ILLUSTRATED MICHELIN GUIDES
TO THE BATTLE-FIELDS (1914-1918)
THE
SOMME
VOLUME 2.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
(1918)
(AMIENS, MONTDIDIER, COMPIÈGNE)
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THE
SOMME.
VOLUME II.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
(1918)
AMIENS--MONTDIDIER--COMPIÈGNE.
[Illustration]
Compiled and published by
MICHELIN & CIE., Clermont-Ferrand, France.
_All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or
whole) reserved in all countries_
[Illustration: The Front Line, March 21, 1918.
THE BATTLEFIELD.]
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
At different periods during the War, important events took place in the
Plains of Picardy, in the region which extends between Amiens and St.
Quentin, Bapaume and Noyon, between the valleys of the rivers Ancre,
Avre and Oise.
The Franco-British Offensive of July-September 1916, and the German
Retreat of March 1917, are described in the Michelin Guide "=The First
Battle of the Somme=, 1916-1917", which includes carefully prepared
itineraries, enabling the reader to cover the whole battlefield of that
period.
The present guide describes the operations which took place in Picardy
in March-April 1918 (=The German Offensive=), and in August 1918 (=The
Franco-British Offensive=); in a Word, the ebb and flow of the German
Armies in 1918, from St. Quentin to Montdidier.
THE BATTLEFIELD.
Driven from the banks of the Somme by the Franco-British Offensive of
1916, the Germans were compelled, in March 1917, to retreat, before the
menace of the Allied offensives on their flank.
They then established themselves on the Hindenburg Line, and in
1917, in consequence of British attacks in the Arras sector and
before Cambrai, they unceasingly increased the number of their
fortified lines. This redoubtable position stretched to the west of
the Cambrai-La Fère road, via Le Catelet and St. Quentin, utilising
a series of natural obstacles, the most important of which were the
Escaut, the St. Quentin Canal and the marshy valley of the Oise. (See
the Michelin Guide "=The Hindenburg Line=".)
But in the early days of 1918, having crushed Russia, Germany decided
to assume the offensive, using the Hindenburg positions as a kind of
spring-board, from which her mighty armies rushed forward to conquer
France.
In February 1918, the British positions extended in front of the
Hindenburg Line, as far as the village of Barisis, opposite the Forest
of St. Gobain, to the south of the Oise. Three successive positions,
widely separated from one another, had been actively strengthened.
Moreover, the water-lines of the marshy valley of the Oise, the Crozat
Canal, the loop in the Somme, and the North Canal, formed so many
natural obstacles.
The Picardian Plain, with its broad and gentle undulations, dotted here
and there with small woods, is closed, on the south, near the valley
of the Oise, by the wooded hills of Genlis, Frières and La Cave, and
to the west of the bend in the Oise, by the hills of Porquericourt
and the wooded _massif_ of Le Plémont, with its promontory, Mount
Renaud, to the south of Noyon. Further west, the high ground of
Boulogne-la-Grasse does not close the Plain of Santerre, which, between
the slopes of Le Plémont and Montdidier, communicates freely with the
Plain of Ile-de-France. The enclosed and wooded valleys of the rivers
Avre, Trois-Doms and Luce intersect the tablelands of Santerre. Further
north, stretches the old battlefield of 1916,--a chaotic waste of
winding trenches and barbed wire entanglements.
In the Picardian Plain, beyond the bounds of the old battlefield,
were numerous country villages, with their cottages grouped around
the church. The long, straight roads, bordered with fine elms or
fruit-trees, stretched as far as the eye could reach. This rich
and prosperous region, with its vast fields of corn and beet, was
completely ravaged by the War.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME (1918).
The German Offensive: Formation of the Montdidier Pocket (March
21-April 24.)
[Illustration: _Disruption of the British Front (March 21-22.)._]
[Illustration: _Widening the Breach._]
[Illustration: _The fall of Montdidier (March 27.)._]
[Illustration: _The fixing of the new front-line._]
The Allied Offensive: Reducing the Pocket as far as the Hindenburg Line
(August 8-September 25.).
[Illustration: _The Offensive of August 8-12. Liberation of
Montdidier._]
[Illustration: _Combined Offensives on the Somme and Oise, August
18-29._]
[Illustration: _Combined Offensives on the Scarpe and Aisne, August
25-Sept. 8._]
[Illustration: _In contact with the Hindenburg Line (September
10-25)._]
[Illustration: GENERAL PÉTAIN.]
[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL HAIG.]
_In March 1918, the British and French Armies, under separate commands,
opposed the furious attacks of numerically superior and more powerfully
equipped enemy forces, grouped under the command of a single chief:
Ludendorff._
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21.
The Opposing Forces--Their Material and Moral Strength.
Towards the end of 1917, the abandonment of the Allies, by Russia, was
consummated by the Russo-German Armistice of December 20, followed by
the Peace of Brest-Litowsk, of February 9, 1918. As early as November
1917, Germany began to transfer her legions from the eastern to the
western front. Arriving, via Belgium, in ever-increasing numbers,
sixty-four new divisions were thus added to her Western Armies, already
one hundred and forty-one divisions strong, giving a total strength of
205 German divisions against the Allies' 177 divisions.
The material resources, accumulated on the Russian front, were likewise
transferred to the western front. The enemy's artillery was reinforced
all along the line, the number of heavy batteries being doubled in many
of the sectors.
