, that we should study a
little this early instance of Freethought and disbelief. It will be
good for those who do not believe in Christ to look at this scene,
because it will show this fact, that there were those who disbelieved
in Christ. It will show this fact, that this is not a religion whose
origin is lost in the dim distance of time; it is not a legendary
faith of which no one can say when it began or who first taught it,
as it arose in historical times; a faith continuing from the very
first, not without question or dispute, but in spite of the question
and notwithstanding the dispute. It will show that Freethought is as
old as Christianity itself, and when we read how long it is since men
had the same doubts and difficulties, it will occur to us that after
all there must be a wonderful power in this faith that struggles into
acceptance in spite of those doubts and difficulties, and that there
must be some marvellous vitality in the faith that has survived 1800
years, something that is worth inquiring into. This bush that is
burning and never burned, is worth turning aside to look at. It will
be good for us to look at those early unbelievers, because it
strengthens our faith to be reminded that unbelief is no new thing,
and that Christianity has survived more than 1800 years.
It is good for another reason; it teaches us to try to understand the
feelings of those who don’t believe; it teaches us to try to put
ourselves in their place, to try to understand how it is they don’t
agree with us; to make all allowances for the honesty of their
disbelief, to try to enter fairly into their motives and feelings.
If we don’t do this, we are in danger of being hard, and bitter, and
unjust in contending for him, but not in his spirit; forgetting that
there is not one of those who disbelieve in him, for whom he has not
died, forgetting that an unbeliever is not an enemy to be driven back
from the fortress, but an exile to be won back by earnest reasoning
to his Father in Heaven. Let us learn, above all, that in all our
arguments for Christianity we should be filled with the spirit of him
for whom we plead, and that we should manifest the truth in love.
We ask you then to contemplate this scene, in which we find Christ
winning and losing disciples, and learn something. And the first
thing we have to remark is this, how very little those that come and
go seem to have been influenced by what we call the evidences of
Christianity. They were doubtless drawn to Christ by the fame of his
miracles, it does not seem to have been his miracles that converted
them. It was as “he said those words many believed on him.” Then he
said something else, and they left him. It was not that they doubted
of his ability to work miracles, but because something he said
offended them. They came to him not altogether in consequence of his
miracles, and they left him in spite of his miracles. It teaches us
that the religion of Christ was not received unquestioningly, even in
the case of his miracles, for in spite of his miracles they ventured
to question his doctrine; so that those who say Christianity was
received in an ignorant age are contradicted by the story of
Christianity itself, for many of those who saw his miracles rejected
him.
There is another reason for noting this, in order to observe the
power of prejudice and passion in influencing men’s belief or
disbelief. There are few men who believe strictly in accordance with
their reflecting faculties. The desires, prejudices, and passions of
men largely share in the making of their beliefs; and if this be true
of beliefs, it is equally true of men’s unbelief. If there be those
here who do not believe in Christ, I ask them: Are you quite sure
that your unbelief is the result of calm, and thoughtful, and careful
study of what Christianity has to say for itself? Are you sure you
have not hastily taken up some objections against Christianity
without waiting for the answer? Are you quite sure that you have not
misunderstood some words of Christ—some words that, having offended
you, you have passed away without waiting for the reason? Are you
sure that there is no unreason in your unbelief, you that say there
is so little reason in our belief? It is because I am deeply
convinced of this that I am here. It is because I believe that
misconception, prejudice, and hasty adoption of other men’s opinions
upon slender grounds, make a large part of ignorant belief, often a
large part of ignorant unbelief. It is because these
misunderstandings may be removed, that I am here to speak of the
subjects I have announced. It is because I believe it is useless to
argue against prejudices, that I shall endeavour to remove those
prejudices, and mistaken feelings and opinions, that make men
unwilling to listen to arguments for Christianity. Those who follow
me will bring many arguments for Christianity, and I am here to-night
to prepare the way for them.