[Illustration: LUDENDORFF.
_From General Buat's_ "LUDENDORFF" (_Publishers: Payot. Paris._)]
Besides this numerical and material superiority, Germany possessed
the additional advantage of a unique commander: Ludendorff, master
of the hour, at once absolute military chief and political dictator.
On the other hand, whilst the Allies were closely united by cordial
friendship, sealed on the field of battle, their armies were
independant units, separately commanded, each having its own reserves
concentrated behind its particular front.
[Illustration: GENERAL PÉTAIN AMONG HIS "POILUS"]
On February 3, 1917, the United States of America ranged themselves on
the side of the Allies, but their eventually powerful effort could not
make itself seriously felt before the summer of 1918. In March 1918,
four American divisions were in France, and a million more men were
expected by the following Autumn, but the Germans were convinced that
they would have the Allies beaten before then.
The moral strength of the opposing forces constituted one of the most
important factors of victory.
During 1917, after the Allies' Spring Offensives, a wave of lassitude
had lowered the fighting spirit of certain units of the French Army.
However, the _morale_ of the French Army had fully regained its former
high level, when the great German offensive of March 1918 was launched.
The British Army had in the meantime perfected its training, and
acquired, in addition to experience, splendid fighting qualities.
The Germans, badly shaken in 1916 by their failure at Verdun and by
the Allies' Offensive on the Somme, had, in consequence of Russia's
collapse, recovered all their former arrogant confidence and pride.
But the Allies' blockade, despite Germany's ruthless submarine warfare,
tightened, and each day the menace of famine increased.
Triumphal announcements of victory, and promises of an early German
peace appeared periodically in their press, yet still the war dragged
on. Something had to be done to end it all, whatever the cost, and so
the "Peace Offensive" was decided on.
Although inferior in numbers and equipment, the Allies had acquired
moral superiority.
[Illustration: DRIVEN FROM HOME BY THE GERMAN PUSH. (_Photo Imperial
War Museum_).]
The German Strategy and Tactics.
In all the previous offensives, especially that of the Somme in 1916,
the artillery had been used, prior to the attack, to destroy the
adversary's defences. The great number of fortified works and their
ever increasing strength necessitated a proportionately longer and more
intense artillery preparation. Thus warned, the enemy were able to make
dispositions to counteract the effects of the attack, and to bring up
reinforcements.
Moreover, the tremendous pounding of the ground greatly hampered the
advance of the storming troops, who were hindered at every step by the
enormous shell-holes and craters.
Breaking away from past errors, and adopting and perfecting the methods
inaugurated the previous year before Riga, the German High Command
attacked by surprise, in March 1918, thereby securing a crushing
numerical superiority. The Allies were thrown into confusion, and
all attempts at resistance were unavailing, until the arrival of the
reserves. During this period of complete demoralisation, the enemy were
able to exploit their initial success to the full.
The method employed was that of a sudden, violent shock, preceded by a
short artillery preparation, mostly with smoke and gas shells, the aim
of which was to put the men out of action, rather than to crush the
defences. To this end, huge concentrations of troops were effected, in
such wise that the masses of men could be thrown quickly and secretly
at the presumed weak part of the Allies' front.
The semi-circular disposition of the front facilitated the enemy's
task, as the German reserves, grouped in the Hirson-Mézières region,
in the centre of the semi-circle, could be used with the same rapidity
against any part of the front-line from Flanders to Champagne.
The point chosen by Ludendorff was the junction of the Franco-British
Armies. To separate these two groups, by driving back the British, on
the right, and the French, on the left; to exploit the initial success
in the direction of the sea, isolating the British and forcing them
back upon their naval bases of Calais and Dunkirk; then, having crushed
the British, to concentrate the whole of his efforts against the
French, who, unsupported and demoralized, would soon be driven to their
knees,--such was apparently the strategical conception of the enemy's
"Kaiserschlacht" or "Emperor's Battle".
The Opposing Forces.
On March 21, three German armies attacked along a 54-mile front, from
the Scarpe to the Oise.
In the north, the XVIIth Army (von Below) and the IInd Army (von
Marwitz) attacked on either side of the Cambrai salient, but the main
effort was made by the XVIIIth Army (von Hutier), which stretched from
the north of St. Quentin to the Oise.
[Illustration]
Facing these armies were: the right of the British 3rd Army (Byng),
extending from the Scarpe to Gouzeaucourt, and the British 5th. Army
(Gough), from Gouzeaucourt to south of the Oise.
The British expected the brunt of the attack to fall between the river
Sensée and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, i.e. on the right of Byng's Army,
which was reinforced accordingly, whilst the sector in front of the
Oise, south of St. Quentin, against which von Hutier's huge army had
been concentrated, was only held by 4 divisions.
More than 500,000 Germans were about to attack the 160,000 British
under Gough and Byng, whilst from the outset of the battle, large enemy
reserves swelled the number of the attacking divisions to 64, i.e.,
more than the total number of British divisions in France. In all, no
less than 1,150,000 Germans were engaged in these tremendous onslaughts.
During the five nights which preceded the attack, the German divisions
had been brought up secretly, the artillery having previously taken up
its positions and corrected its range, without augmenting the volume of
firing, so that nothing revealed the increased number of the batteries.
The shock troops, after several weeks of intensive training, were
brought up by night marches to the points of attack. During the day,
they were kept out of sight in the woods or villages. At night, whether
on the march or bivouacking, lights and fires were strictly forbidden.
Aeroplanes hovered above the columns to see that these orders were
carried out. The ammunition parks and convoys were concealed in the
woods. Until the last moment, the troops and most of the officers were
kept in ignorance of their destination.
These huge forces moving silently under the cover of night,
symbolized the enemy's might and cunning. "_It is strange_", wrote a
German officer in his note-book, "_to think of these huge masses of
troops--all Germany on the march--moving westward to-night_".
THE BATTLE.
On March 21, during this, the "Einbruch" or piercing stage, the
enormous enemy mass crushed, in less than 48 hours, the three British
positions situated in front of St. Quentin. Carrying the battle into
the open country beyond, the enemy transformed the "piercing" into a
break-through ("Durchbruch").
This sudden, powerful thrust was followed by a "tidal wave" of German
infantry which at first submerged all before it, but which, dammed by
degrees, finally spent itself, a week later, against the Allies' new
front.
THE DISRUPTION OF THE BRITISH FRONT.
On March 21, at daybreak (4.40 a.m.) a violent cannonade broke out,
and for five hours the intensity of this drum-fire steadily increased.
First, a deluge of shells, mostly gas, pounded the British batteries,
some of which were silenced. Then the bombardment ploughed up the first
positions, spreading dense clouds of gas and fumes over a wide zone.
"Michael" hour.
Under cover of the smoke and fog, the German Infantry speedily crossed
No-Man's Land, and at 9.30 a.m. ("Michael" hour) penetrated the
British defences.
[Illustration: GENERAL GOUGH.
_Photo "Daily Mirror Studios"._]
[Illustration: GENERAL BYNG. _Photo Russell, London._]
The front assigned to each attacking division was only two kilometres
wide, the troops being formed into two storm columns of one regiment
each. The third regiment was kept as sector reserves, to develop
initial successes.
The storm-troops, led by large numbers of non-commissioned officers,
advanced in waves, shoulder-to-shoulder, preceded by a rolling barrage
some 300 yards ahead of the first line. This barrage afterwards moved
forward at the rate of about 200 yards every five minutes.
The waves advanced resolutely, protected first by the rolling barrage,
then by the accompanying artillery and _Minenwerfer_. Wherever the
resistance was too strong, a halt was made, allowing the neighbouring
waves to outflank the obstacle on either side, and crush it.
The Germans straightway threw the greatest possible mass of infantry
into the Allies' defences.
Amid clouds of gas, smoke and fog, the British in the advanced
positions were surrounded and overwhelmed, often before they had
realized what was happening.
Nearly all their machine-guns, posted to sweep the first zone, were put
out of action.
The First Day (March 21).
The first day of the attack, General Byng's Army from
Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Demicourt, withstood the shock steadily, the
Germans penetrating the first lines only.
In the centre, before St. Quentin, and to the south, in front of
Moy and La Fère, General Gough's Army, overwhelmed by numbers, and
notwithstanding the courage of the men, was broken early in the attack.
Opposite Le Catelet, the enemy storm divisions advanced 6 to 8
kilometres, penetrating at noon the second-line positions along the
Epéhy-Le Verguier line. Further south, in front of Moy, they reached
Essigny-Fargnières.
General Gough withdrew his right behind the water-line of the Crozat
and Somme Canals.
[Illustration: _The Disruption of the Front. March 21-22._]
The Second Day--March 22.
Tergnier fell, and the water-line was turned from the right. Still
favoured by the fog, the Germans crossed the Crozat Canal. Fresh
divisions harassed the British without respite, the losses, both in men
and material, being very heavy.
Their reserves, greatly outnumbered, were quickly submerged, and the
third positions were lost after a desperate but ineffectual resistance.
In spite of its stubborn resistance, the 3rd Army (Byng) was forced to
fall back, pivoting on its left, to line up with the retreating 5th
Army (Gough).
The enemy advance developed rapidly. Within forty-eight hours, over 60
German divisions (750,000 men) had been thrown into the battle, which
now raged in the open.
THE INTERVENTION OF THE FRENCH.
[Illustration: _Arrival of the first French Divisions. (March 22)._
_Humbert's Army barring the road to Paris. (March 24)._
_Debeney's Army holding the enemy on the west. (March 28)._
PHASES OF THE FRENCH INTERVENTION.]
The crushing of the right and centre of the British 5th Army opened a
large breach north of the Oise, through which, as early as March 21,
the Germans streamed south and west. The situation was critical, as the
enemy hordes, having broken through the fortified zone, threatened to
submerge all before them. Prompt intervention was imperative, in order
to retard the enemy at all cost.
[Illustration: GENERAL PELLÉ REVIEWING THE TROOPS OF THE 5TH CORPS IN
1917.]
As early as the evening of the 21st, General Pétain made dispositions
to support the British right. The 9th and 10th Div. (5th Corps) and the
1st Div. of unmounted Cuirassiers (Pellé), in reserve near Compiègne,
received orders to hold themselves in readiness. At the same time, the
staff of Gen. Fayolle's Army Group, and that of Gen. Humbert's Army,
prepared to take over the direction of the operations.