I ask you, then, to turn again to this story, and to see why it was
that those new disciples left Christ. It was for this reason, that
they were offended because he appeared to deny them the possession of
liberty. When they became his disciples he said, “Ye shall know the
truth, and the truth shall make you free.” Then they answered him,
“We be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man; how
sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?” He had offered them liberty,
and this implied that they were not free, and this they regarded as
the gravest of affronts. We, the children of Abraham, the
aristocracy of humanity, those whom the Lord delivered out of Egypt,
whose slaves are we that you venture to offer us freedom? The offer
is an absurdity and an affront, and you are denying us freedom in the
very words; and so left him, for they deemed it an insult to their
birthright of freedom. We, who understand the story, can see how
much these men were mistaken. Our Lord was offering them moral
freedom, and they supposed that he was offering them political
freedom.
There was a misunderstanding as to the nature of liberty; he offered
them a liberty for which they were not desirous. It was a dispute
about liberty between Christ and those first Freethinkers. Now, may
there not be some misunderstanding still? That is the subject of my
sermon to-night. It is Christianity and Freethought. What do you
understand by Freethought? Something opposed to Christianity; and by
a Freethinker, one who rejects all or a part of Christianity. Why do
such men give themselves that name? Because it expresses their
conviction that Christianity is opposed to freedom of thought, that
it puts a restraint on the human intellect. They say that
Christianity shackles the human mind. “I boast of my freedom,” says
the Freethinker; “you require me to submit the freedom of my
intellect to the authority of a book. My mind resents such an
attempt to fetter it, I submit to no authority. You priests and
bigots that come to me with your authority, and threaten me with
penalties for daring to think thus and thus, you are convicting
yourselves of falsehood before you utter another word, for you are
opposed to freedom. I cannot listen to your evidences of
Christianity. No proof of miracle will make me give up my freedom of
thought.” How often do we hear of the bigotry of the priest, and the
enlightened Freethought of the age. Mark then, we have the issue
raised between Christianity and Freethought. Let us understand it
clearly, before we go further. It is true that Christianity comes
with a claim of authority. It is true that Christianity says,
Believe this and that, because Christ has said it. He is seeking men
now, as he did, with authority; and it is true that Christianity does
warn men of certain penalties, heavy and grievous penalties, if they
don’t believe what Christ says. Christianity is authoritative
teaching, accompanied with threats of penalties. Now we are told,
that is just the point at which Christianity comes into collision
with Freethought. Freedom of thought will not endure to hear of
authority, and resents the very idea of penalty.
Now we have put before us the issue between Christianity and
Freethought. It is necessary that we should define for ourselves
what is Freethought. The word is on men’s lips, and I am not sure
that they understand what they mean by it. Let us try to understand
what is Freethought. It may mean one of three things. It may mean
freedom as opposed to necessity, it may mean freedom as opposed to
authority, or it may mean freedom as opposed to responsibility. As
regards the first of these, by freedom as opposed to necessity, we
mean that a man is free to think in one way or another, that it is
not absolutely necessary for him always to think in one way or
another; that is to say, his thought is not the necessary product of
physical constitution, that his thoughts do not grow out of him, as
the blade grows out of the seed or the flower out of the plant; that
it is not mechanical or necessary, but that a man has the power to
choose how he will think. Then as to freedom as opposed to
authority, we mean that a man is not bound to think like other
men—that is, his thought is not subject to any other man’s, and he
has a right to say, “That is your opinion and not mine.” Freedom of
thought as opposed to responsibility means that a man is not
answerable for his belief, and that whatever he thinks on any
subject, he is never to suffer for his belief in any way whatever.
These three are the only possible meanings.
Now let us take them in their order.
First, freedom of thought as opposed to necessity. Does Christianity
deny this freedom? On the contrary, it asserts and vindicates it.