The 125th Inf. Div. was pushed forward to the Oise, whilst the
22nd, 62nd, and 1st. Cavalry. Divn. (Robillot's Group) were rapidly
despatched to the weak points of the battle line.
This newly formed group was placed under the command of Gen. Robillot
of the 2nd Cavalry Corps.
Rushed up in lorries, the first French divisions were thrown into the
thick of the battle without waiting for their artillery. Heroism often
made good the lack of equipment and munitions.
THE BATTLE OF DISRUPTION.
Once the fortified zone crossed, the German armies pushed westward
rapidly.
On March 23, the French Cavalry Divisions were engaged, with their
armoured cars and groups of cyclists. Thanks to their great mobility,
the situation was repeatedly saved. Galloping from breach to breach,
the Cavalry, dismounting, stayed the enemy advance until the arrival of
the infantry.
The armoured cars raided the enemy's lines unceasingly and harassed
their troops with machine-gun fire. They were also used for bringing
up supplies to the first-line troops and for maintaining the different
liaisons. Their splendid work, with that of the Cyclist Corps, greatly
helped to stay the enemy thrust.
The retreat of the British was also covered by detachments of cavalry,
mounted artillery, armoured cars and tanks, which vigorously attacked
the assaillants.
The Air Service likewise rendered invaluable aid.
On the evening of the 22nd, General Pétain gave orders for every
available bombing plane to be used to retard the enemy advance, until
reinforcements could be brought up. The air squadrons met a few hours
later at the assigned point, some of them having flown ninety miles. On
the way, they dropped their loads of bombs on German troops which were
crossing the Somme, north of Ham, thereby retarding the advance of two
enemy divisions which were preparing to outflank the British.
On the 23rd, at noon, a hundred aeroplanes, skimming just over the
Germans' heads, wrought indescribable havoc and confusion in their
ranks. Priceless hours were thus gained.
[Illustration: THE EFFECTS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT.
_Photographed in the Ardennes, in October 1918. A German munition
train, bombed by aeroplanes, blew up, destroying the line and the
artillery limbers which were being loaded. The dead horses and broken
limbers are plainly visible. One may imagine the ravage caused by the
Allies' aerial bombardments among the enemy concentrations in the
Somme._]
Crossing the Water-line of the Crozat Canal, Somme and Tortille (March
23-24).
[Illustration]
Whilst Byng's Army withstood the enemy's onslaughts, that commanded by
Gough was dislocated by the powerful thrust of von Hutier's Army.
On the =morning of the 23rd=, the remnants of the British 3rd and
18th Corps were thrown back across the Crozat Canal, among the French
divisions which were taking part in the battle between the Somme and
Oise, and with which they were assimilated.
Further north, his divisions heavily depleted, and reinforcements
coming up only slowly, General Gough abandoned the strong
Somme-Tortille line, and continued his retreat westward, towards his
reserves in the old battlefield of 1916.
The same day, the first French units to arrive were thrown between
Crozat Canal and the woods of Genlis and Frières, linking up, on their
right, with the 125th Division, detached from the left of the 6th Army,
and established astride of the Oise, in front of Viry. (_Sketch below_).
The 1st Division of dismounted Cuirassiers (Brécart) vigorously
attacked the enemy, and succeeded in staying their thrust towards the
Oise. The 9th Division (Gamelin) barred the Ham-Noyon road, along a ten
mile front. On their left, the 10th Division (Valdant) held the zone
north of Guiscard.
[Illustration: _The French Divisions were engaged from the Oise to
Nesle, before Noyon, which the British retreat left unprotected._]
On the evening of the 23rd, the situation was critical. General Pellé's
divisions retarded the German advance in front of the Chauny-Noyon
region, which they were covering, but the enemy held Ham. In their
retreat, the British constantly bore to the north-west.
The 1st Cavalry Division (Rascas), and the 22nd (Capdepont) and 62nd
(Margot) Divisions arrived, and were thrown into the battle between
Guiscard and Nesle, where they attempted to join hands with the French
10th Division on their right and with the British on their left.
[Illustration: _Converging on Noyon, the Germans effected a breach
north of Nesle._]
The same day, the German long range "Bertha" guns began to bombard
Paris, in the hope of spreading panic and disorder there.
[Illustration: GENERAL HUMBERT.]
On =March 24=, the crushing effect of the German thrust was further
accentuated by the arrival of new enemy divisions.
Favoured by the fog, which entirely hid the valleys of the Oise and
Somme, their advance-guards swept the plain with machine-gun fire, in
their search for gaps and weak places in the thin French line.
All the attacks converged towards Noyon. At 9 a.m., in the valley of
the Oise, the capture of Viry-Noureuil threatened Chauny, whilst in the
centre, Villequier-Aumont and Genlis Wood were taken. Overwhelmed by
numbers, the Cuirassiers, after firing their last cartridges, fell back
on Caillouel Hill. The divisions on the left took up positions south of
Guiscard. In spite of the unequal struggle, the fighting spirit of the
troops remained admirable.
On the left of General Pellé's group, between Nesle and Guiscard, the
situation was still more desperate, as, having crossed the Somme, the
Germans now greatly intensified their thrust. The depleted British
units continued their retreat westward, leaving a gap north of Nesle.
The French 22nd Div. was hurriedly despatched towards Nesle, and
elements of the 1st Cav. Div. to the east of Chaulnes.
On March 24, south of Péronne, the German IInd Army crossed with
difficulty the marshy valley of the Somme, then pushing on towards
Chaulnes, opened a gap at Pargny.
North of Péronne, the enemy reached Sailly-Saillisel, Rancourt and
Cléry in the morning, and pushed west with 3,000 cavalry. In danger of
being turned, Byng's Army, which had abandoned the Havrincourt Salient
during the night of the 22nd, evacuated Bertincourt and retreated
westward.
[Illustration: SHARPSHOOTERS AT THE SIDE OF THE ROAD.]
[Illustration: FRANCO-BRITISH LINE OF INFANTRY IN WHICH "TOMMIES"
MINGLED WITH "POILUS" (_Photo Imperial War Museum_).
_One of the gravest consequences of the retreat of Gough's Army was
the temporary severance of the French from the British. To restore and
consolidate the liaison was the constant aim of the French General
Staff._]
_These units coolly withdrew, whenever they found themselves outflanked
and in danger of being cut off, often fighting furious rearguard
actions, and repulsing the enemy with heavy loss, each time a frontal
attack was attempted. (Field-Marshal Haig)._
On the contrary, we read in Ludendorff's Memoirs that _the German
XVIIth Army was exhausted, having suffered too heavy losses before the
Cambrai Salient on March 21 and 22_.
[Illustration]
During the night, the enemy continued to press forward in the fog, in
an attempt to rout the precariously installed and ill-supplied French
units, and to harass Gough's Army, in retreat towards the Santerre
Plateau. On this, Palm Sunday evening, Holy Week opened tragically.
The Fall of Noyon and the Fighting on the old Battlefield of the Somme.
=The 25th, at daybreak=, fresh German divisions violently attacked the
exhausted French units, seeking to turn their left wing, and at the
same time crush General Pellé's group in the centre.
In face of the increasing danger, General Pellé received orders to
"check the enemy advance, whatever the condition of the men might be".
The 1st Inf. Div. (Grégoire), hastily brought up and reinforced by
the remnants of the British 18th Div. and of various French Divisions
picked up on the way, established itself on the hills which cover Noyon
to the north-east. They had scarcely taken up their positions, when
the Germans attacked, only to be repulsed. Further to the left, the
enemy were unable to debouch from Crisolles, but on the French right,
the 55th and 125th Div., which had been fighting incessantly since the
22nd, were forced back across the Oise, near Brétigny. Pushing on, the
Germans captured Babœuf, but a British counter-attack forced them to
fall back slightly.
[Illustration]
The battle continued to rage and the danger of being outflanked
became more and more acute. Catigny and Beaurains fell, leaving
Noyon unprotected on the north-west. In the course of a fierce
counter-attack, the 144th Inf. Reg. succeeded in recapturing these
villages, but the German hordes still pressed on, opening a gap
between Beaurains and Genvry, through which they poured, following the
little valley of the Verse which slopes down towards Noyon. The troops
defending the northern and north-eastern approaches to that town were
now threatened with being surrounded.
General Pellé endeavoured to stop this fresh gap with the few
units left at his disposal, and organized a new line of support on
Porquericourt Hill and Mont Renaud (_sketch, p. 18_), at the same time
urging the troops which were fighting to the north of Noyon to "hold
out a few hours longer, each hour being worth a day".
One French division, and units of a second division, comprising some
British remnants, were now fighting against odds of four to one.
[Illustration:
_The enemy threatened Noyon, through the valleys of the Oise and
Verse. To the north of Nesle, the Montdidier road was open._]
[Illustration:
_Fall of Noyon. Gen. Pellé's Group organized positions on
Porquericourt Hill and Mont-Renaud. Gen. Robillot's forces fell back
on Roye._]
On the =evening of the 25th=, they fell back in good order, on Noyon.
The 57th Inf. Reg. resisted all night in the town, to enable the final
line of resistance to be organized.
At midnight, the front line passed in front of Porquericourt Hill
and Mont Renaud, at Pont-l'Évêque, thence following the Oise. It was
along this line that Gen. Pellé's Corps had orders to hold the German
advance, and bar the road to Paris.
General Humbert declared on the evening of the 25th: _The troops of the
5th A.C. and of the 2nd C. of unmounted Cavalry are defending the very
heart of France. The consciousness of the grandeur of their task will
point out the path of duty to them._
This day (25th) was still more tragical on General Humbert's left.
At daybreak, a violent battle broke out around Nesle, the town being
abandoned at 11 a.m.
Spread over a too wide front, from Nesle to Guiscard, the troops under
Gen. Robillot had orders to maintain the liaison on their right with
Gen. Pellé's forces (retreating southward) and on the left with the
depleted British units which were falling back to the north-west. The
gap widened, and the enemy pressed through. The situation was highly
critical, the road to Montdidier being now open.
[Illustration: GENERAL FAYOLLE, IN COMMAND OF THE HUMBERT-DEBENEY ARMY
GROUP]
Despite their desperate resistance and the untiring activity of the
1st Cav. Div. and 2nd Corps--units of which galloped from breach to
breach to re-establish the liaison and retard the enemy onrush--General
Robillot's group fell back towards Roye.