Christianity teaches that man is free, and terribly free, to will his
own belief. It teaches this by the fact that it tells us a man is
answerable for his belief, for a man cannot be answerable for that in
which he has no choice, any more than he has of the colour of his
hair. If he be answerable, it can only be because he has the power
of choosing. It is remarkable that many people who call themselves
Freethinkers, insist on it that man is not answerable for his belief
any more than for the colour of his hair. They thus deny the freedom
of thought. Freedom and responsibility always go together; so you
see in this view of Freethought, Christianity, so far from denying
it, asserts it against many Freethinkers; and in this respect the
Christian is the Freethinker, and maintains the doctrine of
Freethought.
Second, freedom of thought as opposed to the idea of all authority.
We are told that thought cannot be free if it submits to any
authority, and it is quite true in the abstract. Attend to this. It
is true that the abstract idea of freedom is opposed to the abstract
idea of authority, in thought or religion. But it is equally true,
that these are opposed in everything else. It is just as true in
politics, in which the idea of freedom is opposed to the idea of
authority. Where there is absolute freedom, there cannot be
authority. Where there is absolute authority, we cannot understand
logically how there can be any freedom. Starting from the maxim,
“Man is free,” we arrive logically at the conclusion that there can
be no authority for that man. Starting from the axiom, “Authority is
supreme,” is to arrive at the logical conclusion that there is no
room for liberty. The two ideas are logically opposed, the one to
the other. But are they so in practice? Is it a fact that freedom
is found inconsistent with authority? Is it not true that men
reconcile them every day? Is it not true that thought is free, and
yet thought submits itself to authority? Many cherished opinions are
received on authority, not because we have proved them ourselves. We
take the opinion of a lawyer on law, and of a doctor on medicine, as
authority. Morality itself is largely received upon authority. We
are always submitting ourselves to authority. Logically, freedom and
authority are separate, but there never was a society in which the
two did not come together. They are like the chemical elements,
which have a strong affinity for each other, and are never apart,
except when separated in the laboratory of the chemist, but the
moment they are liberated they are together again. It is just the
same with Freethought and authority. Men are always submitting
themselves to authority, and if they did not they would never learn
or know anything. When we speak of the authority of a revelation
from God, we mean that we bring to Freethought, to judge of, the
reasons for believing that the teacher knows more about the things he
teaches than others. That is a very large part of what is called
“the evidence from miracles.” Men speak as if the miracles were the
evidences of the morals of the Gospel. That is not what we say.
What we say is this, Our Lord coming down from heaven (as we believe)
to tell us of another and supernatural world of which he knew and we
did not, gave evidence of that knowledge by bringing down the
supernatural.
Let us suppose we were walking through one of the church-yards of
this city with another person, and the discourse fell upon the
resurrection. If you said it was impossible for any authority to
prove it, and the person said, I know there can be a resurrection of
the dead, and I will give you a proof of it; and suppose he bade the
dead rise, and they sprang alive out of the earth; do you mean to say
that would be no authority from him on the question of the
resurrection of the dead? Would it be a tyranny over Freethought to
be told that the dead can rise? So you see Freethought is not
inconsistent with the authority of a revelation, for this reason,
that the revelation submits its proof to your Freethought.
I am not saying that I have proved the miracles, I am only saying
that by miracles we are not violating Freethought; but on the
contrary we are maintaining it. I speak as unto wise men, judge ye
what I say.
I now come to the third idea of freedom, that is, freedom as opposed
to responsibility; and this is, I really believe, what men mean when
they speak of Freethought as opposed to Christianity. They say, “You
threaten us with penalties for unbelief, and our whole soul revolts
against that. It would be tyrannical to punish a man for his
opinions. We cannot endure men to do this. Do you mean to say that
God will be less just than man and persecute us for our opinions?”
Let us see whether we clearly understand this question. This
objection goes to the principle that no man should be punished for
his opinions. I will ask you to consider this question. Is it true
that no man under any circumstances should be punished for his
opinions? And again is it true that men do not suffer for their
opinions? It is true that so long as he keeps his thoughts to
himself, he will not be punished for them, for the simple reason that
they are not known; but when he utters them, he may be punished. Is
it not true, that a man who utters a seditious, a libellous, or
indecent thought is punished and should be punished? And why?
because the law of liberty of the individual comes into collision
with the higher law of the general welfare, and must give way to it.