[Illustration: MARCH 25.
THE ROAD TO AMIENS OPEN TO THE ENEMY.]
South of the Somme, the situation was still more critical. The remains
of the British 18th and 19th Corps withdrew to the line Chaulnes-Frise,
which they were, however, unable to hold.
Their retreat continued to the line Proyart-Rosières. No more reserves
were expected for four days. Should the Germans succeed in crushing
these exhausted units the road to Amiens would be open.
About six miles behind the Proyart-Rosières front, there was an old
French line, partly filled in, on the Santerre Plateau, between the
Somme (at Sailly-le-Sec) and the Luce (at Demuin).
A battalion of Canadian Engineers was ordered to restore it. However,
there were no troops to hold it, and as its abandonment would have
imperilled Amiens, Gen. Gough decided to muster an emergency detachment
of engineers, miners, electricians, mechanics, staff personnel,
pupils and instructors from the schools of the 3rd and 5th Armies,
and American sappers, in all about 2,200 men. This detachment, under
Maj.-Gen. Carey, was ordered to hold an eight-mile front and bar the
road to Amiens.
North of the Somme, the Germans attacked from Ervillers to the river;
the British left stood firm, whilst on the right, the hinge formed by
Byng's Army, likewise resisted. Further south, the Germans captured
Maricourt, and broke through the curtain of British troops, which
lost contact with one another. The Ancre was crossed, and Byng's
right, pivoting on Boyelles, fell back on the line Bucquoy, Albert,
Bray-sur-Somme.
General Pétain issued a stirring appeal to the men:
_The enemy is attacking in a supreme effort to separate us from the
British, and open the road to Paris. At all cost, he must be held.
Stick to the ground, stand firm, reinforcements are at hand. United,
you will fling yourselves on the invader. Soldiers of the Marne, Yser
and Verdun, the fate of France is in your hands._
From all parts of the front, French divisions poured in. Long lines of
motor-lorries sped along all the roads converging towards Montdidier.
The high spirits and fine bearing of the men reassured the anxious
population, who, for several days past, had heard the guns drawing
nearer, and seen the endless stream of refugees fleeing before the
invader.
General Debeney arrived with his staff from Toul, to take command of
the 1st Army (in formation), divisions of which arrived each day.
[Illustration]
The 77th. Inf. Div. (d'Ambly) was added to the 3rd Army (Humbert). The
operations of these two armies, whose task it was to bar the road to
Paris and cover Amiens, were co-ordinated by Gen. Fayolle.
The Push towards Montdidier and Fall of Roye.
The Push towards Amiens and Fall of Albert.
On the =26th=, Gen. Pellé's group occupied Mont Renaud--a natural
rampart protecting the valley of the Oise.
Determined to force a passage at all cost, the enemy attacked with
fresh troops.
_The present positions must be held at all cost. The honour of each
commanding officer is at stake_, proclaimed Gen. Pellé. Trenches were
dug, and Mont Renaud organised. The road to Compiègne was barred and
the hills to the south and south-west of Noyon became the pivot of the
defences. Repeatedly attacked, Mont Renaud changed hands several times,
finally resting with the French. The exhausted 10th Div. fell back on
the _massif_ of Le Plémont, where the 77th Div. had just taken up its
positions.
However, although Gen. Humbert's right checked all enemy advance, Gen.
Robillot's group and the first units of Gen. Debeney's Army, on the
left, were unable to hold their ground in the Picardy Plain. Forming
but a thin line, the enemy's powerful thrust opened gaps in places.
Units of the 56th and 133rd Inf. Divns. and of the 4th and 5th Cav.
Divns. under Gen. de Mitry, were pushed forward, with orders to
establish the liaison, on their right, with the 22nd Div., and on their
left, with the British who were falling back on the Santerre Plateau.
This liaison was necessarily weak, as the troops had to be deployed.
Fighting day and night for every inch of ground given up, these
splendid troops succeeded in retarding the enemy's advance until the
arrival of reinforcements on the line of the Avre.
[Illustration: _The Germans attempted with their left to turn General
Humbert's Army, strongly established at Le Plémont. Roye fell._]
The exhausted 22nd Div. fell back, carrying with it the 62nd on its
right. Roye, outflanked from the south and attacked on the north, was
lost. A breach, opened between the 22nd and 62nd Div. was filled by
an emergency detachment hastily got together on the spot by General
Robillot.
On the evening of the 26th, the front was established on the line
Echelle-St.-Aurin, Dancourt, Plessis-Cacheleux.
[Illustration: ROYE. THE PLACE D'ARMES AT THE END OF THE WAR.]
General Humbert made a strong appeal to his men: _Let all commanding
officers firmly resolve to accomplish their duty to the extreme limit
of sacrifice, and imbue their men with the same spirit._
North of the Somme, the Germans took Albert--an important junction--but
were checked further north, by the left wing of Byng's Army.
[Illustration: THE MONT RENAUD.]
Allied Unity of Command.
Events had forcibly demonstrated the urgent necessity for Allied unity
of command. On March 26, a War Council, composed of M.M. Poincaré,
Clemenceau, Lord Milner, Haig, Pétain and Foch, empowered the latter to
_coordinate the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front_.