There are other penalties; society punishes a man more sharply than
the law. There are offences of thought and speech which the law does
not and should not punish, and yet which society visits very heavily.
Let a man entertain evil and unkind thoughts of his neighbour, and
show it by his looks, and we know how society visits him for his
Freethought. Every man knows that if all the thoughts of his heart
were laid bare, before his fellow men, he might pass a miserable and
outcast existence, because society defends itself against this
injurious exercise of Freethought.
Then pass a step further, and think of the constitution of nature and
of the laws of the world. Does this world of nature allow of
Freethought? Do these natural laws allow a man to make mistakes with
impunity? Let any man think wrong of the powers of nature, that fire
will not burn nor water drown, and he will soon find himself visited
with a sharp and merciless punishment, for there are no laws so
merciless as those of nature. He that transgresses them ignorantly
or wittingly, is beaten alike with many stripes. The great revolving
machinery of the world will not arrest its revolutions because of the
cry of a human creature that by a very innocent error, even by his
mistaken action of Freethought, is ground to pieces beneath them. If
the man of science warns us of the consequences of transgressing the
laws that he has discovered, we should be at liberty to think
differently from him, but it will be at our own proper peril, if we
exercise our Freethought. As sure as you do, so you will suffer from
it. It is not the prophet or his warning that brings down the
penalty, it is not the book upon sanitary law that brings diptheria
or scarlet fever, it is not the sinking of the mercury in the glass
that brings the storm; the written proof in the one case, the mute
proof in the other, foretell the evil, but do not create it. Nature
and science, then, have their warnings, and threatenings, and
penalties; and nature and science avenge themselves on Freethought.
And mark this, the more and more you lose sight of personal will, the
fainter and fainter seems to grow the chance of forgiveness, less and
less room there seems to be for Freethought; there is something in
the words, “I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and
earth,” there is something in the loving will that has power to save
the Freethought of his erring creatures from the soulless and
merciless machinery of law.
Now we see how little room there is for Freethought in this world of
law. Let us introduce into the world a fact; let us introduce the
idea of a God; let us suppose for the sake of argument that there is
a God. Can it be a matter of indifference how he feels toward us,
and how we should feel and act toward him? How can there be a
possibility of thought without consequences as regards God, if there
be no possibility of thought without consequences as regards the very
least of God’s works? Does it make no difference to us whether he is
an Almighty tyrant or a father to us, whether or not he can suspend
the terrible laws of nature which we dread? Can we hear about this
God, and not wish to learn all about him? Can there be anything more
absurd than the saying, Let us have religion and no theology? Is
that more sensible than to say, Let us have sun, moon, and stars, and
no astronomy; let us have plants and no botany; let us have the earth
and no geology? If God be a fact, there must certainly come theology
out of that fact. As geology grows out of the fact with which it
deals, so does theology grow out of a fact. Of all the errors of the
time there cannot be a greater absurdity than a religion without
theology, for every religion teaches our obligations to a higher
being. If there be a God, there must be a theology. I will ask you
what is this creed of Christendom? It is nearly all the assertion of
facts:
“I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and
in Jesus Christ his only son our Lord, who was conceived by the Holy
Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was
crucified, dead and buried; he descended into hell, the third day he
rose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sits at the
right hand of God the Father Almighty: from thence he shall come to
judge the quick and the dead.”
All these assertions of facts you may say are not facts; but if they
be facts, you are bound to think rightly about them. You are bound
to think right about them under penalties, but no more so than as to
other facts. You are as much bound to think right as to the fact of
a God as to any other fact. But men say, These facts are not so
certain as the facts of physical science. We answer, They are more
certain to us; they are to us facts as certain as the great lights of
heaven. We cannot conceive the possibility of ourselves doubting
them. We may say, Perhaps there is a God, and we have a right to
say, The perhaps may become a certainty. If we think right, and you
think wrong, you must suffer the consequences. If a man of science
puts into your hand a book, and warns you of the danger of infection,
and you say you don’t believe it, because you are sceptical about the
teaching, he cannot compel you to believe it, but meantime you will
suffer; the proof may come in sickness and in death, and you will not
escape. And we say, not in anger and bitterness, not in hard
denunciation of the wrath of God—God forbid that we should do it; but
we speak in the same tone of warning, and not threatening, and we
say, If you doubt, remember time is passing, and if you think wrong,
there is danger of the judgment. We say, Take heed how you grope in
the dark and stumble. We cannot alter the facts if they are facts,
and they will affect your happiness. We say, There is in this
nothing uncharitable, no violation of Freethought any more in
religion than in science. We say that the consequences of thinking
erroneously in religion may be as perilous as the consequences of
thinking erroneously as to physical facts. It remains to be shown
what are the facts of our religion. All that we say now is, that an
error about the facts may be fraught with serious consequences, and
we no more violate Freethought than when a physician warns you.
Now, then, I trust we have disposed of those prejudices that lay upon
the threshold of our inquiry, these prejudices against Christianity
as being opposed to Freethought; for if Freethought means freedom as
opposed to necessity, religion does not deny it; if Freethought means
freedom as opposed to authority, religion does not create the
distinction, it is just as easy to reconcile it with religion as with
the state of society. If you mean by Freethought, freedom without
responsibility as to consequences, there is no such thing either in
society or in nature, and you have no right to expect it in religion.
All that we say is, that we are not to expect freedom of thought
without its responsibility. Christianity gives us glimpses of the
means of escape from the operation of material laws in the mercies of
the loving Father of the human family.
FIRST REPLY
OF
MR. C. BRADLAUGH.
CHRISTIANITY AND FREETHOUGHT.
[_Delivered in the Free Library_, _Norwich_, _April_ 3, 1871.]
WHEN on the 7th of February the Very Reverend the Dean of Norwich issued
his circular announcing that a series of discourses would be delivered by
“some competent preacher,” “having for their object the vindication and
establishment of the Christian faith,” and “directed against modern forms
of infidelity,” I felt deep interest, not I presume confined to the ranks
of the party which has permitted me to be its advocate upon this
occasion. The circular was in point of fact an announcement that the
Church of England felt it necessary to challenge and give battle to
modern infidelity; and that having determined that the struggle should be
a real one, it intended to select its best man, and by his mouth to
vindicate and establish the faith, which modern infidelity is doing so
much to undermine, not only in the busy North, but even in the quiet and
church-shadowed capital of East Anglia.
When on my arrival in Norwich I learned that the influence of the Dean
and Chapter of this cathedral city had in no sense been exerted to give
me the sort of opportunity to be heard in reply to their advocate, which
I had a reasonable right to expect, and when I knew that after our
friends making a circuit of the city, in the vain endeavour to hire a
building meet for such an occasion, it was difficult to ensure the use of
the Free Library Hall, I felt that even in Norwich the approved mode of
encountering modern infidelity seemed to be that of free speech for the
church advocate and gagged mouth for the pleader on behalf of heresy.
When I sat in the fine nave of the old cathedral, and weighed the
accessories of choir and organ, intoned litany, and prayer responses
instrumentally accompanied; when I looked at the large number of clergy
present, headed by two bishops, and supported by the wealth and fashion
of the district, I could not but feel that so far as mere scenic effects
went, our side was sadly lacking in such accessories to win adhesion.
When, too, I saw the selected “competent preacher,” the Right Rev. Dr.
Magee, Lord Bishop of Peterborough, whose fame as an eloquent orator, an
erudite and polished disputant, has long since been widely spread, I knew
that our cause laboured under every possible disadvantage save one. It
had but its truth and justice. Prestige, talent, skill, fashion, were
allied to serve the Church. When, moreover, I found that in the local
press religious men, headed by Church of England clergy, sought to excite
prejudices against me before even a word had been spoken on my side, I
could not help thinking that even if defeated in a struggle so unequal it
would leave the Church but little to boast of in its victory. But I
plead neither for mercy nor favour; fair encounter has been asked and
denied, and I take the risk of battle. Although we are to-day the
challenged, the Church refuses tourney ground to our party, and we must
contend as best we can.