"At the moment when Foch was to take precedence of Pétain and Haig,
what was the position of the armies, as regards the directives of the
High Command? In other words, how was the Anglo-French battle being
directed? The position is defined in the General Orders of Pétain and
Haig, the former of whom prescribed:
"To keep the French forces grouped, to protect the Capital; _essential
mission_;
"To ensure the liaison with the British; _secondary mission_;
"The latter prescribed that everything possible should be done to avoid
severance from the French;
"Should this be unavoidable, _to fall back slowly, covering the Channel
Ports_.
"If we place these two orders side by side, _their divergence strikes
us painfully_. It is patent that the instructions of the two great
chiefs had not the same object in view, and did not tend towards the
same end. One was thinking of Paris, the other of the Channel Ports.
Each would evidently consecrate the bulk of his forces and resources to
what he considered the essential task. To sum up: on the German side,
there was only one battle; _on the Allies' side, there were two: the
battle for Paris, and the battle for the ports_. Had this situation
continued, our defeat was certain.
[Illustration: BRITISH AND FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS IN A VILLAGE. (_Photo
imperial War Museum_).]
"Foch's first thought, from the moment he took over the direction,
was to cause this disastrous divergence to cease. To the two
commanders-in-chief he prescribed the maintenance, at all cost, of the
liaison between their armies. The accessory thus became the essential.
The vital point was to ensure the junction between the Allied Armies,
and to that end, to cover neither Paris, nor Calais, but Amiens. The
battle which, till then, had been double, became single, i.e. _the
Battle for Amiens_.
"Such was the strategical idea which, during the following days, Foch
strove to materialise. Motoring from G.H.Q. to G.H.Q., he impressed the
same thing upon all; on Haig, Pétain, Gough, the latter's successor,
Rawlinson, Fayolle, Debeney and Humbert. By dint of repetition, this
idea was to be deeply impressed into the minds of the executants.
"To ensure liaison, to keep the troops where they were, to prevent
voluntary retreat, above all, to avoid effecting relief during
the battle, to throw the divisions into the line of fire, as they
arrived--such were the orders which were constantly on his lips during
the days which followed". (_La bataille de Foch_, by Raymond Recouly).
On March 28, General Pershing offered Foch the direct and immediate
help of the American Forces: _I come to tell you that the American
people would consider it a great honour for our troops to take part in
the present battle. I ask this of you in my name and theirs. At this
time, the only question is to fight. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all
we have is yours._
Henceforth, the battle was directed from Foch's headquarters,
temporarily installed at Beauvais. Twice a day, couriers maintained
communications between Foch and the British and French G.H.Q's.
[Illustration: LINE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SHARPSHOOTERS. (_Photo
Imperial War Museum_).]
The Fall of Montdidier.
The Growing Resistance on the Wings.
[Illustration]
By the =27th=, the German attacks had lost much of their earlier sting.
The French, whose resistance was stiffening steadily, harassed the
enemy unceasingly.
Their infantry, now thirty-six miles from their base, could only be
revictualled with great difficulty. The Allied airmen bombed their
convoys and the railway stations incessantly.
Their artillery had difficulty in keeping up with the infantry, and the
latter were not always efficiently supported.
Meanwhile, the Allies steadily organized their defences. Gen. Pellé's
group, with strong positions on the bastions of the Île de France,
repulsed the enemy's repeated assaults.
Five attacks on Mont Renaud were broken.
From Canny to the Oise, the Allies stood firm.
[Illustration: _Montdidier fell, but in face of the Allies' increasing
resistance, the enemy could advance no further._]
[Illustration: GENERAL DEBENEY.]
Held on this front, the enemy deviated towards Montdidier, overwhelming
Gen. Robillot's forces, which fell back on Rollot. The Germans reached
Montdidier, Piennes, Rubescourt and Rollot. A wide breach was thus
made between Gen. Humbert's left and the right of Gen. Debeney's Army,
then taking up its positions on the tablelands before the valley of the
Avre.
[Illustration: GENERAL RAWLINSON.
_Photo Russell, London._]
It was a tragic moment. Gen. Debeney telegraphed to Gen. Fayolle:
_There is a gap of nine miles between the two armies, with nobody
to fill it. I ask General Fayolle to have troops brought up in
motor-lorries and despatched north of Ployron, to resist at least the
passing of the Cavalry._
[Illustration: _March 26-27._
_British reinforcements arrived north of the Somme. The Germans
converged towards Montdidier._]
A few hours later, two divisions of Humbert's Army filled the breach.
Exhausted by their terrible losses, the enemy were brought to a stand.
East of Rollot, the essential portions of the massif of
Boulogne-la-Grasse were strongly held.
Behind the Avre, trains and lorries were bringing up the divisions of
Debeney's Army.
The British received reinforcements, and stayed their retreat in the
outskirts of Albert.
The thrust against their line was now less violent, the enemy forces
converging towards Montdidier.
Gen. Rawlinson replaced Gen. Gough.
[Illustration: THE ANCRE AT ALBERT.]
The Battle for Amiens. The Allies consolidate their front and
counter-attack.
[Illustration]
After the fall of Montdidier, the fourteen divisions of von Hutier's
army converged towards the pocket to the south-west.
Seven other divisions, marching against the British front between the
Somme and Arras, suddenly turned south. On the 28th, 80,000 Germans
made for the gap, through which 160,000 men of von Hutier's army
were already pressing. In all, 240,000 men were about to attack on a
seventeen-mile front.