In treating the subject of “Christianity and Freethought,” in reply to
the address of the Bishop of Peterborough, I am entitled to narrow, and
shall narrow, the question covered by this reply, to one merely between
the Freethinker and the Church of England Christian only. The litany,
hymns, and prayers which formed the preface to the Bishop’s advocacy are
here fair weapons to use against him. I do not stand here to-night to
plead against Roman Catholic Christianity, or against Wesleyan,
Independent, or Baptist nonconforming Christianity, nor do I plead
against Unitarian Christianity. I am here to reply to the Church and
State Christianity, the thirty-nine articles Christianity; to the system
with which the Lord Bishop of Peterborough has identified his brilliant
talents and great powers of speech, and with all the faults and
corruptions of which he must rest burdened so far as this controversy is
concerned. Here he must not throw aside any one of the three Creeds,
here every line of the Prayer Book affects his teaching. The
Christianity he must defend is that which the 9 and 10 William IV., cap.
32, maintains; the Christianity by law established.
I pass without comment the fact that the text selected by the Lord Bishop
was not only from the Gospel whose authenticity is doubted by many
Christians, but from a chapter specially regarded as an interpolated one.
On this head, I leave Dr. Magee to debate with Dr. Davidson. But I am
bound to draw attention to the very extraordinary exposition given of the
contents of this chapter, which we are invited to study. Dr. Magee says
that the people who were with Jesus, “were doubtless drawn to Christ by
the fame of his miracles,” and that when they left him “it was not that
they doubted of his ability to perform miracles.” Now, so far as this
chapter is concerned, there is not the smallest particle of reference to
miracles at all, and, therefore, Dr. Magee’s words on this head, and even
admitting his alleged authority, were only so much foundationless
verbiage. And when Dr. Magee says that this chapter teaches that “the
religion of Christ was not received unquestioningly, even in the case of
his miracles, for in spite of his miracles they ventured to question his
doctrine,” I can only express my deep regret that the many occupations of
the Lord Bishop of Peterborough should have left him without the time to
master the actual contents of the chapter on which his sermon was based.
Bishop Magee further urges that “those who say that Christianity was
received in an ignorant age, are contradicted by the story of
Christianity itself, for many of those who saw his miracles rejected
them.” I fail to see the contradiction; clearly the Jews were an
ignorant people, they had no scientific literature, no philosophy, no
recorded oratory, not even a language—for the Hebrew is but that which
the captives borrowed from their captors—not a trace of their ancient
tongue having been preserved.
The learned Bishop argues that “the desires, prejudices, and passions of
men largely share in the making of their beliefs.” But surely he might
have carried this farther still, and have shown—and this even apart from
the case made out by Darwin, Spencer, and Wallace—that race, climate,
soil, food, and mode of life, modify and change beliefs, and that such
beliefs are transmissible and transmitted from parent to child in
similar—though perhaps not in the same—fashion as are features and
frames. And as in the case of the _physique_ the inherited nature is
modified, improving or deteriorating with the mode of life of the
individual, so also, but in a more varied degree, with his
thought-abilities and his thoughts. But if it be true, as was so
powerfully urged by the Right Reverend Christian Advocate, that men’s
desires, passions, and prejudices contribute largely to the making up of
their beliefs, what becomes of his Lordship’s subsequent startling
declaration that a man is free to choose what he will believe, “to will
his own belief?” If there are hereditary predispositions to particular
lines of thought, hereditary predispositions to regard particular topics
from limited stand-points, hereditary predispositions to ignore or accept
unquestioningly particular propositions, I ask, Does not the acquiescence
in such a doctrine fatally impeach the Bishop’s arguments?