General Humbert's left maintained an aggressive defensive.
On =March 28=, they counter-attacked. The 4th Zouaves captured
Orvillers and Boulogne-la-Grasse, threatening the enemy on the flank at
Montdidier. Seeing the danger, the Germans retook part of the conquered
positions. The moral effect was, however, considerable, indicative as
it was of the Allies' determination to re-act.
[Illustration: BARRICADE AT THE ENTRANCE TO MERVILLE-AU-BOIS.
(_6 kms. to the west of Moreuil_).]
On the 29th, these counter-attacks were continued, thus mobilising
many enemy units on this front, which were preparing to attack on the
Avre.
[Illustration: FRENCH ARTILLERY IN MOREUIL.]
During these two days, General Debeney, further north, was
concentrating his forces along the front of Le Quesnel, Hangest,
Pierrepont, Mesnil-Saint-Georges, Rubescourt. _There can be no
question,_ he declared, _of crossing to the left bank of the Avre_.
[Illustration: _On March 29, the Germans were firmly held at the bottom
of the pocket._]
The Germans attacked at dawn on the 28th. To the west of Montdidier,
Mesnil-St.-Georges was captured. The 166th Division, which had just
detrained, stayed the thrust at Grivesnes and Plessier. A battalion
of the 5th Cav. Div. fighting on foot, recaptured Mesnil and
Fontaine-sous-Montdidier.
At the junction with the British, the attack was more violent.
Capturing Hangest, the Germans slipped along the valley of the Luce,
driving back the British. The resistance of the latter stiffened,
however, and they maintained their positions on the right bank of the
Avre.
On the 29th, the enemy renewed the attack with fresh divisions,
especially at Demuin and Mézières, where the defenders were driven back
along the Avre. However, Gen. Debeney's Army was now completed by the
arrival of the 127th, 29th and 163rd Divisions. Its junction with the
British, was strongly reinforced.
Before Arras, astride the Scarpe, the British fell back into line with
Byng's Army, repulsing several violent attacks. (_Sketch, p. 26_).
On the evening of March 29, the enemy were firmly held at the bottom of
the pocket, the sides of which stood firm.
The General Attack at the bottom of the Pocket and the holding of the
German Advance.
[Illustration]
On =March 30=, the Germans launched a general attack along a
thirty-mile front, from Moreuil to Noyon, against the armies of Humbert
and Debeney. This was their last effort in the southward push.
In many places, the French heavy artillery had not yet taken up its new
positions. The battle was therefore mainly one of infantry. To the Air
Service fell the task of making good the deficiency, and throughout
the battle, bombs were rained upon the railway-stations, columns of
German infantry, and enemy supply convoys, whilst the fighting section,
skimming over the enemy masses, riddled them with machine-gun fire.
In front of Humbert's Army, the French lines were practically intact.
Homeric combats were delivered at Le Plémont, Plessis-de-Roye and
before Orvillers.
In the region of Orvillers-Sorel, the 38th Div. repulsed four assaults
delivered by the 4th Div. of the Prussian Guards.
The attack against the front of Debeney's Army was delivered with equal
fury.
[Illustration: THE ENEMY'S FINAL EFFORT SOUTHWARDS.
_March 30-April 5._]
On its right, not an inch of ground was lost. All assaults on
Mesnil-Saint-Georges were repulsed. The 6th Corps maintained
practically all its positions intact, except before Hill 104, where a
slight withdrawal was necessary.
On the left wing, the 36th Corps (Nollet) was forced to give way, and
fell back on the Avre. Moreuil was lost in the evening of the 30th.
=March 31= was marked by extremely violent local actions, especially at
Mesnil-St-Georges and Grivesnes, without appreciable result for either
side.
[Illustration: MONTDIDIER IN GERMAN HANDS.
_The Palais de Justice (see p. 99). Across the street a German
Notice-Board._]
On the evening of the 31st, the French front, practically intact,
passed west of Moreuil, skirted the high ground on the left bank of
the Avre, running thence west of Cantigny, round Montdidier, along the
suburbs of Orvillers, through Roye-sur-Matz, Le Plémont and the hills
to the south of Noyon, where the Germans had been unable to gain a
footing.
=April 1st.= The enemy sounded the French lines at Rollot, south-east
of Montdidier, but were smartly checked by a vigorous counter-attack.
Three attacks in front of Grivesnes were likewise repulsed.
April 2 and 3 were fairly quiet, being the prelude to the final effort
against Debeney's Army.
=April 4th.= At daybreak, an intense artillery preparation began,
extending from the north of Hangard to the south of Grivesnes. At 7.30
a.m., the attack was launched with unheard-of violence.
Against this front, only nine miles wide, fifteen divisions--seven of
which were composed of fresh troops--attacked ten times in the course
of the day.
Before Grivesnes, four attacks were repulsed, whilst all the enemy's
efforts against Cantigny and Hill 104 broke down. Further north the
Germans captured Mailly-Raineval, Morisel and Castel.
The next day (=April 5th=), counter-attacks checked the Germans,
prevented them exploiting their success north of Montdidier, and drove
them back into Mailly-Raineval and Cantigny.
On the following days, fighting took place at different points, which
changed hands several times, but these actions were of a local nature
only.